164595923 case-digest-new

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LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also
appears to be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was
reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the president
issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against him, the
petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for
fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesn’t have any
jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights

against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive
against him. While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which
not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in
which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal
cases filed against him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal ofthe petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner
b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect ofthe petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does
the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service, which
is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the
power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the president the power to
appointand the inherent power to remove, such power is notwithout limit. Under the Administrative code of
1987, career services are characterized to have security oftenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from
being willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a
valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due process. According to the Court it found that,
although the procedural due process was followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a
valid cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of
the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the
petitioner was acquitted from thecriminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the
administrative case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress
independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed
any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore
there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the
authority to do so, as seen in the preamble ofthe E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though
it is admitted that the presidenthad the power to reorganize the BIR, the courtstated that such power is not
limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that
the reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the
E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence
and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non
reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been
prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case
the petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation
benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled
to back wages.
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA- ATTRITION ACT OF 2005, R.A. NO. 9335

FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of2005 and contend that by establishing a system ofrewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of
the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection as it limits the scope ofthe law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the Presidentthe
power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine ofseparation of
powers by creating a Congressional OversightCommittee to approve the law’s implementing rules.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?
HELD:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, exceptfor Section 12 ofthe law which creates a Joint Congressional
OversightCommittee to review the law’s IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries” is
purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who
are guilty of negligence, abuses,malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the
law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinctprimary function of
revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the Presidentin fixing revenue
targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected ofthe BIR
and the BOC.
However, the creation of a JointCongressional OversightCommittee for the purpose ofreviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies ofthe executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it
violates the doctrine ofseparation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2001)FACTS:
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
-
by virtue of Cory Aquino’s
EO 127, it was designatedto perform functions primarily to gather information and pieces ofevidence on
illegal activities, such as, butnot limited to the ff:a.
Economic sabotageb.
Smugglingc.
Tax evasiond.
Dollar salting

By virtue ofMemorandum Order 225, EIIB was assigned as the agency ofprimary responsibility for
ANTI-SMUGGLING OPERATIONS
11 years after, Erap issued EO 191
“Deactivationofthe EIIB” becauseoftheff:
a.
The designated functions ofEIIB are also performed by other agenciesb.
There is a need to monitor the overlapping functions
Erap issued EO 196 creating the
Presidential Anti-
SmugglingTaskForce“A
duana
”
Erap also issued EO 223, EIIB employees were separated from service pursuantto the reorganization
hence,the case.
ISSUES
:(1)
WON EO Nos. 191 and 223 are unconstitutional (Sec. 2(3) Art. IX-B) and do these amountto grave abuse
of discretion
Sec. 2 (3) Art. IX- B.
No officer or employee ofthe civil service shall be removed or suspended exceptfor cause provided by
law.
(2)
WON EO Nos. 191 and 223 are considered reorganization ofthe EIIB and if these were done in good
faith(3)
WON the Presidenthas the authority to abolish
1
EIIB
HELD/ RATIO:
(1)
The petitioners’righttosecurityoftenure isnotviolated.QuotingJ.Sarmiento:

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As
ageneral rule,
a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case ofdismissal) or separation actually
occursbecause the position itselfceases to exist. And in that case, security oftenure would not be a
Chinese wall.
There is no such thing as an absolute rightto hold office. Exceptconstitutional offices which provide
forspecial immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested rightin an office
or itssalary.(2) Yes, itis considered as reorganization. Itis valid so long as itis done in
GOOD FAITH
. It is done in good faith if it isfor the purpose ofeconomy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. RA 6656
provides for
5 circumstances of
BAD FAITH
:1. where there is a significant increase in the number ofpositions in the new staffing pattern of
thedepartmentor agency concerned;2. where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created;3. where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms ofstatus of
appointment, performance andmerit;4. where there is a classification of offices in the departmentor agency
concerned and the reclassified officesperform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and5.
where the removal violates the order ofseparation
1
One of the issues raised by the Sol. Gen. is the distinction between
abolish
and
deactivate
, but the court ruled that either way, the executivedepartmenthas the authority to do both
Even though Aduana was established after the deactivation ofEIIB, it was done for economy.
3 Justifications:
1.
No employmentwas made for the task force, they are employees ofother existing agencies.2.
The idea is to encourage and utilize personnel, facilities and resources instead ofmaintaining
anindependentoffice, which is burdensome for the government3.
Based on the budgetappropriation, itwas evident that the intent was to lessen the expenses ofEIIB
Task Force Aduana have additional powers that EIIB previously do notpossess, i.e.
power to effectsearches,seizures and arrests.
Furthermore, it has the authority to investigate cases involving ill-gotten wealth.

