This article presents a realist and internalist response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness regarding moral properties. It argues:
1) Mackie was correct that inherently motivating moral properties would be strange, but incorrect that we attribute such properties.
2) Moral beliefs have satisfaction conditions in addition to truth conditions. Believing a moral claim requires being motivated to some extent to satisfy it.
3) This explains the internalist intuition that moral beliefs necessitate motivation, without requiring inherently motivating properties. Strong internalism is true conceptually, due to the nature of moral beliefs and norms.
The document discusses different views of truth, including the correspondence view which holds that truth corresponds to reality. It also discusses relative views which hold that truth can vary by person, time, or place. However, the document argues that relativism is self-defeating, and that truth must be absolute to avoid contradictions. It defends a correspondence view of truth and addresses objections to this view.
This document discusses the nature of truth and different theories about truth. It explains that truth refers to statements that correspond to actual facts or realities in the world. There are three main theories on the nature of truth: (1) the correspondence theory which states that a belief is true if it corresponds to a real fact or entity, (2) the coherence theory which defines truth based on coherence with other beliefs, and (3) the pragmatic theory which defines truth based on the usefulness of believing a statement. The document also discusses different domains of truth, including scientific, social, personal truths, and the different types of justification used to establish truth within each domain such as empirical evidence, social acceptability, and authenticity of claims.
This document discusses different methods used in theology and their proponents. It argues that methodology is important because it determines the conclusions reached. Naturalistic methods will inevitably lead to naturalistic conclusions, while methods open to the supernatural will not rule out supernatural conclusions. It also discusses category mistakes in applying methods from one discipline to another inappropriately. Methods must not be antisupernatural or incompatible with evangelical beliefs to be valid for theology.
This document discusses and critiques pluralism and exclusivism in religion. It defines pluralism as the belief that all religions are true, while exclusivism is the belief that only one religion is true. The document analyzes John Hick's argument that religions should be viewed equally based on their moral teachings. However, several responses note that moral behavior does not prove religious truth claims. The document concludes that pluralism's view of truth is self-defeating, as it denies any single religion could be exclusively true while claiming its own view is correct.
This document provides an overview of a philosophical theology approach called pneumatological philosophy. Some key points:
- It takes an incarnational, liturgical, and sacramental perspective that emphasizes nonhierarchical vehicles for faith alongside institutional models.
- It describes reality's "givens," values/products, and processes using manufacturing and natural process metaphors to explore relationships, truths, beauties, goods, and freedoms.
- It suggests society's culture, history, institutions, economy, and politics can manifest a "pneumatological consensus" by how well they sanctify, orient, empower, heal, and save people.
The document discusses several philosophical theories of knowledge:
1) Empiricism claims knowledge comes from sense experience, while rationalism claims ideas are formed through reason alone.
2) Skepticism doubts the possibility of certain knowledge from senses or reason.
3) Correspondence theory holds that true beliefs correspond to reality while false beliefs do not. It is criticized for not allowing for false beliefs.
4) Pragmatic theory claims ideas are true if they have practical and desirable consequences. It is criticized for allowing truth to vary between individuals.
5) Coherence theory holds a set of beliefs is true if consistent and does not contradict other knowledge.
This document provides an overview and summary of Norman Geisler's book concerning the "preconditions" of evangelical theology. It discusses that evangelical theologians believe the Bible is infallible and true, coming from God, which presupposes certain philosophical beliefs. These include beliefs in God, miracles, revelation, and that revelation follows the laws of logic and can be objectively interpreted. It then examines the three laws of rational thinking - noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle. Next it discusses deductive logic through categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. It also covers inductive logic and degrees of probability. The key point is that for evangelical theologians, God
The document discusses different philosophical positions on the nature of reality - pluralism, which asserts that multiple beings exist, and monism, which argues that all of reality is a single being. It states that theism would take the position of pluralism by asserting that both God and the natural world exist as separate beings. It then provides an overview of several common cosmological, teleological, ontological, moral, and anthropic arguments for the existence of God.
The document discusses different views of truth, including the correspondence view which holds that truth corresponds to reality. It also discusses relative views which hold that truth can vary by person, time, or place. However, the document argues that relativism is self-defeating, and that truth must be absolute to avoid contradictions. It defends a correspondence view of truth and addresses objections to this view.
This document discusses the nature of truth and different theories about truth. It explains that truth refers to statements that correspond to actual facts or realities in the world. There are three main theories on the nature of truth: (1) the correspondence theory which states that a belief is true if it corresponds to a real fact or entity, (2) the coherence theory which defines truth based on coherence with other beliefs, and (3) the pragmatic theory which defines truth based on the usefulness of believing a statement. The document also discusses different domains of truth, including scientific, social, personal truths, and the different types of justification used to establish truth within each domain such as empirical evidence, social acceptability, and authenticity of claims.
This document discusses different methods used in theology and their proponents. It argues that methodology is important because it determines the conclusions reached. Naturalistic methods will inevitably lead to naturalistic conclusions, while methods open to the supernatural will not rule out supernatural conclusions. It also discusses category mistakes in applying methods from one discipline to another inappropriately. Methods must not be antisupernatural or incompatible with evangelical beliefs to be valid for theology.
This document discusses and critiques pluralism and exclusivism in religion. It defines pluralism as the belief that all religions are true, while exclusivism is the belief that only one religion is true. The document analyzes John Hick's argument that religions should be viewed equally based on their moral teachings. However, several responses note that moral behavior does not prove religious truth claims. The document concludes that pluralism's view of truth is self-defeating, as it denies any single religion could be exclusively true while claiming its own view is correct.
This document provides an overview of a philosophical theology approach called pneumatological philosophy. Some key points:
- It takes an incarnational, liturgical, and sacramental perspective that emphasizes nonhierarchical vehicles for faith alongside institutional models.
- It describes reality's "givens," values/products, and processes using manufacturing and natural process metaphors to explore relationships, truths, beauties, goods, and freedoms.
- It suggests society's culture, history, institutions, economy, and politics can manifest a "pneumatological consensus" by how well they sanctify, orient, empower, heal, and save people.
The document discusses several philosophical theories of knowledge:
1) Empiricism claims knowledge comes from sense experience, while rationalism claims ideas are formed through reason alone.
2) Skepticism doubts the possibility of certain knowledge from senses or reason.
3) Correspondence theory holds that true beliefs correspond to reality while false beliefs do not. It is criticized for not allowing for false beliefs.
4) Pragmatic theory claims ideas are true if they have practical and desirable consequences. It is criticized for allowing truth to vary between individuals.
5) Coherence theory holds a set of beliefs is true if consistent and does not contradict other knowledge.
This document provides an overview and summary of Norman Geisler's book concerning the "preconditions" of evangelical theology. It discusses that evangelical theologians believe the Bible is infallible and true, coming from God, which presupposes certain philosophical beliefs. These include beliefs in God, miracles, revelation, and that revelation follows the laws of logic and can be objectively interpreted. It then examines the three laws of rational thinking - noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle. Next it discusses deductive logic through categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. It also covers inductive logic and degrees of probability. The key point is that for evangelical theologians, God
The document discusses different philosophical positions on the nature of reality - pluralism, which asserts that multiple beings exist, and monism, which argues that all of reality is a single being. It states that theism would take the position of pluralism by asserting that both God and the natural world exist as separate beings. It then provides an overview of several common cosmological, teleological, ontological, moral, and anthropic arguments for the existence of God.
This document summarizes several philosophical arguments for the existence of God put forth by prominent thinkers throughout history. It discusses St. Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument, Thomas Aquinas' five ways, William Paley's teleological argument, Cardinal Newman's argument from conscience, Blaise Pascal's wager, John Smith's argument from life's crucial junctures, and Rudolf Otto's argument from religious experience. It analyzes the different approaches and perspectives addressed by each argument and emphasizes the importance of building faith on a solid foundation of truly knowing God rather than blindly following what others say.
