The document provides a summary of the impact of economic sanctions on poverty and economic growth. It finds that sanctions generally fail to achieve their aims and negatively impact ordinary citizens more than political leaders. Specifically:
- Sanctions increase poverty and the poverty gap by harming important economic sectors that employ many low-skilled workers. This disproportionately impacts the most deprived sections of society.
- Sanctions damage income equality and living standards more than they change government behavior. Elites can better negotiate the effects while poorer citizens suffer more.
- In Sudan, sanctions have not changed government actions and poverty is used as a political tool. Sanctions also reduce aid delivery, exacerbating poverty. While oil exports boosted growth, overall
Poverty is associated with political conflict in developing countries, but evidence of individual grievances translating into dissent among the poor is mixed. We analyze survey data from 40 developing nations to understand the determinants radicalism, support for violence, and participation in legal anti-regime actions as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes. In particular, we examine the role of perceived political and economic inequities. Our findings suggest that individuals who feel marginalized tend to harbor extremist resentments against the government, but they are generally less likely to join collective political movements that aim to instigate regime changes. This potentially explains the commonly-observed pattern in low- and middle-income countries whereby marginalized groups, despite their political attitudes and high-levels of community engagement, are more difficult to mobilize in nation-wide movements. We also find that arenas for active political participation (beyond voting) are more likely to be dominated by upper-middle income groups who are committed, ultimately, to preserving the status quo. Suppressing these forms of political action may thus be counterproductive, if it pushes these groups towards more radical preferences. Finally, our findings suggest that the poor, in developing nations, may be caught in a vicious circle of self-exclusion and greater marginalization.
Anders Olofsgård (with R. Desai and T. Yousef).
How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using village-level data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure, a practice called Umuganda. This practice was highly politicized and, in the years before the genocide, regularly used for spreading political propaganda. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional
variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. These results pass a number of indirect tests of the exclusion restriction as well as other robustness checks and placebo tests.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
Poverty is associated with political conflict in developing countries, but evidence of individual grievances translating into dissent among the poor is mixed. We analyze survey data from 40 developing nations to understand the determinants radicalism, support for violence, and participation in legal anti-regime actions as petitions, demonstrations, and strikes. In particular, we examine the role of perceived political and economic inequities. Our findings suggest that individuals who feel marginalized tend to harbor extremist resentments against the government, but they are generally less likely to join collective political movements that aim to instigate regime changes. This potentially explains the commonly-observed pattern in low- and middle-income countries whereby marginalized groups, despite their political attitudes and high-levels of community engagement, are more difficult to mobilize in nation-wide movements. We also find that arenas for active political participation (beyond voting) are more likely to be dominated by upper-middle income groups who are committed, ultimately, to preserving the status quo. Suppressing these forms of political action may thus be counterproductive, if it pushes these groups towards more radical preferences. Finally, our findings suggest that the poor, in developing nations, may be caught in a vicious circle of self-exclusion and greater marginalization.
Anders Olofsgård (with R. Desai and T. Yousef).
How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using village-level data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure, a practice called Umuganda. This practice was highly politicized and, in the years before the genocide, regularly used for spreading political propaganda. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional
variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. These results pass a number of indirect tests of the exclusion restriction as well as other robustness checks and placebo tests.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business-
government relationships. We present a simple model in which influence requires firms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political influence improves the business environment for selected firms, but restricts their ability to fire workers. Under these conditions, if political influence primarily lowers fixed costs over variable costs, then favored firms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will suffer, even if they earn higher profits than non-influential firms. We rely on the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 firms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We find that influential firms benefit from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these firms are worse-performing than their non-influential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
International Journal of Business and Management Invention (IJBMI)inventionjournals
International Journal of Business and Management Invention (IJBMI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Business and Management. IJBMI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Business and Management, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online
Amplifying and nullifying the impact of democratic sanctions through aid to c...Paulina Pospieszna
Both foreign aid and sanctions are foreign policy tools to promote
democracy. Yet, it is unclear how far incentives and coercion
enhance democratization. Since sanctions and aid are often
employed at the same time, the goal of this study is to determine
their joint effect on democratization in target/recipient countries.
We argue that sending democracy aid through civil society organizations
enhances the effectiveness of sanctions as a democracy
promotion tool because the civil society is empowered to introduce
democratic changes. Thus, in addition to the top-down
pressure on the target government created by sanctions, there
is a bottom-up pressure exerted by the civil society. Our empirical
results show that democratic sanctions by the European Union
and the United States are more likely to have a positive effect
when aid flows bypass the government. Conversely, aid channeled
through the public sector mitigates the generally positive
effect of sanctions on democracy. In order to estimate these joint
effects, we employ a new comprehensive dataset on economic
sanctions: the EUSANCT Dataset which integrates and updates
existing databases on sanctions for the period between 1989 and
2015, merged with disaggregated OECD aid data and V-Dem
democracy scores.
The United States of America is in the midst of an enormous demographic and economic transformation; effects are witnessed through decreased labor force participation, stagnant economic growth, and financially strained government programs. Layered within the demographic change is a system morphed through partisan interests and inequitable assumptions. The country’s social insurance programs perpetuate on guarantees that supporters receive similar benefits as needed. Academics and government officials have warned of the coming population wave for decades, yet little action has been taken to mitigate associated problems.
Safety nets are critical for developed nations to maintain minimum living standards and some forms are sustainable. U.S. social insurance programs are underfunded by $39.698 trillion dollars, net of assets and future tax revenue, if continued under the current structure. The following research is provided to raise awareness of the existing system’s insolvency, generational inequity, and long-term costs in hope of instigating the necessary discussion of realigning economic, fiscal, and social policies onto a sustainable trajectory.
