A Typology Of Terrorism

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460938
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM
*
SHAWN KAPLAN, ADELPHI UNIVERSITY
I. The Problems of Defining Terrorism
The difficulties surrounding the project of defining terrorism are at
first glance classic problems of connotation and denotation. In its
everyday usage, terrorism is a value laden term often connoting craven
indifference to innocent life. In contemporary political rhetoric, terrorism
is more of an accusation than a descriptive term. There may be no more
effective rhetorical device today than to accuse one’s opponent of being a
terrorist. Not only do such accusations carry an explicit moral claim but
they seemingly can be cast in all directions. In the ‘war of words’, the
question of who can fairly be referred to as a terrorist seems to devolve
into a debate over who is most deserving of moral condemnation.1
Furthermore, the effect of charging another as a terrorist is to excuse
oneself from any further debate concerning the justness of their claims or
their legitimacy in either domestic or international politics.
Given the most publicized terrorists acts of recent years, it is not
difficult to understand why the common usage of terrorism carries such
extremely negative connotations. It is less than obvious, however, that a
definition of terrorism should embrace a universal moral prejudgment of
terrorist actions and the agents who carry them out. Skepticism about such
an approach comes from both traditional philosophical concerns as well as
one specific to terrorism itself. Any definition that incorporates an all
encompassing moral evaluation tends to circumvent the need to provide
arguments and reasons to support this judgment. In addition, by including
heavily value laden characteristics into any definition, one may easily
*
I would like to thank both Greg Klass and John Kleinig for their detailed
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1
For a thorough treatment of the accusation of terrorism in contemporary rhetoric
see Tomis Kapitan, “The Terrorism of ‘Terrorism’”, in J. Sterba (ed.), Terrorism
and International Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 47-66.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460938
A Typology of Terrorism
2
restrict the extension of the term in too severe a fashion.2
Thus, by
including within the definition of terrorism either that it always targets
innocent persons or that it is always morally indefensible, one excludes
certain actions that could and perhaps should be at least examined as
potential terrorist acts. Beyond these two general concerns, to incorporate
a universal moral evaluation into the definition of terrorism may in fact
prove difficult due to the instrumental nature of terrorism.
Like violence itself, terrorism is a means for obtaining any number of
possible ends.3
Just as one can universally condemn all violent actions,
one can analogously condemn terrorism as a means. However, the same
sorts of challenges that the thorough going non-violentist faces in
demonstrating the coherence of her position must similarly be confronted
by the person universally condemning terrorism.4
Given the instrumental
character of violence, can’t we conceive of a noble end (e.g. saving
innocent persons from great harm or death) that could only be obtained by
violent means? As it is extremely difficult to rule out such a possibility,
an absolute version of non-violentism is not easily defended. Why then
would it be fair to assume that an absolute moral evaluation is possible for
the instrument of terror? Isn’t it equally conceivable that terrorism could
serve a noble end when no other means could do so? That such a case is
conceivable will be acknowledged by admitting terrorism’s instrumental
character. The likelihood of such a case existing will depend upon two
factors. The first factor concerns the nature of this instrumentality and I
take this to be the central concern of a definition of terrorism. A definition
of terrorism that focuses upon how it serves as a means to any number of
possible ends will be purposively broad so as to capture its current and
future possible employments. The second factor will flow from an attempt
to differentiate between the many types of terrorism—what I call a
typology of terrorism. The typology that I develop here does not key
primarily upon the ends terrorism aims at. In the first place, the future
2
At the same time, most any definition of terrorism will contain the negatively
valued term of violence and, thus, will prejudge terrorism as being morally
problematic, i.e. in need of some kind of moral justification.
3
Hannah Arendt persuasively argues that the instrumentality of violence is not to
be confused with political power that may be valued as an end in itself. Hannah
Arendt, “On Violence” in Crises of the Republic (San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1972), pp. 105-198.
4
For an illuminating treatment of the challenges to nonviolentism, see Robert
Holmes, “The Morality of Nonviolence,” in D. Cady and R. Werner (eds.), Just
War, Nonviolence, and Nuclear Deterrence (Wakefield, NH: Longwood Academic
Press, 1991), pp. 131-48.

Shawn Kaplan 3
ends of terrorism may be beyond ready prediction. Secondly, the nobility
of a terrorist’s aim is not sufficient for justifying her actions. While I will
consider the typical and readily conceivable ends of terrorism, the
typology is primarily an analysis of the modes of terrorism’s instrumentality.
Thus, the broad phenomenon of terrorism is divided according to factors
of targets, the degree of force employed, agency, and the geographic
context of deployment. It is only by first drawing out the diverse types of
terrorism that moral evaluation can take place in a concrete and
meaningful way.
Before I present a definition of terrorism, I will critically examine
four current approaches to defining terrorism so as to draw closer to an
understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. In addition to avoiding a
strong moral prejudgment, I contend that a definition of terrorism ought to:
a) distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence and coercion, b)
allow for a diversity of state and non-state agents, and c) express some
core elements common to the overall phenomenon of terrorism that can be
more or less readily recognized in practice. It isn’t my aim to provide the
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying terrorism. Rather, I am
interested in uncovering those qualities that unite by ‘family resemblance’
a wide range of actions as terrorist. As a result, my approach will not
marginalize those instrumental uses of terror that fall outside the purview
of what is traditionally considered politics. While most people are rightly
concerned with terrorism as a political reality, it is quite possible that the
broader applications can be instructive with regard to understanding the
instrumental quality of the basic phenomenon as well as perhaps proving
instructive in regard to the moral positions we take on terrorism. After
defending my proposed definition, I will provide a typological analysis of
the broad range of phenomena that fit under my proposed definition and
attempt to outline the potential utility of this typological framework when
morally evaluating terrorist acts.
II. Four Strategies for Defining Terrorism
1. Terrorism as Non-conventional Tactics
Given my assertion of the instrumental nature of terrorism, it may be
tempting to identify terrorism with a series of non-conventional tactics
resorted to in asymmetric conflicts. According to this approach, terrorism
is a type of political violence that is adopted for pragmatic reasons due to
one side being the resounding underdog in a conflict. The advantage of
such an approach is that it leaves the morality of terrorism open for

4
evaluation on a case by case basis.5
Such a strategy for defining terrorism
could include anyone as a terrorists who resorts to guerilla warfare,
assassination, rioting, or any revolt that does not use an established army.
I say could because the notion of non-conventional tactics is a purely
conventional idea. Should the definition of terrorism shift as certain
tactics become more and more popular or take on the semblance of
normality? Certainly assassination was a more conventional act of
political violence in ancient Rome and one could argue that in an era of
world super-power(s) guerilla warfare is becoming normalized. More
significantly, it is unclear how any of the ‘non-conventional’ tactics listed
above fit our intuitions of terrorism. I am not suggesting this based upon
the common intuitions that morally prejudge terrorism in total. Rather, by
using unconventional tactics to either protect oneself, or produce a change
in the political or social order, how has one necessarily used terror or fear
as a means? If we hold that terrorism has a distinct meaning that involves
terror (broadly understood), then this focus upon unconventional tactics
appears to be misdirected.
My last criticism of equating terrorism with non-conventional
methods of political violence is that such an approach ignores that much of
the ‘work’ of terrorism is carried out through the direct threat of violence.
The direct threat of violence elicits as much (if not more) terror, fear, and
anxiety as actual violent attacks. Of course, threats unsubstantiated by
actual attacks eventually lose their power to draw forth such responses.
One could argue that those who live under the threat of terrorist attacks
experience a kind of psychological violence. However, in the case that
psychological violence is included, the idea of non-conventional tactics
becomes extremely broad. Accordingly, one would have to embrace an
idea of terrorism that includes most any kind of threat to the political or
economic well-being of a people. Examples could include the use of
propaganda during a conflict to dishearten the opposition, or threats of
economic sanctions like those carried out against Iraq beginning in 1990 to
devastating effect, or the formations of military or economic alliances that
are perceived as threatening to a people’s future well-being, or a military
build-up, or a new weapons program carried out by a traditional adversary.
I believe these examples indicate a problem for this expanded notion of
non-conventional tactics; viz. it may be difficult to distinguish between
5
By situating terrorism as merely one species of political violence, Andrew Valls
argues that terrorism can be justified by the traditional principles of just war theory
equally well as the conventional forms of political violence. Andrew Valls, “Can
Terrorism Be Justified?” in A. Valls (ed.), Ethics in International Affairs (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 65-79.

Shawn Kaplan 5
psychological violence and the terror or anxiety experienced by merely
perceiving a threat. While in the last analysis terrorism may always
involve psychological violence insofar as it elicits terror, defining
terrorism as political violence by non-conventional means does not
provide the precision needed to determine the role of psychological
violence in terrorism.
2. Terrorism as Indiscriminate Violence that Targets
the Innocent
In a recent essay, Shannon French argues against the association of
terrorism with non-conventional tactics.6
While I agree with her general
assertion that there is little reason to identify an underdog who uses non-
conventional tactics in an asymmetric battle as a terrorist, she makes this
move so as to distinguish between legitimate fighters in asymmetric battles
and terrorists who in her eyes are simply murderers. Terrorists are
murderers for French due to the innocence of their targets. While many
definitions of terrorism include a clause that indicate such acts always
target innocent people (i.e. non-combatants who pose no immediate threat
to the terrorists), French makes this the central factor for defining terrorists
along with the agent being the underdog in an asymmetric fight.7
Following French’s reasoning, nation-states cannot be terrorists when
directly targeting innocent persons; rather, they are guilty of war crimes.
French uses a modified version of The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE),
similar to Walzer’s, to build an analogy between war crimes and
terrorism.8
Just as military personnel or policy makers are war criminals
6
Shannon E. French, “Murderers, Not Warriors: The Moral Distinction Between
Terrorists and Legitimate Fighters in Asymmetric Conflicts” in J. Sterba (ed.),
Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.
31-46.
7
Some additional examples of theorists who make the targeting of non-combatants
a key element of their definitions of terrorism are: Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A
Critique of Excuses” in Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004), pp. 51-66; James Sterba, “Terrorism and International Justice” in J. Sterba
(ed.), Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), pp. 206-228; C.A.J. Coady, “The Morality of Terrorism,” Philosophy 60
(1985): 52; Igor Primoratz, “What is Terrorism?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 7
(1990): 129-38; and Noam Chomsky, 9/11 (New York: Seven Storied Press, 2001),
p. 57.
8
French, “Murderers, Not Warriors,” pp. 38-43. For Walzer’s treatment of the
DDE see his Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd
ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp.
152-159.