1) The author argues that Wilber's integral approach could be improved by making it more fully integral at all times of human value realization, not just at certain moments.
2) An example is given of how the descriptive, evaluative, normative, and interpretive methods are all necessary to fully understand and realize a value.
3) The author emphasizes distinguishing between epistemology and ontology when considering nondual experiences from Eastern traditions, noting that such experiences speak more to phenomenology than metaphysics.
1) The document discusses the argument from religious experience for the existence of God. It claims that religious experiences are said to offer a strong argument in favor of God, though not a conclusive proof.
2) However, criticisms of religious experiences note that they are varied, contradictory, vague, and often rely on circular reasoning by conforming to preexisting beliefs.
3) Religious experiences also cannot be confirmed since they offer no way to make accurate predictions or check the veracity of their claims, which is generally taken as evidence an explanation is faulty.
The document discusses improving Ken Wilber's integral approach by making it more fully integral. It argues that for a value to be fully realized, all quadrants (perspectives) and levels (stages of development) must be integrated at once, not just included separately. It provides an example showing that descriptive, evaluative, normative, and interpretive ways of knowing are each necessary to complete our understanding, though each is also distinct. The document suggests leading with shared non-propositional practices and pneumatology (spirit) in interfaith dialogue to foster understanding before discussing doctrinal differences.
This document discusses various views of God and identifies problems with views that differ from theism. It defines theism as the view that God created all and is both beyond the world and active within it. Other views addressed include deism, which holds God is beyond the world but not active within; finite godism, where God is limited; atheism, which denies God's existence; pantheism, where God is equivalent to the universe; polytheism; and panentheism. The document also discusses neotheism and identifies logical inconsistencies within that view.
This document discusses the relationship between faith and reason. It addresses whether faith and reason are compatible or antagonistic. It examines Pascal's Wager argument that it is rational to have faith in God due to the potential rewards and costs. It also discusses problems with this argument, such as whether one can choose what to believe, and whether faith should be presented as a gamble. The document explores whether faith can be self-authenticating or if reason can help determine if God exists. It analyzes fideism, which claims faith operates where reason has no power. It also examines reformed epistemology and whether some religious beliefs can be properly basic due to their central role in one's belief system.
1. Evangelical theology is built on the foundation of supernatural events like creation, Jesus' miracles and resurrection, and his ascension into heaven.
2. There are two definitions of miracles - the weak view that they are unusual but not contrary to nature, and the strong view that they are beyond nature's power and can only be done by God.
3. Miracles have purposes like glorifying God, accrediting his spokespeople, and providing evidence for belief in God. Skeptics argue miracles violate immutable natural laws and that evidence is always greater for regular occurrences than rare ones, but these arguments can be refuted. Believing in miracles is important to theology because
This document discusses different kinds, domains, and tests of truth. It outlines three kinds of truth - empirical, necessary, and normative truths. Empirical truths are based on experience, necessary truths are true by reason alone, and normative truths involve general agreements. The domains of truth discussed are the objective, social, and personal domains. The justification of truths corresponds to these domains, with empirical evidence for objective truths, social acceptability for social truths, and consistency and authenticity for personal truths. Three tests of truth are also outlined: the correspondence theory which evaluates if concepts match real objects/events; the coherence theory which assesses if beliefs cohere with other accepted truths; and the pragmatic theory which determines truth based on the
DOIN' WHAT COMES NATUR'LLY: TOWARD A HUMANIST THEORY OF ETHICSDr Ian Ellis-Jones
This document discusses and critiques several common theories of ethics, arguing that they are flawed. It then proposes a positive Humanist theory of ethics. The key points are:
1. Theories based on religion, majority approval, feelings, consequences, or commands are problematic for reasons like circularity, subjectivity, and avoiding the real question of what is good.
2. A Humanist theory is proposed - something is good or right if it is objectively good or right. While this may seem circular, the document argues it is not and experience allows humans to know good directly.
3. In overcoming the flaws of other theories, this theory offers a positive, objective, realistic and non-pres
The document discusses natural theology and its relationship to beliefs about God. It makes three key points:
1) Neither philosophy nor metaphysics can conclusively prove or fully describe the reality of God, but beliefs in certain concepts of God can still be justified and meaningful.
2) The reality of God and the problem of evil cannot be fully explained rationally, but invite existential responses through questions about faith and purpose.
3) Natural theology explores what is logically possible about primal realities like God, and suggests these questions are reasonable, which can justify fundamental trust in reality and shape human desires through liturgical theology.
This chapter discusses the fact-value problem in metaethics and different theories that have attempted to address it. It introduces Hume's view that one cannot derive ought from is, Moore's naturalistic fallacy that you cannot define goodness in natural terms, and Ayer's emotivism which holds that moral statements express attitudes rather than having truth values. It also covers prescriptivism proposed by Hare which sees moral judgments as having both descriptive and prescriptive elements.
This document discusses nonduality from both epistemological and ontological perspectives. It argues that nonduality has more to do with epistemology than ontology. From an epistemological standpoint, our understanding of reality is fallible and partial, but this does not deny the empirical realities of self, God, or other concepts. Ontologically, it prefers the terms "unitary" rather than "unitive" and "intraobjective" rather than "intersubjective" but notes that epistemology can model ontology to a degree. Overall, it suggests that nonduality from an epistemic approach means reality is more dynamic and process-oriented than static substances.
This document discusses arguments for the existence of God from a philosophical perspective. It outlines several common arguments including the ontological, teleological, cosmological, and moral arguments. It also discusses how humans can conceive of abstract concepts like love and emotions that have no physical form, and suggests this ability could also be an argument for why humans can conceive of God. However, the document concludes that while arguments can be made, the existence of God cannot be ultimately proven or disproven, just as absolute truth cannot be known. It compares the concept of faith in God to faith in science.
This document discusses optimizing human functioning through altruistic self-mastery with mathematical understanding, physical intelligence, biological empathetic awareness, and individual responsibility. It argues that consciousness integrates information unlike any other state of matter, and that creative mathematical understanding, combined with intelligence and awareness, allows humans to transcend rules and expand truth. It defines physical intelligence as maximizing future freedom of action, keeping options open, and resisting constraints. Biological empathetic awareness is described as having fault tolerance that increases utility. Individual responsibility involves daily work on altruistic self-mastery to guide practice, rather than as a level of attainment.
The document discusses different theories of perception from common sense realism to phenomenalism to phenomenology. It outlines some of the key ideas from each view: common sense realism holds we directly perceive objects through the senses, while representational realism and phenomenalism argue we only indirectly perceive sense data or ideas. Phenomenology, represented by Merleau-Ponty, argues knowing involves interpretation and that perception centers around attention, the body, and sensory synthesis rather than isolated sensations. The document concludes that phenomenology best accounts for the full range of human perceptual experience.
The document discusses how internalism became entrenched in philosophy due to Descartes' assumption that in a demon world, our beliefs would remain the same. For centuries after Descartes, philosophers tried to justify our beliefs about the external world by analyzing them in terms of subjective experiences. A number of philosophers, including Berkeley, Hume, and Frege, developed theories attempting to bridge the Cartesian gap between mind and world, but their theories were still framed within the Cartesian paradigm of distinguishing between subjective and objective.
Russ Shafer-Landau is a professor of philosophy who has authored and edited several books on ethics. The document discusses two types of ethical subjectivism: normative and meta-ethical. Normative subjectivism holds that an act is morally right if the person judging approves of it. Meta-ethical subjectivism claims that moral judgments cannot be true or false. The document presents arguments for each view and considers objections, such as disagreement in ethics not proving lack of objective truth and moral judgments potentially being factual beliefs that do not intrinsically motivate.
Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom.docxjesuslightbody
Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE Virtue Theory and Abortion
The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as
virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming
better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible
rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come
criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate
criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me
to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or
of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its
terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that
will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to
articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject
this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the
second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues
raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it
is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.