(3) Yes, the Presidenthas the authority to do so.
Sec. 48 of RA 7645
provides:
Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities ofAgencies Within the Executive Branch
.
–
The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activitieswhich are no longer essential in the delivery ofpublic services and which may be
scaled down, phased outor abolished,
subjectto civil service rules and regulations. XX X.
Actual scaling down, phasing outor abolition
of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office ofthe
President.’
Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327
Postedby Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
(Public Officer, Appointments,CSC)
Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointmentwas described as “permanent” butthe CSC approved it as “temporary,” subjectto the final action taken
in the protestfiled by the private respondentand another employee.
Subsequently,the CSC found the private respondentbetter qualified than the petitioner for the contested position
and, accordinglydirected that the latter be appointed to said position in place ofthe petitioner whos e appointmentis
revoked. Hence, the private respondentwas so appointed to the position byMayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner,invoking his earlier permanentappointment,questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s
appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanentappointmenton the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and,on the basis ofthis finding,order his replacement.
Held: No. The appointmentofthe petitioner was nottemporarybut permanentand was therefore protected by
Constitution.The appointing authorityindicated that it was permanent,as he had the right to do so,and it was not for
the respondentCSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to “…approve all appointments,whether original or promotional,to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointmentextended by the appointing officer,its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointmentin the lightof the requirements ofthe CSC Law.
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,the Commission has no choice but
to attest to the appointmentin accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is withoutauthority to revoke an appointmentbecause ofits beliefthat another person was better qualified,
which is an encroachmenton the discretion vested solelyin the city mayor.
MANUEL LEYSON, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 134990 (2000)
Facts: D committed a breach in his contract with P. P charged D with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC against D.
Issue: Whether P committed forum-shopping
Held:No. Forum-shoppingconsistsof filingmultiplesuitsinvolvingthe same parties for the same cause
of action,eithersimultaneouslyorsuccessively,forthe purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is
readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i.e.,
violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts, is different from the cause of action in the case
pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.
Indigent party
TEOFILO MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 132852 (2000)
Facts: P filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. He also filed a Motion to Litigate
as Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by P himself and by 2 ostensibly
disinterested persons attesting to P’s eligibility to avail himself of this privilege. The CA denied
the motion and directed P to remit the docket fees.
Issue: Whether P should be allowed to litigate as pauper
Held: Yes. P has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in
court as a pauper.He has executedanaffidavitattestingtothe factthat he andhisimmediate family do
not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut,

cannot be worthmore than P10,000.00. He has alsosubmitteda jointaffidavitexecuted by X and Y who
generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner’s own affidavit.
Bitonio vs Commission on Audit
GR No. 14732
March 12, 2004
Instant petition filed under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks the annulment
of the decision of COA denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the COA
Notices of Disallowance.
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in the DOLE. Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of DOLE designated Bitonio
to be the DOLE representative to the Boiard directors of PEZA. After post audit of
PEZA’s disbursement transactions, COA disallowed the per diem of Bitonio.
Arguments of COA:
1. Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to
primary office are not allowed to receive compensation to subsequent office
Argument of Bitonio:
1. Rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant secretary are not covered by the
prohibition
2. Section 11 RA No. 7916 was enacted four years after Civil Liberties Union become final
thus Congress is presumed to be aware of the parameters.
3. RA No. 7916 is presumed to be valid.
4. RA No. 7916 is more superior than COA Memorandum No. 97-038. (Statute vs
Administrative directive)
Ruling of the Court:
1. Article VII Section 13 of 1987 Constitution’
2. Dela Cruz v Commission on Audit – if a secretary of Finance attends a monetary board
meeting as an ex officio member, he is actually and in legal compensation performing
the primary function of his principal office
3. Whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is
likewise, not exempted.
4. Constitution is more superior than a statute
RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA No. 8748 to cure the defect
Bitonio vs Commission on Audit
GR No. 14732
March 12, 2004

Instant petition filed under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeks the annulment
of the decision of COA denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the COA
Notices of Disallowance.
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in the DOLE. Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of DOLE designated Bitonio
to be the DOLE representative to the Boiard directors of PEZA. After post audit of
PEZA’s disbursement transactions, COA disallowed the per diem of Bitonio.
Arguments of COA:
1. Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to
primary office are not allowed to receive compensation to subsequent office
Argument of Bitonio:
1. Rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant secretary are not covered by the
prohibition
2. Section 11 RA No. 7916 was enacted four years after Civil Liberties Union become final
thus Congress is presumed to be aware of the parameters.
3. RA No. 7916 is presumed to be valid.
4. RA No. 7916 is more superior than COA Memorandum No. 97-038. (Statute vs
Administrative directive)
Ruling of the Court:
1. Article VII Section 13 of 1987 Constitution’
2. Dela Cruz v Commission on Audit – if a secretary of Finance attends a monetary board
meeting as an ex officio member, he is actually and in legal compensation performing
the primary function of his principal office
3. Whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is
likewise, not exempted.
4. Constitution is more superior than a statute
RA No. 7916 was later amended by RA No. 8748 to cure the defect
Cayetano vs Monsod
9MAY
201 SCRA 210, 1991
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April
25, 1991. Cayetano opposedthe nomination because allegedly Monsod doesnot possessthe required
qualificationof having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the
validity of the confirmationby the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner
filed a petition for Certiorariand Prohibitionpraying that said confirmationand the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Electionsbe declared null and void
because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practicedlaw for the last ten years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable considerationengages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporationsasto their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity asan advocate in proceedingspending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constitutedby law or authorized to
settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engagesin the business
of advising clientsas to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performsany act or acts either
in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinationsof
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the IntegratedBar of the
Philippines since its inceptionin 1972-73. He has also been paying his professionallicense feesas
lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’spast work experiencesasa lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutionalrequirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81;
22 SEPT 1986]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidatesin Antique
for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to
enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being
the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve
of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these
murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to theCommission on Elections
to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that

