HSSE Transition Through Project Phases

HSSE IN TRANSITION THROUGH
PROJECT PHASES
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HSSE
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A Case Study of Pearl GTL

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HSSE in Transition through Project Phases
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FOREWORD
This is the first edition of a book that “tells the story” about a specific subject that is important in the
CSU phase of a project and is part of a series of Books.
It appears that a lot of people in the Shell organisation are very interested in learning from Pearl GTL
and how it could be used to benefit their own projects. This shows that we have an organisation
that wants to be a “learning organisation”, and we should do all that we can to help encourage that
mindset. In addition to technical learnings, there are management and organisational aspects. This
means that telling the integrated story of all these learnings is not so easy. This initiative tries to create
a comprehensive story for specific subjects and could be seen as a contribution to the CSU Lessons
Learned post Train 2 start-up initiative. Also, it could potentially contribute to the WEB based Pearl
GTL Lessons Learned initiative.
Each book is standardised and consists of three parts. The central part is a document of
approximately 40 to 50 pages which ‘tells’ the management-, strategic-, interface- elements
called ‘The Book’. To assist in the initial engagement, a slide set of 15 to 20 slides has also been
developed. ‘The Book’ can be used as back-up and reference material thereafter. The third part
contains all the attachments, hard core examples and deliverables, details and procedures.
The references between the documents are structured: at the start of each paragraph, in bullet format,
the key messages are given; these key messages are also contained in the slide set. In ‘The Book’,
if applicable, cross reference is made to the hard core deliverables (attachments). The index of the
attachments (part 3), contains references to the paragraphs in the book.
Part 1
The Slide Set
The Bullet Points
The Bullet Points
The Attachment No.
The Paragraph No.Part 2
The Book
Part 3
The Attachments
OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE
By design, the content has not been generalised considering the essential details will be lost. The
philosophy is that the book ‘tells the story’ as to how it has been done on the Pearl GTL project. At
the end of ‘The Book’, there is a chapter called “what could be done better”. However, it is for the
individual reader to adjust the total process, including the suggestions for improvement to the specific
circumstances and needs of their project.
This initiative was an attempt to consolidate the experience from multiple groups of people about
specific subjects on a project and to make sure that diverse views and perspectives were included.
I would like to thank all the people who have contributed to the content of these books and for their
assistance in making the processes a success.
As this initiative in itself is a learning experience, feedback and suggestions for improvement are
welcome.
I hope you find it beneficial.
Maurice van den Broek

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
5.8 Asset MS & HSSE MS development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.9 Integrated Offshore and Onshore Operational HSSE Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.10 Work Process to Identify High Risk and Severity 5 Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.11 Risks Related to Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.12 Identify Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.13 Manage Identified Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.14 Implementing Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.15 Asset HSSE MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.16 Key points for reflection: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.17 Further thoughts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.18 Construction and Commissioning HSSE MS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.19 Commitment and Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.20 Implementing Policy through Objectives, Targets and Key Performance Indicators . . . . . 33
6. CSU HSSE ORGANISATION, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2 CSU HSSE Implementation Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7. HSSE CRITICAL PROCESSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2 My starting point - Five Critical Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3 Other Critical Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8. AND FINALLY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.1 At the start of a Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.2 What should a CSU HSSE Implementation Manager/Safety Lead do?. . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.3 Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4 Governance and Control: Transition from Construction to Commissioning. . . . . . . . . . .64
8.5 HSSE Management Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.6 HSSE Organisation Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.7 Safety Districts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.8 HSSE Critical Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FOREWORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview of the Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. THE CONSTRUCTION SAFETY AND WELFARE STORY AT PEARL GTL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 CEO Leadership: CEO Summits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Worker Welfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6 Incident and Injury Free (IIF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.7 Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.8 Life Critical Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.9 Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.10 There was more…. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.11 Key Messages: Five Focus Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. HSSE IMPLEMENTATION IN A PROJECT ENVIRONMENT: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE. . . . 12
3.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Start Making Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 What else?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. HSSE CULTURE TRANSITION FROM CONSTRUCTION INTO CSU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1 Construction HSSE Culture: IIF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Commissioning HSSE Culture: IIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 Start-Up HSSE Culture: Goal Zero. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. HSSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2 Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3 HSSE Manual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4 HSSE Case(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.5 Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.6 Critical Processes – Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.7 HSSE Plans and Journey Book. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

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LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION
Where do you start when you want to tell a story about the Health, Safety, Security, and Environment
(HSSE) performance that was achieved by 52,000+ construction workers and a Commissioning and
Start-Up (CSU) organisation of approximately 3,500 Shell employees and contractors (or as we say
at Pearl GTL – Partners)?
Whilst the HSSE “story” will concentrate and focus on what was done and achieved during CSU,
reference and relevance to the fantastic achievements during construction and what lessons were
learnt will be made.
During the periods that the plant was under construction, being within meters of plant under
commissioning, and next to equipment already started up… What was it that helped us stay
in control?
Robust governance with clear controls and standards for each phase, excellent communication, clear
segregation and adequate separation of activities that potentially conflicted, “in the field visible
supervision”, and much more, were all needed to ensure that our people worked and went home
safely. This took an enormous amount of planning, flexibility, organisation and control. We did not
sacrifice hard won performances by succumbing to schedule pressure, as it would have led to short
cuts with the eventual and inevitable deterioration in performance.
If management and supervision had portrayed behavior that put into question whether the Company’s
core values were only words and not deeds at Pearl GTL, the impact on our vast workforce
would have been incalculable. I am happy to say that this did not happen and it is a testimony to
senior leadership that their commitment to HSSE and the welfare of all who worked at Pearl GTL
was paramount. In my 40 years of Company service, I have never seen this level of commitment
demonstrated day-to-day, over the whole course of a project, by so many leaders.
That is not to say that we did everything right, exactly to plan, or without incident. Our story will also
share with openness when things did not go right, when things just went wrong; and in some areas
with hindsight, where we would do things differently.
I hope that there are insights for you to learn. I hope that parts of our story re-enforces what you
already know and do. Above all, if there is only one thing that you gain from reading this story that
is new or you will do differently or better that prevents just one person from being hurt, I am sure that
you will agree that reading our story was well worthwhile.
Colin Hunt, CSU HSSE Implementation manager, Pearl GTL (2008 – 2012).

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2. THE CONSTRUCTION SAFETY AND WELFARE STORY AT PEARL GTL
What could have happened
Unmitigated scenario – projected situation
without case for change
What happened
Mitigated situation – performance on
Pearl GTL
■ 25 predicted fatalities
■ 190 Non Accidental Deaths (NADs)
■ NAD rate of 1.2 deaths/1000man
years, or 2x Sakhalin
■ Large number of riots, strikes with potential
impact on progress (+associated NPV impact)
■ Construction fatality
■ 53 Non Accidental Deaths (NADs)
■ NAD rate of 0.3 deaths/1000man
years, a third of what had been anticipated
and over 30% lower than Sakhalin LNG.
■ Limited number of cases of worker unrest
considering size of workforce, no strikes
(no impact on NPV)
Figure 1: Pearl GTL safety performance versus unmitigated projection.
2.2 LEADERSHIP
The Pearl GTL Managing Director and Qatar Country Chairman, Andy Brown, set the standard for
the entire organisation by committing to stay overnight twice per month at the Pearl village where
Pearl GTL workers lived. This commitment was delivered on, not just fine words, but committed action
over the course of the Project.
An overnight stay would allow early morning attendance at tool box talks. Early morning meant a
4:30 a.m. call from bed and being in attendance on site between 5 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. This would
be followed by various engagements with workers over the course of the day as construction work
progressed. Work would be observed, workers would be listened to, and when needed intervention
would take place while maintaining respect.
The style of leadership adopted at Pearl GTL helped to create a culture that would bring closer all
parties involved in construction and in doing so, strengthen values of respect, team work and care for
each other.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The construction phase that would result in a massive, complex facility being built, involving the toil
of 52,000 plus workers in conditions of extreme heat, humidity, dust, and sand would present major
challenges to face and overcome. Performance measures of cost, schedule, the safety of people,
their welfare and many more indicators framed the challenge ahead. It was however an analysis by
project leadership during the early days of Construction that clearly placed the safety and welfare of
all workers involved in building Pearl GTL as the biggest challenge of all.
Based on the average industry performance, a project the size of Pearl GTL (>500 million hours
worked, 52,000 people on site at peak, >290 million km driven) would result in approximately 25
fatalities. Senior leadership recoiled at this possibility. The reality that potentially 25 people could lose
their lives building Pearl GTL was an outcome senior leadership would not accept. Things would have
to be different at Pearl GTL.
As a start, Senior Project Leadership identified five key focus areas that were seen as fundamental to
achieve performance that all could be proud of. In doing so, the mindset that was quickly developed
was one fatality over the course of construction was one too many. Other things were done of
course, but the pursuit of excellence in the five key focus areas remained a priority.
The five key focus areas were:
■■ Leadership.
■■ Worker welfare.
■■ Communication.
■■ Life Critical Activities (LCA).
Additionally, Shell chose to work with JMJ associates to implement an Incident & Injury Free (IIF)
program. The IIF program was seen as the vehicle to maximise the contribution of the five focus areas.
1. Leadership would be demonstrated by values and beliefs.
2. Worker welfare would incorporate care for people.
3. Training would develop and enhance skills, not just core discipline but also supervisory skills.
4. Communication would be two-way, listening would be a key focus. Recognition of a job well
done achieved through practices and standards that would contribute to people working safely
would be encouraged.
5. LCA were a focus that required strict compliance.
Implementing these contributions would be hard work, particularly each and every day. Senior Project
Leaders were committed to do this.

