This document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, a special anti-graft court in the Philippines. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson and others questioned whether new provisions in Republic Act No. 8249, which expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include cases where any accused (not just principal accused) meet certain ranks or positions, could be applied retroactively to their pending cases related to a 1995 incident. The Supreme Court document outlines the legal arguments on both sides and the background of the related bills passed by Congress and signed into law on the issue.

1. 1
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/
click here for freelancing tutoring
sites
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-
intervenors.
D E C I S I O N
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan – is being challenged in this petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also
seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the
trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder)
against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve
in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from
the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-
intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission – Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed
by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)

2. 2
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo
Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May
18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-
out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This
panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers
and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident,
with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel’s
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner
and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against
Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for
murder[2]
before theSandiganbayan’s Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among
those charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-
fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,
[3]
the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5]
before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused[6]
was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7]
They contend
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused” are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended
informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has
the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8]
dated May 8, 1996
(promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou,
with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,
[9]
the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A.
7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner
and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending
resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up
with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996,
House Bill No. 2299[10]
and No. 1094[11]
(sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12]
(sponsored by
Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among
others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused”
in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

3. 3
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law
as R.A. No. 8249[13]
. The law is entitled, “AN ACT FURTHER
DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the
President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14]
denying the
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it
“stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.”
On the same day,[15]
the Sandiganbayan issued an
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
“After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his
concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted
Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the
new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of
granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor’s
motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so
in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
x x x x x x x x x
“Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are
PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M.
Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all
these cases – in fact, no order of arrest has been issued – this
court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
“To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the
vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in
these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither
concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide
the cases.”[16]
[Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4
R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the
said law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.” Petitioner argues
that:
“a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced
by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit
the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it,
thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the
way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases
to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been
timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein
moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights
under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact
that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which
petitioner’s cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet
commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus
making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 – 23057 to
procedural due process
“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
aforesaid “innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which
actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law
(RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.”[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
intervention, add that “while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously
appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and
an ex-post factostatute intended to apply specifically to the

4. 4
accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before
the Sandiganbayan.”[18]
They further argued that if their case is
tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due
process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the
two-tiered appeal to theSandiganbayan, which they acquired
under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor
General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality
of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying
that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19]
requiring the parties
to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10)
days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question
of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by
the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20]
The burden of proving
the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That
burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the
present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
“SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to
be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987)
Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
“Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential
Decree No. 1486[21]
created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order,
were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22]
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,[23]
P.D. No. 1860,[24]
P.D. No. 1861,[25]
R.A. No. 7975,
[26]
and R.A. No. 8249.[27]
Under the latest amendments introduced
by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following cases:
“SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

5. 5
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade
‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’
or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as
the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to
the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x
x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

6. 6
“SEC. 7. Transitory provision. – This act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A.
7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
“SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade
‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’
or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
“In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided inBatas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions
lower than grade ’27,’ or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
x x x x x x x x x
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled

7. 7
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts.”
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
“principal” before the word “accused” appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word “principal” that
the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
theSandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A.
7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan,
has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information has the
rank of Superintendent[28]
or higher. On the other hand, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is
tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except
in certain cases,[29]
contends that theSandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals
that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-
gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30]
(d) Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31]
or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items
(a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32]
holding any of
the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the
offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under
Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on
the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b,
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other
offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to
their office.” The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad
as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he
is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs
a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether
he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting
R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of
P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Section 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law[33]
because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is

8. 8
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial
distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of
the questioned provisions. The classification between those
pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial
has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.[36]
In the first instance,
evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within
the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject
to the constitutional limitations,[37]
it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for
a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner
and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as
them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall
apply to “all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just
happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those
affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had
already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part
of a Senator and two Justices of theSandiganbayan[38]
for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it
is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments
against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee
headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been
selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of
the deletion of the word “principal” in paragraph a, Section 4 of
P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
8249.[39]
R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated,
considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings,
the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the
matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41]
for they are

9. 9
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no
longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex
post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42]
an ex post facto law is
one –
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the
passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that
when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to
his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
penal laws.[46]
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law
on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations;[47]
or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
[48]
R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal
law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes
rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice.[49]
Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenor’s contention that their right to a
two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been rejected by the court several
times[50]
considering that the right to appeal is not a natural
right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is
not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51]
R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition.[52]
Moreover, the law did not alter
the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53]
It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55]
On the
removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still
has the power of review to determine if the presumption of
innocence has been convincingly overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the
one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Much
emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it
“defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly
does is to “expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such,
does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law

10. 10
because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one
subject expressed in the title[57]
is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.[58]
Such
rule is severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance
with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the
general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject.[59]
The Congress, in employing the word “define”
in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2,
Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body
to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts”.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the
subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No.
8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in
the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against
herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information,[61]
and not by the evidence presented by
the parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of
R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63]
This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases
committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, “in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.” This constitutional
mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.”
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64]
we held that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
“intimately connected” with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.[65]
This intimate relation between the offense charged
and the discharge of official duties “must be alleged in the
Information.”[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the
information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates:
“SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. – The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and
concise language without repetitionnot necessarily in the terms of
the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that “the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts.”[67]
The
real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.”[68]

11. 11
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
“The object of this written accusations was – First, To
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense, and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specificallegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of
the facts that are imputed to him as “he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.”[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present
case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations[71]
for murder reads:
“AMENDED INFORMATION
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO,
CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO,
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN,
SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows:
“That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO all taking advantage of their public and official
positions as officers and members of the Philippine National
Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shootJOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
“That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT.
ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP.
CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD,

12. 12
PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police
are charged herein asaccessories after-the-fact for concealing
the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about the early
dawn of May 18, 1995.
“CONTRARY TO LAW”
While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder “in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation
of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories
after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is
alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that
there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.” The
sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused” surprises the reader. There is no indication in the
amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the “raid.” Worse, the raid and arrests
were allegedly conducted “at Superville Subdivision,Parañaque,
Metro Manila” but, as alleged in the immediately preceding
paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim
by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in two places far away from each other is
puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed the offense “in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),” we,
however, do not see the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the accused’s official functions, which, as
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office” is
not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72]
where the jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we
ruled:
“It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result
of evidence after trial.
“In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the
amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of
regular policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and
provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command
x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were
stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without
bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon

13. 13
his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin
Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to
the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their
official functions and would not have been committed had they
not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive
in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562
and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused
arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege
that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed
the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is
these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.”
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is
noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public
office” does not appear in the information, which only signifies
that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the
crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court,[73]
not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of theSandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First
Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S.
BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN
GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD
HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN
DOES, respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and
preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and
Basilan, and the defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said
criminal case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination
thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction issue, enjoining
respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of said case;
that, after due hearing, the rulings of respondent Judge, rejecting
some evidence for the prosecution therein and not permitting the
same to propound certain questions, be set aside; that said
respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim
be declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent
Judge, disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel
for the accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the

14. 14
petition, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for,
without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance,
that the ruling complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective
Joaquin R. Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong)
and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro
Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and several John Does, are charged, in
said Criminal Case No. 672, with murder. It is alleged in the
information therein that, during May and June, 1958, in the sitio
of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan, Mayor Brown
"organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes",
consisting of regular and special policemen, whom he "armed
with pistols and high power guns", and then "established a camp",
called sub-police headquarters — hereinafter referred to as sub-
station — at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his
command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in which his
codefendants were stationed; that the criminal complaints were
entertained in said sub-station, in which defendant Pollisco acted
as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the
apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days
or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958; one
Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown,
without any warrant or complaint filed in court, and then brought
to, and detained in, the aforementioned sub-station; that while
on the way thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated, pursuant
to instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by Pollisco, to the
effect that Tebag be mauled until such time as he shall surrender
his gun; that, once in the sub-station, Tebag, whose hands were
securely tied, was subjected, by defendants Lacerna, Hasbi,
Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other special policemen, to further and
more severe torture, in consequence of which Tebag died; that, in
order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace officers in
the course of an encounter between the latter and a band of
armed bandits of which he formed part, the body of Tebag was
brought, early the next morning, to a nearby isolated field, where
defendant Hasbi fired twice at said dead body from behind, and
then an old Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor Brown, was placed
beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the aforementioned
simulation, a report of said imaginary encounter, mentioning
Tebag as the only member of a band of armed bandits whose
identity was known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi caused
one of his companions to shoot him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected
the following evidence for the prosecution therein:
1. Exhibit A — A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer
of the PC Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated the case,
showing that on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF,
found nine (9) detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was
part of the chain of evidence of the prosecution to prove that
persons used to be detained in the aforementioned sub-station by
the main respondents herein, without either a warrant of arrest
or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C — Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in
charge of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the
whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter, was
arrested in his house, by policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt.
Sarrosa took possession of this letter in the course of his
aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 — These are the transcript of the
testimony of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City,
when she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V — Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch
of the sub-station; pictures of several huts therein, indicating their
relative positions and distances; a picture depicting how the body
of Tebag was taken from a camarin in the sub-station; a picture
showing how Patrolman Hasbiwas shot by a companion, at this
request; and a picture, Exhibit T, demonstrating how Mayor
Brown allegedly gave the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be
planted beside Tebag's body.

15. 15
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona
Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their testimony as witnesses
for the prosecution, these exhibits were not admitted in evidence,
which were presented to show how they were able to observe the
movements in the sub-station, the same being quite small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) — Amenola said
that these effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the
latter's office, and that he then saw therein the Japanese rifle,
Exhibit Y, which was later placed beside the dead body of Awalin
Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL — These show that on April
28, 1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed
affidavits admitting participation in a given robbery; that an
information therefor (Exh. KK) was filed against them on May 2,
1958, with the municipal court of Basilan City (Criminal Case No.
1774); and that, in compliance with warrants for their arrest then
issued, they were apprehended and detained in the sub-station,
thus corroborating the testimony of prosecution witness Yakans
Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the effect that Kallapattoh
and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with them, in the
aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was maltreated and
died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming Pollisco's
statement, Exhibit TT-18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan city, on
June 21, 1958, admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on
June 5, 1958, on account of the warrant of arrest adverted to.
Through the exhibits in question the prosecution sought, also, to
bolster up its theory that Kallapattoh and Fernandez disappeared
from the sub-station after Tebag's death, because the main
respondents herein illegally released them to prevent them from
revealing the circumstances surrounding said event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM — These are sketches of a human body
and pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as well as
of exit, of two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of Tebag.
Respondent Judge rejected these exhibits and did not allow Dr.
Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked by the
prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said bullets
wounds were parallel to each other, which, the prosecution
claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been alive when
he sustained said wounds..
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain
questions propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries
sustained by Tebag in the large intestines must have been
inflicted when Tebag was dead already, and did not allow Dr.
Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and MM, indicating the
connection between the points of entrance and those of exit of
said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 — These are records of the office of the City
Fiscal of Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y,
two rounds of ammunitions and one empty shell were received by
said Office from the Police Department of Basilan City on June 17,
1958. These exhibits were presented to show that said rifle tallies
with the description thereof given by prosecution witness Kona
Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14, 1958, when said weapon
was still in the possession of respondent Pollisco, and hence, to
establish Amenola's veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were
rejected by respondent Judge, viz:
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 — These are daily records of events of the
police department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including the
Tipo-Tipo region. They do not mention the killing therein, by the
police patrol, of any outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby
contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of respondent
Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the
record clerk of the City Fiscal's office to identify said exhibits,
upon the ground that it was too late to present him although
when the exhibits were marked by the prosecution it reserved the
right to identify them as part of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 — Respondent Pollisco had testified
that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that
he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of
the city government; and that he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu

16. 16
Unding be advised not to worry, because there was no evidence
against Awalin. To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the
prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration, for the
same show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin
Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail
on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could not have truthfully informed
Aisa on June 4, 1958, what Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor
Brown to the seat of the city government and that there was no
evidence against him; for he was then a detention prisoner; and
that Pollisco could not have had in mind, therefore, said Dong
Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had inquired. Indeed,
Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying before the City Fiscal,
respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered Patrolman Lacerna
on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for
investigation.
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 — These are the testimonies before the City
Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross
examination by the prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the
predicate therefor was established by the prosecution which
sought thereby to impeach Sali's veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 — These are the testimonies, before
the City Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave a
different story before respondent Judge. The prosecution thus
sought to impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own behalf,
after laying down the predicate in the course of their cross
examination.
5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 — These are sworn statements made
by defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were presented in
rebuttal, after laying down the predicate, to impeach his
testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 — With these exhibits the
prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco's testimony to the effect that
prosecution witness Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he
(Pollisco) having charged him with theft in the City Fiscal's Office.
It appears from said exhibits that Arip's affidavit, implicating
Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas Pollisco's affidavit
charging Arip with theft, was dated June 20, 1958, so that said
statement of Arip could not have been influenced by
Pollisco's subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by
respondent Judge in dealing with the aforementioned evidence
for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the liberality with
which the lower court admitted, as evidence for the defense,
records of supposed achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station
(Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I 21
and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and a letter of
commendation to a peace officer assigned thereto (Exh. 7),
including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23-
A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower
court had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution,
and in not permitting the same to propound the questions,
already adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and
rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned questions, are
relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 627. Although
it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the
proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that
case, it is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In
this connection it should be noted that, in the light of the
allegations of the amended information in said case and of the
records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the
accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the
opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their respective
testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitude
in the presentation of their evidence lest they may be so
hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or
appear to be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must
be avoided, particularly in cases of the nature, importance and
significance of the one under consideration.