the proclamationwas void because made only by a division and not by
the Commissionon Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on
the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private
respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial
but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with
what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make themotions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest
FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest
number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra,
and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his
election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one
vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from
the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The
judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or initial,
should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and
Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly
reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no
power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC
in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact
shall be final and non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not
taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant
ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall
“Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests
are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section.
Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed
directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar

as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case
should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
--- OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs MADRIAGA and BERNARDO Case Digest
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO
503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The Ombudsman’s authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the bounds of the law.
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie
Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1
of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found
guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the Office of
the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the
Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
sanctions over public officials
HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative
disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to
―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure
compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar.
That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman
to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating
therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No.
6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper
officer.
Isagani Cruz vs DENR
on January 29, 2012
Land Titles and Deeds – IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that,
by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain –
somehow against the regalian doctrine.
Lee Hong Kok vs. David
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an
order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds
then issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it
as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised
by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept
of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under

dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to
an unlaw fuldeprivation of the State’s ow nership over lands of the public domain as w ellas minerals and other naturalresources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestraldomains w hich may include naturalresources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestraldomains”
and “ancestrallands” which might even include private lands found w ithin said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landow ners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there w as no majority vote, Cruz’s petition w as dismissed and the IPRA law wassustained. Hence, ancestraldomains may include natural
resources – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo w ent to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the ow ner of a 146 hectare land he’s been
possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessoryinformation and no other documentation. The State opposed the
petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that
a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightfulow ner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute ow ner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It w as never used foranything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrec tion against Spain it has
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has alw aysrecognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has alw ays
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain fromthem his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute ow ner.
GR NO. 127882 DECEMBER 1, 2004 (MR)
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSN., vs. DENR
FACTS: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court that challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3)

the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
ISSUE: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance
only?
RULING: The Court did not see how applying a strictly literal or verbalegis interpretation of
paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the
drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x xx involving either technical or
financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The
drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or
technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be
very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving"
signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do
with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word
"involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the
sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring,"
"implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly,
none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving,"
when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance,
necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other
words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such
assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations
are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very
apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against
"agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a
verbalegis approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so
unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true
intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely
prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or
words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, there
was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an
intent not to use the expression "agreements x xx involving either technical or financial
assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI
Corporation
on February 27, 2012
09 July 2002
Land Titles and Deeds – Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain.
CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)

FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private
entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the
negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price
of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in
price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for
seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited
in favor of the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession
over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight
Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One
Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred
(P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per
square meter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed
or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable
natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of
submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2,
Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still
submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total
area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended
JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation,
although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title
would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent
third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor
Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands
remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."
Godinez vs. Fong, 120 SCRA 223, G.R.No. L-36731 January 27, 1983
VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA, defendant-appellee.