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Visible leadership was not enough however. To be seen and heard, to listen and respond was
needed, but there was more. As well as leadership visibility, “servant leadership” was identified as
a preferred leadership style. A manager who works tirelessly to put in place the conditions for their
teams to succeed can be called a servant leader. Is focus given to the people doing work every
day the essence of good supervision and management? Senior Project Leaders advocated and
encouraged all leaders within Pearl GTL to behave and interact with their teams in this preferred style,
which was deemed essential and supportive of the culture that was wanted.
It has to be said that not all managers and supervisors on Pearl GTL lived up to this aspiration. That
was the reality we lived in. I am sure that people will not be surprised hearing that. Over the course
of the Project, the fact that the vast majority of line supervisors and managers modified their approach
in how they led their teams is testimony to the cultural journey taken. But this change is not a given nor
does it come easily. Companies bring culture to Projects such as Pearl. To respect different cultures
is necessary but if the shared vision is to create a unique project culture that to some is different,
unusual, or out of the norm of how they carry out work, then it takes great effort, determination
and belief to bring this about. Looking back, the benefits as seen at Pearl far outweigh the effort
expended to achieve this. This was a critical success factor and over the course of the Project played
a huge part in our success. Senior Project Leadership can be proud of what was achieved.
2.3 CEO LEADERSHIP: CEO SUMMITS
Another important initiative was the yearly CEO summits. CEO’s from the contracting companies and
Pearl GTL Senior Leadership came together to discuss the IIF journey and make concrete commitments
to put in place, agreed requirements, and also to pursue future improvements. This resulted in the
development of an “IIF Commitment Charter”. The Charter was signed by all parties and represented
visible support to the vision for Worker Welfare, Training, Leadership, Communication and LCA.
Posters were made of the signed commitment statements and posted around offices, workshops, mass
halls across the entire construction site for everyone to see.
Figure 2: Andy Brown on-site handing out an award on Safety Day.
Leadership visibility demonstrated by Brown, Rob Kretzers, and other members of the Project Senior
Leadership team was fundamental in creating a culture that would support the ambition that every
worker would go home safely at the end of each working day. Acting as role models for other
managers and supervisors, the premise that if Brown, Kretzers et al, could spend time listening and
encouraging the workforce to carry out work safely, to look out for each other and to take pride in
what they were building, then so could they.
I have too often seen Management Teams go through the motions of making commitment statements,
the fanfare of signing such statements and having them posted across a Project. A tick in the box that
a Management Team can say they have done. The real value is living the commitments made. This is
where credibility, respect and voluntary compliance from workers are earned. The Project Team under
Brown and Kretzer’s leadership delivered on the commitments made.
LOWRES
Please provide
better quality

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Figure 4: Sights of Pearl Village.
Countless recreational events were organised every month (>300) to foster team spirit and keep
morale high. Internet and television was widely available, good catering facilities (at peak, more
than 3 million meals were prepared every month), with a variety of diet on offer with good nutritional
value. Cultural sensitivities were observed that took account of religious beliefs.
Daily buses were provided between the village and Qatar’s capital city of Doha, to avoid a sense of
captivity and separation. The village never once suffered a loss of power, sending a strong message to
all residents regarding the level of quality and care Shell was investing in their home away from home.
To keep a finger on the pulse of worker morale, maintain a sense of vibrancy and help people feel
secure at Pearl Village, a support network was established that consisted of 200 “aunts and uncles”
helping and advising those needing and seeking support. The village had a mayor, a dedicated
welfare team, and two professional psychologists. These people were simply amazing and definitely
unsung heroes. Their time and dedication to all the workers who came and lived at Pearl Village
undoubtedly contributed to the success of the Project.
An environment where people feel valued and cared for, an open community where people are free
and encouraged to participate in countless recreational events, helps to create good team spirit and
a sense of harmony. Whilst it is difficult to measure the level of harmony achieved, the village never
suffered any major riots (unlike other worker residential camps of similar size in the region) or labour
Figure 3: CEO summit commitment poster.
The Commitment Charters developed also helped to re-enforce the “One Project, One Team”
approach that had originated from discussions and actions as a result of the IIF journey. Increasingly
and as a result of IIF engagements, visible communication such as the Commitment Charters helped
to convey consistent messages to all contracting companies on the Project. The call to work each day
would consist of one simple message that would stick in everyone’s minds before starting work, –
working safely, caring for each other, and ensuring an IIF free work place.
2.4 WORKER WELFARE
A village was born in the desert of Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC), Qatar. This was to be the home
for thousands of workers from many different parts of the world. An incredible 42,000 beds was
provided to accommodate the lion’s share of all workers involved in Pearl GTL construction. The
village, run and supported by 1800 people, was designed and constructed to leading industry
quality standards. This extended beyond just the living quarters; the village was also home to
$13 million worth of sports and entertainment facilities.

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One of the most significant investments in training was the inspired decision to embark on the IIF
journey during the Construction and Commissioning phases of Pearl GTL. As was said earlier in this
chapter, the IIF program became the vehicle that the five key focus areas of Leadership, Welfare,
Training, Communication and the LCA were implemented across the Project and influenced greatly the
Pearl GTL Culture.
2.6 INCIDENT AND INJURY FREE (IIF)
The following is a short summary of Pearl’s IIF Program:
The IIF message was very much focused on generating a safety-conscious mindset and culture to
complement standards and rule based compliance, focusing on:
■■ Convincing workers to ‘want’ to be safe.
■■ Open dialogue and relationship building.
■■ Challenging leaders at all levels to engage constructively with their workers.
IIF Leadership was across all layers of the organisation:
■■ IIF Steering Committee led by Pearl GTL Managing Director.
■■ IIF Leadership Committees in all Asset delivery Teams.
■■ 500 IIF Champions (trained and full-time).
■■ Trained trainers from the line to lead courses.
The IIF message was further reinforced by 6 Safety Days that included evening celebrations, quizzes,
booths and numerous site meetings. The legendary Indian cricketer Kapil Dev was flown in for these
events to re-enforce the safety message; when the message comes from someone who is a true idol
for a huge majority of the workforce, its impact is significantly amplified. This kind of creativity and
understanding of what motivates a workforce is very important when creating a desired culture, an
IIF culture.
On Pearl GTL, it was recognised that HSSE leadership is best demonstrated through passion, energy,
and belief. Pearl GTL’s industry leading safety record during construction has been partly attributed to
the following key leadership behaviours:
■■ Show care and concern for all people, create a relationship on things important to them (e.g.,
children, community)
■■ Show a degree of personal sacrifice (e.g., attending tool box talks at 5 a.m., staying overnight)
■■ Follow-up when people get hurt to show care and concern (e.g., hospital visits)
■■ Hold people who can help the masses accountable (e.g., when a mess hall is too hot – give them
two weeks to fix it and return to verify progress)
■■ Mingle with people at all levels, sit and chat in their rest shelters
disputes that led to work stopping. We believe that there is a strong link between the welfare success
at the Pearl Village and the safety performance on the project.
2.5 TRAINING
On Pearl GTL, a huge focus was placed on training to ensure a disciplinary competent workforce,
good standards of safe working, and an awareness and understanding of the necessary safe
behaviours expected of all our workers. Additionally, opportunities for personal and professional
development were made available. The provision of opportunities for personal development linked
strongly with the work to provide world class welfare facilities for our workers.
In total, 137,000 individuals attended the Pearl GTL Project HSSE Induction course. On top of this,
contractors also ran their own induction courses.
Further, 383,000 HSSE courses were given, covering topics such as confined space entry, working
from heights, PTW, etc… A full listing is given in the Appendices.
To embark and deliver such a huge training load required a variety of approaches. Whilst the
majority of training was delivered by professional trainers at the first class facility built at the Pearl
Village, encouragement was given to a “train the trainer” approach; whereby willing contractor
companies had their own people trained to deliver training to their peers. This approach allowed
Shell and the PMC to deliver the huge volume of training courses identified as necessary to prepare
our workers for the challenges ahead. By adopting this shared approach to delivery we found an
increased level of responsibility and accountability from the construction contractors to their workers.
“Train the trainer” was not an easy option to take and required a lot of oversight to ensure good
quality delivery, but it was definitely a worthwhile approach.
Leadership training was another important element provided to support development of the Culture
that Senior Project Leadership had identified as key: approximately 5,000 contractors successfully
completed the 7+ day supervisor training, consisting of nine different modules and resulting in special
badges (Bronze, Silver and Gold) for the newly qualified supervisors. This training was accredited
(ILM UK Certificated). This Leadership training was organised by Shell, with a commitment from
contractor management to give their employees enough free time to attend the training.
We also organised a number of computer based training courses that were held in the evenings or
workers free time – these were open to all who desired to broaden their knowledge. These courses
were always fully booked!

