ADAM PARRIS How Hurricane Sandy Tamed tne Bureaucracy A practical story of making science useful for society, with lessons destined to grow in importance. R emember Hurricane Irene? It pushed across New England in August 2011, leaving a trail of at least 45 deaths and $7 million in damages. But just over a year later, even before the last rural bridge had been rebuilt. Hurricane Sandy plowed into the New Jersey-New York coast, grabbing the national spotlight with its even greater toll of death and destruction. And once again, the region—and the nation—swung into rebuild mode. Certainly, some rebuilding after such storms will always be necessary. However, this one-two punch underscored a pervasive and corrosive aspect of our society: We have rarely taken the time to reflect on how best to rebuild developed areas before the next crisis occurs, instead committing to a disaster-by-disaster approach to rebuilding. Yet Sandy seems to have been enough of a shock to stim- ulate some creative thinking at both the federal and regional levels about how to break the cycle of response and recov- ery that developed communities have adopted as their de- fault survival strategy. I have witnessed this firsthand as part of a team that designed a decision tool called the Sea Level Rise Tool for Sandy Recovery, to support not just recovery from Sandy but preparedness for future events. The story that has emerged from this experience may contain some useful lessons about how science and research can best sup- port important social decisions about our built environ- ment. Such lessons are likely to be of increasing importance as predicted climate change brings the inevitability of ex- treme weather events. A story of cooperation In the wake of Sandy, pressure mounted at all levels, from lo- cal to federal, to address one question: How would we re- build? This question obviously has many dimensions, but one policy context cuts across them all. The National Flood Insurance Program provides information on flood risk that developers, property owners, and city and state governments are required to use in determining how to build and rebuild. SUMMER 2014 83 Run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the program provides information on the height of floodwaters, known as flood elevations, that can be used to delineate on a map where it is more or less risky to build. Flood elevations are calculated based on analysis of how water moves over land during storms of varying intensity, es- sentially comparing the expected elevation of the water sur- face to that of dry land. FEMA then uses this information to create flood insurance rate maps, and insurers use the maps to determine the cost of insurance in flood-prone areas. The cost of insurance and the risk of flooding are major factors for individuals and communities in determining how high to build structures and where to locate them to avoid seri- ous damage during floods. But here's the challeng.

1. ADAM PARRIS
How
Hurricane Sandy
Tamed tne
Bureaucracy
A practical story of
making science useful for society,
with lessons destined to
grow in importance.
R
emember Hurricane Irene? It pushed across New
England in August 2011, leaving a trail of at least
45 deaths and $7 million in damages. But just
over a year later, even before the last rural bridge
had been rebuilt. Hurricane Sandy plowed into
the New Jersey-New York coast, grabbing the
national spotlight with its even greater toll of
death and destruction. And once again, the region—and
the nation—swung into rebuild mode.
Certainly, some rebuilding after such storms will always
be necessary. However, this one-two punch underscored a
pervasive and corrosive aspect of our society: We have rarely
taken the time to reflect on how best to rebuild developed
areas before the next crisis occurs, instead committing to a
disaster-by-disaster approach to rebuilding.

2. Yet Sandy seems to have been enough of a shock to stim-
ulate some creative thinking at both the federal and regional
levels about how to break the cycle of response and recov-
ery that developed communities have adopted as their de-
fault survival strategy. I have witnessed this firsthand as part
of a team that designed a decision tool called the Sea Level
Rise Tool for Sandy Recovery, to support not just recovery
from Sandy but preparedness for future events. The story
that has emerged from this experience may contain some
useful lessons about how science and research can best sup-
port important social decisions about our built environ-
ment. Such lessons are likely to be of increasing importance
as predicted climate change brings the inevitability of ex-
treme weather events.
A story of cooperation
In the wake of Sandy, pressure mounted at all levels, from lo-
cal to federal, to address one question: How would we re-
build? This question obviously has many dimensions, but
one policy context cuts across them all. The National Flood
Insurance Program provides information on flood risk that
developers, property owners, and city and state governments
are required to use in determining how to build and rebuild.
SUMMER 2014 83
Run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), the program provides information on the height of
floodwaters, known as flood elevations, that can be used to
delineate on a map where it is more or less risky to build.
Flood elevations are calculated based on analysis of how
water moves over land during storms of varying intensity, es-

3. sentially comparing the expected elevation of the water sur-
face to that of dry land. FEMA then uses this information to
create flood insurance rate maps, and insurers use the maps
to determine the cost of insurance in flood-prone areas. The
cost of insurance and the risk of flooding are major factors
for individuals and communities in determining how high
to build structures and where to locate them to avoid seri-
ous damage during floods.
But here's the challenge that our team faced after Sandy.
The flood insurance program provided information on flood
risk based only on conditions in past events, and not on
conditions that may occur tomorrow. Yet coastlines are dy-
namic. Beaches, wetlands, and barrier islands all change in
response to waves and tides. These natural features shift,
even as the seawalls and levees that society builds to keep
communities safe are designed to stay in place. In fact, sea-
walls and levees add to the complexity of the coastal environ-
ment and lead to new and different changes in coastal fea-
tures. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers implements ma-
jor capital works, including flood protection and beach
nourishment, to manage these dynamic features. The Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
helps communities manage the coastal zone to preserve the
amenities we have come to value on the coast: commerce,
transportation, recreation, and healthy ecosystems, among
others. And both agencies have long been doing research
on another major factor of change for coastlines around the
world: sea-level rise.
Any amount of sea-level rise, even an inch or two, in-
creases the elevation of floodwaters for a given storm. Esti-
mates of future sea-level rise are therefore a critical area of
research. As Sandy approached, experts from NOAA and
the Army Corps, other federal agencies, and several univer-
sities were completing a report synthesizing the state of the

4. science on historic and future sea-level rise. The report, pro-
duced as part of a periodic updating of the National Cli-
mate Assessment, identified scenarios (plausible estimates)
of global sea-level rise by the end of this century. Coupled
with the best available flood elevations, the sea-level rise
scenarios could help those responsible for planning and de-
veloping in coastal communities factor future risks into their
decisions. This scenario-planning approach underscores a
very practical element of risk management: If there's a strong
possibility of additional risk in the future, factor that into
decisions today.
Few people would argue with taking steps to avoid fu-
ture risk. But making this happen is not as easy as it sounds.
FEMA has to gradually incorporate future flood risk infor-
mation into the regulatory program even as the agency mod-
ernizes existing flood elevations and maps. The program
dates back to 1968, and much of the information on flood
elevations is well over 10 years old. We now have newer in-
formation on past events, more precise measurements on
the elevation of land surfaces, and better understanding of
how to model and map the behavior of floodwaters. We also
have new technologies for providing the information via
the Internet in a more visually compelling and user-specific
manner. Flood elevations and flood insurance rate maps
have to be updated for thousands of communities across
the nation. When events like Sandy happen, FEMA issues
"advisory" flood elevations to provide updated and improved
information to the affected areas even if the regulatory maps
are not finalized. However, neither the updated maps nor
the advisory elevations have traditionally incorporated sea-
level rise.
Only in 2012 did Congress pass legislation—the Biggert-
Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act—authorizing FEMA to

5. factor sea-level rise into flood elevations provided by the
flood insurance program, so the agency has had little oppor-
tunity to accomplish this for most of the nation. Right now,
people could be rebuilding structures with substantially more
near-term risk of coastal flooding because they are using
flood elevations that do not account for sea-level rise.
Of course, reacting to any additional flood risk resulting
from higher sea levels might entail the immediate costs of
building higher, stronger, or in a different location alto-
gether. But such short-term costs are counterbalanced by
the long-term benefits of health and safety and a smaller
investment in maintenance, repair, and rebuilding in the
wake of a disaster. So how does the federal government pro-
vide legitimate science—science that is seen by decision-
makers as reliable and legitimate—regarding future flood
risk to affected communities? And how might it create in-
centives, financial and otherwise, for adopting additional
risk factors that may mean up-front costs in return for ma-
jor long-term gains?
After Sandy, leaders of government locally and nation-
ally were quick to recognize these challenges. President
Barack Obama established a Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding
Task Force. Governor Mario Cuomo of New York estab-
lished several expert committees to help develop statewide
plans for recovery and rebuilding. Governor Chris Christie
84 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY
Right now, people could be
rebuilding structures with
substantially more near-term
risk of coastal flooding because

6. they are using flood elevations
that do not account for
sea-level rise.
of New Jersey was quick to encourage higher minimum
standards for rebuilding by adding 1 foot to FEMAs advisory
flood elevations. And New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg created the Special Initiative on Risk and Re-
silience, connected directly to the city's long-term planning
efforts and to an expert panel on climate change, to build
the scientific foundation for local recovery strategies.
The leadership and composition of the groups established
by the president and the mayor were particularly notable
and distinct from conventional efforts. They brought ex-
pertise and emphasis that focused as strongly on prepared-
ness for a future that is likely to look different from the pres-
ent, as on responding to the disaster itself. For example, the
president's choice of Shaun Donovan, secretary of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to
chair the federal task force implicitly signaled a new focus
on ensuring that urban systems will be resilient in the face
of future risks.
New York City's efforts have been exemplary in this re-
gard. The organizational details are complex, but there is
one especially crucial part of the story that I want to tell.
When Mayor Bloomberg created the initiative on risk and
resilience, he also reconvened the New York City Panel on
Climate Change (known locally as the NPCC), which had
been begun in 2008 to support the formulation of a long-
term comprehensive development and sustainability plan,
called PlaNYC. All of these efforts, which were connected di-
rectly to the Mayor's Office of Long-term Planning and Sus-
tainabüity, were meant to be forward-looking and to integrate
contributions from experts in planning, science, manage-
ment, and response.

