1. BP Energy Outlook 2035
January 2014
bp.com/energyoutlook
#BPstats
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2. Disclaimer
This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global
economic growth, population growth, energy consumption, policy support for renewable
energies and sources of energy supply. Forward-looking statements involve risks and
uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may
occur in the future. Actual outcomes may differ depending on a variety of factors, including
product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; legal and
regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse
weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and other factors discussed
elsewhere in this presentation.
Energy Outlook 2035
2
© BP 2014

3. Contents
Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
3
© BP 2014

4. Welcome to the 2014 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook.
Published for the 4th time, the annual Energy Outlook reflects our best effort to describe a
“most likely” trajectory of the global energy system, based on our views of likely
economic and population growth, as well as developments in policy and technology. The
Outlook, like its sister publication, the Statistical Review of World Energy, is the result of
intensive analysis by our Economics Team; both documents have deservedly become
standard references for those with an interest in energy.
Of course the future is uncertain: the numbers that make up this Outlook are less
important than the long-term trends, the possible forks in the road ahead, and the choices
they pose for decision makers in government and business.
This edition of the Outlook raises three big questions: Will the world have sufficient
energy to fuel continued economic growth? Will that energy be secure? And will it be
sustainable?
On the first question, our answer is a resounding “Yes” We project that global energy
.
consumption will rise by 41% by 2035, with 95% of that growth coming from rapidlygrowing emerging economies. That growth rate is slower than what we have seen in
previous decades, largely as a result of increasing energy efficiency. Trends in global
technology, investment and policy leave us confident that production will be able to keep
pace. New energy forms such as shale gas, tight oil, and renewables will account for a
significant share of the growth in global supply. Energy efficiency promises to improve
unabatedly, driven by globalization and competition.
Energy Outlook 2035
4
© BP 2014

5. On the question of security, our Outlook offers a mixed, though broadly positive, view.
Among today’s energy importers, the United States is on a path to achieve energy selfsufficiency, while import dependence in Europe, China and India will increase. Asia will
become the dominant energy importing region. Russia will remain the leading energy
exporter, and Africa will become an increasingly important supplier. While it will remain a
key energy player, the Middle East is likely to see relatively static exports.
And on the question of sustainability, we project that global carbon dioxide emissions
will rise by 29%, with all of the growth coming from the emerging economies. There are
some positive developments: emissions growth will slow as natural gas and renewables
gain market share from coal and oil. And emissions are expected to decline in Europe and
the US. But we could do better.
This year, we extend the outlook to 2035 – far enough to see some key turning points:
India is likely to surpass China as the largest source of energy demand growth;
renewable energy will no longer be a minor player, surpassing nuclear energy; and OECD
countries will have started to “crack the code” of sustaining economic growth while
reducing energy demand.
Once again, the Outlook highlights the power of competition and market forces in
unlocking technology and innovation to meet the world’s energy needs. These factors
make us optimistic for the world’s energy future, and they suggest a way forward in
mastering challenges such as security and sustainability.
I hope you find the BP Energy Outlook a useful addition to the global energy discussion.
Bob Dudley
Group Chief Executive
Energy Outlook 2035
5
© BP 2014

6. Note on method and assumptions
This edition updates our view of the likely path of global energy markets
and extends it to 2035. The underlying methodology remains unchanged
– we make assumptions on changes in policy, technology and the
economy, based on extensive internal and external consultations, using
a range of analytical tools to build a single “most likely” view.
We focus on these “most likely” numbers, to provide a basis for
discussion. Of course the future is uncertain, and in the process of
building the Outlook we explore the impact of alternative assumptions.
While we do touch on some of the key uncertainties, the treatment of
energy market risks here is by no means exhaustive.
Unless noted otherwise, data definitions are based on the BP Statistical
Review of World Energy, and historical energy data through 2012 is
consistent with the 2013 edition of the Review. Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is expressed in real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms and
rescaled from 2005 to 2012 prices using a simple across-the-board
increase for exposition purposes. All data sources are listed on page 96.
Energy Outlook 2035
6
© BP 2014

7. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
7
© BP 2014

8. Primary energy consumption growth slows...
Consumption by region
Ten year increments by region
Billion toe
Billion toe
18
2.8
15
2.0
Other
12
1.2
9
China
0.8
China
6
India
1.6
India
0.4
OECD
0.0
OECD
Energy Outlook 2035
8
2035
2025
2015
2005
2035
1995
1975
2000
-0.4
1985
3
0
1965
Other nonOECD
2.4
© BP 2014

9. …and the growth is almost all in the non-OECD
Primary energy demand increases by 41% between 2012 and 2035, with
growth averaging 1.5% per annum (p.a.). Growth slows, from 2.2% p.a.
for 2005-15, to 1.7% p.a. 2015-25 and just 1.1% p.a. in the final decade.
We are leaving a phase of very high energy consumption growth, driven
by the industrialization and electrification of non-OECD economies,
notably China. The 2002-2012 decade recorded the largest ever growth of
energy consumption in volume terms over any ten year period, and this
is unlikely to be surpassed in our timeframe.
There is a clear long-run shift in energy growth from the OECD to the
non-OECD. Virtually all (95%) of the projected growth is in the non-OECD,
with energy consumption growing at 2.3% p.a. 2012-35. OECD energy
consumption, by contrast, grows at just 0.2% p.a. over the whole period
and is actually falling from 2030 onwards.
China has emerged as the key growth contributor, but by the end of the
forecast China’s contribution is starting to fade. India’s contribution
grows, almost matching that of China in the final decade of the forecast.
Energy Outlook 2035
9
© BP 2014

10. The strong impetus from industrialization...
Consumption by sector
Ten year increments by sector
Billion toe
Billion toe
18
3.0
Transport
15
12
Other
2.5
2.0
Industry
1.5
9
Electricity
share
6
Other
1.0
Industry 0.5
Transport
3
Energy Outlook 2035
10
2035
2025
2015
2005
2035
1995
2000
1985
0
1965
1975
0.0
© BP 2014

11. …starts to fade toward the end of the forecast
By sector, industry remains the dominant source of growth for primary
energy consumption, both directly and indirectly (in the form of
electricity). Industry accounts for more than half of the growth of energy
consumption 2012-35. This reflects the unprecedented pace and scale of
industrialization in Asia. Energy for industry grows at 2.6% p.a. over the
decade 2005-15, but this slows to just 1.0% p.a. in the final decade of the
forecast as China’s rapid industrialization comes to an end.
The next major component of growth is energy used in the ‘other’ sector
(residential, services and agriculture), predominantly in the form of
electricity. By the final decade, growth in other sector energy use almost
matches industry in volume terms.
The transport sector continues to play a relatively small role in primary
energy growth throughout the forecast, growing steadily but accounting
for just 13% of total growth during 2012-35.
Energy Outlook 2035
11
© BP 2014

12. The slowdown in China and industry...
Consumption by fuel
Ten year increments by fuel
Billion toe
Billion toe
18
3.0
Renew.*
Hydro
Nuclear
15
Renew.*
2.5
Hydro
2.0
12
Coal
Nuclear
1.5
3
2035
2025
2015
2035
2005
1975
2000
1995
0.0
Oil
0
1965
Oil
1985
6
Gas
0.5
Gas
Coal
1.0
9
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2035
12
© BP 2014