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The ability to communicate effectively is hard work, but it is essential that you try and get it as right
as you can. Recognising what it takes to effectively communicate and become organisationally skilled
in good communication is an area of focus that Senior Project Leadership at Pearl GTL strived hard
to achieve.
2.8 LIFE CRITICAL ACTIVITIES
The “Life Critical Activities” implemented at Nanhai were adopted for the Pearl GTL Project with some
slight modifications that were relevant to the ambitions of Pearl GTL, e.g., Worker Welfare. It could be
said that the LCA were the pre-cursor to the Shell Groups 12 Life Saving Rules (LSR). Comparisons can
be made. What can be applauded is the clear focus and simplicity of both the LCA and the LSR.
The LCA were:
Road Transportation Excavation
Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) Electrical Safety
Lifting Confined Spaces
Fall Protection Working in Poor Lighting
Scaffolding Falling Objects
Health and Welfare
In order to ensure compliance to the rules, Pearl GTL adopted the approach that “if you choose
to break the rules, you choose not to work for Shell”. This statement of intent clearly indicates the
importance placed by Shell on the safety of people. Justification given to this approach was for the
workforce to internalise the potential consequences of their violations. The loss of life and the impact
that this would have, to family, to friends, was one level of justification. The other justification given
was that as a Project Leadership team, there would be a zero tolerance to people putting their lives
at risk by not complying with the rules. This approach was structurally agreed with all Contracting
Companies at Pearl GTL.
■■ Focus on recognition, make awards personally
■■ Make time for celebrations and unlocking people’s imagination
■■ Invest in people development (leadership training)
■■ Leaders must stretch themselves and leave their comfort zone.
The IIF Program and journey became the glue and context for the five focus areas identified by Senior
Project Leadership to make Pearl GTL Project different from the Industry norm.
2.7 COMMUNICATION
Good communication is difficult. The number of different nationalities and languages and dialects
spoken by workers at Pearl PTL made communication difficult.
For instructional purposes, when rules for hazardous information need to be understood and complied
with, which involves learning critical steps in a procedure, every effort possible should be made to
ensure communication is effective.
Pictures can tell a thousand words and the eyes interpretation can be a reliable form of
communication. The posters provided during construction were stark and left nothing to the
imagination regardless of the workers language skills or level of education. When our posters
conveyed a message we would strive to make it as simple as possible, with few words. Simplicity
does not always look beautiful, but we were not in a beauty contest so simple words were the order
of the day. If the target audience is predominantly Indian, then do not message in English! Do your
homework and confirm dialect sensitivities, but wherever possible communicate to the majority by
respecting their native language.
Workplace communication will normally result in an outcome or action. Whilst listening is important
it is not sufficient to say “yes, I have heard you” with a smile and a nod of the head. Unless listening
promotes a response or action, then the process of communication is incomplete.
Workplace communication about a task or activity needs to be simple and unambiguous. In this
context listening should be focused on confirming understanding. As part of the leadership journey at
Pearl GTL when, for example, leaders attended tool box talks or carried out safety walks observing
people at work, communication with the workforce would be through the use of a simple question set
of what, how and why. These three principal questions and the answers received prompted active
listening and would end in an outcome or action. The action could be to correct or improve on the
delivery of the task or the outcome could be that a confirmed understanding and agreement of the
task delivery. Good communication was essential during the execution of LCA and when the project
went into the SIMOPS phase.

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2.9 STATISTICS
Whilst statistics don’t always tell the whole story, a sample of headline statistics below testifies the
impact of measures taken at Pearl GTL to minimise harm to people. The significance of IIF, (LCA) and
LSR contributed to a project LTIF of 0.12 and TRCF of 1.16, with proud milestones such as:
■■ 8.7 million hours TRC free.
■■ No serious road injuries.
■■ 77 million hours LTI free.
■■ CCIC (contractor) 85 million hours LTI free.
■■ C6 GTL (contractor) 71 million hours LTI free.
2.10 THERE WAS MORE…
The Construction story shared has not told about everything done. Included with this narrative are
attachments that give further in-sight and detail to other work and focus. References are made to Total
Safety Task Instruction (TSTI), to Safety Observation Cards (SOC) and to a simple list of activities and
situations that a Construction Permit (permit to work) was required.
2.11 KEY MESSAGES: FIVE FOCUS AREAS
Leadership Visible, servant leadership.
Incident and Injury Free (IIF).
One project, one team. Project culture.
Welfare Pearl Village, “aunts and uncles”. Village Mayor.
Dedicated welfare team.
Training Discipline competence. Standards of safe working. Awareness and
understanding of safe behaviours expected on the Project.
Leadership training to support desired culture.
Personal development training.
IIF training – convincing workers to want to be safe. Mindset. Open
dialogue, relationship building.
Communication Respect of language/dialect differences.
Visual communication and the use of few/simple words.
Active listening.
Simple set of engagement questions in-line with culture aspirations.
Life Critical Activities 1. Road Transportation, 2. Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), 3. Lifting,
4. Fall Protection, 5. Scaffolding, 6. Excavation, 7. Electrical Safety,
8. Confined Spaces, 9. Working in Poor Lighting, 10. Falling Objects,
11. Health and Welfare
In the event of rules being broken, “just culture” was applied, leading to both formal warnings and
dismissals, as summarised in the following table:
Figure 5: Disciplinary Actions
Pearl GTL was serious about compliance. One of the LSR that was given special attention on Pearl
GTL was road safety. Very early on, senior management understood that a project the size of Pearl
GTL, combined with local road traffic fatality rate that is 8 times higher than that in Europe, would,
without significant intervention, lead to fatal accidents. They took ownership of Road Safety and
developed a Road Transport Safety Case to minimise, and where possible, eliminate exposure to
road safety risks with the following controls:
■■ No self driving for Shell & JK (managing contractor) employees: buses were provided for all
commuters between Doha, Al Khor, Ras Laffan and the Pearl Village.
■■ Driving private vehicles to and from work (with the exception of people living and working in Doha)
was prohibited. This approach saved 30 million km of road travel.
■■ Pearl GTL constructed its own $30 million material unloading Jetty, avoiding the need for more than
120,000 additional lorry loads.
■■ Performance was monitored in more than 5,000 vehicles using the In Vehicle Monitoring System
(IVMS), which flags unsafe driving.
These initiatives resulted in 290 million km driven for Pearl GTL, with NO serious injuries. A great
example of how identifying and mitigating specific risk areas can massively benefit a project’s overall
safety performance.
LCA
3047
4118
705
1
1
57
232
118
24
94
7411
11
12
6
7
29
68
1
16
7
2
4
3
9
7
Verbal
Written
Dismissal
Total
3131
4512
1021

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3. HSSE IMPLEMENTATION IN A PROJECT ENVIRONMENT: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE
Try not to be a “Safety Policeman”. Whilst at times you may want to tell people what to do, to
order people to work safely, this type of approach does not work in the long run. Such a mentality
would result in the creation of safety programs that restate the same old regulations and policies that
have been written countless times before. Such safety programs become the domain of the Safety
Policeman that only they read and understand.
This kind of safety approach doesn’t make sense. It doesn’t mean forget everything that you have
learned in the past or that has worked well in similar situations, but the mindless regurgitation
of programs, procedures, regulations and rules without understanding the context of the current
challenge; getting the feel of a Project, sensing the prevailing culture, understanding the current level
of performance and practices of workers and their companies, such an approach simply does not
make sense.
Safety as a program to inflict on an organisation, on a project, does not make sense. Safety as
a principle, as a value, as a part of nature does make sense. This is where a safety professional
coming to a project should start. Focus should be given on how to inculcate into individuals the value
of wanting to protect themselves. If people can look after themselves, they may be willing to look out
for others. When all people on a project can accept personal responsibility for safety, working (and
living) safely ultimately becomes a project wide value and culture. Some may recognise this as an
“Interdependent Safety Culture”, and it is.
This is where a CSU HSSE (Safety) manager should start. It is our job (and others of course) to
promote this collective responsibility. To meet this goal, safety professionals have to stop thinking like
policemen and start recognising their role as advisors who empower people to work (and live) safely.
The inevitable safety program then becomes a direct extension of these principles, with the important
context of knowing where your project is in its journey; wherever possible, keep the program/training
language simple with clear phrases.
Safety instructions need to be clear and make sense. If it does then most of our workers will do
what they are supposed to do, most of the time, without you having to tell them to do it. Voluntary
compliance is essential; otherwise a safety program will not deliver its purpose successfully. .
When I arrived in Qatar in 2008, the Project was 18 months into construction. To my delight, senior
project leaders had already realised that ‘safety had to make sense’. They were just embarking on
an IIF journey. As mentioned, in the “construction experience” chapter of this book, project leadership
had also identified five key focus areas as a strategy to deliver world class safety and welfare for all
workers. The steps taken made sense.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As a CSU HSSE Manager or HSSE lead during a Project, you have a lot of influence; you are in a
position of responsibility and most importantly will be looked to for advice, guidance, leadership in
your expert field, and the tangible and practical support you can give others to share and resolve
issues. You need to bridge the world of Construction and a Construction organisation and the very
different world of Commissioning and a Commissioning organisation.
Your previous experience will shape your view on work, how you believe work should be done. Your
own personal values and beliefs will also impact the way that you will set out to ensure that HSSE in
transition from Construction into CSU proceeds without incident. Whilst you should use your previous
experiences to guide your views on how things should be done, remember that there will be others
with different experiences that should be respected and if you listen, can give you new insights. My
warning though is there are limits to the number of different views on such matters that you can and
should heed. This is a conundrum that you can only manage before taking action to proceed; this
requires judgment.
Relationships with people through project transition are critical. It is through people that work gets
done. As a CSU HSSE Manager you will need to influence and build relationships, guide and advise
the project organisation so that the safety journey for all on the Project makes sense. Sometimes
relationships prove difficult. Use your professionalism to focus on end results. Strive to secure
relationships that achieve shared goals.
As a starting point from the generalities I have spoken about, I would suggest that one of the first
things that a CSU HSSE Manager/Safety Lead should establish is:
3.2 START MAKING SENSE
On a Project you are never far away from schedule pressure. Depending at what stage you join the
Project, be it at the start or end of construction, as a “CSU” HSSE (or safety) manager you will help
the project organisation navigate through the phases that come during and after construction through
to start-up. To do this, you must understand the nature of work specific to each phase, the different
hazards and risks prevailing. It all sounds complicated, and whilst it is, as a manager you have to
make sense of the current state and prepare for the next transition to come. It’s important to try and
make things as simple as possible.
I have been in the company of many safety professionals, and not all of us make sense, well not in
the way that I think we should go about our jobs. So how do you do this, where do you start? Let me
start by saying what you should not do, and what you should try not to be.

