2/5/2018 3. Federalism: U.S. v. The States, Topic Overview
http://www.learner.org/courses/democracyinamerica/dia_3/dia_3_topic.html 1/3
Topic Overview Unit 3
Federalism: U.S. v. the States
Learning Objectives
After completing this session, you will be able to:
Explain how the Constitution distributes power between the national and
state governments.
Describe the various types of federalism.
Explain the changes that have occurred in the federal system in the past 200
years.
Summarize the part played by state governments in the contemporary
federal system.
Discuss the role of grantinaid programs in the American federal system.
Describe the advantages and disadvantages of a federal system.
Unit 3 provides an overview of the workings of federalism in the United States. In
this unit, the complex and changeable relationship between the national and state
governments is explored. By focusing on the conflicts between national and state
powers, the unit develops a deeper understanding of nature of governmental power
in the American system.
Federalism is the division of powers between a central government and regional
governments. Most developed nations experience ongoing struggles over the
relative powers of their central and regional governments. The United States has a
federal system of government where the states and national government exercise
separate powers within their own spheres of authority. Other countries with federal
systems include Canada and Germany. In contrast, national governments in
unitary systems retain all sovereign power over state or regional governments. An
example of a unitary system is France.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to create a federal system that
promotes strong national power in certain spheres, yet recognizes that the states
are sovereign in other spheres. In "Federalist No. 46," James Madison asserted
that the states and national government "are in fact but different agents and
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers." Alexander Hamilton,
writing in "Federalist No. 28," suggested that both levels of government would
exercise authority to the citizens' benefit: "If their [the peoples'] rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress." However, it
soon became clear that Hamilton and Madison had different ideas about how the
national government should work in practice. Hamilton, along with other
"federalists" including Washington, Adams, and Marshall, sought to implement an
expansive interpretation of national powers at the states' expense. Madison, along
with other "states' rights" advocates including Thomas Jefferson, sought to bolster
state powers.
The U.S. Constitution delegates specific enumerated powers to the national
government (also known as delegated powers), while reserving other powers to
the states (reserved powers). Article VI of the Constitution declares the laws of
the national gov ...
Essay on United States Government and Federalism
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Federalism Essay
Reflection Paper On Federalism
Essay On Cooperative Federalism
Powers Of National-State Governments
Essay on Why Framers Chose Federalism
Study Outline for Chapter 3: Federalism
Argumentative Essay On Constitutional Federalism
Essay On Federalism
Essay on Federalism
federalism Essay
Essay on Balanced Federalism
Essay On Dual Federalism
Federalism Essay
Federalism And The Other Federalism
Federalism Essay
Federalist Arguments
Federalism Vs Federal Government
This document contains lecture materials from a political science course covering various topics related to US government and federalism. It includes 10 course topics, such as American federalism, pressure groups in California, and civil rights movements. It also discusses the distribution of powers between national and state governments in the US system of federalism and how powers have centralized over time. Additionally, it addresses elite control of the policy process and how protest movements have achieved civil rights goals.
Slide 8 WestCal Political Science 1 - US Government 2015-2016WestCal Academy
American Leadership Policy Studies (ALPS) is a for-college credit certificate program that teaches the fundamentals of American government. ALPS includes a custom tailored Political Science 1 – US Government course taught in partnership with accredited colleges to assure students receive college credit. The class is taught from the perspective of industry professionals who work in local/state/federal bureaucracies and/or political/union campaigns. This course program may operate at the site of a partnering college or instructor of record who licenses ALPS course materials from WestCal Academy or at WestCal Academy’s main campus in partnership with an accredited college. WestCal Academy
This slide covers the following:
1. American Federalism
2. Powers Flow To The National Elite
3. Five Patterns Of Federalism
4. Redefining Federalism Patterns
5. California Political History
6. Pressure Groups In The Golden State
7. Protecting Interests From Sacramento
8. Citizen Use Of Media For Manipulation
9. Progressive Movements
10. Civil Rights Movement
Federalism is a system of government that divides power between a central federal government and state governments. Under the US Constitution, governmental power is shared between the federal government and state governments, with the federal government having broad general powers and states having more specific regulatory powers. The purpose of federalism is to ensure a balance of power between the federal and state governments.
Federalism refers to a system of government where power is divided between a central national government and several regional or state governments. Over time in the US, the balance of power between the national and state governments has shifted, with the national government gaining more authority up until recent decades when some powers have been returned to the states. Federalism was included in the Constitution to address fears of a too-powerful central government and protect the rights of states and citizens.
Federalism Essay
Federalism Essay
Essay On Federalism
what is federalism
Federalism Essay example
Purpose Of Federalism
Federalism Essay
federalism Essay
Federalism Essay
Essay on Federalism
Essay on United States Government and Federalism
Federalism Essay
Federalism Essay
Reflection Paper On Federalism
Essay On Cooperative Federalism
Powers Of National-State Governments
Essay on Why Framers Chose Federalism
Study Outline for Chapter 3: Federalism
Argumentative Essay On Constitutional Federalism
Essay On Federalism
Essay on Federalism
federalism Essay
Essay on Balanced Federalism
Essay On Dual Federalism
Federalism Essay
Federalism And The Other Federalism
Federalism Essay
Federalist Arguments
Federalism Vs Federal Government
This document contains lecture materials from a political science course covering various topics related to US government and federalism. It includes 10 course topics, such as American federalism, pressure groups in California, and civil rights movements. It also discusses the distribution of powers between national and state governments in the US system of federalism and how powers have centralized over time. Additionally, it addresses elite control of the policy process and how protest movements have achieved civil rights goals.
Slide 8 WestCal Political Science 1 - US Government 2015-2016WestCal Academy
American Leadership Policy Studies (ALPS) is a for-college credit certificate program that teaches the fundamentals of American government. ALPS includes a custom tailored Political Science 1 – US Government course taught in partnership with accredited colleges to assure students receive college credit. The class is taught from the perspective of industry professionals who work in local/state/federal bureaucracies and/or political/union campaigns. This course program may operate at the site of a partnering college or instructor of record who licenses ALPS course materials from WestCal Academy or at WestCal Academy’s main campus in partnership with an accredited college. WestCal Academy
This slide covers the following:
1. American Federalism
2. Powers Flow To The National Elite
3. Five Patterns Of Federalism
4. Redefining Federalism Patterns
5. California Political History
6. Pressure Groups In The Golden State
7. Protecting Interests From Sacramento
8. Citizen Use Of Media For Manipulation
9. Progressive Movements
10. Civil Rights Movement
Federalism is a system of government that divides power between a central federal government and state governments. Under the US Constitution, governmental power is shared between the federal government and state governments, with the federal government having broad general powers and states having more specific regulatory powers. The purpose of federalism is to ensure a balance of power between the federal and state governments.
Federalism refers to a system of government where power is divided between a central national government and several regional or state governments. Over time in the US, the balance of power between the national and state governments has shifted, with the national government gaining more authority up until recent decades when some powers have been returned to the states. Federalism was included in the Constitution to address fears of a too-powerful central government and protect the rights of states and citizens.
Federalism Essay
Federalism Essay
Essay On Federalism
what is federalism
Federalism Essay example
Purpose Of Federalism
Federalism Essay
federalism Essay
Federalism Essay
Essay on Federalism
(No Plagiarism) Explain the statement Although many leading organi.docxtamicawaysmith
(No Plagiarism) Explain the statement: "Although many leading organizations have invested significant resources in developing the culture and routines for this innovation processes, most organizations continue to rely on the efforts of a handful of people and chance. An innovative organization is one that can perfect these routines in addition to creating an innovation culture in the organization that engages people. Five key routines can facilitate its management of the innovation process” (Dooley & O'Sullivan, 2003).
.
What made you choose this career path What advice do you hav.docxtamicawaysmith
The document discusses potential paths and college options after high school but provides little details. It briefly mentions fields of study and interests without elaborating on specific choices or recommendations. The document offers no clear direction or next steps for the reader.
Patient Population The student will describe the patient populati.docxtamicawaysmith
Patient Population: The student will describe the patient population that is impacted by the clinical issue. With a focus on the diversity of the human condition found within this patient population, the student will describe the influence that cultural values may have on the proposed solution. Proposed
Solution
: The student will set the stage for proposing the best solution to the clinical problem by using appropriate evidence-based data and integrating data from peer-reviewed journal articles. In this paper, the student will: i. Propose a clear solution to the clinical problem that is supported by a minimum of three scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles.ii. Expand on the ethical considerations when developing the plan.
.
Dr. Paul Murray Bessie Coleman Jean-Bapiste Bell.docxtamicawaysmith
Dr. Paul Murray
Bessie Coleman
Jean-Bapiste Belley
Harriet Elizabeth Brown
Monte Irvin
Shirley Graham Dubois
Vernon Dahmer
Hale Woodruff
Jo Ann Robinson
Eugene "Pineapple" Jackson
Dr. Francis Cress Welsing
Dr. Kenneth Clark
Amy Jacques Garvey
Ophelia DeVore
Augusta Fells Savage
Eugene Jacques Bullard
Bobby Timmons
Clyde Kennard
Madison Washington
Joseph Winters
Sam Sharpe
Joseph Rainey
Bessie Stringfield
DJ Kool Herc
Lonnie Clayton
Mrs. Mamie Lang Kirkland
Lucius Septimius Bassianus
Carolyn Gudger
Jasmine Twitty
Daisy Bates
Ella Jenkins
Lewis Henry Douglass
Cynthia Robinson
Sylvester Magee
Mabel Fairbanks
Cathay Williams
Clara Belle Williams
John Baxter Taylor Jr.
Anna J. Cooper
The Black Seminoles
Dr. Daniel Hale Williams
Matthew Williams
Phillipa Schuyler
Yarrow Mamout
Mamie "Peanut" Johnson
Frank E. Petersen
"Miss Maggie" Walker
Paul Robeson
Olivia J. Hooker
Dr. Henry T Sampson
Lovie Yancy
Willie James Howard
Toni Stone (Marcenia Lyle Alberga)
Lucien Victor Alexis
Mevinia Sheilds
Dr. Lonnie Smith
Rosewood
Miss Jane Pittman
Lucy Terry
Abraham Galloway
Thomas Jennings
Irene Morgan
Paul Lawrence Dunbar
Jean Toomer
Doris Payne
Ann Petry
Madam C.J. Walker
Dr. May Edward Chinn
Greenwood, Tulsa, OK
Karen Bass
Dr. Dorothy Height
Dr. Geneva Smitherman
Michaëlle Jean
Robin Kelly
Mary Macleod Bethune
Jane Bolin
Donna Edwards
Dame Eugenia Charles
Dr. Thomas Elkins
Wilma Rudolph
Annie Malone
Ann Lowe
Black Wall Street
Cathy Hughes
Kamala Harris
Fannie Lou Hamer
Sarah Rector
Ruth Simmons
Claudette Colvin
MC Lyte
Benajin Banneker
Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.
Thurgood Marshall
Doris "Dorie" Miller
Cecil Noble
WC Handy
Dorothy Counts
Bayard Rustin
Dr. Eliza Ann Grier
Matthew Henson
Jesse Owens
Nina Simone
Wendell Scott
Adam Clayton Powell
Percy Julian
Dr. Charles Drew
Thomas "Fats" Waller
Satchel Paige
Bass Reeves
Marian Anderson
Josephine Baker
Joe Louis
Walter White
William Hastie
Elijah McCoy
Jan Matzelger
Lewis Latimer
Granville T. Woods
Fred Jones
Nella Larsen
Lloyd Hall
A. Philip Randolph
Althea Gibson
Barbara C. Jordon
Marcus Garvey
Malcolm X
James Meridith
Guy Buford
Hazel Scott
Stokely Carmichal
Denmark Vessey
Alex Haley
Virginia Hamilton
Ishmael Reed
Nalo Hopkinson
George Schuyler
Patricia Roberts Harris
John Lewis
Les McCann
Martin Delany
Derek Walcott
Carter Godwin Woodson
Alvin Ailey
Debbie Allen
Ralph Abernathy
Arthur Ashe
Crispus Attucks
Amiri Baraka
Seko.
In depth analysis of your physical fitness progress Term p.docxtamicawaysmith
In depth analysis of your physical fitness progress
Term paper should include details of:
▪ What worked and why (include all documentation)
▪ What didn’t and why
▪ Are your physical fitness results in alignment with your health continuum goals (include documentation)
▪ What are your current goals
▪ What are your future goals
▪ Develop a road map to get achieve those goals Due no later than November 30, 2020.
samples
Physical fitness benchmark assessments
Fitness assessment data sheet
Exercise charts
Personal physical fitness progress chart
Self assessment: Individual Health Continuum
.
Information systems infrastructure evolution and trends Str.docxtamicawaysmith
Information systems infrastructure: evolution and trends
Strategic importance of cloud computing in business organizations
Big data and its business impacts
Managerial issues of a networked organization
Emerging enterprise network applications
Mobile computing and its business implications
Instructions:
9- 10 pages (does not include Title page and references )
can Include images (not more than two)
Minimum six (6) sources – at least two (2) from peer reviewed journals
Include an abstract, introduction, and conclusion
.
⦁One to two paragraph brief summary of the book. ⦁Who is the.docxtamicawaysmith
⦁One to two paragraph brief summary of the book.
⦁Who is the author and his/her background?
⦁Does the author have any particular ideological viewpoint that he or she is trying to advance or do you consider the author to have been neutral and presented both sides of controversial issues? (You will find asking this same question will help you in other courses and your future career.)
⦁When was this book written? Does the author reflect the views (biases) of the time when the book was written? Why or why not?
⦁What did you find most interesting in the book? Least interesting?
⦁What additional topics should the author have included in the book? Why?
⦁How had people before the age of the telegraph attempted to communicate faster over distances?
⦁How did the telegraph reflect scientific and technological developments, both in the United States and other countries?
⦁Why did the telegraph represent such a revolutionary development and not just an incremental improvement in communication?
⦁How did the telegraph impact politics, journalism, business, military strategy and society in general?
⦁How were the American and European experiences similar or different in developing the telegraph? Did the telegraph have a similar impact in the United States and Europe?
⦁What do you think of the author’s title? Is the Victorian-era telegraph really the equivalent of today’s internet in terms of its impact or is that an exaggeration? Why or why not?
⦁Do you think the author makes the material interesting, understandable and relevant to the general public? Why or why not?
⦁If you were the editor in the publishing company, what changes would you make to the author’s draft?
⦁Did the book increase your interest in a particular issue that you would like to learn more about?
⦁Do you think it is worthwhile learn about the historical impact of scientific and technological developments?
⦁Would you recommend this book to a friend? Why or why not?
⦁Would you recommend that I continue to use this book in this course with future students?
.
100.0 Criteria10.0 Part 1 PLAAFP The PLAAFP thoroughly an.docxtamicawaysmith
This document provides information about a student named Alicia for the purposes of developing her IEP. It includes her background information and diagnoses of ADD and dyscalculia. Her strengths include average reading skills and interest in dance, while her challenges involve focus, organization, math skills, and independence. The PLAAFP section will use this information to outline Alicia's present levels of performance, while her transition plan will address independence, employment, and post-secondary education goals based on her interests.
102120151De-Myth-tifying Grading in Sp.docxtamicawaysmith
10/21/2015
1
De-Myth-tifying Grading
in Special Education
1980 2015
10/21/2015
2
Primary Purpose
• “the primary purpose of…grades…
(is) to communicate student
achievement to students, parents,
school administrators,
post-secondary institutions and
employers.” and
• To provide teachers with information
for instructional planning.
Taken from “Reporting Achievement at the Secondary School Level: What and How?”, in Communicating Student
Learning: ASCD Yearbook 1996, p. 120.
What makes grading so
hard?
• Teacher preparation programs seldom include course work or
even discussions of recommended practices for grading
students in general, much less for students who may be
struggling learners. As a result, teachers at all grade levels
grapple with issues of fairness in grading.
• Despite the magnitude of this problem, few recommendations
for grading struggling learners can be found in the research
literature or in education policy.
• Urban Grading Legends
10/21/2015
3
Urban Legends:
Bigfoot/Sasquatch
Urban Legends
• I can’t fail a special education
student.
• I give all my Life Skills students an
85.
• The report card grade does not really
mean anything.
10/21/2015
4
Urban Legends
• The grade on the report card can’t be less
than the IEP mastery level (default 70%)
• I teach a lot in my classroom, but I can
only grade the things that are on the IEP.
• I don’t do the grades for my special
education students in my classroom, the
special education teacher does that for
me.
What’s the
problem??
• Some students are not getting REAL
grades.