13. …is reflected in a marked slowdown in coal growth
All fuels show growth over the forecast period, with the fastest growth
seen in renewables (6.4% p.a.). Nuclear (1.9% p.a.) and hydro-electric
power (1.8% p.a.) both grow more rapidly than total energy.
Among fossil fuels, gas is the fastest growing (1.9% p.a.) and the only
one to grow more rapidly than total energy. Oil (0.8% p.a.) shows the
slowest growth, with coal (1.1% p.a.) only slightly ahead.
Coal’s contribution to growth diminishes rapidly. It is currently the
largest source of volume growth, but by the final decade coal adds less
volume than oil and is only just ahead of hydro. Again, this reflects the
shift away from coal-intensive industrialization in China.
In that final decade, gas is the largest single contributor to growth; but
non-fossil fuels in aggregate contribute even more than gas, accounting
for 39% of the growth in energy in that period.
Energy Outlook 2035
13
© BP 2014

14. New sources help to supply sufficient energy...
Primary energy production
New energy forms
Billion toe
Billion toe
18
3
FSU
S & C America
12
N America
2
Middle East
Europe
6
1
Asia Pacific
0
1990
Africa
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
Renewables
in power
Shale gas
14
12%
Tight oil,
oil sands,
biofuels
6%
% of total
(RHS)
0
1990
2035
18%
2005
2020
0%
2035
© BP 2014

15. …to meet demand growth
World primary energy production grows at 1.5% p.a. from 2012 to 2035,
matching consumption growth. Growth is concentrated in the non-OECD,
which accounts for almost 80% of the volume increment.
There is growth in all regions except Europe. Asia Pacific shows both the
fastest rate of growth (2.1% p.a.) and the largest increment, providing
47% of the increase in global energy production. The Middle East and
North America are the next largest sources of growth, and North America
remains the second largest regional energy producer.
There is expansion across all types of energy, with new energy forms
playing an increasingly significant role. Renewables, shale gas, tight oil
and other new fuel sources in aggregate grow at 6.2% p.a. and
contribute 43% of the increment in energy production to 2035.
The growth of new energy forms is enabled by the development of
technology and underpinned by large-scale investments. Our Outlook
assumes that the right competitive and policy conditions are in place to
support that investment and technical progress.
Energy Outlook 2035
15
© BP 2014

16. Energy is gradually decoupling from economic growth…
GDP and energy
Trillion $2012
Shares of primary energy
Billion toe
220
44
50%
Oil
GDP
170
40%
34
Coal
30%
120
24
20%
70
14
10%
Energy
(RHS)
20
1965
2000
Gas
Hydro
0%
1965
4
2035
Nuclear
2000
Renewables*
2035
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2035
16
© BP 2014

17. …and the fuel mix is slowly shifting away from fossil fuels
Energy consumption grows less rapidly than the global economy, with
GDP growth averaging 3.5% p.a. 2012-35. As a result energy intensity, the
amount of energy required per unit of GDP declines by 36% (1.9% p.a.)
,
between 2012 and 2035. The decline in energy intensity accelerates; the
expected rate of decline post 2020 is more than double the decline rate
achieved 2000-2010.
Fuel shares evolve slowly. Oil’s share continues to decline, its position as
the leading fuel briefly challenged by coal. Gas gains share steadily. By
2035 all the fossil fuel shares are clustering around 27%, and for the first
time since the Industrial Revolution there is no single dominant fuel.
Taken together, fossil fuels lose share but they are still the dominant
form of energy in 2035 with a share of 81%, compared to 86% in 2012.
Among non-fossil fuels, renewables (including biofuels) gain share
rapidly, from around 2% today to 7% by 2035, while hydro and nuclear
remain fairly flat. Renewables overtake nuclear in 2025, and by 2035 they
match hydro.
Energy Outlook 2035
17
© BP 2014

18. The power sector takes an increasing share of energy…
Inputs to power as a share of
total primary energy
50%
40%
Primary inputs to power
100%
World
Renew.
Gas
OECD
Non-OECD
75%
Nuclear
Oil
30%
50%
Coal
20%
25%
10%
Hydro
0%
1900
1945
Energy Outlook 2035
1990
2035
18
0%
1965
2000
2035
© BP 2014

19. …and plays a key role in shaping the fuel mix
One of the longest established trends in energy is the increasing role of
the power sector. The share of primary energy devoted to power
generation rises in industrializing as well as in mature economies, where
growth is dominated by the service sector.
In 2012, 42% of primary energy was converted into electricity in the
power sector, up from 30% in 1965. By 2035 that share will rise to 46%.
Fuels for power generation account for 57% of the growth in primary
energy consumption 2012-35. And the power sector is the one place
where all the fuels compete.
At the global level coal remains the largest source of power through
2035, although in the OECD coal is overtaken by gas. Carbon-free sources
(renewables, hydro and nuclear) increase their combined share of power
generation from 32% in 2012 to 37% by 2035. Renewables overtake
nuclear as a source of power generation in 2028, increasing their share of
power generation from 5% today to 13% in 2035, and showing little sign
of approaching any limit to their market share.
Energy Outlook 2035
19
© BP 2014

20. The security and sustainability of energy supply…
Primary energy net balances
Energy and CO2 emissions
Index: 1965 = 100
Billion toe
FSU
4
500
Africa
2
S&C
America
Middle
East
North
America
Asia
0
-2
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
300
Energy
200
CO2
Europe
-4
1990
400
100
1965
2035
20
2000
2035
© BP 2014

21. …continue to pose significant challenges
Regional energy imbalances – production minus consumption for each
region – suggest that trading relationships will change significantly by
2035. North America switches from being a net importer of energy to a
net exporter around 2018. Meanwhile, Asia’s need for imported energy
continues to expand; by 2035 Asia accounts for 70% of inter-regional net
imports – and nearly all of the growth in trade.
Among exporting regions, the Middle East remains the largest net
regional energy exporter, but its share falls from 46% in 2012 to 38% in
2035. Russia remains the world’s largest energy exporting country.
Energy security is a theme that will run through the fuel-by-fuel
projections described later in this Outlook.
The biggest challenge in terms of sustainability remains the level of
carbon emissions, which continue to grow (1.1% p.a.) – slightly slower
than energy consumption, but faster than recommended by the scientific
community. We will also address this challenge in more detail later.
Energy Outlook 2035
21
© BP 2014

22. Energy Outlook 2035
22
© BP 2014

23. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
23
© BP 2014

24. The global liquids balance reflects shifts…
Supply
Demand
Mb/d
110
2035 level
Crude
105
Other
100
Mid East
95
Other Asia
North
America
India
Other
NGLs*
90
China
85
80
2012
OECD
decline
Non-OECD
growth
2012
Non-OPEC
growth
OPEC
growth
*Natural gas liquids
Energy Outlook 2035
24
© BP 2014

25. …in non-OECD demand and non-OPEC supply growth
Oil is expected to be the slowest growing fuel over the outlook period.
Global liquids demand (oil, biofuels, and other liquids) nonetheless is
likely to rise by around 19 Mb/d, to reach 109 Mb/d by 2035.
Demand growth comes exclusively from rapidly growing non-OECD
economies. China, India and the Middle East account for nearly all of the
net global increase. OECD demand has peaked and consumption is
expected to decline by 8 Mb/d.
Rising supply to meet demand growth will come primarily from nonOPEC unconventional sources and, later in the outlook, from OPEC. By
2035, non-OPEC supply is expected to have increased by 10.8 Mb/d while
OPEC production will have expanded by 7.4 Mb/d.
The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (3.6
Mb/d), Canada (3.4 Mb/d), and Brazil (2.4 Mb/d), which offset declines in
mature provinces such as the North Sea. OPEC supply growth will come
primarily from NGLs (3.1 Mb/d) and crude oil in Iraq (2.6 Mb/d).
Energy Outlook 2035
25
© BP 2014