6
when their actions fail to pass the DDE because they do not sufficiently
protect non-combatants, for French asymmetric fighters whose actions fail
to pass the DDE are analogously terrorists. Leaving aside the controversies
surrounding the definition of innocent persons which underlies French’s
approach, her equating of terrorism with murder stands as the most explicit
possible moral prejudgment of terrorism. Her approach narrowly limits
terrorism not only under the category of immorality but even under the
more restrictive heading of murder. Must terrorist acts always be acts of
murder? Need an action be lethal to be considered terrorism? Must
terrorism target persons, let alone innocent ones?
In the hours after the 9-11 attacks upon The United States of America,
security forces were rushed to The Liberty Bell in Philadelphia with the
understanding that terrorists might likely target property with symbolic
significance. In addition, with the increased awareness of The United
States’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks, amplified concern was expressed
for the security of infrastructure such as power plants, pipelines, water
treatment plants, transportation hubs and communications centers. The
stock exchanges in New York were also considered likely targets for both
their symbolic and economic significance. If these targets had been
attacked without the loss of innocent lives, would we refuse to consider
them as potential acts of terrorism? On the domestic front, organizations
like the Ku Klux Klan have long and ugly histories of targeting property
(e.g. Black Churches) as well as persons to elicit terror. It is not at all
clear that the burning of Black Churches in the South should be any less of
a potential terrorist act than lynching.9
In each of the above examples, a
piece of property was either a reasonably anticipated direct target of
terrorist attack or the actual target of what many take to be a terrorist
organization. My suggestion is that by equating terrorists with asymmetric
fighters who target innocent people one places severe and perhaps
unreasonable restrictions upon how one conceives of terrorism.
Even in an instance where supposedly non-innocent persons are
targeted, is it necessary to conclude that such an attack can never be
terrorism? Is it impossible for terrorists to target military personnel? If
we take the attack upon the U.S.S. Cole as an example and we assume for
the moment that as a military vessel that the sailors were legitimate
9
Some theorists attempt to distinguish between “hate crimes” and terrorism. Thus,
an act that solely intends to inflict a harm upon a hated party would not be
considered terrorism. For an example, see Claudia Card, “Making War on
Terrorism in Response to 9/11,” in J. Sterba (ed.), Terrorism and International
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 175-6. I will address why I
believe this to be a false distinction shortly.

Shawn Kaplan 7
targets, then we can ask why the members of al-Qaeda responsible for this
attack are not terrorists on this occasion as opposed to their other
activities. When a traditional military force targets innocent individuals, it
is not claimed that they are no longer engaged in making war. Instead, as
French and others point out, they are guilty of war crimes. In analogous
fashion, a terrorist organization that carries out attacks against innocent
individuals would seemingly be guilty of terror crimes.10
By identifying
terrorism according to its innocent targets, French and others hastily
dismiss the possibility of terrorism that discriminates between legitimate
and illegitimate targets.11
From the standpoint of rhetoric, the assumption
that terrorists are necessarily indiscriminate with regard to the legitimacy
of its targets reinforces the popular notion that terrorists are irrational ‘mad
men’ who cannot be negotiated with and cannot be taken seriously. While
it would be an unfair rush to judgment to claim that anyone engaged in
war is an irrational ‘mad man’, it is fair to propose from the perspective of
just war theory that the indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants in war
is criminal and that some criminals may appear to be mad. To complete
the analogy, perhaps a definition of terrorism shouldn’t paint all terrorists
as targeting the ‘innocent’ and should allow for a distinction between
discriminate and indiscriminate acts of terrorism. At this point, I am
suggesting that those who equate terrorists with asymmetric fighters who
target ‘innocents’ non-combatants have assumed that terrorists cannot be
discriminating with regard to the legitimacy of their targets and, thus, have
leapt to the conclusion that all terrorism is a terror crime.
3. Terrorism as Having Coercive Intent
An alternative approach to defining terrorism first proposed by Carl
Wellman complicates the issue of targets by suggesting that terrorists have
in fact two targets, one direct and the other is an indirect target.12
10
In the typology that follows, I will examine more fully both the distinction
between discriminate and indiscriminate terrorism based upon the nature of the
targets as well as the analogy between war crimes and terror crimes.
11
By suggesting that terrorism can be discriminate, I am using the narrow meaning
of discriminating between targets who are a direct threat as opposed to those non-
combatants who are not a direct threat to the terrorists. I think few theorists would
suggest that terrorists are indiscriminate in the broader sense of having no plan or
purpose regarding their acts of violence; although this broader notion is part of the
common rhetoric against terrorism.
12
Carl Wellman, “On Terrorism Itself,” Journal of Value Inquiry 13, (1979): 250-
258.

8
According to this view, the direct target receives the harm but is secondary
to the target whom the terrorist intends to influence or coerce by the act.
The focus here is not upon the dual targets alone but the ulterior motive of
coercion that tends to cause this complication. Neither the direct nor
indirect targets need to be innocent within this conception of terrorism;
although the direct target often is innocent. This approach to defining
terrorism is not restrictive with regard to the terror producing tactics
involved in coercing the indirect target, nor does it place restrictions upon
the agent of terrorism. That is, either a nation-state, or an non-state agent,
or even an individual can inflict harm upon one target in order to terrorize
and coerce a response from another. To further broaden the possibilities,
Wellman suggests that a single entity can serve as both direct and indirect
target. Thus, torture can be a form of terrorism, if the intent of the person
is to coerce her victim. However, if the intent is punitive, vengeful,
sadistic, or merely hateful, the attack (or torture) cannot be terrorism. To
his credit, Wellman’s approach has a number of positive aspects: it doesn’t
morally prejudge all terrorism; the coercive intent could be served by a
threat of harm; the secondary goals of terrorists could be quite diverse; it
isn’t specific to either international or domestic terrorism; and, the
secondary target could conceivably be a piece of property and not a
person. Wellman’s account takes a surprising turn when he claims
“violence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorism
are nonviolent.”13
However, given that Wellman’s examples of nonviolent
terrorism involve some threat of a significant psychological harm, he
seems to be working with a narrow conception of violence that only allows
for physical violence. Regardless, it seems to me that an additional
advantage of Wellman’s approach is that he acknowledges both the
physical and psychological harms of terrorism and thus his theory is
amenable to a broader conception of violence which includes
psychological violence in addition to physical violence.
Claudia Card argues for an interesting extension of Wellman’s
approach whereby rape and domestic abuse can be categorized as
terrorism.14
According to Card, the physical and psychological violence of
rape and domestic abuse are used by men to coerce women into
13
Ibid., p. 251. If one considers that nonviolent action and protest never aims at
producing harms—psychological or physical—to others, the notion of nonviolent
terrorism seems oxymoronic. For an enlightening account of nonviolent tactics
and how they do not aim at coercion but to allow one’s opponent to see the
injustice of their ways, see Robert Holmes, “The Morality of Nonviolence,” pp.
145-7.
14
Claudia Card, “Making War on Terrorism in Response to 9/11,” pp. 179-81.

Shawn Kaplan 9
subservience. While many (although not all) instances of domestic
violence can readily be understood as intending intimidation and coercion,
the intentions behind specific acts of rape may vary significantly. In
response, Card argues that “the institution of rape” is terroristic. That is,
the unwritten rules of society that allow and excuse rape as well as often
times blame the victim for the crime underlie a series of institutionalized
practices perpetrated by men in order to coerce women. Beyond the
provocative characterization of rape as a terrorist institution, Card’s
account implies two interesting possibilities for terrorism itself. The first
is that a series of institutional practices can function as a kind of terrorism.
The second implication is that terrorism can be carried out not only by
individuals, non-state organizations, and nation-states but by an entire
gender.
While some may be uncomfortable with Card’s characterization of
rape as a terrorist institution and the implications that it carries for
terrorism, I believe that such reactions may in part be in response to some
broader problems associated with Wellman’s account of terrorism that
Card takes as her starting point. If one acknowledges Wellman’s claim
that the direct and indirect targets of terrorism can be united in one person,
then any number of actions with coercive intent will be categorized as
terrorism. In addition to people guilty of domestic abuse and possibly
rape, one might have to include the mugger, the armed bank robber, the
kidnapper, the blackmailer, the organized crime group, and the playground
bully as terrorists. Wellman admits many of these as examples of
terrorism and even includes himself as an occasional terrorist. “I must
confess that I often engage in nonviolent terrorism myself, for I often
threaten to flunk any student who hands in his paper after the due date.”15
In light of the magnitude of harmed threatened in his example, Wellman’s
definition of terrorism seems to make it indistinguishable from any act of
coercion. After all, doesn’t every use of force to control the actions of a
voluntary agent rely upon eliciting some degree of ‘terror’ as the means
for such control?
Besides Wellman’s definition having too broad of an extension, it is
also fair to ask whether his insistence that all terrorism is coercive is
somewhat of an arbitrary characterization. What if the attacks of 9-11
were motivated by hatred, or from a desire to punish the U.S., or to
demonstrate this super power’s vulnerability, or to provoke an extreme
and transparently unjust military response by the U.S. to affect global
opinion, etc.? Should such motives exclude these attacks from being acts
15
Carl Wellman, “On Terrorism Itself,” p. 252.

