2012 2030 energy_outlook_booklet

BP Energy Outlook 2030

London, January 2012

Disclaimer

This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global
economic growth, population growth, energy consumption, policy support for renewable
energies and sources of energy supply. Forward-looking statements involve risks and
uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may
occur in the future. Actual results may differ depending on a variety of factors, including
product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; legal and
regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse
weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and other factors discussed
elsewhere in this presentation.

Energy Outlook 2030
2 © BP 2012

Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21
Key determinants 43
Risks and unknowns 73
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
3 © BP 2012

Welcome to the 2012 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030.

This is the second year in which BP has made our outlook for global energy available to
the public. I am glad to see this decision was endorsed by the response we received to
last year’s edition, which was downloaded over 36,000 times from BP’s website.
I was particularly pleased at this response because I strongly believe that sharing the data
and analysis of the Energy Outlook – and of our annual Statistical Review of World Energy
– is part of our responsibility to inform the discussions on energy that are occurring in
companies, governments, and over dinner tables worldwide.
This Energy Outlook contains our projections of future energy trends and key
uncertainties, based on our views of the evolution of the world economy, of policy, and
technology. This is our view of the most likely outcome for world energy supply and
demand to 2030; it is not necessarily the energy world we at BP wish to see.
This year we examine in more detail several important facets of the global energy story:
the pathways for economic development and energy demand in China and India; the
factors affecting the energy export prospects of the Middle East; and the “drivers” of
energy consumption in road transportation.
As always, the numbers that make up this outlook point to long term trends and highlight
potential decision points or “fault lines” in the system; in short, their job is to convey the
underlying challenges and opportunities we all face in producing and consuming energy.

4 © BP 2012

Our job is to unlock this story from the numbers. For example, this outlook highlights the
critical role that fossil fuels will continue to play in the world’s energy mix, even as
renewable energy sources continue their rapid growth. While this has inescapable
implications for the likely path of carbon emissions, the outlook also highlights the
opportunities for improving energy efficiency and “lightening the carbon load” by
switching to less carbon-intensive fuels such as natural gas.
The outlook also challenges some long-held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply and
demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that import dependence (in what
is today’s largest energy importer) will decline substantially.
Perhaps most important to me is how the outlook reminds us that we are all connected.
Global energy trade continues to grow rapidly, linking the world’s economies and driving
a remarkable convergence of the relationship between energy use and economic activity
in countries around the world.
These are changes for the better. They are market driven, and while they need the support
of well-designed policies, they represent a key reason why I feel optimistic about the
world’s ability to meet the challenge of providing energy that is affordable, secure,
sustainable and of course safe.
We hope you find the 2012 edition of the BP Energy Outlook 2030 a useful addition to the
global energy discussion.
Bob Dudley
Group Chief Executive

Energy Outlook 2030
5 © BP 2012

Note on method and assumptions

This edition updates our view of the likely path of global energy
markets to 2030, taking account of developments over the past year.
The underlying methodology remains unchanged – we make
assumptions on changes in policy, technology and the economy, based
on extensive internal and external consultations, and use a range of
analytical tools to build a “to the best of our knowledge” view.
We focus on the “most likely” base case numbers, to provide a basis
for discussion. Of course the future is uncertain, and in the process of
building the Outlook we explore the impact of alternative assumptions.
While we do touch on some of the key uncertainties, the treatment of
energy market risks here is by no means exhaustive.
Unless noted otherwise, data definitions are based on the BP Statistical
Review of World Energy, and historical energy data through 2010 is
consistent with the 2011 edition of the Review . Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is expressed in real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
terms. All data sources are listed on page 88.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Key determinants 43
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
7 © BP 2012

Key assumptions are population and GDP growth…

Global growth rates
% p.a.
4%

GDP
3%
Population
2% Energy
Energy per capita
1%
Energy per GDP
0%

-1%

-2%
1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030

Energy Outlook 2030
8 © BP 2012

…and a key outcome is accelerating energy efficiency

Population and income remain the key drivers of energy demand.
Over the last 20 years the global population has increased by 1.6
billion people, but the growth rate is trending down. We project
population growth of 1.4 billion over the next 20 years (or 0.9% p.a.).
Global GDP growth is likely to accelerate, driven by low and medium
income economies. We project GDP growth to rise over the next 20
years, to 3.7% p.a. from 3.2% p.a. between 1990 and 2010. This
implies accelerating growth of income per capita.
Energy efficiency – measured broadly as energy per unit of GDP –
will continue to improve globally, at an accelerating rate of 2.0% p.a.,
vs. 1.2% p.a. over the past 20 years. This acceleration restrains the
overall growth of primary energy consumption.
Primary energy consumption growth to 2030 decelerates to 1.6% p.a.
(compared to 2.0% p.a. the last 20 years); energy consumption per
capita grows at 0.7% p.a., about the same rate as it has since 1970.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Non-OECD economies drive energy consumption growth…

Billion toe Billion toe
18 18

15 15
Renewables*

12 12 Hydro

Nuclear
9 9
Non-OECD
Non-OECD Coal
6 6
Gas

3 OECD 3 Oil
OECD

0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
10 © BP 2012

…as the fuel mix gradually shifts away from oil and coal

World primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 1.6% p.a.
over the period 2010 to 2030, adding 39% to global consumption by
2030. The growth rate declines, from 2.5% p.a. over the past decade,
to 2.0% p.a. over the next decade, and 1.3% p.a. from 2020 to 2030.
Almost all (96%) of the growth is in non-OECD countries. By 2030
non-OECD energy consumption is 69% above the 2010 level, with
growth averaging 2.7% p.a. (or 1.6% p.a. per capita), and it accounts
for 65% of world consumption (compared to 54% in 2010).
OECD energy consumption in 2030 is just 4% higher than in 2010,
with growth averaging 0.2% p.a. to 2030. OECD energy consumption
per capita is on a declining trend (-0.2% p.a. 2010-30).
The fuel mix changes slowly, due to long gestation periods and asset
lifetimes. Gas and non-fossil fuels gain share at the expense of coal
and oil. The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels)
which are expected to grow at 8.2% p.a. 2010-30; among fossil fuels,
gas grows the fastest (2.1% p.a.), oil the slowest (0.7% p.a.).
Energy Outlook 2030
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Fuel substitution is the main story in the OECD…