26. Asia and the Middle East drive liquids demand growth…
Five year increments
Demand by region
Mb/d
Mb/d
120
2.5
100
Other
Middle East
80
1.5
India
60
China
40
1.0
US
20
0
1965
2.0
India
Middle East
China
Other OECD
0.5
0.0
2000
Energy Outlook 2035
2035
2010- 2015- 2015- 2025- 20302015 2020 2025 2030 2035
26
© BP 2014

27. …with growth in India overtaking China by 2035
Global liquids consumption is projected to reach 109 Mb/d by 2035 but
growth continues to slow (from 1.3% p.a. in 2000-12 to 0.6% for 2025-35).
OECD consumption is projected to fall by 8 Mb/d to 37.6 Mb/d in 2035, the
lowest since 1985. Non-OECD consumption will reach 71 Mb/d by 2035 –
60% higher than in 2012.
Demand in China grows by 8 Mb/d to 18 Mb/d in 2035, surpassing the US
in 2029 (US demand falls 2.7 Mb/d to 15.8 Mb/d over the outlook period).
India and the Middle East are the next largest contributors, both growing
by 4.6 Mb/d while other non-OECD Asia sees growth of 3.1 Mb/d.
Although China provides the largest increment to liquids demand over
the outlook period, its growth volumes slow relative to those observed
over the last 10 years. During 2030-35 Chinese demand rises by only 0.9
Mb/d (versus 2.3 Mb/d for 2005-10) making India the largest contributor
to demand growth (1.3 Mb/d for 2030-35). The Middle East also sees
growth of 0.9 Mb/d during this period, and overtakes the US to become
the largest per capita consumer of oil in 2033.
Energy Outlook 2035
27
© BP 2014

28. Liquids demand growth is largest in non-OECD transport...
Five year increments
Demand by sector
Mb/d
120
Mb/d
4
Industry
Transport
Non-OECD
transport
100
3
80
OECD
transport
60
Non-OECD
ind. & other
40
OECD
ind. & other
20
0
1965
2
1
Power
0
2000
Energy Outlook 2035
2035
2010- 2015- 2020- 2025- 20302015 2020 2025 2030 2035
28
© BP 2014

29. …but growth in industry becomes increasingly important
By sector, liquids demand growth to 2035 comes primarily from nonOECD transport (16.6 Mb/d) – due to a rapid increase in vehicle
ownership – and from non-OECD industry (8.7 Mb/d, largely for
petrochemicals).
OECD demand declines across all sectors. Outside of transport there are
two main drivers: the continued displacement of oil by cheaper
alternative fuels, and the closure of uneconomic industrial plants (in
refining and petrochemicals) in favour of newer plants in the non-OECD.
In transport, declines are first driven by vehicle efficiency improvements
(despite slow growth in the OECD vehicle fleet) and then by increasing
penetration of non-liquid alternative fuels, such as natural gas.
At the global level, transport demand growth for liquid fuels slows post
2025, as efficiency gains and displacement by gas ramp up, falling below
growth in industry between 2030 and 2035. Industrial growth remains
steady since the production of petrochemicals is already an efficient
process and as yet there are no large scale alternatives to oil available.
Energy Outlook 2035
29
© BP 2014

30. Supply growth is supported initially by unconventionals…
Tight oil supply
Liquids supply by type
Mb/d
Mb/d
12
120
Russia
% of total
China
(RHS)
South America
Canada & Mexico
US
OPEC NGLs
100
OPEC crude
80
8
9%
6%
Biofuels
60
Oil sands
Tight oil
20
0
1990
4
3%
0
40
0%
Other non-OPEC
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
2005
2035
30
2020
2035
© BP 2014

31. …pushing the need for OPEC growth to later in the outlook
Liquids supply will expand by over 18 Mb/d with non-OPEC production
contributing nearly 11 Mb/d of growth and OPEC crude and NGLs
accounting for the rest. Unconventionals will drive non-OPEC growth
and delay the need for higher OPEC supplies.
By 2035, growth of tight oil (5.7 Mb/d), biofuels (1.9 Mb/d), and oil sands
(3.3 Mb/d) alone will have accounted for 60% of global growth and all of
the net increase in non-OPEC production.
Tight oil will account for 7% of global supplies in 2035 while biofuels and
oil sands obtain market shares of 3% and 5%, respectively. North
America will dominate the expansion in unconventionals with 65% of
global tight oil and with Canada responsible for all the world’s oil sands
production.
OPEC crude production will not expand significantly until 2025, but by
the end of the forecast period will be up over 4 Mb/d. OPEC NGLs will
continue to expand on increasing natural gas production in the Middle
East and contribute over 3 Mb/d to growth.
Energy Outlook 2035
31
© BP 2014

32. Oil balances suggest OPEC will be challenged…
OPEC share of global supply
OPEC spare capacity
Mb/d
10
Mb/d
Spare capacity
50%
40
Call on OPEC (RHS)
45%
8
30
6
40%
35%
4
20
30%
2
0
1975
1995
Energy Outlook 2035
2015
10
2035
25%
1975
32
1995
2015
2035
© BP 2014

33. …but the experience of the 1980s is unlikely to be repeated
In our outlook, demand growth slows and non-OPEC supplies rise – both
as a result of high prices. We assume that OPEC members cut production
over the current decade. As a result, spare capacity will exceed 6 Mb/d by
2018, the highest since the late 1980s.
The market requirement for OPEC crude is not expected to reach today’s
levels for another decade before rebounding. While we believe that
OPEC members will be able to maintain discipline despite high levels of
spare capacity, cohesion of the group is a key oil market uncertainty.
The challenging decade ahead for OPEC, however, is unlikely to be a
repeat of the 1980s. At that time, spare capacity peaked at over 10 Mb/d
and the group’s share of global supply dropped well below 30%.
The key difference is the response of demand, which collapsed after the
price shock of the 1970s, due to the combination of fuel substitution and
efficiency improvements. Furthermore, spare capacity as a share of
crude production will peak at 7%, compared to 17% in 1985.
Energy Outlook 2035
33
© BP 2014

34. Supply disruptions reduce the immediate impact on OPEC…
Historical disruptions
Recent disruptions
Change since 4Q10, Mb/d
Change from pre-disruption level*, Mb/d
3
2
2
Sudans
Iran
Libya
Syria
US
Net
1
Iran (1979)
Iraq (1990)
Libya (1970)
Russia (1991)
0
1
-1
0
-2
-1
-3
-2
-4
-3
-5
3Q11
2Q12
1Q13
4Q13
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
*Event occurs in year 1
Energy Outlook 2035
34
© BP 2014

35. …and history suggests recovery will take time
Since the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, supply disruptions have
become a key feature of today’s oil market. Libyan production suffered a
complete shutdown in early 2011, followed by disruptions in Syria due to
civil war, Sudan as the country split, and Iran due to international
sanctions.
By the end of 2013, disruptions in those countries had removed over 2
Mb/d from global markets. Meanwhile, US output surged due to tight oil,
nearly matching disruptions barrel for barrel. Absent those disruptions,
prices would likely have come under pressure without OPEC action.
While non-OPEC supply growth – led by unconventionals – may place
pressure on OPEC in the medium term, historical precedent suggests
that supply disruptions take years to fully recover, which could provide
some cushion for OPEC. Revolutions in Libya and Iran, war and
sanctions in Iraq, and the collapse of the Soviet Union all resulted in
production declines that persisted for at least a decade following the
disruptive event.
Energy Outlook 2035
35
© BP 2014