Dominador Sobrevinas for plaintiffs-appellants.
Muss S. Inquertofor defendant-appellee
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel oflandsoldbytheir father, now deceased, to FongPakLuen, analien, onthe
ground that the sale was nullandvoidab initiosince it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Co de.
The order of the Court of First Instance of Suludismissingthe complaint was appealedto the Court of Appeals but the latter
court certifiedthe appeal to us since onlypure questions of law were raised bythe appellants.
The facts of the case were summarizedbythe Court of Appeals as follows:
On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs fileda complaint inthe Court of First Instance ofSuluallegingamong others that theyare
the heirs of Jose Godinez who was marriedto Martina AlvarezGodinez sometime in1910;that during the marriage of their
parents the saidparents acquireda parcel of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with anarea of3,665 square meters as evidenced
byOriginal Certificate of Title No. 179 (D -155) in the name ofJose Godinez;that their mother died sometime in1938 leaving
the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs;that on November 27, 1941, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the saidJo se
Godinez, for valuable consideration, soldthe aforesaidparcel of landto the defendant FongPakLuen, a Chinese citizen, which
transactionis contraryto lawandinviolationof the Civil Code because the latter beinganalienwhois inhibited bylaw to
purchase real property;that Transfer Certificate Title No. 884 was thenissuedbythe Register of Deeds to the said defendant,
which is null andvoid abinitiosince the transaction constituteda non-existent contract;that on January11, 1963, said
defendant Fong PakLuen executeda power ofattorneyinfavor of hisco-defendant KwanPun Ming, also analien, who
conveyed and sold the above described parcel of landto co-defendant TrinidadS. Navata, who is aware ofand withfull
knowledge that Fong Pak Luenis a Chinese citizenas well as KwanPunMing, whounder the law are prohibitedanddisqualified
to acquire real property inthis jurisdiction;that defendant Fong Pak Luenhasnot acquiredanytitle or interest insaid parcel of
landas the purportedcontract of sale executed byJose Godinezalone was contraryto law andconsiderednon- existent, so
much so that the alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant KwanPun Ming had not conveyed anytitle or interest over said property
and defendant Navata hadnot acquired anything fromsaid grantor andas a consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322,
which was issuedbythe Register of Deeds in favor of the latter is null andvoid abinitio,- that since one-halfof the said
propertyis conjugal propertyinheritedbythe plaintiffs from their mother, Jose Godinez could -not have legallyconveyedthe
entire property;that notwithstanding repeated demands on saiddefendant to surrender to plaintiffs the saidpropertyshe
refusedandstill refuses to do soto the great damage andprejudice of the plaintiffs;andthat theywere constrainedto engage
the services of counsel inthe sum ofP2,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët The plaintiffs thus praythat theybe adjudgedas the owners of the
parcel of land inquestion andthat Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issuedinthe name of defendant Fong PakLuenbe
declarednull andvoid ab initio;andthat the power of attorneyissuedinthe name of Kwan PunMing, as well as Transfer
Certificate ofTitle No. 'L322 issuedinthe name of defendant Navata be likewise declarednull andvoid, withcosts against
defendants.
On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed ananswer claiming that he wasnot yet the register of deeds then;
that it was onlythe ministerial dutyof his office to issue the title in favor of the defendant Navata once he was determinedthe
registerabilityof the documents presented to hisoffice.
On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filedher answer withthe affirmative defenses andcounterclaim alleging among
others that the complaint does not state a cause ofactionsince it appears fromthe allegationthat the propertyis registeredin
the name ofJose Godinez sothat as his sole propertyhe maydispose of the same; that the cause of action has beenbarredby
the statute of limitations as the allegeddocument ofsale executedbyJose Godinez onNovember 27, 1941, conveyed the
propertyto defendant Fong Pak Luenas a result of which a title wasissued to saiddefendant;that under Article 1144 (1) of the
Civil Code, an action basedupona writtencontract must be brought within10 years fromthe time the right of actionaccrues;
that the right ofactionaccruedonNovember 27, 1941 but the complaint was filedonlyon September 30, 1966, beyondthe 10
year periodprovidedfor bylaw;that the torrens title inthe name of defendant Navata is indefeasible whoacquiredth e
propertyfrom defendant Fong PakLuen whohad beenin possessionof the propertysince 1941 andthereafter defendant
Navata had possessedthe same for the last 25 years including the possession ofFong PakLuen;that the complaint is intended
to harassthe defendant as a civic leader andrespectable member of the communityas a result of which she suffered moral
damages ofP100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 expenses of litigation, hence, saiddefendant prays that th e
complaint be dismissedandthat her counterclaimbe granted, with costs against the plaintiffs. On November 24, 1967, the