• Multiple court cases regarding failing
students who are not receiving
appropriate specially designed instruction
or students only get “A’s” and it doesn’t
truly reflect how he/she really performs in
relation to the curriculum
10/21/2015
5
What does the law really
say?
• Neither the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) nor any other federal education laws contain
requirements for grading. Therefore, each state has
discretion on the issue.
• The TEC is the set of state laws our state legislators have
passed that relate to education. ARD committees do not
have the authority to override state laws. The Texas
Administrative Code (TAC) is the set of rules that the State
Legislature has authorized Texas Education Agency (TEA)
or the State Board to write. ARD committees must also
follow these rules.
• The state statutes apply to all public school students in
Texas regardless of special education eligibility.
Local Grading Policies
TEC §28.0216
(1) “must require a classroom teacher to assign a grade that
reflects the students’ relative mastery of an assignment;
[and]
(2) may not require a classroom teacher to assign a
minimum grade for an assignment without regard to the
student’s quality of work.”
(3) may allow a student a reasonable opportunity to make up
or redo a class .
100.0 %Criteria
30.0 %Flowchart Content
The flowchart skillfully depicts the two possible discipline paths following the manifestation determination. In addition, there are two comprehensively aligned IEP goals for each determination.
40.0 %Legal Issues Analysis
A compelling analysis is included regarding any legal issues raised by the change in Carrie's transportation, proficiently incorporating relevant statutes, regulations, and case decisions.
5.0 %Research
Research strongly supports the information presented. Sources are timely, distinctive and clearly address all of the criteria stated in the assignment.
5.0 %Rationale Organization
The content is well organized and logical. There is a sequential progression of ideas related to each other. The content is presented as a cohesive unit and the audience is provided with a clear sense of the main idea.
5.0 %Overall Flowchart Presentation
The work is well presented. The overall appearance is neat and professional. Work would be highly desirable for public dissemination.
10.0 %Mechanics of Writing (includes spelling, punctuation, grammar, language use)
Submission is virtually free of mechanical errors. Word choice reflects well-developed use of practice and content-related language. Sentence structures are varied and engaging.
5.0 %Documentation of Sources (citations, footnotes, references, bibliography, etc., as appropriate to assignment and style)
Sources are documented completely and correctly, as appropriate to assignment and style, and format is free of error.
100 %Total Weightage
.
100 words agree or disagree to eac questions Q 1.As her .docxtamicawaysmith
100 words agree or disagree to eac questions
Q 1.
As her defense attorney, I will argue that the officer did not only not read Sally's Miranda rights; he also did not respect her right to consul. After Sally made her allegedly verbal utterance, the Officer should have known to read Sally her rights. I will bring up that during New Jersey v. James P. Kucinski, Oct 26, 2016, the defendant was arrested for the bludgeoning death of his brother. The defendant was taken to police headquarters for questioning after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; he requested an attorney. The law enforcement officers terminated the interrogation, spoked with their supervisor, and approximately eight minutes later, the officers returned into the room and advised the defendant that he was being charged with murder. The scare tactic worked, and the defendant asked to speak with the officers. The defendant reluctantly answered a series of questions. Before trial, the defendant moved for suppression motion because the officers did not honor his request for counsel. The court denied the motion, during further questioning the defendant claimed to have acted in self-defense, the defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but instructed the jury that the defendant's right to remain silent should be limited to assessing his credibility. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes The Appellate Division reversed the defendant's conviction and motion for a new trial due to the prosecutor's question doing cross-examination was improper. The panel concluded that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent by telling law enforcement officers that he did not want to talk or answer questions. The Appellate Division found that the trial court instructions to the jury were flaws, and the supreme court agreed and affirmed. The officers should have stopped all questioning and contacted the defendant's attorney.
New Jersey v. Kucinski (2017). https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2017/a-58-15.html
Q 2.
My last name begins with a K. so I am answering in the role of prosecutor. Sally was originally pulled over because she had shown probable cause of drunk driving. Upon her traffic stop, Sally was then searched after being arrested and the handgun and drugs were found on her body. The police asked about the two items but did not “interrogate” her. Sally voluntarily answered the arresting officers’ questions and in doing so piled new charges onto her initial arrest charge. I believe that the judge will deny the request to suppress the admission of Sally’s statements. Sally does have rights under the Fifth Amendment, but her statements to the police officers were not coerced out of her. The Cornell Law School website states that the Fifth Amendment, under the self-incrimination clause, if an individual makes a spo.
101118, 4(36 PMCollection – MSA 603 Strategic Planning for t.docxtamicawaysmith
10/11/18, 4(36 PMCollection – MSA 603 Strategic Planning for the Admin ...
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Post: dis 4
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Posted Date: October 9, 2018 8:50 PM
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Brian Mcleod
I would say that for them to move the work and still be ethical defensible are work conditions,
respect for labor laws of the parent company, and job opportunities for the long-term
employees.
To expand on this would be the work conditions. The conditions that the workers have to work
under should be the same conditions that workers in the US have to work under. This involves
safety and environmental protection for the workers.
Labor laws of the host country and “most” of the internally recognized laws must be observed.
Overtime and child labor are a couple of items.
The long-term employees should be given the opportunity to move to another US based plant if
possible or to the new country.
Sometimes because of the state of the industry companies do have to make these decisions or
face possible bankruptcy. This alternative may not be the perfect solution but better than
bankrupting a company that still has operation in the US.
← OK
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Thread: DB4
Post: DB4
Author:
Posted Date: October 10, 2018 8:51 PM
Status: Published
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Christina Lacroix
It is ethically defensible to outsource production when the outcome of not outsourcing
would negatively impact stakeholders. Organizations define their most important
stakeholders, often the shareholders, as they invested capital. While some risk is
assumed by shareholders as a fiduciary managers have an obligation to the
shareholders to protect their interest when possible. A company risks shareholder
investment (access to capital) and jeopardizes all other stakeholders such as
employees, suppliers, and creditors. An organization cannot risk itself and the other
stakeholders depending upon in order to save employees.
The organization should do its due diligence in securing its outso.
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a g.docxtamicawaysmith
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a general idea or opinion.
A.
· Compare and contrast two works from the Italian Baroque period with two works from the Renaissance. Be sure to note the appearance in the works of the defining characteristics from each period.
· Discuss why artistic expression shifted from the restrained stoicism of the Renaissance to that of the heightened emotion in the religious and other works of the Baroque.
B. From video
Goya -
The Third of May
- If you cannot see this video, click here -
https://youtu.be/e7piV4ocukg
Respond in writing to the following questions after reading Chapter 12, watching the video, and exploring the sites above.
1. Heroism, nationalism, and passion are themes associated with Romanticism. Which
three
landmarks of the nineteenth century are most representative of these themes? You can discuss art, philosophy, or literature.
2. Compare Neoclassicism and Romanticism as styles and sensibilities. What do their differences reflect about patronage, popular taste, and historical change? Provide specific examples from the chapters.
C.
1. From the arts of West Africa, what are some characteristics of African cultural heritage?
2. How did their religious beliefs influence their art and music.
D.
Watch video below
Manet -
Déjeuner
sur
l’herbe -
If you cannot see this video, click
https://youtu.be/3xBGF8H3bQ4
1. Viewers of Manet’s
Déjeuner sur l’herbe
initially responded to its public display by attacking the canvas with their umbrellas. Why?
2. What kind of art has evoked a comparable response in our own time? Do some research online. Find a recent work of art that caused controversy. Summarize the reasons for the controversy and your reaction to it. Try not post the same article as someone else. (This board is not POST FIRST, so you will be able to see what others have posted right away.) If you can, attach a picture of the image you are describing to your posting.
E.
Watch the video below. If you cannot see the video, click here:
https://youtu.be/XyLNPumMMTs
George Braque, Violin and Pitcher, (1909)
•
Pablo Picasso, Guernica, (1937)
•
Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, (1912)
Respond in writing to the following question after reading Chapter 14 in your text, watching the video above, viewing the Web Assignments, and the sites above.
1. Describe how they three have departed from styles such as symbolism and impressionism of the late nineteenth century.
F.
Take some time to reflect on all we have covered in this course. Then, respond in writing to the following question.
1. After your experience in this course, describe why you feel the humanities are important.
.
100A 2
2 4 4
5
1A 1034 5
1B 1000 10
1C 1100 1
1D 1123 20
1E 1210 5
20 10 10
7
1A 2180 20
1B 1283 20
1C 3629 5
1D 3649 3
1E 4051 15
1F 4211 1
1G 5318 5
100B 1
2 4 1
3
1A 2180 10
1B 1283 10
1C 3629 5
100C 2
0 0 0
3
1A 6774 5
1B 6869 5
1C 6879 2
0 0 0
4
1A 6774 2
1B 6869 5
1C 6879 1
1D 7555 10
100D 1
10 5 3
3
1A 2180 5
1B 3649 2
1C 4211 3
Self-care and Residency Reflection Paper Scoring Rubric -
Content
80 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
All key elements of the assignment are covered in a substantive way.
Write a 700- to 1,050-word paper to reflect on your residency experience and outline your plan for self-care. Please use the self-care and residency reflection paper template posted in Student Materials for this assignment.
Consider the following questions when writing your reflection:
a) What have you learned about yourself during residency?
b) What have you learned about yourself as a counselor-in-training during residency?
c) What are aspects of residency that you enjoyed? Why did you enjoy these aspects?
d) What aspects of residency did you not enjoy? Why did you not enjoy these aspects?
e) What is counselor self-care? Why is it important? Include two separate in-text and end of work references.
f) What strategies for maintaining self-care did you try throughout this program? How can you implement these strategies?
g) How will you know when you are experiencing burnout? What can you do to prevent this?
The content is comprehensive, accurate, and /or persuasive.
The paper links theory to relevant examples of current experience and industry practice and uses the vocabulary of the theory correctly. This refers to the use of literary references. Generally you will need one separate literary reference for each main point (objective) of your paper.
Major points are stated clearly and are supported by specific details, examples, or analysis.
Organization / Development
35 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
The paper has a structure that is clear, logical, and easy to follow.
The paper develops a central theme or idea, directed toward the appropriate audience.
The introduction provides sufficient background on the topic and previews major points.
The conclusion is logical, flows from the body of the paper, and reviews the major points.
Transitions between sentences/ paragraphs/sections aid in maintaining the flow of thought.
The tone is appropriate to the content and assignment.
Mechanics
35 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
The paper, including the title page, reference page, tables, and appendices follow APA guidelines for format.
Citations of original works within the body of the paper follow APA guidelines.
The paper is laid out with effective use of headings, font styles, and white space.
Rules of grammar, usage, and punctuation are followed.
Sentences are complete, clear, concise, and varied.
Spelling is correct.
.
10122018Week 5 Required Reading and Supplementary Materials - .docxtamicawaysmith
10/12/2018
Week 5 Required Reading and Supplementary Materials - MGMT 670 9042 Strategic Management Capstone (2188)
https://learn.umuc.edu/d2l/le/content/333174/viewContent/13406413/View
/2
Required Readings:
From the UMUC library: (Note: You must search for these articles in the UMUC library. In the case of video links in the UMUC library, exact directions are given on how to find the video.)
Porter's Five-Forces model. (2009). In Encyclopedia of management (6th Ed., pp. 714-717).
From Other websites:
Evaluating the industry. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-03-evaluating-the-industry.html
The impact of external and internal factors on strategy. (2016, 31 May). In Boundless Management. Retrieved from https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-management/chapter/strategic-management/
Mapping strategic groups. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-04-mapping-strategic-groups.html
The PESTEL and SCP frameworks. (2016, 26 May). In Boundless management. Retrieved from https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-management/chapter/external-inputs-to-strategy/
The relationship between an organization and its environment. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-01-the-relationship-between-an- or.html
Strategic group mapping. (2010, October 5). MBA lectures. Retrieved from http://mba-lectures.com/management/strategic- management/1000/strategic-group-mapping.html
Supplementary Materials:
From the UMUC library: (Note: You must search for these articles in the UMUC library. In the case of video links in the UMUC library, exact directions are given on how to find the video.)
Anand, B. N. (2006). Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning [Video]. Harvard Business School Faculty Seminar Series.
Follow these steps to find this video:
Go to http://sites.umuc.edu/library/index.cfm
Type in the entire name of the article: "Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning," into the search box and click on "search."
Click on "multimedia" in the upper left hand corner of the webpage (under "Ask a Librarian.)
Type in the entire name of the article: "Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning," in the box at the top of the page to the left of the word, "Search."
Make sure only "Business Videos" and "Find all my search term" are the only boxes that are checked. Uncheck both "Image Collection" and "Apply equivalent
subjects"
Click on "Search" at the bottom right hand corner of the webpage. It is a small word in a box. The next page shows the article. Click on the article.
Dahab, S. (2008). Five forces. In S. R. Clegg & J. R. Bailey (Eds.), International en.
101416 526 PMAfter September 11 Our State of Exception by .docxtamicawaysmith
10/14/16 5:26 PMAfter September 11: Our State of Exception by Mark Danner | The New York Review of Books
Page 1 of 11http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/10/13/after-september-11-our-state-exception/?printpage=true
After September 11: Our State of Exception
Mark Danner OCTOBER 13, 2011 ISSUE
We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.
—George W. Bush, September 20, 2001
1.
We are living in the State of Exception. We don’t know when it will end, as we don’t know when the War on Terror will
end. But we all know when it began. We can no longer quite “remember” that moment, for the images have long since
been refitted into a present-day fable of innocence and apocalypse: the perfect blue of that late summer sky stained by acrid
black smoke. The jetliner appearing, tilting, then disappearing into the skin of the second tower, to emerge on the other
side as a great eruption of red and yellow flame. The showers of debris, the falling bodies, and then that great blossoming
flower of white dust, roiling and churning upward, enveloping and consuming the mighty skyscraper as it collapses into the
whirlwind.
To Americans, those terrible moments stand as a brightly lit portal through which we were all compelled to step, together,
into a different world. Since that day ten years ago we have lived in a subtly different country, and though we have grown
accustomed to these changes and think little of them now, certain words still appear often enough in the news—
Guantánamo, indefinite detention, torture—to remind us that ours remains a strange America. The contours of this
strangeness are not unknown in our history—the country has lived through broadly similar periods, at least half a dozen or
so, depending on how you count; but we have no proper name for them. State of siege? Martial law? State of emergency?
None of these expressions, familiar as they may be to other peoples, falls naturally from American lips.
What are we to call this subtly altered America? Clinton Rossiter, the great American scholar of “crisis government,”
writing in the shadow of World War II, called such times “constitutional dictatorship.” Others, more recently, have spoken
of a “9/11 Constitution” or an “Emergency Constitution.” Vivid terms all; and yet perhaps too narrowly drawn, placing as
they do the definitional weight entirely on law when this state of ours seems to have as much, or more, to do with politics
—with how we live now and who we are as a polity. This is in part why I prefer “the state of exception,” an umbrella term
that gathers beneath it those emergency categories while emphasizing that this state has as its defining characteristic that it
transcends the borders of the strictly legal—that it occupies, in the words of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben, “a position
at the limit between politics and law…an ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the
political.”
Call it, then, the s.
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only.docxtamicawaysmith
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a general idea or opinion.
A.
· Compare and contrast two works from the Italian Baroque period with two works from the Renaissance. Be sure to note the appearance in the works of the defining characteristics from each period.
· Discuss why artistic expression shifted from the restrained stoicism of the Renaissance to that of the heightened emotion in the religious and other works of the Baroque.
B. From video
Goya -
The Third of May
- If you cannot see this video, click here -
https://youtu.be/e7piV4ocukg
Respond in writing to the following questions after reading Chapter 12, watching the video, and exploring the sites above.
1. Heroism, nationalism, and passion are themes associated with Romanticism. Which
three
landmarks of the nineteenth century are most representative of these themes? You can discuss art, philosophy, or literature.
2. Compare Neoclassicism and Romanticism as styles and sensibilities. What do their differences reflect about patronage, popular taste, and historical change? Provide specific examples from the chapters.
C.
1. From the arts of West Africa, what are some characteristics of African cultural heritage?
2. How did their religious beliefs influence their art and music.
D.
Watch video below
Manet -
Déjeuner
sur
l’herbe -
If you cannot see this video, click
https://youtu.be/3xBGF8H3bQ4
1. Viewers of Manet’s
Déjeuner sur l’herbe
initially responded to its public display by attacking the canvas with their umbrellas. Why?