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We can all, relatively experienced and less experienced, benefit from a more rigorous and
independent assessment of proposed implementation plans. Focus would concentrate on examining
the strategies to achieve the plan. Strategies articulate the how implementation will be undertaken.
I would also advocate that examination involves testing and inspection. Inspection and testing is
as relevant for the work and function of people as it is for hardware. This is the fertile ground that
experts, expert teams from outside of the immediate project can add value and support. Such an
approach becomes more learning centered; food for thought.
In the context of my role and future contribution, my job had been made much easier as the ‘right’
safety and welfare philosophy was being pursued. My efforts could now concentrate on making sure
that this would be continued during commissioning and into start-up. I could also start to pay attention
to other necessary work I held responsibility for.
3.3 WHAT ELSE?
Over the following chapters, reference will be made of the main work I became involved with as the
CSU HSSE manager, which can vary from project to project. The good news is that as CSU HSSE
managers/safety leads, we do not embark on this journey alone. There are stated requirements,
standards and procedures that can guide this journey. Our tasks and accomplishments have been
written in a variety of documents by expert teams within the Company.
In addition to what’s written, there is also a network of subject matter expert teams. Numerous teams
cover all /most of the topic areas detailed in the HSSE Control Framework. If we as CSU HSSE
managers do not entirely understand what is written in the library of HSSE documentation available,
or further explanation is required, such teams and the various corporate wide HSSE Focal Points can
advise and make sense of the documents. (So the theory goes!)
My experience of leveraging such expertise is mixed. This in part (a large part) is of my own doing.
I do not look for fault elsewhere but look at my own inadequacy to capatalise on this expertise.
What I would like to see, however, is a discussion on the type of business model that can be best
utilised to leverage expertise within the Shell Group. I am suggesting that the current situation can be
improved. Contact and exposure to experts at time of audit, gate/stage reviews, etc. is insufficient
and too formal.
That being said, most of the documentation available (and there is a lot of it), focuses on describing
“what has to be done”, setting requirements and meeting standards; this is necessary, helpful and
gives direction. Allied to the network teams one could argue that adequate resource is available to
managers that will implement HSSE in a project environment.
I personally would have benefitted from perspectives on “how” to implement stated requirements and
meet standards. I do not think that I was active enough to leverage the expertise of the Subject Matter
Expert (SME) teams. I had experience of implementation during my time at Stanlow and during the
CSU of the Nanhai Petro-Chemical complex in China. I had achieved a reasonable level of success,
so that was it; I would pursue the same, tried and trusted path of implementation.

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4. HSSE CULTURE TRANSITION FROM CONSTRUCTION INTO CSU
values, behaviours, and mindset had to be consistent. Whilst the rules would change to reflect the
changing hazard profile, the other enablers to culture would be continued:
Leadership, welfare provision, communication, training and dependent on the Project phase, LCA or
Life Saving Rules.
GENERATIVE
HSSE is how we do business
round here
PROACTIVE
We work on the problem that we
still ﬁnd
CALCULATIVE
We have systems in place to
manage all hazards
REACTIVE
Safety is important, we do a lot
every time we have an accident
PATHOLOGICAL
Who cares as long as we're
not caught
Increasing
Trustand
Accountability
Increasinglyinformed
Figure 6: Cultural ladder.
4.1 CONSTRUCTION HSSE CULTURE: IIF
Much has already been said in this book about the construction HSSE culture as described by the IIF
journey and the five key focus areas of:
Leadership,
Welfare,
Training,
Communication, and
Life Critical Activities (LCA).
The way work was carried out during Construction, the way that people interacted, whether to inquire
or to intervene, the rules applied, the discipline shown, how engagement between people happened,
care for self and others, all contributed to the working culture that could be felt and visibly seen.
Using a very simple definition of culture; “The way things are done and seen to be done”, then
what was seen and carried out during construction was not just relevant to the hazards and risks
prevailing, but much, much more. As a simple example, whilst building the plant, structures at height
would be incomplete, therefore it was a Construction rule as communicated via the LCA, that any
person working from height (> 1.5 m) would only do so wearing a lifeline and harness, which would
require tie-off. Now whilst this makes sense, if you’re working above ground without other appropriate
safeguards, it was a construction rule from a specified point during the project that all workers
working on the construction site would wear a lifeline and harness, regardless of whether they were
at height or not. A lifeline and harness for this period became standard PPE. To some this may seem
an over-reaction. If the means justifies the ends, then at Pearl GTL there was no fatality or major injury
from working at height. There was no ambiguity. The focus instead shifted to making sure that when
workers were at height during this period then appropriate tie-off was ensured.
This particular element of the working culture during Construction would be modified as parts of the
plant were subject to Commissioning controls. As sections of the plant were handed over into the
Commissioning organisation, the risk profile changed. Working at height on completed structures with
handrails, etc., would no longer require a lifeline and harness to be worn as standard PPE. We were
now experiencing HSSE controls in transition. This had to be managed carefully.
The “one team, one project” cultural ambition, plus the essential mindset and behaviours that came
about from the IIF journey describes the Construction HSSE Culture. This culture was a day-to-day
focus. It was something that had to happen every day. The end point of the construction HSSE culture
was when the last construction activity was completed. In many cases and situations towards the end
of Construction this would mean construction activities being completed in Commissioning controlled
areas, where commissioning rules applied. Cultural transition was essential to keep people safe. The

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■■ Follow up when people get hurt to show care and concern (e.g., hospital visits).
■■ Hold people who can help the masses accountable (e.g., when a mess hall is too hot – give them
2 weeks to fix it and return to verify progress).
■■ Mingle with people at all levels, sit and chat in their rest shelters.
■■ Focus on recognition, make awards personally.
■■ Make time for celebrations and unlocking people’s imagination.
■■ Invest in people development (leadership training).
■■ Leaders must stretch themselves and leave their comfort zone.
Would be continued…
The decision to continue with the Incident and Injury Program and maintain a clear focus on the
five key areas of leadership, welfare, training, communication and LSR during Commissioning made
sense.
Construction
Rob Kretzers
Marty Schweers
Project Man.
IC/EPCM
(Const. Manager)
Constr. PTW
Construction
Rob Kretzers
Marty Schweers
Project Man.
IC/EPCM
(Comm. Manager)
Comm. PTW
Comm. HSSE
LSRs
Operational
Utilities S&P
Rob Kretzers
Steve Johnson
SU Leader
Shell
Shell MS
Shell HSSE Rules
LSRs
Shell PTW
SU Leader
Shell
Post Handover
Roel Cornelisse
Steve Johnson
Comm. PTW
HSSE Authority
Operational control
Safety Disctrict Owner
HSSE Control
Constractor’s MS
Project HSSE Rules
LCAs
PTW
Figure 7: Leadership Transition
Individual and company HSSE performance can perhaps best be assessed on the following scale,
known as the “cultural ladder,” which progresses with increased information, trust and accountability:
1. Pathological - Who cares as long as we’re not caught?
2. Reactive - Safety is important. We do a lot every time we have an accident.
3. Calculative - We have systems in place to manage all hazards.
4. Proactive - We work on problems we find.
5. Generative - HSSE is how we do business.
World class HSSE performance requires more than mechanically applying a management system. It
requires involvement of an entire organisation - from top to bottom. This involves three key elements:[
■■ Personal responsibility - understand and accept what should be done and what is expected.
■■ Individual consequences - understand and accept there is a fair system for reward and discipline.
■■ Proactive interventions - work safely because it is the right thing to do, want to make interventions
and actively participate in improvement activities.
4.2 COMMISSIONING HSSE CULTURE: IIF
The Project’s IIF journey continued into commissioning. Why not?
The IIF message was very much focused on generating a safety-conscious mindset and culture to
complement standards and rule based compliance, focusing on:
■■ Convincing workers to ‘want’ to be safe.
■■ Open dialogue and relationship building.
■■ Challenging Leaders at all levels to engage constructively with their workers.
IIF Leadership was across all layers of the organisation:
■■ IIF Steering Committee led by Pearl GTL Managing Director I.
■■ IF Leadership Committees in all Asset delivery Teams.
■■ 500 IIF Champions (trained and full-time), - (IIF Champions would be maintained but not in the
same numbers due to the reducing workforce).
■■ Trained trainers from the line to lead courses.
HSSE leadership as demonstrated through passion, energy and belief would continue. Pearl GTL’s
industry leading safety record during Construction would be seen with pride and a demonstration of
what could be achieved in Commissioning. Leadership visibility, as demonstrated by:
■■ Show care and concern for all people, create a relationship on things important to them
(e.g., children, community).
■■ Show a degree of personal sacrifice (e.g., attending tool box talks at 5 a.m., staying overnight).