10
of terrorism? If terrorism has an instrumental nature, it seems problematic
to assume that terrorism is solely an instrument for coercion.16
The matter
can be further pressed by asking whether the motives of terrorists can be
mixed. This of course starts to push the criticisms into deeper
philosophical waters. Can I only know terrorism by knowing the intention
of the agent? Do I need to know the intention of the person carrying out
the attack, or those who planned it, or those who funded it? Can there be a
collective intention for a terrorist organization or a terrorist state? Do I
have to rely upon the stated intentions of the putative terrorists? Can I
ever know the real intent of another, or even of myself? Suffice it to say
that I am skeptical that coercive intent is a productive avenue for defining
terrorism. Given the opaque intentions of the members of al-Qaeda
responsible for the 9-11 attacks, Wellman’s approach leaves us in the
awkward position of not being able to identify these attacks as terrorism.17
4. Composite Approaches to Defining Terrorism
I will now consider one last approach to defining terrorism which
tends to aggregate several aspect together into a composite definition. The
following attempt to define terrorism by J. Angello Corlett is in large part
derived from the definition provided by Burleigh T. Wilkins and is a
thoughtful representative of this composite approach.18
Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, economic,
or religious, change by the actual or threatened use of violence against
other persons or other persons’ property; the violence (or threat thereof)
employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) an
existing social or political order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or
causes espoused by the agents or by those on whose behalf the agents act;
often, though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme counter-
16
Virginia Held accurately points out that like all types of violence terrorism is
also inherently coercive but this fact doesn’t support Wellman’s claim that the
terrorist always uses terror as a means toward the singular aim of coercion.
Virginia Held, “Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,” in R.G. Frey and C.W.
Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), pp. 60-1.
17
Card comes to the same conclusion regarding the 9-11 attacks using Wellman’s
definition. Card, “Making War on Terrorism in Response to 9/11”, p. 173.
18
J. Angelo Corlett, Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Press, 2003), pp. 119-20. Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, Terrorism and
Collective Responsibility (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 6.

Shawn Kaplan 11
measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals or
cause.
Corlett depicts terrorism as a diverse phenomenon which either uses
or threatens violence to obtain a number of possible goals. There is much
to praise in Corlett’s definition. He has taken great care to: not morally
prejudge terrorism, allow for a wide range of terrorist agents, allow for
persons or property to be the target of terrorist attacks, and to
acknowledge—at least to a limited degree—the instrumental character of
terrorism. At the same time, however, Corlett’s composite definition
leaves one wondering what are the core elements that establish the family
resemblance between the various types of terrorism—a problem common
to such composite approaches. His definition seems to concentrate on
excluding ‘inessential’ attributes rather than highlighting how terrorism is
distinct from other forms of actual or threatened political violence. Corlett
argues that both Wilkins’ and his own definition of terrorism “best capture
what is essential to terrorism” insofar as terrorism “need not be [actually]
violent…nor must it target the innocent…nor must terrorism be
unrestrained.”19
Even if these claims are stated in positive terms, it is not
obvious that every threatened or actual act of violence that aims at either
achieving or preventing change in the given order as well as possibly
aiming to publicize the agent’s cause is an act of terrorism.
Let us take a case where one party is apparently violating the
conditions of a peace treaty. It may not be unreasonable for the offended
party to threaten the accused violator with violence in the hope that they
will change their current policies and actions. Furthermore, those
threatening violence may hope that such threats will cause the
international community to pay attention to their claims and hopefully
apply pressure to the offending party so as to avoid a crisis. Such a case
fits neatly within Corlett’s definition of terrorism and yet is rather distant
from our common intuitions of a terrorist act. After all, can’t there be a
difference between threatening or using violence to coerce another and
terrorizing them? One can argue that every peace treaty entails a coercive
threat of violence if either party fails to live up to the conditions. Does
that mean that every such treaty has a terrorist vein at its heart? For better
or worse, it is not entirely unusual for parties to threaten violence in their
negotiations or in trying to publicize their causes. Yet, is the threatened
19
Corlett, Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 118.

12
party necessarily a victim of terrorism?20
Given Corlett’s definition, one
might even categorize every state that threatens any violence towards its
citizens in order to preserve lawfulness as a terrorist state. Unlike the
totalitarian state that uses and threatens violence on a grand scale and with
a large degree of arbitrariness, the state that finds certain criminal offences
punishable by caning or capital punishment through fair legal procedures
fails to terrorize its general public.21
In all of the counter instances to Corlett’s definition of terrorism
provided above, there is one common complaint. Doesn’t terrorism
require the use of terror, extreme fear or anxiety in the attempt to
accomplish its ends? Using violence or the threat thereof in order to
preserve a treaty, or as leverage in negotiation (especially for peace), or in
maintaining a lawful society needs to be distinguished, by in large, from
terrorism as distinct forms of actual or threatened political violence.
While Corlett’s composite approach to defining terrorism may contribute
to his failure to elucidate what core attributes differentiate terrorism from
other forms of political violence, the hesitancy to focus upon terrorism’s
instrumental use of terror is relatively widespread.
III. The Instrument of Terror (Four Challenges)
1) The Intent to Terrorize
I believe that much of the resistance to including terror within the
definition of terrorism comes from four concerns. On the one hand,
theorists often reduce the issue to a matter of the terrorists’ intentions.
Even if one brackets the general problem of knowing another’s intentions,
it is difficult to determine whether the motives of terrorists are primarily
aimed at eliciting terror or at some other end. As my comments regarding
Wellman’s definition indicate, I too am skeptical of basing a definition of
terrorism upon the intentions of the actors.
2) Terror as a Consequence
The ready alternative of looking to the consequences of violent or
threatening actions to determine whether they elicit terror also appears
20
It is certainly conceivable that such threats of violence can be extreme enough to
elicit terror. However, it would be wrong to automatically categorize all such
coercion as terrorism.
21
One can still doubt the wisdom or justness of such punishments without making
them instances of terrorism.

Shawn Kaplan 13
problematic. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that many
soldiers in active combat experience terror as a consequence of their
opponents’ violent or threatening actions. Would we have to categorize all
war as fundamentally terroristic? This absurdity results not from
examining the consequences of violent or threatening actions but failing to
distinguish between primary and secondary effects. While the soldier
experiences terror in combat, the other side is not necessarily using terror
in itself as the primary instrument for attaining victory or weakening its
opponent. Instead, more often, terror is a natural consequence of wartime
experiences while functioning as a secondary consequence of the more
immediate strategic aims. One should at the same time recognize that a
typical military victory is not the result of an extermination of the
opposition but their being weakened and intimidated to the extent that they
surrender. Accordingly, those who plan and carry out military strategy
may wish to maximize both the direct physical harms inflicted as well as
the coercive secondary intimidation. So long as the terror produced is a
secondary effect of the attack it shouldn’t be viewed as terrorism.
However, if the tactic only contributes indirectly to the military aims by
the terror it elicits, then the military personnel involved can be fairly
accused of terrorism. Examples that cross this line include the mass
murder of captured combatants or the desecration of the opposition’s dead.
Such actions elicit terror as a primary consequence and thus can be
distinguished from the typical terror experienced by soldiers in wartime.
While a debate can emerge as to what actual role or function terror is
playing (either as a primary or secondary consequence) in a particular
case, my initial point is that this is the more fruitful debate as opposed to
considering the intention of the agent.22
There are advantages to asking whether an act or threat of violence
produces a terror which functions in an instrumental fashion, as opposed to
asking whether the agents held terror as their primary intention. As Card
points out, coercion by terror may have been a secondary motive for those
who carried out and planned the 9-11 attacks, or perhaps it was not one of
their motives at all. In fact, however, these attacks did produce a terror
that served as the instrument for many ends that may have been intended
or unintended by the terrorists. For example, the terror elicited by the 9-11
attacks provoked a number of diverse responses: a downturn of the U.S.
economy, increased attention for al Qaeda and its ‘causes’, the mostly
unilateral (and some would claim unjust) military strikes against
22
In the following typology, I will further develop this position when
distinguishing between terrorist attacks upon military personnel and the use of
unconventional tactics against an army. See Subsection 1 on targets.