7. Tying the response to Sandy to the city's varied efforts
signaled a new approach to post-disaster development that
embraced long-term resilience: the capacity to be prepared
for an uncertain future. In particular, the NPCC's role was
to ensure that the evolving vulnerabilities presented by cli-
mate change would play an integral part in thinking about
New York in the post-Sandy era. To this end, in September
2012, the City Council of New York codified the operations
SEA-LEVEL RISE
of the NPCC into the city's charter, calling for periodic up-
dates of the climate science information. Of course, science-
based groups such as the climate panel should be valuable
for communities and decisionmakers thinking about re-
silience and preparedness, but often they are ignored. Thus,
another essential aspect of New York's approach was that
the climate panel was not just a bunch of experts speaking
from a pulpit of scientific authority, but it also had mem-
bers representing local and state government working as
full partners.
Within NOAA, there are programs designed to improve
decisions on how to build resilience into society, given the
complex and uncertain interactions of a changing society
and a changing environment. These programs routinely en-
courage engagement among different scales and sectors of
government and resource management. For example, NOAAs
Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA) pro-
gram provides funding for experts to participate in New
York's climate panel to develop risk information that informs
both the response to Sandy and the conceptual framework for
adaptively managing long-term risk within PlaNYC. Through
its Coastal Services Center, NOAA also provides scientific
tools and planning support for coastal communities facing

8. real-time challenges. When Sandy occurred, the center offered
staff support to FEMA's field offices that were the local hubs
among emergency management and disaster relief Such col-
laboration and interactions between the RISA experts, the
center staff, and the FEMA field offices fostered social rela-
tions that allowed for coordination in developing the Sea
Level Rise Tool for Sandy Recovery.
In still other efforts, representatives of the president's
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force and the Council
on Environmental Quality were working with state and lo-
cal leaders, including staff from the New York City's risk
and resilience initiative. The leaders of the New York ini-
tiative were working with representatives of NOAA's RISA
program, as well as with experts on the NPCC who had par-
ticipated in producing the latest sea-level rise scenarios for
the National Climate Assessment. The Army Corps partic-
SUMMER2014 85
We have to reconcile
what we learn from
science with the practical
realities we face in an
increasingly populated and
stressed environment.
ipated in the president's Task Force and also contributed to
the sea-level rise scenarios report. This complex organiza-
tional ecology also helped create a social network among
professionals in science, policy, and management charged
with building a tool that can identify the best available sci-
ence on sea-level rise and coastal flooding to support re-
covery for the region.

9. Before moving on to the sea-level rise tool itself, I want
to point out important dimensions of this social network
and the context that facilitated such complex organizational
coordination. Sandy presented a problem that motivated
people in various communities of practice to work with each
other. We all knew each other, wanted to help recovery ef-
forts, and understood the limitations of the flood insurance
program. In the absence of events such as Sandy, it is diffi-
cult to find such motivating factors; everyone is busy with
his or her day-to-day responsibilities. Disaster drew people
out of their daily routines with a common and urgent pur-
pose. Moreover, programs such as RISA have been doing
research not just to provide information on current and fu-
ture risks associated with climate, but also to understand
and improve the processes by which scientific research can
generate knowledge that is both useful and actually used.
Research on integrated problems and management across
institutions and sectors is undervalued; how best to organ-
ize and manage such research is poorly understood in the
federal government. Those working on this problem them-
selves constitute a growing community of practice.
Communities need to be able to develop long-term plan-
ning initiatives, such as New York's PlaNYC, that are sup-
ported by bodies such as the city's climate change panel. In
order to do so, they have to establish networks of experts
with whom they can develop, discuss, and jointly produce
knowledge that draws on relevant and usable scientific in-
formation. But not all communities have the resources of
New York City or the political capacity to embrace climate
hazards. If the federal government wishes to support other
communities in better preparing people for future disasters,
it wül have to support the appropriate organizational arrange-
ments—especially those that can bridge boundaries between

10. science, planning, and management.
Rising to the challenges
For more than two decades, the scientific evidence has been
strong enough to enable estimates of sea-level rise to be fac-
tored into planning and management decisions. For exam-
ple, NOAA maintains water-level stations (often referred to
as tide gages) that document sea-level change, and over the
past 30 years, 88% of the 128 stations in operation have
recorded a rise in sea level. Based on such information, the
National Research Council published a report in 1987 esti-
mating that sea level would rise between 0.5 and 1.5 meters
by 2100. More recent estimates suggest it could be even higher.
Of course, many coastal communities have long been
acutely aware of the gradual encroachment of the sea on
beaches and estuaries, and the ways in which hurricanes and
tropical storms can remake the coastal landscape. So, why
is it so hard to decide on a scientific basis for incorporating
future flood risk into coastal management and development?
For one thing, sea-level rise is different from coastal flood-
ing, and the science pertaining to each is evolving some-
what independently. Researchers worldwide are analyzing the
different processes that contribute to sea-level rise. They are
thinking about, among other things, how the oceans will
expand as they absorb heat from the atmosphere; about how
quickly ice sheets will melt and disintegrate in response to
increasing global temperature, thereby adding volume to
the oceans; and about regional and local processes that cause
changes in the elevation of the land surface independent of
changes in ocean volume. Scientists are experimenting, and
they cannot always experiment together. They have to iso-
late questions about the different components of the Earth
system to be able to test different assumptions, and it is not
an easy task to put the information back together again. This

11. task of synthesizing knowledge from various disciplines and
even within closely related disciplines requires interdisci-
plinary assessments.
The sea-level rise scenarios that our team used in design-
86 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY
SEA LEVEL RISE
ing the Sandy tool, which derived from the National Cli-
mate Assessment prepared for Congress every four years to
help synthesize and summarize the state ofthe climate and
its impacts on society, varied greatly. The scenarios were
based on expert judgments from the scientific literature by
a diverse team drawn from the fields of climate science,
oceanography, geology, engineering, political science, and
coastal management, and representing six federal agencies,
four universities, and one local resource management or-
ganization. The scenarios report provided a definitive range
of 8 inches to 6.6 feet by the end ofthe century. (One main
reason for such different projections is the current inade-
quate understanding of the rate at which the ice sheets in
Greenland and Antarctica are melting and disintegrating in
response to increasing air temperature.) The scenarios were
aimed at two audiences: regional and local experts who are
charged with addressing variations in sea-level change at
specific locations, and national policymakers who are re-
considering potential impacts beyond any individual com-
munity, city, or even state.
But wasn't the choice of the experts who prepared the
scenarios to present such a broad range of sea-level rise es-
timates simply adding to policymakers' uncertainty about

12. the future? The authors addressed this possible concern by
associating risk tolerance—the amount of risk one would
be willing to accept for a particular decision—with each sce-
nario. For example, they said that anyone choosing to use the
lowest scenario is accepting a lot of risk, because there is a
wealth of evidence and agreement among experts that sea-
level rise will exceed this estimate by the end ofthe century
unless (and possibly even if) aggressive global emissions re-
duction measures are taken immediately. On the other hand,
they said that anyone choosing to use the highest scenario
is using great caution, because there is currently less evi-
dence to support sea-level rise of this magnitude by the end
of the century (although it may rise to such levels in the
more distant future).
Thus, urban planners may want to consider higher sce-
narios of sea-level rise, even if they are less likely, because this
approach will enable them to analyze and prepare for risks
in an uncertain future. High sea-level rise scenarios may
even provide additional factors of safety, particularly where
the consequences of coastal flood events threaten human
health, human safety, or critical infrastructure—or perhaps
all three. The most likely answer might not always be the
best answer for minimizing, preparing for, or avoiding risk.
Framing the scenarios in this fashion helps avoid any mis-
perceptions about exaggerating risk. But more importantly,
it supports deliberation in planning and making policy about
the basis for setting standards and policies and for design-
ing new projects in the coastal zone. The emphasis shifts to
choices about how much or how little risk to accept.
In contrast to the scenarios developed for the National
Climate Assessment, the estimates made by the New York
City climate panel addressed regional and local variations in
sea-level rise and are customized to support design and re-

13. building decisions in the city that respond to risks over the
next 25 to 45 years. They were developed after Sandy by in-
tegrating scientific findings published just the previous
year—after the national scenarios report was released. The
estimates were created using a combination of 24 state-of-
the-art global climate models, observed local data, and ex-
pert judgment. Each climate model can be thought of as an
experiment that includes different assumptions about global-
scale processes in the Earth system (such as changes in the
atmosphere). As with the national scenarios report, then,
the collection of models provides a range of estimates of
sea-level rise that in total convey a sense ofthe uncertainties.
The New York City climate panel held numerous meetings
throughout the spring of 2013 to discuss the model projec-
tions and to frame its own statements about the implica-
tions ofthe results for future risks to the city arising from sea-
level rise (e.g., changes in the frequency of coastal flooding
due to sea-level rise). These meetings were attended by not
only physical and social scientists but also by decisionmak-
ers facing choices at all stages ofthe Sandy rebuilding process,
from planning to design to engineering and construction.
As our team developed the sea-level rise tool, we found
minimal difference between the models used by the New
York climate panel and the nationally produced scenarios.
At most, the extreme national scenarios and the high-end
New York projections were separated by 3 inches, and the in-
termediate scenarios and the mean model values were sep-
arated by 2 inches. This discrepancy is well within the lim-
its of accuracy reflected in current knowledge of future sea-
level rise. But small discrepancies can make a big difference
in planning and policymaking.
New York State regulators evaluating projects proposed
by organizations that manage critical infrastructure, such
as power plants and wastewater treatment facilities, look to