17. 17
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim
may appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as
defendants in said criminal case, the Constitution provides that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall "appear
as counsel ... in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation
of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue,
therefore, is whether the defendants in Criminal case No. 672 are
"accused of an offense committed in relation" to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits
an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information
that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes
consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen,
appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns"
and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his
"command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted
the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the
authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line
with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is
not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed
by the main respondents herein, according to the amended
information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected
with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior
officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied
upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the
prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in
point, for, as stated in the decision therein:
From the allegations of the information it does not
appear that the official positions of the accused were
connected with the offense charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives
for the crimes were personal with political character. It
does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the
crimes were committed by the defendants in line of
duty or in the performance of their official functions.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed
and respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution,
as well as to permit the formulation, of the questions already
referred to, with costs against the respondents herein. It is so
ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 137762-65. March 27, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. REYNALDO BARES y LONGASA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are here on automatic review from the
decision,[1]
dated January 28, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte, finding accused-appellant
Reynaldo Bares y Longasa guilty of four counts of rape against his
daughter Maribel Bares and sentencing him to death and ordering
him to pay the complainant for each count of rape the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 96-0079, the information alleged:

18. 18
That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of September
8, 1995 at Barangay Dalas, municipality of Labo, province of
Camarines Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused motivated by bestial lust and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] one
Maribel D. Bares, a minor fifteen years of age who is his own
daughter and that thereafter, the said dastardly act was repeated
two more times on the same early morning, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 96-0080, the information stated:
That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 21,
1995 at Barangay Dalas, municipality of Labo, province of
Camarines Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, motivated by bestial lust and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] one
Maribel D. Bares, a minor fifteen years of age who is his own
daughter, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No. 96-0081, the information averred:
That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 22,
1995, at Barangay Dalas, municipality of Labo, province of
Camarines Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, motivated by bestial lust and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] one
Maribel D. Bares, a minor fifteen years of age who is his own
daughter, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In Criminal Case No. 96-0082, the information asserted:
That on or about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 20,
1995 at Barangay Dalas, municipality of Labo, province of
Camarines Norte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused urged by his bestial lust,
unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally, did then and there, commit
sexual intercourse with his own daughter, Maribel Bares, a girl 15
years [of age] and while on [the] family way with seven (7)
months pregnancy against the will of said Maribel Bares to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
When arraigned on June 3, 1996, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him,[6]
and the cases
were then jointly tried.
Three witnesses, namely, complainant Maribel Bares, her
aunt Nenita Bares,[7]
and Dr. Marcelito Abas, medico-legal officer
of the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, testified for the
prosecution. Their testimonies established the following facts:
Complainant is the daughter of accused-appellant Reynaldo
Bares and his wife, Predisminda Dasco. She finished only the
fourth grade of elementary school. When she was studying, her
family lived in her grandmother’s house in Sta. Elena. Later on,
after her mother left for Manila, complainant and her brother
lived with accused-appellant in Barangay Dalas, Labo, Camarines
Norte.[8]
Prior to September 8, 1995, complainant ran away with her
boyfriend, Artemio Bola, and went to Mabilo I, Labo, Camarines
Norte. She stayed there until she became pregnant by him. On
September 8, 1995, accused-appellant went to Artemio Bola’s
house and fetched complainant so she could go back with him to
Barangay Dalas, Labo, Camarines Norte. By that time, complainant
was already eight months pregnant.[9]
At around 1 o’clock in the morning of September 9, 1995,
[10]
complainant Maribel Bares was sleeping in their house in
Barangay Dalas, Labo, Camarines Norte when she was awakened
by accused-appellant. Complainant woke up to find that her
hands and feet had been tied. She noticed that she only had her
panty on. Upon discovering that complainant had woken up,
accused-appellant removed her panty, went on top of her, and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. As she was
already eight months pregnant when she was raped by accused-

19. 19
appellant, complainant felt pain on her shoulder and
pelvis. Complainant was raped by accused-appellant thrice that
day.[11]
On October 20, 1995, complainant was again raped by her
father in their house in Barangay Dalas. He got angry when she
did not remove her panty, and he even kicked her. Nevertheless,
accused-appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
complainant. The following day, October 21, 1995, accused-
appellant once more forced complainant to have sex with him.
Accused-appellant raped Maribel for the last time on October 22,
1995. She was already nine months pregnant at that time. During
the occasions she was raped by accused-appellant, complainant
was left alone with accused-appellant in their house because her
mother and sister were staying in Manila.[12]
On October 23, 1995, complainant went to the house of
Nenita Bares, sister of accused-appellant, in Masalong, Labo,
Camarines Norte and told the latter about what accused-
appellant had done to her. Complainant then asked her aunt to
file a complaint against accused-appellant so Nenita accompanied
her to the Camarines Norte Provincial Command of the Philippine
National Police in Dogongan, Daet, Camarines Norte. At the
police headquarters, complainant gave her statement to the
investigating officer. She also submitted herself to physical
examination in the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital.[13]
On the same day, October 23, 1995, Dr. Marcelito Abas
conducted a physical examination of complainant Maribel Abas
which yielded the following results:
Genital Exam:
= Multiple hymenal lacerations;
= Admits two fingers with ease;
= Pregnant nine (9) months;
= Negative for Physical injuries;[14]
Dr. Abas testified that the multiple hymenal lacerations
meant that complainant had had sexual intercourse several
times. He explained that the opening of the vagina is closed when
a woman is a virgin, but when the vagina admits two fingers with
ease, as in complainant’s case, this could only mean that
penetration of the vagina had already occurred. As the victim was
already nine months pregnant at the time of the examination, Dr.
Abas confirmed that the pregnancy was not caused by the rapes
that began in September 1995. However, he said that a woman
would still be capable of engaging in sexual intercourse even if she
was already eight months pregnant. He added that the presence
of lacerations in the vagina does not preclude voluntariness on
the part of the woman in engaging in sexual intercourse.[15]
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-
appellant himself, his son Reynaldo Bares, Jr., and his landlady
Lydia Espina.
Accused-appellant admitted that complainant Maribel
Bares is his daughter but denied that he raped her. He claimed
that he was working as a driver and helper at the Uniphil at the
time of the alleged rapes. At around 1 o’clock in the morning of
September 8, 1995, he said he and his son Reynaldo Bares, Jr.,
went to the warehouse of Uniphil to load copra and later
proceeded to San Pedro, Panganiban. On October 20, 1995, he
went to the worksite at San Pedro, Panganiban and, upon arriving
there, loaded copra. He finished loading copra only at 12 noon of
the same day. He went back to Labo, Camarines Norte at 3
o’clock in the afternoon. The next day, October 21, 1995, he
again went to San Pedro, Panganiban and returned to the Uniphil
compound in Labo, Camarines Norte at around 4 o’clock in the
afternoon. At 1 o’clock in the early morning of October 22, 1995,
he went to San Pedro, Panganiban to load copra and came back to
Labo, Camarines Norte at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of
October 23, 1995. He testified that his wife and daughter were
angry at him because he discovered that they had been fooling
around with other men as a result of which both became
pregnant. He claimed that because of this, he maltreated his wife
and daughter. He likewise stated that his sister Nenita Bares was
angry at him because she tolerated and even helped cover up his
wife’s and daughter’s activities. Accused-appellant testified that

20. 20
his sister was also interested in appropriating for herself a piece of
land left by their parents.[16]
Reynaldo Bares, Jr. corroborated accused-appellant’s
testimony that he was with the latter during the time of the
alleged rapes.[17]
On cross-examination, however, he admitted
that he testified accordingly only because he had been asked to
do so by accused-appellant.[18]
Lydia Espina likewise corroborated accused-appellant’s
testimony. According to her, accused-appellant was not in the
house during the times of the alleged rapes as he left for work
early in the morning. She also testified that Maribel Bares was
not staying in their house on October 21, 1995 as the latter lived
in the house of her supposed sister-in-law in front of the
Camarines Norte College.[19]
On January 28, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding accused REYNALDO BARES,
SR. Y LONGASA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
four (4) counts of rape as defined and penalized under par. 3,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec. 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and accordingly,
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of
the four (4) separate crimes of rape committed on September 8,
1995 and October 21, 22 and 23, respectively, all in 1995, and to
pay the victim in the amount ofP50,000.00 each for four (4)
separate crimes of rape with a total of P200,000.00 as moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 (3) in relation to Article 2217 of
the New Civil Code and P30,000.00 each for four (4) separate
crimes of rape or a total of P120,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Accused-appellant now makes the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
TWO KEY PROSECUTION WITNESSES, MARIBEL
BARES AND NENITA [BARES], DESPITE THERE
BEING ILL MOTIVE ON THEIR PART TO IMPUTE
ACCUSATORY CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT THE MEDICAL FINDINGS DO
NOT CLEARLY SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION
AND THE ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY THE
SUPPOSED VICTIM ARE INHERENTLY FLAWED.
III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO DEATH, ALTHOUGH
THE MINORITY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM WAS
NEVER DULY PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS.
AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER.[21]
First. Accused-appellant questions the probative value of
the testimonies of Nenita Bares and Dr. Marcelito Abas. He claims
that Dr. Abas’ testimony does not establish that he (accused-
appellant) had raped complainant as she was already pregnant at
the time Dr. Abas examined her. Nor can Nenita Bares’ testimony
be given evidentiary weight, accused-appellant argues, because
Nenita had only been told about the rape incidents by
complainant.[22]
To be sure, a medical certificate is not necessary to prove
the commission of rape. Indeed, the purpose of Nenita Bares’
testimony is not to corroborate complainant as to the commission
of the rapes but only to prove that the latter told her aunt what
had happened to her and that she and her aunt reported the
matter to the authorities afterwards.
The prosecution of rape cases is anchored mainly on the
credibility of the complaining witness. Generally, the nature of the
offense is such that the only evidence that can prove the guilt of
the accused is the testimony of the complainant herself.[23]
Hence,
in deciding rape cases, this Court has been guided by the

21. 21
following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime, where two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
[24]
It is well settled that the accused in a rape case may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness,
provided that such is credible, natural, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
[25]
In this case, Maribel testified in a direct, unequivocal, and
consistent manner with regard to the rapes committed by
accused-appellant:
Q Sometime on September 8, 1995, while you and your
father were staying in Dalas, Labo, Camarines Norte, in
the morning at around 1:00 o’clock, do you remember
[an] unusual incident that happened to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to you?
A I was raped, sir.
Q Who raped you?
A My father, sir.
Q What is his name?
A Reynaldo Bares, sir.
Q At that time, where was your mother then?
A In Manila, sir.
Q How did the accused, Reynaldo Bares, your own father,
raped you?
A I was asleep, sir.
Q Then, while you were asleep, what happened to you?
A I noticed that I was already tied, sir.
Q What part of your body was tied?
A My two hands were tied and separated and my two feet
were also tied and separated, sir.
Q What were you wearing then at that time?
A I was wearing my panty, sir.
(The witness’ answer to the question is punctuated by sobs
and cries.)
Q After you were tied by your father, what did your father
do to you?
A He immediately went on top of me, sir.
Q Were you still wearing your panty?
A No longer, sir.
Q Who removed your panty?
A My father, sir.
Q While your father was on top of you, what did you do?
A I was already raped, sir.
Q How did he rape you?
A He was already on top of me and he was so heavy, sir.
Q Did you feel pain?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of your body was painful?
A My shoulder and my pelvis, sir.
(At this point [in] time, the witness is already crying.)
Q How about your sexual organ, what did you feel?
A It’s painful, sir.
Q Why was it painful?
A It’s painful, sir.
Q What was the cause of the pain?
A My father put his penis [into] my vagina, sir.
Q How long did your father place his penis inside your
vagina?
A Thrice within a night, sir.
Q How do you call your father?
A I would not call him anything, sir. (“Wala po akong
itatawag d’yan.”)
(The witness answered in a [sarcastic] voice.)