plaintiffs filedan answer to the affirmative defensesand counter-claim. As the defendants Fong PakLuenand KwanPun Ming
are residingoutside the Philippines, the trialcourt uponmotionissued anorder of April17, 1967, for the service of summons
on saiddefendants bypublication. No answer hasbeen filed bysaiddefendants.
On December 2, 196 7, the court issuedanorder as follows:
Both parties having agreedto the suggestionof the Court that theysubmit their supplemental pleadings to support both
motionandoppositionandafter submittal ofthe same the saidmotionto dismiss whichis anaffirmative defense allegedinthe
complaint is deemedsubmitted. Failure ofbothpartiesor either partyto submit their supplemental pleadings onor about
December 9, the Court will resolve the case.
On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued anorder missingthe complaint without pronouncement as to costs. (Recordon
Appeal, pp. 31- 37). A motionfor reconsideration of this order wasfiled bythe plaintiffs on December 12, 196F, whichwas
denied bythe trialcourt in anorder of July11, 1969, (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now interp ose this
appeal withthe following assignments of errors:
I. The trial court erredindismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint onthe groundof prescriptionof action, applying Art. 1144
(1) New Civil Code onthe basisof defendant TrinidadS. Navata's affirmative defense of prescriptioninher answer treatedas a
motionto dismiss.
II. The trial court erredindenyingplaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsiderationof the order ofdismissal.
III. The trial court erredinnot ordering this case to be triedon the merits."
The appellants contend that the lower court erredin dismissing the complaint on the groundthat their cause ofactionhas
prescribed. While the issue raised appears to be onlythe applicabilityof the law governing prescription, the real question
before us is whether or not the heirs ofa personwhosolda parcel of landto an alienin violationof a constitutional prohibition
mayrecover the propertyif it had, in the meantime, been conveyedto a Filipinocitizenqualifiedto own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairlyclearlyhow the questionshould be resolved.
There canbe nodispute that the sale in1941 byJose Godinez of his residential lot acquiredfrom the Bureau ofLands as part of
the Jolotownsite to FongPakLuen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative ofSection5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitutionwhichprovided:
Sec. 5. Save in casesof hereditarysuccession, no private agricultural landwill be transferredor assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or holdlands of the public domain inthe Philippines.
The meaningof the above provisionwas fullydiscussedinKrivenkov. Register of Deeds ofManila (79 Phil. 461) whichalso
detailedthe evolution ofthe provisioninthe public landlaws, Act No. 2874 andCommonwealthAct No. 141. The Krivenko
ruling that "under the Constitutionaliens maynot acquire private or agricultural lands, includingresidential lands" is a
declarationof an imperative constitutionalpolicy. Consequently, prescriptionmaynever be invokedto defend that whichthe
Constitutionprohibits. However, we see nonecessityfromthe facts of this case to pass uponthe nature of the contract of sale
executedbyJose Godinez and Fong PakLuen whether voidabinitio, illegal per se or merelypro-exhibited.** It is enoughto
stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescriptionis unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs relyon an
argument based onimprescriptibilitybecause the landsold in1941 is now inthe hands ofa Filipinocitizenagainst whomthe
constitutionalprescriptionwas never intendedto apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simplythe
applicationof the statute of limitations.
From the fact that prescriptionmaynot be usedto defenda contract whichthe Constitutionprohibits, it does not necessarily
followthat the appellants maybe allowedto recover the propertysoldto analien. As earlier mentioned, Fong PakLuen, the
disqualifiedalien vendee later soldthe same propertyto Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizenqualifiedto acquire real property.
In Vasquez v. Li SengGiap and Li SengGiap& Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alienve ndeelater sold the propertyto a Filipino
corporation, this Court, inaffirming a judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale ofreal propertyto the defendant Li
Seng Giap onJanuary22, 1940, on the groundthat the vendee was analien and under the Constitutionincapable to ownand
hold title to lands, held:

In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao49 Qff Gaz., 4321;Talento vs. Makiki 49 Off. Gaz., 4331;Bautista vs. Uy49 Off. Gaz., 4336;Rellosa vs. Gaw
Chee 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercadovs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360, the majorityof this Court has ruledthat insalesof real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto byvirtue ofthe provisions of the Constitution (Section5, Article XIII Krivenko
vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) boththe vendor and the vendee are deemedto have committed the constitutional
violationand beingthus inpari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305, oldCivil Code;Article
1411, new Civil Code) Fromthis ruling three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes andthe writer. See
Caoile vs. Yu ChiaoTalento vs. Makiki Bautista us. Uy, Rellosavs. Gaw Chee andMercadovs. GoBio). supra.
The actionis not ofrescission because it is not postulated upon anyof the grounds providedfor inArticle 1291 of the oldCivil
Code andbecause the actionof rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is anactionfor annulment under
Chapter VI, Title II, Book 11, on nullityof contracts, based ona defect inthe contract whichinvalidatesit independentlyof such
lesionor damages. (Manresa, Commentarios al CodigoCivil Espanol Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is verylikelythat the majorityof
this Court proceededuponthat theorywhen it applied the in pari delictorule referredto above.
In the UnitedStates the rule is that in a sale of real estate to analiendisqualifiedto hold title thereto the vendor divests himself
of the title to suchreal estate andhas norecourse against the vendee despite the latter's disabilityon account of alienage to
hold title to suchrealestate and the vendee mayholdit against the whole worldexcept as against the State. It is onlythe State
that is entitledbyproceedings in the nature of office foundto have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee whois
incapable of holding title to the real estate soldand conveyedto him. Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327;Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4
Law, Ed. 460;3 Wheat, 563, 589590;Cross vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.]513;17 Law. Ed., 515;Governeur vs. Robertson, 11
Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.)
However, if the State does not commence suchproceedings and inthe meantime the alienbecomes naturalized citizen, the
State is deemedto have waivedits right to escheat the real propertyandthe title ofthe alien theretobecomes lawful andvalid
as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him. (Ostermanvs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116, 18 Law. ed. 730;Manuel vs. Wulff, 152
U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532;Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470;Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The rule inthe UnitedStates
that in a sale of realestate to analien disqualified to holdtitle thereto, the vendor divests himselfof the title to such real estate
and is not permitted to sue for the annulment Of his Contract, is alsothe rule under the Civil Code. ... Article 1302 of the old
Civil Code provides:... Persons sui juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacityof those with whomthey
contracted;...
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (I)f the banon aliens fromacquiring not onlyagricultural but, also urbanlands, as construedbythis Court in the Krivenko
case, is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved bymakinglawful the acquisition ofreal estate byaliens whobecame Filipino citizens bynaturalization. The title to the
parcel of land ofthe vendee, a naturalizedFilipinocitizen, beingvalidthat of the domestic corporationto whichthe parcel of
landhas beentransferred, must alsobe valid, 96.67 per cent of its capitalstock beingowned byFilipinos.
Herrera v. LuyKim Guan(SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling bydeclaring that where landis soldto a Chinese citizen, who
later soldit to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) whichrelaxedthe pari delicto
doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, inappropriate cases, to recover that whichtheir predecessors soldto
aliens.
Onlyrecently, in Sarsosavda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we hadoccasion to pass upon a factual situation
substantiallysimilar to the one inthe instant case. We ruled:
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated propertyis nowinthe hands of a naturalizedFilipino. It is nolonger owned by
a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalizedcitizen, wasconstitutionallyqualifiedto ownthe subject property. There
wouldbe no more public policyto be servedinallowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is alreadyinthe hands of a
qualified person. Applyingbyanalogythe ruling of thisCourt inVasquezvs. Giap& Sons:(.96 Phil. 447 [1955])
... if the banon aliens fromacquiring not onlyagricultural but also urbanlands, as construedbythis Court in the Krivenkocase,
is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations ofFilipinos, that aim or purpose wouldnot be thwartedbut achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate byaliens whobecame Filipinocitizens bynaturalization.