14. science vetted by the federal government as a basis for ap-
proving new or rebuilt infrastructure. Might the discrepan-
cies between the scenarios produced for the National Climate
Assessment and the projections made by the NPCC, how-
ever small, cause regulators to question the scientific and
engineering basis for including future sea-level rise in their
project evaluations? Concerned about this prospect, the
New York City Mayor's Office wanted the tool to use only the
SUMMER 2014 87
projections of its own climate panel.
The complications didn't stop there. In April 2013, HUD
Secretary Donovan announced a Federal Flood Risk Re-
duction Standard, developed by the Hurricane Sandy Re-
building Task Force, for federal agencies to use in their re-
building and recovery efforts in the regions affected by
Sandy. The standard added 1 foot to the advisory flood el-
evations provided by the flood insurance program. Up to
that point, our development team had been working in fairly
confidential settings, but now we had to consider additional
questions. Would the tool be used to address regulatory re-
quirements of the flood insurance program? Why use the
tool instead of the advisory elevations or the Federal Flood
Risk Reduction Standard? How should decisionmakers deal
with any differences between the 1-foot advisory elevation
and the information conveyed by the tool? We spent the
next two months addressing these questions and potential
confusion over different sets of information about current
and future flood risk.
Our team—drawn from NOAA, the Army Corps, FEMA,
and the U.S. Global Change Research Program—released

15. the tool in June 2013. It provides both interactive maps de-
picting flood-prone areas and calculators for estimating fu-
ture flood elevations, all under different scenarios of sea-
level rise. Between the time of Secretary Donovan's an-
nouncement and the release of the tool, the team worked
extensively with representatives from EEMA field offices,
the New York City climate panel, the New York City Mayor's
Office, and the New York and New Jersey governors' offices
to ensure that the choices about the underlying scientific
information were well understood and clearly communi-
cated. The social connections were again critical in conven-
ing the right people from the various levels of government
and the scientific and practitioner communities.
During this period, the team made key changes in how the
tool presented information. For example, the Hurricane
Sandy Rebuilding Task Force approved the integration of
sea-level rise estimates from the New York climate panel
into the tool, providing a federal seal of approval that could
give state regulators confidence in the science. This deci-
sion also helped address the minimal discrepancies between
the long-term scenarios of sea-level rise made for the Na-
tional Climate Assessment and the shorter-term estimates
made by the New York climate panel. The President's Of-
fice of Science and Technology Policy also approved ex-
panding access to the tool via a page on the Global Change
Research Program's Web site [http://www.globalchange.gov/
what-we-do/assessment/coastal-resilience-resources]. This
access point helped distinguish the tool as an interagency
product separate from the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram, thus making clear that its use was advisory, not man-
dated by regulation. Supporting materials on the Web site
(including frequently asked questions, metadata, planning
context, and disclaimers, among others) provided back-
ground detail for various user communities and also helped

16. to make clear that the New York climate panel sea-level rise
estimates were developed through a legitimate and trans-
parent scientific process.
The process of making the tool useful for decisionmak-
ers involved diverse players in the Sandy recovery story dis-
cussing different ideas about how people and organizations
were considering risk in their rebuilding decisions. For ex-
ample, our development team briefed a diverse set of deci-
sionmakers in the New York and New Jersey governments
to facilitate deliberations about current and future risk. Our
decision to use the New York City climate panel estimates in
the tool helped to change the recovery and rebuilding process
from past- to future-oriented, not only because the science
was of good quality but because integration of the panel's
numbers into the tool brought federal, state, and city ex-
perts and decisionmakers together, while alleviating the
concerns of state regulators about small discrepancies be-
tween different sea-level rise estimates.
In 2013, New York City testified in a rate case (the process
by which public utilities set rates for consumers) and called
for Con Edison (the city's electric utility) and the Public
Service Commission to ensure that near-term investments
are made to fortify utility infrastructure assets. Con Edison
has planned for $1 billion in resiliency investments that ad-
dress future risk posed by climate change. As part of this ef-
fort, the utuity has adopted a design criteria that uses EEMAs
flood insurance rate maps that are based on 100-year flood
elevations, plus 3 feet to account for a high-end estimate of
sea-level rise by mid-century. This marked the first time in
the country that a rate case explicitly incorporated consid-
eration of climate change.
New York City also passed 16 local laws in 2013 to im-
prove building codes in the floodplain, to protect against

17. future risk of flooding, high winds, and prolonged power
outages. For example. Local Law 96/2013 adopted FEMA's
updated flood insurance rate maps with additional safety
standards for some single-family homes, based on sea-level
rise as projected by the NPCC.
Our development team would never have known about
New York City's need to develop a rate case with federally vet-
ted information on future risk, if we had not worked with of-
ficials from the city's planning department. Engaging city
and state government officials was useful not just for im-
88 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY
The key difference in the
development of the Sandy
recovery tool was the
intensive and protracted social
process of discussing what
information went into it and
how it could be used.
proving the clarity and purpose of the information in the
tool. It was also useful for choosing what information would
be included in the tool to enable a comprehensive and im-
plementable strategy.
Different scales of government—local, state, and fed-
eral—have to be able to lead processes for bringing appro-
priate knowledge and standards into planning, design, and
engineering. Conversely, all scales of government need to
validate the standards revealed by these processes, because
they all play a role in implementation.
Building resilience capacity

18. This complex story has a particularly important yet unfa-
miliar lesson: Planning departments are key partners in help-
ing break the cycle of recovery and response, and in helping
people adopt lessons learned from science into practice. Plan-
ners at different levels of government convene different com-
munities of practice and disciplinary expertise around shared
challenges. Coincidentally, scientific organizations that cross
the boundaries between these different communities—such
as the New York City climate panel and the team that devel-
oped the sea-level rise tool—can also encourage those inter-
actions. As I've tried to illustrate, planning departments con-
vene scientists and decisionmakers alike to work across or-
ganizational boundaries that under normal circumstances
help to define their identities. These are important ingredi-
ents for preparing for future natural disasters and increas-
ing our resilience to them over the long term, and yet this
type of science capacity is barely supported by the federal
government. How might the lessons from the Sandy Sea
Level Rise Recovery Tool and Hurricane Sandy be more
broadly adopted to help the nation move away from disaster-
by-disaster policy and planning? Here are two ideas to con-
sider in the context of coastal resilience.
First, re-envision the development of resilient flood stan-
dards as planning processes, not just numbers or codes.
Planning is a comprehensive and iterative function in
government and community development. Planners are
connected to or leading the development of everything from
SEA-LEVEL RISE
capital public works projects to regional plans for ecosys-
tem restoration. City waterfronts, wildlife refuges and re-
stored areas, and transportation networks all draw the at-
tention of planning departments.

19. In their efforts, planners seek to keep development goals
rooted in public values, and they are trained, formally and
informally, in the process of civic engagement, in which
citizens have a voice in shaping the development of their
community. Development choices include how much risk
to accept and whether or how the federal government reg-
ulates those choices. For this reason, planners maintain
practical connections to existing regulations and laws and
to the management of existing resources. Their position
in the process of community development and resource
management requires planners to also be trained in apply-
ing the results of research (such as sea-level rise scenarios)
to design and engineering. Over the past decade, many
city, state, and local governments have either explicitly cre-
ated sustainability planner positions in high levels (such
as mayors' or governors' offices) or reframed their plan-
ning departments to emphasize sustainability, as in the case
of New York City. The planners in these positions are in-
credibly important for building resilience into urban en-
vironments; not because they see the future, but because
they provide a nucleus for convening the diverse constituen-
cies from which visions of, and pathways to, the future are
imagined and implemented.
If society is to be more resilient, planners must be criti-
cal actors in government. We cannot expect policymakers
and the public to simply trust or comprehend or even find
useful what we learn from science. We have to reconcile
what we learn from science with the practical realities we
face in an increasingly populated and stressed environment.
And yet, despite their critical role in achieving resilience,
many local planning departments across the country have
been eliminated during the economic downturn.
Second, configure part of our research and service net-

20. works to be flexible in response to emergent risk.
The federal government likes to build new programs.
SUMMER 2014 89
sometimes at the expense of working through existing ones,
because new initiatives can be political instruments for
demonstrating responsiveness to public needs. But recovery
from disasters and preparation to better respond to future
disasters can be supported through existing networks. Across
the span of lands under federal authority, FEMA has regional
offices that work with emergency managers, and NOAA sup-
ports over 50 Sea Grant colleges that engage communities
in science-based discussions on issues related to coastal man-
agement. Digital Coast, a partnership between NOAA and six
national, regional, and state planning and management or-
ganizations, provides timely information on coastal hazards
and communities. These organizations work together to de-
velop knowledge and solutions for planners and managers
in coastal zones, in part by funding university-based science-
and-assessment teams. The interdisciplinary expertise and
localized focus of such teams help scientists situate climate
and weather information in the context of ongoing risks such
as sea-level rise and coastal flooding. All of these efforts con-
tributed directly and indirectly to the Sea Level Rise Tool
before, during, and after Hurricane Sandy.
The foundational efforts of these programs exemplify
how science networks can leverage their relationships and ex-
pertise to get timely and credible scientiñc information into
the hands of people who can benefit from it. Rather than
creating new networks or programs, the nation could sup-
port efforts explicitly designed to connect and leverage ex-

21. isting networks for risk response and preparation. The story
I've told here illustrates how existing relationships within
and between vibrant communities of practice are an impor-
tant part of the process of productively bringing science and
decisionmaking together. New programs are much less ef-
fective in capitalizing on those relationships.
One way to support capacities that already exist would
be to anticipate the need to distribute relief funds to exist-
ing networks. This idea could be loosely based on the Rapid
Response Research Grants administered by the National
Science Foundation, with a couple of important variations
from its usual focus on supporting basic research. Agencies
could come together to identify a range of planning processes
supported by experts who work across communities of prac-
tice to ensure a direct connection to preparedness for fu-
ture natural disasters of the same kind. These priority-set-
ting exercises might build on the interagency discussions
that occur as part of the federal Global Change Research
Program. Also, since any such effort would require engage-
ment between decisionmakers and scientists, recipients of
this funding would be asked to report on the nature of ad-
ditional, future engagement. What further engagement is
required? Who are the critical actors, and are they adequately
supported to play a role in resilience efforts? How are those
networks increasing resilience over time? Gathering infor-
mation about questions such as these is critical for the fed-
eral government to make science policy decisions that sup-
port a sustainable society.
Working toward a collective vision
The shift from reaction and response to preparedness seems
like common sense, but as this story illustrates, it is com-
plicated to achieve. One reaction to this story might be to
replicate the technology in the sea-level rise tool or to apply