22. 22
Q Now, while your father was on top of you and his penis
penetrated your vagina, what did you tell your father?
A I told him to remove it, but he did not, sir.
Q Now, how about on October 20, 1995, while you were in
your house in Brgy. Dalas, do you remember anything
out of ordinary that happened to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to you?
A I was raped, sir.
Q Who sexually abused you?
A My father, sir.
Q What’s his name?
A Reynaldo Bares, sir.
Q How did the accused, your own father, sexually abuse
you?
A He was always angry with me if I do not remove my
panty. He used to kick me, sir.
(At this point [in] time, the witness is again crying.)
Q Can you continue testifying?
A Yes, sir.
Q On October 20, 1995, where was your mother then at
that time?
A She was in Manila together with my sister, sir.
Q When your mother left for Manila, who was left in your
house at Brgy. Dalas?
A My father and I, sir.
Q On October 21, 1995, also in the morning at around 1:00
o’clock, do you remember what happened to you in
your house at Brgy. Dalas?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to you?
A He raped me, sir.
Q How did your father sexually abuse you?
A I was tied by my father, sir.
Q Was your father able to penetrate his penis [into] your
vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about on October 22, 1995 in the morning also,
what happened to you in your house in Brgy. Dalas?
A I was raped by my father, sir.
Q Was your father able to penetrate his penis into your
vagina?
A Yes, sir. It’s big, sir.
Q At that time on October 22, 1995, where was your
mother then at that time?
A She was in Manila, sir.
Q Whenever your father sexually abused you, what did you
tell him, if any?
A I don’t like it, sir, but he insisted.
Q When did your mother arrive from Manila?
A It was a long time already, sir.
Q Do you know who filed a complaint against your father
by reason of the sexual ordeal that you have suffered
from your own father?
A I myself, sir.
Q Who initiated in filing the complaint?
A I was accompanied by my auntie, sir.
Q Where?
A To the Provincial Command in Dogongan, sir.
Q What is the name of your auntie?
A Nenita Bares, sir.
Q By the way, after your father have sexually abused you
on different occasions, did you submit yourself for
genital examination of your genital organ?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what hospital did you go?
A Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, sir.[26]
Thus, with tears in her eyes, Maribel told of how accused-
appellant, her own father, bound her hands and legs, removed
her underwear, and forced himself upon her the first time he
raped her. She described how accused-appellant, by employing
force and instilling fear in her, succeeded in having repeated

23. 23
sexual intercourse with her. Lastly, Maribel narrated how she,
unwilling to endure more of her father’s abuse, finally told her
aunt what accused-appellant had been doing to her and willingly
subjected herself to medical examination.
Indeed, Maribel’s tale of accused-appellant’s sexual abuse
bears the earmarks of truth and candor. The tears she shed
during her testimony further enhance her credibility as they
indicate the outrage and distress she felt over what accused-
appellant had done to her.[27]
This Court is hard put to dismiss the
testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if
it constitutes incestuous rape, as a mere concoction. For normally,
no person would disclose the fact that she had been raped,
subject herself to medical examination, and willingly undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and testify on the details of her ordeal,
especially at the hands of her father, were it not the truth.[28]
Accused-appellant, however, questions the veracity of
complainant’s testimony by pointing out the inconsistency in her
testimony as to when she was first raped. He argues that it was
physically impossible for her to have been raped early in the
morning of September 8, 1995 as she stated that she was fetched
by him on the same day in the house of Artemio Bola.[29]
We have time and again ruled that it is not unnatural for a
rape victim, especially one who is of tender age, to make
inconsistent statements. But so long as the testimony is
consistent on material points, slightly conflicting statements will
not undermine the witness’ credibility nor the veracity of her
testimony. They in fact tend to buttress, rather than impair, her
credibility as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[30]
In this case, Maribel’s testimony made it clear that she was
raped by accused-appellant for the first time after the latter had
fetched her from her boyfriend’s house on September 8,
1995. When the rape occurred at around 1 o’clock early the
following morning, it was still dark and complainant had just been
awakened by accused-appellant. It is thus understandable for her
to be disoriented and think, however erroneously, that the first
rape occurred on the day she was fetched by accused-appellant.
[31]
A witness is not expected to remember with perfect
recollection every minute detail of her harrowing experience. A
minor mistake as to the exact time of the commission of the rape
is immaterial and cannot discredit the testimony of a witness.
[32]
We have repeatedly held that the exact date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
the rape by accused-appellant against complainant has been
sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor
matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot
be considered grounds for acquittal. Thus, accused-appellant can
be validly convicted under the information in Criminal Case No.
96-0079 alleging that he committed rape on September 8, 1995
even if it appears that the actual date is September 9, 1995.[33]
Neither can accused-appellant’s attempt to cast aspersions
on complainant’s moral character free him from criminal liability.
In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is
immaterial. Rape may be committed not only against single
women and children but also against those who are married,
middle-aged, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of
rape.[34]
Nor is it relevant to discuss the paternity of Maribel’s
child. The question of who fathered complainant’s child has no
bearing on rape cases, pregnancy not being an element of the
crime.[35]
Accused-appellant likewise contends that he could not
have raped complainant on October 20, 21, and 22, 1995 as the
latter was already nine months pregnant at that time. He states
that Dr. Marcelito Abas, the medico-legal officer who conducted
the examination of the complainant, testified that a pregnant
woman could engage in sexual intercourse only up to the eighth
month of her pregnancy.[36]
This contention must fail. That complainant was already
pregnant before the commission of the first rape does not belie
her testimony that accused-appellant raped her.[37]
Indeed, while

24. 24
married couples may abstain from contact after the eighth month
of pregnancy of the wife, no such rule applies to rape which may
still be committed despite the fact that the victim is already eight
months pregnant.[38]
Furthermore, contrary to accused-appellant’s
representation, Dr. Marcelito Abas testified:
Q Doctor, if a woman is on the family way at around eight
(8) months, is the woman still susceptible to have a
sexual intercourse?
A Yes, sir.[39]
Accused-appellant claims, however, that complainant bore
a grudge against him because he left her mother and often
maltreated her. He contends that complainant, with hatred in her
heart, fabricated lies against him and implicated him for crimes he
did not commit.[40]
Accused-appellant’s contention is without merit. It strains
credulity for accused-appellant to say that his maltreatment of his
daughter and separation from his wife propelled complainant to
accuse him of crimes that could possibly cost him his
life. Moreover, no woman, especially one who is of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter make herself subject to a public trial
if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the guilty
brought to justice.[41]
Furthermore, a rape victim’s testimony
against her father is entitled to greater weight because it is deeply
ingrained in our culture to revere and respect our elders. Hence,
absent any evidence to show that complainant had an improper
motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant, her testimony
is deemed credible and trustworthy.[42]
In contrast to complainant’s credible and consistent
testimony, accused-appellant could only offer the defenses of
denial and alibi. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility.[43]
It is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater weight than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters. Between the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[44]
With respect to accused-appellant’s alibi, we hold that such
defense cannot prevail over complainant’s positive identification
of accused-appellant as her rapist.[45]
It is noteworthy that the witnesses who corroborated
accused-appellant’s alibi are his son and landlady, who are
evidently biased witnesses. A witness is considered biased when
his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an
incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, to
suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[46]
In this
case, Reynaldo Bares, Jr. admitted that accused-appellant had
instructed him to testify in these cases and that he did so out of
filial obedience.[47]
On the other hand, Lydia Espina testified that
she usually went to sleep between 9 to 10 o’clock in the evening
and woke up at around 4 o’clock in the morning.[48]
Hence, she
could not have known if accused-appellant did not arrive home in
the early morning on the days the rapes were
committed. Moreover, Espina’s testimony, full of gaps and
uncertainties, cannot be deemed worthy of belief.
In sum, what accused-appellant raises are issues of
credibility, which are best left for determination by the trial court
which had the opportunity of observing the behavior and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.[49]
Unless there are
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which were
misconstrued or overlooked by the trial court, its findings and
conclusions concerning the credibility of witnesses must be
accorded respect and should not be disturbed on appeal.[50]
Second. But although accused-appellant is guilty of four
counts of rape, we agree with him that he cannot be sentenced to
death because the minority of the victim, which is a special
qualifying circumstance, was not established by the prosecution.
[51]
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. No.
7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

25. 25
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty, therefore,
the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the
information and proved in court.[52]
The minority of the victim
must be proved with equal certainty as the commission of the
crime itself.[53]
While the relationship of complainant to accused-appellant
has been alleged and proved, no proof was presented by the
prosecution to establish the minority of complainant at the time
of the commission of the crime. Neither complainant nor her
aunt testified as to the former’s age. The birth certificate of
complainant was not offered in evidence to prove her
age. Accordingly, the death penalty cannot be imposed on
accused-appellant.
In addition, the trial court erred in convicting accused-
appellant only of four counts of rape, corresponding to the
number of informations filed against him. In must be noted that
in Criminal Case No. 96-0079, the information against accused-
appellant alleged that “the above-named accused motivated by
bestial lust and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge
on one Maribel D. Bares, a minor fifteen years of age who is his
own daughter and that thereafter, the said dastardly act was
repeated two more times on the same early morning, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party.”[54]
The wording of
the information is thus clear. Accused-appellant raped
complainant not once but thrice.
Under Rule 110, §13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “[a] complaint or information must charge only one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses.” While this may be so, accused-appellant failed
to timely question the defect in the information in Criminal Case
No. 96-0079, and he may be deemed to have waived his objection
to the multiplicity of charges.[55]
Accused-appellant may thus be
convicted of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and the
appropriate penalty may be imposed on him for each and every
one of them.[56]
Complainant testified that she was raped by her father
three times one early September morning.[57]
There being no
question as to complainant’s credibility, sufficient evidence exists
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty
of three counts of rape, not merely one, under Criminal Case No.
96-0079.
Anent the damages awarded to complainant, we find the
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape to
be in accord with our rulings.[58]
Moral damages are awarded in
rape cases without need of proof other than the fact of rape itself
because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such an award.[59]
An additional award
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for each count of rape should,
however, be given complainant in consonance with current
jurisprudence.[60]
The award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 should also be sustained considering that the
generic aggravating circumstance of relationship has been
established.[61]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that accused-appellant is found guilty of six (6)
counts of rape against his daughter Maribel Bares and for each
count is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua and to pay complainant P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in
addition to the awards of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116945. February 9, 1996]
ROMULO DELA ROSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BENJAMIN MAGTOTO, respondents.

26. 26
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the dismissal of a criminal action for violation of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial constitute a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense? May the offended
party, on his own and independently of the Solicitor General,
appeal a trial court’s order dismissing a criminal case? These are
the main issues resolved in this special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision[1]
of
the Court of Appeals[2]
promulgated on August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31665 which reversed the Orders dated November 17,
1992 and May 24, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54[3]
in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-99715 to 91-99723.
Private respondent filed his Comment on November 14,
1994 while petitioner sent his Reply on November 29, 1994. By
resolution datedNovember 13, 1995, the First Division transferred
this case to the Third. After due deliberation and consultation on
the foregoing submissions, the Court tasked the
undersigned ponente with the writing of this Decision.
The Facts
The facts are not disputed.
On October 22, 1991, nine (9) separate informations
(Criminal Cases Nos. 91-99715 to 91-99723) were filed against
petitioner, charging the latter with violation of B.P. Big. 22 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, upon complaint of
private respondent.
At the scheduled arraignment set on May 18. 1992,
petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue a
warrant for his arrest. The next day, petitioner filed a motion to
lift the order of arrest and for the continuance of his bail bond,
stating that his failure to appear was due to illness. The motion
was granted by the trial court.
During the arraignment on June 10, 1992. petitioner,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. The trial court
set hearings on the following dates: August 4, 10, 18, 25 and
September 2, 9, 16, 23, 1992.
The hearings set for August 4, 10, and 18, 1992 were all
cancelled at the instance of petitioner, who claimed that he had
not yet secured the services of his counsel de parte.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent presented his first
witness, Romy Antonio of the Philippine Bank of
Communications. On motion of petitioner, the cross-examination
of the said witness was deferred to September 2, 1992.
The trials scheduled on September 2 and 9, 1992 were
likewise cancelled upon written motion of petitioner, who claimed
that his counsel had prior commitments.
On September 10, 1992, private respondent moved for the
postponement of the trial set for September 16, 1992, on the
ground that Antonio was not available due to work-related
matters. The trial court granted the motion without any objection
from petitioner.
The cross-examination of witness Antonio was completed
on September 23, 1992. Two additional trial dates (October 21
and November 17, 1992) were set by the trial court.
On October 19, 1992, private respondent moved for the
postponement of the hearing set for October 21, 1992 due to a
previous out-of-town commitment. The same was granted by the
trial court without any objections from petitioner.
On November 17, 1992, counsel for private respondent, in
open court, moved for the postponement of the trial set on that
date on the ground that private respondent had doubts “as to his
inability to bring out the details of the transaction” (Records, p.
73). Petitioner objected to the postponement and invoked his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Consequently, the trial court
dismissed all the nine cases against petitioner in its questioned
order dated November 17, 1992, on the following:[4]
“Considering that according to the private prosecutor and without
objection or qualification on the part of the public prosecutor, the
prosecution is not ready to present the complainant who is the
second and maybe the last witness for the prosecution, on the
ground that the private complainant is having serious doubts as to
the details of the cases and is not ready to testify; considering the