By fuel and country grouping Contributions to global growth

Change 2010 to 2030, Billion toe % p.a.
5 2.5%
Renewables*
4 2.0%
Hydro
3 Nuclear
1.5%

2 Coal
1.0%
Gas
1
0.5% Oil
0
0.0%
-1 1970- 1990- 2010-
OECD Non-OECD 1990 2010 2030
* Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
12 © BP 2012

…while the non-OECD sees all fuels expanding

OECD total energy consumption is virtually flat, but there are
significant shifts in the fuel mix. Renewables displace oil in transport
and coal in power generation; gas gains at the expense of coal in
power. These shifts are driven by a combination of relative fuel
prices, technological innovation and policy interventions.
The economic development of non-OECD countries creates an
appetite for energy that can only be met by expanding all fuels. For
many developing countries the imperative remains securing
affordable energy to underpin economic development.
The growth of global energy consumption is increasingly being met
by non-fossil fuels. Renewables, nuclear and hydro together account
for 34% of the growth; this aggregate non-fossil contribution is, for
the first time, larger than the contribution of any single fossil fuel.
Renewables on their own contribute more to world energy growth
than oil. The largest single fuel contribution comes from gas, which
meets 31% of the projected growth in global energy.

Energy Outlook 2030
13 © BP 2012

The growth of energy consumption by sector…

By sector and region to 2030 By sector and fuel to 2030

3.0 3.0
Hydro
2.5 RoW 2.5 Nuclear
2.0 2.0 Renew.
Middle Electricity
1.5 East 1.5
Gas
1.0 China & 1.0
Biofuels
India
0.5 0.5 Oil
OECD
0.0 0.0 Coal
Other
Industry
Transport

Transport

Other
Industry
-0.5 -0.5

Final energy use Inputs to power Final energy use Inputs to power

Energy Outlook 2030
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…is dominated by power generation and industry

Energy used to generate electricity remains the fastest growing
sector, accounting for 57% of the projected growth in primary
energy consumption to 2030 (compared to 54% for 1990-2010).
The power sector is also the main driver of diversification of the
fuel mix; non-fossil fuels, led by renewables, account for more than
half of the growth.
Industry leads the growth of final energy consumption, particularly
in rapidly developing economies. The industrial sector accounts for
60% of the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030.
The transport sector shows the weakest growth, with OECD
transport sector demand projected to decline. In transport, we are
starting to see diversification: driven by policy and enabled by
technology, biofuels account for 23% of transport energy demand
growth (with gas contributing 13% and electricity 2%).

Energy Outlook 2030
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Strong growth in power generation continues…

World power generation Growth of fuel inputs to power

Thousand TWh Billion toe
40 1.6
Renewables

30 Hydro 1.2

Nuclear

20 Coal 0.8

Gas
10 0.4
Oil

0 0.0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990- 2000- 2010- 2020-
2000 2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030 -0.4
16 © BP 2012

…with lower carbon fuels gaining market share

World electricity demand (2.6% p.a.) is projected to grow more
rapidly than total energy over the next 20 years, although not as
rapidly as GDP (3.7% p.a.). Efficiency gains in power generation
mean that the fuel inputs grow less rapidly than power output,
averaging 2.1% p.a. 2010-30.
Over the next decade coal is still the largest contributor to the
growth of power fuels, accounting for 39%, but non-fossil fuels are
rapidly catching up. In aggregate nuclear, hydro and other
renewables contribute as much as coal.
The growing role of non-fossil fuels becomes even clearer in the
following decade to 2030, with 75% of the growth coming from
these sources and very little from coal. Meanwhile the contribution
of gas remains relatively steady at around 31% through the
decades.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Convergence of energy intensity and fuel shares…

Energy intensity Shares of world primary energy

Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
0.4 50% Oil

40%
0.3
China
US Coal
30%
0.2
World
20%
Gas
0.1 India 10%
Hydro
Nuclear
0 0% Renewables*
1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
* Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
18 © BP 2012

…will be dominant trends

Energy intensity continues its long term trend of convergence across
countries, to a lower and lower global level – a process we have
discussed in more detail in the 2011 edition of the Energy Outlook. As
a result, economic growth will become significantly less energy
intensive, especially in non-OECD economies.
Convergence is driven by energy trade, the diffusion of technology,
and the standardization of consumption baskets.
Fossil fuels are converging on a market share of 26-28% each and
non-fossil fuel groups on a market share of 6-7% each.
Oil follows a long run trend of decline in its market share, while gas
continues to gain. Coal’s recent gain in market share will start to
reverse soon, with a trend decline evident by 2020. The rate at which
renewables penetrate global energy markets bears remarkable
similarity to the emergence of nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Energy Outlook 2030
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Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Liquid fuels 22
Natural gas 30
Coal 36
Non-fossil fuels 38
Key determinants 43
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
21 © BP 2012

Liquids demand growth from non-OECD countries…

Mb/d Demand Supply
105
2030 level
Other
Other
100 Iraq
S&C Am
Saudi
95 Mid East Oil Sands
NGLs
Biofuels
India
90
Brazil
US
China
85

80
2010 OECD Non- 2010 Non- Non- OPEC
Declines OECD OPEC OPEC Growth
Growth Growth Declines

Energy Outlook 2030
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…will be met by supply growth from OPEC and the Americas

Oil is expected to be the slowest-growing fuel over the next 20 years.
Global liquids demand (oil, biofuels, and other liquids) nonetheless is
likely to rise by 16 Mb/d, exceeding 103 Mb/d by 2030.
Growth comes exclusively from rapidly-growing non-OECD
economies. China (+8 Mb/d), India (+3.5 Mb/d) and the Middle East
(+4 Mb/d) together account for nearly all of the net global increase.
OECD demand has likely peaked (in 2005), and consumption is
expected to decline by 6 Mb/d.
Rising supply to meet expected demand growth should come
primarily from OPEC, where output is projected to rise by nearly 12
Mb/d. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from
NGLs, as well as conventional crude in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
Non-OPEC supply will continue to rise, growing by 5 Mb/d, due to
strong growth in the Americas from US and Brazilian biofuels,
Canadian oil sands, Brazilian deepwater, and US shale oil, offsetting
continued declines in a number of mature provinces.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Liquids demand growth is driven by non-OECD transport…