While, strictlyspeaking, OngKing Po, private respondent's vendor, hadno rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise in
escapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inactionor inexcusable
neglect, she shouldbe heldbarredfrom asserting her claimto the litigatedproperty(Sottovs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978])
Laches hasbeen defined as the failure or neglect, for anunreasonable and unexplainedlengthof time, to dothat which by
exercising due diligence could or shouldhave been done earlier;it is negligence or ommission to assert a right withina
reasonable time, warrantinga presumptionthat the partyentitledto assert it either hasabandonedit or declinedto assert it.
(Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35).' (Cited inSotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154
[1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declaredto be the rightful owner of the property.
In the light ofthe above considerations, we findthe secondand third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata,
the titledowner of the propertyis declaredthe rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appealis hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and denyingthe motionfor
reconsiderationare affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez andRelova, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
** Under the facts inSarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco(113 SCRA 547), this Court statedthat "(t)here should be noquestion
that the sale of the land inquestion in 1936 byEpifania Sarsosa to OngKing Po was non-existent andvoid fromthe beginning
(Art. 1409 [71, Civil Code) because it was a contract executedagainst the mandatoryprovisionof the 1935 Constitution, which
is anexpressionof public policyto conserve lands for the Filipinos." In Philippine BankingCorporationv. Lui She (21 SCRA 52)
the Court, however, applied Article 1416 of the Civil Code, whichrefers to agreements not illegal se but merelyprohibited, to
justifythe exceptionto the rule on pari delicto.
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ
111 SCRA 82
FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a
French.
In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part
to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3
was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian.
The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates
the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD: No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless.
The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in
the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

ARTICLE 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
Albano vs. Reyes Case Digest
Albano vs. Reyes
(175 SCRA 264)
Facts: On April 20, 1987, the PPA ( Philippine Ports Authority ) Board adopted its Resolution No.
850 directing PPA management to prepare the Invitation to Bid and all relevant documents and
technical requirements necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and
operation for the MICT ( leasing as well as to implement this project. Respondent Secretary Reyes
created a 7 man “Special MICT Bidding Committee” charged with all bid proposals.
After evaluation of the seven companies that submitted bids, the committee recommended the
award of the contract to ICTSI for having offered the best technical and financial proposal. However,
before the MICT contract could be signed, 2 cases were filed against respondents which assailed
the legality and regularity of the bidding. But on May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines
approved the proposed MICT Contract with specific directives on the part of the PPA and the
contractor ICTSI.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Albano, the petitioner filed a petition assailing the award of the MICT contract to
ICTSI claiming that the former is a public utility and therefore needs a legislative franchise before it
can legally operate as a public utility, pursuant to Article 12, Sec 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the MICT needs a legislative franchise from Congress to legally operate as a
public utility?
Held: NO. EO No. 30 dated July16, 1986 provides for the immediate recall of the franchise granted
to the Manila International Port Terminals Inc., and authorize the PPA to take over, manage and
operate the Manila International Port Complex at North Harbor, Manila and undertake the provision
of cargo handling and port related services thereat, in accordance with PD 857 and other applicable
laws and regulations.