VIRTUE THEORY
Virtue theory can be laid out in a framework that reveals clearly some of
the essential similarities and differences between it and some versions of
deontological and utilitarian theories. I begin with a rough sketch of fa-
Versions of this article have been read to philosophy societies at University College, Lon-
don, Rutgers University, and the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, Oxford, Swansea,
and California-San Diego; at a conference of the Polish and British Academies in Cracow
in I988 on "Life, Death and the Law," and as a symposium paper at the Pacific Division of
the American Philosophical Association in I989. I am grateful to the many people who
contributed to the discussions of it on these occasions, and particularly to Philippa Foot and
Anne Jaap Jacobson for private discussion.
This content downloaded from 130.95.106.69 on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 09:06:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991), "Virtue Theory and Abortion",
Philosophy & Public Affairs 20(3):223-246
224 Philosophy & Public Affairs
miliar versions of the latter two sorts of theory, not, of course, with the
intention of suggesting that they exhaust the field, but on the assump-
tion that their very familiarity will provide a helpful contrast with virtue
theory. Suppose a deontological theory has basically the following frame-
work. We begin with a premise providing a specification of right action:
P. i. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a moral rule or prin-
ciple.
This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between the concepts
of right action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until one
knows what a moral rule is. So the next thing the theory .
This document summarizes several philosophical arguments for the existence of God put forth by prominent thinkers throughout history. It discusses St. Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument, Thomas Aquinas' five ways, William Paley's teleological argument, Cardinal Newman's argument from conscience, Blaise Pascal's wager, John Smith's argument from life's crucial junctures, and Rudolf Otto's argument from religious experience. It analyzes the different approaches and perspectives addressed by each argument and emphasizes the importance of building faith on a solid foundation of truly knowing God rather than blindly following what others say.
1) The author argues that Wilber's integral approach could be improved by making it more fully integral at all times of human value realization, not just at certain moments.
2) An example is given of how the descriptive, evaluative, normative, and interpretive methods are all necessary to fully understand and realize a value.
3) The author emphasizes distinguishing between epistemology and ontology when considering nondual experiences from Eastern traditions, noting that such experiences speak more to phenomenology than metaphysics.
1) The document discusses the argument from religious experience for the existence of God. It claims that religious experiences are said to offer a strong argument in favor of God, though not a conclusive proof.
2) However, criticisms of religious experiences note that they are varied, contradictory, vague, and often rely on circular reasoning by conforming to preexisting beliefs.
3) Religious experiences also cannot be confirmed since they offer no way to make accurate predictions or check the veracity of their claims, which is generally taken as evidence an explanation is faulty.
The document discusses improving Ken Wilber's integral approach by making it more fully integral. It argues that for a value to be fully realized, all quadrants (perspectives) and levels (stages of development) must be integrated at once, not just included separately. It provides an example showing that descriptive, evaluative, normative, and interpretive ways of knowing are each necessary to complete our understanding, though each is also distinct. The document suggests leading with shared non-propositional practices and pneumatology (spirit) in interfaith dialogue to foster understanding before discussing doctrinal differences.
This document discusses various views of God and identifies problems with views that differ from theism. It defines theism as the view that God created all and is both beyond the world and active within it. Other views addressed include deism, which holds God is beyond the world but not active within; finite godism, where God is limited; atheism, which denies God's existence; pantheism, where God is equivalent to the universe; polytheism; and panentheism. The document also discusses neotheism and identifies logical inconsistencies within that view.
This document discusses the relationship between faith and reason. It addresses whether faith and reason are compatible or antagonistic. It examines Pascal's Wager argument that it is rational to have faith in God due to the potential rewards and costs. It also discusses problems with this argument, such as whether one can choose what to believe, and whether faith should be presented as a gamble. The document explores whether faith can be self-authenticating or if reason can help determine if God exists. It analyzes fideism, which claims faith operates where reason has no power. It also examines reformed epistemology and whether some religious beliefs can be properly basic due to their central role in one's belief system.
1. Evangelical theology is built on the foundation of supernatural events like creation, Jesus' miracles and resurrection, and his ascension into heaven.
2. There are two definitions of miracles - the weak view that they are unusual but not contrary to nature, and the strong view that they are beyond nature's power and can only be done by God.
3. Miracles have purposes like glorifying God, accrediting his spokespeople, and providing evidence for belief in God. Skeptics argue miracles violate immutable natural laws and that evidence is always greater for regular occurrences than rare ones, but these arguments can be refuted. Believing in miracles is important to theology because
This document discusses different kinds, domains, and tests of truth. It outlines three kinds of truth - empirical, necessary, and normative truths. Empirical truths are based on experience, necessary truths are true by reason alone, and normative truths involve general agreements. The domains of truth discussed are the objective, social, and personal domains. The justification of truths corresponds to these domains, with empirical evidence for objective truths, social acceptability for social truths, and consistency and authenticity for personal truths. Three tests of truth are also outlined: the correspondence theory which evaluates if concepts match real objects/events; the coherence theory which assesses if beliefs cohere with other accepted truths; and the pragmatic theory which determines truth based on the
DOIN' WHAT COMES NATUR'LLY: TOWARD A HUMANIST THEORY OF ETHICSDr Ian Ellis-Jones
This document discusses and critiques several common theories of ethics, arguing that they are flawed. It then proposes a positive Humanist theory of ethics. The key points are:
1. Theories based on religion, majority approval, feelings, consequences, or commands are problematic for reasons like circularity, subjectivity, and avoiding the real question of what is good.
2. A Humanist theory is proposed - something is good or right if it is objectively good or right. While this may seem circular, the document argues it is not and experience allows humans to know good directly.
3. In overcoming the flaws of other theories, this theory offers a positive, objective, realistic and non-pres
The document discusses natural theology and its relationship to beliefs about God. It makes three key points:
1) Neither philosophy nor metaphysics can conclusively prove or fully describe the reality of God, but beliefs in certain concepts of God can still be justified and meaningful.
2) The reality of God and the problem of evil cannot be fully explained rationally, but invite existential responses through questions about faith and purpose.
3) Natural theology explores what is logically possible about primal realities like God, and suggests these questions are reasonable, which can justify fundamental trust in reality and shape human desires through liturgical theology.
This chapter discusses the fact-value problem in metaethics and different theories that have attempted to address it. It introduces Hume's view that one cannot derive ought from is, Moore's naturalistic fallacy that you cannot define goodness in natural terms, and Ayer's emotivism which holds that moral statements express attitudes rather than having truth values. It also covers prescriptivism proposed by Hare which sees moral judgments as having both descriptive and prescriptive elements.
This document discusses nonduality from both epistemological and ontological perspectives. It argues that nonduality has more to do with epistemology than ontology. From an epistemological standpoint, our understanding of reality is fallible and partial, but this does not deny the empirical realities of self, God, or other concepts. Ontologically, it prefers the terms "unitary" rather than "unitive" and "intraobjective" rather than "intersubjective" but notes that epistemology can model ontology to a degree. Overall, it suggests that nonduality from an epistemic approach means reality is more dynamic and process-oriented than static substances.
This document discusses arguments for the existence of God from a philosophical perspective. It outlines several common arguments including the ontological, teleological, cosmological, and moral arguments. It also discusses how humans can conceive of abstract concepts like love and emotions that have no physical form, and suggests this ability could also be an argument for why humans can conceive of God. However, the document concludes that while arguments can be made, the existence of God cannot be ultimately proven or disproven, just as absolute truth cannot be known. It compares the concept of faith in God to faith in science.
This document discusses optimizing human functioning through altruistic self-mastery with mathematical understanding, physical intelligence, biological empathetic awareness, and individual responsibility. It argues that consciousness integrates information unlike any other state of matter, and that creative mathematical understanding, combined with intelligence and awareness, allows humans to transcend rules and expand truth. It defines physical intelligence as maximizing future freedom of action, keeping options open, and resisting constraints. Biological empathetic awareness is described as having fault tolerance that increases utility. Individual responsibility involves daily work on altruistic self-mastery to guide practice, rather than as a level of attainment.