36. OPEC countries face pressure from rising populations…
Population
GDP per capita
OPEC exports
Index: 1975 = 100
Index: 1975 = 100
Mb/d and Bcf/d
400
800
40
OPEC
Other non-OECD
OECD
Oil
Gas
300
600
200
400
20
100
200
10
0
1975 1995 2015 2035
Energy Outlook 2035
0
1975 1995 2015 2035
36
30
0
1975
1995
2015
2035
© BP 2014

37. …booming energy demand and limited economic growth
High population growth, limited economic opportunities, and the burden
of high energy demand (largely due to subsidies) create pressures on
OPEC (and other oil-producing) countries.
Population growth in OPEC countries has outpaced the rest of the nonOECD for the past 40 years and the growth rate over the next 20 years
will be more than double that of the rest of the emerging markets.
OPEC GDP per capita has been stagnant since 1975, compared to a 200%
increase in the rest of the non-OECD. GDP per capita is set to expand by
just 30% to 2035, compared to 130% in the other emerging markets.
The level and growth rates of energy use per capita are also well ahead
of other non-OECD countries. Today, OPEC countries consume nearly
75% more energy per capita than the non-OECD average. This will limit
the growth of both oil and natural gas exports.
These factors have contributed to recent oil supply disruptions and could
pose risks to future capacity and production prospects.
Energy Outlook 2035
37
© BP 2014

38. Oil trade continues to shift from West to East…
Mb/d
US: sources
of supply
30
Net imports
Tight oil
Other supply
25
20
Regional imbalances
Mb/d
75
50
Mb/d
Middle East
Europe
Africa
N America
China: sources
of supply
30
FSU
Asia Pacific
S&C America 25
20
25
15
15
0
10
10
-25
5
0
1995
2015
Energy Outlook 2035
-50
1995
2035
5
0
2015
38
2035
1995
2015
2035
© BP 2014

39. …but Asia’s import needs go beyond the Middle East
In the US, the increase in tight oil production coupled with declining
demand will continue the dramatic shift in import dependence. Imports
are set to decline from a peak of well over 12 Mb/d, or 60% of demand, in
2005 to just 1 Mb/d, or less than 10% of demand in 2035.
China’s import requirement, on the other hand, is projected to more than
double from today’s levels to almost 14 Mb/d, or 75% of demand, a level
and share of demand higher than the US at its peak. China will likely
surpass the US as the world’s largest importer next year and largest
consumer by 2029.
On a regional basis, led by China’s growing import requirement, Asia’s
imports will account for nearly 80% of inter-regional net imports by 2035,
up from 57% today.
Meanwhile, the Middle East’s share of inter-regional net exports will dip
from 54% in 2012 to 52% by 2035, suggesting that Asia will not only
require Middle Eastern oil, but will also pull oil from other surplus
regions such as the Americas, Africa, and the FSU.
Energy Outlook 2035
39
© BP 2014

40. The growth of alternatives will challenge refiners…
Cumulative liquids supply growth
Cumulative liquids demand growth
Mb/d
Mb/d
US crude
Condensate
NGLs
15
OPEC crude
RoW crude
20
Biofuels
20
Light distillates
Middle distillates
Fuel oil
Other
Biofuels
15
Other*
10
10
5
5
OECD
0
OECD
0
-5
-5
2013
2024
2035
2015
*Includes gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids and refinery volume gain
Energy Outlook 2035
40
2020
2025
2030
2035
© BP 2014

41. …as will demand growth trends and crude market dynamics
Liquids supply growth comprises a variety of sources; of total liquids
supply growth to 2035 of around 19 Mb/d, about 7 Mb/d comes from
NGLs, biofuels and other liquids that do not require refining.
In the medium term, OPEC oil production cuts are offset mainly by US
output growth that may not be fully exportable. The scope for non-US
refiners to grow throughputs in aggregate could therefore be impacted.
There will also be uneven regional impacts as new East of Suez refining
capacity takes a disproportionate share of crude run growth, keeping the
pressure on crude run levels in weaker refining centres, such as Europe.
Liquids demand growth is heavily biased towards middle distillates,
especially jet-fuel and diesel, while light distillate demand growth will be
partly met by new supplies of NGLs and condensates.
This will require refiners to adjust product yields. Gasoline cracks are
already more volatile than diesel, reflecting an increasing tendency for a
supply overhang to develop outside of the driving season.
Energy Outlook 2035
41
© BP 2014

42. Global transport demand growth slows…
Transport demand by fuel
Five year increments by fuel
Billion toe
Mtoe
3
200
Electricity
Gas
2
150
Coal
Biofuels
Oil:
1
Road
Non-road
50
0
0
1980 1991 2002 2013 2024 2035
Energy Outlook 2035
100
2010- 2015- 2020- 2025- 20302015 2020 2025 2030 2035
42
© BP 2014

43. …as prices and policy boost vehicle fuel economy
Energy consumption growth in transport slows to 1.1% p.a. between
2012 and 2035 (from 1.9% p.a. 1990-2012) primarily due to accelerating
gains in fuel economy. Other factors include the impact of high oil prices
on driving behaviour (reduced average miles driven), vehicle saturation
in the OECD, and non-OECD fuel subsidy reduction.
Transport demand will remain dominated by oil (still 87% in 2035, mostly
for road use), since alternatives are likely to remain uneconomic in many
market segments without policy support. Natural gas (including gas-toliquids) is the fastest growing alternative (6.8% p.a.) – particularly LNG
for heavy duty vehicles and shipping – and is expected to overtake
biofuels in 2022 before reaching almost 7% of transport by 2035. On an
energy basis, the biofuels share grows from 2.5% currently to 4% by
2035 while the electricity share grows to just 1.5%.
By the end of the outlook period, natural gas is starting to make
significant inroads into the transport sector – between 2030 and 2035 gas
contributes more to transport demand growth than oil (46 versus 37
Mtoe), restricting oil’s growth rate to only 0.3% p.a. during this period.
Energy Outlook 2035
43
© BP 2014

44. Vehicle numbers are set to grow rapidly in the non-OECD…
Vehicle fleet
Billions
2.5
Vehicles per 1000 capita
Billion toe
800
2.0
3
US
Germany
600
Japan
1.5
400
1.0
Transport demand
Vehicle ownership
2
Non-OECD
China
Non-OECD
1
200
0.5
India
OECD
OECD
0.0
1965
2000
Energy Outlook 2035
2035
0
1965
2000
44
0
2035 1965
2000
2035
© BP 2014

45. …while OECD growth slows due to saturation
The global vehicle fleet (commercial vehicles and passenger cars) grows
rapidly – more than doubling from around 1.1 billion today to 2.3 billion
by 2035. Most of the growth is in the developing world (86%) with some
mature markets at saturation levels.
The non-OECD’s vehicle population more than triples from 0.4 to 1.5
billion over the outlook period and overtakes the OECD fleet in 2022.
Between 2012 and 2035, vehicle density per 1000 population grows from
20 to 130 in India (8.4% p.a.) and from 80 to 360 in China (6.9% p.a.).
China is likely to follow a slower path to vehicle ownership than seen
historically in other countries due to higher recent oil prices and policies
to limit oil import dependency and congestion, including rising fuel and
road taxation and widespread mass transportation.
Efficiency improvements limit growth in transport demand relative to
vehicles. Non-OECD transport demand rises by ‘only’ 82% despite the
tripling of vehicles. In the OECD, transport demand falls (by 15%) since
efficiency gains outweigh slow growth of the vehicle fleet (22%).
Energy Outlook 2035
45
© BP 2014

