Ham/Amateur Radio is vastly insecure, however it's internet based infrastructure poses even more concern.

1. Communication in an insecure world
Harold Giddings
KRØSIV

2.  Amateur radio operators are unable to utilize encryption.
 This is almost entirely the fault of the old ham generation.
 This generation is not interested in encryption or innovation.
 Proposals for encryption were shutdown by HAMS not the FCC.
 The State of Radio Data
 Clear text
 Location data
 Hospital data
 Personal data
 Phone numbers
 etc

3.  We simply are not authorized to encrypt data on the
amateur radio bands.
 There is little to nothing (without this) that can be
done to secure data ‘in the air’
 However…
 We can secure the data on our internet backlinks.
and we should.

4.  Automated Packet Reporting System..
 Transmits location data as well as messages, weather, etc.
 The APRS-IS Network is a back-end to the RF APRS Network.
 APRS.fi
 Website allows tracking of ALL APRS network users in real-time.
 Website allows viewing of RAW data.
 Findu.com
 Website allows you to message anyone using unverified callsigns.
 Website allows snooping. Ie: View messages between operators.
 APRSMail
 Winlink to aprs gateway. More on Winlink later.

5.  Winlink
 The email to RF network bridge
 Telnet backend
 100% clear text
 No Authentication or passwords
 Very Exploitable
 With a little scripting knowledge you can dump the emails of ALL
winlink users.
 Send emails from anyone's callsign email address

6.  I get it, we can’t encrypt over the radio right now.
 What can we do?
 Limit access to data over the internet
 Encrypt the back-ends
 Force password protection schemes
 Provide documentation to allow developers to securely work with
these networks.

7.  Fully encrypt the APRS-IS backend
 Preventing users from blindly monitoring the network
 Developers should have API keys where access is needed
 APRS-fi
 Hide ALL message data
 Hide locations by default unless a user specifies public tracking
 Findu.com
 Shut this thing down –or
 Validate ALL callsigns
 Require registration and require a password
 Do NOT allow blind monitoring of messages (encrypted backend)

8.  Force registration with a password
 Validate the user with a callsign lookup
 Encrypt your back-end
 Shutdown your Telnet links

9.  Data within the APRS-IS networks can be gated to RF
 A single attack could flood the APRS-IS network world-wide.
 This flood could be spoofed to gate it to RF.
 RF gated floods would lock up networks, air space, and cause FCC
violations.
 Email to APRS networks could allow dumping off user details.
 Data within the Winlink system can be obtained
 A single attacker with enough time could copy all user emails.
 An attacker could send email using any hams callsign/address.

10.  It doesn’t have to be.
 You now know what’s wrong, let’s see if anyone tries to
fix it.
 Before someone tries to attack these networks on a
global scale.