The document discusses different theories of perception from common sense realism to phenomenalism to phenomenology. It outlines some of the key ideas from each view: common sense realism holds we directly perceive objects through the senses, while representational realism and phenomenalism argue we only indirectly perceive sense data or ideas. Phenomenology, represented by Merleau-Ponty, argues knowing involves interpretation and that perception centers around attention, the body, and sensory synthesis rather than isolated sensations. The document concludes that phenomenology best accounts for the full range of human perceptual experience.
The document discusses how internalism became entrenched in philosophy due to Descartes' assumption that in a demon world, our beliefs would remain the same. For centuries after Descartes, philosophers tried to justify our beliefs about the external world by analyzing them in terms of subjective experiences. A number of philosophers, including Berkeley, Hume, and Frege, developed theories attempting to bridge the Cartesian gap between mind and world, but their theories were still framed within the Cartesian paradigm of distinguishing between subjective and objective.
Russ Shafer-Landau is a professor of philosophy who has authored and edited several books on ethics. The document discusses two types of ethical subjectivism: normative and meta-ethical. Normative subjectivism holds that an act is morally right if the person judging approves of it. Meta-ethical subjectivism claims that moral judgments cannot be true or false. The document presents arguments for each view and considers objections, such as disagreement in ethics not proving lack of objective truth and moral judgments potentially being factual beliefs that do not intrinsically motivate.
Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom.docxjesuslightbody
Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5Archetypes Of Wisdom5
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE Virtue Theory and Abortion
The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as
virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming
better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible
rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come
criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate
criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me
to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or
of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its
terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that
will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to
articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject
this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the
second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues
raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it
is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.
VIRTUE THEORY
Virtue theory can be laid out in a framework that reveals clearly some of
the essential similarities and differences between it and some versions of
deontological and utilitarian theories. I begin with a rough sketch of fa-
Versions of this article have been read to philosophy societies at University College, Lon-
don, Rutgers University, and the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, Oxford, Swansea,
and California-San Diego; at a conference of the Polish and British Academies in Cracow
in I988 on "Life, Death and the Law," and as a symposium paper at the Pacific Division of
the American Philosophical Association in I989. I am grateful to the many people who
contributed to the discussions of it on these occasions, and particularly to Philippa Foot and
Anne Jaap Jacobson for private discussion.
This content downloaded from 130.95.106.69 on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 09:06:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991), "Virtue Theory and Abortion",
Philosophy & Public Affairs 20(3):223-246
224 Philosophy & Public Affairs
miliar versions of the latter two sorts of theory, not, of course, with the
intention of suggesting that they exhaust the field, but on the assump-
tion that their very familiarity will provide a helpful contrast with virtue
theory. Suppose a deontological theory has basically the following frame-
work. We begin with a premise providing a specification of right action:
P. i. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a moral rule or prin-
ciple.
This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between the concepts
of right action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until one
knows what a moral rule is. So the next thing the theory .
This document provides an introduction to philosophy and the philosophical concept of determining truth. It begins by outlining the learning objectives and discussing how philosophy aims to acquire real knowledge and truth. It then examines various methods of philosophizing including distinguishing opinion from truth. The document explores several theories for determining truth such as correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatic theory. It also discusses fallacies that can undermine arguments. Overall, the document serves as an introductory overview of philosophical perspectives on knowledge and determining what is considered true.
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE Virtue Theory and Abortion The sort o.docxdurantheseldine
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE Virtue Theory and Abortion
The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as
virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming
better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible
rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come
criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate
criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me
to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or
of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its
terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that
will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to
articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject
this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the
second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues
raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it
is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.
VIRTUE THEORY
Virtue theory can be laid out in a framework that reveals clearly some of
the essential similarities and differences between it and some versions of
deontological and utilitarian theories. I begin with a rough sketch of fa-
Versions of this article have been read to philosophy societies at University College, Lon-
don, Rutgers University, and the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, Oxford, Swansea,
and California-San Diego; at a conference of the Polish and British Academies in Cracow
in I988 on "Life, Death and the Law," and as a symposium paper at the Pacific Division of
the American Philosophical Association in I989. I am grateful to the many people who
contributed to the discussions of it on these occasions, and particularly to Philippa Foot and
Anne Jaap Jacobson for private discussion.
This content downloaded from 130.95.106.69 on Thu, 13 Jul 2017 09:06:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991), "Virtue Theory and Abortion",
Philosophy & Public Affairs 20(3):223-246
224 Philosophy & Public Affairs
miliar versions of the latter two sorts of theory, not, of course, with the
intention of suggesting that they exhaust the field, but on the assump-
tion that their very familiarity will provide a helpful contrast with virtue
theory. Suppose a deontological theory has basically the following frame-
work. We begin with a premise providing a specification of right action:
P. i. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a moral rule or prin-
ciple.
This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between the concepts
of right action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until one
knows what a moral rule is. So the next thing the theory needs is a prem-
ise about that:
P.2. A moral rule is one that ...
Virtue ethics focuses on developing good character and moral virtues rather than rules or consequences. This essay discusses virtue ethics and how developing the virtue of patience is important for overcoming obstacles in life. The author has chosen to work on being more patient, as it is a virtue that can help deal with challenges of the present day, such as peer pressure. According to Aristotle, every virtue has a vice of excess or deficit, and patience falls in between the extremes of indifference and irritability. The author's dog helps remind them to remain patient in the mornings.
Moral ReasoningFirst published Mon Sep 15, 2003; substantive rev.docxgilpinleeanna
Moral Reasoning
First published Mon Sep 15, 2003; substantive revision Mon Feb 11, 2013
Moral reasoning is individual or collective practical reasoning about what, morally, one ought to do. Philosophical examination of moral reasoning faces both distinctive puzzles — about how we recognize moral considerations and cope with conflicts among them and about how they move us to act — and distinctive opportunities for gleaning insight about what we ought to do from how we reason about what we ought to do.
1. The Philosophical Importance of Moral Reasoning
1.1 Defining “Moral Reasoning”
This article takes up moral reasoning as a species of practical reasoning — that is, as a type of reasoning directed towards deciding what to do and, when successful, issuing in an intention (see entry on practical reason). Of course, we also reason theoretically about what morality requires of us; but the nature of purely theoretical reasoning about ethics is adequately addressed in the various articles on ethics. It is also true that, on some understandings, moral reasoning directed towards deciding what to do involves forming judgments about what one ought, morally, to do. On these understandings, asking what one ought (morally) to do can be a practical question, a certain way of asking about what to do. (See section 1.5 on the question of whether this is a distinctive practical question.) In order to do justice to the full range of philosophical views about moral reasoning, we will need to have a capacious understanding of what counts as a moral question. For instance, since a prominent position about moral reasoning is that the relevant considerations are not codifiable, we would beg a central question if we here defined “morality” as involving codifiable principles or rules. For present purposes, we may understand issues about what is right or wrong, or virtuous or vicious, as raising moral questions.
When we are faced with moral questions in daily life, just as when we are faced with child-rearing, agricultural, and business questions, sometimes we act impulsively or instinctively and sometimes we pause to reason, not just about what to do, but about what we ought to do. Jean-Paul Sartre described a case of one of his students who came to him in occupied Paris during World War II, asking advice about whether to stay by his mother, who otherwise would have been left alone, or rather to go join the forces of the Free French, then massing in England (Sartre 1975). In the capacious sense just described, this is probably a moral question; and the young man paused long enough to ask Sartre's advice. Does that mean that this young man was reasoning about his practical question? Not necessarily. Indeed, Sartre used the case to expound his skepticism about the possibility of addressing such a practical question by reasoning. But what is reasoning?
Explicit reasoning is responsibly conducted thinking, in which the reasoner, guided by her assessments of her reasons (K ...