2. What kind of art has evoked a comparable response in our own time? Do some research online. Find a recent work of art that caused controversy. Summarize the reasons for the controversy and your reaction to it. Try not post the same article as someone else. (This board is not POST FIRST, so you will be able to see what others have posted right away.) If you can, attach a picture of the image you are describing to your posting.
E.
Watch the video below. If you cannot see the video, click here:
https://youtu.be/XyLNPumMMTs
George Braque, Violin and Pitcher, (1909)
•
Pablo Picasso, Guernica, (1937)
•
Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, (1912)
Respond in writing to the following question after reading Chapter 14 in your text, watching the video above, viewing the Web Assignments, and the sites above.
1. Describe how they three have departed from styles such as symbolism and impressionism of the late nineteenth century.
F.
Take some time to reflect on all we have covered in this course. Then, respond in writing to the following question.
1. After your experience in this course, describe why you feel the humanities are important.
Edit question's body
.
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17Celine George
An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
A workshop hosted by the South African Journal of Science aimed at postgraduate students and early career researchers with little or no experience in writing and publishing journal articles.
(No Plagiarism) Explain the statement Although many leading organi.docxtamicawaysmith
(No Plagiarism) Explain the statement: "Although many leading organizations have invested significant resources in developing the culture and routines for this innovation processes, most organizations continue to rely on the efforts of a handful of people and chance. An innovative organization is one that can perfect these routines in addition to creating an innovation culture in the organization that engages people. Five key routines can facilitate its management of the innovation process” (Dooley & O'Sullivan, 2003).
.
What made you choose this career path What advice do you hav.docxtamicawaysmith
The document discusses potential paths and college options after high school but provides little details. It briefly mentions fields of study and interests without elaborating on specific choices or recommendations. The document offers no clear direction or next steps for the reader.
Patient Population The student will describe the patient populati.docxtamicawaysmith
Patient Population: The student will describe the patient population that is impacted by the clinical issue. With a focus on the diversity of the human condition found within this patient population, the student will describe the influence that cultural values may have on the proposed solution. Proposed
Solution
: The student will set the stage for proposing the best solution to the clinical problem by using appropriate evidence-based data and integrating data from peer-reviewed journal articles. In this paper, the student will: i. Propose a clear solution to the clinical problem that is supported by a minimum of three scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles.ii. Expand on the ethical considerations when developing the plan.
.
Dr. Paul Murray Bessie Coleman Jean-Bapiste Bell.docxtamicawaysmith
Dr. Paul Murray
Bessie Coleman
Jean-Bapiste Belley
Harriet Elizabeth Brown
Monte Irvin
Shirley Graham Dubois
Vernon Dahmer
Hale Woodruff
Jo Ann Robinson
Eugene "Pineapple" Jackson
Dr. Francis Cress Welsing
Dr. Kenneth Clark
Amy Jacques Garvey
Ophelia DeVore
Augusta Fells Savage
Eugene Jacques Bullard
Bobby Timmons
Clyde Kennard
Madison Washington
Joseph Winters
Sam Sharpe
Joseph Rainey
Bessie Stringfield
DJ Kool Herc
Lonnie Clayton
Mrs. Mamie Lang Kirkland
Lucius Septimius Bassianus
Carolyn Gudger
Jasmine Twitty
Daisy Bates
Ella Jenkins
Lewis Henry Douglass
Cynthia Robinson
Sylvester Magee
Mabel Fairbanks
Cathay Williams
Clara Belle Williams
John Baxter Taylor Jr.
Anna J. Cooper
The Black Seminoles
Dr. Daniel Hale Williams
Matthew Williams
Phillipa Schuyler
Yarrow Mamout
Mamie "Peanut" Johnson
Frank E. Petersen
"Miss Maggie" Walker
Paul Robeson
Olivia J. Hooker
Dr. Henry T Sampson
Lovie Yancy
Willie James Howard
Toni Stone (Marcenia Lyle Alberga)
Lucien Victor Alexis
Mevinia Sheilds
Dr. Lonnie Smith
Rosewood
Miss Jane Pittman
Lucy Terry
Abraham Galloway
Thomas Jennings
Irene Morgan
Paul Lawrence Dunbar
Jean Toomer
Doris Payne
Ann Petry
Madam C.J. Walker
Dr. May Edward Chinn
Greenwood, Tulsa, OK
Karen Bass
Dr. Dorothy Height
Dr. Geneva Smitherman
Michaëlle Jean
Robin Kelly
Mary Macleod Bethune
Jane Bolin
Donna Edwards
Dame Eugenia Charles
Dr. Thomas Elkins
Wilma Rudolph
Annie Malone
Ann Lowe
Black Wall Street
Cathy Hughes
Kamala Harris
Fannie Lou Hamer
Sarah Rector
Ruth Simmons
Claudette Colvin
MC Lyte
Benajin Banneker
Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.
Thurgood Marshall
Doris "Dorie" Miller
Cecil Noble
WC Handy
Dorothy Counts
Bayard Rustin
Dr. Eliza Ann Grier
Matthew Henson
Jesse Owens
Nina Simone
Wendell Scott
Adam Clayton Powell
Percy Julian
Dr. Charles Drew
Thomas "Fats" Waller
Satchel Paige
Bass Reeves
Marian Anderson
Josephine Baker
Joe Louis
Walter White
William Hastie
Elijah McCoy
Jan Matzelger
Lewis Latimer
Granville T. Woods
Fred Jones
Nella Larsen
Lloyd Hall
A. Philip Randolph
Althea Gibson
Barbara C. Jordon
Marcus Garvey
Malcolm X
James Meridith
Guy Buford
Hazel Scott
Stokely Carmichal
Denmark Vessey
Alex Haley
Virginia Hamilton
Ishmael Reed
Nalo Hopkinson
George Schuyler
Patricia Roberts Harris
John Lewis
Les McCann
Martin Delany
Derek Walcott
Carter Godwin Woodson
Alvin Ailey
Debbie Allen
Ralph Abernathy
Arthur Ashe
Crispus Attucks
Amiri Baraka
Seko.
In depth analysis of your physical fitness progress Term p.docxtamicawaysmith
In depth analysis of your physical fitness progress
Term paper should include details of:
▪ What worked and why (include all documentation)
▪ What didn’t and why
▪ Are your physical fitness results in alignment with your health continuum goals (include documentation)
▪ What are your current goals
▪ What are your future goals
▪ Develop a road map to get achieve those goals Due no later than November 30, 2020.
samples
Physical fitness benchmark assessments
Fitness assessment data sheet
Exercise charts
Personal physical fitness progress chart
Self assessment: Individual Health Continuum
.
Information systems infrastructure evolution and trends Str.docxtamicawaysmith
Information systems infrastructure: evolution and trends
Strategic importance of cloud computing in business organizations
Big data and its business impacts
Managerial issues of a networked organization
Emerging enterprise network applications
Mobile computing and its business implications
Instructions:
9- 10 pages (does not include Title page and references )
can Include images (not more than two)
Minimum six (6) sources – at least two (2) from peer reviewed journals
Include an abstract, introduction, and conclusion
.
⦁One to two paragraph brief summary of the book. ⦁Who is the.docxtamicawaysmith
⦁One to two paragraph brief summary of the book.
⦁Who is the author and his/her background?
⦁Does the author have any particular ideological viewpoint that he or she is trying to advance or do you consider the author to have been neutral and presented both sides of controversial issues? (You will find asking this same question will help you in other courses and your future career.)
⦁When was this book written? Does the author reflect the views (biases) of the time when the book was written? Why or why not?
⦁What did you find most interesting in the book? Least interesting?
⦁What additional topics should the author have included in the book? Why?
⦁How had people before the age of the telegraph attempted to communicate faster over distances?
⦁How did the telegraph reflect scientific and technological developments, both in the United States and other countries?
⦁Why did the telegraph represent such a revolutionary development and not just an incremental improvement in communication?
⦁How did the telegraph impact politics, journalism, business, military strategy and society in general?
⦁How were the American and European experiences similar or different in developing the telegraph? Did the telegraph have a similar impact in the United States and Europe?
⦁What do you think of the author’s title? Is the Victorian-era telegraph really the equivalent of today’s internet in terms of its impact or is that an exaggeration? Why or why not?
⦁Do you think the author makes the material interesting, understandable and relevant to the general public? Why or why not?
⦁If you were the editor in the publishing company, what changes would you make to the author’s draft?
⦁Did the book increase your interest in a particular issue that you would like to learn more about?
⦁Do you think it is worthwhile learn about the historical impact of scientific and technological developments?
⦁Would you recommend this book to a friend? Why or why not?
⦁Would you recommend that I continue to use this book in this course with future students?
.
100.0 Criteria10.0 Part 1 PLAAFP The PLAAFP thoroughly an.docxtamicawaysmith
This document provides information about a student named Alicia for the purposes of developing her IEP. It includes her background information and diagnoses of ADD and dyscalculia. Her strengths include average reading skills and interest in dance, while her challenges involve focus, organization, math skills, and independence. The PLAAFP section will use this information to outline Alicia's present levels of performance, while her transition plan will address independence, employment, and post-secondary education goals based on her interests.
102120151De-Myth-tifying Grading in Sp.docxtamicawaysmith
10/21/2015
1
De-Myth-tifying Grading
in Special Education
1980 2015
10/21/2015
2
Primary Purpose
• “the primary purpose of…grades…
(is) to communicate student
achievement to students, parents,
school administrators,
post-secondary institutions and
employers.” and
• To provide teachers with information
for instructional planning.
Taken from “Reporting Achievement at the Secondary School Level: What and How?”, in Communicating Student
Learning: ASCD Yearbook 1996, p. 120.
What makes grading so
hard?
• Teacher preparation programs seldom include course work or
even discussions of recommended practices for grading
students in general, much less for students who may be
struggling learners. As a result, teachers at all grade levels
grapple with issues of fairness in grading.
• Despite the magnitude of this problem, few recommendations
for grading struggling learners can be found in the research
literature or in education policy.
• Urban Grading Legends
10/21/2015
3
Urban Legends:
Bigfoot/Sasquatch
Urban Legends
• I can’t fail a special education
student.
• I give all my Life Skills students an
85.
• The report card grade does not really
mean anything.
10/21/2015
4
Urban Legends
• The grade on the report card can’t be less
than the IEP mastery level (default 70%)
• I teach a lot in my classroom, but I can
only grade the things that are on the IEP.
• I don’t do the grades for my special
education students in my classroom, the
special education teacher does that for
me.
What’s the
problem??
• Some students are not getting REAL
grades.
• Multiple court cases regarding failing
students who are not receiving
appropriate specially designed instruction
or students only get “A’s” and it doesn’t
truly reflect how he/she really performs in
relation to the curriculum
10/21/2015
5
What does the law really
say?
• Neither the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) nor any other federal education laws contain
requirements for grading. Therefore, each state has
discretion on the issue.
• The TEC is the set of state laws our state legislators have
passed that relate to education. ARD committees do not
have the authority to override state laws. The Texas
Administrative Code (TAC) is the set of rules that the State
Legislature has authorized Texas Education Agency (TEA)
or the State Board to write. ARD committees must also
follow these rules.
• The state statutes apply to all public school students in
Texas regardless of special education eligibility.
Local Grading Policies
TEC §28.0216
(1) “must require a classroom teacher to assign a grade that
reflects the students’ relative mastery of an assignment;
[and]
(2) may not require a classroom teacher to assign a
minimum grade for an assignment without regard to the
student’s quality of work.”
(3) may allow a student a reasonable opportunity to make up
or redo a class .
100.0 %Criteria
30.0 %Flowchart Content
The flowchart skillfully depicts the two possible discipline paths following the manifestation determination. In addition, there are two comprehensively aligned IEP goals for each determination.
40.0 %Legal Issues Analysis
A compelling analysis is included regarding any legal issues raised by the change in Carrie's transportation, proficiently incorporating relevant statutes, regulations, and case decisions.
5.0 %Research
Research strongly supports the information presented. Sources are timely, distinctive and clearly address all of the criteria stated in the assignment.
5.0 %Rationale Organization
The content is well organized and logical. There is a sequential progression of ideas related to each other. The content is presented as a cohesive unit and the audience is provided with a clear sense of the main idea.
5.0 %Overall Flowchart Presentation
The work is well presented. The overall appearance is neat and professional. Work would be highly desirable for public dissemination.
10.0 %Mechanics of Writing (includes spelling, punctuation, grammar, language use)
Submission is virtually free of mechanical errors. Word choice reflects well-developed use of practice and content-related language. Sentence structures are varied and engaging.
5.0 %Documentation of Sources (citations, footnotes, references, bibliography, etc., as appropriate to assignment and style)
Sources are documented completely and correctly, as appropriate to assignment and style, and format is free of error.
100 %Total Weightage
.
100 words agree or disagree to eac questions Q 1.As her .docxtamicawaysmith
100 words agree or disagree to eac questions
Q 1.
As her defense attorney, I will argue that the officer did not only not read Sally's Miranda rights; he also did not respect her right to consul. After Sally made her allegedly verbal utterance, the Officer should have known to read Sally her rights. I will bring up that during New Jersey v. James P. Kucinski, Oct 26, 2016, the defendant was arrested for the bludgeoning death of his brother. The defendant was taken to police headquarters for questioning after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; he requested an attorney. The law enforcement officers terminated the interrogation, spoked with their supervisor, and approximately eight minutes later, the officers returned into the room and advised the defendant that he was being charged with murder. The scare tactic worked, and the defendant asked to speak with the officers. The defendant reluctantly answered a series of questions. Before trial, the defendant moved for suppression motion because the officers did not honor his request for counsel. The court denied the motion, during further questioning the defendant claimed to have acted in self-defense, the defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but instructed the jury that the defendant's right to remain silent should be limited to assessing his credibility. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes The Appellate Division reversed the defendant's conviction and motion for a new trial due to the prosecutor's question doing cross-examination was improper. The panel concluded that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent by telling law enforcement officers that he did not want to talk or answer questions. The Appellate Division found that the trial court instructions to the jury were flaws, and the supreme court agreed and affirmed. The officers should have stopped all questioning and contacted the defendant's attorney.
New Jersey v. Kucinski (2017). https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2017/a-58-15.html
Q 2.
My last name begins with a K. so I am answering in the role of prosecutor. Sally was originally pulled over because she had shown probable cause of drunk driving. Upon her traffic stop, Sally was then searched after being arrested and the handgun and drugs were found on her body. The police asked about the two items but did not “interrogate” her. Sally voluntarily answered the arresting officers’ questions and in doing so piled new charges onto her initial arrest charge. I believe that the judge will deny the request to suppress the admission of Sally’s statements. Sally does have rights under the Fifth Amendment, but her statements to the police officers were not coerced out of her. The Cornell Law School website states that the Fifth Amendment, under the self-incrimination clause, if an individual makes a spo.
101118, 4(36 PMCollection – MSA 603 Strategic Planning for t.docxtamicawaysmith
10/11/18, 4(36 PMCollection – MSA 603 Strategic Planning for the Admin ...
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reading. A Collection must be created to tag posts. More Help
Thread: dis 4
Post: dis 4
Author:
Posted Date: October 9, 2018 8:50 PM
Status: Published
Overall Rating:
Tags: None
(Post is Read)
Brian Mcleod
I would say that for them to move the work and still be ethical defensible are work conditions,
respect for labor laws of the parent company, and job opportunities for the long-term
employees.
To expand on this would be the work conditions. The conditions that the workers have to work
under should be the same conditions that workers in the US have to work under. This involves
safety and environmental protection for the workers.
Labor laws of the host country and “most” of the internally recognized laws must be observed.
Overtime and child labor are a couple of items.
The long-term employees should be given the opportunity to move to another US based plant if
possible or to the new country.
Sometimes because of the state of the industry companies do have to make these decisions or
face possible bankruptcy. This alternative may not be the perfect solution but better than
bankrupting a company that still has operation in the US.
← OK
�
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Thread: DB4
Post: DB4
Author:
Posted Date: October 10, 2018 8:51 PM
Status: Published
Overall Rating:
Tags: None
(Post is Read)
Christina Lacroix
It is ethically defensible to outsource production when the outcome of not outsourcing
would negatively impact stakeholders. Organizations define their most important
stakeholders, often the shareholders, as they invested capital. While some risk is
assumed by shareholders as a fiduciary managers have an obligation to the
shareholders to protect their interest when possible. A company risks shareholder
investment (access to capital) and jeopardizes all other stakeholders such as
employees, suppliers, and creditors. An organization cannot risk itself and the other
stakeholders depending upon in order to save employees.
The organization should do its due diligence in securing its outso.
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a g.docxtamicawaysmith
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a general idea or opinion.
A.