14
Afghanistan and Iraq, the passing of The Patriot Act, and a damaged
public perception of the U.S. government in the international community
(a tertiary effect). Whether these secondary and tertiary effects were
intended by the terrorists is not a central factor for categorizing the actions
as terrorism. One must initially ask whether terror was elicited by an act
or threat of violence and whether this terror functioned as an instrument
for producing further effects (intended or not).23
3) The Failure to Elicit Terror
This leads directly to another of the complaints raised against a
definition of terrorism that focuses upon its instrumental use of terror.
What if an attempted act of terrorism fails to elicit terror? Does such
failure make the agent innocent of terrorism? There are two immediate
reasons why a putative act of terrorism may not elicit terror. In the first
place, the violent act could either be botched or thwarted by authorities. In
such situations, a case for attempted terrorism or a conspiracy to commit
terrorism would need to be made in the courts—in analogous fashion to
charges of attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder. Secondly,
what if a putative act or terrorism fails to draw public attention or is not
significant enough in its destructive scope to elicit terror? A recent
example that took place in New York City can illustrate the vagueness of
the situation. In the early morning hours of May 5, 2005, two crude
homemade explosives were detonated in front of a midtown office
building that houses the British Consulate.24
The next day parliamentary
elections were being held in England. While there was property damage
and shrapnel as far as a block away, no people were physically harmed.
Were those responsible attempting to elicit fear so as to ‘send a message’
to voters in England? To make the case that this was an attempted act of
terrorism is difficult due to its ineffectiveness in eliciting fear. Certainly,
had the explosives been detonated in the middle of a workday when the
streets are crowded, it would have been far more effective in eliciting fear
or terror. The problem faced here is not so different, however, from other
23
While terrorism is an instrument, it is both imprecise and powerful. The
instrument of terror may bring unpredicted and unintended consequences.
Whether a consequence of terrorism was intended or not should only play a factor
in determining the culpability of the agent or her just punishment, not in
categorizing an act as terrorism.
24
Jennifer Lee, Matthew Sweeney & Michael Wilson, “2 Blasts Before Dawn
Shatter Windows and Close Third Avenue,” New York Times, 6 May 2005, sec. B,
p. 1.

Shawn Kaplan 15
instances of ineffective violence. The non-pharmacology student who
heavily drugs my coffee may be attempting to murder me but may not
have the knowledge or experience to be effective. In a legal context, one
may not be able to charge the student with attempted murder but it is
entirely conceivable that this is what occurred. Likewise in the case of
those who set off the explosives in front of the British Consulate, it is
conceivable that it was an attempted act of terrorism although it may prove
difficult to bring such charges against them due to their ineffectiveness in
eliciting terror. At bottom, a failure to elicit instrumental terror brings
about the same sorts of problems of categorization as do other varieties of
‘failed’ violence. Such difficulties are not reason alone for dismissing a
definition of terrorism that focuses upon its instrumental use of terror nor
do these problems certainly make the intentions of terrorists a more
reliable avenue for defining terrorism and properly identifying specific
acts as terrorism.
4. What Kind of Terror Underlies Terrorism?
One last potential complaint against a definition of terrorism that
concentrates upon the instrumental use of terror, fear, or anxiety concerns
the type and or degree of terror, fear, or anxiety involved. To illustrate the
complaint, let’s take the example of the playground bully. Bullies use and
threaten violence to elicit fear from their targets as an instrument for
gaining a desired end, e.g. lunch money or a sense of power over others.
While the bully is a menace to the other children on the playground, the
title of terrorist doesn’t seem fitting. It is tempting to draw the line
between a bully and a terrorist according to the degree or intensity of fear
elicited. Due to the subjective variations in the experience of fear or
terror, this is a temptation to be avoided. Differences in bravery (or
foolhardiness) between individuals makes such a standard less than useful.
Furthermore, the victims of the bully and the terrorist may in fact
experience a comparable degree of fear or terror. I believe a more
promising avenue for drawing the distinction is by asking, in the first
place, what precisely is the victim in fear of. While the victims of bullies
are in fear of being bloodied and bruised, the victims of terrorism are in
fear for their lives and their most fundamental liberties. The two cases are
only similar insofar as each threat of violence is coercive, as all threats of
violence are. Once again, the difference is not based upon a the degree of
fear experienced but the magnitude of the harm inflicted or threatened.
Yet, this is only an initial step in addressing the complaint. There are
violent threats to life or basic liberties that elicit terror as an instrument

16
which we would still not generally considered terrorism, e.g. the armed
robber who threatens ‘your money or your life’ or the kidnapper. While
the armed robber or kidnapper threatens a great enough harm, it is a one
time threat to either adopt the undesired option of handing over property or
suffer the threatened harm, here and now. A terrorist act, on the other
hand, always carries with it either an explicit or implicit threat of a
separate act of future violence. The person who threatens ‘your money or
your life’ uses terror or fear as an instrument but in an operationally
different way than the terrorist insofar as it is an immediate threat that
lacks a future orientation. Even though the kidnapper’s threat has some
greater future orientation, it remains a single act of coercion much like the
armed robbery that lacks the threat of a separate act of future violence.
Whether one considers the systematic and repeated taking of hostages,
suicide bombings, car bombings, or the ‘disappearance’ of the opponents
to a terrorist state, each instance carries a future oriented threat. Either
present and future demands are met or more hostages will be taken and
killed, or more bombings will occur, or more of the vocal opposition will
‘disappear’ in the future.25
Even when demands are not explicitly made
(as in the case of the 9-11 attacks), there is an implicit threat of additional
attacks in the future. Without a perceived threat of future violence
existing, the 9-11 attacks would have been a horrendous act of mass
murder but would not have been an act of terrorism.26
In such an instance,
terror or fear would not be cultivated as an instrument—though horror
would still be an expected response.
IV. Proposed Definition of Terrorism
Based upon the critical examination of four current approaches to
defining terrorism carried out in this essay, I believe the following
definition has some strong advantages.
Terrorism is an act or threat of violence to persons or property that elicits
terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the security of human life or fundamental
25
I contend that the taking of hostages is not always an act of terrorism. Often,
hostages can be taken as a means to some immediate end, e.g. the bank robber who
takes hostages as a negotiation ploy. If, however, hostages are taken regularly in
order to cultivate terror or fear in the opposition (i.e. a future threat of separate acts
of violence is implied), then such hostage taking is terrorism.
26
Some of the difficulties of categorizing actions as terrorist ones arise from this
quality of future threat. We are left to our perceptions of a future threat existing or
not and it is likely that some will perceive a future threat where others do not.

Shawn Kaplan 17
rights and that functions as an instrument to obtain further ends. This
instrumentality relies upon either an explicit or implicit threat of separate
acts of future violence.
In the first place, my proposed definition of terrorism makes it distinct
from other forms of political violence insofar as terrorism isn’t linked to
the unconventional tactics of an underdog in an asymmetric battle. Thus,
not every insurgency or group using guerilla warfare tactics will be
considered terrorists. As a matter of fact, the proposed definition leaves
both the agency and the specific tactics of terrorism quite open. The
instrument of terror can be employed by states, non-government
organizations, local or international collectives, as well as by individuals.
The possible tactics used by terrorists are innumerable so long as they can
elicit terror regarding the security of people’s lives or their fundamental
rights.
The proposed definition avoids a strong moral prejudgment of
terrorism and its agents by not limiting the targets of terrorism to
‘innocent’ non-combatants. As a result, two important advantages are
associated with this definition. First, attacks or threats to either property
or military personnel are not automatically ruled out as putative terrorist
acts, e.g. the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Second, the definition
does not beg the moral question of possible justification. Given the
openness of the definition on the morality of terrorism, arguments must be
provided for why any individual act of terrorism, or any general type of
terrorism, is either justified or not.
By emphasizing within the definition the instrumental role of terror,
the magnitude of harm inflicted or threatened, as well as the future
orientation of terrorist violence and threats, the proposal provides a core
that is common to all acts of terrorism that composite definitions often
lack. At the same time, terrorism as defined here remains distinct from
other coercive acts and threats of violence, e.g. armed robbery. By setting
a standard for the magnitude of harm committed or threatened and
highlighting the future oriented threats implicit or explicit in terrorism, the
proposed definition does not fall into the problem of other broad
definitions of terrorism, viz. making terrorism indistinct from other forms
of violence and coercion.
Lastly, this definition doesn’t rest upon the intention of the actors.
Not only does this avoid the problem of having to actually know the
intentions of others, it allows the instrumental character of terrorism to
come forward. Terrorism needn’t serve the single end of coercion, even
though all violence and threats of violence are inherently coercive. While
terrorists may often aim to coerce others to either maintain or destabilize

18
the current order of things (e.g. the current social, political, economic, or
religious order), the instrument of terror could be aimed at such alternative
ends as: publicizing the terrorists’ cause, punishing the targets of
terrorism, expressing hatred towards the targets, or provoking an extreme
(and perhaps unjust) response to the attacks. While some of these goals
are directly political in nature, terrorism as conceived in the proposed
definition is not limited to a strictly political notion of terrorism. Even
though most people have political terrorism in mind when they speak of
terrorism, recognizing the instrumental quality of terror in the
phenomenon opens up a wider range of possible contexts for terrorist
actions and agents—both political and nonpolitical. Herein lies another
advantage of the proposed definition regarding the question of terrorism’s
effectiveness. If the intended aim of terrorism is not fixed by the
definition, then one cannot simply assume that terrorism is never effective
in obtaining its ends. Thus, those who dismissively claim that terrorism
can never be justified on consequentialist grounds must pause to conceive
of a wider range of possible goals for terrorism than is typically allowed
it.27
However, any meaningful evaluation of terrorism (whether on
consequentialist or other grounds) can only occur if this broad
phenomenon is analyzed into more discreet types.
V. Typology
The proposed definition’s breadth regarding terrorist agents, targets,
goals, as well as the degrees of force employed and the harms inflicted by
terrorists provides the basis for a typological analysis carried out on many
levels.28
There are several axes by which one could carry out a typological
27
Michael Walzer falls into this camp insofar as he seems to assume that terrorism
must be aiming at national liberation, if it is ever to be excusable. While he may
be correct that no nation owes its independence to terrorism alone, this doesn’t
mean that other goals cannot be effectively obtained by terrorism. Walzer,
“Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,” pp. 55-56.
28
I have found three previous attempts at producing a typology of terrorism. Paul
Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: The Macmillan Press, 1974), pp. 32-44.
Richard Schultz, “Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology,” Journal of
International Affairs 32 (1978): pp. 7-15. Liam Harte, “A Taxonomy of
Terrorism,” in Timothy Shanahan (ed.), Philosophy 9/11 (Chicago: Open Court,
2005), pp. 23-50. Each one concentrates on a narrow conception of ‘political’
terrorism which the first two authors distinguish from criminal terrorism that aims
at material gain, wartime terrorism, or the ritual use of terror and Harte contrasts to
the broad category of social terrorism where the agent gains some personal
advantage. Wilkinson’s typology then proceeds to divide political terrorism