Arrangements by which influential firms receive economic favors, has been documented in numerous case studies but rarely formalized or analyzed quantitatively. We offer a formal voting model in which political influence is modeled as a contract by which politicians deliver a more preferential business environment to favored firms who, in exchange, protect politicians from the political consequences of high unemployment. From this perspective, cronyism simultaneously lowers a firm’s fixed costs while raising its variable wage costs. Testing several of the implications of the model on firm-level data from 26 transition countries, we find that more influential firms face fewer administrative and regulatory obstacles and carry bloated payrolls, but they also invest and innovate less. These results do not change when using propensity-score matching to adjust for the fact that influence is not randomly assigned.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
In this paper I examine the development effects of coups. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically-elected leaders imply a different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders, and that these differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy. Secondly, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coups as well as implementing matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental. I find no evidence that these results are symptomatic of alternative hypothesis involving the effects of failed coups or political transitions. Thirdly, when overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises and political instability, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Find more research publications at https://www.hhs.se/site
Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-reports/dj-vu-in-myanmar.html - Over the past two months, Myanmar has plunged into a political crisis. Myanmar’s tentative political transition towards democracy, which started in 2010 and gained momentum after the 2015 elections, has been reversed. The military (Tatmadaw) has staged a coup d’état and arrested democratically elected leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
In this paper we argue that aid effectiveness may suffer when partnerships with new regimes need to be established. We test this argument using the natural experiment of the break-up of communism in the former Eastern Bloc. We find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and the urgency of entry into new partnerships in the first half of the 1990s, while developmental objectives became more important only over time. These results hold up to a thorough sensitivity analysis, including using a gravity model to instrument for bilateral trade flows. We also find that aid fractionalization increased substantially, and that aid to the region was more likely to be tied, more volatile and less predictable than to aid to other recipients at the time. Overall, these results suggest that the guidelines for aid effectiveness agreed upon in the Paris Declaration are likely to be challenged by the current political transition in parts of the Arab world. Hopefully being aware of these challenges can help donors avoid making the same mistakes.
A high wire balancing act conservative voice paperGed Mirfin
A Paper entitled A High Wire Balancing Act – Reshuffles, Reform, Modernization and Policy Making in the Coalition: UKIP & Cameron’s Attempt to Overcome the Limitations of Electoral Groupthink published on the Conservative Voice Web-Site which can also be downloaded here: http://www.conservativevoice.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/A-High-Wire-Balancing-Act-Conservative-Voice-Paper.pdf
The accompanying article Are We All the Victims of Electoral Groupthink Now? – The Death of the Middle Classes & Reshuffles, Reform, Modernization and Policy Making in the Coalition can be accessed here: http://www.conservativevoice.co.uk/category/popular/
Despite the fact that the global poverty rate has been halved since 2000, intensified efforts are required to boost the incomes, alleviate the suffering and build the resilience of those individuals still living in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection systems need to be expanded and risks need to be mitigated for disaster-prone countries, which also tend to be the most impoverished. (Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, 2017)
The purpose of this short paper is to raise an argument that corruption plays a major role in preventing the world from achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this paper I particularly focus on corruption on poverty. This is also the same with the former Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that were never met.
Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business-
government relationships. We present a simple model in which influence requires firms to provide goods of political value in exchange for economic privileges. We argue that political influence improves the business environment for selected firms, but restricts their ability to fire workers. Under these conditions, if political influence primarily lowers fixed costs over variable costs, then favored firms will be less likely to invest and their productivity will suffer, even if they earn higher profits than non-influential firms. We rely on the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8,000 firms in 40 developing countries, and control for a number of biases present in the data. We find that influential firms benefit from lower administrative and regulatory barriers (including bribe taxes), greater pricing power, and easier access to credit. But these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to incumbents through bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. Finally, these firms are worse-performing than their non-influential counterparts. Our results highlight a potential channel by which cronyism leads to persistent underdevelopment.
International Journal of Business and Management Invention (IJBMI)inventionjournals
International Journal of Business and Management Invention (IJBMI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Business and Management. IJBMI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Business and Management, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online
Amplifying and nullifying the impact of democratic sanctions through aid to c...Paulina Pospieszna
Both foreign aid and sanctions are foreign policy tools to promote
democracy. Yet, it is unclear how far incentives and coercion
enhance democratization. Since sanctions and aid are often
employed at the same time, the goal of this study is to determine
their joint effect on democratization in target/recipient countries.
We argue that sending democracy aid through civil society organizations
enhances the effectiveness of sanctions as a democracy
promotion tool because the civil society is empowered to introduce
democratic changes. Thus, in addition to the top-down
pressure on the target government created by sanctions, there
is a bottom-up pressure exerted by the civil society. Our empirical
results show that democratic sanctions by the European Union
and the United States are more likely to have a positive effect
when aid flows bypass the government. Conversely, aid channeled
through the public sector mitigates the generally positive
effect of sanctions on democracy. In order to estimate these joint
effects, we employ a new comprehensive dataset on economic
sanctions: the EUSANCT Dataset which integrates and updates
existing databases on sanctions for the period between 1989 and
2015, merged with disaggregated OECD aid data and V-Dem
democracy scores.
The United States of America is in the midst of an enormous demographic and economic transformation; effects are witnessed through decreased labor force participation, stagnant economic growth, and financially strained government programs. Layered within the demographic change is a system morphed through partisan interests and inequitable assumptions. The country’s social insurance programs perpetuate on guarantees that supporters receive similar benefits as needed. Academics and government officials have warned of the coming population wave for decades, yet little action has been taken to mitigate associated problems.
Safety nets are critical for developed nations to maintain minimum living standards and some forms are sustainable. U.S. social insurance programs are underfunded by $39.698 trillion dollars, net of assets and future tax revenue, if continued under the current structure. The following research is provided to raise awareness of the existing system’s insolvency, generational inequity, and long-term costs in hope of instigating the necessary discussion of realigning economic, fiscal, and social policies onto a sustainable trajectory.