· Compare and contrast two works from the Italian Baroque period with two works from the Renaissance. Be sure to note the appearance in the works of the defining characteristics from each period.
· Discuss why artistic expression shifted from the restrained stoicism of the Renaissance to that of the heightened emotion in the religious and other works of the Baroque.
B. From video
Goya -
The Third of May
- If you cannot see this video, click here -
https://youtu.be/e7piV4ocukg
Respond in writing to the following questions after reading Chapter 12, watching the video, and exploring the sites above.
1. Heroism, nationalism, and passion are themes associated with Romanticism. Which
three
landmarks of the nineteenth century are most representative of these themes? You can discuss art, philosophy, or literature.
2. Compare Neoclassicism and Romanticism as styles and sensibilities. What do their differences reflect about patronage, popular taste, and historical change? Provide specific examples from the chapters.
C.
1. From the arts of West Africa, what are some characteristics of African cultural heritage?
2. How did their religious beliefs influence their art and music.
D.
Watch video below
Manet -
Déjeuner
sur
l’herbe -
If you cannot see this video, click
https://youtu.be/3xBGF8H3bQ4
1. Viewers of Manet’s
Déjeuner sur l’herbe
initially responded to its public display by attacking the canvas with their umbrellas. Why?
2. What kind of art has evoked a comparable response in our own time? Do some research online. Find a recent work of art that caused controversy. Summarize the reasons for the controversy and your reaction to it. Try not post the same article as someone else. (This board is not POST FIRST, so you will be able to see what others have posted right away.) If you can, attach a picture of the image you are describing to your posting.
E.
Watch the video below. If you cannot see the video, click here:
https://youtu.be/XyLNPumMMTs
George Braque, Violin and Pitcher, (1909)
•
Pablo Picasso, Guernica, (1937)
•
Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, (1912)
Respond in writing to the following question after reading Chapter 14 in your text, watching the video above, viewing the Web Assignments, and the sites above.
1. Describe how they three have departed from styles such as symbolism and impressionism of the late nineteenth century.
F.
Take some time to reflect on all we have covered in this course. Then, respond in writing to the following question.
1. After your experience in this course, describe why you feel the humanities are important.
.
100A 2
2 4 4
5
1A 1034 5
1B 1000 10
1C 1100 1
1D 1123 20
1E 1210 5
20 10 10
7
1A 2180 20
1B 1283 20
1C 3629 5
1D 3649 3
1E 4051 15
1F 4211 1
1G 5318 5
100B 1
2 4 1
3
1A 2180 10
1B 1283 10
1C 3629 5
100C 2
0 0 0
3
1A 6774 5
1B 6869 5
1C 6879 2
0 0 0
4
1A 6774 2
1B 6869 5
1C 6879 1
1D 7555 10
100D 1
10 5 3
3
1A 2180 5
1B 3649 2
1C 4211 3
Self-care and Residency Reflection Paper Scoring Rubric -
Content
80 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
All key elements of the assignment are covered in a substantive way.
Write a 700- to 1,050-word paper to reflect on your residency experience and outline your plan for self-care. Please use the self-care and residency reflection paper template posted in Student Materials for this assignment.
Consider the following questions when writing your reflection:
a) What have you learned about yourself during residency?
b) What have you learned about yourself as a counselor-in-training during residency?
c) What are aspects of residency that you enjoyed? Why did you enjoy these aspects?
d) What aspects of residency did you not enjoy? Why did you not enjoy these aspects?
e) What is counselor self-care? Why is it important? Include two separate in-text and end of work references.
f) What strategies for maintaining self-care did you try throughout this program? How can you implement these strategies?
g) How will you know when you are experiencing burnout? What can you do to prevent this?
The content is comprehensive, accurate, and /or persuasive.
The paper links theory to relevant examples of current experience and industry practice and uses the vocabulary of the theory correctly. This refers to the use of literary references. Generally you will need one separate literary reference for each main point (objective) of your paper.
Major points are stated clearly and are supported by specific details, examples, or analysis.
Organization / Development
35 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
The paper has a structure that is clear, logical, and easy to follow.
The paper develops a central theme or idea, directed toward the appropriate audience.
The introduction provides sufficient background on the topic and previews major points.
The conclusion is logical, flows from the body of the paper, and reviews the major points.
Transitions between sentences/ paragraphs/sections aid in maintaining the flow of thought.
The tone is appropriate to the content and assignment.
Mechanics
35 Points
Points Earned
Additional Comments:
The paper, including the title page, reference page, tables, and appendices follow APA guidelines for format.
Citations of original works within the body of the paper follow APA guidelines.
The paper is laid out with effective use of headings, font styles, and white space.
Rules of grammar, usage, and punctuation are followed.
Sentences are complete, clear, concise, and varied.
Spelling is correct.
.
10122018Week 5 Required Reading and Supplementary Materials - .docxtamicawaysmith
10/12/2018
Week 5 Required Reading and Supplementary Materials - MGMT 670 9042 Strategic Management Capstone (2188)
https://learn.umuc.edu/d2l/le/content/333174/viewContent/13406413/View
/2
Required Readings:
From the UMUC library: (Note: You must search for these articles in the UMUC library. In the case of video links in the UMUC library, exact directions are given on how to find the video.)
Porter's Five-Forces model. (2009). In Encyclopedia of management (6th Ed., pp. 714-717).
From Other websites:
Evaluating the industry. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-03-evaluating-the-industry.html
The impact of external and internal factors on strategy. (2016, 31 May). In Boundless Management. Retrieved from https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-management/chapter/strategic-management/
Mapping strategic groups. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-04-mapping-strategic-groups.html
The PESTEL and SCP frameworks. (2016, 26 May). In Boundless management. Retrieved from https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-management/chapter/external-inputs-to-strategy/
The relationship between an organization and its environment. (2012). In Mastering strategic management. Washington, DC: Saylor Academy. Retrieved from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_mastering-strategic-management/s07-01-the-relationship-between-an- or.html
Strategic group mapping. (2010, October 5). MBA lectures. Retrieved from http://mba-lectures.com/management/strategic- management/1000/strategic-group-mapping.html
Supplementary Materials:
From the UMUC library: (Note: You must search for these articles in the UMUC library. In the case of video links in the UMUC library, exact directions are given on how to find the video.)
Anand, B. N. (2006). Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning [Video]. Harvard Business School Faculty Seminar Series.
Follow these steps to find this video:
Go to http://sites.umuc.edu/library/index.cfm
Type in the entire name of the article: "Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning," into the search box and click on "search."
Click on "multimedia" in the upper left hand corner of the webpage (under "Ask a Librarian.)
Type in the entire name of the article: "Crafting business strategy and environmental scanning," in the box at the top of the page to the left of the word, "Search."
Make sure only "Business Videos" and "Find all my search term" are the only boxes that are checked. Uncheck both "Image Collection" and "Apply equivalent
subjects"
Click on "Search" at the bottom right hand corner of the webpage. It is a small word in a box. The next page shows the article. Click on the article.
Dahab, S. (2008). Five forces. In S. R. Clegg & J. R. Bailey (Eds.), International en.
101416 526 PMAfter September 11 Our State of Exception by .docxtamicawaysmith
10/14/16 5:26 PMAfter September 11: Our State of Exception by Mark Danner | The New York Review of Books
Page 1 of 11http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/10/13/after-september-11-our-state-exception/?printpage=true
After September 11: Our State of Exception
Mark Danner OCTOBER 13, 2011 ISSUE
We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.
—George W. Bush, September 20, 2001
1.
We are living in the State of Exception. We don’t know when it will end, as we don’t know when the War on Terror will
end. But we all know when it began. We can no longer quite “remember” that moment, for the images have long since
been refitted into a present-day fable of innocence and apocalypse: the perfect blue of that late summer sky stained by acrid
black smoke. The jetliner appearing, tilting, then disappearing into the skin of the second tower, to emerge on the other
side as a great eruption of red and yellow flame. The showers of debris, the falling bodies, and then that great blossoming
flower of white dust, roiling and churning upward, enveloping and consuming the mighty skyscraper as it collapses into the
whirlwind.
To Americans, those terrible moments stand as a brightly lit portal through which we were all compelled to step, together,
into a different world. Since that day ten years ago we have lived in a subtly different country, and though we have grown
accustomed to these changes and think little of them now, certain words still appear often enough in the news—
Guantánamo, indefinite detention, torture—to remind us that ours remains a strange America. The contours of this
strangeness are not unknown in our history—the country has lived through broadly similar periods, at least half a dozen or
so, depending on how you count; but we have no proper name for them. State of siege? Martial law? State of emergency?
None of these expressions, familiar as they may be to other peoples, falls naturally from American lips.
What are we to call this subtly altered America? Clinton Rossiter, the great American scholar of “crisis government,”
writing in the shadow of World War II, called such times “constitutional dictatorship.” Others, more recently, have spoken
of a “9/11 Constitution” or an “Emergency Constitution.” Vivid terms all; and yet perhaps too narrowly drawn, placing as
they do the definitional weight entirely on law when this state of ours seems to have as much, or more, to do with politics
—with how we live now and who we are as a polity. This is in part why I prefer “the state of exception,” an umbrella term
that gathers beneath it those emergency categories while emphasizing that this state has as its defining characteristic that it
transcends the borders of the strictly legal—that it occupies, in the words of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben, “a position
at the limit between politics and law…an ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the
political.”
Call it, then, the s.
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only.docxtamicawaysmith
100 words per question, no references needed or quotations. Only a general idea or opinion.
A.
· Compare and contrast two works from the Italian Baroque period with two works from the Renaissance. Be sure to note the appearance in the works of the defining characteristics from each period.
· Discuss why artistic expression shifted from the restrained stoicism of the Renaissance to that of the heightened emotion in the religious and other works of the Baroque.
B. From video
Goya -
The Third of May
- If you cannot see this video, click here -
https://youtu.be/e7piV4ocukg
Respond in writing to the following questions after reading Chapter 12, watching the video, and exploring the sites above.
1. Heroism, nationalism, and passion are themes associated with Romanticism. Which
three
landmarks of the nineteenth century are most representative of these themes? You can discuss art, philosophy, or literature.
2. Compare Neoclassicism and Romanticism as styles and sensibilities. What do their differences reflect about patronage, popular taste, and historical change? Provide specific examples from the chapters.
C.
1. From the arts of West Africa, what are some characteristics of African cultural heritage?
2. How did their religious beliefs influence their art and music.
D.
Watch video below
Manet -
Déjeuner
sur
l’herbe -
If you cannot see this video, click
https://youtu.be/3xBGF8H3bQ4
1. Viewers of Manet’s
Déjeuner sur l’herbe
initially responded to its public display by attacking the canvas with their umbrellas. Why?
2. What kind of art has evoked a comparable response in our own time? Do some research online. Find a recent work of art that caused controversy. Summarize the reasons for the controversy and your reaction to it. Try not post the same article as someone else. (This board is not POST FIRST, so you will be able to see what others have posted right away.) If you can, attach a picture of the image you are describing to your posting.
E.
Watch the video below. If you cannot see the video, click here:
https://youtu.be/XyLNPumMMTs
George Braque, Violin and Pitcher, (1909)
•
Pablo Picasso, Guernica, (1937)
•
Marcel Duchamp, Nude Descending a Staircase, (1912)
Respond in writing to the following question after reading Chapter 14 in your text, watching the video above, viewing the Web Assignments, and the sites above.
1. Describe how they three have departed from styles such as symbolism and impressionism of the late nineteenth century.
F.
Take some time to reflect on all we have covered in this course. Then, respond in writing to the following question.
1. After your experience in this course, describe why you feel the humanities are important.
Edit question's body
.
How to Fix the Import Error in the Odoo 17Celine George
An import error occurs when a program fails to import a module or library, disrupting its execution. In languages like Python, this issue arises when the specified module cannot be found or accessed, hindering the program's functionality. Resolving import errors is crucial for maintaining smooth software operation and uninterrupted development processes.
A workshop hosted by the South African Journal of Science aimed at postgraduate students and early career researchers with little or no experience in writing and publishing journal articles.
Strategies for Effective Upskilling is a presentation by Chinwendu Peace in a Your Skill Boost Masterclass organisation by the Excellence Foundation for South Sudan on 08th and 09th June 2024 from 1 PM to 3 PM on each day.
This slide is special for master students (MIBS & MIFB) in UUM. Also useful for readers who are interested in the topic of contemporary Islamic banking.
বাংলাদেশের অর্থনৈতিক সমীক্ষা ২০২৪ [Bangladesh Economic Review 2024 Bangla.pdf] কম্পিউটার , ট্যাব ও স্মার্ট ফোন ভার্সন সহ সম্পূর্ণ বাংলা ই-বুক বা pdf বই " সুচিপত্র ...বুকমার্ক মেনু 🔖 ও হাইপার লিংক মেনু 📝👆 যুক্ত ..
আমাদের সবার জন্য খুব খুব গুরুত্বপূর্ণ একটি বই ..বিসিএস, ব্যাংক, ইউনিভার্সিটি ভর্তি ও যে কোন প্রতিযোগিতা মূলক পরীক্ষার জন্য এর খুব ইম্পরট্যান্ট একটি বিষয় ...তাছাড়া বাংলাদেশের সাম্প্রতিক যে কোন ডাটা বা তথ্য এই বইতে পাবেন ...
তাই একজন নাগরিক হিসাবে এই তথ্য গুলো আপনার জানা প্রয়োজন ...।
বিসিএস ও ব্যাংক এর লিখিত পরীক্ষা ...+এছাড়া মাধ্যমিক ও উচ্চমাধ্যমিকের স্টুডেন্টদের জন্য অনেক কাজে আসবে ...
How to Manage Your Lost Opportunities in Odoo 17 CRMCeline George
Odoo 17 CRM allows us to track why we lose sales opportunities with "Lost Reasons." This helps analyze our sales process and identify areas for improvement. Here's how to configure lost reasons in Odoo 17 CRM
Walmart Business+ and Spark Good for Nonprofits.pdfTechSoup
"Learn about all the ways Walmart supports nonprofit organizations.
You will hear from Liz Willett, the Head of Nonprofits, and hear about what Walmart is doing to help nonprofits, including Walmart Business and Spark Good. Walmart Business+ is a new offer for nonprofits that offers discounts and also streamlines nonprofits order and expense tracking, saving time and money.
The webinar may also give some examples on how nonprofits can best leverage Walmart Business+.
The event will cover the following::
Walmart Business + (https://business.walmart.com/plus) is a new shopping experience for nonprofits, schools, and local business customers that connects an exclusive online shopping experience to stores. Benefits include free delivery and shipping, a 'Spend Analytics” feature, special discounts, deals and tax-exempt shopping.
Special TechSoup offer for a free 180 days membership, and up to $150 in discounts on eligible orders.
Spark Good (walmart.com/sparkgood) is a charitable platform that enables nonprofits to receive donations directly from customers and associates.
Answers about how you can do more with Walmart!"
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UPRAHUL
This Dissertation explores the particular circumstances of Mirzapur, a region located in the
core of India. Mirzapur, with its varied terrains and abundant biodiversity, offers an optimal
environment for investigating the changes in vegetation cover dynamics. Our study utilizes
advanced technologies such as GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and Remote sensing to
analyze the transformations that have taken place over the course of a decade.
The complex relationship between human activities and the environment has been the focus
of extensive research and worry. As the global community grapples with swift urbanization,
population expansion, and economic progress, the effects on natural ecosystems are becoming
more evident. A crucial element of this impact is the alteration of vegetation cover, which plays a
significant role in maintaining the ecological equilibrium of our planet.Land serves as the foundation for all human activities and provides the necessary materials for
these activities. As the most crucial natural resource, its utilization by humans results in different
'Land uses,' which are determined by both human activities and the physical characteristics of the
land.
The utilization of land is impacted by human needs and environmental factors. In countries
like India, rapid population growth and the emphasis on extensive resource exploitation can lead
to significant land degradation, adversely affecting the region's land cover.
Therefore, human intervention has significantly influenced land use patterns over many
centuries, evolving its structure over time and space. In the present era, these changes have
accelerated due to factors such as agriculture and urbanization. Information regarding land use and
cover is essential for various planning and management tasks related to the Earth's surface,
providing crucial environmental data for scientific, resource management, policy purposes, and
diverse human activities.