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would also be a significant and distinctive change to the Project landscape. This “red army” was the
future Shell operators and technicians who would support the commissioning work to come.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature to appear on the Construction landscape was the kilometers
of fencing that started to be erected across the Project to physically separate construction and
commissioning activity. This fencing stood 2 m tall. Purple tape was wrapped around this fencing with
posters that showed a caged tiger (see Figures 8 and 9).
Purple became the colour of commissioning activities. The caged tiger was symbolic and represented
the hazards of commissioning and the message that commissioning hazards were potentially
dangerous and could result in serious harm. The caged tiger represented the same potential danger,
if released in an uncontrolled manner, the “tiger hazard” could harm.
Figure 8: Commissioning Tiger.
Fencing was insufficient as the only physical barrier to restrict access to a Commissioning area. All points
of access and egress were guarded. Guards were trained to collect and check commissioning badges.
These badges had photographic proof of identity and were only given to workers after they had attended
commissioning induction training. In addition, guards would collect mobile phones, lighters, matches and
other potential sources of ignition before entry was granted. Guards would know how many people had
gained access into a given commissioning area as all ID badges were retained at the entrances. Badges
were collected by workers when leaving fenced Commissioning areas after work was completed.
As can be seen in (Figure 7), the decision to maintain the key elements that contributed to a successful
culture being established in construction and relevant for commissioning was helped by the unified
transition of people and organisational control. The exceptions to this as can be seen in (Figure 7) is
the HSSE Management System and Plan, the transition from LCA rules to LSR and PTW transition from
a construction to a commissioning environment.
To support this transition we had to put in place safeguards that would demonstrate to all workers
that working in a Commissioning area was different than Construction, what was different, what
precautionary measures would be mandated and why? We communicated simply (with as few words
as possible) with pictures and posters, in the main languages prevailing, and through the enormous
efforts during Induction training for all workers due to work in commissioning areas.
The change of requirements and rules that would accompany transition through the phases of the
project would need careful consideration so that clarity was given. Particularly vulnerable would
be workers who had worked in Construction and would now be asked to carry out work in
Commissioning areas. Control requirements were very different. We had workers, worker teams
working in a Construction environment one day and a Commissioning environment the next. This had
to be managed. Tool box talks each and every day were given and were essential. They focused
on the work to be done, how work was to be done, what could go wrong and with increasing
importance as the project transitioned, where this work would be carried out, in a Construction or
a Commissioning controlled area. Emphasis would then be given to what controls needed to be in
place, why, and the discipline needed to comply at all times.
Making sense of such stated precautions would be given and supported by constant reminders to all
that safety was their responsibility. Additionally, workers were reminded and encouraged to look out
for the safety of their fellow workers.
As transition progressed, elements of the working culture changed. Whilst some Senior Leaders
would transition through the phases of Construction into Commissioning, some would leave and new
people arrive. Leadership demonstrated during Construction and the preferred Leadership style would
continue through Commissioning. Welfare standards would be maintained. In the areas of Training,
Communication and LCA a changing emphasis would be demanded. As an example, during
Commissioning, emphasis would be given to the LSR.
Whilst it has already been stated that the main elements of the Construction culture were relevant
and continued in Commissioning, things changed in what workers started to see, how work was
controlled differently, how access requirements to enter and work in a Commissioning area were
different. What seemed like a “new” army of people all wearing the same uniform of red coveralls

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Construction work could still be carried out in commissioning areas, but would be subject to a more
rigorous regime of commissioning control. The decision to declare a commissioning area was not
taken lightly, and in certain cases individual lines were wrapped in purple tape and barricaded.
Similarly, commissioning zones within a bigger construction area were established and in only these
zones would commissioning rules and control be applied. A pragmatic but controlled transition would
be pursued.
The Commissioning organisation took responsibility for zones and areas of plant and equipment and
all work carried out on plant and equipment in zones and areas under commissioning. This was a
major change. Hazards that were invisible to the naked eye under hot pressure could move silently
from one part of the Plant to another by the operation of a valve that demanded a level of oversight,
control and permission different from what had been seen in general during Construction.
Rules and compliance had been a requirement during construction. Rules and compliance became a
point of work control in Commissioning to a degree greater than had been seen during Construction.
To help manage an increasing rule based and compliance driven culture, commissioning work would
increasingly become subject to a simple control philosophy that asked consideration of:
■■ Supervision,
■■ Standards,
■■ Surveillance,
■■ Separation,
■■ Synchronisation,
■■ Planning,
■■ Preparation, and
■■ PTW.
This was referred to as the 5S and 3P framework. This will be further discussed in the SIMOPS book.
4.3 START-UP HSSE CULTURE: GOAL ZERO
Transition from a Commissioning HSSE culture to a culture relevant for the start-up of plant and
equipment of Pearl GTL involved a continuation of what had been established in the previous phases
and an appreciation and level of preparedness of what was to come. In addition, a detailed
knowledge and understanding of the hazards and risks of starting up plant and equipment and
thereafter daily operating and routine maintenance at Pearl GTL would drive the cultural journey. As in
commissioning, levels of permission to access and carry out work would be subject to strict rules and
standards during start-up of the plant and for future operation.
Do not let the Purple Tiger out of the Cage
Chemicals
Steam
Fuel Gas
Hot Water
Do not touch any Valve,
Spade or Blind
Do not cut any
Commissioning Pipe
without Permit
Purple Pipe ==
Purple will
Bite you
Figure 9: Commissioning Tiger Information.
For those workers carrying out physical work, not just visiting the area, a PTW would be required.
The permits issued would identify hazards assessed with the proposed work and the environment that
the work was to be carried out, in addition to stipulating control measures designed to reduce risk.
Observation of workers and compliance to controls stated on permits in Commissioning areas was
a daily activity. The application of PTW was very different for areas under Commissioning than had
been experienced during Construction.
The decision point of when to declare an area a “Commissioning Area” and as such subject to
commissioning controls would come when the main prevailing hazards, risk profile and major
consequences were resultant from commissioning activities. A formal walk-down of the area and
an assessment of its commissioning readiness would be made by an independent team of HSSE
Inspectors and area representatives. A punch list of outstanding work would be made. The punch
list would form the basis of an assessment and agreement for a zone or an area to transition from
Construction to Commissioning control.

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LSR are an integral part of the total rule set that all people working and visiting Pearl GTL must comply
with. In addition, Shell’s golden rules of “comply, intervene and respect”, are behavioural imperatives
of the HSSE Culture required and expected. There is also site and local area rules that are defined to
instruct, clarify, and give direction to all who come to work or visit Pearl GTL.
The HSSE cultural journey continues at Pearl GTL. There are values and behaviours that all are asked
to commit to. The focus areas originally identified by Project Senior Leadership in the early days
of Construction are retained. The rule set and work permissions are aligned to the expectations as
detailed in the HSSE Control Framework. Goal Zero is now the vehicle that drives and builds further
the Pearl GTL culture.
Pearl GTL values and beliefs statements can be found in Attachment 4.2.
The beliefs, values, and mindset that had been so successful in developing a very positive and
enabling HSSE culture during Construction and Commissioning IIF would be carried forward by the
“Goal Zero” journey that everyone in the Shell Group now pursue.
Leadership visibility and the close connectivity with front line workers, Shell workers or Partner
Contractor Companies, remains as a key focus as it did in Construction and Commissioning. A
strong belief in Servant Leadership as lived daily by Brown, Wael Sawan, Roel Cornelisse, Steve
Johnson and their management team can be seen and felt. CEO’s from the main Partner Contractor
Companies are invited annually to meet, discuss, and commit to the safety and welfare of their
people working at Pearl GTL. This continues the approach started in Construction.
The huge camp that was once home to the vast workforce during Construction and Commissioning is
in transition. However, welfare provision for all non-Shell workers is a contractual obligation for Partner
Contractor Companies. Management of this provision is applied to ensure standards are maintained
and any issues resolved in timely manner.
Communication is given in an open and honest way. Listening to the concerns and issues of front line
staff is actively pursued both formally and informally. Feedback from conversations that take place
during Goal Zero engagements and walks around the site are reflected upon by teams and an
emphasis to take necessary action, if applicable, is given. “No” is an acceptable answer in some
conversations, given with reason and respect.
Continued emphasis is given to the discipline competence of all who work at Pearl. During 2013,
a huge effort is being given to the development of Front Line Leaders, and a core component of
this development training is HSSE; this includes Process Safety. The content and design of this
development training is given in Front Line Leaders Development Training Materials (Attachment 4.1) in
this book

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5. HSSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION
accommodated. A “freeze” on new or updated standards was taken. This was necessary. This
allowed documentation to be taken to a point of readiness to use. In parallel, a gap analysis was
maintained which would be subject to address at an agreed point. For Pearl GTL this was particularly
sensitive as the HSSE Control Framework standards started to be issued circa 2008 and on.
It was at this time that I had just joined the Project and was starting to prepare for the development
of the Operations HSSE Case, and the HSSE Manuals and Procedures that would follow. It was
necessary to freeze standards for implementation; aiming at a moving target does not make for effective
or efficient development work. This approach adopted by Pearl GTL was communicated appropriately.
At this point I would like to make reference to an operational set of standards that are particularly
important and an area of implementation that people at Pearl GTL worked hard to deliver. These
standards come under the umbrella title; Ensure Safe Production (ESP).
ESP is one of the business processes under Global Asset Management Excellence (GAME). ESP is a
basic, standardised, operational work process that ensures operation (of a processing plant) within
well-defined, well-understood limits. Operation within these limits is continuously achieved through
a defined and well-followed set of operational and organisational behaviors at all levels. ESP’s
main principles are shown in Figure 10 below and it is implemented by its sub-processes which are
described below:
■■ Initial Setup to gather all constraints, limits, responses in a central database.
■■ Validate targets to ensure no one can make demands outside of safe limits (across any interface to
operators).
■■ Monitor and control conditions to manage everything in the shift-to-shift work process.
■■ Learn and improve in a structured way, supported by tools. This ensures that the desired
behaviors “sticks forever” by engraining formally in management systems and people’s personal
accountabilities.
The ESP process is described in more detail in the ESP section of Attachment 5.1 – Standards.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
I will talk later in this chapter how HSSE MS was developed and transitioned in each of the phases
of the project.
I would first like to start by describing the main steps to take to develop a HSSE MS, the context and
considerations. I will talk about standards and the importance of the HSSE Manual. The processes of
hazard identification, risk management and the assignation of people to carry out tasks and activities
deemed critical to maintain barriers from threats. This work forms part of the HSSE Cases developed
for Pearl GTL. A rule set that includes the Life Saving Rules (LSR), Golden Rules, Asset Rules and
Area Asset Rules. A set of procedures that describes how to apply and implement critical processes
identified as part of HEMP. Finally, the role of the annual HSSE Plan developed throughout the
phases of the Project into the Plan and Journey Book of the Run and Maintain organisation.
5.2 STANDARDS
Standards are at the heart of the development of the Pearl GTL HSSE MS. This was our starting point.
Shell Group standards were core but other standards applicable to ensure Pearl GTL complied with
regulations applicable to Qatar and RLIC were ensured. Examples of such standards included:
■■ Shell HSSE Control Framework (although in 2008 this work was still in its infancy).
■■ Applicable Qatari statutory requirements, including international agreements and protocols to which
Qatar is a signatory.
■■ Qatar Petroleum/RLIC requirements,
■■ Internationally accepted industry norms and standards (e.g., API Recommended Practices,
IP Codes) as defined in the HSSE/SD premises for the project.
■■ Guidance from international institutions and organisations (e.g., WHO).
The standards applied at Pearl GTL for HSSE can be found in (Attachment 5.1 – Standards). The
Project adopted HSSE/SD standards for the implementation phase as specified in the Project Guide
1B (SGSI) which can be found in (Attachment 5.2 – Shell Guides). The standards for the Run and
Maintain organisation are defined in the HSSE/SD premises for the Operational phase.
To ensure that compliance to standards was met, a process and assigned responsibilities was
implemented so that new, and changes to requirements applicable to Pearl GTL were known and
addressed in a timely fashion.
Over the life of a project, particularly projects of the size and duration of Pearl GTL, care should
be taken to adopt an appropriate and pragmatic approach in the development of documentation
derived from stated requirements in standards. When an organisation is developing a Management
system in a project environment there is only so much change to standards that can be