Liquids demand by sector Liquids demand by product group

Mb/d Mb/d
105 105
Non-OECD
Biofuels
Ind. & Other
90 90
Non-OECD
75 75 Light
Transport
distillates
60 60
OECD Ind. & Middle
Other distillates
45 45

30 OECD 30 Other
Transport
15 15
Power Fuel Oil
0 0
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
24 © BP 2012

…while OECD demand falls across all sectors

Global liquids consumption growth is projected to slow to 0.8% p.a.
(from 1.4% p.a. in 1990-2010); oil will slow to 0.6% p.a.. OECD
consumption will fall to 40.5 Mb/d, 1 Mb/d below the 1990 level. Non-
OECD consumption is likely to overtake the OECD by 2014, and reach 63
Mb/d by 2030 – 2½ times the 1990 level.
Overall consumption growth will be constrained by stronger crude oil
prices seen in recent years, technological advances, a range of new
policies, and the continued, gradual reduction of non-OECD subsidies.
By sector, liquids demand growth to 2030 comes from non-OECD
transport (nearly 14 Mb/d), with non-OECD industry also contributing
(6.5 Mb/d, largely for petrochemicals). Expected OECD declines are
initially concentrated outside the transport sector, where oil can be
more easily displaced by gas and renewables; post-2015, improved
engine efficiency will drive declines in OECD transport demand.
Demand growth is expected to be weighted towards middle distillates
while fuel oil consumption declines. This will continue to put pressure
on those refineries with limited upgrading capacity.
Energy Outlook 2030
25 © BP 2012

OPEC’s critical position in the oil market grows...

Liquids supply by type Growth from 2010 to 2030
Mb/d Mb/d
105 45% 12
OPEC share (rhs) Other
90 OPEC NGLs
9 Saudi
75 OPEC crude Arabia Brazil
Biofuels
60 6 Iraq US Shale
Oil Sands Oil
45
Other non- Biofuels
3
OPEC
30 NGLs
Non-OPEC Canadian
conventional Oil Sands
15 0 Other
OPEC Americas RoW
0 30%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 -3

Energy Outlook 2030
26 © BP 2012

…while the Americas also play an expanding role

Global liquids supply growth will match expected growth in demand
with OPEC accounting for 70% of incremental supply; the group’s
market share will approach 45%, a level not reached since the 1970s.
OPEC NGLs will grow by more than 4 Mb/d – driven in part by rapid
growth of natural gas production. Crude oil output from Iraq is projected
to double to nearly 6 Mb/d, while Saudi output expands by nearly 3
Mb/d. Saudi Arabia is assumed to add new capacity as and when
required to maintain a cushion of spare capacity.
Supply from the Americas will also expand, by 8 Mb/d, as advances in
drilling technologies unlock additional resources in the Canadian oil
sands (+2.2 Mb/d), Brazilian deepwater (+2 Mb/d), and US shale oil (+2.2
Mb/d). In addition, the US and Brazil contribute over half of total biofuels
production growth (of +3.5 Mb/d) expected by 2030.
Overall, non-OPEC output is projected to rise by over 5 Mb/d as these
growth areas more than offset declining conventional output elsewhere.

Energy Outlook 2030
27 © BP 2012

The implications for refining are stark…

Global liquids supply and demand Supply growth 2010-30

Mb/d Total liquids 16 Mb/d
105 Global liquids demand
Other Other liquids:1 1
NGLs Non-refined NGLs: 3
90
Bio Biofuels: 3
=> Refined crude: 9
75

Crude
China crude runs:2 7

60 => Runs ex-China 2
OECD

1 includes processing gains
45 2 if self-sufficient in products
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
28 © BP 2012

…with refinery throughputs likely to grow only modestly

Growth in the call on refinery throughput to 2030 will be constrained by
the growth of liquids which do not need refining: biofuels (+3.5 Mb/d)
and non-refined NGLs (+3 Mb/d).
Increases in processing gains and growth in supplies of liquids derived
from gas and coal are likely to add another 1 Mb/d to product supplies.
All of these supply sources will compete directly with refineries to meet
total liquids demand growth of 16 Mb/d from 2010, limiting the growth
in the call on refinery throughput to only 9 Mb/d over the next 20 years.
Existing spare capacity will accommodate some of the future growth in
refinery throughput.
More than half of global liquids demand growth is in China, and that
country’s refinery expansion plans will affect product balances globally.
A continuation of its stated strategy to be self-sufficient in refined
products would severely curtail crude run increases for refiners outside
of China.

Energy Outlook 2030
29 © BP 2012

Natural gas demand growth is concentrated in the non-OECD…

Demand Supply
Bcf/d
470
2030 level
Other Other
420 India
N. America
China FSU

370 Mid East
Mid East
Other
Africa
Other Australia
320
N. America Mid East

270
2010 OECD Non-OECD 2010 LNG Pipeline

Energy Outlook 2030
30 © BP 2012

…with LNG playing a growing role in supply

Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing fossil fuel globally
(2.1% p.a.). The non-OECD accounts for 80% of global gas demand
growth, averaging 2.9% p.a. growth to 2030. Demand grows fastest in
non-OECD Asia (4.6% p.a.) and the Middle East (3.7% p.a.).
Gas grows rapidly in China (7.6% p.a.) to a level of gas use in 2030 (46
Bcf/d) equal to that of the European Union in 2010. China contributes
23% to the global demand increase. The share of gas in China’s primary
energy consumption expands from 4.0% to 9.5%.
On the supply side the main regional contributors to growth are the
Middle East (26% of global growth) and FSU (19%). Significant
incremental supply (11-12% of global growth each) is also expected from
Australia, China, and the US.
LNG represents a growing share of gas supply. Global LNG supply is
projected to grow 4.5% p.a. to 2030, more than twice as fast as total
global gas production (2.1% p.a.) and faster than inter-regional pipeline
trade (3.0% p.a.). LNG contributes 25% of global supply growth 2010-30,
compared to 19% for 1990-2010.
Energy Outlook 2030
31 © BP 2012