46. Policy and technology enable efficiency improvements…
Fuel economy of new cars
Vehicle sales by type
Litres per 100 km*
20
15
100%
EU
US light vehicles
China
Plug-ins incl.
BEVs
80%
Full hybrid
60%
Mild hybrid
10
40%
2035
2030
2035
2025
2015
2020
1995
2015
0%
2010
20%
5
0
1975
Conventional
including
stop-start
*New European Driving Cycle
Energy Outlook 2035
46
© BP 2014

47. …as the vehicle fleet gradually shifts to hybrids
Fuel economy has been improving in recent years at rates not seen since
the period after the first oil price shock in 1973. Recent gains have been
driven by consumer reaction to rising prices and tightening policy (e.g.
CO2 emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and have
been made possible by technology improvements.
Efficiency gains are likely to be sustained, with new car fuel economy in
the US, EU and China improving by 2.5%-3% p.a. over the outlook
period. The gains come initially from powertrain enhancements (direct
injection, stop-start, engine downsizing, boosting) and other measures
such as light-weighting, followed by the gradual penetration of hybrid
powertrains into the vehicle fleet.
By 2035, sales of conventional vehicles fall to a quarter of total sales,
while hybrids dominate (full hybrids 23%, mild hybrids 44%). Plug-in
vehicles, including full battery electric vehicles (BEVs), are forecast to
make up 7% of sales in 2035. Plug-ins have the capability to switch to oil
for longer distances and are likely to be preferred to BEVs, based on
current economics and consumer attitudes towards range limitations.
Energy Outlook 2035
47
© BP 2014

48. Efficiency has the biggest impact on oil in road transport…
Oil demand in road transport
Mb/d
80
70
Non-OECD
60
Non-OECD
OECD
50
40
OECD
30
2012
Increased
number of
vehicles
Reduced
average
usage
Improved
Increased
vehicle
use of
efficiency alternatives*
2035
* Includes biofuels, GTL, CTL, CNG, LNG and electricity
Energy Outlook 2035
48
© BP 2014

49. …but alternative fuels play a greater role post 2030
Assuming no changes to vehicle usage, efficiency and the use of
alternatives, oil demand in road transport would increase by a massive
40 Mb/d over the forecast, more than double our projected oil demand
growth (19 Mb/d), due mostly to more vehicles in the non-OECD. Instead
we project oil demand growth for road transport to be 7 Mb/d.
Vehicle fleet fuel economy is forecast to improve by 2% p.a., saving 23
Mb/d by 2035 – more than half of the incremental oil demand that would
be required under the above “no change” case.
Average miles driven per vehicle is expected to fall (saving 6 Mb/d) due
to high fuel prices (partly due to rising taxes or reduced subsidies),
congestion and mass transit. In addition, increased private ownership in
the non-OECD from low levels is likely to lead to lower vehicle utilization.
Alternative fuels play a smaller role in limiting oil’s growth due to
barriers delaying scale-up; e.g. blend limitations for biofuels, CNG/LNG
logistics and battery costs for electric vehicles. Post 2030, however, the
absolute growth in alternatives outpaces growth for oil.
Energy Outlook 2035
49
© BP 2014

50. Energy Outlook 2035
50
© BP 2014

51. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
51
© BP 2014

52. Natural gas demand continues its steady growth…
Demand by region
Demand by sector
Bcf/d
500
400
300
100%
China
Other non-OECD
Other
80%
Middle East
Other OECD
60%
North America
200
20%
Power
40%
100
Transport
0
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
2000
2035
52
Industry
0%
1965
2000
2035
© BP 2014

53. …in all regions and all sectors
Global demand for natural gas will grow by 1.9% p.a. over the outlook
period, reaching 497 Bcf/d by 2035, with non-OECD growth (2.7% p.a.)
outpacing the OECD (1% p.a.).
In the OECD, gas will overtake oil as the dominant fuel by 2031, reaching
a share of 31% in primary energy by 2035. But in the non-OECD, gas
remains in third place, behind coal and oil, with a 24% share of primary
energy by 2035.
The fastest growing sector is transport (7.3% p.a.), but this is from a small
base. In volume terms the largest growth comes from industry (71 Bcf/d,
1.9% p.a.) and power (63 Bcf/d, 1.9% p.a.).
The pattern of growth by sector differs between the OECD and nonOECD. OECD volume growth comes primarily from the power sector (17
Bcf/d, 1.2% p.a.) followed by industry (10 Bcf/d, 0.8% p.a.), while industry
remains the largest source of non-OECD growth (61 Bcf/d, 2.6% p.a.).
Energy Outlook 2035
53
© BP 2014

54. Shale gas shows the fastest production growth…
Gas production by type and region
Shale gas production
Bcf/d
Bcf/d
500
120
400
300
Non-OECD other
Non-OECD shale
OECD shale
80
OECD other
16%
Power
200
40
100
0
1970 1983 1996 2009 2022 2035
Energy Outlook 2035
24%
Rest of world
China
Europe & Eurasia
Canada & Mexico
US
54
Other
8%
% of total
(RHS)
0
1990
OECD
Transport
2005
2020
0%
2035
© BP 2014

55. …but conventional sources provide the largest increment
Global gas supply is expected to grow by 1.9% p.a. or 172 Bcf/d over the
outlook period, reaching a total of 497 Bcf/d by 2035. Shale gas is the
fastest growing source of supply (6.5% p.a.), providing nearly half of the
growth in global gas.
Gas supply growth is concentrated in the non-OECD (126 Bcf/d or 2.1%
p.a.) accounting for 73% of global growth. Almost 80% of non-OECD
growth is from non-shale sources. OECD supply growth (1.5% p.a.)
comes exclusively from shale gas (5.1% p.a.), which provides nearly half
of OECD gas production by 2035.
Shale gas supply is dominated by North America, which accounts for
99% of shale gas supply until 2016 and for 70% by 2035. However, shale
gas growth outside North America accelerates and by 2027 will overtake
North American growth. China is the most promising country for shale
growth outside North America, accounting for 13% of world shale gas
growth; together, China and North America will account for 81% of shale
gas by 2035.
Energy Outlook 2035
55
© BP 2014

56. Gas trade continues to expand…
Regional net exports
Imports share of consumption
Bcf/d
120
80
FSU
Middle East
N America
Asia Pacific
Africa
S & C America
Europe
40%
Total
30%
40
0
Pipeline
20%
-40
10%
LNG
-80
-120
1990
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
0%
2035
1990
56
2005
2020
2035
© BP 2014

57. …with Asia overtaking Europe as the key importing region
Net inter-regional imbalances are expected to more than double in our
forecast, growing by 4% p.a. or 53 Bcf/d.
The expansion of trade is driven by Asia Pacific where imports will more
than triple and account for 51% of net inter-regional imports by 2035.
Asia Pacific is expected to overtake Europe as the largest importing
region by 2026. Meanwhile, the growth of shale gas turns North America
from a net importer today into a net exporter in 2017.
The share of total gas consumption that is imported grows steadily, from
31% in 2012 to 34% in 2035; but the projected rate of increase is markedly
slower than recent history. Pipeline remains the primary method for gas
trade, but it declines as a share of consumption, due to the reduced need
for pipeline imports into the US and slow demand growth in Europe.
Nonetheless, the flexibility and integration of the global gas market
continues to increase due to rapidly growing LNG trade (3.9% p.a.);
LNG’s share of traded gas rises from 32% in 2012 to above 46% by 2035,
while its share of consumption expands from 10% to 15%.
Energy Outlook 2035
57
© BP 2014