22. the same or similar information sets elsewhere. The federal
government has already begun such efforts, and this ap-
proach will supply people with better information.
Yet across the country, there are probably hundreds of
similar decision tools developed by universities, nongovern-
mental organizations, and businesses that depict coastal
flooding resulting from sea-level rise. The key difference in
the development of the Sandy recovery tool was the intensive
and protracted social process of discussing what informa-
tion went into it and how it could be used. By connecting
those discussions to existing planning processes, we reached
different scales of government with different responsibilities
and authority for reaching the overarching goal of develop-
ing more sustainable urban and coastal communities.
This story suggests that the role of science in helping
society to better manage persistent environmental prob-
lems such as sea-level rise is not going to emerge from re-
search programs isolated from the complex social and in-
stitutional settings of decisionmaking. Science policies
aimed at achieving a more sustainable future must increas-
ingly emphasize the complex and time-consuming social
aspects of bringing scientific advance and decisionmak-
ing into closer alignment.
Adam Parris is program manager of Regional Integrated Sci-
ences and Assessments at the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration.
90 ISSUES IN SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY
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University of Texas at Dallas

23. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
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the copyright holder's express written permission. However,
users may print, download, or
email articles for individual use.
THE ROLES ASSUMED BY PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: THE LINK BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND
REPRESENTATION
ALEXANDRU ROMAN
California State University, San Bernadino
ABSTRACT
Traditionally, studies couched within the theory of
representative bureaucracy have focused on examining
outcomes for
social minorities within a specific set of administrative
practices or
public policies. The concept of administrative discretion
typically lies
at the core of these studies, as public servants do indeed need to
enjoy a
certain level of administrative discretion in order to incorporate
the
values of a given group into their everyday decision-making.
Yet, while
the centrality of administrative discretion is seldom, if ever,

24. questioned
and it is most often implicitly assumed, its actual effects are
rarely
explicitly explored. This study, constructed on the theoretical
insights
drawn from representative bureaucracy and role theories,
examines the
relationship between administrative discretion and the
assumption of
roles by public servants, in particular, the representation role of
steward
of public interest. The empirical results confirm that
administrative
discretion has a significant impact on the types of roles assumed
by
public administrators.
596 PAQ WINTER 2015
One would be hard pressed to locate a concept that is
more central to the evolution of public administration theory
and
practice than administrative discretion. From discussions on the
democratic nature of the administrative constructs to the ones
on
the latest managerial technique, administrative discretion

25. always
seems to creep into the conversation. In fact, a number of the
classical debates in public administration come down to
questions of proper handling of administrative discretion. The
Finer (1940) – Friedrich (1941) debate is a case in point. Finer
(1941) asserted that administrative decision-making can be and
should be clearly organized within the frame of well-designed
legislative and organizational mandates. Accountability,
according to Finer (1941), is a function of strong external
structures. Friedrich (1940), in contrast, asserted that public
administrators are more than capable of self-control and the
boundaries imposed by social norms and professional values
would be able to channel administrative discretion within
appropriate democratic expectations. Taken together, most of
the
current public administration scholars tend to agree with
Friedrich (1940) and have resigned to the idea that
organizational constraints have significant limits in terms of
imposing exacting controls on administrative behaviors.
Discretionary power has been and remains a prevailing reality
for many public servants and their agencies and continues to be
an essential ingredient in conditioning administrative
responsiveness and accountability.1 As Wilson (1966) has once
argued, for administrators “large powers and unhampered
discretion” seem to be “the indispensable conditions of
responsibility” (p. 373).
Yet, while the centrality of administrative discretion for
public administration theory and practice is never questioned, it
is rarely explicitly analyzed and receives only a limited amount
empirical attention. In particular, very little is known about the
effects that administrative discretion has on the roles assumed
by
public servants. This study was designed with the specific
purpose of examining the relationship between perceived access
to administrative discretion and the assumption of

26. administrative
roles. The research explores whether a public administrator who
PAQ WINTER 2015 597
believes that he or she enjoys higher levels of administrative
discretion is more likely to assume the representation role of
steward of public interest. This study directly builds on the
work
of Selden, Brewer and Brudney (1999) and Sowa & Selden
(2003). It extends their empirical conceptualizations by testing
previously unexamined relationships.
From the start it should be noted that many of the studies
carried under the umbrella of the theory of representative
bureaucracy have a number of common limitations. First, the
majority of the studies are, for obvious and necessary
methodological and conceptual reasons, bounded to the
organizational level (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011). Second, as a
rule, the studies driven by the theory of representative
bureaucracy often address policy specific outcomes; hence,
their
generalizability is seriously challenged by their careful
selection
of their eventual sampling frame. Kennedy (2013) noted that an
overreliance on convenient sources of data, such as education
data, is a particular weakness of research examining
representation. While insightful, the findings developed in these
convenient settings are limited in their generalizability and can
rarely be transferred to other policy domains. Furthermore, few
scholars venture into exploring representation outside of the
demographic-behavior link (Kennedy, 2013). Within this
context, studies that address representation on the part of

27. administrators at the individual level and which would focus on
administrative discretion, but without imposing policy specific
constraints, become rather warranted. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly for the purposes of this study, administrative
discretion is regularly assumed, but rarely empirically tested. A
similar condition can be identified when it comes to
administrative roles. Some (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 707) have
previously called for research that would examine the
“interaction between the role accepted by the administrator and
the degree of discretion perceived by that administrator.” The
research presented here was in large part undertaken with the
scope of answering such calls.
Notwithstanding the actual empirical results, there are a
number of broad, conceivably significant, contributions that this
598 PAQ WINTER 2015
article makes. First, this study combines in a somewhat original
manner insights provided by the theory of representative
bureaucracy and role theory. In a sense, it adds an important
twist to the traditional delimitation of representative behaviors
by tracing them through administrative roles rather than through
traditional demographic links. Second, this represents one of
only a few studies that empirically explored representative
bureaucracy questions at the individual level. Most studies
examined the topic within the context of institutional level
outcomes. Finally, this research was framed in a manner that
does not make it policy domain dependent; meaning, that
empirical results cut across policy issues. This provides the
possibility to generalize part of the results to the larger context
of
public administration.

28. REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY THEORY
Based on his observation of the interaction during World
War II between middle-class oriented British civil service and
the ruling party, Kingsley (1944) argued that a bureaucracy that
is more representative of the social classes would be more
responsive to the population’s needs. Soon after, American
scholars picked up Kingsley’s (1944) idea as a possible solution
to reconciling the longstanding inherent tension between
bureaucracy and democracy. Given that social class did not
seamlessly translate into the American democratic narrative,
American scholars moved away from social class to
demographic characteristics as the primary variable of interest.
Within the American context, Levitan (1946) asserted
that the actions of agencies whose workforce composition
reflected the demographic makeup of the citizenry, would have
an easier time being accepted and interpreted as legitimate.
Referencing the ineffectiveness of external controls, Levitan
(1946) also supported representativeness as an improved choice
for enforcing bureaucratic accountability. The link between
representativeness and legitimacy was later echoed in the works
of Long (1952) and Van Ripper (1958). In fact, in his seminal
PAQ WINTER 2015 599
article on the topic, Long (1952) went as far as to suggest that
bureaucracy might be more representative than Congress.
The work of Mosher (1968) further extended the theory
and to some degree provided a turning point in its development.

29. Mosher (1968) clearly delineated the dynamics and implications
behind passive (descriptive) and active representation. Mosher
(1968) endorsed passive representation as a fundamental factor
for public administration in a democracy. He suggested that
even
in the cases when passive representation might not lead to
obvious democratic improvements; the mere presence of such
setup in the administration provides democratic value on its
own.
This perspective is currently widely accepted among scholars as
normatively appropriate and is always linked to a number of
positive outcomes. Active representation, on the other hand,
was
normatively undesirable for Mosher (1968).
It may be noted that active representativeness run
rampant within a bureaucracy would constitute a major
threat to orderly democratic government. The summing
up of the multitude of special interests seeking
effective representation does not constitute the public
interest. (Mosher, 1968, p. 12)
Most scholars, as Lim (2006) has noted, have shied
away from joining Mosher (1968) in rejecting active
representation as a desirable characteristics of bureaucracy.
Many have been rather supportive, or at the very least
cautiously
optimistic, of the benefits of active representation.
Another important chapter in the evolution of the theory
is provided by the work of Krislov (1974), who advanced the
theory by constructing understandings regarding organizational
socialization. For Krislov (1974), the demographic backgrounds
of public administrators offered the framework within which

30. certain values are created and espoused. In cases when the
organizational demographic structures mimic the backgrounds
of
the population at large, the values that are shaped within
organizational interactions will reflect the demands of the
citizenry. Similar to Long (1952) and Van Riper (1958), Krislov
(1974) supported the idea that bureaucracy, through it
600 PAQ WINTER 2015
representational capacity, complimented and perhaps even filled
the association gaps between citizens and their political
structures, which are often left unmet by political institutions
such as Congress. Table 1 provides a summary of the presumed
direct and indirect social benefits of bureaucratic
representation.
Table 1
Social Benefits of Bureaucratic Representation2
Partiality (advocacy) Bias in favor of a given social group and
against other groups.
Shared values and beliefs
Discretionary behavior in accordance to
one's own values and beliefs - intended or
not - serves the interests of the social
group with which one associates.
Empathic understanding
Due to a common social background,
administrators not only share but also