Arrangements by which influential firms receive economic favors, has been documented in numerous case studies but rarely formalized or analyzed quantitatively. We offer a formal voting model in which political influence is modeled as a contract by which politicians deliver a more preferential business environment to favored firms who, in exchange, protect politicians from the political consequences of high unemployment. From this perspective, cronyism simultaneously lowers a firm’s fixed costs while raising its variable wage costs. Testing several of the implications of the model on firm-level data from 26 transition countries, we find that more influential firms face fewer administrative and regulatory obstacles and carry bloated payrolls, but they also invest and innovate less. These results do not change when using propensity-score matching to adjust for the fact that influence is not randomly assigned.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
In this paper I examine the development effects of coups. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically-elected leaders imply a different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders, and that these differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy. Secondly, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coups as well as implementing matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental. I find no evidence that these results are symptomatic of alternative hypothesis involving the effects of failed coups or political transitions. Thirdly, when overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises and political instability, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Find more research publications at https://www.hhs.se/site
Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-reports/dj-vu-in-myanmar.html - Over the past two months, Myanmar has plunged into a political crisis. Myanmar’s tentative political transition towards democracy, which started in 2010 and gained momentum after the 2015 elections, has been reversed. The military (Tatmadaw) has staged a coup d’état and arrested democratically elected leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
In this paper we argue that aid effectiveness may suffer when partnerships with new regimes need to be established. We test this argument using the natural experiment of the break-up of communism in the former Eastern Bloc. We find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and the urgency of entry into new partnerships in the first half of the 1990s, while developmental objectives became more important only over time. These results hold up to a thorough sensitivity analysis, including using a gravity model to instrument for bilateral trade flows. We also find that aid fractionalization increased substantially, and that aid to the region was more likely to be tied, more volatile and less predictable than to aid to other recipients at the time. Overall, these results suggest that the guidelines for aid effectiveness agreed upon in the Paris Declaration are likely to be challenged by the current political transition in parts of the Arab world. Hopefully being aware of these challenges can help donors avoid making the same mistakes.
A high wire balancing act conservative voice paperGed Mirfin
A Paper entitled A High Wire Balancing Act – Reshuffles, Reform, Modernization and Policy Making in the Coalition: UKIP & Cameron’s Attempt to Overcome the Limitations of Electoral Groupthink published on the Conservative Voice Web-Site which can also be downloaded here: http://www.conservativevoice.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/A-High-Wire-Balancing-Act-Conservative-Voice-Paper.pdf
The accompanying article Are We All the Victims of Electoral Groupthink Now? – The Death of the Middle Classes & Reshuffles, Reform, Modernization and Policy Making in the Coalition can be accessed here: http://www.conservativevoice.co.uk/category/popular/
Despite the fact that the global poverty rate has been halved since 2000, intensified efforts are required to boost the incomes, alleviate the suffering and build the resilience of those individuals still living in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection systems need to be expanded and risks need to be mitigated for disaster-prone countries, which also tend to be the most impoverished. (Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, 2017)
The purpose of this short paper is to raise an argument that corruption plays a major role in preventing the world from achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this paper I particularly focus on corruption on poverty. This is also the same with the former Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that were never met.
This paper explores the relationship between security and development, with a focus on how different types of violence inhibit development in fragile and conflict-affected states.
This paper is based upon a comprehensive literature review of separate pieces of research including academic studies, datasets and policy analysis. It explores statistics and figures that illustrate the barriers that insecurity poses to achieving development outcomes in fragile and conflict-afflicted states. It also examines these dynamics in detail in four countries: Afghanistan, Solomon Islands, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.
The assignment was not to come up with policy recommendations per se; rather it was to present a comprehensive synopsis of how different types of violence shackles and inhibits development in fragile and conflict-affected states. The research team believes that the material presented will be of use to inform policy debate and development, including in the field of security sector reform.
The analysis is contextualised by focusing on three types of violence: political, criminal and interpersonal. The barriers these different types of violence pose to development is presented throughout the report, and embedded in the country case studies.
The statistics uncovered in the course of the project are stark and unnerving. These statistics, among others, are used to highlight the barriers that different types of violence pose to development. It is not only the financial cost, but also the broader institutional and social costs that generate a series of barriers for meaningful development. Through synthesising these statistics, this paper contributes to the understandings of the links between security and development, paving way for policy recommendations and lines of action for Australia and development practitioners.
The high levels of corruption, unemployment and abysmal development reflect a situation of poor macroeconomic management in Nigeria. Sound macroeconomic policies and management contribute in many ways to high quality growth that has positive correlation with poverty reduction. Increased and more efficient public spending in the areas of public education, healthcare, and employment remain the catalysts for poverty reduction and sustainable development. It is believed that efficient use of resources is central to economic growth and sustainable development. Descriptive research design was used for the study. Data generated were triangulated, analyzed and it was found that prudent macroeconomic management has positive association with poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Running head CORRUPTION 5CorruptionAuthor’s Na.docxtodd271
Running head: CORRUPTION 5
Corruption
Author’s Name
Institutional Affiliation
Corruption
Introduction
Corruption is a significant crisis that kills the power of the constitution. Corruption diminishes the power of the society, economy, and social welfare of the nation. There are minimal chances of growth when corruption prevails. Thus, corruption is one of the biggest challenges facing the USA and is clearly shown by the form of administration. Factors that influence corruption is more, and the effect varies depending on the affected individuals. Typical corruption forms have taken way to inform of mishandling of policies, public funds misuse, and failure to submit to public growth projects. Current reports show that corruption is prevalent in many public sectors including but not limited to bribing of civil servants, misuse of political power, and bureaucrats using public power in the United States for a personal end.
Solution
s
Fighting corruption is a challenging task because individuals involved have either political or economic power this providing ways to manipulate the will of the weak. Regardless the report highlights possible ways to solve the issue of corruption while giving recommendations for implementation. First, it is possible to address corruption by engaging the public. Teaching the public about the effect of corruption would help combat the problem. That is, each person should be encouraged to follow the norms of the society and laws of the land (Olaguer, 2006). Following stands of morality would ensure that each person is watchful of individuals’ behaviors. Also, the public should learn how to spot instances of corruption and take necessary action when necessary. When the public is knowledgeable about the consequences of corruption, it is easier to engage in public participation in fighting the epidemic.
Next, corruption can be eradicated by employing a legal strategy. The process involves engaging the law, the judiciary, press, the police, and the media. By creating certainty and involving the bodies mention, it would be easier to discriminate corruption through justice. The legislature should be encouraged to review the laws and make clear the aspect of corrupt and corruption. Although the process might require more time, it would help understand when an individual is convicted of corruption (Heimann et al., 2008). Furthermore, the public should have the power to report against corrupt individuals in society without fear. While the legislature revises the laws, judicial civil servants would have the ability to sentence people from various social classes irrespective of their impact on society.
Third, decentralization of power is an essential step towards fighting corruption in the USA. This would give way for more transparency in the public sectors, procurement process, and budget process should be passed through mass media.