Natural gas demand growth is supported by fuel substitution…

Demand by sector Gas demand growth 2010-30
Bcf/d Bcf/d
500 60
Growth at
Transport
constant
50
400 fuel shares
Non-OECD 40 Effect of
Power changing
300 30 fuel mix
Non-OECD
Ind. & Other 20
200
OECD 10
100 Power
0
OECD Ind. &
0 Other -10 Power Industry Power Industry
1990 2010 2030 OECD Non-OECD

Energy Outlook 2030
32 © BP 2012

…as gas gains market share against coal and oil

Of the major sectors globally, growth is fastest in power (2.4% p.a.) and
industry (2.1% p.a.) – consistent with historical patterns. Natural gas use
in transport is confined to 2% of global gas demand in 2030, despite
growing four times from today’s level.
In the OECD, growth is concentrated in the power sector (1.6% p.a.).
Efficiency gains and low population growth keep industrial (0.9% p.a.)
and other sector (<0.1% p.a.) gas growth low.
Non-OECD gas use is driven by industrialisation, the power sector and
the development of domestic resources. Gas consumption expands most
strongly in power (2.9% p.a.) and industry (2.8% p.a.).
Growth in gas demand is supported by fuel substitution, especially in the
OECD, triggered by regulatory changes and lower relative prices. About
half of all incremental gas demand in the OECD power sector and 75% of
incremental demand in OECD industry is substitution for other fuels.
Substitution is much less pronounced in the non-OECD, where rapidly
expanding energy demand creates room for all fuels to grow.

Energy Outlook 2030
33 © BP 2012

Unconventional gas will play a growing role…

Sources of gas supply, by region
North America Europe China
Bcf/d Bcf/d Bcf/d
100 100 100 Net pipeline
imports
Net LNG
80 80 80 imports
Syngas from
60 coal
60 60
Shale gas and
CBM
40 40 40 Conventional
(inc. tight gas)

20 20 20 Domestic
production
0 0 0
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
34 © BP 2012

…especially in North America and Asia

The world had 6,609 Tcf of proved gas reserves in 2010, sufficient for 59
years of production at current levels. Unconventionals remain to be
appraised in detail globally, but current estimates suggest they could
double this R/P ratio.
Shale gas and coal bed methane (CBM) will account for 63% of North
American production by 2030. Sustained growth of shale gas raises the
prospect of LNG exports from North America by 2030 (5 Bcf/d).
Outside North America, unconventionals are in their infancy, but likely to
play a growing role in the long term as current technical and regulatory
hurdles recede. In Europe we do not expect major unconventional
production before 2020. The decline in conventional supply implies a
growing import requirement for Europe, up by more than 60%, from 26
Bcf/d in 2010 to 42 Bcf/d in 2030.
In China gas production is expected to grow at 6.1% p.a.. CBM and shale
gas are likely to contribute 46% to growth, but still leave a rising need for
imports, which are met by expansion of LNG and pipeline projects.

Energy Outlook 2030
35 © BP 2012

Coal consumption levels off after 2020…

Coal demand by region Coal demand by sector

5 5 Oil
Other

4 4
China Industry
3 3

2 2
India
Other Non-OECD Power
1 1
OECD
0 0
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
36 © BP 2012

…as China shifts to a less coal-intensive economy

Coal consumption declines in the OECD (-1.1% p.a. 2010-30), offset by
growth in the non-OECD (2.1% p.a.). In China, rapid coal consumption
growth ends after 2020. This will bend the global trend: Growth is set to
decline from 4.0% p.a. in 2000-2010 to just 0.5% p.a. in 2020-2030.
Efficiency gains and structural shifts dramatically reduce coal intensity in
China – coal consumed per unit of GDP is almost 60% lower in 2030 than
today. Still, China accounts for 67% of global coal growth to 2030 and
remains the largest coal consumer, increasing its share of global
consumption from 48% to 53%.
India’s continuing growth only partially offsets the slow-down of coal in
China. India contributes 33% of global growth to 2030, and its share of
global coal consumption climbs from today's 8% to 14% in 2030. India
and China together account for all the global net growth to 2030.
Both China and India face challenges in growing domestic production fast
enough to keep up with demand. Their growing import requirements
drive further expansion and integration of the global coal trade.

Energy Outlook 2030
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Non-fossil fuels growth is led by renewables in the OECD…

OECD Non-OECD

2.0 2.0
Renewables
Biofuels
1.5 1.5
Hydro
Nuclear
1.0 1.0

Renewables in power
0.5 0.5

Biofuels
0.0 0.0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
38 © BP 2012

…while all sources grow rapidly in the non-OECD

Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD (2.0% p.a.) and
non-OECD (5.1% p.a.). OECD growth is concentrated in renewable
power. Nuclear output is restored to pre-Fukushima levels by 2020,
but thereafter shows only modest growth. Hydro continues to grow
slowly, constrained by the availability of suitable sites.
In the non-OECD growth is more evenly split between renewables,
nuclear and hydro, as rapidly growing economies call on all
available sources of energy supply. Nuclear output grows rapidly,
averaging 7.8% p.a. 2010-30, as China, India and Russia pursue
ambitious expansion programmes.
Renewables growth is initially led by the EU, but from 2020 the US
and China are the largest sources of growth. Over the 2020-30
period the non-OECD adds more renewable power than the OECD.
The non-OECD increases its share of renewable power from 22%
today to 43% by 2030.

Energy Outlook 2030
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The increasing share of renewables in power and transport…

Share of power generation Share of transport sector

30% 30%

25% 25%
EU
20% 20%

15% Other 15%
OECD

10% 10%
World

5% 5%
Non-OECD
0% 0%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
40 © BP 2012

…is constrained primarily by the cost of scaling up

Renewables are generally more costly than other energy sources,
although in some cases they are competitive already (e.g. Brazilian
biofuels, US onshore wind in the best locations). Policy support is
assumed to remain in place to help the industry deploy new
technologies and drive down costs. A key constraint on the pace of
renewables penetration is the willingness and ability to meet the
rapidly expanding cost of policy support as renewables scale up.
By 2030 renewables supply 11% of world electricity. The EU leads the
way, with 26% of power coming from renewables by 2030. The rest of
the OECD follows with a lag, and then the non-OECD also starts
ramping up the share of renewables in power.
Renewables face a tougher challenge penetrating the transport fuels
market. By 2030, 7% of world transport fuels come from renewable
sources. Brazil has the highest penetration of biofuels (21% in 2010,
rising to 39% by 2030), while the US leads the OECD in incentivising
biofuels (4% in 2010 to 15% by 2030).