Accurate understanding of land use and cover is imperative for the development planning
of any area. Consequently, a wide range of professionals, including earth system scientists, land
and water managers, and urban planners, are interested in obtaining data on land use and cover
changes, conversion trends, and other related patterns. The spatial dimensions of land use and
cover support policymakers and scientists in making well-informed decisions, as alterations in
these patterns indicate shifts in economic and social conditions. Monitoring such changes with the
help of Advanced technologies like Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems is
crucial for coordinated efforts across different administrative levels. Advanced technologies like
Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems
9
Changes in vegetation cover refer to variations in the distribution, composition, and overall
structure of plant communities across different temporal and spatial scales. These changes can
occur natural.
Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering.pptxDenish Jangid
Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering
Syllabus
Chapter-1
Introduction to objective, scope and outcome the subject
Chapter 2
Introduction: Scope and Specialization of Civil Engineering, Role of civil Engineer in Society, Impact of infrastructural development on economy of country.
Chapter 3
Surveying: Object Principles & Types of Surveying; Site Plans, Plans & Maps; Scales & Unit of different Measurements.
Linear Measurements: Instruments used. Linear Measurement by Tape, Ranging out Survey Lines and overcoming Obstructions; Measurements on sloping ground; Tape corrections, conventional symbols. Angular Measurements: Instruments used; Introduction to Compass Surveying, Bearings and Longitude & Latitude of a Line, Introduction to total station.
Levelling: Instrument used Object of levelling, Methods of levelling in brief, and Contour maps.
Chapter 4
Buildings: Selection of site for Buildings, Layout of Building Plan, Types of buildings, Plinth area, carpet area, floor space index, Introduction to building byelaws, concept of sun light & ventilation. Components of Buildings & their functions, Basic concept of R.C.C., Introduction to types of foundation
Chapter 5
Transportation: Introduction to Transportation Engineering; Traffic and Road Safety: Types and Characteristics of Various Modes of Transportation; Various Road Traffic Signs, Causes of Accidents and Road Safety Measures.
Chapter 6
Environmental Engineering: Environmental Pollution, Environmental Acts and Regulations, Functional Concepts of Ecology, Basics of Species, Biodiversity, Ecosystem, Hydrological Cycle; Chemical Cycles: Carbon, Nitrogen & Phosphorus; Energy Flow in Ecosystems.
Water Pollution: Water Quality standards, Introduction to Treatment & Disposal of Waste Water. Reuse and Saving of Water, Rain Water Harvesting. Solid Waste Management: Classification of Solid Waste, Collection, Transportation and Disposal of Solid. Recycling of Solid Waste: Energy Recovery, Sanitary Landfill, On-Site Sanitation. Air & Noise Pollution: Primary and Secondary air pollutants, Harmful effects of Air Pollution, Control of Air Pollution. . Noise Pollution Harmful Effects of noise pollution, control of noise pollution, Global warming & Climate Change, Ozone depletion, Greenhouse effect
Text Books:
1. Palancharmy, Basic Civil Engineering, McGraw Hill publishers.
2. Satheesh Gopi, Basic Civil Engineering, Pearson Publishers.
3. Ketki Rangwala Dalal, Essentials of Civil Engineering, Charotar Publishing House.
4. BCP, Surveying volume 1
हिंदी वर्णमाला पीपीटी, hindi alphabet PPT presentation, hindi varnamala PPT, Hindi Varnamala pdf, हिंदी स्वर, हिंदी व्यंजन, sikhiye hindi varnmala, dr. mulla adam ali, hindi language and literature, hindi alphabet with drawing, hindi alphabet pdf, hindi varnamala for childrens, hindi language, hindi varnamala practice for kids, https://www.drmullaadamali.com
252018 3. Federalism U.S. v. The States, Topic Overview.docx
1. 2/5/2018 3. Federalism: U.S. v. The States, Topic Overview
http://www.learner.org/courses/democracyinamerica/dia_3/dia_
3_topic.html 1/3
Topic Overview Unit 3
Federalism: U.S. v. the States
Learning Objectives
After completing this session, you will be able to:
Explain how the Constitution distributes power between the nati
onal and
state governments.
Describe the various types of federalism.
Explain the changes that have occurred in the federal system in
the past 200
years.
2. Summarize the part played by state governments in the contemp
orary
federal system.
Discuss the role of grant-in-aid programs in the American feder
al system.
Describe the advantages and disadvantages of a federal system.
Unit 3 provides an overview of the workings of federalism in th
e United States. In
this unit, the complex and changeable relationship between the
national and state
governments is explored. By focusing on the conflicts between
national and state
powers, the unit develops a deeper understanding of nature of g
overnmental power
in the American system.
Federalism is the division of powers between a central governm
ent and regional
governments. Most developed nations experience ongoing strug
gles over the
relative powers of their central and regional governments. The
United States has a
federal system of government where the states and national gov
ernment exercise
separate powers within their own spheres of authority. Other co
untries with federal
systems include Canada and Germany. In contrast, national gove
rnments in
3. unitary systems retain all sovereign power over state or regional
governments. An
example of a unitary system is France.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to create a federal s
ystem that
promotes strong national power in certain spheres, yet recognize
s that the states
are sovereign in other spheres. In "Federalist No. 46," James Ma
dison asserted
that the states and national government "are in fact but different
agents and
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers." Alexa
nder Hamilton,
writing in "Federalist No. 28," suggested that both levels of gov
ernment would
exercise authority to the citizens' benefit: "If their [the peoples']
rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of re
dress." However, it
soon became clear that Hamilton and Madison had different idea
s about how the
national government should work in practice. Hamilton, along w
ith other
"federalists" including Washington, Adams, and Marshall, soug
ht to implement an
expansive interpretation of national powers at the states' expens
e. Madison, along
with other "states' rights" advocates including Thomas Jefferson
, sought to bolster
state powers.
The U.S. Constitution delegates specific enumerated powers to t
he national
4. government (also known as delegated powers), while reserving
other powers to
the states (reserved powers). Article VI of the Constitution decl
ares the laws of
the national government deriving from the Constitution to be "t
he supreme law of
the land" which the states must obey. The Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution, a
part of The Bill of Rights passed in 1791, attempts to limit natio
nal prerogatives
Teacher resources and professional development across the curri
culum
Search
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3_video.html
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6. powers, also called implied powers, include Congress's power u
nder Article I,
Section 8, to make laws that are "necessary and proper" for carr
ying out its
enumerated powers. The president's constitutional role as "com
mander in chief" has
allowed presidents, including Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and
now George W. Bush,
to claim emergency powers for the national government in times
of national
emergency. Finally, the Supreme Court's original delegated pow
ers in Article III
were significantly enhanced in the case of Marbury v. Madison (
1802), where
Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated the Court's power t
o exercise judicial
review. Judicial review is the power to strike down as unconstit
utional acts of the
national legislature and executive, as well as state actions.
A review of American history shows that the lines that divide p
ower between the
national government and the states are blurry, and in practice th
e balance of
powers between the two levels of government is constantly in fl
ux. At the same
time, certain periods of federalism can be identified, and are oft
en associated with
creative (although not always precise) metaphors:
Dual federalism, also known as "layer cake federalism" involves
clearly
enumerated powers between the national and state governments,
and
sovereignty in equal spheres. This relationship predominated fro
7. m the 1790s
to 1930.
Cooperative federalism, also known as "marble cake federalism,
" involved
the national and state governments sharing functions and collab
orating on
major national priorities. This relationship predominated betwee
n 1930 and
1960.
Creative federalism, also known as "picket fence federalism,"
predominated during the period of 1960 to 1980. This relationsh
ip was
characterized by overloaded cooperation and crosscutting regula
tions.
Finally, new federalism, sometimes referred to as "on your own
federalism," is characterized by further devolution of power fro
m national to
state governments, deregulation, but also increased difficulty of
states to
fulfill their new mandates. This period began in 1981 and contin
ues to the
present.
There are other concepts of federalism that help describe the co
mplicated
relationships between the national and state governments. Judici
al federalism
involves the struggle between the national and state government
s over the relative
8. constitutional powers of each, and over key constitutional provi
sions including the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. With its power of
judicial review, the
Supreme Court is the arbiter of what the Constitution means on
various questions,
including federalism. Chief Justice John Marshall defended a na
tional-supremacy
view of the Constitution in the 1819 case of McCulloch v. Mary
land. In that case
the Supreme Court expanded the powers of Congress through a
broad interpretation
of its "necessary and proper" powers, and reaffirmed national su
premacy by striking
down Maryland's attempt to tax the Bank of the U.S.
Not all judicial decisions favor national power. In the 1997 case
, Printz v. United
States, for example, the court invalidated federal law that requir
ed local police to
conduct background checks on all gun purchasers. The court rul
ed that the law
violated the Tenth Amendment. Writing for the five-to-four maj
ority, Justice Antonin
Scalia declared: "The Federal government may neither issue dir
ectives requiring the
states to address particular problems, nor command the states' o
fficers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a Federal r
egulatory program....
Such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our consti
tutional system of
dual sovereignty."
9. Fiscal federalism involves the offer of money from the national
government to the
states in the form of grants to promote national ends such as pu
blic welfare,
environmental standards, and educational improvements. Until 1
911, federal grants
were used only to support agricultural research and education.
With the passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1916, which legalized the federal i
ncome tax, the
national government gained a significant source of revenue that
it used to shape
national policy in a variety of new policy areas.
Categorical grants, in which the national government provides
money to the
states for specific purposes, became a major policy tool of the n
ational government
during the New Deal era, and expanded rapidly during the 1960s
' Great Society. But
state and local officials began to criticize this method of nationa
l support because of
the costly application and implementation procedures. They also
complained that it
was difficult to adapt the grants to local needs.
Beginning in the mid 1960s, block grants, which combined seve
ral categorical
2/5/2018 3. Federalism: U.S. v. The States, Topic Overview
http://www.learner.org/courses/democracyinamerica/dia_3/dia_
12. An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org
• from the CESifo website: Twww.CESifo-group.org/wp
T
CESifo Working Paper No. 2385
How Do Local Governments Decide on
Public Policy in Fiscal Federalism?
Tax vs. Expenditure Optimization
Abstract
Previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in
local public finance while
expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the
choice of the optimization
variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward
local governments influences the
way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the
presumption, the paper shows that
local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures.
The result most notably
prevails when federal policy subsidizes local fiscal effort. The
results offer a new perspective
of the efficiency implications of federal policy toward local
governments and, thereby, enable
13. a more precise characterization of local government behaviour
in fiscal federalism.
JEL Code: H7, H3, H1.
Keywords: tax vs. expenditure optimization, federalism,
endogenous commitment, fiscal
incentives, policy interaction.
Marko Koethenbuerger
University of Vienna
Hohenstaufengasse 9
1010 Vienna
Austria
[email protected]
First version: Aug 2007
This version: Aug 2008
Comments by Panu Poutvaara are gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
Models of local public finance predominantly take taxes as
14. being optimized while expenditures
are residually determined via the budget constraint. The view is
one possible prescription of
how governments decide on fiscal policy. In making budgetary
decisions, governments may
equally set expenditures optimally and let taxes adjust
residually.1 Given the two options, a
natural question is why governments should prefer one or the
other budgetary item as a policy
variable. A potential strategic motive is that each item
differently influences the amount of
federal resources which flow to the jurisdiction. Incentives to
attract federal transfers, either
intended or unintended by federal policy, are widespread in
local public finance. Besides
responding to corrective grants to cash in on federal resources,
local governments also adjust
their taxes in order to receive more formulaic equalizing
transfer payments (Smart, 1998,
Buettner, 2006, and Egger et al., 2007). Similarly, local
governments may well select inefficient
local policies to lure more discretionary federal transfers to the
local budget, e.g., as part of
a bailout package (Wildasin, 1997, Qian and Roland, 1998, and
15. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008).
Building on these insights, the goal of this paper is to analyze
whether federal policy has
a bearing on the choice of the policy variable in local public
finance. That is, we set up a
model where the choice of the policy variable is not imposed,
but arises endogenously from
the fundamentals of the fiscal architecture of the federation. In
so doing, we consider two
models of fiscal federalism: a model of formula-based
equalization and a model of ex-post
federal policy. In either model local governments levy a tax on
local residents and use the
proceeds along with federal transfers to provide a public good.
A presumption might be that expenditure and tax optimization
yield identical policy
outcomes since taxes and expenditures are inherently related via
the budget constraint. This
presumption holds true when local economies are fiscally
independent, i.e., when there exists
no fiscal interaction between policy choices by different local
governments. The bias towards
tax optimization in the existing literature is innocuous in such a
fiscal environment. We show
16. that the equivalence between tax and expenditure policy
becomes invalid if local policies are
linked via transfer programmes. Key to the result is that tax and
expenditure policy have
different effects on transfer payments and local governments
thus strategically choose their
1Throughout the paper we interchangeably refer to tax
(expenditure) optimization as tax (expenditure)
policy and to the optimization variable as policy variable.
2
policy variable in order to gain in transfers. To illustrate the
incentives involved in the
equilibrium choice of policy variables, consider a two-state
federation in which interstate
transfers are only conditioned on state taxes and a rise in one
state’s tax rate lowers transfer
income in the tax-raising state and lures additional transfers to
the neighboring state. Were
taxes optimized by the neighboring state, public expenditures
would adjust residually to
the rise in transfer income with no consequences for interstate
transfers. With expenditure
17. optimization, however, taxes decrease residually and this
response lures more transfers to
the neighboring state, financed by a cutback of transfers to the
tax-raising state. Given
the negative fiscal repercussion, the cost of raising taxes turns
out to be higher when the
neighboring state sets expenditures instead of taxes.
Playing on this effect, state governments strategically influence
the neighbor state’s cost
of taxation by its own choice of policy variable. To see the
equilibrium implications, assume
that both states initially optimize over taxes and that one state
(let’s say state 1) consid-
ers deviating to expenditure optimization. The deviation
increases the cost of public good
provision in state 2 which induces the state to decrease its tax
rate. The fiscal adjustment
lures more transfers to state 2, financed by a cutback in
transfers to state 1. The transfer
retrenchment eliminates any incentive to deviate and, in
equilibrium, governments set taxes
optimally and let expenditures adjust residually. A reversed
type of reasoning applies when
the transfer scheme exerts a positive incentive effect on state
18. policy.2 A deviation to expendi-
ture setting lures more transfers to the deviant state’s budget,
and states choose to optimize
over expenditures in equilibrium.
A straightforward question relates to the sensitivity of the
results to the channel through
which state policy interacts. To infer into it, we consider a
different model of fiscal federalism
frequently invoked in the literature. In particular, we allow
states to “see through” the federal
tax policy decision which opens up a second source of fiscal
interaction.3 State policy not only
affects the amount of transfers, but also influences the amount
of taxes state residents pay
to the federal government. In this setting, the divergent
interaction of tax and expenditure
policy implies that states may not optimize over taxes even
though transfers discourage state
2For instance, transfer schemes which equalize fiscal capacities
are one type of transfers which exert a
positive incentive effect – e.g. Smart (1998). Transfer schemes
which build on the notion of fiscal capacity
equalization are implemented in, e.g., Australia, Canada,
Germany and Switzerland.
3The type of “seeing through” delineates a game of
19. decentralized leadership – see, e.g., Wildasin (1997),
Qian and Roland (1998), Caplan et al. (2000), Akai and Sato
(2005) and Koethenbuerger (2007).
3
fiscal effort. More precisely, provided the disincentive effect of
transfers policy is sufficiently
pronounced, the equilibrium choices turn out to be asymmetric
in the sense that one state
chooses to optimize over taxes, whilst the other state optimizes
over expenditures.
The analysis allows for a more informed prediction as to the
efficiency of pubic good
provision in fiscal federalism. For instance, when transfers
encourage local taxation, the
prediction of both models considered is that state governments
optimize over expenditures.
Public good provision is more severely downward distorted than
when taxes are optimized
(as widely assumed in the literature). However, when transfers
undermine taxing incentives,
the efficiency prediction as perceived in the literature turns out
to be consistent with the
equilibrium choice in the first model considered in the paper.
20. With ex-post federal tax policy,
the equilibrium only entails tax policy setting if the disincentive
effect of transfer policy is
not too pronounced. Otherwise, one state sets expenditures and
public good provision is
higher (either less underprovision or more-severe
overprovision) relative to the widely held
conjecture in the literature.
The results are of relevance for the design of corrective policy.
The prediction as to
the magnitude and even as to the sign of the inefficiency
generically differs in models with
(exogenous) tax optimization and with an endogenous selection
of policy variables, and so
does the appropriate matching component of the Pigouvian
grant. Also, the analysis offers a
more nuanced perspective of the effects of federal policy on
local public finance. For instance,
a reform of the federal transfer formula, which leaves more
own-source tax revenues to local
governments, may not necessarily promote local spending
incentives. Fixing the initial choice
of policy variables, public expenditures will indeed rise in
response to the reform. However,
21. phasing in the endogeneity of the policy variables, the fiscal
response may entail a reduction
in local public spending.