Shawn Kaplan 19
analysis of terrorism. For example, a typology could draw distinctions
that would be relevant for considering the strategic success of terrorism, or
for considering the variety of political and non-political goals terrorists
may aim at, or for coming to an understanding of the various possible
causes of terrorism, etc. As my concern from the beginning has been to
lay the groundwork for more concrete and meaningful normative
evaluations of terrorist acts or types of terrorism, the divisions of my
typology will highlight what I take to be the most salient issues for such
evaluations. While the elucidation of principles whereby terrorism may be
normatively evaluated is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope to bring
forth a framework whereby we can recognize the key typological or
formal variables of terrorism (as opposed to circumstantial variables) that
any concrete evaluation of terrorist acts would need to take under
consideration.
The first subsection of the typology is dedicated to the questions of
whether terrorists can ever, or do actually, discriminate between legitimate
and illegitimate targets. I will defend the possibility of discriminate
terrorism insofar as it might either target military personnel, societal
infrastructure, symbolically valued property, or as it might consist mainly
as a threat of future violence. While the distinction between discriminate
and indiscriminate types of terrorism is the basis for conceiving of terror
crimes in analogy to war crimes, not ever indiscriminate act of terrorism is
automatically a terror crime nor is every discriminate act of terrorism
somehow justified or excusable. Still, indiscriminate acts of terrorism will
necessarily face greater challenges with regard to a normative justification.
Similarly, when the focus shifts in the second subsection to whether or not
lethal force is employed by a terrorist, the moral salience of the degree of
force employed is quite evident. Regardless of what principle(s) of
normative evaluation one adopts, the use of lethal force by terrorists will
according to the broad objectives of carrying out revolution, demanding smaller
scale political changes (“Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism”), and carrying out
repression by an established power. Schultz follows these initial distinctions and
then subdivides according to broad factors such as causes, environment, strategy
and the like. Harte initially divides political terrorism according to agency (state
vs. non-state) and geographic scope (domestic vs. international) only to add
additional layers regarding the intentions of the agents (e.g. promodern vs.
antimodern). In all three cases, the authors either assume that terrorism proper
always has a political motive or at least operates as such. In addition, Wilkinson
assumes that terrorism is always indiscriminate in its targeting. As a result, all of
these previous efforts provide much narrower typological analyses and
Wilkinson’s carries a strong moral prejudgment of terrorism.

20
raise the bar for justification. The last subsection of the typology
examines two distinct divisions regarding the types of agents as well as the
types of contexts for the deployment of terrorism. The normative salience
of whether the act of terrorism is carried out by a state or nonstate agent or
whether it is carried our domestically or internationally is only indirect.
The generally recognized authority of a state has no direct bearing upon
whether its terrorist actions are justifiable or excusable. Rather, by
categorizing an act as either state or nonstate terrorism the analysis of the
circumstantial variables salient for a normative evaluation gains greater
focus. For example, we tend to evaluate the legitimacy, rights, and
responsibilities of state and non-state agents differently. Likewise, the
division between domestic and international terrorism has no direct
justificatory salience; however, a state has different responsibilities to its
own citizens than it does to other states, or to international collectives.
1. Targets
Where one makes the first division in a typology of terrorism is
somewhat arbitrary. I will begin with the issue of targets, since this is
where my approach differs from many of the alternative accounts of
terrorism. As I have already discussed, several theorists include within
their definition of terrorism the criterion that ‘innocent’ noncombatants
must be the target of such attacks.29
While it must be admitted that the
vast majority of examples of terrorism do in fact target those who are not a
direct threat to the terrorist agents, there are actual examples of terrorist
acts that are more discriminate in regard to targeting as well as a wide
range of conceivable acts of discriminate terrorism.
More needs to be said first by what it means to be discriminating with
regard to targets. First off, I am referring to the sense of discriminating
between legitimate and illegitimate targets and not the broader distinction
between wholly indiscriminate acts of violence that are entirely random
and irrational and those that discriminate in the sense of being purposive.
Given my emphasis that terrorism is a kind of instrumentality, I assume
that its agents are rational in the minimal sense of being able to choose
goals and set terrorism as their means. Regarding the notion of a
legitimate target, I cannot get into the full debate over who is ‘innocent’
and thus should be immune from either traditional military or terrorist
attacks. However, I do not favor a focus upon the ‘moral innocence’ of
potential targets. To attempt to justify an attack that directly targets
29
See foot note 7.

Shawn Kaplan 21
ordinary citizens of any nation because of their supposed support for their
corrupt or oppressive government is to make the attackers judge and jury
of a moral court that never hears witnesses and is not in the least
concerned with bringing the truth to light. Directly targeting ordinary
citizens in response to a perceived moral culpability never serves justice.
There are citizens outside of the military who because of their role in
society pose some direct threat to the opposition, e.g. those citizens
working in munitions factories or politicians actively supporting an
oppressive or belligerent policy, etc. While these may be legitimate
targets in any conflict, a discriminate attack doesn’t only concern those
directly targeted but those who must be protected from collateral
damage.30
In this, I agree with Walzer’s assessment that it is not sufficient
for the foreseeable, secondary harm to innocents to be merely unintended
but there must be an active attempt to protect the lives of those who are
not a direct threat even at the risk to oneself or to one’s own side of the
conflict.31
While one might argue over how much risk-taking is required
to protect those who pose no direct threat to your side, it will be readily
acknowledged by most that the protection of noncombatants is a worthy
end to be pursued.
What is less readily acknowledged is that terrorists ever do, or could,
actively protect the lives of those who are not a direct threat to themselves
while simultaneously eliciting terror as an instrument. In the first place,
based upon the fact that terrorists do so often directly target
noncombatants, it seems doubtful whether they view the protection of
noncombatants as a valuable goal. Yet, this fact only affirms that the vast
majority of actual terrorist acts fall under the indiscriminate category.
This can be partly explained by the apparent fact that violence
indiscriminately directed and threatened towards noncombatants produces
a more widespread and heightened sense of terror or fear. After all, since
30
Whether one considers either the directly intended targets or the unintended
‘collateral’ effects of terrorism, a discriminate terrorist attack only concerns the
physical harms inflicted and not the psychological damages. It is always difficult
to predict who will be psychologically harmed by the fear and terror produced by
terrorist threats and attacks, or in many other contexts for that matter. Thus, from
the perspective of psychological harms, it would be hard to count any act of
terrorism as discriminate in a strong sense.
31
For Walzer’s treatment of noncombatant immunity see, Just and Unjust Wars,
pp. 138-159. Walzer sets a limit to the dangers one must take on in protection of
noncombatants “at that point where any further risk-taking would almost certainly
doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not be repeated.”
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 157.

22
from the victim’s standpoint the targeting appears so random, every
individual realizes that she could have been the victim. The more
discriminate the threat or use of violence is, the more circumscribed the
terror elicited and the greater the chance that it will be ineffective in
eliciting terror at all. To reinforce the existence of discriminate terrorism,
I will examine examples where instrumental terror has been elicited from
the use or threat of violence against human life and fundamental rights and
that targets either: military personnel, government facilities, societal
infrastructure, or symbolic property.
There have been notable examples of military personnel being
attacked in recent years by organizations widely held to be terrorist in
nature. I will use as examples the attack upon the USS Cole in 2000 and
the 1983 suicide bombing of the US marine barracks in Lebanon to
illustrate some of the complexities of such cases. While the cases have
much in common, there are some significant difference in the context of
the attacks. The similarities are mainly related to the method of the
attacks. In the first instance, reputed members of al Qaeda maneuvered a
small vessel next to the Cole while it was refueling in the Port of Aden,
Yemen. The vessel was loaded with explosives which were set off in
close proximity to the Cole, killing 17 sailors and inflicting significant
damage to the ship. In 1983, two simultaneous attacks upon US and
French military personnel took place in Beirut. Two trucks heavily armed
with explosives were driven by members of Islamic Jihad into the US
marine barracks and the French military post killing 241 US marines and
58 French troops respectively. Both the US and French forces were in
Lebanon on a peacekeeping mission in the hope that negotiations would
lead both Syria and Israel to withdraw their troops. In the context of the
ongoing war in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad (who claimed responsibility) as
well as the nations who reportedly supported their activities (Syria and
Iran) had a strong military interest in forcing the western troops to
withdraw. The suicide truck bombings were not isolated attacks but
followed upon a similar bombing of the US embassy in Beirut as well as
gunfire upon the US marine position at the Beirut airport. Approximately
four months after the truck bombings, the US began a complete
withdrawal of ground forces from Lebanon.
While suicide bombing is typically associated with terrorism, we
shouldn’t assume that such ‘non-conventional’ tactics make the attack an
instrumental employment of terror. While many were horrified by the
Beirut bombings, it is possible to interpret these attacks as part of an
escalating military engagement that aimed at a military victory, viz.
expelling the western forces from Lebanon. The withdrawal of US troops