Epistemology and the problem of knowledgeNoel Jopson
The document discusses epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, scope, and validity of knowledge. It defines epistemology and examines what constitutes knowledge, including the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. The document also explores the sources of knowledge according to rationalism and empiricism, and theories of truth such as the correspondence theory.
Module 7 OverviewEthical Nonobjectivism and Moral RealismWelco.docxmoirarandell
Module 7 Overview
Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Welcome to Module Seven. Are there moral truths? Is it actually wrong to lie, or do we just believe it is wrong? Moral nonobjectivists claim that there are no objective moral truths; that is, moral truths exist apart from ourselves. If tomorrow it suddenly became legal to leave a store without paying for an item, would you do it? Would your friends participate? This module assesses moral objectivism and moral nonobjectivism.
Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this module, you should be able to:
3D
examine the reasons why moral realism might fail.
6G
describe moral nonobjectivism.
6H
discuss the nature of ethical nonobjectivism.
6I
explain the modesty of moral realism.
Module 7 Reading Assignment
Waller, B. N. (2011). Consider ethics: Theory, readings, and contemporary issues (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson. Chapters 10 and 11.
Course Login Instructions
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Please view the Online Presentation for Module 7.
Ethical Nonobjectivism and Moral Realism
Chapter 10 Lecture Notes: Ethical Nonobjectivism
The Nature of Ethical Nonobjectivism
Ethical nonobjectivists hold that there are no objective moral facts and no objectively true moral principles. It is important to emphasize that this theory does not just believe that moral facts are difficult to discover or that we might not be sure what they are; rather, it holds that there are no objective moral truths to discover. One version of ethical nonobjectivism is emotivism or noncognitivism. According to this theory, sentences that appear to state ethical facts, such as “stealing is wrong,” are instead merely expressions of emotion and not genuine statements at all. Most contemporary nonobjectivists, however, are not emotivists; they believe that such sentences are statements, but that there are no objective facts to support these statements.
Arguments for Ethical Nonobjectivism from Moral Diversity
The key argument for ethical nonobjectivism is the argument of moral diversity. This argument focuses on the enormous diversity of moral beliefs both within cultures and cross-culturally. Many cultures around the world hold conflicting moral beliefs that cannot both be correct. If these cultures cannot agree on what is morally true, then there cannot be any moral truths to begin with.
The objectivist has two possible answers to this argument. First, the great divergence of moral opinion is more ...
This document summarizes the key differences between rationalism and empiricism in epistemology. Rationalism claims that some knowledge comes from reason alone, independently of sense experience, through intuition or innate ideas/knowledge. Empiricism claims that all knowledge comes from sense experience. The debate between rationalism and empiricism concerns the extent to which we depend on sense experience to gain knowledge about the external world.
Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief Robert Adams [I have.docxmoirarandell
Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief
Robert Adams
[I have discussed the topics of this paper for several years in classes at the
University of Michigan and UCLA, with students and colleagues to whom I am
indebted in more ways than I can now remember. I am particularly grateful to
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Bernard Kobes, and Barry Miller for their comments on the
penultimate draft.]
Moral arguments were the type of theistic argument most characteristic of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More recently they have become one of
philosophy's abandoned farms. The fields are still fertile, but they have not
been cultivated systematically since the latest methods came in. The rambling
Victorian farmhouse has not been kept up as well as similar structures, and
people have not been stripping the sentimental gingerbread off the porches to
reveal the clean lines of argument. This paper is intended to contribute to the
remedy of this neglect. It will deal with quite a number of arguments, because I
think we can understand them better if we place them in relation to each other.
This will not leave time to be as subtle, historically or philosophically, as I
would like to be, but I hope I will be able to prove something more than my own
taste for Victoriana.
I
Let us begin with one of the most obvious, though perhaps never the most
fashionable, arguments on the farm: an Argument from the Nature of Right and
Wrong. We believe quite firmly that certain things are morally right and others
are morally wrong (for example, that it is wrong to torture another person to
death just for fun). Questions may be raised about the nature of that which is
believed in these beliefs: what does the rightness or wrongness of an act
consist in? I believe that the most adequate answer is provided by a theory that
entails the existence of God--specifically, by the theory that moral rightness
and wrongness consist in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will
or commands of a loving God. One of the most generally accepted reasons for
believing in the existence of anything is that its existence is implied by the
theory that seems to account most adequately for some subject matter. I take it,
therefore, that my metaethical views provide me with a reason of some weight for
believing in the existence of God.
Perhaps some will think it disreputably "tender-minded" to accept such a reason
where the subject matter is moral. It may be suggested that the epistemological
status of moral beliefs is so far inferior to that of physical beliefs, for
example, that any moral belief found to entail the existence of an otherwise
unknown object ought simply to be abandoned. But in spite of the general
uneasiness about morality that pervades our culture, most of us do hold many
moral beliefs with almost the highest degree of confidence. So long as we think
it reasonable to argue at all from grounds that are not absolutely certain,
...
This document discusses theories of normative ethics including subjectivism, objectivism, and emotivism. Subjectivism claims that moral judgments are neither true nor false but depend on individual psychology. Objectivism claims moral judgments can be objectively true or false. The document outlines arguments for and against both subjectivism and objectivism. Emotivism, developed by David Hume, claims that moral judgments are emotional expressions of approval or disapproval rather than statements of fact.
This document provides an overview of educational philosophies from various parts of the world. It discusses the philosophical foundations of education including metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and axiology. It examines the philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shintoism. The key ideas are that Eastern philosophies see time as cyclical and integrate thinking and living. Chinese philosophy emphasizes propriety, order, and following nature. Indian philosophies include Hinduism's caste system and concept of karma, while Buddhism teaches the four noble truths and eightfold path to end suffering. Japanese philosophy centered on Shintoism and worship of kami spirits.
12/04/17
1
Introduc0on to Philosophy
Theory of Value 1
Theory of Value
• Theory of Value is about things which are good or bad, right or wrong,
concerning issues related to how one ought to behave and to what
makes life valuable
• Broadly, there are two types of issues we are going to discuss:
1. Are statements of value, like ‘You ought to do this’, because ‘it is good
to do this’ and ‘This person is a good person’ and ‘Pleasure is good’,
true/false, or are they not the kind of things which can be true/false?
If no, you are subjec,vist.
If yes, there is a next ques0on: How are such statements true/false?
If because of reality, then you are a realist
If because someone determined it so, then you are a
conven,onalist
> God: Divine Command Theory
> Society: Ethical Rela,vism
> Individual: cf. Existen,alism
Theory of Value II
2. What makes valuable/good ac0ons good?
Ø We are going to discuss three views:
a. U,litarianism: an ac0on is good if and only if it
maximizes the amount of pleasure/absence of
pain or distress in society.
b. Kan,anism: an ac0on is good if you could turn it
into a ra0onal law
c. Aristotelianism: an ac0on is good if it
contributes to or flows from your well-
func0oning as a human being
Subjec0vism
• Statements of value are neither true nor false
• Perhaps they are more like expressions of liking/disliking?
(emo0vism)
• Some ini,al arguments for subjec0vism:
Ø There is a lot of disagreement on value - therefore value is
subjec0ve
Ø What is true or false describes what is the case; but a value
statement does not describe what is the case, but what ought to be
the case – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only what is the case can be true/false
– can be a fact
Ø What is true or false describes natural proper0es; but according to
the meaning of value statements, they do not describe natural
proper0es – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only natural (observable) proper0es
can be described in true/false statements – only they appear in facts.
12/04/17
2
Some ‘Stronger’ Arguments for
Subjec0vism
1. There is no reasoning in ethics, while there is in science, because
there is nothing really to reason about
Ø But there is a lot of reasoning in ethics, at least to check consistency
2. There are no observa0ons in ethics, while there are in science,
because there is nothing really there to observe
Ø But we do make ethical observa0ons, at least of par0cular cases
3. Disagreement in ethics cannot really be solved, for there is no path
towards agreement one can agree about, while in science there are
ways of ul0mately finding out (and if not, it does not ma_er)
Ø Sober’s cri0cism: one can fail to see the truth in ethics because of,
say, self-interest or self-decep0on > so there might be truth, even if
there is no path to agreement
Ø But in ethics, failure ...