Energy Outlook 2030
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Energy Outlook 2030
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Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Key determinants
China and India 43
Middle East 53
Transport 63
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
43 © BP 2012

The pace and scale of development in India and China…

Population Energy GDP

Billion Billion toe Trillion, $2010 PPP
9 18 180
8
15 150
7
6 12 120
5
9 90
4
3 Rest of World 6 60
2
India 3 30
1
China
0 0 0
1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
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…play a major role in shaping the global outlook

By 2030 China and India will be the world’s largest and 3rd largest
economies and energy consumers, jointly accounting for about 35% of
global population, GDP and energy demand.
Rapid economic development means industrialisation, urbanisation
and motorisation. Over the next 20 years China and India combined
account for all the net increase in global coal demand, 94% of net oil
demand growth, 30% of gas, and 48% of the net growth in non-fossil
fuels.
The development paths of China and India represent a major source of
uncertainty for any global outlook, posing two key questions:
 Will China’s energy demand continue to grow as rapidly as in the
past decade, or will it slow?
 Will India replicate China’s pattern of a rapid acceleration of energy
consumption growth as GDP rises, or will it follow a different pattern
of development?

Energy Outlook 2030
45 © BP 2012

The surge in China’s energy consumption slows…

India China

5 5
Renewables*
Hydro
4 4
Nuclear

3 Coal 3
Gas

2 Oil 2

1 1

0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
46 © BP 2012

…and is not repeated in India

China’s energy demand growth is projected to decelerate to 3.0% p.a.
over the forecasting period (vs. 6.6% p.a. 1990-2010) due to slowing GDP
growth and rapid improvement in energy intensity.
India does not follow China’s path; there is no surge in energy demand
as India industrialises. Demand growth slows to 4.5% p.a. (vs. 5.5% p.a.
1990-2010) as improvements in energy efficiency partly offset the energy
needs of industrialisation and infrastructure expansion.
India remains on a lower path of energy intensity; by 2030 it consumes
only about half the energy that China consumes today, at a similar
income per capita level as in China today.
Coal remains the main commercial fuel, but its share falls from 70% to
55% in China as a result of maturing industrial structure, and from 53%
to 50% in India due to domestic resource constraints. Oil’s share is flat at
18% in China and falls to 26% in India, constrained by prices and
growing import dependency. Gas gains market share along with nuclear
and renewables in both countries.

Energy Outlook 2030
47 © BP 2012

China and India follow a historical pattern of development…

Historical industrialisation Energy intensity

Industry as %GDP Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
50 0.4
China
40
0.3

30
0.2
20

20 major countries 1820-2010 0.1 India
10 China 1970-2010
India 1945-2010

0 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 1970 1990 2010 2030
$2010 GDP per capita (000s)
Energy Outlook 2030
48 © BP 2012

…but from different starting points

A stylised pattern of economic development shows energy intensity
rising as the economic structure shifts from low energy intensive
agriculture to intensive activities in industry, and then falling again as
the economy shifts to the less energy intensive service sector (see the
2011 edition of the Energy Outlook). We see this pattern at work in both,
China and India, although they start from different places.
As China matures, its share of industry in GDP will decline. The
composition of industry also shifts away from heavily energy intensive
sub-sectors as the need for infrastructure and urbanisation projects
declines. The rate of decline in energy intensity accelerates, constraining
the growth of energy demand.
In India, the share of industry continues to grow, as infrastructure
development catches up and manufacturing expands to absorb a
growing labour force, but it never reaches the Chinese level. India
therefore remains significantly less energy intensive, with a relatively
high share of the service sector in GDP .

Energy Outlook 2030
49 © BP 2012

Industry causes energy demand to decelerate…

China: final energy demand by sector Primary energy growth by fuel
China India
3.5 1.4
Other
3.0 Transport 1.2 Renewables*
Industry Hydro
2.5 1.0
Nuclear
2.0 0.8
Coal
1.5 0.6 Gas
Oil
1.0 0.4

0.5 0.2

0.0 0.0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 90- 00- 10- 20- 90- 00- 10- 20-
*Includes biofuels 00 10 20 30 00 10 20 30
Energy Outlook 2030
50 © BP 2012

…as the fuel mix diversifies away from coal

Our Outlook assumes structural economic transformation in China will
significantly slow industry’s energy demand growth, especially post
2020.
Industrial energy consumption grew by 9.9% p.a. in the last decade and
accounted for about 80% of the final energy demand growth.
The fuel mix implications of this slowdown are most notable for coal, the
principal fuel in power and heavy industry. The contribution of coal to
primary energy growth drops from 48% between 2010-2020 to 13% in
2020-2030. Its use in power generation declines between 2020 and 2030.
India’s fuel mix changes more gradually, with coal remaining the main
source of primary energy growth (48%) in the next 20 years.
Non-fossil fuels account for an increasing share of energy growth in
both countries (44% and 16% in China and India respectively over the
2020-2030 period), driven by rising dependence on fossil-fuel imports
and environmental challenges related to heavy coal use.

Energy Outlook 2030
51 © BP 2012

Energy Outlook 2030
52 © BP 2012

Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Key determinants
China and India 43
Middle East 53
Transport 63
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
53 © BP 2012

Resource availability shapes the Middle East...

GDP per capita Energy per capita Energy intensity
Index (1970=100)
600 500 300
Non-OECD Mid East *
Other non-OECD
500
400 OECD 240

400
300 180
300
200 120
200

100 60
100

0 0 0
1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
*Non-OECD Middle East includes Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

Energy Outlook 2030
54 © BP 2012

...though gradual adjustments are expected

Per capita income growth in the Middle East has lagged other regions
and is likely to continue to do so. Energy consumption, in contrast,
has soared. In 1970, energy use per capita was roughly twice the rest
of the non-OECD; by 2010, it was more than 3 times as high.
Energy intensity in 1970 was less than half the level of other non-
OECD; by 2010, it was 50% higher. With the trend in other countries
pointing toward continuous improvement, the Middle East region by
2030 is likely to be more than twice as energy intensive as the rest of
the non-OECD.
The Middle East, enjoying a comparative advantage in access to
cheap energy, will remain energy intensive. However, modest
improvements are likely, reversing the long run upward trend.
We expect energy intensity to start declining before 2020, due to a
slowdown in the expansion of energy intensive industries (especially
petrochemicals), a gradual reduction in subsidies and other policies to
improve efficiency, as well as gas for oil substitution.