While the notion that expenditure and tax policy have different
implications for local
public finance is well established in the literature, it lacks (to
the best of our knowledge)
an analysis of when local governments opt for one or the other
type of policy setting. In
particular, Wildasin (1988) and Bayindir-Upmann (1998)
contrast expenditure and tax policy
in the presence of capital mobility among jurisdictions.
Hindriks (1999) compares transfer
and tax competition when households are mobile. The papers do
not endogenize the choice of
policy instruments over which local governments compete in
fiscal competition. More related
to the present paper, Akai and Sato (2005) contrast expenditure
and tax policy setting in
4
a two-tier federal system in which the federal government
provides transfers ex-post. The
22. choice of the optimization variable is exogenous to the analysis.
Although this paper formally abstracts from tax base mobility,
it is helpful in predicting
which policy scenario can be sustained as an equilibrium choice
in models with tax base mo-
bility. For instance, applying the methodology of the paper to
the setting in Wildasin (1988),
in which capital mobility is the only fiscal linkage between
states, reveals that competition
over taxes is the equilibrium choice. The result is supportive for
almost all papers on capital
tax competition to date which assume that states compete over
taxes and expenditures adjust
residually.
Finally, the choice of optimization variable determines with
which policy variable state
governments commit toward other states’ fiscal policy.4 The
endogenous choice of com-
mitment relates the paper to the Industrial Organization
literature on endogenous timing
of moves, and hence commitment, in models of firm
competition (e.g., Van Damme and
Hurkens, 1999, and Caruana and Einav, 2008). Therein, the
23. sequence of decisions is deter-
mined endogenously, while the choice of optimization variables
is exogenous. In this paper
it is reversed: the sequence of moves is exogenous while the
choice of optimization variables
(for state governments) is endogenous.5
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a
model of formula-based
equalization and Section 3 characterizes the choice of the
optimization variable. Section 4
extends the basic model by allowing for ex-post federal tax
policy, i.e. local governments
have the capacity to “see through” the federal choice of taxes,
and characterizes the selection
of policy variables. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Model
Consider two states which may differ with respect to
preferences and endowments. The rep-
resentative household in state i (i = 1, 2) derives utility from
private and public consumption,
ci and gi, according to the utility function U i(c, g) = ui(c) +
ui(g) where uik > 0 and u
i
kk < 0,
24. 4Optimizing over, e.g., the tax rate implies that other states
perceive the tax rate to be held fixed, and
thus to be pre-committed, when they choose their policy
simultaneously.
5Note, the two types of commitment, i.e. the sequencing of
moves and the choice of optimization variables,
are not equivalent. The former relates to sequential games while
the latter already exists in simultaneous move
games. Also, with the former type it is the best response of
players which determines the value of commitment.
With the latter it is the residual variation of fiscal variables
(determined by the budget constraint rather than
first-order conditions) which is primarily decisive for the choice
of the commitment strategy.
5
k = c, g.6,7 Households have an endowment Ii which is subject
to taxation. The private
budget constraint is
ci = Ii − T i, (1)
where T i ∈ [0, Ii] are taxes levied by state government i. State
governments finance public
expenditures {gi}i=1,2 by locally collected taxes {T i}i=1,2 and
interstate transfers {zi}i=1,2
gi = T i + zi. (2)
The transfer to state i, zi, is conditioned on the level of locally
25. collected tax revenues T i and
tax revenues of the neighbor jurisdiction T j ,
zi = γ(T i, T j ), where zi + zj = 0. (3)
Given the generality of the transfer formula, we impose three
reasonable assumptions:
∣ ∣ ziT i
∣ ∣ < 1, sign{ziT i} = sign{z
j
T j
}, and sign{ziT i} = const.
First,
∣ ∣ zi
T i
∣ ∣ < 1 such that changes in taxes do not imply an over-
proportional change in
transfers.8 The marginal tax or subsidy on own-source tax
revenues hence does not exceed
100 percent. Second, states are symmetrically treated by
transfer policy in the sense that
sign{zi
T i
} = sign{zj
T j
}. The transfer formula may still be non-linear in taxes and,
thereby,
26. the slope {zi
T i
}i=1,2 may differ in magnitude over the range of feasible taxes.
Third, sign{ziT i}
is non-reversal, i.e., it is the same for all feasible levels of
taxes.
The transfer scheme (3) embeds different types of formulaic
transfers which most notably
differ w.r.t. the sign of the transfer response zi
T i
. As an example, transfers which share
locally collected tax revenues across states typically respond
negatively to a rise in own-
source tax revenues (e.g., Baretti et al., 2002), whilst fiscal
capacity equalization transfers
rise in response to a hike in own-state tax rates (Smart, 1998).9
State governments are benevolent and maximize utility of the
representative household,
while the federal government maximizes the sum of utilities.
6Additive preferences are without loss of generality in Section
3. In Section 4 the identified equilibria
extend to non-additive preferences when private and public
consumption are complements (U icg < 0) or weak
substitutes, i.e. U icg is not too positive.
27. 7As long as confusion cannot arise we omit the state-specific
superscript for consumption levels.
8Subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout.
9To firmly model fiscal capacity equalization transfers we
would have to introduce a tax-sensitive tax base.
One possibility is to allow for endogenous labor supply which
negatively responds to higher state taxes on
labor – e.g. Smart (1998). The extension would complicate the
exposition of the paper, without affecting the
main results of the analysis.
6
Straightforwardly, the (first-best) efficient public expenditure
level in state i satisfies
uig
uic
= 1. (4)
The marginal rate of substitution between public and private
consumption has to equal the
social marginal rate of transformation (normalized at unity).
Unless otherwise stated, the sequence of fiscal decisions is:
Stage 1: States simultaneously choose whether to optimize over
taxes or expenditures.
Stage 2: States simultaneously optimize over the policy variable
chosen at the first stage.
28. Stage 3: Transfers {zi}i=1,2 are paid, taxes {T i}i=1,2 are
collected, and households con-
sume {ci, gi}i=1,2.
We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium (in pure
strategies) by applying backward
induction.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
To isolate the incentive effects inherent to federal policy, it is
instructive to first characterize
local decision-making in the absence of transfers, i.e. zi ≡ 0. In
this case changes in taxes
yield a one-to-one change in expenditure levels. The tax price
of marginal public spending is
unity irrespectively of whether the change in taxes is fixed and
expenditures adjust residually
or vice versa. Thus, solving
max U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (1) and (2) (5)
either by differentiating w.r.t. T i (with gi being residually
determined) or w.r.t. gi (with T i
being residually determined) yields the first-order condition
uig
uic
= 1. (6)
29. Public goods are efficiently provided. Noting (1), (2), and (6),
optimal state policy is inde-
pendent of the neighbor state’s policy and so is utility in each
state. The implications for the
equilibrium choice of policy variables at stage 1 of the game are
straightforward. Given the
absence of fiscal interaction between states and the equivalence
between tax and expenditure
7
optimization within a state, we conclude that any choice of
policy variable yields the same
level of state utility and, hence, is an equilibrium of the policy
selection game.
Proposition 1: In the absence of transfers (zi ≡ 0) any pair of
policy variables selected
by state governments is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
policy selection game.
We now re-introduce federal transfer policy and analyze the
extent to which the equiva-
lence result in Proposition 1 is preserved. Consider first that
state government j optimizes
over taxes T j . Optimal policy in state i follows from
30. max U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), (7)
taking T j as given. Differentiating w.r.t. T i or gi gives
uig
uic
=
1
1 + zi
T i
. (8)
The equivalence between tax and expenditure policy is formally
shown in the Appendix.
When zi
T i
< 0 (> 0) state i anticipates a loss (gain) in transfers in response
to a rise in
taxes with the consequence that public goods are underprovided
(overprovided) relative to
the first-best solution (4).
When state j optimizes over expenditures, its taxes adjust
residually to a change in trans-
fer income which in turn affects state i’s transfer payment. State
i realizes the fiscal feedback
mediated via the transfer system and, hence, perceives transfer
31. income to be implicitly given
by
zi∗ = γ(T i, gj − zj∗ ), (9)
which follows from inserting (2) into (3), to substitute T j by gj
− zj∗ . State i solves
max U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (1), (2) and (9), (10)
taking gj as given. Differentiating w.r.t. T i or gi, the optimal
policy satisfies (see the
Appendix)
uig
uic
=
1
1 + zi∗
T i
. (11)
8
Straightforwardly, public consumption is underprovided
(overprovided) relative to the first-
best rule when zi∗
T i
32. < 0 (> 0).
Comparing (8) and (11) reveals that state i’s policy is
inefficient for any choice of opti-
mization variable by the neighboring state, but the scope of
inefficiency depends on which
variable the neighboring state optimizes. Implicitly
differentiating (9) and using the self-
financing requirement zi
T j
= −zj
T j
yields
zi∗ T i =
zi
T i
1 + zj
T j
⇒ zi∗ T i < ziT i . (12)
The tax-induced change in transfers is more favorable for state i
(either more inflow or less
outflow) when state j optimizes over taxes.10 The rationale is
that tax and expenditure
policy interact differently through the transfer scheme. More
33. precisely, assume higher taxes
reduce entitlement payments, zi
T i
< 0. A rise in state i’s taxes reduces transfers to state i
and, in order to balance the budget, increases transfers to state
j. When state j optimizes
over taxes, the additional transfer income increases public
expenditures in state j. Transfer
payments are unaffected by the residual adjustment. Differently,
when state j optimizes over
expenditures, the rise in transfer income reduces state i taxes. In
response, more transfers
go to state j, financed by a further cutback of transfers to state i
– hence (12) follows. The
negative repercussion on state i’s budget renders public good
provision more costly. Analo-
gously, when zi
T i
> 0 a higher tax in state i decreases state j’s transfer income.
When state
j optimizes over expenditures, state j’s taxes rise residually
which yields a budget-balancing
retrenchment of state i’s transfer income. The retrenchment
dilutes state i’s incentives to
34. spend on public consumption. We can thus summarize:
Lemma 1: State i’s incentives to provide public goods are less
pronounced when state j
optimizes over expenditures rather than taxes. In particular,
provided zi
T i
< 0 (> 0) public
goods are more severely underprovided (less severely
overprovided) in state i when public ex-
penditures rather than taxes are subject to optimization in state
j.
We will now turn to the subgame-perfect choice of the
optimization variable at stage 1
of the game. This involves a comparison of stage-2 utilities for
any possible combination of
10Thus, in case zi
T i
< 0 the first-order condition (11) only holds provided zi
T i
is not too negative. Otherwise,
state i will select a zero tax rate. To save on notation we
abstract from corner solution in what follows.
9
35. optimization variables by both states. Utility in the different
stage-2 games may differ because
the tax price in the neighboring state depends on the own choice
of policy variable. States
understand the effect and are inclined to manipulate the
neighbor state’s policy in order to
qualify for more transfers. Before proceeding, note that in any
stage-2 subgame, the states’
best responses are implicitly defined by the first-order
conditions (8) and (11), respectively.
Equilibrium existence follows from standard fixed point
theorems. We assume uniqueness
and stability of the stage-2 equilibrium throughout.11
Equilibrium stability implies that a
change in a state’s tax price translates into a change in the
stage-2 equilibrium tax to the
opposite sign; an implication which simplifies the analytical
exposition in what follows.
We will first analyze the case of zi
T i
< 0. Consider both states initially optimize over taxes.
When state i deviates from tax to expenditure optimization,
state i’s public good level, and
36. thus taxes, stay the same unless state j changes its policy in
response.12 In fact, state j faces
a distinct interaction of policy variables via the transfer scheme
when state i optimizes over
gi rather than T i. As observed in connection with Lemma 1, the
tax price of marginal public
expenditures rises and T j will be set at a lower level in the
ensuing equilibrium. To infer the
induced change in state i’s well-being, we compute state i’s
utility when it optimally sets its
policy for given state j’s policy. To this end, let’s define vi(T j
) as the utility evaluated at
taxes T i satisfying the optimality condition (8) for given T j
.13 Invoking the envelope theorem
and rearranging (all these steps are relegated to the Appendix),
the change in utility vi(T j )
in response to a hike in state j’s taxes is
dvi(T j )
dT j
= −uigziT i . (13)
Since T j drops following the deviation, state i experiences a
loss in transfers and thereby
in utility. By symmetry of policy incentives, neither state has an
37. incentive to switch to
expenditure optimization given that the neighbor state optimizes
over taxes. A reversed type
of argument applies when zi
T i
> 0 with the consequence that state i’s utility increases when
setting expenditures rather than taxes.
11In particular, we need to impose global stability rather than
local stability since changes in the policy
variable at stage 1 trigger discrete changes in states’ best
responses at stage 2. See, e.g., Vives (2000) for a
formal definition of global and local stability.
12Recall, for a given level of taxes in state j, state i’s utility is
independent of whether it optimizes taxes or
expenditures – see (8).
13Given the equivalence between tax and expenditure
optimization by state i, vi(T j ) applies prior and after
state i’s deviation.
10
Ti
Tj
state i’s best-response
38. state j’s best-response
A
B
Ti
Tj
state i’s best-response
state j’s best-response
A
B
Figure 1: Best Responses for zi
T i
< 0 (left panel) and zi
T i
> 0 (right panel).
To graphically illustrate state i’s best response at stage 1,
consider zi
T iT j
≡ 0. In this
case it is straightforward to show that states’ taxes are
unambiguously strategic substitutes
(complements) if zi
T i
39. < 0 (> 0). The left panel in Figure 1 depicts the best responses
by both
states when zi
T i
< 0. Point A is the initially prevailing equilibrium of the stage-2
game.14 The
switch to expenditure policy by state i shifts state j’s best-
response function inwards. The lo-
cus of state i’s best-response function stays the same (implicitly
defined by (8)), and the new
tax choices are illustrated by point B. From (13), the change in
state i’s utility, when moving
along state i’s best-response function from A to B, is negative.
Hence, state i becomes worse
off due to the deviation. The right panel in Figure 1 depicts
both states’ best responses for
zi
T i
> 0. The initial equilibrium of the stage-2 subgame is point A.
Following state i’s devia-
tion to expenditure policy state j’s tax price rises, and state j’s
best-response function shifts
inwards. Taxes T j decrease (see point B). Following (13), state
i’s utility rises when moving
40. along state i’s best response from the initial equilibrium A to
the new equilibrium B. In sum:
Lemma 2: Assume that state j optimizes over taxes. State i’s
best response is to opti-
mize over taxes (expenditures) iff zi
T i
< 0 (> 0).
Suppose now that state j initially optimizes over gj and state i
over T i. From Lemma 1
we observe that a deviation to expenditure optimization by state
i increases state j’s tax price
which incentivizes state j to spend less on public consumption.
Defining vi(gj ) as state i’s
14For simplicity, best responses are drawn as linear functions.
11
utility evaluated at public policy which satisfies the optimality
condition (11), the envelope
theorem implies (see the Appendix)
dvi(gj )
dgj
= −uig
zi
41. T i
1 + zj
T j
. (14)
As the drop in state j’s expenditures translates into a lower tax,
state i’s transfer income
and thus utility drops (rises) in response to the lower tax in
state j when zi
T i
< 0 (> 0).15
Lemma 3: Assume that state j optimizes over expenditures.
State i’s best response is to
optimize over taxes (expenditures) iff zi
T i
< 0 (> 0).
Combining Lemma 2 and 3, we conclude for the case zi
T i
< 0 that state i loses in utility
when optimizing over expenditures instead of taxes. The result
holds irrespective of whether
state j optimizes over taxes or expenditures. Hence, in the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the
policy selection game both states optimize over taxes. When zj
42. T j
> 0 state i gains in utility
when optimizing over expenditures rather than taxes. Again, the
finding holds irrespective
of whether state j optimizes over taxes or expenditures.
Consequently, the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the policy selection game entails states to
optimize over expenditures.
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the policy
selection game entails tax
(expenditure) optimization when transfers undermine
(strengthen) state fiscal incentives, i.e.,
zi
T i
< 0 (> 0).
States compete for transfers and choose the optimization
variable strategically so as to
lure more funds to the public budget. Although the results have
been derived in the absence of
resource mobility, the logic underlying the results equally
applies when states do not compete
for transfers, but for mobile resources. To be more precise,
consider a model of symmetric
43. capital tax competition in which states tax capital at source and
decide on the tax system
to attract more capital (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, and
Wildasin, 1988). Therein, the
interstate flow of resources is in capital rather than in transfers,
and the formal analog to
the tax-induced flow of transfers, zi
T i
, is how the capital tax base responds to own-state tax
15The diagrammatic exposition of the choice of policy variables
is analogous to Figure 1. We hence refrain
from a graphical illustration (as we do for all other games
analyzed in the sequel).