Shawn Kaplan 23
after the bombing can be interpreted as not being a direct response to
terror elicited from the attack and the implicit threat of future violence but
along consequentialist reasoning. The increased casualties to US marines
may have simply made the peacekeeping mission too costly and perhaps
impossible to carry out with the 1,200 marines deployed on the ground in
Lebanon. While President Reagan identified the attackers as terrorists, he
provides a similar consequentialist rationale for the US withdrawal. "Once
the terrorist attacks started there was no way that we could really
contribute to the original mission by staying there as a target just
bunkering down and waiting for further attacks.”32
Reagan’s statement
does not of course rule out the possibility that the bombing did elicit terror
as an instrument for forcing the US out of Lebanon. My point is not to
debate what the ‘true’ reasons were for the US withdrawal so as to be able
to categorize the attacks in retrospect. Rather, it is important to recognize
that the more an attack using unconventional tactics fits within an ongoing
military struggle and contributes directly to the clearly defined objectives
of the struggle through the damage it inflicts (and not through the fear it
elicits) the less likely it is an act of terrorism.33
The key issue here is
whether the damage inflicted by unconventional tactics contribute directly
to the aim of military victory or whether such tactics contribute indirectly
by eliciting terror.
In contrast, the Cole was on normal patrol in the area and not part of
an ongoing military operation. The damage inflicted by the suicide
bombers to the Cole and its sailors did not contribute in any direct way to
clear-cut military objectives, e.g. the expulsion of US forces from the
Saudi Peninsula. Given that the attackers discriminated in choosing a
military target, it is likely that terror was not elicited on a wide scale
among US citizens. However, following the seemingly unprovoked attack
upon a naval vessel, fears and anxieties were no doubt heightened among
military personnel and those people responsible for their deployment.
Even if one wishes to interpret the al Qaeda attack upon the Cole as part of
32
Quoted in: “1984: US troops withdraw from Beirut,” BBC on this Day.
Retrieved from htttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/
newsid_4153000/4153013.stm on 15 July, 2008.
33
I believe that the current ‘insurgent’ forces fighting directly against the US
military in Iraq cannot generally be categorized as terrorists when they use
unconventional tactics against occupying troops. However, when these fighters
abduct combatants or noncombatants to torture or brutally murder or when they
make a public show of desecrating the bodies of their military opponents, such
actions contribute, at best, indirectly by eliciting terror and not directly through the
damage inflicted.

24
an ongoing operation that included the previous bombings of the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the subsequent 9-11 attacks, it
is hard to conceive of the harms inflicted by these attacks as directly
contributing to an al Qaeda victory (military or other) without the use of
terror as an instrument. Interestingly though, these three attacks carried
out by al Qaeda demonstrate three degrees of discrimination regarding
targets. While the Cole attack targeted only military personnel and the 9-
11 attack upon The World Trade Center were completely indiscriminate,
the bombing of embassies is a more vague issue.34
Embassies are now a long standing target of terrorist groups for
several reasons. As a government installation on foreign soil, embassies
are more vulnerable to attack; they symbolically and literally represent that
government; they tend to hold military personnel; and they are known to
be the centers for intelligence agencies and their spies. Many of these
reasons help to support the view that embassies are a legitimate target.
However, embassies also have civilian support staffs made up of citizens
of both the host nation and the represented nation. In addition, most of the
officials within an embassy are there for diplomatic purposes and pose no
direct threat to those who carry out the attack.35
Thus, to be categorized as
a discriminate attack, a case must be made that the activities of the
embassy constitute a direct threat to the terrorist agents. Even if such a
case were successfully made, the attack would still have to protect citizens
of the embassy’s host nation. As a case in point, the fact that the bombing
of the US embassy in Tanzania killed only citizens of the host nation is a
clear indication that those who carried out the attack did not make an
active attempt to protect Tanzanian citizens who posed them no direct
threat. In contrast, the putative terrorist attack upon the British consulate
in New York referred to earlier took significant measures to protect
innocent US citizens by setting off the explosives at 3:00AM and using
short fuses so as to lessen the possibility that anybody would unexpectedly
come into range of the explosions. While the choice of an early morning
hour could be interpreted as an attempt to protect the ‘innocent’, it also put
the mission at risk regarding its successfully eliciting terror. Moreover,
the short fuses put the attackers at greater physical risk as well as
34
The attack upon The Pentagon on 9-11-2001 was also indiscriminate insofar as
ordinary citizens were directly targeted as passengers aboard the hijacked flight
that was flown into the building. Had the attack been carried out by other means,
an attack upon The Pentagon would fall into the same unclear category as
embassies.
35
In contrast, to a group opposed to the US military presence in and around the
Saudi Peninsula, the trained military personnel on the Cole do pose a direct threat.

Shawn Kaplan 25
increased the possibility of them being caught. This example illustrates
how the greater the efforts to be discriminate in an attack, the greater
likelihood that it will fail to elicit a significant degree of terror.
Regardless, this does not exclude the possibility of terrorists being
discriminate regarding targets; it only shows the challenges of being a
discriminate and effective terrorist at the same time.
This is not a challenge novel to terrorism however. Any traditional
military operation faces significant challenges when attempting to carrying
out discriminate attacks due to several factors, e.g., the prevalence of
guerilla warfare tactics, the use of long-range weapons, the purposive
entrenchment of military targets near non-combatants, and the
questionable reliability of intelligence resources. Even while one can
recognize these challenges, it would be a leap to conclude that traditional
military operations are either incapable of being discriminate or that they
are excused from meeting such challenges due to the difficulties. Instead,
it should be acknowledged that the failure to take measures to protect
those who are not a direct threat is to commit a war crime.36
It is my
contention that to analogously elicit terror by either directly targeting
ordinary citizens or not taking active measures to protect those who are not
a direct threat is to commit a ‘terror crime’. By distinguishing between
war crimes and terror crimes, I am not suggesting a distinction in the
severity of the crimes. Rather, the severity of the crime should be linked
to the severity of the harms committed and the culpability involved. To
distinguish between these two types of criminal acts is to draw a
distinction between two instrumental forms of violence—one which
attempts to gain its ends directly through the damage it inflicts and the
other indirectly through the terror it elicits.
The analogy between war crimes and terror crimes relies upon our
ability to draw a distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate acts
of terrorism. While I will further address occasions that can be
conceivably interpreted as discriminate acts of terrorism, I must first put
forward two cautionary comments regarding the proposed analogy. The
first concerns how far the analogy can be extended. Both those who resort
to terrorism and traditional military force are posed with a challenge to
discriminate between legitimate targets and non-legitimate targets and
while both challenges are complicated, the very effectiveness of an action
to elicit terror is inversely proportionate to the degree of discrimination
36
Of course, if such indiscriminate targeting by a traditional military force elicits
terror or fear as an instrument for obtaining its ends, then it is engaged in terrorism
and would be guilty of a ‘terror crime’.

26
exercised. This seems to simply be a fact of human psychology.37
Thus,
in the case of terrorism, there is a strong impulse to put aside questions of
legitimate targets in favor of effectively eliciting terror. In the case of
traditional military force, there is a similar impulse to bracket questions of
discrimination but this is usually based upon an analysis of consequences,
e.g. in cases of ‘supreme emergency’, or under an ideology of victory at
any cost, or from a desire to end the fighting sooner, etc. While a terrorist
can come to a similar conclusion from comparing the consequences for
themselves of an indiscriminate attack (greater degree of terror produced)
versus a discriminate attacked (increased risk to personal safety and to
mission success), there is the additional factor related to the human
psychology of fear that has no analog for traditional military force.
The second cautionary comment regarding the analogy has to do with
the place of jus in bellum considerations within just war theory as a whole.
Discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets is a question of
whether the general strategies and particular actions carried out within a
conflict are just. In applying such a notion to terrorism, it should not be
forgotten that traditionally such questions are secondary to whether the
resort to military force is justified in the first place by some kind of just
cause. For example, in Aquinas’ original expression of the DDE, the
secondary and unintended effect of killing a person is not excusable unless
the just cause of self-defense is already satisfied.38
What might constitute
a just cause for resorting to terrorism is far beyond the scope of this
typology. However, it would be misleading to believe that a discriminate
terrorist attack is a justified one; it is simply a type of terrorism that has a
greater chance of being justifiable. On the other hand, an indiscriminate
terrorist attack is criminal in an analogous sense to a war crime and, thus,
most probably can never be justified or excused.39
37
See Yael Danieli, Brian Engdahl, and William E. Schlenger, “The Psychosocial
Aftermath of Terrorism” in Moghaddam & Marsella (eds.), Understanding
Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions (Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association, 2003). pp. 223-246.
38
St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica: II, ii, Q64, 7, trans. Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, 1947. Retrieved from http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/
summa/SS/SS064.html#SSQ64A7THEP1 on 21 June, 2006.
39
At minimum, I leave an opening for cases labeled “Supreme Emergencies” by
Walzer. He claims that under the imminent threat of genocide or some equally
extreme imminent threat of humanitarian disaster the direct targeting of
noncombatants can be excused, if such indiscriminate targeting could be effective
in averting the emergency. Technically, such indiscriminate responses to Supreme
Emergencies would not be categorized as war crimes but excusable transgressions
of war conventions. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 251-268.