Virtue, Ethics and Morality in Business Essay
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This document is a thesis submitted by Christopher Aaron Simpson to the University of Texas at Austin in partial fulfillment of a Master of Arts degree. The thesis argues that non-cognitivism, a view of ethics that ethical thoughts are motivational and ethical sentences express those thoughts, cannot account for ethical explanation. The thesis lays groundwork by introducing non-cognitivism, locating the challenge of accounting for ethical explanation, describing the embedding problem faced by non-cognitivism, and considering Allan Gibbard's response. It then presents problem cases where non-cognitivism cannot give plausible accounts of the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences used to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. It concludes non-cognitivism cannot
Similar to A realist and internalist response to one of mackie's arguments from queerness. Torbjörn Tännsjö (16)
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A realist and internalist response to one of mackie's arguments from queerness. Torbjörn Tännsjö
1. A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness
Author(s): Torbjörn Tännsjö
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 172, No. 2 (February 2015), pp. 347-357
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24704196
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3. 348 T. Tannsjo
Here I am only concerned with his argument from queerness and, in particular, his
discussion about prescriptivity. This is how he states the premise of his general
argument from queerness:
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
universe.1
What, then, would be strange (queer) about them? This is how he puts the argument
from the putative queerness of prescriptivity. He explains, with reference to Plato's
idea of the Form of the Good, what this kind prescriptivity, or intrinsic to-be
pursuedness, would amount to:
The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with
both a direction and an overriding motive; something's being good both tells
the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it.2
A fairly standard answer from non-naturalist moral realists to this objection from
prescriptive queerness goes as follows. Mackie is right when he insists that a
property, acting at a distance, magnetically as it were, providing us with an
overriding motive would be a very strange (queer) property. However, he is wrong
when he believes that we attribute such a property to an action when we claim that it
is right. We do attribute an objective property, they claim. However, we do not
attribute any inherently motivating property. But is not this a counter-intuitive
response? Is Mackie not right in his insistence that there is a close connection
between moral properties, and motivation?
He is, or, at least, he is close to the mark. Mackie is wrong when he believes that
we take moral properties as such to motivate us to act, when we learn about them,
but our moral beliefs have such a tendency. Even when we hold false moral beliefs
we are somewhat motivated to act on them, one could add. In this most non
naturalist moral realists concur. And here is their standard explanation of our
'internalist' intuition to the effect that there is a close connection between moral
belief (rather than moral properties as such) and motivation. It is certainly true that
most people, when they believe that an action ought to be done, have some incentive
to perform this action. But this does not mean that the property of obligatoriness as
such has any inherent magnetic force attached to it, which is released when we
become acquainted with it. It is because most people care about doing their duty
that they are somewhat inclined to do a certain action, once they acknowledge that it
is obligatory.
This motivation could be explained along the following lines: Given a non
naturalist objectivist semantic account of normative language, normative judge
ments, such as most typically the expression of obligations, have, not only truth
values, but satisfaction-values as well. The proposition that I ought to do F can be
satisfied or not satisfied. It is satisfied, if I do F, and it is not satisfied, if I don't. And
1 Mackie (1977. p. 38).
2 Ibid. (p. 40), my italics.
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4. Response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness 349
we take an interest in these satisfaction-values. These satisfaction-values explain
what it means for norms to be 'prescriptive', or what it means for it to give us
'direction'. And our general interest in having them satisfied explains our
motivation in a particular case. The same goes for judgements to the effect that it
is wrong to F. This judgement is satisfied if we do not F. Our normative vocabulary
contains also judgements to the effect that it is all right to F (F is right). This
judgement is satisfied regardless of whether we do F or not. Hence, we take no
special practical interest in it. In the sequel I will just discuss norms proper, i.e.
judgements to the effect that we ought to F or to the effect that it is wrong to F,
having both necessary and sufficient satisfaction-conditions.
The internalist may object, however, and correctly so I believe, and Mackie
himself would have been well advised to concur,3 that the empirical fact that most
people care to have their favoured norms satisfied does not fully explain our
internalist intuition to the effect that, necessarily, if you believe that you ought to do
F, you have at least some motive to do F. However, given the notion of satisfaction
of norms, we can indeed explain this intuition, without having recourse to the idea
that normative properties are inherently motivating. This is how we can do it.
2 A new internalism
Let us return to the satisfaction values and truth-values of a norm and consider them
more in detail. We then see that, after all, there is a sense in which, necessarily, if
we hold a normative view, we are inclined to act on it. This is, as I will show, a
conceptual truth.
The moral non-naturalist realist believes that when we pass moral (normative)
judgements we express propositions capable of being true or false and believes also
that there are true moral propositions, i.e. moral (normative) facts, existing
independently of our conceptualisation. How does this view square with internalism,
the view that, necessarily, if someone believes an action to be wrong, then this person
has at least some motive to avoid performing the action? Moral realism, in a non
naturalist version often defended in these days,4 is consistent with internalism. The
(best) explanation is as follows. Internalism is a conceptual truth, explained by the
nature of moral beliefs in combination with how sometimes we use the word 'accept'.
As we will see, my account is inconsistent with naturalism, both in a conceptual and
an ontological form. I see this as a strong aspect of my account. I can explain what is
lost in the transaction, when normative terms or properties are reduced to, or identified
with, non-moral terms, to wit, their normativity (their satisfaction-conditions).
On an objectivist and non-naturalist understanding of moral language the content
of beliefs such as the belief that it is wrong for P at t to F has both truth-values and
satisfaction-values, then. The content of this belief, which is a moral proposition to the
effect that it is wrong for P at t to F, is true if and only if it is wrong for P at t to F; the
' See Dreier (2010, p. 82), for an argument to the extent that Mackie 'mislocated' the problem to the
object of moral beliefs rather than to the beliefs themselves.
4 For example by Parfit (2011) and Tannsjo (2010).
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5. 350 T. Tannsjo
content of this belief is satisfied by P at t if and only if, at t, P does not F. And the moral
principle that we ought to maximise the sum total of happiness in the universe is true,
if and only if we ought to maximise the sum total of happiness in the universe. It is
satisfied if and only if every action in the universe does maximise the sum total of
happiness. The case with moral tightness (permissions), as indicated above, is a bit
different. The content of my belief that it is right for P at t to F is satisfied if P does F at
t. This is a sufficient criterion. There is no corresponding necessary condition. This is
part of the explanation behind the fact that beliefs in actions being right do not connect
in any close manner to motivation. Yet, when there are some alternatives open to an
agent that are each all right for her to perform, then it is also true of the alternatives
outside the set of these permissible alternatives, that they are wrong. And here we
meet with both sufficient and necessary satisfaction-conditions.
If we have objective moral beliefs (in objective moral propositions), then we are
not said to 'accept' these propositions unless we are to some extent behaving in
certain manners. If I believe that it is wrong to F, then I do not also believe that it is
all right to F, for example. If I believe that it is wrong to F, then I am prepared to
'conditionalise' on this belief. This is constitutive of my having the belief in the first
place. This is no different from my 'having' ordinary non-moral beliefs. And, in a
sense, we may say that I do 'have' moral beliefs, if I just conform to this (regular)
behavioural pattern of having beliefs in general in my dealings with moral
propositions. We may then say that I 'accept' some moral propositions. We may
speak of this kind of acceptance or belief as theoretical.