31. understand the values and norms of a
specific social group.
Checking
Public administrators who associate with a
particular social group can check the
excesses in behaviors of their colleagues.
Restraint
Public administrators not associated with a
specific social group might restrain their
behaviors for fear of being disapproved of,
exposed, or otherwise checked.
Resocialization
With time the mere presence of
bureaucrats from minority social groups
can lead to enhanced empathic
understanding of their colleagues.
Demand inducement
The presence of minority bureaucrats can
stimulate more service demand on the part
of minority clients.
Coproduction inducement
Minority bureaucrats might have greater
success in stimulating behavioral changes
on the part of minorities for purposes of
improved program outcomes.
Adapted from Lim (2006)

32. The most recent turn in the intellectual progress of the
theory is in large part hedged on the idea of role acceptance. A
PAQ WINTER 2015 601
number of scholars (Kennedy, 2013; Meier & Bohte, 2001;
Kelly, 2013; Selden, 1997; Selden, Brudney, & Kellough, 1998;
Sowa & Selden, 2003) have argued that role acceptance
provides
an enriched set of insights into understanding the
representativeness of bureaucracy, which might under different
conditions be missed by the traditional link between social
minority and representation. Although, demographic
background
still remains a fundamental ingredient, scholars are now
becoming open to the idea that it might not be the most critical
in
explaining representation; in fact, it might actually be
secondary
to role assumption, especially outside of policy specific
questions (Kennedy, 2013). That is to say, outside of policies
that specifically target women or social minorities, variables
such as gender and race respectively, might be less useful in
predicting active representation than administrators’
expectations
regarding what constitutes their appropriate roles. “[T]he role
accepted by administrators and the amount of discretion they
perceive themselves to have exerts an impact on the outcomes
serving minority interests above and beyond the individual
characteristics of the administrators” (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p.
707).

33. All things considered, despite its wide acceptance and
appeal, the theory does motivate a healthy dose of well-
grounded
criticism, some of which is coming directly from its supporters.
First, scholars have argued (Frederickson & Smith, 2003) that
the theory’s concept framework is fraught with ambiguity. One
of the results of this nebulousness, particularly when it comes
to
the ambiguous conceptualization of core terms, is that there is
surprisingly relatively little empirical research in the area.
Furthermore, most of the empirical studies that are conditioned
by the theory follow similar customary formats, use similar type
of data and rarely venture into challenging or exploring some of
the more vague aspects within the theory. Within the same vein,
Lim (2006) was rather critical in his discussion of how
partiality
is conceptualized in empirical studies, arguing that what the
instruments often capture are things other than partiality. Lim
(2006) asserted that most of the assumptions behind the possible
benefits of active representation are regularly confused with
602 PAQ WINTER 2015
those of passive representation and are frequently exaggerated,
hence limiting the usefulness of the research based on those
assumptions. Third, most studies take the relationship between
an individual’s background and a supposed group as a given
(Kennedy, 2013). This link, however, is often much weaker and
less direct than typically believed. Krislov (1974), for instance,
asserted that the most rigorous test for the representative
capacity of bureaucracy would indeed be whether passive
representation could seamlessly translate into active
representation. Fourth, as Thompson (1976) argued,
organizational socialization raises a significant challenge to the

34. supposed link between passive representation and active
representation. Finally, the mechanics linking passive
representation and administrative outcomes are also highly
ambiguous and not fully understood. For instance, does the
presence of passive representation increase the probability of
active representation? Or is passive representation necessary or
sufficient for active representation? Wilkins and Keiser (2006)
suggested that representation’s central question might not be
whether there is a link between passive and active
representation,
but under what conditions such link exists.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
There are many powerful implications that are bound to
come with any active degree of administrative discretion and
they warrant important levels of attention. In their efforts to act
as representatives of citizens’ interests, through their discretion,
in particular when it comes to interpreting public policy, public
administrators regularly wield significant levels of political
power (Mosher, 1968)) and are consequential policy makers in
their own right (Kennedy, 2013; Lipsky, 1980). The legitimacy
of this routine exercise of power, however, is often challenged
and consistently triggers heated academic debates. As Lim
(2006) has noted the line between legitimate active
representation through administrative discretion and partiality
exhibits dangerous levels of fuzziness. Many often believe that
PAQ WINTER 2015 603
they speak of the former, when in reality they are desperately

35. attempting to justify the later.
Scholars have yet to reach a general consensus regarding
the normative placement of administrative discretion within
public service and it is hard to envision this happening any time
soon. The theory of representative bureaucracy, at least up to
this
point, provides for one of the better approaches for reconciling
the complexity associated with the attempts to properly
operationalize administrative discretion. The theory posits that
the actions and power that come with the regular access to
discretion would be more representative of the public and its
interests if the public servants would associate through their
social and demographic characteristics to the citizens whom
they
serve (Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1975;
Mosher, 1968; Selden, 1997). The benefits of a representative
administration, according to theory of representative
bureaucracy, are not limited to a specific policy area or agency
type. Any administrative area is set to gain from being more in
tune with the demographic make-up of the population that is
being served.
Administrative discretion is to be sure a fundamental
concept within public administration and the theory of
representative bureaucracy. It lies at its very core, especially in
terms of active representation on the part of public servants.
Scholars tend to agree that in order for administrators to engage
in representation, they need to have access to administrative
discretion first before they can decide to creatively make use of
it (Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Meier &
Stewart, 1992; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Depending upon the
organizational and policy contexts, public servants have the
discretion to shape the performance of their bureaus if they
embrace a representative type role. Individual preferences,
especially in terms of shaping policy interpretations, do matter

36. and often carry significant power, sufficient to impact policy
outcomes.
Meier and Bohte (2001) conceptualized administrative
discretion as the ability of public administrators to command a
sphere of influence to take actions that reflect the specific
values
604 PAQ WINTER 2015
they might hold. Following the line of a similar argument, Sowa
and Selden (2003) defined administrative discretion as an
administrator’s perceived latitude in effecting administrative
outcomes. For the purposes of this research, the perspective
offered by Sowa and Selden (2003, p. 703) is embraced.
Administrative discretion is conceptualized and measured at the
individual level, specifically within one’s perception of one’s
levels of discretion. Given that one simultaneously shapes and
is
shaped by one’s environment and that reality is often socially
filtered and constructed through one’s values and experiences
(Weick, 1995), one’s perceived level of discretion does perhaps
perform better in capturing administrative discretion than other
commonly used measures, which are based on organizational
structure. In other words, a perception based measure is
preferred because two administrators within similar
organizational structures could, depending on their sense-
making
mechanics, differ significantly in their evaluation of how much
discretion they enjoy; hence, the part played by the latter in
conditioning their everyday behaviors. Measures of
administrative discretion, which are constructed on
organizational structures would miss or perhaps even distort
this

37. link between perceived administrative discretion and behaviors.
The uses and impacts of administrative discretion are
believed to be especially important for organizations which are
not legislatively designed to engage in active representation. In
these contexts, public servants must be able to command
respectable spheres of influence in order to translate the values
they hold into policy outcomes (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa &
Selden, 2003). Here, it becomes crucial to note that the mere
presence of administrative discretion does not guarantee
representative outcomes nor representation per se; neither the
literature nor the theory itself make claim to such associations.
Although administrative discretion might be necessary it is not
sufficient. Public servants still have to choose whether to
exercise it in a manner that would fit within a representation
pattern or to remain loyal to organizational doctrines.
PAQ WINTER 2015 605
ORGANIZATIONAL TENURE
Scholars (Dolan, 2000; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998;
Sowa & Selden, 2003; Zimmermann & Allen, 2009) have
suggested tenure as a critical variable in explaining
representative behaviors on the part of public administrators.
Although there is a wide agreement in regards to tenure and
representation being intimately linked, the direction of the
relationship is less certain. On the one hand, with tenure, public
administrators, due to their growing experience and
organizational standing, are expected to be able to command
increasing levels of power and discretion. This, in turn, will

38. provide them with the necessary organizational influence and
discretionary space to engage in representation should they
decide to do so. Under this perspective, tenure is often linked
within increased levels of policy involvement and representative
type behaviors on the part of public administrators (see Svara
1990; Diggs & Roman, 2012; Roman, 2014; Roman, 2013a). On
the other hand, with tenure employees can become increasingly
indoctrinated with organizational values (Ewing, 1977; Ramos,
1981; Scott & Hart, 1979). As a result, unless representation is
a
specific value mandated at the organizational level, public
administrators would be less likely to assume a representative
type role (Dolan, 2000; Selden, 1997; Sowa & Selden, 2003).
BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS AND ROLES
Roles and Role Theory
Role theory derives its core from the theatrical metaphor
(Biddle, 1986). The theory postulates that within a given social
context every individual will have to assume a specific role,
which will constrain the individual to following a given “script”
and “enacting” expected behaviors. The framework focuses on
individuals and their behaviors and it provides an
accommodating perspective that bridges anthropology,
sociology, social psychology and institutionalism. Roles are
regularly applied to the study of consensus, social perception,
606 PAQ WINTER 2015
formal organizations and role conflict. It is assumed that
individuals carry commonalities in their habitual behaviors,

39. which are fairly predictable in cases when the context is known.
Although there are a number of definition present in the
literature (table 2), in grand lines, a role can be defined as
patterned human behavior. Roles are formed by interactions
with
others and with institutional constraints. They are influenced by
one’s self-expectations, the expectations of others as well as by
contexts (Biddle, 1979, 1986).
Hickson (1966) asserted that, under one form or another,
organizational theories, despite their apparently distinct
terminologies, differ only in the degree of role specificity and
legitimacy of discretion attributed to behavior. Hickson (1966)
argued that the degree of role specificity ranges from complete
legitimate discretion to fully specified role behavior. Frank
(1964) suggested three types of roles depending of their
specificity: underdefined, well-defined, and overdefined. Public
administration scholars have associated role specificity with
role
responsibilities (e.g. Selden et al., 1999). Public servants with
underdefined roles might enjoy more discretion than those with
well-defined roles.
Table 2
Role Definitions
Definition Author
An internally consistent series of conditioned responses.
Cottrell (1942, p.
617)
Includes the attitudes, values and behavior ascribed by
the society to any and all persons occupying a specific
status.