Sec. 6 of PD 857 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PPA provides as one of the
corporate duties of the PPA is to provide services ( whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise )
within the Port Districts and the approaches thereof including but not limited to…
As stated above, PPA has been tasked under EO No. 30, with the management and operation of the
Manila International Port Complex in accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and
regulations. However, PD 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself, by
contracting it out, or through other means. Reading EO No. 30 and PD 857 together, the
inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the
operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another
by contract or other means at its option. The latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a
franchise from Congress to authorize an entity other than the PPA to operate and manage the MICP
becomes unnecessary.
Therefore, PPA’s act of privatizing the MICT and awarding the Contract to ICTSI are wholly within its
jurisdiction under its Charter which empowers the PPA to “supervise, control, regulate, construct,
maintain, operate and provide such facilities necessary in the ports vested”.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
PLDT, digested
Postedby Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law– EminentDomain,Expropriation,JustCompensation)
FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suitagainstprivate respondentpraying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the GovernmentTelephone System and that of PLDT, so
that the Government Telephone System could make use ofthe lines and facilities ofthe PLDT. Private respondent
contends thatit cannotbe compelled to enter into a contract where no agreementis had between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDTand the Government Telephone System can be a valid object
for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminentdomain,the Republic mayrequire the telephone
companyto permitinterconnection as the needs ofthe governmentservice may require,subjectto the payment of
justcompensation.The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone
systems,through expropriation can be a subjectto an easementofrightof way.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325.
March 19, 1997)
25APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in
their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
“Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin
asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375
failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for

in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission
must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to
stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the
Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having
intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is
clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-
written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the “initiatory”
Delfin Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly proposed by the people through initiative,”
there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.”
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority’s two other rulings.
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support
of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC
21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967

Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be
amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number
of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
1. Does the Congress (through ordinarylegislative process) have the power to amend or propose amendment
to the Constitution?
2. May the proposed amendments be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections?
Held:
1. No.The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress.It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress,but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function,for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, am endments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law,it follows that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. The Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

2. Yes. The term “election” in article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not indicate that the “election” therein
referred to is a “special”, not a general election. The circum stance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merelyshows thatcongress deemed
it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC- kring zamora group 3
Jan 21 2004
Parties: - Petitioners: Arturo Tolentino, Arturo Mojica
- Respondents: COMELEC, Ralph Recto, Gregorio Honasan
- Ponente: Carpio
Background:
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside the COMELEC’s Resolutions which proclaimed official and final the 13
candidates elected as Senators in the May 14 2001 elections.
Facts of the Case
In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated w/ the appointment of then Sen.
Guingona as VP of the PI.
The Senate then adopted Resolution #84 wc: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate & 2) called the
COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously w/ the regular election on
May 14 2001,and 3) declared the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highestnumber ofvotes shall serve only for
the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona. Accdg to the Senate, this Resolutn is for the “guidance” &
“implementatn” of the COMELEC, &that it had NO discretion to alter the said procedure.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired 3yr term in the special
electn. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the 12 regular Senate seats w/ a 6yr term
each. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents (eg Voter Info Sheet, List of Candidates, Sample Ballot).
The Listof Candidates DID NOT provide 2 different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the 12 regular 6-

year term seats & the single 3-year term seat. Nor did the ballots provide a separate space for the candidate to be
voted in the special election & instead provided 13 spaces for 13 senatorial seats.
Without any COMELEC resolution/notice on the time,place & manner ofthe special election,the special election was
held on the scheduled May 14 2001 regular elections.
A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done.
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted for violating the precedents set by the
1951 & 1955 special elections,both of wc were held simultaneously & yet distinctly w/ the regular gen eral elections.
Thus, they pray that the Court declare that 1) NO special elections were held & that 2) Comelec’s Resolutions that
proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the 13th
highest # of votes as a duly elected be declared
NULL&VOID
Issue/s
Procedural Issues: 1) WON the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter bec respondents say it is a quo
warranto proceeding (a proceeding wc determines the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office & to oust
him from it if his claim is not well-founded), where only the Senate Electoral Tribunal can serve as judge.
2) WON the petition is MOOT
3) WON the petitioner have locus standi
Substantive Issue: WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May
14 2001, despite the lack of a “call” for such an election & for lack of notice from COMELEC
Ratio Decidendi
The petition HAS NO MERIT.
Procedural Issues: 1) YES, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction bec what the petitioners are questioning
here is the validity of the special election in wc Honasan was elected, NOT his right in the exercise of his office as
Senator. His election is merely incidental to the petitioner’s case of action.
2) Although the petition may be moot, it is no bar for the Court to decide on its resolution bec the question of the
validity of a special election is likely to be repeated
3) YES, the Court shall be liberal in applying its rule of locus standi bec the issues raised are of transcendental
significance & paramount importance to the people, for it involves the people’s right for suffrage.