27. 27
manifestation of counsel for the accused invoking his client’s
constitutional right to speedy trial; considering that the cases had
been filed before this Court on October 22, 1991 or more than a
year ago and during this period the complainant should have
taken steps to gather all details and refresh his memory as to all
other matters pertaining to these cases, considering that as stated
by the private prosecutor himself that the cases involve a large
amount, and the complainant is not here today; the motion of
counsel for the accused is hereby granted, (and) all these cases
are dismissed x x x”
Private respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
the trial court on May 24, 1993.
Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which rendered a Decision setting aside the two orders
of the trial court and reinstating the cases,[5]
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders
dated November 17, 1992 and May 24, 1993 of the RTC-Manila,
Branch 54, are SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 91-99715 to 91-
99723 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for
further proceedings.”
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals, petitioner filed this special civil action.
The Issues: Speedy Trial and Double Jeopardy
Petitioner contends that since the dismissal of the cases
against him by the trial court was based on his constitutional right
to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same
would place him in double jeopardy.
In Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan,[6]
we held:
“It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition
of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test
used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter,
in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.”
Records show that the delay in the trial of the case was
mainly due to petitioner’s fault. As found by the respondent Court
of Appeals, to wit:
“x x x. His arraignment set for May 18, 1992 was canceled due to
his non-appearance. From the time he was arraigned on June 10,
1992, to the first trial date onAugust 4, 1992, he failed to secure
the services of a lawyer. which led to the postponement of the
hearing scheduled for that day and the trials set for August 10 and
18, 1992. It is unusual for private respondent dela Rosa to fail to
have a lawyer on the trial dates set by the lower court. He had
enough time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, or
counsel of his choice to represent him. If indeed private
respondent dela Rosa was wary of his right to a speedy trial, he
should not have moved for the postponement of the scheduled
trials on September 2 and 9, 1992, and objected to the
cancellation of the trials set for September 16 and October 21,
1992 x x x.”
Indeed, the several postponements sought and obtained by
petitioner, in effect, amounted to a waiver or abandonment of his
right to a speedy trial.[7]
Delay of his own making cannot be
oppressive to him.[8]
On the other hand, private respondent’s reasons for the
postponement of the trials set on September 16, 1992, October
21, 1992 andNovember 17, 1992 cannot be said to be vexatious,
capricious and oppressive as to result in the denial of petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial.
In asking for the postponement of the trial set on
November 17, 1992, private respondent reasoned out that “x x x
there are details which we feel are important for our case, and
there are numerous transactions here involving the accused and

28. 28
the private complainant (herein private respondent). We wish to
ask for a postponement to give our witness more time to refresh
his memory, x x x”[9]
. It will be noted that the amount involved in
these nine criminal cases amounted to more or. less P13
million. The postponement of this trial date would not in any way
have prejudiced the accused considering that accused himself as
stated earlier is guilty of delay. The more prudent thing would
have been for the trial court to reset the case to another date to
give the prosecution another opportunity to present its case.
[10]
The trial court’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the
petitioner is entitled to a speedy trial is capricious and
unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
Neither does double jeopardy apply in the instant case. The
requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[11]
The
fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the cases was upon the
motion of petitioner as shown by the following:
“COURT: You insist (sic) the right to speedy trial.
ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, I do insist.
COURT: So make a (sic) oral motion.
ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor please, in todays (sic) hearing, the
complainant (sic) is not around and he is
scheduled to testify, Your Honor. The accused
is present, Your Honor, together with his
counsel and we are ready for trial, but, Your
Honor, in as much as the private prosecutor is
not ready, on the ground that his client, who
is the private complainant, has problems or
have (sic) doubt about the details of this case
before, Your Honor, then, we respectfully plea
(sic) that the case be dismissed, invoking the
constitutional right of the accused for speedy
and an expensive (sic) public trial, Your
Honor.”[12]
(Italics supplied)
Solicitor General’s Intervention Not Necessary
Petitioner further alleges that private respondent as a
private offended party in a criminal case cannot file a special civil
action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of
dismissal without the intervention of the Solicitor General.
In the case of People vs. Santiago, [13]
this Court said:
“It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to
that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
“In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that
the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party
or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect
of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may he
prosecuted in (the) name of said complainant.” (italics supplied)
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the
respondent Court was therefore proper since it was brought in his
own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. That
the said proceedings benefited the People is not a reversible

29. 29
error. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion. There
being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the
prosecution of the case may still resume in the trial court, as
decided by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 131280. October 18, 2000]
PEPE CATACUTAN and AURELIANA CATACUTAN, petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF NORMAN KADUSALE, HEIRS OF LITO
AMANCIO and GIL B. IZON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari is
whether or not a subsidiary writ of execution may issue against
the employers of an accused, against whom a judgment of
conviction had been entered, even when said employers never
took part in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
charged, tried and convicted.
Assailed in the instant petition is the August 12, 1997
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43617,
directing the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution against
petitioners, as well as its October 9, 1997 Resolution,[2]
denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts relevant to the issue before us may
be summarized, as follows -
Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan is the registered owner and
operator of a jeepney, driven by the accused Porferio Vendiola,
which bumped a tricycle on April 11, 1991, in Banilad, Bacong,
Negros Oriental, thereby causing the death of its driver, Norman
Kadusale, and its passenger, Lito Amancio, and serious physical
injuries to another passenger, respondent Gil B. Izon.
Respondents thus filed a criminal case against Porferio
Vendiola, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double Homicide
with Physical Injuries and Damages to Property on July 26, 1991,
before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental.
On December 1, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment,
[3]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, foregoing considered, this court is convinced beyond
doubt that accused is guilty of negligence and imprudence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code in the collision which
occurred in Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental on April 11, 1991
which claimed the lives of Norman Kadusale, the driver of the
motortricycle, and Lito Amancio, a passenger of the motortricycle,
and caused injury to Gil B. Izon.
He is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional medium and maximum periods. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced to one
year eight months and one day of prision correccional as minimum
to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as
maximum for each death to be served successively, and for the
physical injuries suffered by Gil B. Izon, accused is ordered to
suffer the penalty of thirty days of arresto mayorstraight. He is
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Norman Kadusale and
Lito Amancio in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos each victim;
and to pay actual damages to:
1. Norman Kadusale or his heirs the amount of
P170,543.24;
2. Lito Amancio or his heirs the amount of P38,394.35; and
3. Gil B. Izon, the amount of P23,454.00.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Accused Vendiola did not appeal the judgment of
conviction. Instead, he applied for probation. Meanwhile, when
the judgment became final and executory, respondents moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution and the corresponding writ
was issued by the trial court on April 24, 1996. However, per the
Sheriff's Return of Service,[5]
dated July 3, 1996, the writ was
unsatisfied as the accused had "nothing to pay off the damages in
the decision."
On August 28, 1996, respondents filed a Motion for
Subsidiary Writ of Execution[6]
before the trial court, praying that
such writ be issued against petitioner Aureliana Catacutan as

30. 30
registered owner and operator of the jeepney driven by the
accused when the collision occurred.Petitioner Aureliana
Catacutan filed her Opposition[7]
thereto, arguing that she was
never a party to the case and that to proceed against her would
be in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner also argued that the subsidiary liability of
the employer is not determined in the criminal case against the
employee.
On October 3, 1996, the trial court issued an
Order[8]
denying the said Motion for lack of merit. According to
the trial court, it never acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
Aureliana Catacutan since she was never impleaded as party to
the case, and respondents' remedy was to file a separate case for
damages. Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied on December 3, 1996.[9]
Undaunted, respondents went on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals. On August 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision.
The issue raised in the instant petition is not new. It has
been passed upon in the case of Yusay v. Adil,[10]
where this Court
held -
Petitioners contend that they were not informed of Criminal Case
No. 11828 nor heard therein, in the matter of their alleged
subsidiary liability and that they were thus denied their day in
court, and that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
We hold otherwise. Petitioners were given ample opportunity to
present their side. The respondent judge admitted their "Urgent
Ex Parte Motion for Time to File Necessary Pleadings." The
respondent judge also issued an order suspending the execution
of the writ dated 24 October 1980 and granting petitioners until 5
November 1980 within which to file their comment and/or
opposition to the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Subsidiary
Execution. On 4 November 1980, petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the order of 24 October 1980 and To Set
Aside Subsidiary Writ of Execution. This was opposed by private
respondent. On 21 November 1980, an order of denial of the
Motion dated 4 November 1980 was issued. A second motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners which was again opposed
by private respondent. Petitioners filed their reply thereto. Acting
on the pleadings, respondent judge issued a resolution denying
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
As stated in Martinez v. Barredo:
"The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in
court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the
employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary
civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in
a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon
proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only the employee's primary liability but also his
employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence (81
Phil. 1, 3, G.R. No. L-49308, May 13, 1948, citing Almeida et al., vs.
Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116;
Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco vs. Onrubia, 46
Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56
Phil., 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p.
403)."
The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to the criminal
case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability
imposed upon him by law. Thus:
"It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the
criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and
in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon
him by law. It is his concern, as well as his employee, to see to it
that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual
participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him
to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his
indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages
are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if
brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability,

31. 31
that he was not given his day in court. It was not without purpose
that this Court sounded the following stern warning:
"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in
selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their
welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them
by reason or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only
in the way of giving them benefit of counsel; and consequently
doing away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If
these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of
the employer shall have been satisfied (Miranda vs. Malate
Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, 675, citing Martinez vs.
Barredo, supra)."
More recently, in the case of Basilio v. Court of Appeals,
[11]
the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution against the
employer of the accused therein was once more upheld,
notwithstanding the non-participation of such employer in the
criminal case against the accused.Instructive as it is on the issue at
hand, we are reproducing hereunder this Court's pronouncement
in said case, to wit -
The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found
in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is
enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is
made. (Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 1) However, before
execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence
of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any
offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and
4) that said employee is insolvent. (Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397,
402 [1996].)
In Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court
observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged
employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the
case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the
employer. Hence, we held:
To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the
alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito
vs. Señeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the
passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as
part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case
in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending
so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the
suit. (Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 [1982].)
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-
employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be
given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due
process. (National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor
Relations Commissions, 283 SCRA 275, 284 [1997].)
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused
because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further,
it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured,
that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in the
criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that
the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship. With the convict's application for probation, the trial
court's judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our
view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner
was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in
the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer
of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time.
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings
for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not

32. 32
properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of
subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an
opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he
properly alleged that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not
discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident. In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly
served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively,
a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution.
This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel
for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in
open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioner's counsel filed a
counter-manifestation that belatedly attempted to contest the
move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil
liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order
granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given
the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that
the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault
respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and
orders of the trial court.
In the instant case, we find no reason why the subsidiary
writ of execution issued against petitioner Aurelianana Catacutan
should be set aside. To begin with, as in Yusay and Basilio, supra,
petitioners cannot complain of having been deprived of their day
in court. They were duly furnished a copy of respondents' Motion
for Subsidiary Writ of Execution to which they filed their
Opposition.
So, too, we find no good ground to order a separate
hearing to determine the subsidiary liability of petitioner
Aureliana Catacutan, as was ordered in the case of Pajarito v.
Señeris, supra. To do so would entail a waste of both time and
resources of the trial court as the requisites for the attachment of
the subsidiary liability of the employer have already been
established, to wit: First, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.[12]
Second, the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry, land transportation industry in this case as the jeep
driven by accused was admittedly a passenger jeep.[13]
Third, the
employee has already been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties.[14]
Finally, said employee is insolvent.[15]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96724 March 22, 1991
HONESTO GENERAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GRADUACION REYES CLARAVALL, Judge, Regional Trial
Court at Pasig, Br. 71, BENNETH THELMO and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
NARVASA, J.:p
Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of
Rizal a sworn complaint accusing Honesto General and another
person of libel, and alleged that by reason of the offense he
(Thelmo) had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in
the total sum of P100 million. The information for libel
subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary
investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting
the damages due the offended party. At the trial, the defense
raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding
to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint
before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action
therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection, by Order dated
March 28, 1990. It also denied the defendants' motion for
reconsideration and motion for suspension of proceedings, by
another Order dated May 17, 1990.