Shawn Kaplan 27
At this point, I would like to explore the possibilities of discriminate
terrorism beyond the cases where it targets military personnel or
government facilities. While many of the following proposed examples of
discriminate terrorism are not actual historical cases, they both satisfy the
definition of terrorism proposed earlier in this essay and have been
considered real threats by law enforcement agencies. Threats or acts of
violence targeting property can elicit terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the
security of human life or fundamental rights and that functions as an
instrument to obtain further ends. Any terrorist attack upon property
would be a discriminate one if the violence only damaged the property and
did not physically harm any person. Terrorist threats, by in large, also fail
to produce physical harms to persons and thus would also qualify as
discriminate. It is important to remember in this context that even a
discriminate attack upon property doesn’t imply that the victims deserve to
have their property destroyed and to experience fear and terror regarding
their fundamental safety, nor does it imply that the terrorists are justified.
To repeat the just offered warning, a discriminate use of terrorism does not
entail the terrorists having a just cause.
Terrorist attacks upon property can roughly be divided between those
aimed at disrupting or destroying infrastructure and those aimed at
property imbued with symbolic value; although, these may not be
mutually exclusive. In the first instance, attacks that disrupt or destroy
infrastructure such as the power grid, communications networks, and
transportation networks can not only paralyze a society for a period of
time but send the population into a panic without necessarily harming
anyone physically. While destroying the property required for providing a
society’s basic services without physically harming those persons who
work at such locations is a severe challenge, it is not an impossibility. A
focused use of destructive violence at times when few people are present
and with warning can still elicit terror both because of the direct effects as
well as the implicit threat of future, and perhaps less discriminate, attacks
it carries.40
A more promising avenue for a discriminate terrorist attack
upon a society’s infrastructure is to disable these systems by disrupting the
computers they rely upon, i.e. cyberterrorism. While there have been
relatively few documented cases of cyberterrorism, it has been recognized
and documented as a significant security risk by law enforcement
40
In this vein, many of the bombings carried out by the IRA and ETA came with
warnings indicating general location and time. In addition, the locations typically
chosen were not highly populated ones.

28
agencies.41
For example, in 1997 The National Security Agency (NSA)
demonstrated that hackers could easily disrupt national security systems
using only their wits and publicly available programming tools found on
the web.42
The simple fact appears to be that the community of hackers
has little desire to terrorize the general public by disrupting the
infrastructure of society and, at the same time, the population of terrorists
seemingly have few hackers in their numbers. Either situation could
change; however, given the history of terrorist networks having the
resources and the will to technically train their members to carry out
missions, the second may be more likely.
A discriminate attack upon symbolically valued property is also a
possibility. Whether a symbol of national strength or national identity, a
landmark, a house of worship, or a religiously significant location is
targeted, it is possible to elicit fear and terror as an instrument without
inflicting casualties or denying fundamental rights. The alleged terrorist
plot to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge is an example of a group targeting
property largely for its symbolic value.43
If carried out in the middle of the
night or with sufficient warning, an attack upon the Brooklyn Bridge could
still elicit fear or terror because of its place as an image of New York, its
history, and its strength. In addition to the fear produced by the reasonable
questions of ‘what if there was no warning?’ or ‘what if it were during
rush hour?’, etc., destruction of such a target can also inspire fears rooted
in its symbolic relevance, e.g., ‘if terrorists can destroy something so rock
solid and part of the historical and daily fabric of the city, what is safe?’.
Accordingly, the targeting of symbolically valued property can greatly
amplify the sense of vulnerability and terror.
41
Many of the so-called cases of cyberterrorism appear more like acts of civil
disobedience as people have bombarded the email or web servers of organizations
they were protesting against with thousands of bogus emails or requests for
downloads, effectively shutting down their electronic communications. Since
these actions do not so much elicit terror as disrupt the daily operations of the
target, they have aptly been likened to web-based sit-ins. For some examples see
Dorothy Denning’s testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (May 23, 2000).
Retrieved from http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html
on 21 June, 2006.
42
For details of this NSA experiment and other documented risks of
cyberterrorism see, Dan Verton, Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terror
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003).
43
Eric Lictblau, “Threats and Responses: Terror; U.S. Cites al Qaeda in Plot to
Destroy Brooklyn Bridge,” New York Times, 20 June 2003, sec. A, p. 1.

Shawn Kaplan 29
Lastly on the topic of discriminate terrorism, the definition put
forward in the previous section begins by claiming that terrorism is either
an act or threat of violence. Threats of violence by themselves are
generally discriminate insofar as they actually inflict no physical harm.
However, by themselves, threats of violence will eventually lose their
capacity to elicit terror unless they are backed up by either actual violence
or at least a show of force. A public show of force can carry with it an
implicit threat or reinforce an explicit threat already made. If we take a
narrow view of the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, the
testing of nuclear weapons by both sides constituted a show of force which
carried a reciprocal threat to each nation. Threats of nuclear annihilation,
even when backed by such a show of force, can only terrorize the targeted
nation and the broader global community so long as the threat is believed
to be a real and present danger. This is true of the implicit threat of future
violence that all terrorism relies upon for it effectiveness. Thus, terrorist
threats will tend to be followed by demonstrations of force and the
willingness to use it. Any prolonged use of terrorism appears to require an
escalation from threats, to demonstrations of force, to acts of violence, to
acts of greater and greater destruction and horror. Since a single act of
terrorist violence will eventually fade from the public’s mind after
sufficient time, the effectiveness of a campaign of terrorism requires
repetition. As the experience of repeated terrorist attacks becomes
‘normalized’ to a society, pressure is felt by terrorists to be less and less
discriminate in their attacks.
2. Degree of Force
Until this point in the typology, we have found that while the
possibility of discriminate terrorism exists and actual examples can be
found, the prolonged use of terrorism tends to make these discriminate
forms of terrorism less effective in eliciting fear and terror. Within the
range of discriminate terrorism considered thus far, the possibilities fall
roughly into two types: those that use a lethal degree of force and those
that are non-lethal.44
Under the heading of lethal, discriminate terrorism
44
While some may argue in favor of a further division between the use of lethal
force and the use of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, it is unclear that the
quantitative difference in the degree of lethal force implied in this distinction
would produce two qualitatively distinct formal variables that are key for a
normative evaluation of terrorist acts. In other words, the use of WMDs does not
necessarily make for a distinct type of terrorism but is a matter of the degree of
lethal force employed. In contrast, the many forms of non-lethal force are

30
fall the occasions when acts of violence are directed at either military
personnel or other citizens who pose a direct threat to the terrorists in
order to elicit an instrumental terror or fear. Furthermore, such attacks
would have to protect those who are not a direct threat to the terrorists.
When military personnel are targeted, the instrument of terror can
conceivably aim at: undermining military effectiveness, evoking an
extreme and transparently unjust response, publicizing the group’s
message, creating a sense of empowerment for all who oppose the
government of that military organization, coercing a change in policy (e.g.
withdrawal of troops), etc. However, the more the damage directly
inflicted by the attack to military personnel directly contributes to a clearly
recognized military objective/victory, the less easily such attacks can be
categorized as terrorism at all.
It is important to note a significant difference between the lethal and
non-lethal variants of discriminate terrorism. There is an additional
burden of proof when using lethal force to show that the target is somehow
truly a direct threat. When targeting infrastructure, or symbolic property,
or using threats and demonstrations of force to elicit terror, there are no
people who are the direct target and thus little need to demonstrate the
target to be a direct threat. Instead, the burden is to show that enough
active care has been taken to protect those in proximity to the targeted
property or to the show of force.
Indiscriminate terrorist attacks can also be divided according to
whether lethal force is used or not. While the examples of lethal,
indiscriminate terrorism abound, there are some possibilities that fall
outside of what normally comes to mind and which deserve our attention.
The standard image of such lethal terror crimes is of some explosive
device being delivered to unsuspecting noncombatants or being set off in a
public space. However, sniper attacks upon abortion doctors, KKK
lynchings, mass executions (e.g., as carried out by totalitarian regimes),
and extreme economic sanctions can all be recognized as attacks that use
lethal force to elicit terror, fear, or anxiety regarding the security of human
life or fundamental rights and which function as an instrument to obtain
further ends. In the case of extreme economic sanctions, trade policies
that prevent a nation from feeding or providing basic medical care for its
people are indeed a kind of indiscriminate attack upon those citizens no
matter how justified the claim is against their government.
qualitative distinct from the lethal varieties—even though the line can be quickly
and even unintentionally crossed.