Best solution
Based on the time required to implement solutions, public participat.
This working paper describes evaluation as a growth industry in rapid transformation. Given the twin challenges of increased inequality and results orientation a new generation of evaluators will have to learn to surf a social impact wave. Given the rise of emerging market countries they will be called upon to move the center of gravity of the discipline south and east. Given the complexity of development challenges they will have to replenish the evaluation tool kit. Given the advent of big data and the spread of social networking they will tap the vast opportunities of a ‘plugged in’ world. Finally given the advent of results oriented networks they will forge resilient connections between public, private and civil society actors in pursuit of collective impact.
Social Protection, Financial Depth, Soundness and Inclusive Growth in Nigeria AJHSSR Journal
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effect of social protection on inclusive growth in Nigeria, focusing also
on the role of financial depth and soundness on inclusive growth using a time series data from 1981 to 2019.
The System Generalized Method of Moments (SYSTEM – GMM) estimator was used in estimating the model.
It was found that social protection had a positive and significant effect on inclusive growth. We also found a
positive and significant effect of the size of financial intermediaries in the financial system on inclusive growth,
but the effectiveness of social protection in enhancing inclusive growth was not dependent on the size of
financial intermediaries in the financial system. A negative and insignificant effect of bank credit to the private
sector to GDP on inclusive growth was also found, nevertheless, the credit to the private sector channel has the
wherewithal to complement social protection to raise the inclusive growth. The liquidity ratio had a positive and
significant effect on inclusive growth and complements the effectiveness of social protection in raising the
inclusive growth rate. The study recommends expansion of the government social safety net measures to
accommodate more beneficiaries especially the small entrepreneurs and the poor unemployed. In this way,
growth will be distributive to enhance inclusiveness. Also, the government social safety net policies cannot
work effectively in isolation with a sound financial system. Therefore, measures should be in place to ensure a
sound and sustainable financial system in the economy
what is the best method to sell pi coins in 2024DOT TECH
The best way to sell your pi coins safely is trading with an exchange..but since pi is not launched in any exchange, and second option is through a VERIFIED pi merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and pioneers and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive amounts before mainnet launch in 2026.
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@Pi_vendor_247
BYD SWOT Analysis and In-Depth Insights 2024.pptxmikemetalprod
Indepth analysis of the BYD 2024
BYD (Build Your Dreams) is a Chinese automaker and battery manufacturer that has snowballed over the past two decades to become a significant player in electric vehicles and global clean energy technology.
This SWOT analysis examines BYD's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats as it competes in the fast-changing automotive and energy storage industries.
Founded in 1995 and headquartered in Shenzhen, BYD started as a battery company before expanding into automobiles in the early 2000s.
Initially manufacturing gasoline-powered vehicles, BYD focused on plug-in hybrid and fully electric vehicles, leveraging its expertise in battery technology.
Today, BYD is the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, delivering over 1.2 million electric cars globally. The company also produces electric buses, trucks, forklifts, and rail transit.
On the energy side, BYD is a major supplier of rechargeable batteries for cell phones, laptops, electric vehicles, and energy storage systems.
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
how can I sell pi coins after successfully completing KYCDOT TECH
Pi coins is not launched yet in any exchange 💱 this means it's not swappable, the current pi displaying on coin market cap is the iou version of pi. And you can learn all about that on my previous post.
RIGHT NOW THE ONLY WAY you can sell pi coins is through verified pi merchants. A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges and crypto whales. Looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale or ico offerings, the only way to get my coins is from buying from miners. So a merchant facilitates the transactions between the miners and these exchanges holding pi.
I and my friends has sold more than 6000 pi coins successfully with this method. I will be happy to share the contact of my personal pi merchant. The one i trade with, if you have your own merchant you can trade with them. For those who are new.
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram.
I wouldn't advise you selling all percentage of the pi coins. Leave at least a before so its a win win during open mainnet. Have a nice day pioneers ♥️
#kyc #mainnet #picoins #pi #sellpi #piwallet
#pinetwork
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview.pptxmarketing367770
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview
If you're dreaming of owning a home in California's rural or suburban areas, a USDA loan might be the perfect solution. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers these loans to help low-to-moderate-income individuals and families achieve homeownership.
Key Features of USDA Loans:
Zero Down Payment: USDA loans require no down payment, making homeownership more accessible.
Competitive Interest Rates: These loans often come with lower interest rates compared to conventional loans.
Flexible Credit Requirements: USDA loans have more lenient credit score requirements, helping those with less-than-perfect credit.
Guaranteed Loan Program: The USDA guarantees a portion of the loan, reducing risk for lenders and expanding borrowing options.
Eligibility Criteria:
Location: The property must be located in a USDA-designated rural or suburban area. Many areas in California qualify.
Income Limits: Applicants must meet income guidelines, which vary by region and household size.
Primary Residence: The home must be used as the borrower's primary residence.
Application Process:
Find a USDA-Approved Lender: Not all lenders offer USDA loans, so it's essential to choose one approved by the USDA.
Pre-Qualification: Determine your eligibility and the amount you can borrow.
Property Search: Look for properties in eligible rural or suburban areas.
Loan Application: Submit your application, including financial and personal information.
Processing and Approval: The lender and USDA will review your application. If approved, you can proceed to closing.
USDA loans are an excellent option for those looking to buy a home in California's rural and suburban areas. With no down payment and flexible requirements, these loans make homeownership more attainable for many families. Explore your eligibility today and take the first step toward owning your dream home.
how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)DOT TECH
Anywhere in the world, including Africa, America, and Europe, you can sell Pi Network Coins online and receive cash through online payment options.
Pi has not yet been launched on any exchange because we are currently using the confined Mainnet. The planned launch date for Pi is June 28, 2026.
Reselling to investors who want to hold until the mainnet launch in 2026 is currently the sole way to sell.
Consequently, right now. All you need to do is select the right pi network provider.
Who is a pi merchant?
An individual who buys coins from miners on the pi network and resells them to investors hoping to hang onto them until the mainnet is launched is known as a pi merchant.
debuts.