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Policy and Objectives
■■ Adopt the Group HSSE Policy and Commitment.
■■ Establish, implement and maintain measurable HSSE objectives and targets, and integrate them into
business plans.
Organisation, Responsibilities, Resources, Standards and Documents
■■ Establish and maintain an organisation that delivers HSSE requirements and effective HSSE
management.
■■ Define and assign HSSE roles, responsibilities and authorities to individuals.
■■ Ensure personnel have the competence needed to perform their HSSE roles and responsibilities.
■■ Identify HSSE critical positions and ensure that individuals in these roles are competent.
■■ Maintain HSSE information that is current and readily available.
Risk Management
■■ Identify HSSE-critical activities and their associated hazards and effects, assess the risks and select
controls that manage them to ALARP.
■■ Manage changes to facilities, processes and organisation to ensure continued risk management.
■■ Apply Product Stewardship throughout the product life cycle.
Planning and Procedures
■■ Incorporate HSSE requirements into Business and Operational Plans and Procedures.
■■ Maintain procedures and work instructions for HSSE critical activities.
Implementation, Monitoring and Reporting
■■ Implement requirements to meet objectives and targets.
■■ Establish and monitor HSSE Performance Indicators and take action to improve.
■■ Log, investigate and learn from incidents.
Audit
■■ Provide assurance that all elements of the HSSE Control Framework are in place and effective using
a risk-based Assurance Plan.
Management Review
■■ Regularly review the suitability and effectiveness of the HSSE Control Framework and implement
opportunities for improvements.
Managing Abnormal
Situations
Console Op
Proactive
Outside Op
Proactive
Safe Limits
Database
Validated Targets
User Deﬁned
Alerts
Start of Shift
Orientation
Shift Handover
Shift Team Meeting
& Planning
End of Shift
Reporting
Figure 10: ESP Pyramid.
5.3 HSSE MANUAL
After the appraisal of relevant standards to apply and comply with, the work of meeting stated
requirements can start. What should be recognised is the procedures, rules, guidance, plans, job
aids, etc., that all come together to make up the HSSE MS should have context. Developing an
effective HSSE MS requires consistency in approach, the use of complimentary language and
where appropriate, reference and linkage. The ability of non-HSSE professionals to easily navigate
documents that are parts of the sum that is the HSSE MS should be the benchmark.
The HSSE Manual is the principal document describing the organisation and arrangements to deliver
HSSE performance. A good HSSE manual does this in the context of the hazards and risks of the
entity. What is written in this manual and how it is written is critical. People at a site, on a project
should recognise what is written in a HSSE Manual. Simplicity is key.
The main sections of the HSSE Manual are:
Leadership and Commitment
■■ Leaders create and sustain an organisational culture that supports effective HSSE management
through their personal behaviour.
■■ Leaders demonstrate commitment and leadership to HSSE through measurable actions.
■■ Leaders ensure HSSE Requirements are communicated and understood at all levels.
■■ Leaders insist on compliance with HSSE Requirements and take appropriate action to
correct deficiencies.

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Operations HSSE Case
■ Identify hazards in all areas and rate using RAM
■ Identify High Risk and Severity 5 Hazards
■ Analyse hazards (step 3) using HEMP tools to
check if operational controls reduce risks to ALARP
■ Identify remedial action and execute
■ Document
■ HSSE Critical Tasks
■ HSSE Critical Elements
SU &
Operations
Commissioning
Construction
Pearl GTL HSSE-MS
Design
HSSE Case
Figure 11: Operations HSSE Case
These eight sections that comprise the HSSE Manual are the basis and fundamentals to implement
HSSE Governance.
5.4 HSSE CASE(S)
HSSE Cases were developed for the Design, (Design HSSE Case), for the Operation (Offshore and
Onshore Integrated Operational HSSE Case) and for Road Transport (Road Transport HSSE Case).
Pearl GTL Design HSSE Case can be found in Attachment 5.3 – Construction. The responsibility to
develop the Design HSSE Case was the Technical HSSE Manager and Technical Engineering team.
The Operations HSSE Case can be found in Attachment 5.4 – HSSE Ops Cases. The responsibility
to develop the Operations HSSE Case was the CSU HSSE Implementation Manager.
The Road Transport HSSE Case can be found in Attachment 5.5. The responsibility to develop the
Road Transport HSSE Case was the Transport Safety Advisor.
The HSSE Cases are fundamental to demonstrate that Risk Management has been applied. The
development of HSSE Cases is a major piece of work. Management of the process to ensure
appropriate rigor, consistency of approach, the participation of appropriate trained and competent
people, provision of experts as needed and more, is essential. The vital importance to ensure that the
cases are kept evergreen should be clearly documented in the HSSE Manual.
Below (Figure 11) shows how HSSE has been implemented in the design of Pearl GTL and translated
into construction. During the start-up of Pearl GTL, all HSSE risks and hazards were identified and
assessed and all safety critical tasks and elements were documented to become part of the Pearl GTL
HSSE-MS as shown below.

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The asset rules are framed to target the following:
Asset Rule Types
1 Rules for Every Person Entering Site 6 Entry into High Risk Areas
2 Moving Around Site 7 Operations Rules
3 Precautions for Entering Plant/Unit Areas 8 PTW Rules
4 Use of Equipment and Materials 9 Management of Change Rules
5 Driving On Site
Figure 13: Asset Rule Types
The rules within each of the categories mentioned above are in the asset rules document in
Attachment 5.6 – Critical Processes.
5.6 CRITICAL PROCESSES – PROCEDURES
What is critical? The processes identified as barriers to threats during HEMP meet this definition. It is
to these processes that a high importance for implementation is attached. These are the processes I
concentrate on first to establish a minimum level of control. They are:
■■ Permit to Work (PTW),
■■ Management of Change,
■■ Incident Management,
■■ Emergency Preparedness and Response,
■■ Contractor HSSE Management,,
■■ Safe Place, Safe Person,
■■ Safety District ownership,
■■ Training and Competence (limited to Critical Process implementation),
■■ Asset Rules, and
■■ Asset Induction.
Procedures to implement these critical processes can be found in Attachment 5.6 – Critical Processes.
In addition, further comment on the implementation of the critical processes will be given later in this book.
5.5 RULES
5.5.1 Life Saving Rules and Golden Rules
The LSR and Golden Rules are Shell group wide mandatory requirements.
Figure 12: Life Saving Rules
The Golden Rules are:
■■ comply with the law, standards and procedures.
■■ intervene on unsafe or non-compliant actions.
■■ respect our neighbours.
The HSSE Golden Rules are about changing how we act. They are three rules that give a framework
for how we must all behave all of the time, in every operation and activity, if we are to achieve
further improvement in our HSSE performance. The thinking behind the rules is well established
in many of our HSSE programmes such as Hearts and Minds. They also fit well with important
new Group initiatives such as Enterprise First – with its emphasis on leadership, accountability and
teamwork - and compliance.
5.5.2 Asset (site wide) Rules
In addition, Pearl GTL has a set of asset (site wide) rules mandatory and applicable to all personnel
working at Pearl GTL. This rule set can be found in Attachment 5.6 – Critical Processes.