Shawn Kaplan 31
On the side of non-lethal, indiscriminate terrorism, one can imagine
the use of non-lethal biological agents being used against a general
population. However, in most cases, it is the fundamental rights of the
victims which are directly targeted—although the threat of lethal force is
often present. The most common examples are various sorts of
abductions, either the taking of hostages and hijackings by non-state
groups or the unlawful imprisonment of the ‘opponents’ of a state.45
While the rights to free movement and due process are directly attacked in
such abductions, in both contexts the threat of lethal force plays an
important role in generating and maintaining a sufficient degree of terror
to serve a terrorist. Closely related is the torture of those people abducted
as another all too common non-lethal form of indiscriminate terrorism.
While the terror elicited within the tortured person is often used to gain
information (reliable or not) or a signature upon a confession, the images
of the tortured have proven useful in generating a more wide-spread sense
of fear and terror.
Again however, there are several variants of this type of terrorism that
may escape what normally comes to mind. Just as in the case of non-
lethal, discriminate terrorism, property can be the direct target of non-
lethal, indiscriminate terrorism. In the first case, if an attack upon an
society’s infrastructure doesn’t take sufficient care to protect ordinary
citizens, then such an attack would of course be indiscriminate and it is
only a question as to whether the force of the attack is lethal or not. One
can easily conceive of non-lethal harms resulting from the environmental
fallout of attacks upon power plants, oil refineries, water treatment
facilities, chemical plants, etc. Secondly, it is conceivable that a non-
lethal attack upon symbolically valued property could so significantly
impinge upon the fundamental rights of individuals that it would be
categorized as indiscriminate. For example, the systematic burning of
black churches in southern states could be interpreted as violating the
fundamental rights to free worship and public assemblage. In addition,
non-lethal force and threats to one’s life or basic liberties can be directed
at persons by organized crime syndicates or even family members in order
to elicit the instrument of terror. Thus, when carrying out extortion,
criminals are acting as local terrorists and those who carry out domestic
abuse are household terrorists.46
Unlike the previously discussed
45
See foot note 25 regarding the ambiguities surrounding the tactic of taking
hostages.
46
While both the extortionist and the domestic abuser are guilty of being bullies,
they differ from the playground bully according to the magnitude of harm

32
approaches of Carl Wellman and Claudia Card who insist that terrorism
always aims at coercion, the psychologically diverse and complicated
motivations for domestic abuse (as well as for torture more generally)
needn’t rule out any cases as examples of terrorism so long as the
instrument of terror is elicited for some further ends.
3. Agents and Context of Deployment
The brief survey of examples of lethal and non-lethal types of
terrorism presented in the previous section is not in any way intended to be
an exhaustive list. Rather, the examples have been chosen to illustrate not
only these four types but the diversity within them regarding the agents
who commit these acts as well as the contexts in which their terrorism is
deployed (domestic vs. international). Thus, the last two divisions within
this typology will be according to the agency and the context where
terrorist acts are deployed. As stated previously, the questions of agency
and contexts do not carry direct moral weight. It makes no immediate
moral difference whether terrorism is committed by an individual, a non-
state collective, a state, or a collective of states. In contrast to the common
contention that only states have the authority to declare war, states do not
enjoy a privileged authority to carry out acts of terrorism. Similarly, it
makes no direct moral difference whether terrorists deploy their efforts at
a domestic target or one abroad. In contrast, it is of direct moral salience
whether an act of terrorism is discriminate or not and whether the force
applied is lethal or not. On these points, I will say more in the conclusion.
While I maintain the conventional terms of state and non-state
terrorism to distinguish between the two types of terrorist agents, I do so in
an expanded sense of both terms. While non-state terrorists generally refer
to either international terrorist organizations or domestic revolutionary
groups, we have seen that collectives like the KKK and organized crime
syndicates as well as individuals guilty of domestic abuse or targeting
abortion doctors qualify as non-state terrorists. Clearly non-state agents
can terrorize either domestic or international targets. The same is not
usually thought to be the case for state terrorists. Terrorist states are most
often depicted as using terrorism against their own citizens in order to
maintain totalitarian control.47
However, there are the cases of states
threatened. By threatening life and basic rights, the extortionist and the domestic
abuser qualify as nonpolitical terrorists.
47
For a thorough account of such varieties of state terrorism, see Jonathan Glover,
“State Terrorism,” in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, and
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 256-275. Igor

Shawn Kaplan 33
attempting to terrorize one another (e.g. India and Pakistan) as well as
states terrorizing non-citizens (potential examples include the unlawful
detention and torture of foreign nationals or some of Israel’s tactics used
against the Palestinians). State terrorism can also be expanded to include
those actions carried out, or threats offered, by a collection of states that
elicit the instrument of terror for their collective goals.
The existence of state sponsored terrorism potentially complicates this
typological division. Accusations of state sponsorship range from a nation
state providing a safe-haven for terrorists, or not actively supporting “the
war on terror”, to providing financial support for terrorists and even using
terrorist organizations to unofficially carry out foreign or domestic policy.
In the case of the Taliban’s relationship to al Qaeda, one can argue that the
terrorist organization actually sponsored the government’s existence.
There is clearly a wide range in the degree of entanglement between
terrorists and their state sponsors. It would be foolish to claim that a
terrorist event must either have state or non-state agency by ignoring state
sponsorship. At the same time, the typological distinction has merits from
the standpoint of a concrete normative evaluation which would initially
have to deal with the terrorists and their state sponsors individually. It is
fair to assume that the criteria for a terrorist group’s justification will often
be distinct from a state’s sponsorship of their activities. For example, a
revolutionary group that resorts to terrorism against its home government
would have to meet a burden of justification that would differ from the
third party state who sponsors their activities. The state sponsor must be
judged according to the rights and responsibilities of states and the
sponsored must be judged according to the rights and responsibilities of
non-state agents. I would contend that when terrorists and state sponsors
are so intertwined that the normative evaluation of each is based upon
identical criteria, we are really considering a case of state terrorism.
The fundamental difference between the expanded notions of state
and non-state terrorism operating here is that states and state collectives
are generally recognized as being legitimate political entities. They have
constitutions and charters that are recognized by the international
community of states and state collectives. As a result, their violent acts
are often perceived as coming from a valid authority. In contrast,
individuals and collectives who threaten or use violence have, from a
traditional standpoint, a much more difficult path to be recognized as
Primoratz presents a brief typology of state terrorism that includes its international
deployment in his “State Terrorism and Counter-terrorism,” in Primoratz (ed.),
Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.
113-127.

34
being legitimate authority. While the presumed legitimacy of state agents
and illegitimacy of non-state agents is greatly a matter of perception, these
are significant perceptions that can be critically examined by including the
dichotomy of state vs. non-state agency within the typology. Furthermore,
as suggested in the previous discussion of state sponsored terrorism,
different questions will need to be asked concerning the circumstantial
variables depending upon whether the agent is a state or not. For example,
regarding cases of state terrorism, one would need to ask: Is the instrument
of terror being used domestically to suppress a portion of the population?
Does this state maintain sufficient popular support at home to be
considered legitimate? Is the instrument of terror being used by the state
to promote imperialist goals abroad or to thwart the terrorism carried out
by others? In contrast, regarding cases of non-state terrorism, one would
need to ask: What is the group or individual attempting to either subvert or
preserve? Are they victims of grave human rights violations, or among
those who inflict such harms, or both? If it is a revolutionary group, do
they enjoy popular support among their fellow citizens? I am not
suggesting that any of these questions can function as a litmus test for
justifying terrorism. Rather, given the different aims and methods of state
and non-state terrorists as well as the differences in the rights and
responsibilities of state and non-state agents, a concrete analysis of
justification will vary in its direction based upon the question of agency.
Once again, this does not mean that either state or non-state terrorism
holds any advantage with regard to possible justification, only that some of
the variables that need to be considered for each type will differ.
By further dividing state and non-state types of terrorism according to
the contexts of domestic and international deployment, the typology
attains a set of descriptive categories that avoids the presumption that state
terrorism always aims to repress a smaller or weaker population or that
non-state terrorism always aims to disrupt the status quo supported by
those in power. Previous typologies have tended to categorized terrorism
according to the broad dynamics of top-down repression and bottom-up
disruption or revolution. Wilkinson and Schultz both identify all terrorist
activities carried out by states or the ‘establishment’ as always serving to
repress those who are beneath them in regard to power or authority.
Similarly, Harte claims “all state terrorism is a form of rule, whereas all
non-state terrorism is a challenge to rule.”48
I have noted, however, that
states can use terrorism against other states who are relatively equal to or
48
Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, pp. 36-40. Schultz, “Conceptualizing Political
Terrorism: A Typology,” p. 11. Harte, “A Taxonomy of Terrorism,” p. 28.

Shawn Kaplan 35
perhaps even stronger than themselves in power. Wilkinson and Schultz
also both divide non-state terrorism into revolutionary and sub-
revolutionary terrorism. While these categories differ in the magnitude of
the political and cultural changes the terrorist aim at, they both assume that
all terrorism not carried out by the state is carried out against the state or
some more established power. However, in the case of the household
terrorist who commits domestic abuse, the dynamic is far from a bottom
up disruption or revolution but an oppression of the physically and
sometimes economically weaker. In addition, competing revolutionary
groups can mutually resort to using the instrument of terror against each
other. Given the instrumental nature of terrorism that has been argued for
here, it is appropriate that the last two divisions of the typology avoid
imposing specific sorts of ends upon the agents of terrorism.
VI. Concluding Comments
In all, the proposed typology has sixteen different categories.49
The
four divisions that produce the sixteen permutations parse the broad
phenomenon of terrorism according to its: targets, degrees of force, agents,
and contexts of deployment. I have suggested from the beginning of this
paper that the above typological analysis of terrorism would lay the
foundation for a more concrete normative evaluation of specific acts and
types of terrorism. While case by case evaluations fall beyond the scope
of this paper, I will briefly consider some trends regarding the possible
justification for the various types of terrorism.
If we consider the first two sets of divisions examined in the typology,
we can see a gradation from the least readily justified to the most possible.
For most people it is hard to imagine circumstances in which
indiscriminate terrorism could ever be justified or excused. However,
when lethal force is used, it is even less likely that indiscriminate terrorism
could be justified or excused. There is the slim possibility raised by
Walzer that when a group is under the imminent threat of a humanitarian
disaster of the severity of genocide or mass enslavement that the
indiscriminate targeting of those from the other side who are not a direct
threat may be excusable. Such “Supreme Emergencies,” as they are
labeled by Walzer, set a very high standard that has rarely been met by
actual cases of indiscriminate, lethal terrorism.50
In Just and Unjust Wars,
49
Please see the diagram in Appendix A.
50
For Walzer’s treatment of Supreme Emergencies see Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars, pp. 251-268.

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