Substantive Issue:
YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001. Although COMELEC
DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements ofRA 6645,either strictly or substantially, it does NOT invalidate the special
election. WHY?
A) Bec although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166
already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the voters w/ knowledge of this
statutory notice & COMELEC’s failure to give additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it.
B) Moreover, there is no proof that the COMELEC’s failure to give a formal notice of the Office to be filled & the
manner ofdetermining the winner in the special election actually misled voters & thereby changed the results of the
election. After all, the voters can be duly notified through other sources such as media reports & election propaganda
during the campaign.
C) Our election laws DO NOT require that a separate documentation or canvassing of votes be made for a special
election.COMELEC acted w/in its constitutional powers when itchose to abandon the precedents of the 1951 &1955
special elections & instead adopted the Senate’s Resolution 84 wc shall award to the senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th
highest number of votes, the unexpired Senate term of Sen. Guingona. The Court shall not interfere.
note: the Senate (through Roco’s suggestion), in Resolution 84 felt that giving the 3year term to the candidate w / the 13th
highest
number of votes w as being practical & economical)
In fine, the Court is loathe to annul elections despite certain irregularities unless itis impossible to distinguish wc laws
are lawful & wc are not. This is to acknowledge the fact that suffrage is one form of people’s direct participation in
government, & it is thus indispensable in a democratic society like ours.
***REMINDER to COMELEC*** : the Court however, reminded the COMELEC to not take chances anymore in future
elections.COMELEC reminded to next time, comply strictly w/ all the requirements of the law regarding both regular
& special elections.
Appendix:
1) Puno’s Dissenting Opinion (joined by Davide, Vitug, Ynares-Santiage & Tinga)
The electorate should have been informed of the time, place & manner of conduct of the May 14 2001 special
election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of VP Guingona. The cases of Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo
Umpar Adiong & Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely
free, orderly&honestelection is predicated upon an informed electorate. The cases of Bince & Benito also teach us
that correct ascertainment of the will of the people is equally necessary. In not allowing the voter to separately
indicate the candidate he voted for the 3yr senatorial term, the voter was deprived of his right to make an informed
judgment based on his own reasons&valuations. Thus, his true will in the special election was not ascertained.
It is the ponencia’s argument that RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular ele ction.

However, this is NOT the intention of the said laws, for they still require that the COMELEC issue an official notice of
call of special elections.Likewise, neither RA 6645 nor RA 7166 contemplates the integration of the special election
into the regular election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the regular elections also
automaticallystand as candidates in the special election. The Omnibus Election Code is clear that a candidate can
run for only 1 position in an election.
The ponencia likewise cites the Duquette case to lend support to its thesis that statutory notice suffices. In Duquette,
it was held that in the absence ofan official notice of the special election mandated by law to be held simultaneously
w/ the regular election, there should be actual notice of the electorate, as proven by the voting of a significant
percentage of the electorate. In the case at bar however, the number of votes cast for the special election cannot be
ascertained as the ballotdid not indicate separatelythe votes for special election.Thus,there is neither official notice
nor proof of actual notice.
The Senate’s observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be lost costly for the govt
as the ballots need not be printed separately does not justify the manner of the May 14 2001 special election. We
cannotbargain the electorate’s fundamental right to vote intelligently w/ of the coin of convenience. Besides, even w/
the Senate observation, the regular ballot had to be modified anyway, to include a 13th
space.
Reliance on RA 6645 as amended by RA 7166 is ERRONEOUS, for under it, it is the COMELEC and NOT the
Senate wc is supposed to call & hold special elections in case ofvacancy. The Senate has NO POWER to impose on
the COMELEC the procedure for the special election.
In fine, the ponencia’s ruling will not only be a step back in time but also constitute a fall in the nation’s rise to
democracy. Free elections does not only mean that the voter is not physically restrained from going to the polling
booth but also that the voter is unrestrained by the bondage of ignorance.
2) 1951 & 1955 elections: In the 1951 & 1955 elections,wc were supposed to serve as models for special elections:
a) a separate space was provided in the official ballotfor senatorial candidates running for the 2yr term,b) candidates
for the single Senate term of 2 yrs filed separate & distinct certificates of candidacy, c) tallying & canvassing were
separated for the regular&special elections.
Gonzales vs COMELEC
on October 30, 2011
** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC
Constitutional Law – Political Question vs Justiciable Question

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional
amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be
more interested in the issues involved in the election. It was contended that such issue cannot be
properly raised before the courts because it is a political one.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to
indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that
the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It
does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC
also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the
same would be or the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one.
Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary
on October 30, 2011
Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973 Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a
Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same
was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is
not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the
1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was

left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
Sanidad vs Comelec - A case Digest
PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras
COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.
FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a
plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.
Allegations of Sanidad:
1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press
2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal
provsions in case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a
valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA
6646
-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space
and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason
3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

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