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As can be seen from what is written above, HSSE Plans were written through transition of the different
phases of the Project; so that these Plans represented a consistent approach, main objectives were set
that prevailed throughout all phases. These main objectives included:
■■ Visible and felt HSSE Leadership,
■■ Flawless Construction and CSU/SIMOPS HSSE interfaces,
■■ Simplified HSSE systems to enable compliance,
■■ Effective Stakeholders Engagement.
To achieve these objectives, Pearl GTL identified focus areas and deliverables which are summarised
in Table 3 below. These focus areas and deliverables would take into account the stage of the Project
and were updated annually. (Refer to Attachment 5.8 – HSSE Plans).
Focus Area Deliverables
Leadership ■■ Visible and felt leadership through effective communication of common
shared values on Safety.
■■ Establishing a strong compliance mind-set.
■■ Recognising performance achievements.
■■ Transition IIF program to CSU/Asset Team.
■■ 2 Safety Days per annum used to energise project personnel.
Environmental
Performance and
Control
■■ Achieve environmental Consent to Operate.
■■ Implement compliance/emissions reporting.
■■ Finalise Hazardous Waste Management Plan and work with RLIC to
establish long term solution.
■■ Oil Spill response preparedness in place and drilled.
■■ CO2
Pilot Project taken to FID.
Road Safety ■■ Maintain implementation of Road Safety standards through Land
Transport Policy/HSSE Case.
■■ Develop site Transport Plan.
Contractor HSSE
Management
■■ Contract Holders to develop and implement robust risk based HSSE
Plans. This to include mobilisation plans for new contractors (for Support
Services, Project and Production contractors).
■■ Formal surveillance program in place to monitor compliance and drive
performance improvement.
Worksite Hazard
Management
■■ Identify Workplace hazards from across Shell Group and embed in to
work instructions and practices to reduce incidents.
■■ Operationalise output from HEMP and assure effectiveness of controls.
5.7 HSSE PLANS AND JOURNEY BOOK
HSSE Plans are a statement of what the organisation wants to achieve in a defined period of time.
They are recognisable through the objectives set, the (key) Performance Indicators that monitor,
measure and report on progress. Furthermore, the main strategies and actions chosen to achieve
objectives are defined, resourced and allocated responsibility.
Good plans satisfy the What, When, Why, Where, Who and How. Good Plans are simple. Plans
are subject to review and when plans are assessed as not meeting expectations then they should be
subject to adaptation. Plans should take account of the ambitions of the organisation, but should be
realistic and cognisant of the capabilities available to deliver. A plan should create tension to achieve
but not be too unrealistic. It takes skill to develop a good plan. It is not an administrative exercise that
collects a number of actions to do. How good is your HSSE Plan?
The HSSE Plans developed and implemented during the phases of the Project contributed to an
excellent Project HSSE performance. The following narrative gives a brief description of the HSSE
Plans for each phase of the Project.
Construction HSSE Management Plan: Procedures required for the IC, EPCM, Early Works
Contractors and sub-contractors during the construction phase of the project. This procedure was
prepared by the PMC (refer to Attachment 5.3 – Construction). This plan was updated annually
throughout the phase of construction. HSSE has been implemented in the design of Pearl GTL and
translated into construction (refer to Attachment 5.3 – Construction).
Commissioning HSSE Management Plan: The PMC Commissioning HSSE Management Plan was
developed to provide instruction and guidance to IC/EPCM regarding activities during CSU that had
a HSSE consequence. (Refer to Attachment 5.7 – Commissioning). This Plan was updated annually
during the phase of commissioning.
Asset Operations HSSE Management Plan: This is applicable during the normal run and
maintain phase. The permanent Shell Operations and Maintenance teams, house contractors and
subcontractors are subject to the aims and objectives of the Plan. They participate in the delivery of
the strategies and actions detailed in the Plan (refer to Attachment 5.8 – HSSE Plans).
The Journey Book sets out a longer term direction and strategy, a 5-year horizon with an annual
update plan (refer to Attachment 5.8 – HSSE Plans).

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The measures included in the focus areas and deliverables were monitored against targets set and
assessed using a simple set of criteria – “good”, “average” and “bad”. Other criteria can be used.
This qualitative criterion was used to directionally indicate performance trends, was compared to
previous years and was used to identify areas for improvement in the years to come.
Attachment 5.8 – HSSE Plans gives examples of targets set. A look ahead for a defined period
was also created. This was normalised to a 5 year look ahead. An example from 2010 is given in
Figure 15.
Focus Area Deliverables
Asset Integrity and
Process Safety
■■ Finalise and implement Operations Process Safety Manual.
■■ Implement Management of Change Procedure, start during CSU.
■■ Roll-out and implement SIMOPS Plan.
■■ Design Engineering Manual 1 & 2 (DEM1, DEM2) implementation plan
in place.
HSSE & SP Control
Framework
■■ HSSE Control Framework gap analysis carried out and impacts
identified and managed through Management of Change process.
■■ Implementation of the CSU/Asset HSSE MS.
■■ Implement and test Emergency response capability in place before
each stage of transition.
■■ Training and Competence: Implementation and Assurance plans
in place.
■■ Security and Emergency Readiness: Ensure interface agreements with
external parties (RLIC/QP) in place.
Health ■■ Implement One-Health-IT and core Health Management Standards
■■ Maintain implementation focus on workers welfare including transition
to operational work patterns.
■■ Maintain measures to minimise risk/impact from communicable
diseases.
Security ■■ Monitor security situation and respond using pre-established threat level
criteria/measures.
■■ Develop security organisation and facilities and, implement in line with
CSU requirements.
Social Performance ■■ Actively support and influence the RLIC Community Outreach Program
(COP) and the Al Khor Information Office operation.
■■ Social Performance Plans in place.
Figure 14: Focus Areas

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No 2010 TARGETS 2009
Actual
2011
Target
2012
Target
2013
Target
2014
Target
2015
Target
Measure Green Orange Red
1 Fatalities 0 - >0 2 0 0 0 0 0
2 Non-Accidental Death (no/103 yrs) <0.2 >0.2 >0.7 0.24 0.15 tbd tbd tbd tbd
3 TRCF (Rec. Injuries/ million hrs) <1.2 <1.5 >1.5 1.56 <0.8 <0.8 <0.8 <0.8 <0.8
4 TROIF (Occ. Illnesses/million hrs) <0.6 >0.75 >1.00 0.63 <0.6 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5
5 RTIF (Road Transport Incident/million Km) <4 <8 >8 4 4 3 3 3 2
6 Land Transport Appraisal Scores/Quarter (% contractors on target) >95 >85 <85 70% >95 >95 >95 >95 >95
7 Contractor readiness to start checklist signed off complete for each contractor 100% >95% <95% - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
8 LSR compliance audit confirms implementation of Just Culture versus Fountain Reports >95% <95% <90% - >95% >95% - - -
9 Crisis exercise carried out 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 Emergency Response drills (no/month per ADT or Area) 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1
11 PTW compliance audit results >95% >90% <90% - >95% >95% >95% >95% >95%
12 Equpt NOx
& SOx
controls meet design specification >95% >90% <90% - >95% >95% >95% >95% >95%
13 Waste management plans in place and all waste accounted for. 100% <90% <90% - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
14 Completion of Pre-startup Safety Reviews and no outstanding High actions 100% >95% >90% - >95% - - - -
15 HEMP Bow-ties completed and controls in place by RFSU 100% >95% >90% - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
16 HSSE Control Framework Assessment Implementation as per plan consistent with Qatar Shell strategy
17 RLIC Community Outreach (community meeting/ yr) 3 1 0 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 15: KPIs
5.8 ASSET MS & HSSE MS DEVELOPMENT
The development of the Asset Operations HSSE Management System started when I joined the
Project in 2008. At this time the Construction HSSE Management System and the Construction HSSE
Plan prevailed and controlled how work was being carried out in construction. The Project was over
18 months away before pre-commissioning and commissioning work would start. The huge Steam
Blow program would announce to the Project that parts of the Plant were ready for commissioning,
but that had yet to come. The development of the Commissioning HSSE Management System and
Plan would start in the early part of 2009, before the start of the Steam Blow program as a joint
cooperative venture between the PMC and Shell. As the Shell CSU HSSE Implementation Manager I
would play a role in this development work. However, there was just over 18 months to look ahead
and start to shape what the future HSSE MS would look like, as for the structure and content.
It was decided to initially pay attention to the structure and main content for the Pearl GTL Asset
Management System, of which the HSSE MS would be a part of. I would venture to propose that this
is a very logical place to start as it enables and promotes context. The HSSE MS should be resultant
from the hazards and risks identified during the development of the HSSE case(s), which in turn is
representative of the processes and work that will be carried out in the asset.