33. 33
General and his co-accused are now before this Court applying for
a writ of certiorari to annul the aforesaid Orders of the Trial Court
on the theory that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. The issue he poses is whether or not, in view of this
Court's decision in three (3) cases —
1) Manchester vs. C.A., 149 SCRA 562 (1987), 1
2) Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274
(1989), 2
and
3) Tacay vs. RTC, 180 SCRA 433 (1989), 3
the rule should now be that the filing fees for the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense should first be paid in order that said civil
action may be deemed to have been impliedly
instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due
course.
Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims
of damages must be alleged both in the body and the prayer of
the complaint, and the filing fees corresponding thereto paid at
the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these requisites
were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial
court; and that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court." Sun
Insurance and Tacayaffirmed the validity of the basic principle but
reduced its stringency somewhat by providing that only those
claims as to which the amounts were not specified would be
refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect
was not necessarily fatal of irremediable as the plaintiff could on
motion be granted a reasonable time within which to amend his
complaint and pay the requisite filing fees, unless in the
meantime the period of limitation of the right of action was
completed.
Now, at the time of the promulgation of the Manchester decision
in 1987, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended in
1985, 4
read as follows: 5
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. — When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately. However,
after the criminal action has been
commenced, the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.
When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of
actual, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such
civil action as provided in these Rules shall
first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the
court where the criminal case is filed. In all
other cases, the filing fees corresponding to
the civil liability awarded by the court shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment
award and no payment by execution or
otherwise may be made to the offended
party without his first paying the amount of
such filing fees to the Clerk of Court. (1a)
The rules set forth in the first paragraph are substantial
reproductions of the corresponding sections of Rule 111 of the
Rules of 1964. The second paragraph is new. It was incorporated
in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in light of this Court's
Resolution of September 13, 1984 in Adm. Matter No. 83-6-389-
0, 6
requiring increased court filing fees effective October 1, 1984,
which resolution pertinently provides that:
. . . When the offended party seeks to
enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such
civil action as provided in the Rules of Court

34. 34
and approved by the Court shall first be
paid to the Clerk of the court where the
criminal action is filed. . . .
The purpose of the Resolution, according to the late
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, 7
was to discourage
the "gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's
office to include in the criminal information their claim
for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos
without paying any filing fees." This was the same
consideration that underlay the Manchester ruling: the
fraudulent practice, manifested by counsel in said ". . .
of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over
P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint, . . .
(an omission which was) clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee." 8
This Court however adopted further amendments to the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, with effect on October 1,
1988. 9
Among the provisions revised was Section 1, Rule 111. As
thus amended, it now reads as follows: 10
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. — When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
A waiver of any of the civil action
extinguishes the others. The institution of,
or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action
as provided in these Rules shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages,
other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial. (1a)
The amendments were deliberated on and adopted by this Court
after the Manchester doctrine had been enunciated. Yet observe
that the last two (2) paragraphs prescribe a rule different from
that in Manchester, and in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under the 1985 Rules, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly
instituted with the criminal had to be paid first to the Clerk of the
court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard
to whether the claim for such damages was set out in the
information or not. Under the 1988 Rules, however, it is only

35. 35
when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial." In any other case—i.e., when the amount of damages other
than actual is NOT alleged in the complaint or information—the
filing fees for the civil action "to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages . . . shall (merely) constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages."
This Court's plain intent—to make the Manchester doctrine,
requiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement
of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under
Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, other
than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information—has thus
been made manifest by the language of the amendatory
provisions.
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the
interests of clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the
guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court—because the offended party has
NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it
separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action
—the rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in
the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court for trial;"
2) in any other case, however—i.e., when the amount of damages
is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the
corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply
"constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for
actual damages.
WHEREFORE, there being no error in the challenged Orders of the
respondent Court dated March 28, 1990 and May 17, 1990, these
appearing on the contrary to be in accord with the law and the
facts, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, with costs
against the petitioner.
[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January
31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago,
Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George
Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through
reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On
appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No.
066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly
liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing
loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of
their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an
information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the
municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay
Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations
and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to

36. 36
prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile
driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing
plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the
said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution’s evidence, as summarized by the trial
court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo
Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his
farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should)
borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is
also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera
but…said that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the
Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they
proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At
the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00
o’clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o’clock
that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben)
Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio
with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one
more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the
evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went
to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused
who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at
Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant
alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer
each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became
vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night
Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the
LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby
store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go
home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with
the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal
Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately
behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about
40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway
because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a
passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately
tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from
the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming
vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road.
x x x
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed
on its top at the side of the highway immediately at the approach
of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved
across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane
of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five
meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch
(Exhibit “A”) prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the
Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio
lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still
inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of
him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was
pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who
was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores
Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit “B”) while Ambrocio
suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident
was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except that
defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not
drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed
that:

37. 37
…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20
inches from the center of the road at about 30 kilometers per
hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when
suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming
from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the car’s lane and bumped the car which turned
turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road
while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by
a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit “1”) and a sketch
(Exhibit “3”) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal
testimony. The car was hit on the driver’s side. As a result of the
collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio
were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where
they were all brought for treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August
4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in
petitioner’s favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and
hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of
appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment. In their
appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses
prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that
appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that
defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent
and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause
of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-
appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben
Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that
at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of
intoxication, due to his having consumed “all in all, a total of at
least twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m.”[6]
It
found that petitioner’s act of driving while intoxicated was a clear
violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7]
and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil
Code,[8]
a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held
that petitioner’s act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in
itself “because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury
sought to be prevented by the regulation.”[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum,
submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY
ON THE ACCUSED’S (PETITIONER’S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN “DOUBLE
JEOPARDY” AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF
ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT
WITH THE PETITIONER’S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL
ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL
ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
ENTITLED:SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v.
GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE

38. 38
REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING
FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING
THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any
further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error
in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of
Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court
on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise
of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial court’s
finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis
for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in
finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court
not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in
“double jeopardy.”
Private respondents contend that while the trial court
found that petitioner’s guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms
that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence,
impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since
civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review
the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for
awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner’s claim that the decision of the
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that “no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.”[10]
When a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical offense.[11]
This is
double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as the first.[12]
In the instant case, petitioner had once
been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and
the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of
acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what
was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was
the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not
charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal
offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show
that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner
on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the appellate
court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order
the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to
speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double
jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission.[13]
There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[14]
The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the

39. 39
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.[15]
This
is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
[16]
where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or
omission.” Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in
the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to
establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission.[17]
The reason for this rule is that
the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of
evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into
the question of petitioner’s negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was
acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated
on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his
acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial
court’s judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did not
clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner’s
negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal
must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29
of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in Criminal Case
No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner’s civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
court’s declaration that did not discount the possibility that “the
accused was really negligent.” However, it found that “a
hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused
presented itself before the Court” and since said “hypothesis is
consistent with the record…the Court’s mind cannot rest on a
verdict of conviction.”[18]
The foregoing clearly shows that
petitioner’s acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit
to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since private
respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their
claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment
of filing fees on the amount of the claim for damages violated the
doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated March 24, 1988.[19]
He avers that since Manchester held
that “The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fees,” the appellate court was
without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much
less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is
inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that the
criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted,
was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as
to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the
information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not
allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then
customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be
stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing
the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively,
under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded
are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of
the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was

40. 40
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.[20]
As
correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it
was not required that the damages sought by the offended party
be stated in the complaint or information. With the adoption of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule
111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents appealed
the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in
1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment
applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together
with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if
other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information,
or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.[21]
Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066
contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that
the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the
filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact
to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are
deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or
information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner’s
allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid
and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its
resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107725. January 22, 1998]
ESPERO SALAO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and JOWIE APOLONIO,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1]
of
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIV, Malolos, Bulacan, which ordered petitioner
Espero Salao to pay private respondent Jowie
Apolonio P20,000.00 in actual damages,P10,000.00 in moral
damages, and P15,000.00 in attorney’s fees, as well as the
appellate court’s resolution of October 23, 1992 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
This case originated from a complaint for damages filed by
the private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him
by petitioner on August 24, 1986. Private respondent, then a
senior student at the Philippine Air Transport and Training
Services, Inc., testified that on August 24, 1986, at around 6:30
p.m., he saw a friend’s jeep parked outside the compound of the
petitioner. Upon entering the compound he saw his friend having
drinks with petitioner. He therefore decided to join them but
petitioner saw him and drove him away for being a drug addict. As
he was leaving petitioner hit him on the head with a gun and
threatened him with further harm. Only the timely intervention
of private respondent’s brother, Gary Apolonio, and petitioner’s

41. 41
mother, Lourdes Salao, saved him from further injuries in the
hands of petitioner.[2]
Private respondent submitted in evidence a certification
and receipts,[3]
in support of his claim for damages. The expenses
were incurred for an operation at Martinez Memorial Hospital
which necessitated private respondent’s confinement there from
September 4 to 9, 1986.[4]
The private respondent’s claim was corroborated by his
brother, Gary Apolonio, who testified that while he was buying
cigarettes from a store in front of petitioner’s residence, he saw
the latter hit his brother on the head with a gun, even as he
accused him of teaching petitioner’s son, Dennis, how to abuse
drugs. Gary said he had to take his brother to the hospital
because of injuries on the head caused by petitioner.[5]
Dr. Antonio Sarrosa testified that he operated on Jowie
Apolonio for a fractured skull at the Martinez Memorial Hospital.
[6]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed it was private
respondent who tried to assault him and he only acted in self
defense by hitting private respondent with his gun. According to
petitioner, on August 24, 1986, between 5 and 6:30 p.m., he was
surprised to see private respondent inside their yard having drinks
with his nephew and the latter’s friends. Because he told the
group to stop drinking, private respondent resented his order and
left. Later, petitioner’s wife arrived and told him that private
respondent was very angry and making threats against
petitioner. As petitioner went to buy cigarettes at the store of his
sister-in-law located also within the compound, private
respondent shouted at him and hit him. Petitioner claimed that, in
self defense, he pulled his gun and hit the private respondent with
it. He asked the group to throw private respondent out of the
compound.[7]
Petitioner also claimed he was going to file charges against
private respondent but was persuaded not to do so by private
respondent’s mother because they were neighbors.[8]
He said he
counseled his sons not to keep private respondent in their
company as he suspected him to be engaged in illegal acts and
trying to make his sons do the same.[9]
The trial court found the private respondent’s version of
the incident to be more convincing than that of the petitioner
which it found to be “uncorroborated and self-
serving.”[10]
Accordingly, it rendered judgment against the
petitioner. The trial court also denied petitioner’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration and new trial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto and later denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then brought this appeal questioning
the award of damages and attorney’s fees to private
respondent. In his Reply to Private Respondent’s Comment, he
raised as additional ground the fact that in the criminal case for
serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same
incident, the Municipal Trial Court of Obando, Bulacan found him
“not guilty” and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
The appeal is without merit.
First. It is settled that issues not raised in the court a
quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in this Court
without violating the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.[11]
In the case at bar, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, assigning two errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, to wit:
1. The Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of and
hearing the case without plaintiff first availing
the conciliation process provided by PD 1508;
and
2. The Trial Court erred in denying defendant-
appellants motion for reconsideration and
alternatively motion for new trial.
The propriety of such award of damages and the effect of
petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal cases were not questioned by
petitioner. Consequently, he is barred from raising these
questions for the first time in this appeal.

42. 42
Second. Petitioner has not shown that the award of
damages is not supported by evidence. For example, the award of
P20,000.00 for actual damages is based on hospital bills and
receipts for medicine which private respondent properly
identified in court and formally offered in evidence.[12]
That private respondent is competent to testify regarding
the authenticity and due execution of these documents is beyond
doubt. Rule 132, §20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
§20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuiness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which
it is claimed to be.
Needless to say, this factual finding of the trial court,
especially because it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
petitioner in this case has presented no rebutting evidence, is well
nigh conclusive in this appeal.[13]
The award of P10,000.00 for moral damages is likewise
appropriate. This being a case of physical injuries resulting from a
crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the
discretion of the court, as provided by Art. 2219(1) or (2) of the
Civil Code. The evidence gives no ground for doubt that such
discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial
court. The award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral
damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the
defendant’s culpable action.[14]
With regard to the award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees,
petitioner invokes rulings[15]
that in view of the policy against
placing a premium on the right to litigate, awards for attorney’s
fees must be based on findings of fact and law, expressed in the
judgment of the trial court, which bring the case within the
exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code. In this case,
the award of attorney’s fees is based on the trial court finding that
because of this case private respondent was compelled to secure
the services of counsel for P20,000.00.[16]
(The actual award is for
P15,000.00) Art. 2208(2) provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except: . . . .
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest; . . .
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there was compliance
by the trial court with the rule regarding attorney’s fees.
Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner’s claim that his
acquittal in the criminal action for serious physical injuries
constitutes a definitive finding that he has no civil liability to the
private respondent. Petitioner invokes Rule 111, §2(b) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.[17]
The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability
arising from crime (ex delicto). It is not the civil liability for quasi
delict which is allowed to be brought “separately and
independently” of the criminal action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
[18]
The civil liability based on such cause of action is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.[19]
Indeed, because the offended party
does not intervene in the criminal prosecution, it is entirely
possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may
not have been presented by the public prosecutor in the criminal
action with the result that the accused in the criminal case may be
acquitted. This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs of
Guaring v. Court of Appeals[20]
where, because the only survivor in
a motor car accident whose testimony proved to be pivotal in the

43. 43
civil case was not called to testify in the criminal prosecution of
the driver of the other vehicle, the latter was acquitted on
reasonable doubt.
We therefore hold that petitioner’s acquittal in the
criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats is not
conclusive of his liability for damages to private respondent. This
case is separate, distinct and independent of the criminal action
and requires only a preponderance to prove it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999]
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and RAMON SUA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA appeals to us through this
petition for review the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
which
acquitted her of the crime of estafa but held her liable
nonetheless for the value of the checks she indorsed in favor of
private respondent Ramon Sua.
On several occasions petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a
sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain
grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks
issued by one Arturo de Guzman: (a) PCIB Check No. 157059
dated 26 February 1987 for P140,000.00; (b) PCIB Check No.
157073 dated 26 February 1987 for P28,000.00; (c) PCIB Check
No. 157057 dated 27 February 1987 for P42,150.00; and, d)
Metrobank Check No. DAG - 045104758 PA dated 2 March 1987
for P125,000.00. These checks were signed at the back by
petitioner. When presented for payment the checks were
dishonored because the drawer’s account was already
closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de
Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay
the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were
filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-
8731. Arturo de Guzman was charged with two (2) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8733 and
D-8734. These cases against petitioner and de Guzman were
consolidated and tried jointly.
On 27 December 1989 the court a quo[2]
acquitted
petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not rule on whether
she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to
private respondent. The trial court found Arturo de Guzman
guilty of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two (2) counts and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day in
each of the cases, and to pay private respondent P167,150.00 as
civil indemnity.
Private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial
court with regard to the civil aspect but the court refused to give
due course to the appeal on the ground that the acquittal of
petitioner was absolute. Private respondent then filed a petition
for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR SP
No. 24626, praying that the court a quo be ordered to give due
course to the appeal on the civil aspect of the decision. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that private respondent
could appeal with respect to the civil aspect the judgment of
acquittal by the trial court.
On 22 January 1996, the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
36376 rendered the assailed Decision insofar as it sustained the
appeal of private respondent on the civil aspect and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent P335,000.00 representing
the aggregate face value of the four (4) checks indorsed by
petitioner plus legal interest from the notice of dishonor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision. On 19 March 1997 the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution noting the admission of both parties that private
respondent had already collected the amount of P125,000.00
from Arturo de Guzman with regard to his civil liability in Crim.