58. Differences in the prospects for unconventional gas…
Sources of gas supply by region
Europe
Bcf/d North America
Bcf/d
120
120
120
100
100
100
80
80
80
60
60
60
40
40
40
20
20
20
0
0
0
-20
-20
China
-20
1995
2015
Energy Outlook 2035
2035
1995
2015
58
Bcf/d
2035
Net pipeline import
Net LNG import
Shale gas
Other unconventional
Conventional
1995
2015
2035
© BP 2014

59. …shape regional supply patterns
North American unconventional gas supplies will grow by 3.4% p.a. over
the forecast period, more than offsetting the 2.3% p.a. decline in
conventional production, and allowing domestic supply to grow by 1.4 %
p.a.. The growth in unconventional gas stems almost exclusively from
shale gas which expands by 50 Bcf/d (4.9% p.a.).
Europe sees domestic production decline by 1.4% p.a. over the outlook,
despite expanding unconventional supplies reaching 3.7 Bcf/d by 2035.
Although European gas demand grows by just 1% p.a., Europe
increasingly relies on imported gas, in particular on net imports via
pipeline which meet 51% of demand by 2035, up from 37% today.
China, by contrast, enjoys strong growth in domestic production (5.7%
p.a.) across all types of supply. Shale gas makes the largest contribution
to growth (10 Bcf/d, 42.7% p.a.), with most of it coming on line after 2020.
Nonetheless, Chinese demand growth will still require a rapid expansion
of imports (8.3% p.a.) both via pipeline and LNG. Pipeline imports from
the FSU remain the dominant source of imports, expanding by 8.0% p.a..
Energy Outlook 2035
59
© BP 2014

60. The shale revolution in the US provides an example…
US oil and gas supply
Gas share of US sector demand
Billion toe
45%
1.6
Industry
1.2
30%
Oil
Power
0.8
0.4
0.0
1970
15%
Gas
Transport
1983
1996
Energy Outlook 2035
2009
2022
2035
60
0%
1965
2000
2035
© BP 2014

61. …of how energy markets adjust
US shale gas output will grow by 4.3% p.a. between 2012 and 2035,
enabling US gas production to rise by 45%. This is causing a series of
adjustments in energy markets; some already evident, others developing
over time.
One of the first responses has been on the supply side. A flexible rig fleet
that can switch between oil and gas has responded to relatively low gas
prices by focussing more on liquids growth.
On the demand side, shale gas gives US natural gas a competitive
advantage relative to other fuels. This is already visible in the power
sector, where gas is likely to continue to grow (0.5% p.a.) at the expense
of coal, despite the rapid expansion of renewables.
Next, gas will gain market share in the industrial sector, from 39% in 2012
to 42% by 2035. And finally, gas will start to penetrate the transport
sector. Gas is the fastest growing fuel (18% p.a.) in a sector where overall
demand is falling (-0.9% p.a.). By 2035 gas will account for 8% of US
transport sector fuels, almost matching biofuels.
Energy Outlook 2035
61
© BP 2014

62. Shale gas will completely change the US gas trade picture…
US natural gas net exports
Share of global LNG trade
Bcf/d
15
80%
LNG
Pipeline
10
60%
Total
US
Australia
5
40%
Africa
20%
0
Qatar
0%
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
-5
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Energy Outlook 2035
62
© BP 2014

63. …with a profound impact on global LNG trade
Perhaps the most dramatic adjustments to shale gas are seen in trade
flows. The US is set to shift from a net importer of gas today to a net
exporter in 2018, with net exports reaching 10.6 Bcf/d by 2035. It will
become a net LNG exporter from 2016, reaching a total net LNG export
volume of 11.2 Bcf/d by 2035.
The arrival of US LNG exports at scale has a profound impact on global
LNG markets, contributing to a shake-up in the structure of LNG
supplies. Australia is set to overtake Qatar as the largest LNG exporting
country by 2019, followed by the US overtaking Qatar in 2030. And Africa
as a region is likely to overtake the Middle East.
Increasing diversification of LNG supply sources supports the
globalization of the gas market. Australia is expected to be the largest
LNG exporter in 2035 with a share of 21% of global LNG trade; that
compares to a share of 32% held by the dominant supplier today, Qatar.
Energy Outlook 2035
63
© BP 2014

64. US shale gas not only offsets declines in conventional supply…
Demand and trade
Production
Bcf/d
100
2035 level
LNG
90
Other
Transport
Industry
Power
80
70
Pipeline
60
50
2012
Energy Outlook 2035
Demand
growth
Net trade
64
2012
Non-shale
decline
Shale
© BP 2014

65. …but also accommodates demand growth and shifts in trade
US domestic gas production has been revitalized by the shale gas
‘revolution’. US shale gas output by 2029 will exceed the highest level
ever achieved by conventional gas production in the US. By 2035, shale
gas production will be just short of US total gas output in 2012.
How does the market accommodate this shale gas ‘shock’? All the
elements of the supply and demand balance adjust, responding to
relative price movements. Conventional supply declines faster than it
would have done in the absence of shale; gas gains share in the various
segments of US energy markets, in competition with other fuels; and US
gas gains share in the international market in competition with other
suppliers.
These responses emerge at different timescales, from the easiest and
least constrained (e.g. coal to gas switching in power) to the more
difficult and slowest (e.g. developing the infrastructure and technology to
get gas into transport).
Energy Outlook 2035
65
© BP 2014

66. Energy Outlook 2035
66
© BP 2014

67. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
67
© BP 2014

68. Coal consumption growth slows in the non-OECD…
Ten year increments by region
Consumption by region
Billion toe
Billion toe
5
1.2
Other
4
0.9
China
0.3
FSU pipeline
0.0
Conventional
Energy Outlook 2035
68
2035
2025
2035
2015
2000
2005
0
1965
-0.3
1995
OECD
1985
1
Russian pipeline
OECD
1975
2
0.6
LNG
India
China
India
3
Other non-OECD
© BP 2014

69. …while the OECD reduces its reliance on coal
Global coal consumption rises by 1.1% p.a. in 2012-35. Consumption
continues to grow in the non-OECD (1.6% p.a.), offsetting the decline in
the OECD (-0.9% p.a.). China and India combined will contribute 87% of
global coal growth to 2035. With 51% of global consumption, China
remains the largest coal consumer in 2035, while India (13%) will
overtake the US to occupy second place in 2024. The OECD’s share will
drop from 28% in 2012 to 18% in 2035.
China’s coal demand growth decelerates rapidly from 902 Mtoe (6.1%
p.a.) in 2005-15 to just 13 Mtoe (0.1% p.a.) in 2025-35. After 2030, demand
will likely decline (-0.1% p.a.), driven by the rebalancing of China’s
economy toward services and domestic consumption, and supported by
efficiency improvements and more stringent environmental policy.
China’s profile explains the marked slowdown in global coal growth.
India’s demand growth, in contrast, remains robust; rising from 142 Mtoe
(5.9% p.a.) in 2005-15 to 159 Mtoe (3.0% p.a.) in 2025-35 as the country’s
industrialization continues. In the final decade India replaces China as the
leading source of coal demand growth.
Energy Outlook 2035
69
© BP 2014

70. Coal loses market share…
Coal share in sector
60%
Coal share in primary energy
90%
Power
Industry
Other
Transport
40%
60%
China
20%
0%
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
30%
2000
0%
2035
1965
70
India
Other
OECD
2000
2035
© BP 2014