12
hikes. As governments spend tax revenues on a public
consumption good, which in itself has
no bearing on the return to capital, the tax base response is
negative. The conclusion is that
states choose to compete for mobile capital by optimizing over
taxes.16 A formal proof of the
result is relegated to Appendix B.
4 Ex-Post Federal Tax Policy and Formula-Based Transfers
44. In the sequel we analyze the robustness of the results derived in
the last section. In so doing,
we resort to an alternative, frequently invoked model of fiscal
federalism in which the federal
government has taxing authority, but cannot commit to tax
policy, i.e., it sets federal policy
after states have determined their policy. This type of vertical
interaction is referred to as
decentralized leadership and lies at the root of the soft budget
constraint syndrome in fiscal
federalism – see, e.g., Wildasin (1997), Qian and Roland
(1998), Caplan et al. (2000), Akai
and Sato (2005) and Koethenbuerger (2007).17 In particular,
consider the federal government
has access to taxes {ti}i=1,2.18 The budget constraint of the
household in state i becomes
ci = Ii − T i − ti. (15)
For simplicity, we retain the assumption that transfers are
budget-balancing, zi + zj = 0.
The federal budget constraints thus read
t1 + t2 = 0 and z1 + z2 = 0. (16)
Federal taxes redistribute private income across states, while
transfers redistribute public
45. funds across states. The budgetary dichotomy simplifies the
analysis without affecting the
qualitative insights.19
The sequence of decisions becomes:
16In particular, when both states initially optimize over taxes, a
deviation to expenditure optimization by
one state leads to lower capital taxes in the neighboring state
and, thereby, to an outflow of capital in the
deviant state. Anticipating the negative effect on own-state
revenues, states choose to compete over taxes.
17See Kornai et al. (2003) and Vigneault (2007) for a review of
the related literature.
18A non-uniform tax scheme can be implemented by a uniform
federal tax scheme and state-specific subsidies
to address disparities in private consumption. Thus, the net tax
revenue the federal government collects in each
state differs (as allowed for here). With the richer set of
instruments, we could allow the federal government
to pre-commit toward the common tax scheme and to set
subsidies ex-post, i.e., after state governments have
moved (as, e.g., in Caplan et al., 2000). Importantly, the results
of the analysis would be preserved.
19The identified equilibria of the policy selection game equally
exist in the absence of the assumption. Details
of the calculations are available upon request.
13
46. Stage 1: States simultaneously choose whether to optimize over
taxes or expenditures.
Stage 2: States simultaneously optimize over the policy variable
chosen at the first stage.
Stage 3: The federal government selects {ti}i=1,2 for given
state policy.
Stage 4: Transfers {zi}i=1,2 are paid, taxes {ti, T i}i=1,2 are
collected, and households
consume {ci, gi}i=1,2.
Solving backwards, the federal government solves
max
{ti}i=1,2
∑
i=1,2
ui(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (2), (3), (15) and (16), (17)
taking the states’ policy choices as given. In so doing, the
federal government sets taxes in
order to equalize the marginal utility of private consumption,
i.e.
uic = u
j
c, i 6= j. (18)
At stage 2, state government i anticipates the effect its policy
has on the federal govern-
47. ment’s choice of tax rates. Assume first that both states
optimize over taxes. Differentiating
the federal first-order condition (18) and the federal budget
constraint w.r.t. ti, tj , and T i and
inserting −T i
ti
= T i
tj
in the differentiated first-order condition, to eliminate the tj
derivative,
yields
tiT i = −
uicc
uicc + u
j
cc
∈ (−1, 0). (19)
More locally collected tax revenues, T i, reduce private
consumption in state i. To equalize
the marginal utility of consumption across states (see (18)), the
federal government reduces
the federal tax rate ti.
Replacing (1) by (15) in state i’s optimization problem (7) and
48. additionally taking (16)
and (19) into account, public good provision satisfies
uig
uic
=
(
1 − u
i
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
)
1
1 + zi
T i
. (20)
The first-order condition equally applies when state i optimizes
w.r.t. gi rather than T i (see
the Appendix). Evident from (20), the federal tax-transfer
policy influences the perceived
tax price of marginal public expenditures in two ways: ex-post
federal tax policy provides a
49. subsidy on state i’s taxing effort as depicted by the bracketed
term, while the transfer scheme
14
imposes a tax (subsidy) on state i’s taxing effort when zi
T i
< 0 (> 0). Federal tax-transfer
policy hence renders public good provision inefficiently high or
low.
Differently, consider state i still optimizes w.r.t. T i, but
conjectures state j to set expen-
diture levels optimally. Starting at (18), iterating the same steps
involved in deriving (19)
(now differentiating w.r.t. gj rather than T j ) and noting (9), the
marginal adjustment in ti
following a rise in T i is
tiT i = −
uicc
uicc + u
j
cc
−
u
50. j
ccz
j∗
T i
uicc + u
j
cc
. (21)
The first term coincides with (19); representing a subsidy on
state i’s marginal tax revenues.
As to the second term, zj∗ denotes transfer payments for state j
when state i conjectures
state j to optimize over expenditures as defined in (9). A rise in
state i’s taxes translates into
a change in entitlement payments which depends on the sign of
zj∗
T i
. As state j’s taxes adjust
residually to the change in transfers, its private consumption
rises (drops) when zj∗
T i
> 0
(< 0). To restore (18), the federal government offsets the
imbalance in private consumption
51. by reducing (increasing) ti.
Substituting (1) by (15) in state i’s optimization problem (10)
and additionally taking
(16) and (21) into account, state i chooses a level of public
goods which satisfies
uig
uic
= 1 − u
i
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
. (22)
The first-order condition holds irrespectively of whether state i
optimizes over taxes or ex-
penditures (see the Appendix). It might be intuitive that state i
chooses an inefficient policy
in the pursuit of a favorable treatment under federal policy.
What might be less intuitive
is that the tax price of public expenditures is independent of
how federal transfers respond
to state policy and, thus, that the inefficiency is only related to
the federal tax response.
52. The rationale is that the adjustment in federal taxes insulates
state governments from the
incentive effects of transfers; albeit the federal government
aligns the marginal utility of pri-
vate consumption which is not directly affected by transfer
payments. However, when a rise
in state i’s tax, for instance, lowers state i’s entitlement
payments, the induced inflow of
transfers in state j reduces the amount of taxes state j levies on
its residents. Private con-
sumption in state j consequently rises and the federal
government offsets the imbalance in
private consumption across states by lowering state i’s tax as
captured by the second term
in (21). The positive effect on state i’s utility turns out to be
proportional to the negative
15
effect of transfers, thereby nullifying the latter. In sum, ex-post
federal tax policy neutralizes
the incentive effect of transfer policy and subsidizes state-
financed spending. Consequently,
the state i’s tax price is unambiguously below the social price.
53. Lemma 4: Public good provision in state i is either inefficiently
high or low under tax
policy setting by state j. When state j sets expenditures public
good provision in state i is
inefficiently high. In particular, provided zi
T i
< 0 (> 0) state i’s incentives to spend on public
goods are more pronounced (weaker) when state j optimizes
over expenditures instead of taxes.
The divergence of policy incentives is due to the fact that state
policy instruments in-
teract differently through federal tax-transfer policy. To
illustrate the interaction, suppose a
higher tax rate in state i leads to more transfers in state j, i.e. zi
T i
< 0. Under tax policy
setting by state j, the residual adjustment in public expenditures
does not spill back through
federal tax-transfer policy to state i. Transfers are formally
conditioned only on taxes and
federal tax policy seeks to align private consumption levels. In
contrast, when state j sets
expenditures, the higher transfer income lowers state j’s tax rate
(residually determined).
54. Private consumption cj rises which yields a lower federal tax
rate in state i – a repercussion
which strengthens state i’s fiscal incentives.20
To infer how federal tax-transfer policy influences the choice of
the optimization variable
at stage 1 of the game, we proceed by characterizing incentives
of each state to unilaterally
deviate from a given combination of policy variables. As in the
previous section, we will
assume the stage-2 equilibrium to be unique and globally stable
throughout. Assume first that
states initially optimize over taxes and that transfers undermine
taxing incentives (zi
T i
< 0).
As inferred from Lemma 1, a change to expenditure policy on
the part of state i reduces state
j’s tax price, and the new equilibrium entails a higher tax T j .
The impact on state i’s utility
is evaluated using state i’s best-response function as implied by
the first-order condition (20).
Define vi(T j ) as the associated utility level for a given level of
T j . Applying the envelope
55. theorem, deriving the tax-transfer responses and rearranging (all
the steps are relegated to
the Appendix), we get
dvi(T j )
dT j
= −uic
1 + zi
T i
+ zj
T j
1 + zi
T i
u
j
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
. (23)
20The associated transfer changes are absorbed by the federal
tax response – see (22).
16
56. Provided zi
T i
+ zj
T j
< −1 (∈ (−1, 0)), utility rises (drops) following state i’s change
in the
optimization variable.21 The intuition is that both the federal
tax ti and the transfer payment
zi rise in response to state j’s tax hike, exerting counteracting
effects on state i’s utility. The
disincentive effect of transfer policy amplifies the positive
transfer response in two ways:
First, the stronger the disincentive effect zj
T j
the larger the inflow of transfers to state i in
response to a higher tax rate T j . Second, the more pronounced
zi
T i
the higher the inflow of
transfers to state i which results from the residual reduction in
its own tax rate subsequent
to the first-round inflow of transfers. If the joint effect is
sufficiently strong (as measured by
zi
T i
57. + zj
T j
) the positive transfer response dominates the rise in federal
taxes ti.
The result changes when transfers promote taxing incentives (zi
T i
> 0). In this case, state
j decreases its tax rate in response to state i’s deviation from tax
to expenditure optimiza-
tion which exerts two unidirectional effects on state i’s utility:
the federal tax ti decreases,
to level off differences in private consumption, and transfers
increase. In response, state i
unambiguously enjoys a higher level of utility in the new
equilibrium.
Lemma 5: Consider state j optimizes over taxes. State i has an
incentive to deviate
from tax to expenditure policy if either zi
T i
> 0 or zi
T i
< 0 and zi
T i
58. + zj
T j
< −1.
Finally, assume state j optimizes over expenditures. Provided
transfers discourage state
fiscal effort, a switch to expenditure optimization by state i
increases expenditures, and thus
taxes, in state j. To unravel the impact on state i’s utility, define
vi(gj ) as state i’s utility
evaluated at state i’s best-response function which follows from
(22). Invoking the envelope
theorem, computing the responses in transfers and federal taxes,
and rearranging yields (the
derivation is dealt with in the Appendix)
dvi(gj )
dgj
= −uic
u
j
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
< 0. (24)
59. The federal government taxes state i’s household at a higher
rate in response to the deviation,
just to counteract the imbalance in private consumption which
results from the higher tax
T j .22 Accordingly, state i becomes worse off. Following a
related line of arguments, state i
becomes better off following the deviation when transfers
encourage state fiscal effort.
21For expositional simplicity, we omit the special case zi
T i
+z
j
T j
= −1, in which dvi(T j )/dT j = 0, throughout.
22Note, the federal tax response absorbs the effect of transfer
policy on state i – see (22).
17
Lemma 6: Consider state j optimizes over expenditures. State i
has an incentive to
deviate from tax to expenditure optimization iff zi
T i
> 0.
60. What are the equilibrium implications of both Lemmata? When
zi
T i
< 0, Lemma 6 rules
out expenditure optimization as an equilibrium since both states
have an incentive to deviate.
Lemma 5 shows that tax optimization is an equilibrium if
transfer responses zi
T i
+ zj
T j
are not
too pronounced. Otherwise, we observe an asymmetric
equilibrium, i.e., one state optimizes
over taxes whilst the other state does so over expenditures.
When zi
T i
> 0 Lemma 5 rules out
tax policy as an equilibrium outcome, and the only policy which
is immune to a unilateral
deviation is expenditure optimization – see Lemma 6. To
summarize,
Proposition 3: (i) When transfer policy undermines state fiscal
incentives (zi
61. T i
< 0) the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the policy selection game
entails both states to optimize over
taxes if the overall disincentive effect of transfer policy, as
measured by zi
T i
+ zj
T j
< 0, is
sufficiently weak, i.e., zi
T i
+ zj
T j
∈ (−1, 0). Otherwise, states choose to optimize over different
policy variables in equilibrium. (ii) When transfer policy
strengthens state fiscal incentives
(zi
T i
> 0) the subgame perfect equilibrium involves both states to
optimize over expenditures.
Common to the analysis in Section 3, states choose their policy
variable such that the
induced adjustment in fiscal policy of the neighboring state
62. yields a favorable response in
federal policy. However, different to the preceding model, tax
optimization is not the unique
equilibrium outcome when transfers discourage states from
relying on own-source public
funds. In fact, states select themselves into different policy
regimes if the disincentive effect
is sufficiently strong.23
The finding that states may not optimize over the same policy
variable opens up the
possibility that the tax price of marginal public expenditures
drops when transfer policy
exerts a stronger disincentive effect on state policy. For
illustrative simplicity, assume the
transfer system (3) to be linear and zi
T i
= zj
T j
. A reform of the transfer formula such that
23The required strength of the disincentive effect is not
implausibly large. Empirical estimates of the
“marginal tax” federal transfer programmes impose on own-
source tax revenues may well exceed 0.5 (e.g.,
Baretti et al., 2002, and Zhuravskaya, 2000).
63. 18
the transfer slope changes from a pre-reform level above -0.5 to
a post-reform level below -0.5
leaves fewer own-source tax revenues to the state. Conditional
on the initial choice of policy
variables (here taxes – see Lemma 6), incentives to spend on
public goods are predicted
to be diluted (see (20)). Taking the endogeneity of the policy
variable into account, one
state changes from tax to expenditure policy while the other
state still engages in tax policy.
Implied by Lemma 4, spending incentives are strengthened in
the non-switching state and,
as a consequence, its outlays on public consumption rise.
5 Conclusion
Previous literature predominantly assumes taxes to be optimized
and expenditures to adjust
residually. The paper endogenizes the choice of policy variables
by state governments and,
in particular, explores how federal policy toward state
governments influences the choice.
Albeit the equilibrium choice turns out to be sensitive to the
64. way federal tax-transfer policy
targets state policy, a common finding in both models
considered is that governments choose
to optimize over expenditures when federal transfers subsidize
state fiscal effort. The paper’s
results are of relevance for the design of corrective policy and
for evaluating the impact of
federal tax-transfer schemes on the efficiency of state policy.
Specifically, the conditional
response (i.e., for a given choice of policy variables) and the
unconditional response (i.e.,
accounting for the adjustment of policy variables) of local
policy to changes in federal policy
differ not only quantitatively, but may also differ qualitatively.
A reform of the federal tax-
transfer system, which discourages state spending conditional
on the choice of policy variable,
may in fact promote spending incentives when accounting for
the endogeneity of the choice.
The main part of the paper builds on the assumption that state
budgets are only fiscally
linked through federal policy. In practice, budgets are also
fiscally connected through the
mobility of taxable resources such as capital or households. As
65. shown for the canonical capital
tax competition model (see Appendix B), the logic underlying
the results straightforwardly
applies to models with capital mobility. Having said this, we
believe that the paper’s insights
will likewise provide a helpful starting point for analyzing the
choice of policy variables in
different models of local public finance; e.g., nesting fiscal
interaction through both tax base
mobility and federal policy.
Finally, a natural question is whether the strategic incentives
pertaining to the choice of
19
policy variables may not be more multi-faceted than suggested
in the paper. For instance,
decomposing the expenditure side of the budget into
consumption outlays and infrastructure
investment, states are equally in a position to compete for
transfers by optimizing over, e.g.,
consumption expenditures and taxes and by letting
infrastructure spending adjust residually.
Which pair of policy variables ultimately constitutes an
66. equilibrium choice and how the choice
influences the efficiency of the local public sector are
interesting questions which are left to
future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of (8)
Tax policy A rise in state i’s tax rate dT i implies a change in
transfers by zi
T i
dT i, and
public expenditures increase by dgi = (1+zi
T i
)dT i. The tax price of marginal public spending
is dT i/dgi = 1/(1 + zi
T i
). Thus, the first-order condition is (8).