40. Linton (1945, p.
77),
Actions of individual occupants of a position. Newcomb (1950,
p. 280)
Behavior of actors seen in the context of its functional
significances.
Parsons (1951, p.
25)
Position differentiated in terms of a given social
structure.
Levy (1952, p.
159)
Activities which in combination produce the
organizational output.
Katz and Kahn
(1966, p. 179)
An identity, a set of characteristic behaviors, or a set of
expectations.
Biddle, (1979, p.
8)
PAQ WINTER 2015 607
Table 3

41. Conceptualizing Roles
Core Propositions
Certain behaviors are patterned and are characteristic of persons
within
contexts.
Roles are often associated with sets of persons who share a
common
identity.
Persons are often aware of roles, and to some extent roles are
governed
by the fact of their awareness.
Roles persist, in part, because of their consequences (functions)
and
because they are often imbedded with larger social systems.
Persons must be taught roles and may find either joy or sorrow
in the
performances thereof.
Conceptualization of Roles
Roles are behavioral (does not include: sex, race, national
origin,
attitudes, norms, values).
Roles are performed by individuals.
Roles are limited by context.
Roles are constructed on behaviors that are characteristic of a
set of
persons and contexts.
Adapted from Biddle (1979)
Administrative Roles
As a rule, agencies impose on its members specific work
roles; each role is usually defined as a specific set of
expectations and behaviors required from individuals within a
certain job (Kahn et. al, 1964). Institutions themselves can be
defined on the whole as symbolic and behavioral frameworks

42. bound by rules, which motivate certain individual roles
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). While roles are often associated
with positions, within the context of current governance, roles
need not be position specific, as individuals within diverse
positions can engage in similar roles and vice versa. The
contours of a role are transmitted and infused into the
workforce
through formal (e.g. job descriptions, meetings) and informal
channels (socialization, organizational artifacts). Within every
social context individuals might be simultaneously faced with
the demand to enact several context dependent roles; generally,
however, with time, one single role will become dominant
(Merton, 1949; Biddle, 1979; Sieber, 1974). Once
608 PAQ WINTER 2015
institutionalized, roles can become so powerful that they
provide
a complete sense-making mechanism within the organizational
milieu. In fact, scholars (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977) asserted that roles might often persist even after
the institutional and rational motivations behind them might
have
long disappeared.
For Selden et al. (1999) “an administrative role is a
cohesive set of job-related values and attitudes that provides the
public administrator a stable set of expectations about his or her
responsibilities” (p. 175). There are several important
dimensions to this definition. First, the attitudes and values are
job related. This means that one’s role will be defined by one’s
job and work environment. Second, one’s expectations represent
one’s interpretations of a given set of values. This implies that
the actual set of values need not be objective or empirically

43. tested, all that matters is one’s interpretation of that given value
set. Finally, and most critically, the set of expectations
regarding
one’s role is assumed as being stable. The latter is highly
significant, since it would imply that expectations do not
change
easily and a snapshot analysis would certainly provide an
adequate evaluation of the overall nature of roles in public
administration.
In order to truly understand the intricate dynamics
evolved in administrative roles as conceptualized through
theory
of representative bureaucracy it becomes highly useful to
carefully reexamine the passive-active distinction as framed by
Mosher (1968). For Mosher (1968) descriptive representation is
concerned with the social origins of the administrators (e.g.
education, demographics, location within the social matrix) and
the extent to which their collective profile reflects the society at
large. According to Mosher (1968) passive representation can
be
rather easily measured and evaluated. Unlike passive
representation, active representation is, per Mosher (1968),
fully
linked to expectations. Active representation encompasses
directed efforts by administrators to press for the interests of
those whom the administrators believe to represent. Active
representation is conceptualized in its entirety through
administrators’ guiding set of expectations. Such a formulation
PAQ WINTER 2015 609
would put into question the dominance of demographic

44. backgrounds, passive representation in sum, as the driver
behind
active representation. Mosher (1968) argued that there are no
realistic grounds to believe that a public servant with a given
set
of demographic characteristics will automatically nurture the
necessary set of expectations for representing the interest of
others with a similar makeup. In fact, Mosher (1968) suggested
that administrators with a certain social background might “lean
over backwards” in order not to lead others to believe that they
engage in partiality. This view is also partially echoed by
Saltzstein (1979), who asserted that the best way to represent
and
serve one’s social group in the long run is by being impartial.
Herbert (1974) suggested that by and large the
challenges associated with role assumption will be present
regardless of race. Organizations habitually generate a system
of
rules that demand certain behaviors as appropriate. As such,
associations with social minorities can be often overruled by
organizational expectations. Within the context of
representative
bureaucracy, then, administrative roles might often override
administrators’ ethnic or gender characteristics. Selden et al.
(1998) noted:
While minority employees can be expected to embrace
this role [representative role] most often and most
closely, nonminority administrators may also adopt it
as a result of their background or socialization…In
some circumstances, minority employees with
discretionary authority may avoid the minority
representative role. Regardless of race or ethnicity,
moreover, the attachment of public administrators to
the representative role will vary, so that they may not

45. always make decisions and take actions responsive to
the minority community…employee’s perception of
their work role conditions the translation of
demographic (and other) characteristics into policy
outputs. (p. 720)
Although there are a number of frameworks and
typologies of administrative behaviors and roles (see de Graaf,
610 PAQ WINTER 2015
2011; Diggs & Roman, 2012; Kennedy, 2013; O’Kelly &
Dubnick, 2005; Roman, 2013a; Selden, 1997), two models,
somewhat more than others, have developed a significant
standing in academe. Downs’ (1967) administrative role
typology represents perhaps the most recognizable
categorization
currently present in the literature. Downs’ (1967) five roles -
climber, conserver, zealot, advocate and statesman – are a
common occurrence in public administration texts. Yet,
somewhat surprisingly, given their popular appeal, the roles, as
delineated by Downs (1967), have attracted only a limited
amount of empirical attention.
The role conceptualization by Selden et al. (1999)
represents the other relatively well established perspective on
administrative roles. Table 4 provides the role descriptions. It
also references the public administration literature where
similar
roles have been discussed. It is important to note here that,
when
compared to other roles identified by Selden et al. (1999), the

46. idea of the public administrator as a steward of public interest
has attracted on aggregate significantly more attention from
public administration scholars.
PAQ WINTER 2015 611
Table 4.
Administrative Roles
Role Role description
Similar to concepts
by:
Stewards of
the Public
Interest
Public administrators "express a desire to
participate in the formulation of good public
policy - that is, policies that incorporate the needs
and concerns of all citizens, disadvantaged
groups…are more committed to social and
political goals than to policy efficiency...see
themselves serving the public and furthering the
public interest, independent of the goals of elected
officials or management" (Selden et. al, 1999, p.
185).
Abney & Lauth (1985),

47. Chandler (1984), Box
(1992), de Graaf
(2011), Hassett &
Watson (2002), Karnig
& McClain (1980),
Kennedy, 2013),
Lovrich (1981), Sowa
& Selden (2003),
Wamsley et al. (1990)
Adapted
Realists
Public administrators "balance equity and fairness
with individual concerns. They express a
commitment to both good management and
equity….the expression of these values may be
mitigated or influence by sources external to the
individual, such as rules, regulation supervisors,
and legislators....they reject the general value of
neutrality...and hold the ideal social equity as
important....they recognize that they must work
within system constraints-rules and proper lines of
authority-to survive in the bureaucracy" (Selden
et al., p. 187).
Box (1992), de Graaf
(2011), Kennedy
(2013), Nalbandian
(1990)
Businesslike
Utilitarians
Public administrators "value efficiency as an
organizational and individual goal…they are

48. willing to reject what more senior agency officials
tell them to do….will opt for the most efficient
solution, ensuring the public interest is
served…set limits on their quest for efficiency
that prevent them from making exaggerated
claims about a program for the sake of generating
support...view efficiency as more important....they
reject any politicization of their role and do not
wish to advance the interests of less privileged or
minority citizens...Although they feel political
pressure from elected officials they are
ambivalent about their relationship with these
officials (Selden et al., p. 188).
612 PAQ WINTER 2015
Table 4, continued
Resigned
Custodians
Public administrators "see themselves as neutral
agents…who know their boundaries, which
consist of established rules and regulations and
expectations of supervisors and the chief elected
officials…they distinguish the appropriate role of
nonelected public employees from that of elected
public officials...they feel no inclination to play a
mediator role" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 189).
Box (1992), de Graaf

49. (2011), Kennedy
(2013), Nalbandian
(1990)
Practical
Idealists
Public administrators "see themselves as highly
responsible and professional - working efficiently,
quickly, and accurately, while implementing and
advocating policy positions and legislation in the
public interest…they do not believe they are
agents of elected officials...committed to social
equity...reject neutrality and the politicization of
the public service" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 190).
de Graaf (2011),
Kennedy (2013)
There are several reasons why the conceptualization
provided by Selden et al. (1999) was preferred. First, the study
from which these roles were derived is among the more recent
and complete discussions of administrative roles. It is also
among the few works that attempted to bridge role theory and
the theory of representative bureaucracy. Second, it is based on
Denhardt and deLeon’s (1995) framework of administrative
responsibility, which is typically believed to be one of the
better
ways of capturing the complexity of everyday decision-making
challenges faced by public administrators (Selden et al., 1999;
Sowa & Selden, 2003). Third, unlike other constructs suggested
by scholars, for instance those by Downs (1967), these five
constructs have been empirically derived and generated
specifically from a public administration perspective with