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Figure16 below is the first draft of the Asset Management System Portal. This would be refined over
the period that followed prior to start-up.
Standards were at the heart of the development of the Pearl GTL HSSE MS. Looking ahead to
what the operational phase management system and HSSE MS would look like based on our
understanding of requirements, an overall structure as represented by Figure 16 was developed.
Sitting behind this portal was a comprehensive listing of activities and control processes that
documentation, procedures, guidance, rules, job aids, etc., would be developed to assist and direct
performance. This listing is found in Attachment 5.9 – Manuals.
All of this work was taking place in the first half of 2008. In parallel to defining and designing
the Asset Management System, work started on the Operational HSSE Case. This proved to be a
challenging but highly enjoyable exercise.
5.9 INTEGRATED OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE OPERATIONAL HSSE CASE
A core team was assembled to deliver this important piece of work. This team would deliver the
Integrated Offshore and Onshore Operational HSSE Case. The team comprised:
■■ Technical HSSE Manager Pearl GTL,
■■ CSU HSSE Implementation Manager,
■■ Regional Head Technical Safety – Offshore Operations expert,
■■ Technical Safety Engineer, and
■■ Risktec Consultancy.
The team insisted that the same facilitation support (same person), would be provided by Risktec
for each and every one of the Bowtie Workshops. We considered this essential from a quality and
consistency perspective. Each Bowtie Workshop would have one, often two members of the core
team in attendance. In total, 10 Bow tie workshops were facilitated. On average, these workshops
lasted approximately five working days. The Project was divided into five distinct operational areas
– Utilities, which included Air Separation Units (ASU), Water Treatment and Steam and Power, Feed
Gas Processing (FGP), Gas-to-Liquids (GTL), Liquid Processing Units (LPU) and two Offshore Platforms
and Pipeline to shore facilities.
As a core team there was considerable experience of how to develop a HSSE Case. Critically, there
was expertise of both Offshore and Onshore operations. The two distinctive worlds of Upstream and
Downstream met and became Pearl GTL. The standards used to develop this integrated HSSE Case
would be complimentary both Upstream and Downstream.
The initial design and development of the Asset Management System took account of work that was
started as early as 2006. It importantly took reference from Shell Group standards. A key standard
used to ensure requirements were considered and addressed was, “Manufacturing Site Requirements
Manual” (DSM – 0515002 – SP – 01, dated 4th
February 2008) (see Attachment 5.9 – Manuals).
As I will share, this document was as current a standard that we could use as our work started in
earnest in March of 2008. We also secured support, expertise and facilitation from SGSI. This
proved highly beneficial and an approach I would advocate.
Attachment 5.9 – Manuals details the workshop design that was organised to gather input into the initial
development of the Asset Management System. The outcome from the workshop that included the initial
portal design to allow web access to the Management System is also given Attachment 5.9 – Manuals.
Governing Process and Activities
Core Work Processes and Activities
2. Purpose &
Scope
4. Objectives
& Strategies
5. Organisation
Responsibilities
Resources &
Competences
6. Risk
Management
1. Introduction
7. Processes,
Assets &
Standards
8. Planning
9.
Implementation
& Monitoring
10. Assurance
& Review
Monitor &
Control Well
Production
Ensure Quality
Products &
Raw Materials
Ensure Safe
Production
Management
of Change
Provide
Technology
Support
Perform
Reliability
Centered
Maintenance
Provide
Instrumented
Protective
Funtions
Perform
Maintenance
Execution
Ensure
Equipment
Integrity
Perform
Turnarounds
Develop &
Maintain
Competences
& Organisation
Procure Goods
& Services –
Asset Interface
Provide
Laboratory
Services
HSE CASE
ROADMAP
Optimise
Supply Chain
Transfer &
Store Products
& Feedstock
Deliver
Products to
Customer
Mass Balance,
Loss & Prod.
Reporting
Ensure Plan
Delivery
Execute Master
Planning and
Manage Capital
Investment
Develop &
Implement
Projects
Account for
Financial
Resources –
Asset Interface
Our
Process Safety
Commitment
Mitigate
Threats to
Availability
Monitor
Operating
Windows
Account for
Stocks –Asset
Interface
Account for
Hydrocarbon
Resource Vol.–
Asset Interface
3. Document
Control
Asset MS
HSSE Manual
and MS
Elements
Permit to Work
and Safety
Regulations
Asset Rules
and Standards
HEMP
Critical
Processes
Asset Related
HSSE Policies
Execute Well &
Reservoir
Management
Emergency
Preparedness
& Response
Enabling and Supporting Processes and Activities
Manufacture
Provide
Asset
Availability
Manage
Change
& Tech
Services
Lead Asset
Business
Process
Make
Products
Enable Asset
Manage
Hydrocarbon
Supply Chain
Engineering
Organisation
Technology
Organisation
Asset Proﬁle
& Area
Manuals
Enable Asset
Organisation
Asset
Leadership
Team
Manual of
Authorities
Operations
Organisation
Assure
HSSE in
the Asset
HSSE
Organisation
Figure 16 – First draft of Pearl Asset MS Portal including HSSE MS.

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5.10 WORK PROCESS TO IDENTIFY HIGH RISK AND SEVERITY 5 HAZARDS
As a brief reminder, I would like to share the work process that was followed at Pearl GTL to identify
High Risk and Severity 5 hazards, assess the associated HSSE risks, demonstrate what measures
(barriers) have been put in place to reduce these risks to ALARP levels and demonstrate how these
hard and soft barriers will be assured for the lifecycle of the Pearl GTL facilities. The definition of High
Risk and Severity 5 hazards is demonstrated through the diagram.
Slight
damage
Minor
damage
Moderate
damage
Major
damage
Massive
damage
Slight effect
Minor
effect
Moderate
effect
Major
effect
Massive
effect
No damage No effect No impact
Slight
impact
Minor
impact
Moderate
impact
Major
impact
Massive
impact
Assets Environment Reputation
A B C D E
Heard of
in the
Industry
Has happened in
the Organisation
or more than
once per year
in the Industry
Has happened at
the Location
or more than
once per year in
the Organisation
Has happened
more than
once per year
at the Location
Never
heard of in
the Industry
Slight injury or
health effect
Minor injury or
health effect
Major injury or
health effect
PTD or up to
3 fatalities
More than
3 fatalities
5
0
1
2
3
4
No injury or
health effect
People
CONSEQUENCES INCREASING LIKELIHOOD
SEVERITY
Figure 17 – Risk Assessment Matrix
Illustrates the process to manage risk and set control measures:
Identify Major
Risks
Risks Reduction
Philosophy
Document in
an Accessible
MS
Theoretical
Control
Measures
Implementing
on-site
Figure 18: Managing Risks and Setting Control Measures
Please read the HSSE Case that was developed for the Operational phase of Pearl GTL. I do not
offer this work as best practice. I venture to say that it is imperfect. It tries to tell what has been done
to identify hazards associated with the Process and the activities that will take place at the Asset in
the presence of such hazards. It describes how we have assessed the risk that the hazards identified
present. We recognise that the assessment and analysis carried out based on current knowledge and
understanding is adequate but will require ongoing insights and further work. More can always be
done? We learnt after start-up of the Asset that we had not identified all threats that could cause the
release of a hazard with negative consequences.
Learning from what happens elsewhere and what happens at the asset must be utilised to further
enhance the HSSE Case. Learning from incidents is a very powerful process to use as input for
updating the case. It is preferable that these incidents are near misses.
The people now responsible to maintain the Pearl GTL Operational HSSE Case must ensure that
this work is kept evergreen. Opportunities to update and enhance work that demonstrates hazard
recognition and understanding is fundamental. Being able to demonstrate that the level of risk
exposure is kept to an agreed and acceptable level is a duty of care to all who work at the entity
and to the community that the entity exists. The HSSE Case is the cornerstone of how an entity meets
the HSSE Policy Commitments of the Shell Group.
The Operational HSSE Case is in Attachment 5.4 – HSSE Ops Cases.

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Figure 19: Safety Showers
5.12 IDENTIFY RISKS
Teams from all areas of the Asset, Offshore, Utilities, FGP, GTL, and LPU under the support and
facilitation of the HSSE Case(s) team and Risktec Consultancy qualitatively assessed the High Risk and
Severity 5 Hazards associated with all operations and plant of Pearl GTL. This included:
■■ Offshore: Platforms (Pearl 1 and 2), wellheads, structures, process plant and utilities, export risers
and pipelines. The risks associated with the onshore pipelines and beach valves. In addition, boat
and helicopter activities.
■■ Onshore facilities: FGP, GTL, LPU, Tanks, Jetties and Corridors, Utilities; Steam and Power, Water
Treatment and Air Separation Units.
The risks were classified and segregated into different categories namely, HSSE. No major risks
were identified in the areas of HSSE. However, 37 major risks were identified in safety and duly
documented. These risks are listed in Attachment 5.4 – HSSE Ops Cases.
5.13 MANAGE IDENTIFIED RISKS
Having indentified the major risks, the risk reduction philosophy for offshore and onshore areas was
defined. For offshore, an integrated design and operations Risk Reduction philosophy was developed
on the basis of three major principles:
1. The philosophy was tailored for high-pressure sour gas.
2. A policy for minimisation of leak paths was pursued by using corrosion resistant alloy as the main
material of construction.
3. Exposure to live sour gas plant was minimised by efficient planning of maintenance activities.
5.11 RISKS RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION
The major risks identified that could impact implementation of the HSSE Cases included:
1. Design to Reality: It is essential to translate the Design HSSE case into tangible solutions in the plant
and assign roles to verify that these solutions have been implemented.
2. Communication of procedures: Once HSSE tasks have been identified, it is essential to
communicate these tasks and procedures to all layers of the organisation. How this is done
depends on the preferred organisational model employed. At Pearl GTL, we focused on an area
by area communication process that was enabled by the Asset HSSE team for consistency. The
central HSSE team tied to ensure that clarity was given and any ambiguity resolved.
3. Assigning Accountabilities: All HSSE roles/positions need to be assigned to competent individuals.
This process was verified through a variety of means (interview, assessment, written testing). Once
satisfied sign-off per individual was undertaken and letters of authorisation issued.
4. Measuring performance: During implementation, supervision monitored the actual performance of
tasks benchmarking what was observed against performance acceptance criteria that had been
defined. Gaps in observed performance would be subject to remedial action.
For more understanding of these risks, refer to Attachment 5.3 – Construction and Attachment 5.4 –
HSSE Ops Cases.
I would like to share one simple example of the difficulty to ensure that when designing to reality, the
reality outcome is the same in all parts of the project.
Example: Safety Showers would be sited at different locations of the Asset as identified and required.
The IC would reference standards to ensure that the Safety Showers selected met DEP requirements.
This is what they did and what happened. However, one fundamental requirement of a Safety
Shower is to apply water when a mechanism on the Shower is activated. If there are more than one
means to activate the shower – by standing on the base plate, or by activating a lever using your
hand, then you apply different solutions and can create confusion.
The use of a Safety Shower in an emergency situation, when a state of panic and urgency exists
requires unconscious competence. You need to know where the nearest shower is, but the action to
activate should require little or no thinking. It should be a natural reaction that has been taught.
If you have Safety Showers that can be operated differently, but are still DEP compliant, the reality of
the design to the user is different. This should be avoided.

HSSE Transition Through Project Phases

HSSE Transition Through Project Phases

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