Expenditure policy Inserting (2) into (3), to express transfers to
state i as an implicit
function of policy variables in state i, gi, and state j, T j , we
have z̄ i = γ(gi − z̄ i, T j ) with
slope z̄ i
gi
= zi
67. T i
/(1 + zi
T i
). A rise in expenditure by dgi now leads to a change in
transfers
by z̄ i
gi
dgi. In response to it, taxes have to increase by dT i = (1 − zi
gi
)dgi. Hence, 1 − zi
gi
is
the tax price of marginal public spending under expenditure
optimization and the first-order
condition is
uig
uic
= 1 − z̄ igi . (25)
Inserting the explicit form of the slope term z̄ i
gi
into the tax price shows that it coincides
with the tax price under tax optimization. The first-order
condition (25) is hence equivalent
68. to (8).
A.2 Derivation of (11)
Tax policy Given (9) a rise in taxes by dT i yields a change in
transfers equal to zi∗
T i
dT i.
Expenditures residually rise by (1+zi∗
T i
)dT i which gives a tax price of marginal public spending
of 1/(1 + zi∗
T i
). The first-order condition thus becomes (11).
Expenditure policy Inserting (2) into (3), to express transfers to
state i as an implicit
function of policy variables in state i and state j, gi and gj , z̃i =
γ(gi − z̃i, gj − z̃j ). Now, a
20
rise in expenditures by dgi requires an adjustment in taxes at an
amount (1 − z̃i
gi
)dT i. The
69. tax price is 1 − z̃i
gi
and the first-order condition reads
uig
uic
= 1 − z̃igi . (26)
Implicit differentiation of z̃i and using z̃i
T j
= −z̃j
T j
, we obtain z̃i
gi
= zi
T i
/(1 + zi
T i
+ zj
T j
).
Inserting the slope term into (26) and inserting (12) into the
first-order condition under tax
policy (11) shows that conditions (11) and (26) coincide.
A.3 Derivation of (13)
70. A rise in T j when state i sets expenditures yields a change in
utility vi(T j ) of
dvi(T j )
dT j
= uicz
∗ i
T j , (27)
where the term has been simplified by invoking the envelope
theorem. Inserting (8) and (12)
into (27) and noting that transfer payments must balance the
budget, the expression (27)
simplifies to
dvi(T j )
dT j
= −uigziT i . (28)
A.4 Derivation of (14)
Marginally increasing T j when state i optimizes over
expenditures implies a change in utility
vi(gj ) which is equal to
dvi(gj )
dgj
= uicz̃
i
gj . (29)
71. z̃i = γ(gi − z̃i, gj − z̃j ) implicitly defines transfer payments to
state i as a function of
expenditure levels in both states. Implicit differentiation and
using z̃i
T j
= −z̃j
T j
yields
z̃i
gi
= zi
T i
/(1 + zi
T i
+ zj
T j
). Inserting the expression and (11) into (29) and noting that
transfers are self-financing
dvi(gj )
dgj
= −uig
zi
T i
1 + zj
72. T j
. (30)
A.5 Derivation of (20)
Tax policy Increasing the state tax by dT i, the combined effect
on state and federal taxes,
T i + ti, is (1 + ti
T i
)dT i. Expenditures change by (1 + zi
T i
)dT i which yields a tax price equal
to (1 + ti
T i
)/(1 + zi
T i
). The first-order condition is (20).
21
Expenditure policy As a first step insert (2) into the federal
first-order condition (18), to
substitute T i for gi − z̄ i, where z̄ i = γ
(
gi − z̄ i, T j
73. )
. Differentiating the modified optimality
condition w.r.t. ti, tj , and gi yields the response ti
gi
= −uicc(1−z̄ igi )/(uicc +u
j
cc). The change in
the combined tax burden to a rise in expenditures thus is [1−z̄ i
gi
−uicc(1−z̄ igi )/(uicc + u
j
cc)]dgi.
The bracketed term represents the tax price of marginal public
expenditures. Hence,
uig
uic
= 1 − z̄ igi − uicc(1 − z̄ igi )/
(
uicc + u
j
cc
)
. (31)
Noting that z̄ i
gi
74. = zi
T i
/
(
1 + zi
T i
)
, the first-order condition (31) equals the first-order condition
under tax policy (20).
A.6 Derivation of (22)
Tax policy Given (21) the effect of a rise in taxes by dT i on the
combined tax burden
ti + T i is [ujcc(1 − zj∗ T i )/(uicc + u
j
cc)]dT i. Expenditures change by (1 + zi∗ T i )dT
i. Since transfers
are budget-balancing, zi∗
T i
= −zj∗
T i
the tax price of marginal public expenditures simplifies to
1 − uicc/(uicc + ujcc) and the resulting first-order condition is
(22).
75. Expenditure policy Inserting (2) into (3), to express transfers to
state i as an implicit
function of policy variables in state i and state j, gi and gj , z̃i =
γ(gi − z̃i, gj − z̃j ). Next,
insert (2) into the federal first-order condition (18), to
substitute T i and T j for gi − z̃i and
gj−z̃j . Differentiating the modified optimality condition w.r.t.
ti, tj , and gi, while accounting
for (16), yields the response ti
gi
= −uicc/(uicc + ujcc) + z̃igi . Now, a rise in expenditures by dgi
yields a change in the tax burden of (1 + ti
gi
− z̃i
gi
)dgi. The tax price is 1 + ti
gi
− z̃i
gi
and
consequently, the first-order condition becomes
uig
uic
= 1 + tigi − z̃igi . (32)
Finally, inserting the tax response ti
gi
76. into (32) shows that the first-order conditions under
tax and expenditure optimization, (22) and (32), coincide.
A.7 Derivation of (23)
Invoking the envelope theorem, the change in utility when state
i optimizes over expenditures
is
dvi(T j )
dT j
= −uic(tiT j + z∗ iT j ). (33)
22
Noting, following (16), that ti
T j
= −tj
T j
and zi
T j
= −zj
T j
and inserting (12) and (19) into (33),
the utility change becomes
77. dvi(T j )
dT j
= −uic
1 + zi
T i
+ zj
T j
1 + zi
T i
u
j
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
. (34)
A.8 Derivation of (24)
When state i optimizes over expenditures, the envelope theorem
implies
dvi(gj )
dgj
= −uic(tigj + z̃igj ). (35)
To characterize both federal responses, insert (2) into (3), to
78. express transfers to state i as an
implicit function of policy variables in state i and state j, gi and
gj , z̃i = γ(gi − z̃i, gj − z̃j ).
Next, insert (2) into the federal first-order condition (18), to
substitute T i and T j for gi − z̃i
and gj − z̃j . Differentiating the modified federal optimality
condition w.r.t. ti, tj , and gj ,
while accounting for (16), yields the response tj
gj
= −ujcc/(uicc +ujcc)+z̃jgj . Plugging tigj = −t
j
gj
into (35) and noting that transfers are self-financing yields
dvi(gj )
dgj
= −uic
u
j
cc
uicc + u
j
cc
< 0. (36)
B Appendix: Capital Tax Competition
79. Consider 2 symmetric states. In each state i (i = 1, 2), the
representative household is en-
dowed with capital K and a fixed factor (e.g. inelastically
supplied labor) which is normalized
to unity. The income of the household is given by ci = wi + rK
where wi is the wage rate
in state i and r is the interest rate determined in the
international capital market. House-
holds derive utility from private consumption ci and from a
local public good gi. The utility
function is24
U (ci, gi) = u(ci) + u(gi), (37)
where uik > 0 and u
i
kk < 0, k = c, g. Regional output can be transformed on a one-
to-one
basis either in a private good ci or a local public good gi.
Output is produced using the
technology f (ki) which exhibits (i) constant returns to scale and
(ii) a positive and declining
24We adopt the same utility function as in the paper. The
additive structure is without loss of generality.
23
80. marginal productivity of capital. Firms are assumed to be profit-
maximizer. Profits are given
by
πi = f (ki) − wi − (r + T i)ki. (38)
Capital employment ki is taxed at source at a rate T i. Firms
maximize (38) with respect to
ki, which leads to the first-order condition
f ′(ki) = r + T i. (39)
(39) implicitly defines regional capital employment as a
function of the tax rate T i and
the interest rate r. The wage rate wi equals f (ki) − f ′(ki)ki.
Hence, noting (39), private
consumption is given by
ci = f (ki) + r(K − ki) − T iki. (40)
Capital is perfectly mobile across states and locates in the state
which offers the highest
net-of-tax rate of return. The capital market equilibrium is
characterized by the first-order
condition (39) and the capital market clearing condition
k1 + k2 = 2K. (41)
(39) and (41) define capital employment and the interest rate as
a function of both states’
81. tax rates, ki(T i, T j ) and r(T i, T j ). The responses of ki and kj
to a change in ti are given by
kiT i = ∆
−1 and kj
T i
= −∆−1 with ∆ := f ′′(ki) + f ′′(kj ) < 0. (42)
In each state tax revenues, T iki, are recycled by providing a
public consumption good, gi,
whose price is normalized at unity:
gi = T iki. (43)
B.1 Tax Optimization by State j
Assume first that state i optimizes over taxes. State i solves
max
T i
U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (40), (42) and (43), (44)
taking T j as given. Differentiating w.r.t. T i the first-order
condition is
uic(f
′(ki)kiT i + rT i (K − ki) − rkiT i − ki − T ikiT i ) + uig(T ikiT i
+ ki) = 0 (45)
24
82. Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium (ki = K) and inserting
(39) yields
−uicki + uig(T ikiT i + ki) = 0. (46)
Consider state i optimizes over expenditures. Inserting the
public budget constraint into
ki(T i, T j ) to express capital employment and the interest rate
as a function of expenditures
gi and taxes T j gives k̃i(gi/k̃i, T j ) and r ̃(gi/k̃i, T j ). The slope
of k̃i w.r.t. gi is
k̃igi =
ki
T i
/k̃i
1 + ki
T i
gi/(k̃i)2
< 0. (47)
State i solves
max
gi
U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (40), (43) and (47), (48)
taking T j as given. Differentiating (48) w.r.t. gi gives
uic(f
83. ′(k̃i)k̃igi + r ̃gi (K − k̃i) − r ̃k̃igi − 1) + uig = 0. (49)
Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium (ki = K) and inserting
(39), the first-order condition
simplifies to
uic(T
ik̃igi − 1) + uig = 0. (50)
Inserting (47) and noting (43), the first-order condition (50)
reduces to (46). Thus, given
that state j optimizes over taxes, expenditure and tax
optimization by state i yield identical
policy incentives.
B.2 Expenditure Optimization by State j
Consider state i optimizes over taxes. Inserting the public
budget constraint by state j into
ki(T i, T j ) to express capital employment in state i and the
interest rate as a function of taxes
T i and expenditures gj gives k∗ i(T i, gj /k∗ j ) and r∗ (T i, gj
/k∗ j ). The slope of k∗ i w.r.t. T i is
k∗ iT i =
ki
T i
1 − ki
T j
84. gj /(k∗ i)2
. (51)
State i solves
max
T i
U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (40), (43) and (51), (52)
taking gj as given. Differentiating (52) w.r.t. T i gives
uic(f
′(k∗ i)k∗ iT i + r
∗
T i (K − k∗ i) − r∗ k∗ iT i − k∗ i − T ik∗ iT i ) + uig(T ik∗ iT i +
k∗ i) = 0. (53)
25
Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium (k∗ i = K) and inserting
(39) yields
uic(−k∗ i) + uig(T ik∗ iT i + k∗ i) = 0. (54)
Finally, suppose state i optimizes over expenditures. Inserting
the public budget con-
straint by state j into ki(T i, T j ) to express capital employment
in state i and the interest rate
as a function of expenditures gi and expenditures gj gives
85. k̄ i(gi/k̄ i, gj /k̄ j ) and r̄ (gi/k̄ i, gj /k̄ j ).
The slope of k̄ i w.r.t. gi is
k̄ igi =
ki
T i
/k̄ i
1 + ki
T i
gi/(k̄ i)2 − ki
T j
gj /(k̄ j )2
. (55)
State i solves
max
gi
U i(c, g) s.t. Eqs. (40), (43) and (55), (56)
taking gj as given. Differentiating (56) w.r.t. gi
uic(f
′(k̄ i)k̄ igi + r̄ gi (K − k̄ i) − r̄ k̄ igi − 1) + uig = 0. (57)
Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium (k̄ i = K) and inserting
(39) the first-order condition
reduces to
86. uic(T
ik̄ igi − 1) + uig = 0. (58)
Inserting (55) into (58) and rearranging gives
−uic(ki + kiT i ) + uig(ki + T ikiT i − T j k
j
T j
) = 0. (59)
To compare the first-order condition (59) with the first-order
condition (54), insert the capital
response (51) into (54) which reveals that both first-order
conditions coincide. Thus, given
that state j optimizes over expenditures, expenditure and tax
optimization by state i yield
identical policy incentives.
The analyze how policy incentives differ when state j sets
expenditures rather than taxes,
we compare (46) and (54). In symmetric equilibrium (k∗ i = ki)
the conditions differ by the
response of capital to changes in the policy variable. Using the
public budget constraint (43)
and the fact that the capital market clears, i.e. ki
T j
= −kj
T j
87. the response (51) becomes
k∗ iT i =
ki
T i
1 + kj
T j
T j /kj
.
26
The capital response k∗ i
T i
differs from ki
T i
by the term 1/(1 + kj
T j
T j /kj ) which is state j’s
tax price of marginal public expenditures when state j and state
i optimize over taxes - see
(46). It exceeds unity and thus the capital response k∗ i
T i
is larger in absolute value relative to
88. ki
T i
. We conclude that the tax price of marginal public expenditures
is higher when state j
optimizes over expenditures rather than taxes.
Lemma A1: State i’s incentives to provide public goods are less
pronounced when state
j optimizes over expenditures rather than capital taxes.
The intuition for the result is that following a rise in state i’s
tax rate capital moves from
state i to state j. The inflow of capital leads to a rise in
expenditures when state j sets taxes,
but leads to a reduction in taxes when state j sets expenditures.
In the latter case even more
capital will move to state j in response to a tax hike in state i
and, hence, state i’s tax price
of marginal public expenditures is higher. The finding is in line
with Wildasin (1988).
B.3 Equilibrium Choice of Policy Variable
To infer into the choice of policy variable, we first characterize
the best response of state i
given that state j optimizes over taxes. We assume the stage-2
equilibrium to be unique and
89. globally stable throughout. Consider state i initially optimizes
over taxes and switches to
expenditure optimization. Invoking Lemma A1, the tax price of
marginal public expenditures
in state j rises and, given global stability of the equilibrium,
state j’s tax rate will be lower in
the new second-stage equilibrium. The effect on state i’s utility
can be computed by defining
vi(T j ) as state i’s utility evaluated at state i’s policy which
satisfies the first-order condition
(46). Using (39) the response in utility to a rise in state j’s tax
rate is
dvi(T j )
dT j
= uicT
ik∗ iT j . (60)
The sign of the utility change is positive since k∗ i
T j
= −k∗ j
T j
> 0 - see (51). Since T j decreases,
state i experiences a loss in utility when deviating. Thus,
Lemma A2: Assume that state j optimizes over capital taxes.
90. State i’s best response is
to optimize over capital taxes.
27
Differently, assume state j optimizes over expenditures. When
state i switches from
tax to expenditure optimization state j’s tax price of marginal
public expenditures goes up.
Owing to global stability, state j’s level of expenditures and
thus taxes will be lower in the
new symmetric equilibrium. Denoting state i’s utility evaluated
at the policy satisfying the
first-order condition (54) by vi(gj ), the change in utility
emanating from a rise in gj is
dvi(gj )
dgj
= uicT
ik̃igj . (61)
The term has already been simplified by using (39). Since gj is
set at a lower level and,
following (47), k̃i
gj
= −k̃j
91. gj
> 0, state i’s utility drops following the deviation.
Lemma A3: Assume that state j optimizes over expenditures.
State i’s best response is
to optimize over capital taxes.
Combining Lemma A2 and A3, state i has a dominant strategy:
optimizing over taxes is
a best response irrespective of state j’s choice of policy
variable. Consequently,
Proposition A1: The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the policy
selection game entails
both states to optimize over capital taxes.
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for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wp T
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany,
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______________________
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Week Two Discussion One
Provide and discuss an example of how the federal government
uses funding to influence the
behavior and policies of local level public safety related
programs.
Week Two Discussion Two
Considering the concept of federalism, who bears the greatest
responsibility for public safety:
Federal state or local government? Or does the greatest
responsibility for public safety lay
elsewhere. Explain your response.