71. …as the global economy gradually switches to cleaner fuels
Coal’s share declines in all sectors. In power generation, the largest coal
consuming sector, the share of coal will decline from 43% in 2012 to 37%
by 2035, as renewables gain share.
In industry, where coal has been gaining importance since 2002, it is
beginning to lose market share (from 28% in 2012 to 23% in 2035) to
electricity and gas.
Following a long-term trend, coal’s share in the other sector, where it is
replaced by electricity, continues to fall (from 7% to 4%).
Globally, coal’s share in primary energy will decline from 30% in 2012 to
27% in 2035. It declines across all regions except non-OECD Asia outside
China and India, where abundant coal and expensive gas cause coal’s
share to rise, offsetting the fall in share elsewhere in the non-OECD.
By 2035, China is still the region with the highest coal share in primary
energy (52%), despite recording the largest decline in that share (from
68% in 2012).
Energy Outlook 2035
71
© BP 2014

72. Renewables lead the growth of non-fossil fuels in the OECD…
Non-OECD
OECD
Billion toe
Billion toe
2
2
Biofuels
Renewables
Nuclear
Hydro
1
1
0
1965
0
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
2000
2035
72
2000
2035
© BP 2014

73. …while growth is more evenly spread in the non-OECD
In aggregate, non-fossil fuels grow faster than total energy consumption
in both the OECD (1.8% p.a.) and the non-OECD (4.3% p.a.): between 2012
and 2035 the non-fossil share of primary energy increases from 18% to
25% in the OECD, and from 10% to 16% in the non-OECD.
In the OECD, the rapid growth of renewables in power (5.8% p.a.) more
than offsets declining nuclear (-0.2% p.a.) and weak growth in hydro
power (0.5% p.a.). Non-fossil fuels are the leading source of energy
growth in the OECD, ahead of natural gas.
By contrast, the non-OECD sees significant growth in all non-fossil
sources, led by renewables (9.1% p.a.), then nuclear (5.9% p.a.) and
hydro power (2.4% p.a.). Non-fossil fuels contribute 24% of the growth of
primary energy in the non-OECD to 2035, almost matching the roughly
equal contributions of oil, gas and coal.
Energy Outlook 2035
73
© BP 2014

74. Renewables in power gain share most rapidly in Europe…
Renewables share of power
Renewables growth 2012 to 2035
Thousand TWh
1.2
35%
30%
25%
EU
US
0.9
China
20%
0.6
15%
10%
0.3
5%
0%
1990
0.0
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
2035
74
China
EU
US
OECD
Asia
India
© BP 2014

75. …while China adds the most volume
The deployment of renewables for power has been led by Europe, with a
strong policy push in the EU in particular; the EU will continue to have
the highest penetration rates of renewables worldwide. The share of
renewables in power generation in the EU increases from 13% in 2012 to
32% in 2035.
Continued improvements in the cost and performance of renewables
reduce the need for policy support. From around 2020 wind power is
increasingly able to compete without subsidization – particularly in
markets that have a significant carbon price. By 2030, wind will be a
serious contender for any new-build power, especially in regions where
carbon prices reach $40/tonne or more.
This enables the continued penetration of renewables in Europe, and the
spread of renewables to other regions. In terms of renewables volume
growth, the EU is surpassed by China, and almost matched by the US.
Energy Outlook 2035
75
© BP 2014

76. Global nuclear power production rises…
Share of nuclear in primary energy
Nuclear generation by region
Thousand TWh
4
12%
China
Rest of world
3
Asia excl. China
9%
Non-OECD
OECD
World
EU
2
US
6%
1
3%
0
1965
0%
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
2000
2035
76
2000
2035
© BP 2014

77. …on the back of growth in China, Russia and India
Global nuclear energy is projected to grow by 1.9% p.a. between 2012
and 2035. However, as a share of global primary energy demand, nuclear
power peaked in 2001 and is not expected to return to past levels.
In the OECD, nuclear generation is expected to decline (-0.2% p.a.) as
aging plants are gradually decommissioned. The economics of nuclear
energy, given stringent safety requirements remain difficult in
competitive markets, and very few new plants are expected to be built.
Global growth therefore is driven by the non-OECD (5.9% p.a.) and in
particular by China, where new capacity additions will match the growth
seen in the US and EU in the 1970s and 1980s.
Looking beyond 2030 illuminates a potential turning point for nuclear
energy. Many reactors among the first adopters of nuclear technology,
such as the US and Europe, will approach technical retirement, while
only a few countries plan to add new capacity. Even allowing for
additional lifetime extensions, we may well see a peak in nuclear energy.
Energy Outlook 2035
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78. Energy Outlook 2035
78
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79. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
79
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80. CO2 emissions from energy use continue to rise…
Emissions by region
Emissions per capita
Billion tonnes CO2
Tonnes CO2
45
25
36
20
27
15
18
IEA 450
Scenario
Non-OECD
EU
10
5
9
US
World
India
OECD
0
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
2000
China
0
1965
2035
80
2000
2035
© BP 2014