Energy Outlook 2030
55 © BP 2012

Gas will play a key role in domestic demand...

Regional demand by fuel 2010-30 growth by sector and fuel
1.5 0.3
Hydro
Renewables Nuclear
Hydro
0.2 Renew.
Nuclear
1.0 Electricity
Coal
Gas 0.1 Gas
Oil Oil
0.5 Coal
0.0

Transport

Other
Industry
0.0
1970 1990 2010 2030 Final energy use Inputs to power

Energy Outlook 2030
56 © BP 2012

...in power generation and industry

The region continues to rely on oil and natural gas for nearly all of its
energy demand. The continuation of long-standing efforts to displace
oil consumption with gas (to sustain oil exports) will continue to boost
gas’ market share from 21% in 1970, to 48% in 2010, and 55% in 2030.
Energy consumption growth slows to 3.0% p.a. for 2010-30, from 5.9%
1970-2010; oil demand growth is expected to slow to 2.0% p.a. and
gas to 3.8% p.a. (compared to 4.8% and 8.1% in 1970-10).
Energy growth is driven by industry and power generation. The
industrial sector needs oil and gas for petrochemicals and the
expansion in energy-intensive LNG production. The power sector
increasingly replaces oil with gas, with oil’s share dropping from 41%
in 1990, to 33% in 2010, and 20% in 2030.
The pace of oil displacement and the associated efficiency
improvement is predicated on regional gas supply growth. If the
development of gas resources fails to materialise, additional oil will
be required to fill the void.

Energy Outlook 2030
57 © BP 2012

High subsidies contribute to elevated energy intensity...

Retail gasoline prices (Nov 2010) Oil intensity vs prices

$/litre Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
2.0 0.4 subsidy tax

Iran
1.6
0.3
1.2 Saudi
2011 increase

0.8 0.2
tax Kuwait
subsidy UAE
0.4 India
0.1 Brazil
China
0.0 US Germany
US
Kuwait
Iran
Saudi

UAE

China
India

Germany
Brazil

0.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Gasoline price (Nov 2010), $/litre

Energy Outlook 2030
58 © BP 2012

...but policy changes should drive gradual improvement

Many Middle Eastern countries heavily subsidise oil products and
natural gas, contributing to the region’s high energy intensity. Our
outlook assumes that the region’s governments slowly introduce
measures to improve energy efficiency.
A number of countries have already reduced subsidies and there is
widespread interest in other measures to boost fuel efficiency. Iran
substantially increased fuel prices last year in the face of international
sanctions – and oil consumption fell. Iraq has reduced oil subsidies
under an agreement with the IMF, and Saudi Arabia committed to a
G20 agreement in 2010 to end fossil fuel subsidies.
The region’s energy intensity gradually improves (-1.0% p.a.) after
2020 due to eventual subsidy reduction and other efficiency
measures. A lack of progress and/or delays on the assumed new
policies is a key risk to this outlook: If oil intensity did not decline, for
example, oil demand would be 3 Mb/d higher in 2030.

Energy Outlook 2030
59 © BP 2012

The region’s role in global oil markets is set to continue...

Mid East Oil and Gas Supply Exports as share of
global demand (excl. Mid East)
Billion toe
2.5 40%
Gas Oil

Oil Gas
2.0
30%

1.5
20%
1.0

10%
0.5

0.0 0%
1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
60 © BP 2012

...as gas supply growth meets domestic needs

Oil constitutes 74% of the region’s energy production, but will drop to
67% by 2030 as gas production expands. Nonetheless, from 2010 to
2030 oil supply is expected to expand by 10 Mb/d and gas production
by 41 Bcf/d, both higher increments than over the past two decades.
Saudi Arabia (+3.7 Mb/d) and Iraq (+3.5 Mb/d) will dominate oil supply
growth while Qatar (+11 Bcf/d), Iran (+9 Bcf/d), and Saudi Arabia (+9
Bcf/d) drive gas production. The region’s share of global supply will
increase to 34% for oil and to 18% for gas (from 29% and 14% today).
While there are large supply increases in both oil and gas, the impact
on the region’s exports differs between the two fuels. Middle East oil
exports currently supply 22% of global demand (excl. Middle East),
rising to 25% by 2030. Gas exports, only 2% of global demand today,
rise to just 3% in 2030, as incremental growth is consumed locally.
Failure to develop gas resources and/or to improve oil intensity will
weigh on the region’s ability to deliver the expected supplies to global
oil markets.

Energy Outlook 2030
61 © BP 2012

Contents

Page
Introduction 4
Key determinants
China and India 43
Middle East 53
Transport 63
Appendix 83

Energy Outlook 2030
63 © BP 2012

Vehicle numbers are set to grow rapidly in the Non-OECD…

Total number of vehicles Vehicles per thousand people
(1970-2030)
Millions Vehicles
1,600 800 US

Germany
1,200 600
Japan

800 Non-OECD 400

400 200
China
OECD

India
0 0
1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 2000 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
64 © BP 2012

…while OECD growth slows due to saturation

The global vehicle fleet (commercial vehicles and passenger cars)
grows rapidly – by 60% from around 1 billion today to 1.6 billion by
2030. Most of the growth is in the developing world with some mature
markets at saturation levels.
More than three quarters of the total fleet growth occurs in the non-
OECD, where the vehicle population rise from 340 million to 840
million over the next 20 years – a 2 ½ fold increase.
Between 2010 and 2030, vehicle density per 1000 population grows
from approximately 50 to 140 in China (5.7% p.a.) and from 20 to 65 in
India (6.7% p.a.).
China is expected to follow a slower path to vehicle ownership than
seen historically in other countries. This reflects the impact of current
and assumed future policies, designed to limit oil import dependency
and congestion, including rising fuel taxation, widespread mass
transportation options and relatively uneven income distribution.