50. special
sensitivity to public service ethos. In addition, perhaps even
more importantly, the role constructs as formulated by Selden et
al. (1999) are not constrained to a given policy domain nor are
they position dependent. Their broad applicability to the
universe
of public administration allows for significant levels of
generalizability that cut across policy sectors and professional
associations. Finally, the role of steward of public interest is
clearly much more representative in terms of underlining
behaviors than any one of the remaining four. This permits for
much cleaner and robust model. This means that although the
PAQ WINTER 2015 613
different roles overlap in terms of characteristic behaviors,
there
is sufficient variability to allow for empirical analysis.
HYPOTHESES
Based on the insights drawn from representative
bureaucracy and role theories, this study explores three main
hypotheses. The hypotheses are framed within the context of
administrative processes and agencies that are not legislatively
designed to encourage and emphasize representation.3
H1. Public administrators who believe that they enjoy high
levels
of administrative discretion are more likely to assume the role
of
steward of the public interest, compared with public

51. administrators who believe that they have low levels of
administrative discretion.
H2. Public administrators who believe that they should be
involved in policy formulation are more likely to assume the
role
of steward of public interest, compared with public
administrators who believe that they should not be involved in
policy formulation.
H3. Public administrators with higher levels of tenure are less
likely to assume the role of steward of public interest, compared
with public administrators with lower levels of tenure.
THE MODEL
The empirical literature on representative bureaucracy
behavior and outcomes (RBB&O) typically estimates the
desired
variables using the following regression model:
RBB&O=βX+α+ε
where X is a matrix of individual, or organizational
characteristic, or both.
The model examined here has one categorical dependent
variable, three independent variables and ten control variables.
The five roles, as conceptualized by Selden et al. (1999),
represent the five categories of the dependent variable: steward
614 PAQ WINTER 2015
of public interest, adapted realist, business like utilitarian,

52. resigned custodian and practical idealist. It is hypothesized that
an administrator’s level of discretion, expectation regarding
involvement in policy formulation and tenure influence role
assumption. In order to control for other possible explanations,
ten additional variables are considered: perception of
stakeholders’ expectations, position, age, gender, minority
association, education, political ideology, the number years of
government service, job satisfaction and the number of years in
current position (see Appendix A for the rationale and detailed
discussions of the model variables).
METHODOLOGY
Sampling Frame
The membership of the National Institute of
Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) was identified as an
appropriate sampling frame for this research. There are several
important reasons why this professional sub-group of public
administrators was of particular interest and was chosen for this
study. First, although NIGP’s membership is diverse in terms of
education, gender, age and ethnicity – due to the
professionalization efforts of the last decade, there are rather
high levels of consensus regarding professional standards and
expectations with the field (Emmett & Wright, 2012; Roman,
2013b; Thai, 2001, 2008). This fact is particularly important
since this would mean that individuals will have clear and well-
developed understandings about the overall professional
expectations and their roles. Also, given their direct proximity
to
financial outlays, their actions and decisions are usually under
important levels of scrutiny. The nature of their work contexts
resembles a metaphorical “stage,” in which actors have to
follow

53. the provided “institutional script.” Consequently, it was
expected
that role behaviors would be easily identifiable across
institutional levels and relatively homogeneous in character.
Second, the procurement professionals in the sampling
frame came from a variety of organizations and they were
employed by different levels of government that cut across
PAQ WINTER 2015 615
multiple policy areas. Public procurement, in general, as an
area,
routinely operates across policy domains. This allows for
important levels of generalizability. Given that the sampling
frame is not constrained to specific organizations or policy
issues, the results, too, could conceivably be extended to the
broader universe of public administrators. This realization is
further strengthened by the fact that both the model and the
instrument employed to collect the data did not make any major
limiting assumptions about the nature of the administrative
work
of those being examined.
Third, public procurement specialists, as a professional
sub-set, are rarely the target of systematic empirical research.
Considering the latter, this research would be able to claim
important levels of originality within an area that is relatively
underexplored. Fourth, due to previous work in the area, this
represented an accessible research environment for the
researcher, for which entrance paths were previously
established.
In many ways, although not the primary motive, the selection of

54. this specific sampling frame was driven by convenience
considerations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, much of the body
of extant scholarly literature would suggest that public
procurement specialists are faithful enforcers of procurement
ordinances (Thai, 2001, 2008). Any deviation from established
procurement practices, which active representation would be, is
normally discouraged and could be even penalized (Diggs &
Roman, 2012). Administrative discretion, too, is rarely
encouraged or supported. The rule-based professional rigidity
offered by the public procurement context, makes for a very
challenging environment for the enactment of representative
behaviors, hence it provides a rigorous test for the proposed
model. Confirming the hypotheses within this setting would
allow the possibility of generalizing the results to environments
which are more representation-friendly; to paraphrase some of
Fred Ebb’s most famous music lyrics if the model makes it here
it will make it anywhere.
616 PAQ WINTER 2015
Sampling Procedures
The sampling procedures for this study aimed to exploit
the benefits of random sampling. A random sample of 2,000
contacts was drawn from the contact database of NIGP
membership. In January of 2013 NIGP had a total of
approximately 16,000 members. The 2,000 contacts were
selected from the full list of members using a random sequence
generator in Microsoft Office Excel. The contact info was
obtained directly from NIGP’s research department. Given that

55. typically response rates for NIGP internal survey range between
15% and 25%, a large contact sample was believed necessary in
order to obtain the minimal work sample of approximately 3904
required for purposes of valid power and generalizability
estimation. Given that sample representativeness is often
considered to be more important than the sample size itself
(Gliner, Morgan, & Leach, 2009), the main goal of the sampling
procedures was securing a representative picture of NIGP
membership.
Instrument
The instrument employed by this study drew heavily on
the conceptualization provided by Selden et al.’s (1999)
research. Selden et al. (1999) have studied a diverse group of
public administrators who had no apparent professional
similarities. The instrument items proposed by the authors were
broad in their formulation, as such, offering important levels of
cross-sectional applicability. For the purpose of this study,
survey items were transformed with an emphasis on action
oriented statements and were modified as to remove any double-
barreled questions. Given the design of the original study no
reliability statistics for the role constructs were available. As
such, an important part of this research was the provision of a
reliability evaluation of survey instrument.
Each one of the five role constructs was measured using
four Likert-type items. The average rating for the four items for
each construct was used to identify the dominant role assumed
by the public administrator and the responses were coded
accordingly. The main reason for choosing average score rather
PAQ WINTER 2015 617

56. than total score lies within its ability to provide a decision even
in cases with missing item responses. Hence, even when a
respondent did not answer one of the items within the construct
a
decision can be made. In instances when a respondent would
have a similar average across items for several different
constructs, the number of answered items was used as the first
tiebreaker. For example, if the respondent cumulated similar
averages for two constructs the respondent was coded in the
role
within which he or she answered most items. Inter-item variance
was used as the second tiebreaker. All being equal, in cases of
equal averages the respondent was coded in the role that had the
smallest inter-item variance. In cases when neither the average
rating, number of completed items nor inter-item variance was
useful in coding, the respondent’s self-identification was used
to
determine one’s dominant role.
A pre-final version of the instrument was self-
administered and reviewed for accuracy and language
appropriateness by ten tenured and experienced public
procurement professionals. Their reviews led to a number of
linguistic changes. The primary theme of their concerns
appeared to be the overly “academic” language used in some of
the questions. Appendix B provides the complete instrument
employed for purposes of data collection.
Data Collection
The survey instrument has been administered using the
SurveyMonkey platform.5 The on-screen presentation of the
survey was broken down into five distinct pages. The first page

57. included instructions only. The second page introduced the role
measuring items. The respondents were given twenty statements
and they were asked to indicate their level of agreement with
each statement. The order in which each statement appeared was
randomized for each respondent. In a similar manner the options
for question three on page four were randomized. The
randomization of the statements was introduced in order to
reduce the response bias that might have been induced by the
placement of the items. As a result, it should be expected that
the
answer to one specific statement was not systematically
618 PAQ WINTER 2015
influenced by its order of appearance or by the statements
preceding it. Page four asked the respondents to self-identify
within a given role based on the provided descriptions. The last
on-screen page collected demographic and institutional level
variables as they pertained to the respondents. The model and
demographic items on page three and page five respectively,
were not randomized. The order of pages and the items on pages
four and five were identical for all respondents.
A total of 512 individuals replied to the invitation to
participate. This represents 25.6 % response rate. Out of the
total
number of respondents, 493 completed and submitted the
survey,
while 19 had started, but only partially completed the survey –
hence a completion rate of 96.28%. Although this response rate
appears somewhat low, it is rather characteristic for large N
Internet surveys and it falls within the upper limits for studies
driven by NIGP database. The response rate also fits within the
overall recent trends for Internet-based surveys observed in

58. social sciences.
For any study based on data collected through self-
administered instruments, nonresponse bias can be a serious
concern. In order to check for any possible significant
nonresponse bias independent sample t-tests for model variables
among early and late respondents were conducted. The survey
responses were ordered based on their time of receipt, with the
first 10% labeled as early responses and last 10% labeled as late
responses. The results for the independent samples t-tests raised
no concerns regarding possible nonresponse bias. The only
statistically significant difference in means (p<.05) between
early respondents and late respondents was observed for role
item 11 – “regardless of political pressure, I take the decision
which is best for my organization.” Outside of item 11 no other
statistically significant differences in means among early and
late
responses were identified among the model items.
Statistical Method
For purposes of hypotheses testing, multinomial logistic
regression (MLR) was employed. MLR is an extension of binary
logistic regression that allows for more than two categories of
PAQ WINTER 2015 619
dependent variables to be examined by means of several
independent variables. MLR uses maximum likelihood
estimation procedures in order to determine the probability of a
subject being part of a specific group (Hair, Black, Babin, &
Anderson, 2010; Kwak & Clayton-Matthews, 2002; Liao, 1999).