However, since moral propositions, on the objectivist and non-naturalist
understanding of moral language, have not only truth-values but also satisfaction
values, there exists also another way in which we can accept them. The term
'accept' is indeed ambiguous when applied to our attitude to moral propositions. So
we had better disambiguate here. In one sense, my conforming to standard
behavioural patterns connected with belief in general are sufficient for saying that I
have accepted a certain moral proposition. However, since the moral proposition (at
least if it is normative in character) has satisfaction-values as well, there is a sense in
which I have not really 'accepted' it unless I am not only prepared to conditionalise
on it in my theoretical moral thinking; I must also to be somewhat motivated
towards satisfying its demands. This is how we (at least most of us, at least most of
the time)5 tend to speak of people 'accepting' moral propositions, or 'having' moral
beliefs. So the internalist intuition that it is impossible to accept that it is wrong to F,
and yet not be in the least motivated not to F, is correct.
3 Tresan's related notion of internalism
My view here defended may seem reminiscent of a position defended by
Jonathan Tresan. It is different however, and it is simpler as well as more
5 There are philosophers who have reported that they have no such internalist intuition; this may be true
of them, and they may use the term "accept' differently from how most of us do. Generalizations in the
philosophy of language rarely come entirely without exceptions.
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6. Response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness 351
general.6 According to Tresan, we have a concept of a moral judgement such
that we do not count a judgement as moral unless it involves motivation (Tresan
2006, 2009). My view here does not rely on any special notion of a moral
judgement, however. It relies on our understanding of what it means to accept a
normative proposition. If there are other genuine norms than moral ones (such as
epistemic norms, for example), they are covered as well by my explanation. Any
proposition with satisfaction-values can be 'accepted' in the relevant practical
sense.
It may seem that my view is not so different from Tresan
postulated connection between acceptance and motivation doesn't j
with the meaning of 'acceptance'. For it is only when the ter
coupled with a normative proposition that we have the post
connection. Isn't that in effect to say what Tresan says, that it is
relevant content is accompanied by the right sort of attitude that w
a moral belief?7
But there is a clear difference. On my account the notion of m
role whatever. Whether I have accepted the norm in question has n
how we classify my acceptance, as moral or as non-moral.
Moreover, and most importantly, according to Tresan, the
necessarily, if a person accepts that she is obligated to F, she is m
is, as he puts it, de dicto. It has nothing to do with the conte
judgement as such. If we accept Tresan's terminology, we may say
is at least partly de re. It explains the necessity with reference to
norms, i.e. to the fact that they have satisfaction conditions. And i
me that the internalist intuition that should be explained is indeed
It might be objected, however, that my kind of internalism only a
i.e. to moral judgements having satisfaction-values. What are we t
moral judgements, such as value judgements? Well, on some
accounts value judgements are normative judgements in disguise. If
too are captured by my analysis. On other counts there are value
cannot be reduced to normative claims. They may still have norm
implications. Or, as Mackie puts it, the main ethical uses of value ter
supposed intrinsic requirements' (Mackie 1977, p. 63). If they make
or have such implications, they are covered by my analysis. If the
they imply no normative claims whatever, then they are not covere
But this is as it should be, I submit. We should not expect that va
having no normative conceptual implications connect in this c
motivation. Regardless of whether these value judgements belo
somehow defined, or not, it is not to be expected that internalism is t
is a problem for Tresan that if they exist they are covered by his anal
aspect of my analysis that they if they exist they are not covered b
6 To my knowledge, my view has not been stated by anyone before me, even if I bel
occurred to many who have thought about the problem. It is not mentioned in B
where Tresan's related view is discussed.
7 I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
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7. 352 T. Tannsjo
My claim is that my analysis is also in a sense more general than Tresan's. The
idea of a practical acceptance does not only cover norms but imperatives as well,
since imperatives, too, have satisfaction-conditions. You can satisfy 'Shut the door!'
by shutting the door. But no one would speak of 'Shut the door!' as a moral claim.
Of course, since imperatives have no truth-conditions, they can only be accepted in
the practical manner. And there are ordinary factual propositions, such as the
proposition that snow is white, which can only be accepted in the theoretical
manner. According to normative realism in it non-naturalist version, however,
norms have both truth-conditions and satisfaction-conditions. That's why they can
be accepted in both a theoretical and a practical manner.
My analysis generalises also to cases where we meet with categorical normative
facts that are socially constructed. Such facts are objective in a weak sense. They are
objective in the sense that we may be wrong about them. They are not objective in a
strong sense, however. They obtain only because we act and judge in a certain
manner. It may be natural for example to think of rules of etiquette in this manner.8
It is wrong, categorically, to put your elbows on the table when eating. The
requirement not to put your elbows on the table when eating can be accepted in both
a theoretical and a practical sense. However, because it is an objective fact only in
the weak sense, because it does not obtain independently of how we act and judge
our actions, it seems to lack what Mackie calls 'authority'. I suppose that, when I
feel no inclination to abide by such a requirement, I also tend to reject it in the
theoretical sense, and turn to a different understanding of it: 'According to etiquette,
you are not allowed to put your elbows on the table when eating', I will think. And
this is a description with no satisfaction-conditions.
Furthermore, if moral notions and properties can be reduced to non-moral notions
or properties, my account does not capture them. If some kind of naturalistic
analysis of moral language or moral facts had been correct, my analysis would have
failed. As noted at the beginning of this paper, I see this as a strong aspect of my
view. My view can explain what is more exactly that is lost in the reduction of the
normative to something non-normative, to wit, the satisfaction conditions. This is
just another way of saying that what is typically normative is lost.
It is finally of note that if my account is correct we can explain why a person who
claims that it is obligatory to F contextually seems to imply that he has some
motivation to F; this has to do with a very general feature; when we assert that p.
then we also contextually imply that we believe that (accept that) p. This is true not
only for ordinary theoretical acceptance, but for practical acceptance of norms as
well. For a discussion on this theme, see Copp (2009).
4 Is the notion of prescriptivity queer as such?
When I read Mackie's reference to Plato above I read him as saying: the Form of the
Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction (which
8 Tannsjij (2007).
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8. Response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness 353
is not as such queer) and an overriding motive (which is indeed queer). Could one
not read him differently: the Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides
the knower with both a direction (which is in itself queer) and an overriding motive
(which is also queer)? I don't think the latter interpretation is correct and it is
certainly not a charitable one. This, however, is how he is often understood in these
days; it originated with Richard Garner, who wrote:
It is hard to believe in objective prescriptivity because it is hard to make sense
of a demand without a demander, and hard to find a place for demands or
demanders apart from human interests and conventions. We know what it is
for our friends, our job, and our projects to make demands on us, but we do not
know what it is for reality to do so.9
It would spell problem for my kind of internalism, if the very notion of
prescripitivity, i.e. of a norm giving direction, or a requirement, in abstraction from
anyone making it, were queer. But is it?
It is true that Mackie did not think that genuine normative requirements exist in
the world. That there are no such genuine normative requirements is the thesis he
wants to establish with his argument from queerness. But how could Mackie find
genuine norms or requirements as such queerl He must believe they are queer, if
he wants to state an argument from queerness to moral nihilism or anti-realism
(these are not the words Mackie himself uses for his metaphysical denial that there
are objective moral properties actually instantiated, but the terms are to the point
and they have been common in contemporary discussion about his view). Is
Garner right when he insists that it is 'hard to make sense of a demand without a
demander'?
I think not. In order to do so we must only be able to tell what demand is made,
on a certain occasion, by someone making a demand on us. We can abstract the
demand from the one making it in the same way that we can abstract a proposition
from a person expressing it (when stating a fact). Norms, genuine requirements,
giving you direction, aren't in themselves queer. We can think of them, in
abstraction from anyone issuing them, and ponder, for example, their logical
relations. Emotivists, of course, deny this but their denial flies in the face of moral
phenomenology, and it is a strong aspect of Mackie's objectivist view of moral
language that he need not resort to a denial of the existence of moral propositions.
We meet with them, and we identify them with reference to both their truth
conditions and their satisfaction-conditions. But, if so, Mackie's argument cannot
be that norms are so queer in this regard that they cannot be part of the world.
And if they are part of the world, then we really have obligations. The fact that
they are real also explains why they seem, in a sense, unavoidable to us. The fact
that they are real grants them a kind of authority in their own right, regardless of
our attitudes.