Energy Outlook 2030
65 © BP 2012

Transport fuel demand is met predominantly by oil…

By energy type Projected car efficiency

Billion toe Litres per 100 km
3 10
EU
US light vehicles
Electricity
8 China
2 Gas

Coal
6
Biofuels
1 Oil - road
4
Oil - non-road

0 2
1990 2010 2030 2000 2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
66 © BP 2012

…with fuel growth slowing as vehicle efficiency improves

Transport fuel in 2030 remains dominated by oil (87%) and biofuels (7%).
Other fuels gain share, such as natural gas and electricity (4% and 1%
respectively in 2030) are constrained by limited policy support combined
with a general lack of infrastructure in all but a handful of markets.
Despite the projected 60% increase in vehicles over the next 20 years,
energy consumption in total transport is forecast to grow only 26% (1.2%
p.a. – down from 1.9% p.a. between 1990 and 2010).
The growth rate of energy used for transport declines due to accelerating
improvements in fuel economy and the impact of high oil prices on
driving behaviour. Vehicle saturation in the OECD and likely increases in
taxation (or subsidy reduction) and development of mass transportation
in the non-OECD are other factors.
Vehicle fuel economy improvements are driven by tightening policy (CO2
emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled
by improving technology. Prices also play a role, since high fuel costs
provide an additional incentive to improve vehicle efficiency.

Energy Outlook 2030
67 © BP 2012

Policy and technology enable efficiency improvements…

Passenger car sales by type Global vehicle fleet in 2030

100%
Plug-ins incl. 4%
80% BEVs
11%
Full hybrid
60%
16%
Mild hybrid
40% 69%
Conventional
incl. stop-start
20%

0%
2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
68 © BP 2012

…as the vehicle fleet gradually shifts to hybrids

The efficiency of the internal combustion engine is likely to double over
the next 20 years. The improvement come initially from engine stop-start
technologies, downsizing, boosting and lower vehicle weight followed
by the gradual penetration of the vehicle fleet by hybrid cars.
By 2030, sales of conventional passenger vehicles (accounting for nearly
100% today) fall to a third of total sales, while hybrids dominate (full
hybrids 22%, mild hybrids 34%). Sales of plug-in vehicles, including full
battery electric vehicle (BEVs), are forecast to be 8% of sales in 2030.
Plug-in vehicles, with the capability to switch to oil for longer distances,
are likely to be preferred to BEVs, based on current economics and
consumer attitudes towards range limitations.
Hybridisation of the total vehicle fleet takes much longer because of
relatively long vehicle lifetimes and because we assume that heavy
commercial vehicles are unlikely to use this technology. By 2030 our
outlook shows that approximately 30% of conventional vehicles have
been replaced by advanced technologies.

Energy Outlook 2030
69 © BP 2012

Efficiency gains have the biggest impact on oil demand…

Mb/d Oil demand in road transport
60

Non-OECD
50
Non-OECD
OECD

Biofuels
Other*
40

OECD

30
2010 Increased Reduced Improved Increased 2030
number of average vehicle use of
vehicles usage efficiency alternatives
* Includes GTL, CTL, CNG, LNG and electricity
Energy Outlook 2030
70 © BP 2012

…but alternative fuels may play a greater role post 2030

Assuming no changes to vehicle usage, efficiency and the use of
alternatives, oil demand in road transport would increase by a massive
23 Mb/d over the next 20 years, more than our total projected oil demand
growth (16 Mb/d), due mostly to more vehicles in the non-OECD. Instead
we project oil demand growth for road transport to be 6 Mb/d.
Vehicle fuel economy is forecast to improve by 1.1% p.a. in both the
OECD and non-OECD. These efficiency gains are equivalent to 11 Mb/d
by 2030 – saving approximately half of the incremental oil demand that
would otherwise be required under the above “no change” case.
Average miles driven per vehicle is expected to fall (saving 2.4 Mb/d) as
high fuel prices (partly due to rising taxes or reduced subsidies),
congestion and mass transit outweigh the impact of rising incomes.
Biofuels make up more than half of the incremental demand for
alternative fuels in transport. Use of electric vehicles and CNG/LNG is
growing, but there are still barriers delaying the scale-up. Alternative
fuels therefore are not expected to have a material impact by 2030.

Energy Outlook 2030
71 © BP 2012

Quantifying and benchmarking “business as usual” trends…

Implications of business as usual trends
...for China, and its global fuel impact …and in oil markets
Billion toe % of world demand in 2030 Mb/d in 2030
7 35% 10
Business as usual
(at trend intensity)
6 30%
8
5 25%
6
4 20%

3 15% 4
2 Base case 10%
2
1 5%

0 0% 0
1970 1990 2010 2030 Coal Oil Gas CO2 China Trans. M.East

Energy Outlook 2030
74 © BP 2012

…helps to illustrate the uncertainties around any outlook

One way to explore the range of uncertainty around any energy
outlook is to extrapolate past trends to examine the implications of
“business as usual”.
We illustrate this here for China (the market with the greatest potential
to change the global outlook), by assuming that energy intensity will
continue to decline at the same trend rate as over the last 10 years
(less than half the decline rate in our base case projection) to 2030.
Compared to our base case, the resulting higher Chinese demand
would increase global coal demand in 2030 by 32%, oil by 8% and gas
by 2%. Global CO2 emissions would also be 18% higher in 2030.
Inevitably, this would trigger repercussions elsewhere in the system.
The implications of the Chinese “business as usual” case on oil
markets are roughly on par with two similar illustrations: Keeping oil
exports from the Middle East flat 2010-30, and benchmarking the
improvement of fuel efficiency in transport to the rate achieved over
the past ten years.

Energy Outlook 2030
75 © BP 2012

Energy imbalances improve in the Americas…

Europe FSU

N. America

Mid-East China

India
Key:
Billion toe
S. & C. America Africa
1
Gas
Oil
Other Asia Pacific
Coal
0
1990 2010 2030

-1
Net importers
Net exporters

Energy Outlook 2030
76 © BP 2012

…but worsen in Europe and in Asia Pacific

Europe’s energy deficit remains roughly at today’s levels for oil and coal
but increases by 65% for natural gas. This is matched by gas production
growth in the FSU and trade.
Among energy importing regions, North America is an exception, with
growth in biofuel supplies and unconventional oil and gas turning
today’s energy deficit (mainly oil) into a small surplus by 2030.
In aggregate, today’s energy importers will need to import 40% more in
2030 than they do today, with deficits in Europe and Asia Pacific met by
supply growth in the Middle East, the FSU, Africa and S & C America.
China’s energy deficit increases by 0.8 Btoe (spread across all fuels) while
India’s import requirement grows by 0.4 Btoe (mainly oil and coal). The
rest of Asia Pacific remains a big oil importer at similar levels to today.
Asian energy requirements are partially met by increased Middle East
and African production but the rebalancing of global energy trade as a
result of the improved net position in the Americas is also a key factor.