81. …with per capita emissions declining in the OECD
Global CO2 emissions from energy use grow by 29% or 1.1% p.a. over the
forecasting period. Policies to curb emissions continue to tighten, and
the rate of growth of emissions declines, but emissions remain well
above the path recommended by scientists (illustrated by the IEA’s “450
Scenario”). Global emissions in 2035 are nearly double the 1990 level.
Emissions growth is due to non-OECD economies (1.9% p.a.) while OECD
emissions continue to decline (-0.4% p.a.). The OECD falls back to 1990
levels; non-OECD emissions in 2035 are more than triple the 1990 level.
Emissions grow more slowly than energy consumption, as the energy
mix gradually decarbonises. By fuel, coal and gas each contribute 38% of
the increase in emissions, with 24% coming from oil.
In per capita terms, China overtakes the EU in 2017, and the OECD
average in 2033, but remains well below the US level in 2035.
Energy Outlook 2035
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82. Energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy…
Energy intensity
Carbon intensity
Tonnes CO2 per toe
Toe per thousand $2012 GDP
0.4
China
US
India
EU
World
0.3
4
3
0.2
2
0.1
1
0.0
1965
0
1965
Energy Outlook 2035
2000
2035
82
2000
2035
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83. …follow different patterns
Given economic growth, CO2 emissions depend on energy intensity (the
amount of energy used per unit of GDP) and carbon intensity or the
carbon content of the energy mix (carbon per unit of energy).
Global energy intensity is improving rapidly, converging across countries
at lower and lower levels. We project it to decline by a further 36% by
2035 (-1.9% p.a.), with differences across countries the smallest since the
Industrial Revolution. Decline and convergence are both the outcome of
market forces and global competition, promoting the most efficient use
of energy everywhere.
Carbon intensity, in contrast, declines at a slower pace – by 8% between
2012 and 2035 (-0.3% p.a.). There is also no apparent convergence, with
countries following different, albeit downward trends.
Changes in carbon intensity are a function of changes in the fuel mix. In
the absence of a price for carbon, the fuel mix is shaped by other factors
and the observed decline in carbon intensity, as well as the path followed
by individual countries, becomes a by-product of those other factors.
Energy Outlook 2035
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84. The fuel mix diversifies over time…
Evolution of the fuel mix in 20 major countries
Share of dominant fuel
100%
China
80%
Euro4*
China
US
US
60%
40%
20%
1900
EU
1915
1930
1945
1960
1975
1990
2005
2020
2035
*France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom pre-1965
Energy Outlook 2035
84
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85. …and becomes less carbon intensive as a by-product
Historically, as economies grew richer and more sophisticated, the fuel
mix became more diversified. The scope for changes in the fuel mix
depends on technology, resource endowments and tradability, and the
underlying economic structure. As incomes rise we put a premium on
cleaner and more convenient fuels. The actual substitution between fuels
is typically guided by relative prices.
Early industrialization was based almost entirely on coal. Cheap oil and
the internal combustion engine helped oil to replace coal as the
dominant fuel. Gradually, the energy mix diversified further with fuels
specializing in various applications (oil in transport, coal in power).
Overall, the fuel mix remains determined by availability and the local
cost of fuels. Countries with lower energy intensity tend to have more
scope to afford cleaner and more convenient fuels.
The historical pattern of fuel diversification has tended to reduce carbon
intensity, but until recently, this trend was largely the accidental outcome
of changes in the availability and relative cost of various fuels.
Energy Outlook 2035
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86. The power sector is the main driver of fuel mix changes…
Share of power sector fuel consumption
North America
90%
EU
China
Other non-OECD
Asia
Coal
Gas
60%
30%
0%
1990
1990
Energy Outlook 2035
2035 1990
2035 1990
20351990
2035
1990
86
2035 1990
2035 1990
2035
2035
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87. …with different regional outcomes for coal-gas competition
The power sector, where all fuels compete, is the largest and most
diversified driver of the global fuel mix. The global competition between
coal and natural gas gives an example of the underlying forces at work.
Changes are relatively small on the global level. The share of coal in
power generation falls from 43% to 37% between 2012-35, while the
share of natural gas remains at 21%. But these aggregate changes mask
much livelier regional patterns.
In North America, gas gains on the back of new technologies unlocking
new, cheaper supplies. In the EU, a similar outcome but on the back of
carbon price and climate change policy (but note the temporary
replacement of gas with cheaper coal in recent years). China’s economy
is based on local coal; economic rebalancing and a preference for cleaner
fuels will, with rising income, gradually change this situation. In the rest
of developing Asia, coal simply remains the most economic option.
These massive changes partly offset each other. Except in the EU, they
are driven by economics.
Energy Outlook 2035
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88. Energy efficiency is restraining emissions growth…
GDP energy and emissions
,
Emissions growth 2012 to 2035
Index: 1990 = 100
Billion tonnes CO2
500
35
30
GDP
400
25
Energy
intensity
20
300
15
Energy
10
200
5
CO2
100
1990
2005
Energy Outlook 2035
2020
Fuel mix
0
2035
88
GDP growth
effect
Projected
growth
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89. …but fuel mix changes remain a missed opportunity
The widening gap between GDP and energy consumption illustrates the
impact of falling energy intensity; and the gap between energy and CO2
emissions reflects changes in carbon intensity, brought about by changes
in the fuel mix.
Without the projected decline in energy intensity, CO2 emissions in 2035
would be more than 40% higher than our forecast, given the projected
economic growth. The effect of the expected change in the fuel mix is
much smaller – about one fifth as large – though bigger than in the past.
More than half of the fuel mix effect comes from the rising share of
renewables; most of the remainder comes from changes in the fossil fuel
mix, in particular, the substitution of coal with gas.
Competition and innovation, guiding the global improvement in energy
intensity, are not directing changes in the energy mix toward faster
improvements of carbon intensity. The market does not do for carbon
intensity what it does for energy intensity because energy is costly, and
carbon is not.
Energy Outlook 2035
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90. Conclusion
Meeting the global energy challenge
Sufficient and available?
− Yes – new energy sources and
efficiency improvements
Secure and reliable?
− Mixed – improving for some, a
concern for others
Sustainable?
− Room for improvement
Image credit: NASA
Energy Outlook 2035
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91. Page
Introduction
4
Outlook 2035: Global energy trends
7
Liquid fuels
23
Natural gas
51
Coal and non-fossil fuels
67
Carbon emissions and the fuel mix
79
Appendix
91
Energy Outlook 2035
91
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92. Key changes versus last year’s Outlook...
Changes in 2030 levels versus the January 2013 Outlook
Revised down
Revised up
Coal
N. America fossil fuel supply
Oil
Gas
Asia Pacific fossil fuel supply
Middle East oil & gas supply
Bio
Biofuels
Transport consumption
Biofuels
Inputs into power generation
Non-OECD fossil fuel use
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Mtoe
Energy Outlook 2035
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93. …result in little net change in total energy
Our aggregate projection for world energy demand and supply is little
changed since our last Outlook – down by about 0.2% in 2030.
North America’s oil and natural gas supply outlook has been revised
higher (7%) due to evolving expectations for shale gas/tight oil plays.
Higher oil production in North America, Asia Pacific and the Middle East
offsets reduced output in Europe and Africa and helps to meet
incremental oil demand throughout the non-OECD.
Asia Pacific natural gas supply has been revised down as LNG expansion
in the region is assumed to proceed at a more measured pace.
Oil and gas useage in the transport sector has been revised up, partly
reflecting the need to offset a drop in biofuel supplies resulting from
more modest expectations of the penetration of next generation fuels.
Inputs to power generation have been revised down, despite little
change to electricity consumption, due to a more optimistic outlook for
improvements in conversion efficiency.
Energy Outlook 2035
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94. Comparison with other outlooks: the key difference…
Growth of energy consumption, 2010-2035
Billion toe
Billion toe
7
Non-OECD
7
Other
Nuclear
OECD
6
Gas
Liquids
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
Coal
0
IEA NPS
EIA
Energy Outlook 2035
BP
IEA CPS
94
IEA NPS
EIA
BP
IEA CPS
© BP 2014

95. …lies in different views on non-OECD prospects
Our Outlook is based on a “most likely” assessment of future policy
trends. In that respect it differs from the energy projections published by
the IEA and the EIA, which are based on specific policy scenarios and
which make no judgements about the likelihood of those scenarios.
Our policy assumptions are closest to those in the IEA’s “New Policies
Scenario” (NPS), which assesses demand prospects on the assumption
that announced national policy objectives are implemented. Yet our
outcomes are closest to the IEA’s “Current Policies Scenario” and the
EIA’s reference case, both of which assume no change in policy settings.
Our Outlook shows more growth in non-OECD energy demand than the
IEA NPS; it also shows more growth for fossil fuels, especially for coal.
This probably reflects differing views on the outlook for rapidly
industrializing economies, in particular on the speed with which they can
move to a less energy-intensive growth path.
Energy Outlook 2035
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96. Data sources
BP p.l.c., BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, United Kingdom, June 2013
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 7.1, Nov 2012.
Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, Washington, D.C., United States, 2013
Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, Washington, D.C., United States, 2014
Etemad, B., J. Luciani, P. Bairoch, and J.-C. Toutain, World Energy Production 1800-1985, Librarie DROZ,
Switzerland, 1991
International Council for Clean Transportation, Global passenger vehicle standards update. August 2013
International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Paris, France, 2013
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2013
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2013
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2013, Paris, France, 2013
Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics 1750-2005, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, United States, 2007
Oxford Economics Ltd, Oxford, UK
Rühl C., Appleby P., Fennema J., Naumov A., Schaffer ME. (2012). Economic development and the demand for
energy: a historical perspective on the next 20 years. Energy Policy, vol 50, pp. 109-116.
UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, New York, United States, 2013
US Environmental Protection Agency, Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and
Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2012. March 2013
Plus various official sources
Energy Outlook 2035
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