I'll provide you the Telegram username
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the telegram id of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Tele gram: @Pi_vendor_247
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the contact information for my personal pi vendor.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
US Economic Outlook - Being Decided - M Capital Group August 2021.pdfpchutichetpong
The U.S. economy is continuing its impressive recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and not slowing down despite re-occurring bumps. The U.S. savings rate reached its highest ever recorded level at 34% in April 2020 and Americans seem ready to spend. The sectors that had been hurt the most by the pandemic specifically reduced consumer spending, like retail, leisure, hospitality, and travel, are now experiencing massive growth in revenue and job openings.
Could this growth lead to a “Roaring Twenties”? As quickly as the U.S. economy contracted, experiencing a 9.1% drop in economic output relative to the business cycle in Q2 2020, the largest in recorded history, it has rebounded beyond expectations. This surprising growth seems to be fueled by the U.S. government’s aggressive fiscal and monetary policies, and an increase in consumer spending as mobility restrictions are lifted. Unemployment rates between June 2020 and June 2021 decreased by 5.2%, while the demand for labor is increasing, coupled with increasing wages to incentivize Americans to rejoin the labor force. Schools and businesses are expected to fully reopen soon. In parallel, vaccination rates across the country and the world continue to rise, with full vaccination rates of 50% and 14.8% respectively.
However, it is not completely smooth sailing from here. According to M Capital Group, the main risks that threaten the continued growth of the U.S. economy are inflation, unsettled trade relations, and another wave of Covid-19 mutations that could shut down the world again. Have we learned from the past year of COVID-19 and adapted our economy accordingly?
“In order for the U.S. economy to continue growing, whether there is another wave or not, the U.S. needs to focus on diversifying supply chains, supporting business investment, and maintaining consumer spending,” says Grace Feeley, a research analyst at M Capital Group.
While the economic indicators are positive, the risks are coming closer to manifesting and threatening such growth. The new variants spreading throughout the world, Delta, Lambda, and Gamma, are vaccine-resistant and muddy the predictions made about the economy and health of the country. These variants bring back the feeling of uncertainty that has wreaked havoc not only on the stock market but the mindset of people around the world. MCG provides unique insight on how to mitigate these risks to possibly ensure a bright economic future.
Introduction to Indian Financial System ()Avanish Goel
The financial system of a country is an important tool for economic development of the country, as it helps in creation of wealth by linking savings with investments.
It facilitates the flow of funds form the households (savers) to business firms (investors) to aid in wealth creation and development of both the parties
The Evolution of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India: Challenges...beulahfernandes8
Role in Financial System
NBFCs are critical in bridging the financial inclusion gap.
They provide specialized financial services that cater to segments often neglected by traditional banks.
Economic Impact
NBFCs contribute significantly to India's GDP.
They support sectors like micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), housing finance, and personal loans.
If you are looking for a pi coin investor. Then look no further because I have the right one he is a pi vendor (he buy and resell to whales in China). I met him on a crypto conference and ever since I and my friends have sold more than 10k pi coins to him And he bought all and still want more. I will drop his telegram handle below just send him a message.
@Pi_vendor_247
1. The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid
desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and other
Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of
DFID, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further information, please
contact helpdesk@k4d.info.
Helpdesk Report
Impact of Economic sanctions on
poverty and economic growth
Dylan O’Driscoll
University of Manchester
14 June 2017
Question
What is the impact of sanctions on poverty and economic growth? Consider global evidence and
then focus down on Sudan.
Contents
1. Overview
2. Sanctions and Poverty
3. Sanctions and Economic Growth
4. Other Effects of Sanctions
5. Sudan
6. References
1. Overview
Economic sanctions have become a popular tool in international politics, with the US being the
largest actor in imposing sanctions. The aim of sanctions is to ensure government compliance
with the imposer’s interests and are often viewed as more humane than military intervention.
However, economic sanctions are also criticised for not achieving their objective and for having a
negative impact on areas such as human rights, democracy, poverty, healthcare, and basic living
conditions. This rapid review synthesises findings from rigorous academic, practitioner, and
policy references, focusing on recent and seminal works with the aim of highlighting the impact of
sanctions on poverty and economic development. This review examines the wider impact of
sanctions globally in order to create a better understanding of the role that sanctions play in
Sudan and to counteract the fact that there are minimal studies focused on the impact of
sanctions in Sudan itself. It is important to note that the majority of studies on sanctions are
quantitative and thus involve many case studies to prove an overriding theory and do not cover
much specific detail. For this reason there are not many studies of the impact of sanctions on
2. 2
Sudan specifically, however there is data to be extracted on poverty and the economic growth,
which can be contextualised using the quantitative studies.
The majority of the studies for this report highlight the negative impact that economic sanctions
have on the average member of the population, whilst arguing that elites generally find ways to
negotiate the sanctions. Moreover, the studies also demonstrate the failure of sanctions to reach
their desired result in most cases, and when paired with the human suffering they enact they are
often seen as comparable to armed interventions, but without the same success rate in regime
change. Mack and Khan (2000, p. 280) succinctly summarise this point in their summary of the
sanction literature:
The only real disagreement in the contemporary sanctions literature relates to the degree to which
sanctions fail as an instrument for coercing changes in the behaviour of targeted states. No study
argues that sanctions are in general an effective means of coercion, although individual sanction
regimes can and sometimes do succeed.
They do however go on to argue that targeted sanctions have a lesser negative impact on the
wider population, but are also less likely to work. This is not to say that there are not those who
claim that sanctions work, as Marinov (2005) argues that sanctions increase the baseline risk of
the leader losing power by 28%. However, the author does not justify whether the 28% increase
outweighs the local cost.
Key findings are as follows:
Economic sanctions lead to an increase in the poverty gap and deprived sections of the
population feel the most impact.
For the most part sanctions fail to achieve their aims and elites manage to negotiate the
adverse effects to a far greater level than poorer citizens.
Sanctions have a damaging effect on income inequality and impact ordinary people more
than the sanctioned country’s leaders.
Sanctions tend to harm rural and non-industrialised areas more, as resources are
refocused in power and production centres.
Economic sanctions have a negative impact on the cost of reconstruction and economic
growth following the lifting of the sanction(s) or regime change.
Sanctioned regimes often attempt to magnify the sanctions' negative effect on the
economy to prevent the population from revolting.
Between 1976 and 2012 UN sanctions led to a 25.5 percent aggregate decline in GDP
per capita of the sanctioned countries (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015).