44. 44
Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734. The appellate court noted that private
respondent was the same offended party in the criminal cases
against petitioner and against de Guzman. Criminal Cases Nos.
8733 and 8734 against De Guzman, and Crim. Cases Nos. 8730
and 8729 against petitioner, involved the same checks, to
wit: PCIB Checks Nos. 157057 for P42,150.00 and Metrobank
Check No. DAG-045104758 PA for P125,000.00.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent
could not recover twice on the same checks. Since he had
collected P125,000.00 as civil indemnity in Crim. Cases Nos. 8733
and 8734, this amount should be deducted from the sum total of
the civil indemnity due him arising from the estafa cases against
petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous award,
which was erroneously placed at P335,000.00, to P335,150.00 as
the sum total of the amounts of the four (4) checks
involved. Deducting the amount of P125,000.00 already collected
by private respondent, petitioner was adjudged to
pay P210,150.00 as civil liability to private respondent. Hence,
this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her
acquittal by the trial court from charges of estafa in Crim. Cases
Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and D-8731 was absolute, the trial
court having declared in its decision that the fact from which the
civil liability might have arisen did not exist.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The issue is whether
respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
requiring petitioner to pay civil indemnity to private respondent
after the trial court had acquitted her of the criminal
charges. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, specifically provides: "Extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.[3]
Thus, under Art. 29 of the Civil Code -
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not acquittal is due to that ground.
An examination of the decision in the criminal cases reveals
these findings of the trial court -
Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on various
occasions, Remedios Nota Sapiera purchased from Monrico Mart
grocery items (mostly cigarettes) which purchases were paid with
checks issued by Arturo de Guzman; that those purchases and
payments with checks were as follows:
(a) Sales Invoice No. 20104 dated February 26, 1987 in the
amount of P28,000.00; that said items purchased were paid with
PCIBank Check No. 157073 dated February 26, 1987;
(b) Sales Invoice No. 20108 dated February 26, 1987 in the
amount of P140,000.00; that said items purchased were paid with
PCIBank No. 157059 dated February 26, 1987;
(c) Sales Invoice No. 20120 dated February 27, 1987 in the
amount of P42,150.00; that said items were paid with PCIBank
Check No. 157057 dated February 27, 1987;
(d) Sales Invoice No. 20148 and 20149 both dated March 2, 1987
in the amount of P120,103.75; said items were paid with

45. 45
Metrobank Check No. 045104758 dated March 2, 1987 in the
amount of P125,000.00.
That all these checks were deposited with the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Company, Dagupan Branch, for collection from the
drawee bank;
That when presented for payment by the collecting bank to the
drawee bank, said checks were dishonored due to account closed,
as evidenced by check return slips; x x x x.
From the evidence, the Court finds that accused Remedios Nota
Sapiera is the owner of a sari-sari store inside the public market;
that she sells can(ned) goods, candies and assorted grocery items;
that she knows accused Arturo De Guzman, a customer since
February 1987; that de Guzman purchases from her grocery items
including cigarettes; that she knows Ramon Sua; that she has
business dealings with him for 5 years; that her purchase orders
were in clean sheets of paper; that she never pays in check; that
Ramon Sua asked her to sign subject checks as identification of
the signature of Arturo de Guzman; that she pays in cash;
sometimes delayed by several days; that she signed the four (4)
checks on the reverse side; that she did not know the subject
invoices; that de Guzman made the purchases and he issued the
checks; that the goods were delivered to de Guzman; that she was
not informed of dishonored checks; and that counsel for Ramon
Sua informed de Guzman and told him to pay x x x x
In the case of accused Remedios Nota Sapiera, the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy.
Based on the above findings of the trial court, the
exoneration of petitioner of the charges of estafa was based on
the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence
showing conspiracy between her and the other accused Arturo de
Guzman in defrauding private respondent. However, by her own
testimony, petitioner admitted having signed the four (4) checks
in question on the reverse side. The evidence of the prosecution
shows that petitioner purchased goods from the grocery store of
private respondent as shown by the sales invoices issued by
private respondent; that these purchases were paid with the four
(4) subject checks issued by de Guzman; that petitioner signed the
same checks on the reverse side; and when presented for
payment, the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank due to
the closure of the drawer’s account; and, petitioner was informed
of the dishonor.
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite
the conflicting versions of the parties, it is undisputed that the
four (4) checks issued by de Guzman were signed by petitioner at
the back without any indication as to how she should be bound
thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser
thereof. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides -
Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. - Where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are
admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x
x (f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is
not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended
to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x x
Sec. 63. When person deemed indorser. - A person placing his
signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or
acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly indicates
by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other
capacity.
Sec. 66. Liability of general indorser. - Every indorser who
indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders
in due course: (a) The matters and things mentioned in
subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and
(b) That the instrument is, at the time of the indorsement, valid
and subsisting;
And, in addition, he engages that, on due presentment, it shall be
accepted or paid or both, as the case may be, according to its
tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings
on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the
holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to
pay it.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did
not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to

46. 46
insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the
court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not
exist.[4]
An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held
civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so
warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid
value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.[5]
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a
judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the
award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with
Art. 29 of the Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other private
rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party x x x x It is just and proper that for the purposes of
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also
be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?[6]
Finally, with regard to the computation of the civil liability
of petitioner, the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is
civilly liable for the aggregate value of the unpaid four (4) checks
subject of the criminal cases in the sum of P335,150.00, less the
amount of P125,000.00 already collected by private respondent
pending appeal, resulting in the amount of P210,150.00 still due
private respondent, is a factual matter which is binding and
conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 22 January 1996 as amended by its
Resolution dated 19 March 1997 ordering petitioner Remedios
Nota Sapiera to pay private respondent Ramon Sua the remaining
amount of P210,150.00 as civil liability, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY
CAMASO, respondents.
Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed
prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil
action? This is the issue in this petition.
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while
standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult
Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed

47. 47
on January 6, 1983 with the then City Court of Manila, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 027184. On October 19, 1984 a complaint for
damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father,
David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-
27317.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26,
1989 ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff
the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services
and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the
suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they
nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries
arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without
malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such
a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof
is expressly made.
In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.1
A motion for reconsideration thereof filed
by petitioners was denied on January 30, 1990. Hence this
petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. — When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions
extinguishes the others. The institution of,
or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action
as provided in these Rules shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages,
other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon the filing thereof
in court for trial. (1a)
Although the incident in question and the actions arising
therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985

48. 48
Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural
may apply retrospectively to the present case. 2
Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the
offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the
criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case
was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action
no damages was awarded.
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the
accused in this case is a quasi delict as defined under Article 2176
of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation
also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without
previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the
criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was
informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even
far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act
or omission.
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the separate civil action brought before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals dated November 3, 1989 and its resolution
dated January 30, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 119771. April 24, 1998]
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and
PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTINEZ, J.:
At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota
Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a
passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc.
(hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection
of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig,
Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms.
Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.

49. 49
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the
bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein
private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for
damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a
motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages,
totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as
appearance fees.)[1]
With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the
petitioners' answer to the complaint for damages and after
submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial briefs,
petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and
Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency
of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and
the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a
separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by
the Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993,
[2]
ruling thus:
"Answering the first question thus posed, the court holds that
plaintiff may legally institute the present civil action even in the
absence of a reservation in the criminal action. This is so because
it falls among the very exceptions to the rule cited by the movant.
"It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal action has
been instituted, then civil action based thereon is deemed
instituted together with the criminal action, such that if the
offended party did not reserve the filing of the civil action when
the criminal action was filed, then such filing of the civil action is
therefore barred; on the other hand, if there was such
reservation, still the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
"But, this rule (Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court) is
subject to exemptions, the same being those provided for in
Section 3 of the same rule which states:
'Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which was been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.'
"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former
Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the
criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action
has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as
an unauthorized amendment to our substantive law, i.e., the Civil
Code which does not require such reservation. In fact, the
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has
been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court
declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. (Bonite
vs. Zosa, 162 SCRA 180)
"Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff may institute
and prosecute the civil action, it being allowed by Article 2207 of
the Civil Code."
After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993
Order was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to this
Court via petition forcertiorari which was, however, referred to
public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February
24, 1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was
rendered by respondent court, upholding the assailed Manila
Regional Trial Court Order in this wise:
"A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to

50. 50
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary.
"To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles
to the result of the criminal prosecution - whether it be conviction
or acquittal - would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Art. 31,
that this action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
"In Yakult Phil. vs. CA, the Supreme Court said:
'Even if there was no reservation in the criminal case and that the
civil action was not filed before the filing of the criminal action but
before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action,
and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof,
then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that
should be made by the offended party before the prosecution
presented its evidence.'
"The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act
or omission.
"Substantial compliance with the reservation requirement may,
therefore, be made by making a manifestation in the criminal case
that the private respondent has instituted a separate and
independent civil action for damages.
"Oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue
importance on technicalities when by so doing, substantial justice
is sacrificed. While the rules of procedure require adherence, it
must be remembered that said rules of procedure are intended to
promote, not defeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense."
Hence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration
of said respondent court judgment was denied.
The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved, as posited by
petitioners, are:
1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil
action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an
independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action
when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action
was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the
private complainant is actively participating through a private
prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
We rule for petitioners.
On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -- In the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
There is no dispute that these so-called "independent civil
actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the
exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil
action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111.[3]
However, it is easily
deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about
by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure --
particularly the phrase "… which has been reserved" -- that the
"independent" character of these civil actions does not do away
with the reservation requirement. In other words, prior
reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these
independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a
continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action. That this should now be the controlling
procedural rule is confirmed by no less than retired Justice Jose Y.
Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which
drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the
matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, to wit:

51. 51
"The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless
waived, reserved or previously instituted xxx.
Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes
not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said code.
xxx
Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-
delicts under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
However, in view of Article 2177 of the said code which provides
that the offended party may not recover twice for the same act or
omission of the accused, and in line with the policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits, these objections were overruled. In any
event, the offended party is not precluded from filing a civil action
to recover damages arising from quasi-delict before the
institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file
such a separate civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing
a civil action for damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34 before the
institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file
such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases where the
offended party has not previously filed a civil action or has not
reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his civil action
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57
SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an independent
civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under
the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
previously waived or instituted. (Underscoring ours. Justice Jose Y.
Feria [Ret.], 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a pamphlet, published by Central Lawbook Publishing
Co., Inc., Philippine Legal Studies, Series No. 3, 5-6).[4]
Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior
reservation is Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, whose analysis of
the historical changes in Rule 111 since the 1964 Rules of Court is
equally illuminating. Thus,
"1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability
arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or
reserved. The offended party was authorized to bring an
independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code provided such right was
reserved.
In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule 111
thereof reiterated said provision on the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. The independent civil actions, however,
were limited to the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code, obviously because the actions contemplated in
Articles 31 and 2177 of said Code are not liabilities ex delicto.
Furthermore, no reservation was required in order the civil
actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued separately.
2. The present amendments introduced by the Supreme Court
have the following notable features on this particular procedural
aspect, viz:
a. The civil action which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal
action, barring a waiver,
reservation or prior institution
thereof, need not arise from the
offense charged, as the phrase
'arising from the offense
charged' which creates that
nexus has been specifically
eliminated.
b. The independent civil actions
contemplated in the present
Rule 111 include the quasi-
delicts provided for in Art. 2176
of the Civil Code, in addition to
the cases provided in Arts. 32, 33

52. 52
and 34 thereof. It is necessary,
however, that the civil liability
under all the said articles arise
'from the same act or omission
of the accused.' Furthermore, a
reservation of the right to
institute these separate civil
actions is again required,
otherwise, said civil actions are
impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the
former are waived or filed ahead
of the criminal action."(Emphasis
supplied.)[5]
In fact, a deeper reading of the "Yakult Phils. vs. CA"
case[6]
relied upon by respondent court reveals an
acknowledgement of the reservation requirement. After
recognizing that the civil case instituted by private respondent
therein Roy Camaso (represented by his father David Camaso)
against petitioner Yakult Phils. (the owner of the motorcycle that
sideswiped Roy Camaso, only five years old at the time of the
accident) and Larry Salvado (the driver of the motorcycle) during
the pendency of the criminal case against Salvado for reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries, as one based on
tort, this Court said:
"The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the
accused in this case is a quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176
of the Civil Code as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
"The aforecited rule [referring to the amended Section 1,
Rule111] requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-
delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from
the same act or omission of the accused"(Underscoring supplied).
But what prompted the Court to validate the institution and non-
suspension of the civil case involved in "Yakult" was the peculiar
facts attendant therein. Thus,
"Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without
previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the
criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was
informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even
far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence"
The distinct factual scenario in "Yakult" simply does not
obtain in this case. No satisfactory proof exists to show that
private respondent PISC's damage suit was instituted before the
prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pending in
the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Neither is there any indication that
the judge presiding over the criminal action has been made aware
of the civil case. It is in this light that reliance on the "Yakult" case
is indeed misplaced.
Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the
standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent
civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past
pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an
"unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil
Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed
adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are
designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial
justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution
itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the
enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.[7]
Far from altering substantive rights, the
primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the
Court in "Caños v. Peralta":[8]
"… to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and
abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify
the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants."