59. The primary methodological appeal of MLR is that it is robust
against deviations in normality, linearity or homoscedasticity.
MLR makes fewer assumptions than discriminant analysis and
linear regression analysis, and it is robust when those
assumptions are not fully satisfied (Hair et al., 2010; Hosmer &
Lemeshow, 2000; Klenbaum & Klein, 2000). Sample size and
outliers represent critical considerations within MLR. While,
there is no exacting criterion regarding the minimum sample
size, scholars typically agree that the sample should be
sufficiently large to provide a minimum of 10 cases per
independent variable; larger ratios such as 30:1 provide
improved confidence in the results (Hair et al., 2010).
Inspection of the data revealed that there were neither
major issues regarding the assumptions being met nor regarding
data quality.6 There were some minor concerns regarding the
skewness in the distribution of two variables - number of years
in current position and the number of years with current
organization. To alleviate the concern, a logarithmic
transformation was employed for both cases. Multicollinearity,
too, did not appear to be an issue, as none of the correlation
coefficients were above 0.85. Most importantly however, due to
the fact that approximately 93% respondents indicated that they
were either white or black – in terms of the empirical analysis,
the race variable was substituted with a dichotomous variable of
minority association (whether respondent thought of oneself as
a
minority). It was assumed that whether a person considered
oneself as a minority was a more accurate and descriptive
variable, and provides improved information for the purposes of
this study than the actual race label that one carries.

60. 620 PAQ WINTER 2015
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Roles
The five constructs used to code the respondents were
found to be adequate, with acceptable levels of internal
consistency. All five roles constructs, “steward of public
interest” (α=0.765), “adapted realist” (α=0.675), “businesslike
utilitarian” (α=0.763), “resigned custodian” (α=0.733) and
“practical idealist” (α=0.651) had Cronbach’s Alpha levels
above 0.65. The coding results uncovered “practical idealist”
and “adapted realist” as the two most commonly assumed roles
by public administrators in the sample. The role of
“businesslike
utilitarian” was identified as being by a large margin the least
assumed role (table 5).
Table 5
Sample Summary by Role
Role Frequency Percent
Practical Idealist 150 30.4%
Adapted Realist 143 29.0%
Steward of Public Interest 97 19.7%
Resigned Custodian 68 13.8%
Businesslike Utilitarian 35 7.1%
Total 493 100%
Hypotheses
The results of the empirical analysis lend support to the
hypothesized associations between presence of administrative
discretion, individual expectations, tenure and the assumption
administrative roles. Expectation about involvement in policy

61. formulation (p < .05), perceived expectations of stakeholders
(p<0.05), administrative discretion (p <.01), tenure (p <.05) and
the number of years of public service (p <.01) are found to be
significant in explaining the assumption of at least one role. No
other variable including gender (p>.05), minority association
(p>.05) nor position (p>.05) is found to be statistically
significant. Similarly, job satisfaction (p>.05), education
(p>.05)
and political ideology (p>.05) fail to reach statistical
PAQ WINTER 2015 621
significance. Overall, the model classifies correctly 45.8% of
the
cases. This is significantly higher than the minimal criteria of
29.91% derived using marginal percentages. Table 6 provides
the model fit statistics and the likelihood ratio tests. Complete
parameter estimates are provided in Appendix C.
It is found that those who believe that they enjoy higher
levels of discretion are more likely to assume the role of
steward
of public interest. Administrators were more likely to be
categorized as a steward of public interest than adapted realist
(-
1.034, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-1.126, p<.01), resigned
custodian (-1.249, p <.01) or practical idealist (-1.125, p<.01)
with increased levels of discretion.

62. 622 PAQ WINTER 2015
Table 6
Model Fit Information and Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log
Likelihood
Chi-Square Sig.
Intercept Only 1403.665
Final 1167.762 235.903 .000
Model
Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood
Ratio Tests
-2 Log
Likelihood
of Reduced
Model
Chi-
Square Sig.
Intercept 1167.762a .000 .
Expectation of policy
involvement

63. 1178.419 10.658 .031
Stakeholders’
expectations
1178.238 10.476 .033
Administrative
discretion
1248.669 80.907 .000
Log tenure 1179.959 12.197 .016
Years in public service 1186.585 18.823 .001
Job satisfaction
1171.389 3.627 .459
Position
1172.202 4.440 .350
Years in current position
(log)
1169.809 2.047 .727
Education

64. 1172.604 4.843 .304
Political ideology
1173.548 5.786 .216
Minority association
1171.973 4.212 .378
Gender
1170.620 2.858 .582
Age
1169.428 1.666 .797
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods
between the final
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by
omitting an effect
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters
of that effect
are 0.
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because
omitting the
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
PAQ WINTER 2015 623

65. It is also determined that individual expectation
regarding one’s involvement in policy formulation is a powerful
predictor of role assumption. Public administrators were more
likely to be categorized as steward of public interest than
adapted
realist (-.492, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-.509, p<.05),
resigned custodian (-.547, p <.01) or practical idealist (-.514,
p<.01) with increased expectations to be involved in policy
formulation.
Finally, it is established that one’s tenure is significant
in predicting one’s assumed role. With tenure, there is a
decreasing probability that an administrator will assume the role
of steward of public interest. With increased tenure,
administrators were more likely to be categorized as adapted
realist (1.518, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (1.896, p<.01),
resigned custodian (1.580, p <.01) or practical idealist (1.465,
p<.01) than steward of public interest. Indeed, organizational
tenure appears to be inversely related to representative type
behavior.
Taken together, the empirical results confirm the
significance of all three hypothesized links as well as the
direction of their relationships. From the standpoint of
representative bureaucracy theory and future research the most
intriguing results might, however, be located outside the
marginal effects of the independent variables and with the
performance of the control variables. Neither gender nor race
achieved statistical significance. The latter might be explained
by at least two important factors. First, it is possible that
individual expectations and administrative discretion exert an
impact on role assumption above and beyond one’s demographic
background. Second, this might also suggest that gender and
race
are perhaps important predictors of role assumption within
policy domains that directly deal with women or minority
issues,

66. respectively; on every day basis, however, individual
characteristics might be less reliable predictors of
administrative
behaviors.
624 PAQ WINTER 2015
Limitations
As it is the case with any research endeavor of this scale,
this study, through its partially-exploratory nature, is not
perfect.
There were several important tradeoffs that needed to be made
in
order to frame the research within its desired course. Although
these aspects are not expected to seriously challenge the
validity
of the findings, they should, nevertheless, be noted and
accounted for when making any generalizations beyond the
context of the study.
Several of the assumptions that come with this type of
research, which although typical, are still significant and could
strongly influence the outcomes if not fully upheld. It is
assumed
that the survey instrument can accurately capture, transmit and
collect data necessary for answering the research questions in a
manner that was envisioned in the research design. It is also
presumed that, which was confirmed by the high levels of
internal consistency and completion rates, the structure and
delivery of the instrument did not induce important levels of
confusion and was understood well by most, if not all,
respondents.7 The most important assumption that was made,

67. however, is that the responses provided by the public
administrators who participated in this research accurately
reflect
their actions in practice. Strictly speaking, their stated
behaviors
are, or at least closely mirror, their actual behaviors.8 Waldo
(1980) has noted that the study of public administration, social
science research in general, is value-laden. The values of those
being studied as well as the unrecognized values of the
researcher unavoidably seep into the research through the
choice
of the study design or the wording of the survey instrument. In
this sense, then, the captured responses might actually reveal
administrators’ values more than they echo their administrative
behaviors and decision-making.
Possible concerns regarding the representativeness of the
sample provides another limitation that should be considered.
Although the data were collected using a random sample of a
national association and given the nature of the research design
there are sufficient reasons to believe that the results have a
high
degree of generalizability, it should be noted that procurement
PAQ WINTER 2015 625
specialists, as a professional sub-group of public administrators,
might be much more homogeneous in terms of their everyday
behaviors and understandings than most public servants. As a
result, the reliability and validity of the findings should be
considered uncertain when significantly extended beyond the
context of this study to other sub-groups of practitioners that
might not share similar levels of homogeneity in terms of
professional expectations.

68. CONCLUSIONS
The dynamics involved in the relationship between
administrative discretion and representation are perhaps too
complex to allow themselves to be easily modeled.
Nevertheless,
while the research presented here might miss on some important
nuances that surely warrant empirical attention, it does provide
a
crude attempt to isolate the impact of administrative discretion
on the administrative roles. It does so by linking administrative
roles, as constructed through the representative bureaucracy
lens,
to the behavioral insights provided by role theory. The findings
show that public administrators who perceive to have higher
levels of discretion are more likely to assume the representation
role of steward of public interest as the dominant role that
guides
their habitual decision-making. Similar to Sowa and Selden
(2003), this study demonstrates that the presence of discretion
is
not a mere variable that needs to enter in the equation, but it
might be at the center of explaining representative behavior.
The
study extends on what has been done before by moving outside
policy and organizational specific constraints. The research
design employed here allowed representation to be studied
without consideration for the organization context or policy
setting. This could be interpreted both as strength and as a
possible limitation.
To understand the complete contribution that this study
makes, one would have to broaden one’s perspective on the