This does not mean, however, that according to moral realism, reality makes
demands on us, in a way similar to how we make demands on one another. This is a
9 Garner (1990, p. 143).
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9. 354 T. Tiinnsjo
mischaracterisation—a caricature, as it were—of moral realism on the part of
Garner. If this were a correct characterization of moral realism, if moral realism
implied the claim that reality 'spoke' to us, then it would indeed be queer.
I suppose that when Garner in his caricature assumes that the moral (non
naturalist) realist believes that nature makes demands on us, this is because he
thinks that there cannot be any such thing as a demand, without anyone making it.
There cannot be a requirement, if there is no one making it. So even if we can
abstract a content from a demand made by an agent at a certain time, for example
that a person, P, ought to give away his money to the poor, there is no way to
understand the content of this demand, this requirement, to the effect that P ought to
give away his money to the poor, in the absence of someone demanding of him that
he do give away his money to the poor.
This move would work against a person who claims that the content of
imperatives such as 'Shut the door!' could exist in the absence of anyone issuing
them. Imperatives are not truth-apt. But norms are different. Norms are truth-apt.
We can identify norms with reference to their truth-conditions.
Suppose I perform a token of the speech-act to describe something. This
individual and concrete act of mine, taking place at a particular time, has an
abstract content, a proposition. We can assess the truth of the proposition in
abstraction from the concrete act of asserting it. As a matter of fact, there are true
propositions that no one has ever thought of, let alone asserted. In a similar vein, if
I perform a token of the speech act to require something, this individual and
concrete act of mine has an abstract content, a proposition (to the effect that
something is required). This abstract requirement has truth-conditions. The moral
nihilist can argue that these truth-conditions are never satisfied. That is what
Mackie wants to show. But it is hard to see how the moral nihilist could convince
us that we cannot understand them in the abstract. The assumption that we cannot
understand them cannot work as a premise in an argument in defence of moral
nihilism.
If moral (normative) non-naturalistic realism is true then there are, objectively
existing, demands, in the form of true normative propositions, or, to put it in terms
of facts, there are normative facts obtaining, to the effect that we ought to do so and
so. Or, to put it in an ontologically speaking even more parsimonious manner, there
are things we ought to do.
The claim is not that it is obvious that there are such facts. The claim is merely
that it is comprehensible that there are such facts. We need not invoke any ideas of
anyone urging us to comply with the relevant norms to understand them. There is
nothing queer with normative facts or requirements as such.
5 A turn to reasons
As I indicated, Garner's argument has been accepted and repeated by many, bu
these days it is often stated differently, namely in terms of moral reasons rather t
in terms of norms or demands. Here is one example from Olson:
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10. Response to one of Mackie's arguments from queemess 355
The kind of objective prescriptivity Mackie did object to is one that involves
categorical reasons.10
The stress on 'categorical' is there to indicate that these reasons are genuine ones; they
are not 'technical' in nature or of what R. M. Hare used to call values in inverted
commas'1 (i.e. they are not hidden empirical claims cast in normative terminology like,
for example: 'if you want to cut that tree you ought to purchase an axe'). The latter kind
of 'norms' may be seen as elliptical empirical statements with no satisfaction values at
all, to the mere effect that you won't be able to cut the tree unless you purchase an axe.
Incidentally, I think 'categorical' a misnomer here, since even hypothetical norms can be
genuine norms, such as: 'if an action does not maximise the sum-total of happiness in the
universe, it is wrong'. However, what makes this count as a genuine norm is, I suppose,
the fact that from it, together a non-moral proposition ('This action does not maximise
the sum-total of happiness in the universe') we can derive a categorical norm: 'This
action is wrong'. Let us keep this in mind when I continue my argument. The focus here
is on genuine and objective prescriptions, not on technical norms. Or, to put it in terms of
reasons, the focus is on genuine reasons, not on technical ones.
According to some authors, to have a (conclusive) reason to perform an action,
or, having most reasons to perform it, amounts to no more, and no less, than to
having a genuine obligation to perform it; Parfit adopts this stance in (Parfit 2011).
If this how Olson is using the word 'reason', then, in the quoted passage, we just
meet with Garner's objection put in other words. I have then answered it. But other
philosophers have taken the notion of a genuine moral reason to constitute a moral
explanation of why we ought to perform the action in question; this is the view
defended by Tannsjo (2010) and by Broome (2004). On my understanding, this
explanation of the obligation will refer to various non-moral facts, and a moral
principle, together making the moral fact obtain. On Broome's understanding, the
notion of an explanation is taken as primitive. Still, also according to him, a non
moral fact makes something a normative fact.
If this is how Olson understands the notion of a categorical reason, then one may
wonder how non-normative facts can make actions right or wrong. We here meet
with an entirely different objection from queerness, of course. When Olson claims
that 'moral facts entail facts about categorical reasons and moral claims entail
claims about categorical reasons',12 he (in the latter of these two claims) speaks of
something Mackie did indeed find queer, to wit, the fact that a moral fact is
supposed to obtain 'because' a non-moral fact obtains. Mackie had also an argument
to the effect that the very notion of moral facts supervening on, or being
consequential upon, non-moral ones, was queer. In Mackie's own words:
Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is
supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with
its natural features... The wrongness must somehow be 'consequential' or
10 Olson (2011, p. 64).
11 See for example Hare (1952, p. 164).
12 Ibid.
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11. 356 T. Tiinnsjo
'supervenient'; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just
what in the world is signified by this 'because'?13
This is a different argument from queerness, however, and it has nothing to do with
prescriptivity as such; I have discussed it elsewhere,14 and will say no more about it
in the present context.
6 Yet another argument from queerness?
Finally, could Mackie not be taken to argue, simply, that objective prescriptions are
queer because they constitute a superfluous (not necessary) addition to our
'ordinary' empiricist ontology? So, even if prescriptivity is not queer as such,
objective prescriptivity is queer—for this simple reason.
Something Mackie writes about 'companions in guilt' does indeed suggest such a
reading of his argument. What if there are other entities, such as our ideas about
essence, number, identity, diversity and so forth, some of which may resist our
attempts to construct, on empiricist foundations, an account of them, he asks
himself, and gives the following answer:
If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment,
then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the
targets of the argument from queerness.15
One way of understanding him is as I have just indicated. This, however, strikes me
as an extremely dull interpretation. His argument from queerness, on this
understanding of him, collapses into this single one: entities we cannot account
for in empiricist terms are not real (or should not be taken to be real). The only
function of the word 'queer' then is rhetorical.
But another and more charitable interpretation of the quoted passage is also
possible. One could speak of it as the challenge interpretation. According to the
challenge interpretation, if there are necessities or essences, that do not form part of
our empiricist understanding of the universe, then Mackie takes upon himself to find
some peculiar aspects of each and any one of them in which they are queer, apart
from being additions to our empiricist understanding of the universe—in the manner
he claims to have done with moral properties.
7 Conclusion
Mackie has not, in the part of his argument from queerness with which I have h
been engaged,16 been able to show that categorical (genuine) norms or categoric
13 Ibid. (p. 41).
14 Tannsjo (2010).
15 Mackie (1977, p. 39).
16 1 have said nothing to answer the epistemic aspect of his argument from queemess, to the effect t
even if objective prescriptive properties existed, we would not be able to gain knowledge of them. Th
his most serious challenge to the moral realist. I discuss and try to answer it in Tannsjo (2010).
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12. Response to one of Mackie's arguments from queerness 357
normative claims are so queer that they cannot form part of the fabric of the
universe. If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral
realist claims, then we can also explain why—and we need not deny that—strong
(conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because
of any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, but
because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) 'accepted' a
normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that
its satisfaction-conditions are actually met).
Acknowledgments I thank Jens Johansson, Victor Moberger, Jonas Olson, and an anonymous reviewer
for the journal, as well as the joint Uppsala/Stockholm Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy for
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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