The negative impact that sanctions have on economic growth affect women, minority
communities and other marginalised groups to a greater extent.
Sanctions have a significant negative impact on the living standards and humanitarian
situation of the population in the sanctioned state.
Sanctions in Sudan have not led to the regime changing its actions and approach.
Poverty is used as a tool in Sudan to control the population and blame is placed on those
who enact the sanctions.
Sanctions in Sudan have impacted the aid process leading to less aid getting through
which exacerbates poverty.
3. 3
Although oil exporting has led to economic growth in Sudan, overall economic
development is low and there is a disparity in the distribution of wealth from oil.
Poverty as well as lack of services and opportunities are still significant issues in Sudan
and women feel the impact to a greater extent.
In Sudan the cycle of economic hardship, misrule and conflicts, which are partly a result
of the sanctions, manifest to defeat the core purpose of the sanctions.
2. Sanctions and Poverty
This section examines the impact that sanctions have on poverty, as well as the issues closely
related to poverty. Both quantitative and single case studies are used to give a clearer
understanding of the wider, as well as the specific, impact of sanctions on poverty.
Poverty Gap
In a quantitative study of US sanctions between 1982–2011 Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016)
find that US sanctions adversely affect the poor and lead to an average 3.8 percentage point
increase in the poverty gap (the average shortfall from the poverty line of USD 1.25 PPP a day)
in comparison to a controlled group where the dynamics were as similar as possible to the
countries being sanctioned. Moreover, Neuenkirch and Neumeier argue that these sanctions fail
to achieve their aims in 65 to 95 percent of the cases in which they are imposed and that it is the
poorest that suffer the most through their implementation, rather than the elites that the sanctions
aim to target. Through the economic damage of the sanctions, a significant impact is felt by the
public: GDP per capita decreases at an increased rate, exports and imports decrease,
international capital decreases, and inflation increases. Due to the already fragile economies of
sanctioned countries, the sanctions run the risk of leading to an economic collapse, which in turn
leads to greater impoverishment. As import and export focused sectors are more affected by
economic sanctions and these sectors tend to hire low-skilled workers, deprived groups in
society are affected more by sanctions (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016). The increased poverty in
sanctioned countries in conjunction with the pressure on resources that sanctions create
magnifies the poverty, as the wealthy have more access to resources such as medicine, oil, etc.,
in turn leading to an increase in the disparity of the living standards (Sen, Al-Faisal, & AlSaleh,
2013).
Also examining the impact of sanctions on the poverty gap, but through using the case study of
Iraq, Alnasrawi (2001) gives a clearer understanding of the specific adverse effects that
sanctions have on the ground. Whilst acknowledging other factors, such as the Iran/Iraq War and
the air bombing campaign, Alnasrawi argues that economic sanctions in Iraq had a significant
impact on the economy and had a particularly negative effect on the population leading to
widespread poverty. According to Alnasrawi the sanctions led to a decline in life expectancy,
nutritional standards and a loss of more than two-thirds of the country’s GDP. Additionally, the
sanctions led to exorbitant prices, unemployment, an increase in school drop-out rates and mass
emigration of skilled workers. In turn, there was a widening of the poverty gap as certain elite
groups were given access to lucrative foreign trade transactions outside of the sanctions.
Moreover, the government ceased providing social services to lower income groups. All of these
elements greatly impact the cost and period of reconstruction and economic growth following the
lifting of the sanctions or regime change (Alnasrawi, 2001). With the benefit of hindsight we now
4. 4
know the sanctions on Iraq did not lead to regime change or a more democratic government and
military intervention was eventually required to remove Saddam Hussein.
Similarly, using a single case study (North Korea) Lee (2016) finds that sanctions increase the
poverty gap between urban and rural areas. Lee argues that rather than changing the behaviour
of the regime, sanctions increase inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands.
Thus, centres of power, as well as manufacturing cities and mining areas gain economic activity
at the cost of other areas, as resources are reallocated when the country relies more on natural
resources for production and trade.
Income Inequality
Closely linked to the poverty gap Afesorgbor and Mahadevan (2016) examine the impact of
sanctions on income inequality. Using quantitative analysis of 68 states targeted with sanctions
in the time period spanning from 1960 to 2008, Afesorgbor and Mahadevan argue that the
imposition of sanctions has a damaging effect on income inequality. Using empirical evidence
they demonstrate that the imposition of sanctions has unintended consequences and usually
affects the general population more so than the sanctioned country’s leaders. Moreover, their
study demonstrates that the impact of sanctions is more severe on income equality when
sanctions span over a longer duration. More worryingly, Afesorgbor and Mahadevan argue that
even when sanctions are lifted, addressing the widening income equality becomes difficult,
compounds the issue of the economic recovery, and negatively impacts the process.
3. Sanctions and Economic Growth
Although closely connected to poverty, this section examines the broader impact that sanctions
have on economic growth, as well as the issues that are more closely tied to poor economic
growth than poverty.
Regime’s Response
According to Oechslin (2014) regimes targeted by sanctions often do not try to counteract the
impact of sanctions, but rather follow policies that magnify the sanctions' negative effect on the
economy with the aim of preventing the population from revolting. He argues that the state
intentionally deteriorates the economic productivity in order to increase the economic hardship of
the population so that any revolt proves costly for citizens. Although the sanctions impact the
elite, due to their strong economic starting position, funds hidden around the world and
international collaborators, it is the local population who feel the impact the most. That said,
Oechslin argues that the regime will look for ways out of the sanctions, which will either be to find
a suitable exile opportunity or to carry on with its strategy until the sanctions end. There were 57
cases of sanctions for the purposes of regime change identified by Oechslin between 1914 and
2000 and of these only 12 of them (21 percent) are judged as being partly successful. However,
in 37 cases (65 percent), the sanctions were lifted without achieving the goal, whilst the
remaining eight were still ongoing in 2000. Therefore, sanctions lead to a decrease in the
economic growth by both their implementation and the regimes response, yet statistically have a
very poor level of success (Oechslin, 2014).