Energy Outlook 2030
77 © BP 2012

Import dependency rises in Asia and Europe…

India China EU27 US
Billion toe
1.2 Gas
Oil
1.0 Import share of Coal
respective fuel
0.8 42% 80%

0.6 47%

0.4 91% 80% 94%

0.2 32%
40% 6% 57%
0.0

-0.2
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
78 © BP 2012

…and falls in the US

Import dependency, measured as the share of demand met by net
imports, increases for most major energy importers except the US.
The import share of oil demand and the volume of oil imports in the
US will fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising domestic shale
oil production and ethanol displacing crude imports. The US also
becomes a net exporter of natural gas.
In China, imports of oil and natural gas rise sharply as demand
growth outpaces domestic supply. Oil continues to dominate China's
energy imports, although gas imports increase by a factor of sixteen.
China also becomes a major importer of coal.
India will increasingly have to rely on imports of all three – oil, coal
and natural gas – to supply its growing energy needs.
European net imports (and imports as a share of consumption) rise
significantly due to declining domestic oil and gas production and
rising gas consumption. Virtually all of the growth in net imports is
from natural gas.

Energy Outlook 2030
79 © BP 2012

Carbon emission growth slows, but more action is needed…

Global CO2 emissions from energy use

Billion tonnes CO2 Billion tonnes CO2
40 40 Base
Case
Policy
30 Non-OECD 30
Case

Coal
IEA “450
20 20 Scenario”

Gas
10 10
OECD
Oil

0 0
1990 2010 2030 2000 2010 2020 2030

Energy Outlook 2030 80 © BP 2012

…to get emissions falling by 2030

We assume continued tightening in policies to address climate
change. Carbon abatement policies in the OECD, including carbon
pricing, succeeds in reducing emissions in 2030 (by 10% versus 2010).
Non-OECD countries do make significant progress in reducing the
carbon intensity of their economies, but this is outweighed by carbon
increases due to rapid economic growth. The net result is a projected
increase in global emissions of 28% by 2030.
This leaves the world well above the required emissions path to
stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases at the level
recommended by scientists (around 450 ppm).
Our “Policy Case” (discussed in more detail in last year’s Outlook)
assumes a step-change in the political commitment to action on
carbon emissions. Even in this case, the path to reach 450 ppm
remains elusive. However, a declining emissions path by 2030 is
achievable, given the political will to shoulder the cost.

Energy Outlook 2030
81 © BP 2012

Conclusion

GDP Energy and CO2
,

Index (1970=100) Energy can be available and
800 affordable

700  Competition
GDP
 Innovation
600
Coal  Regulation harnessing
500 market forces

400 Energy security will remain an
Gas Energy issue
300 CO2 emissions not on track
Oil CO2
200 OECD

100
1970 1990 2010 2030

Energy Outlook 2030
82 © BP 2012

Key changes versus last year’s Outlook...

Changes in 2030 levels versus the 2011 Outlook

Revised down Revised up

Nuclear output

Biofuels supply

Renewables in power

Biofuels
India total energy demand

N. America oil & gas supply Oil Gas

-100 -50 0 50 100 150
Mtoe

Energy Outlook 2030
84 © BP 2012

…result in little net change in total energy

Our projection for world energy demand and supply is little changed
since our last outlook (up about 1% by 2030). A slightly higher base
year, due to strong global consumption growth in 2010, has been offset
by a slightly slower annual growth rate.
Nuclear prospects have been revised down after Fukushima and the
resulting policy changes in Japan and Europe.
Biofuels growth (while still very robust) has been reduced due to more
modest expectations of penetration of next generation fuels.
Renewables in power generation have been revised higher due to
improved prospects for cost reductions. They also play a part in
replacing the lost nuclear output in Japan and Europe.
Indian energy consumption has been revised upwards on a
reassessment of the country’s economic development path.
North American oil and natural gas supply outlooks have been revised
higher due to evolving expectations for shale plays.

Energy Outlook 2030
85 © BP 2012

Differences with other outlooks are mostly due to…

World energy consumption Growth of energy consumption
2010-2030
20 6
External range BP Non-OECD
5 OECD
15
4

10 3

2
5
1

0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 XOM IEA EIA
IEA BP OPEC IEA
BP
NPS
NPS CPS
Energy Outlook 2030
86 © BP 2012

…differing views on OECD vs. non-OECD prospects

Our outlook is within the range of publicly-available forecasts, initially
lying near the upper end of the range but moving toward the centre by
2030.
Many forecasters expect higher growth in OECD energy demand than
we do, while our projections for non-OECD growth are stronger than
most.
Our outlook lies between the IEA’s “New Policies Scenario”, which
assesses demand prospects on the assumption that announced
national policy objectives are fully implemented, and their “Current
Policies Scenario”, which assumes current policies remain in place
through 2030. In contrast to the IEA scenarios, our outlook does not
take policies as given but makes judgments about the likelihood of
future policy developments and their impacts.

Energy Outlook 2030
87 © BP 2012

Data sources

BP p.l.c., BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, United Kingdom, June 2011
Cedigaz, Paris, France
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 7.0, May 2011.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany
Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook , Washington, D.C., United States,
September 2011
Energy Information Administration, World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions outside
the United States, Washington, D.C., United States, April 2011
International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Paris, France, 2011
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2011
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2011
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, France, 2011
Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics 1750-2005, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, United States, 2007
Oxford Economics Ltd, Oxford, UK
United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, New York, United States,
2009
United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Statistics, New York, United States, 2011
Waterborne Energy, Inc., Houston, Texas, United States
Plus various official sources

Energy Outlook 2030
88 © BP 2012

2012 2030 energy_outlook_booklet

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