53. 53
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under
Article 2207 of the Civil Code,[9]
is not exempt from the
reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based
on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner
Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent
PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the
insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural
requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself
instituted the civil case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution
dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas
City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1
insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing
his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed
the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the
accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2
which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before
final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It
reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:

54. 54
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the
legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870
which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre,
y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no
hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina
y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso,
ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason
that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected
in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it
cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.

55. 55
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the
felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by
reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we
must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will
be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof —
criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are
to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3
was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases ofPeople of the
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4
People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5
and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6
by
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending
appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in
the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment
in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil
liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by
his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G.
4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7
andLamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8
ruled differently. In
the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring
any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused
prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action
for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

56. 56
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course,
that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle
does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs
neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil
contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive,
the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9
requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be
inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be
heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this
case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the
lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the
appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such
decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness
of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In
doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating
thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after

57. 57
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA
394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab,
66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose,
his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of
the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11
raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were
a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil
liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the
demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-
examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant
to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to
the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during
appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate

58. 58
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible
with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article
30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of
the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12
One would
be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to
the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the
final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when
the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-
appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive.
The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon
facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is
an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of
the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take
note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under
Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability
for which his estate would be liable. 13

59. 59
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego,
on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it
upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as
the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30
was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil
liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve
as another basis for the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In
citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the
inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of
his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted
together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond
the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the
Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned
as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter
category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in
Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21
of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14
are contractual

60. 60
money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration
of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that
money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16
(1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-
delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17
of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18
where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec.
5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
to purely personal obligations other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. 19
Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts

61. 61
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521
of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON.
TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No.
24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated
November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela
and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased
Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC.,
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with
offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa

62. 62
Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for,
while the former appears to be the employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA
by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at
the time of the incident complained of, was under their control
and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant
TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security guard at the "Big
Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver
belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per
Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was
due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued
to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No.
Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint
is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be
excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is
not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of
action against the private respondents is based on their liability
under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or an industry.

63. 63
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is
allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore,
the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in
the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation
Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an
employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD
extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging
Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-
1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order
granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S
motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held
that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to
constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence
on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the
same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent
judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of
the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the
facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo,
p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was
one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from
those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the
order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and
ultimate facts alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance
with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid
down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative
defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby
dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and
petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that
quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover
acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191
SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their
negligence either in the selection or supervision of their
employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own
liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary
civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil
action against the employer may therefore proceed
independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section
3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of
whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay
is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)

64. 64
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to
include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus,
petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is
unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of
the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles
2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action
contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting
Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done
with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties
as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's
assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for
damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for
homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action
before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is
even far better than a compliance with the requirement of
express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to
do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the
civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and
not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by
negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the
petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of
the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
(De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
[1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case
would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking
their right to recover damages against the private respondents for
their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.

65. 65
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As
far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]),
this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers
not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the
Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers
not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81
SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in
the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as
"voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence
of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above
doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil
Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to
the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However,
the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965);
Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]).
Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the

66. 66
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary
under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for
Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security
guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-
delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines
v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts
which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous
on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint
simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant
negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states
a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations
in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements
are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]);
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118
[1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint
sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the
defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno
Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that
the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not
the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by
negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of
Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable,
are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the
merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the
allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have
to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the
merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which

67. 67
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury
to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them
to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127934. August 23, 2000]
ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA
ABIVA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 106, except for the award of
thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, which
was deleted. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads as follows
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff:
“1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) as actual
damages;
“2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
“3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
“4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as attorney’s
fees;
“5. Costs of suit.
“SO ORDERED.”[2]
The facts, culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
“The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular
mishap which took place on June 1, 1984, involving a truck owned
by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and driven by its employee,
Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven
by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a motorcycle, was bumped and
dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by
the truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation, causing
his death. Upon his untimely demise, Fidel Abiva left behind a
wife, respondent Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children.
“On July 27, 1984, a criminal information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the two
drivers, Dela Cruz and Parma, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
37248 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103.
“While the criminal action was pending, on March 11, 1985,
respondent Ederlinda Abiva filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 93, a separate civil action for damages
against the two accused in the criminal case, as well as against
Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the owners of
the vehicles involved in the accident and
employers of the accused.
“In her complaint, respondent Abiva prayed that:

68. 68
“1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be immediately issued
against the properties of the defendants as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered;
“2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of
P200,000.00 as actual damage;
“3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees;
“4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of moral
and exemplary damages which this Court may reasonably assess.”
“On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela
Cruz filed a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial court’s
attention the fact that a criminal action was pending before
another branch of the same court, and that under the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil action
arising from a quasi-delict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said
defendants alleged that respondent’s private counsel actively
participated in the criminal proceedings, showing that the
respondent was in fact pursuing the civil aspect automatically
instituted with the criminal case.
“On February 21, 1986, respondent filed an opposition to the
motion arguing that she was not pursuing the civil aspect in the
criminal case as she, in fact, manifested in open court in the
criminal proceedings that she was filing a separate and
independent civil action for damages against the accused and
their employers, as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
“On February 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the action for
damages on the ground that “no civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution in a case for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide”. Respondent Abiva’s motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was also denied by
the trial court. She then elevated the case before the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for
certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. 09644. The appellate court
reversed the dismissal order of the trial court. It was then
petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and Jesus dela Cruz’s turn to
appeal the judgment of the IAC before the Supreme Court. On
August 3, 1988, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying
the petition for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz
for failure “to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in the questioned error”. The
case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
“In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before
the Supreme Court, fire razed the portion of the Quezon City Hall
building which housed the trial courts and the records of the case
were among those that the fire reduced to ashes. It was not until
March 26, 1992 that the records of the case was reconstituted by
the trial court.
“While the pre-trial proceedings in the civil action for damages
was still being set and reset upon motion of the opposing parties,
on July 6, 1992, the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered
judgment in the criminal case, finding as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of both accused Rodolfo Parma and
Jesus dela Cruz for the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide, this Court finds them guilty of said offense charged
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and undergo
imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS
and TEN (10) DAYS also of prision correccional as maximum, and
to pay the costs.
“Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz are hereby ordered
to pay the heirs of the deceased Fidel O. Abiva, jointly or pro
rata, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as

69. 69
indemnification for his death and the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) by way of actual damages.
“SO ORDERED.”
“On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial conference of the civil case was
finally set on April 6, 1993, and notices thereof were sent to the
parties and their respective counsel. On the appointed date,
however, no representative nor counsel for petitioner Ace Haulers
Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon motion of respondent
Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default. Furthermore,
defendants Jesus dela Cruz, Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma
were discharged as defendants, and the case against them
dismissed.
“On June 30, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ruling
against petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation. The trial court
summarized its findings thus:
“Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of plaintiff’s evidence,
testified that she is 43 years old, a widow and housekeeper,
residing at Cefels Subdivision, Deparo, Novaliches, Quezon
City. She told the Court that she is the widow of Fidel Abiva, who
died on June 1, 1984 after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo Truck
Plate No. NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated by the defendant
Ace Haulers Corporation, then driven by Jesus dela Cruz and
that because of the death of her husband, she suffered
damages, among which, moral, exemplary and actual damages for
her expenses and attorney’s fees. She claimed that she is lawfully
married to the late Fidel Abiva as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract (Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘A-1’). Out of their wedlock, (sic) they
begot three (3) children, namely: Noel, Gina and Argentina with
ages 25, 21 and 15, respectively. Her husband died on June 1,
1984 at around 11:45 p.m. (Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’), because
of the vehicular accident which involved the wheeler truck of Ace
Haulers Corporation driven by Jesus dela Cruz, a jeepney owned
by Isabelito Rivera, then driven by Rodolfo Parma and a
motorcycle driven by her husband. Her husband, after his death,
was autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy Report (Exhibit ‘C’) and
by the Postmortem Finding (Exhibit ‘C-1’). This was also covered
by a police report (Exhibit ‘D’) which shows that Jesus dela Cruz is
the driver of the defendant (Exhibit ‘D-1’). This fact is reiterated
in a sworn statement which she executed relative to this vehicular
accident (Exhibit ‘E’) wherein the said driver mentioned and
confirmed the name of his employer (Exhibit ‘E-1’). A criminal
case was lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles and a
Decision was rendered thereon in Criminal Case No. Q-37248
entitled ‘People of the Philippines versus Jesus dela Cruz and
Rodolfo Parma’ finding both of them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. (Exhibits ‘F’, ‘F-1’, ‘F-2’, ‘F-3’, ‘F-4’ and
‘F-5’). This decision has now acquired finality as no appeal was
taken by the accused. It is established, however, that prior to the
filing of the instant case, Mrs. Abiva pleaded to Ace Haulers to
compensate her for the death of her husband. But her plea went
(sic) to deaf ears. She was thus constrained to file this case for
damages.
“Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva revealed that before the death
of her husband, he was employed with Philippine Airlines (PAL)
earning P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced by the Pay
Statement covering the period of 4-15-84 in the amount of
P2,065.00 (Exhibits ‘G’, ‘G-1’, ‘G-2’ and ‘G-3’); that when he died,
he was only 40 years old and healthy, and that based on the life
history and pedigree of his family where some of its members
lived up to 100 years, she expects her husband to live for no less
than 15 years more and could have earned no less than
P828,000.00 for the family. But this, her family was deprived,
because his life was snatched away by this accident while her
husband was riding in a motorcycle which he bought for
P11,850.00 (Exhibits ‘H’ and ‘H-1’) which was also totally wrecked.
“Resulting from her husband’s death, Mrs. Abiva told the Court
that she incurred expenses for his burial and funeral in the total
amount of no less than P30,000.00 and for his wake of six days, in

70. 70
the amount of about P40,600.00 (Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-2’, ‘J-3’, ‘J-4’,
‘J-5’, and ‘J-6’). She also spent around P80,000.00 as litigation
expenses, in her quest for justice since she has to engage the
services of four (4) counsels from the time of the filing of this case
before the Hon. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Presiding Judge
of this Court who once dismissed this case, and which led
eventually to an appeal by certiorari which was later elevated up
to the Supreme Court. (Exhibits ‘K’, ‘K-1’, ‘K-2’, ‘K-3’, ‘K-4’, ‘K-5’
and ‘K-6’). Blaming the defendant, Mrs. Abiva claimed that had
Ace Haulers exercised diligence, care and prudence in the
selection and supervision of its
employees, her husband would have been spared from this
accident. Hence, her prayer for the award of P200,000.00 for the
death of her husband, who by now, could have risen in the
promotional ladder to a senior Executive of PAL and could be
earning about P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She further
prays for award of moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00
exemplary damages of P100,000.00, attorney’s fees of P50,000.00
and litigation expenses of P50,000.00.
“After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the lone witness for the
plaintiff, counsel formally offered his exhibits and rested his case.
“Gathered from the evidence presented, testimonial and
documentary, the Court finds enough legal and factual basis to
grant the claim for damages by the plaintiff. The insinuations of
negligence on the part of defendant’s driver is amply shown as
one, who drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety of life
and property of others, his utter lack of care and caution and his
unmitigated imprudence, rolled into one, all these predicated the
occurrence of this accident which took away a precious human
life.
“‘Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x
x x’ (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
“Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
“‘The obligations imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible’ (Art. 2180, 1st
paragraph, New Civil
Code)
‘x x x x x x
“‘Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, x x x’ (Article 2180 paragraph 5, New Civil Code).
“Taken in their appropriate context, and predicated on the
evidence adduced which has not been evidentiarily traversed by
the defendant, this Court is left to (sic) no other recourse but to
grant the remedies and reliefs which in her complaint plaintiff
prays for, all of them having been by her adduced evidence,
preponderantly shown and established and out of which, she has
shown herself to be completely deserving.”[3]
On September 13, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals.[4]
On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, which is hereby set aside,
the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respect.