5. 5
Sanctions and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Presenting more specific evidence of the impact of sanctions on economic growth, Neuenkirch
and Neumeier (2015) – in a quantitative analysis of UN and US sanctions using a sample of 160
countries of which 67 experienced economic sanctions over the period 1976–2012 – argue that
economic sanctions have a significant negative impact on GDP growth. Their study finds that UN
sanctions have a greater negative impact with an average decrease of the target state's annual
real per capita GDP growth rate of more than 2 percentage points. These effects last for a period
of 10 years and lead to an aggregate decline in the target country's GDP per capita of 25.5
percent. Moreover, comprehensive UN economic sanctions that include embargoes affecting the
majority of economic activity lead to a GDP growth reduction of more than 5 percentage points.
Whereas, US sanctions have a lesser negative impact with an average decrease of the target
state's GDP growth of between 0.75–1 percentage points and this detrimental impact on growth
lasts for seven years and accounts for an aggregate decline in GDP of 13.4 percent (Neuenkirch
& Neumeier, 2015).
Impact of Sanctions on Women
These two large dataset studies clearly demonstrate the negative impact that sanctions have on
economic growth, whereas Drury and Peksen (2012) analyse the impact of the fall of economic
growth, due to sanctions, on women. In their quantitative study of 146 countries, 71 of which
experienced sanctions between the time period 1971 to 2005, they analyse 811 sanction years
(15.4 percent of the data) and 3362 non-sanction years (84.6 percent of the data) in order to give
clear results. In their article they argue that economic sanctions have a negative impact on
women’s access to economic and social status, as well as on the traditional patriarchal norms
and attitudes, which lead to greater violations of women’s rights. Moreover, Drury and Peksen
demonstrate that sanctions have negative gender-specific consequences and that women bear
the burden of the sanctions at a higher level. Thus, not only do sanctions lead to women
experiencing a higher level of economic burden, they also lead to women’s rights decreasing.
Destroying the Economy
Although the sanctions in Myanmar have since been lifted, scholars were particularly critical of
the negative impact that US sanctions had on the economy and the living standards of the
population. For instance, Rarick (2006) argues that although the citizens of Myanmar would have
welcomed democracy, what they wanted more than anything was economic development. Rarick
describes Myanmar at the time as having failing educational and healthcare systems, a
collapsed private banking sector, unreliable and very sporadic power generation, rapidly rising
prices of basic goods, an increasing percentage of malnourished children, rising cases of
diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and HIV, and increasing numbers of young women being
forced to cross into neighbouring countries to work in the sex trade. According to Rarick, the only
thing that sanctions succeeded in was destroying the country. He goes on to question the
rationale of destroying a country if the proposed reason for sanctions was to save it.
Opposite Effect
Using the case study of Cuba, Francis and Duncan (2016) argue that sanctions had the opposite
effect and that instead of removing links between Cuba and the Soviet Union, they actually
strengthened them. They go on to argue that sanctions punished the people they were intended
to help while leaving the Cuban leadership relatively unscathed. For Francis and Duncan, if the
6. 6
goal is for a free and democratic country then opening trade with the country is the optimal
means towards achieving this, as when economic institutions become more inclusive, the
political institutions will also be compelled to become more inclusive. They argue that European
and Canadian countries’ relationships with Cuba led to double digit growth rates in the tourism
industry, which stimulated the economy and this preceded the government’s decision to legalize
the private ownership and sale of homes, cellular phones, and cars, as well as softening the
restrictions on internet use. Thus, according to their study, it was trade, rather than sanctions,
that led to a change in the government’s policies.
4. Other Effects of Sanctions
This report has largely focused on the impact of economic sanctions on poverty and economic
growth, however it is important to note that there are many other adverse effects, particularly with
regards to the humanitarian situation of the target state. These are important to highlight, as the
majority of the studies examined for this report link these negative effects to the increase in the
poverty gap and the worsening economy of the sanctioned states. The various studies highlight
the negative impact sanctions have on the availability of food and clean water, access to
medicine and health-care services, life expectancy and infant mortality, human rights, political
stability, and democracy (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016). In order to give a clearer
understanding of the link between the impact that sanctions have on economic factors and the
decline of the humanitarian situation, a few cases are examined more closely below.
Repression
In a quantitative study of 157 countries for the years between 1976 and 2001, Wood (2008)
argues that sanctions lead to an increase in state-sponsored repression. In these cases
repression is used to prevent the defection of core supporters and to stifle dissent in the face of
declining economic conditions or growing opposition support. The article suggests that
multilateral UN sanctions contribute to greater increases in repression than do unilateral state
sanctions. Both Wood and Mueller and Mueller (1999) argue that military and arms sanctions are
more effective than economic sanctions, as they cause the population no harm.
Democracy Levels
In a quantitative study of 102 countries between the years 1972 to 2000, Peksen and Drury
(2010) found that sanctions worsen the level of democracy. Their dataset included both
sanctioned and non-sanctioned countries chosen for being less democratic and nondemocratic,
as not to bias the results. They argue that economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used
as a strategic tool by the regime to consolidate power and weaken the opposition. Moreover, the
sanctions create incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties.
Terrorism
Using a sample of 152 countries for the period 1968 to 2004 Choi and Luo (2013) examine the
correlation between economic sanctions and the rise of terrorism. Their study argues that
economic sanctions intensify the economic suffering of the poor to a far greater extent than the
rich and thus the imposition of economic sanctions serves as a trigger for frustrated poor people
to turn to terrorist violence. Choi and Luo argue that the poor become violent only when
additional external shocks such as economic sanctions push them over the edge. This is further
7. 7
exacerbated by the fact that the sanctioned leaders often manipulate the poor toward terrorism
by portraying sanctions as a threat to sovereignty and well-being.
5. Sudan
There are very few studies specifically focused on the impact of sanctions in Sudan on poverty
and economic growth. However, using the evidence from the research above, it is possible to
gain a better understanding of their impact based on research that focuses on poverty and the
economy in Sudan.
Impact of Sanctions
Due to numerous human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and state sponsorship of
terrorism, Sudan has been facing sanctions since 1997, yet human rights violations, war crimes,
and undemocratic governance continues, whilst the humanitarian situation has deteriorated.