71. 71
[G.R. Nos. 137408-10. December 8, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLY
MARQUEZ, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For automatic review by the Court is the conviction of
accused Willy Marquez, for three (3) counts of rape[1]
committed
against five-year old Maria Cristina Agustin. The three (3)
similarly worded informations, all dated February 17, 1998 allege:
That on or about the month of October 1997, at Brgy. Bacayao,
Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, and taking advantage of his superior
strength, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
MARIA CRISTINA AGUSTIN, a five year old girl, against her will, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused entered a plea of “not guilty” in
all three (3) cases. The case thereafter proceeded to trial.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the prosecution having
established the guilt of the accused Willy Marquez beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH for each crime he has committed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1536-G, 1537-G and 1538-G. Further, the accused
Willy Marquez is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party
the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The prosecution established that sometime in October
1997, the minor victim, Maria Cristina Agustin, was forcibly
dragged by accused-appellant from her house in Bacayao,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija to the banana plantation situated at the back
of the house. There, accused-appellant undressed Maria Cristina,
spat on her vagina, and had sexual intercourse with her. After the
rape, accused-appellant warned the victim not to tell anybody
what he did to her.
On another occasion also in October 1997, accused-
appellant again dragged Maria Cristina to the banana plantation
where he raped her. This was repeated still in October 1997,
when accused-appellant raped Maria Cristina a third time at the
banana plantation.
It was only on January 8, 1998 when Maria Cristina
confided to her mother in detail what appellant did to her. Upon
the advice of the police, Maria Cristina was brought by her
parents to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital for medical
examination.
Dr. Cora Lacurom, who examined Maria Cristina, found an
old healed hymenal laceration at 6:00 o’clock position, which
could have been inflicted through forced sexual intercourse
committed in or about October 1997.[2]
Denying he had anything to do with the offenses charged,
accused-appellant testified that during daytime for the whole
month of October 1997 he was at his place of work
hauling palay hay for Honofre Arenas at Barangay Bacayao,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.[3]
He further claimed that he worked from
Monday to Sunday from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and had a break
time which lasted from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m.[4]
Aside from

72. 72
hauling palay hay, accused-appellant’s work included pasturing
the cows and cleaning their wastes.[5]
During break time, accused
would hang out at the workshop (talyer) of his employer’s
brother-in-law which was just in front of his workplace.[6]
After his
dismissal from work, he would proceed to the workshop of the
brother-in-law in order to learn.[7]
In his Brief, accused-appellant raises the lone assigned
error that –
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO STATE IN THE (3) INFORMATIONS THE PRECISE
DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPES.
In support of the foregoing error, accused insists in sum
that the three (3) informations charging him with three (3) counts
of rape suffer from “constitutional and procedural infirmities” in
that the “the date and time of the offenses charged are ...
indefinite to give [him] an opportunity to prepare for his
defense.”[8]
Accused-appellant specifically alludes to the phrase
“on or about the month of October, 1997,” the dates of
commission of the crimes as alleged in the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1536-G, 1537-G and 1538-G.[9]
The argument is not novel and is bereft of merit.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the
time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a
motion for bill of particulars.[10]
The records of these cases reveal
that accused-appellant did not ask for a bill of particulars in
accordance with Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of Court,
[11]
which provides that:
SEC. 10. Bill of particulars. – Accused may, at or before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects and details desired.
The failure to move for specifications or the quashal of
information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules of
Court deprives accused of the right to object to evidence which
could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information
of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
accused with a definite crime.[12]
It is too late in the day for
accused-appellant to raise this issue because objections as to
matters of form or substance in the information can not be made
for the first time on appeal.[13]
Be that as it may, the exact date of
the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the
crime.[14]
In People v. Jesus Gianan y Molina,[15]
the Court pointedly
stated that:
It is settled that the time of the commission of rape is not an
element thereof, as this crime is defined in Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under of the circumstances enumerated
therein, i.e. (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In
accordance with Rule 110, Section 11, as long as it alleges that the
offense was committed “at any time as near to the actual date at
which the offense was committed,” an information is
sufficient. Thus, in People v. Bugayong,[16]
it was held when the
time given in the (information) is not the essence of the offense,
the time need not be proven as alleged and that the complaint
will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations and before the commencement of the action.[17]
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, this Court has held that the allegation that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994,"[18]
"sometime in
the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"[19]
and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988"[20]
constitute sufficient compliance
with Rule 110, Section 11. In any event, even if the information

73. 73
failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the
rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented
during trial and any objection based on this ground must be
deemed waived as a result of accused-appellant's failure to object
before arraignment. Accused-appellant's remedy was to move
either for a bill of particulars[21]
or for the quashal of the
information on the ground that it does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form.[22]
Indeed, under Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the
information need only state the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, while Section 11 thereof states that –
SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense.- It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which
the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit. (Italics ours)
In view of the gravity of the penalties imposed on accused-
appellant, the Court must once again defer to the following
guiding principles in the review of rape cases: 1.] to accuse a man
of rape is easy, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused
may be innocent; 2.] considering that in the nature of things, only
two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and 3.] the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merit and not be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[23]
Corollary to the
foregoing legal yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of rape
says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long
as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.[24]
The Court has said time and again that in reviewing rape
cases, it will be guided by the settled realities that an accusation
for rape can be made with facility. While the commission of the
crime may not be easy to prove, it becomes even more difficult
for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove that he did
not commit the crime. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are normally involved, the
testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized with
great caution.[25]
Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the
complainant’s credibility becomes the single most important
issue.[26]
Guided by these principles, the Court has meticulously
scrutinized the testimony of complaining witness Maria Cristina
Agustin and ultimately reached the conclusion that the acts
charged did in fact occur. Maria Cristina’s testimony on the acts
of rape perpetrated against her by accused-appellant is clear and
could have only been narrated by a victim subjected to those
sexual assaults. Nowhere is accused-appellant’s bestiality
detailed than in the following narration of the victim, who was six
years old[27]
at the time she was called to testify at the witness
stand:
FISCAL:
Q Now, do you still remember if sometime in October 1997
this Willy Marquez did something bad to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do to you this Willy Marquez?
A He brought me to the banana plantation (sagingan), sir.
Q That place where there were banana plants, is it situated
near your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q At the back of your house or in front of your house?
A At the back, sir.
Q What were you doing during the first time that Willy
Marquez brought you to the banana plantation or the

74. 74
place where there were bananas? Were you outside
the house or inside the house?
A Outside, sir.
Q You were doing what at that time? Were you playing or
doing something at that time?
A Playing, sir.
Q What time of day was that, in the morning or in the
afternoon or in the evening?
A Afternoon, sir.
Q And you said Willy Marquez brought you to that place
where there were bananas, what did he do to you
when you reach[ed] the place where there were
bananas?
A He took off my clothes, sir.
Q After taking off your clothes, what did Willy Marquez do
to you?
A He took off his clothes, sir.
Q After he took off his clothes, what did he do next?
A He spit, sir (dinuraan).
Q Willy Marquez spit on what?
A My private part, sir.
Q Your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q After spitting on your vagina, what did he do?
A He inserted, sir.
Q What did he insert?
A His private part, sir.
Q He inserted his penis into your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
A I got hurt, sir.
Q What did you do when Willy Marquez was inserting his
penis into your vagina?
A Nothing, sir.
Q What did he tell you, this Willy Marquez?
A That I should not tell anybody, sir.
Q Did he threaten you or was he trying to scare [you] that
you should not tell this to anybody?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were scared of him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, after that first experience with Willy Marquez, did
he repeat the same act in October 1997?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did he do that to you?
A Three (3) times, sir.
Q Now on the second occasion that he did that again to
you, where did he do it?
A Also in the place where there were banana plants, sir.
Q The third time that he did that to you in the same month,
October 1997, where did he do that?
A Also in the place where there were banana plants, sir.
Q The second time that Willy Marquez brought you to the
place where there were bananas, what did he do to
you?
A Also the same, sir.
Q He inserted his penis into your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he tell you anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he tell you?
A I should not tell anybody, sir.
Q The last time that he did that to you, where did he take
you?
A Also the place where there were banana plants, sir.
Q What did he do to you that third time?
A He did the same, sir.
Q He inserted his penis into your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when finally did you tell your mother or father about
what Willy Marquez did to you?

75. 75
FISCAL:
I will refresh (sic) my question your Honor.
COURT:
Do it.
FISCAL:
Q Did you finally tell your mother about what happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you tell your mother?
A The thing that Willy Marquez did to me, sir.
Q When did you tell your mother, the first time Willy
Marquez did that to you, the second time or the third
time that he did that to you?
A The witness nod[ded] her head the sign of approval the
third time.[28]
In his defense, accused-appellant interposed alibi in all
three (3) instances of rape, by claiming that during daytime for
the whole month of October 1997 he was at his place of work
hauling palay hay for Honofre Arenas at Barangay Bacayao,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.[29]
He further alleged that he worked from
Monday to Sunday from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and had a break
time which lasted from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m.[30]
Aside from
hauling palay hay, accused-appellant’s work included pasturing
the cows and cleaning their wastes.[31]
During break time, accused
would hang out at the workshop (talyer) of his employer’s
brother-in-law which was just in front of his workplace.[32]
After
his dismissal from work, he would proceed to the workshop of the
brother-in-law in order to learn.[33]
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime
was committed but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.[34]
In the case at
bar, accused-appellant failed to prove and demonstrate the
physical impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the
approximate time of its commission. No less than accused-
appellant himself admitted that his workplace was 250 meters
away from the house of the victim.[35]
Even his assertion that it
took an hour to get to the victim’s house because of the muddy
condition of the road[36]
can not discount the possibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime. As an element of a credible
alibi, “physical impossibility refers to the distance between the
place where the accused was and when the crime transpired and
the place it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places.”[37]
Accused-appellant’s allegation
that the road was muddy cannot be given credence, inasmuch as
he himself admitted that it did not rain during the month of
October 1997 because it was the height of the El
Niño phenomenon.[38]
In this connection, it must once again be
stressed that –
Alibi is almost always flawed not only by its inherent weakness
but also by its implausibility. Easily susceptible of concoction and
viewed invariably with suspicion, an alibi may be considered with
favor only when established by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence. Significantly, where no one corroborates the alibi of an
accused, such defense becomes all the weaker for this deficiency.
[39]
Neither can plain denial, a negative and self-serving evidence
stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony
made by a victim of rape.[40]
A mere denial is seldom given greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of a witness who creditably
testifies on affirmative matters.[41]
All told, the proffered alibi of accused-appellant can not
stand against the positive identification by the private
complainant that he is the culprit. Basic is the rule that alibi which
is easy to concoct can not prevail over the positive identification;
what is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the approximate time of its commission. Consequently, accused-
appellant’s defense of alibi can not prosper.[42]
Indeed, the
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credit, as the willingness of complainant to face

76. 76
police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of
a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint.
[43]
Stated differently, it is most improbable for a five-year old girl
of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein
offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true.[44]
We now address the issue of the propriety of the penalty
imposed. The trial court meted out the death penalty on accused-
appellant pursuant to Section 11 [7], of Republic Act No. 7659,
which was in force at the time of commission of the crime. The
said law provides in pertinent part:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
x x x x x x x x x;
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years
old.
The above-quoted circumstance qualifies the crime of
rape. As such, the same must be both alleged in the information
and proved with competent and convincing
evidence. Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies
certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach
to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both
alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver
penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of minors
invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death,
there must be independent evidence proving the age of the
victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and
the absence of denial by the accused. A duly certified certificate
of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some
other official document or record such as a school record, has
been recognized as competent evidence.[45]
In the case at bar, while the informations sufficiently allege
the minority of Maria Cristina, the prosecution did not present
proof to substantiate the age of the victim, such as her birth
certificate. This becomes crucial considering that the prosecution
must establish with moral certainty that the victim was below
seven (7) years old at the time of the rape, to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the penalty
imposed on accused-appellant must be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
The Court finally observes that while the trial court
awarded moral damages, it did not award any indemnity ex
delicto. A civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically given to
the offended party without need of further evidence other than
the fact of rape.[46]
Consistent, therefore, with present case law
which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as being mandatory
upon the finding of rape,[47]
accused-appellant should likewise be
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape. This civil indemnity is distinct from and awarded in addition
to moral damages, the two being based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.[48]
This is not the first time that a child has been snatched
from the cradle of innocence by some beast to sate its deviant
sexual appetite. To curb this disturbing trend, accused-appellant
should likewise be made to pay exemplary damages,[49]
which, in
line with prevailing jurisprudence, is pegged at P25,000.00,[50]
for
each count of rape.[51]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, finding accused-appellant
guilty of three (3) counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 1536-G,
1537-G AND 1538-G, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of the three counts of rape, and is ordered to
pay the offended party P150,000.00 as civil indemnity;

77. 77
P150,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Math homework help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Algebra Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Calculus Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Accounting help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Paper Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Writing Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutor
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/