Many of the points highlighted in the studies above are true for Sudan. For instance, the
government of Sudan uses poverty and starvation as a tool to control the population, whilst the
elites have managed to negotiate the sanctions through the sale of oil to their allies (Prendergast
& Brooks-Rubin, 2016). For instance, Sudan has close economic relations with China, linked to
China’s need for Sudan’s oil, which has allowed the regime to circumvent sanctions whilst the
population is still affected (Nour, 2014). To put this into perspective, it is estimated that the
regime spends less than four percent of its annual official budget on public health and education
combined, whilst spending over 60 percent on the military and security sector. Moreover, the
regime in Sudan blames the poor economy and living standards on sanctions. The impact of
sanctions also extends to those delivering aid in Sudan with many complaining of the difficulties
of the process, which often leads to less aid getting through (Prendergast & Brooks-Rubin,
2016).
In one of the few academic articles written specifically on the impact of sanctions on Sudan,
Aluoch (2015) argues that there are significant negative outcomes from sanctions, as the
targeted individuals hold the political and economic levers of the country. Thus, instead of
leading to compliance the sanctions have resulted in poor military and economic choices by the
regime, such as increased expenditure on arms and the increase of conflicts. As a result,
between 2011 and 2013 inflation on fuel and food was at 65 per cent, the economy contracted at
a rate of –11.2 per cent, there was also a shortage of supplies and public services, high rates of
unemployment among the educated youth, and a lack of foreign reserves. Whilst at the same
time oppression of the population and opposition continued through the military. Aluoch goes on
to argue that the economic hardships as a result of the sanctions have confined freedom and
limited the space for advocacy and activism for fostering change. Thus, the cycle of economic
hardship, misrule and conflicts manifest in defeating the core purpose of the sanctions.
Impact on Economy
Sanctions in Sudan have had a major impact on economic growth, with the exception of the oil
industry, which is controlled by the regime, however lowering oil prices have even made this
source of income precarious. Therefore, although technically there has been economic growth,
due to Sudan being one of the newest significant oil producing countries in the world and the
third largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, the finances from this are controlled by the
regime and are not filtered down to the population. Thus, the rest of the economy has suffered
8. 8
and Sudan has become an oil-based economy with very little diversification and with finances
controlled by the elites (Nour, 2014). There is very little investment in Sudan due to the
significant risk for little gains, thus Sudanese entrepreneurs are far more likely to invest in the
thriving national economy of neighbouring Ethiopia. Compounding the poor economic situation,
the majority of the working, professional and middle classes have left the country (Prendergast &
Brooks-Rubin, 2016). Although the sanctions have been counteracted in one way through oil
trade with allies, the sanctions have still had a negative impact on the economy particularly with
the lack of access to foreign technologies and the lack of funding for the development of local
technologies. It is estimated that less than 1 percent of GDP is spent on research and
development, whilst the average and median of the dependency ratio on foreign technology are
0.84 and 0,85 respectively (Arabi & Abdalla, 2013).
Poverty Gap
The poverty gap in Sudan is extremely high and the poor are more than twice as likely to suffer
from a complete lack of basic services (education, health, electricity, water, and sanitation) and
more than 40 percent of the poor in Sudan have no access to adequate public services. As the
lack of services in Sudan are often regionally focused, this correlates with Oechslin’s (2014)
hypothesis that the government will often ensure that sections of the population are impoverished
to prevent them from revolting. Whilst, similar to Drury and Peksen’s (2012) quantitative study on
the impact of sanctions on women, Elsheikh and Elamin (2016) argue that the poverty gap in
Sudan is larger amongst women and that women’s economic empowerment is extremely low in
Sudan.
Current Economy
The economy has improved drastically in Sudan in comparison to the 1990s, which is largely
down to oil exports, however the finances are not distributed fairly. Nonetheless, this has led to a
decrease in poverty. Since the secession of South Sudan there has been the loss of oil revenue
which accounted for over half of the government’s revenues and 95 percent of its exports. This
has led to reduced economic growth and resulted in double-digit consumer price inflation.
Moreover, the drop in oil prices has also affected the economy, which has led to some
diversification towards agriculture.1
That said, it is estimated that 44.8 percent of the population
lives beneath poverty line, with poverty rates higher in rural areas (55 percent) than in urban
areas (28 percent). Whilst high unemployment rates of 17 percent, as well as low employment
opportunities, contribute to the economic disparity found in many regions of Sudan.2
1
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan/overview#1
2
https://borgenproject.org/poverty-sudan/
9. 9
6. References
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Inequality of Target States. World Development, 83, 1-11.
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Alnasrawi, A. (2001). Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990–2000. Third World
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http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0975087814554071
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Drury, A. C., & Peksen, D. (2012). Women and economic statecraft: The negative impact
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Elsheikh, S., & Elamin, S. E. (2016). Women's economic empowerment and poverty: Lessons
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International Economic Studies.
http://www.iies.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.287603.1466421786!/menu/standard/file/772.pdf
Lee, Y. S. (2016). International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on
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http://www.freit.org/WorkingPapers/Papers/TradePolicyMultilateral/FREIT1134.pdf
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Development Economics, 121, 110-119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.005
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financing development in Sudan. UNU-MERIT Working Papers. No. 2014-014.
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/portal/files/1633299/guid-50ad99c5-671a-49af-a5c7-
8e6611328ecb-ASSET1.0
Oechslin, M. (2014). Targeting autocrats: Economic sanctions and regime change. European
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Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2010). Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic
Sanctions on Democracy. International Interactions, 36(3), 240-264. 1
https://doi.org/0.1080/03050629.2010.502436
Prendergast, J., & Brooks-Rubin, B. (2016). Modernized Sanctions for Sudan. The Enough
Project. http://www.hurriyatsudan.com/wp-
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Rarick, C. A. (2006), Destroying a Country in Order to Save it: The Folly of Economic Sanctions
Against Myanmar. Economic Affairs, 26: 60–63. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
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Key websites
World Bank Sudan: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan
Rural Poverty Portal: http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/sudan
Acknowledgements
We thank the following experts who voluntarily provided suggestions for relevant literature or
other advice to the author to support the preparation of this report. The content of the report is
the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of any of the
experts consulted.
Dr Birte Vogel, HCRI, University of Manchester
Dr Róisín Read, HCRI, University of Manchester
Dr. Jonathan Fisher, University of Birmingham
Suggested citation
O’Driscoll, D. (2017). Impact of Economic sanctions on poverty and economic growth. K4D
Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.