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2011
PRESENT
Automation of
Cyber-physical
Systems and
the Internet
of Things
2005
2010
2001
2004
1970
2000
3RD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Automation of
Production by
Electronics
1900
1970
2ND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Mass Production
Powered by
Electricity
TH E
HI S TO RY
O F
ICS
Detailed History of ICS
whitepaper available at
ics.sans.org/resources
1700
1900
1ST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Mechanical
Production
Powered by
Steam
René-Antoine Ferchault de Réamur proposed
ideas for automatic devices to
provide feedback for the purposes of control
James Watt’s steam governor provided
proportional control of the throttle
A U T O M A T I O N
E V E N T S
I C S S E C U R I T Y
E V E N T S
Use of relays and control cabinets in remote
rooms to turn things on/off by use of
switches and monitor recorders
Machine tools were automated
with Numerical Control (NC) using
punched paper tape
Modicon 084 the first programmable
controller implemented. (Modicon stood for
MOdular DIgital CONtroller.)
Allen-Bradley designed and named the
Bulletin 1774 PLC and coined the term
“Programmable Logic Controller”
First use of distributed control
throughout a large industrial plant
1788
1900s
1950s
1959
1969
1971
Fieldbus protocols to include
ControlNet, DeviceNet, Profibus,
and Fieldbus Foundation.
Quickly followed by Ethernet and TCP/IP
connectivity for PLCs
1990s
Modbus introduced
to allow PLCs to talk with one another 1973
First controllers with
embedded web server 2003
Open Technology Movement
ICS Vendors begin migration from
proprietary networks, software, and
hardware platforms to open architectures
2000
& BEYOND
Remote I/O introduced 1976
PLCs are linked to PCs 1986
First PAC is introduced 2001
NERC CIP Standards become enforceable JUL 2008
DHS ICS-CERT is created NOV 2009
First ePAC is introduced 2013
EARLY 1700s
Uncorroborated report of a Trojan program
inserted into SCADA system software that caused
an explosion along the Trans-Siberian pipeline
A former consultant accessed
the control system of the plant and
released up to one million litres of sewage into
the surrounding waterways
Media reports about GAZPROM cyber
incident impacting operational systems
1982
Breach into Pennsylvania water plant
installation of spyware on plant’s
computer systems
NOV 2006
Conficker Worm gets into ICS
along with 12 million general computers.
It infected power generation plants in the U.S.
FEB 2009
Stuxnet worm discovered.
Stuxnet is a computer worm that was discovered
in June 2010 but evidence suggests variations
may have dated back to 2005 and was designed
to target ICS and impact a specific process
2010
Commuter tram collision by glancing
blow and derailment due to unauthorized
switching in the city of Lodz, Poland
JAN 2008
Revelation by U.S. government official
that cyber attacks have resulted in
power outages in multiple regions
outside the United States
MAR 2000
Plant computers infected by Slammer
worm. The worm entered the plant network
via a contractor’s infected computer connected
via telephone dial-up directly to the plant
network, thus bypassing the firewall
JAN 2003
The Blaster worm infected the
communication system of a U.S. railway company
– the dispatching and signaling systems were
affected and passenger and freight traffic systems
were disrupted
AUG 2003
Off-shore oil platform
hacks impact leak detection systems.
Unauthorized access and control of off shore
platform leak detection and monitoring system
2009
APR 2000
DCS system found infected with Nachi
(AKA Welchia) virus on 8 APCs
DEC 2003
Zotob worm infects 13 U.S. auto plants
causing shutdowns and delays
AUG 2005
Los Angeles traffic system cyber
intrusion by insiders (labor strike)
AUG 2007
Utility smart meters are compromised
in scale resulting in lost revenue
SEP 2009
Virus infection of OPC servers at
Petro-chemical plant in South Africa
DEC 2009
Telvent intrusion,
company warns ICS customers (ICS supplier)
SEP 2012
Havex Trojan is discovered in ICS-focused
water-holing attacks – observed capability to locate
OPC servers and attempts to exfiltrate collected data
JUN 2014
Duqu malware discovered
SEP 2011
APT attacks on gas pipeline sector
DEC 2011
Flame malware discovered
MAY 2012
Houston water system compromise
2012
SCADA workstations
shipped to utility with infections
2005
I C S S E C U R I T Y S O L U T I O N S M A P
I C S C U R R I C U L U M
Securing the Human (STH)
Security Awareness Products
STH End User
These modules cover the broadest
set of users and a wide range of
cybersecurity awareness topics.
STH Utility
These modules focus on cybersecurity
awareness and NERC CIP
training program needs for utilities.
STH Engineer
These modules focus on individuals
who support, engineer, or interact with
control system cyber assets.
Intro to the
ICS Curriculum
This GIAC certification is being leveraged across
industries to ensure a minimum set of knowledge and
capabilities that IT, engineers, and security professionals
should know if they are in a role that could impact
the cybersecurity of an ICS environment.
This course is for individuals who interact
with or who could impact Industrial
Controls System environments. The roles
performed by personnel specific to this field
can roughly be divided into four domains:
IT (includes OT support)
IT Security (includes OT security)
Engineering
Corporate, industry,
and professional standards
T R A D I T I O N A L
C O U R S E
T R E N D
A D V A N C E D
I C S
C O U R S E S
SEC301
Intro to Information
Security
GIAC: GISF
ICS410
ICS/SCADA
Security Essentials
GIAC: GICSP
HOSTED
Critical Infrastructure
and Control System
Cybersecurity
HOSTED
Assessing and
Exploiting Control
Systems
ICS515
ICS Active Defense
and Response
SANS’ Advanced
Cybersecurity Courses:
Cyber Defense: SEC501 • SEC502 • SEC503 • SEC511
Forensics: FOR408 • FOR508 • FOR610
Hands-on Exercise: SEC562 (CyberCity)
This course is for individuals new to
information technology that need to
understand the basics of information
assurance, computer networking,
cryptography, and risk evaluation.
Hosted by:
This course is for individuals
with responsibility for
performing pentesting and
vulnerability discovery within
ICS environments.
Hosted by:
This hands-on course is
for individuals with the
responsibility of securing
control systems and control
system components.
Application Security
• Directory Integration
• App Armor
• SE Linux
• chroot()
• MS EMET
Host Defense
Products:
• Traditional AV
• Host IDS
• Application Whitelisting
• File Config Management
Monitoring Products:
• Process Monitoring
• Event Monitoring
• Network Communications Monitoring
• Control System Management
• Health Monitoring
Device Testing:
• Device Fuzzing
• Performance Testing
• Pen Testing
• Vulnerability Scanning
P O S T E R
i c s . s a n s . o r g
T R A I N I N G
T R E N D S
This course is for individuals with
responsibility for generating and
using ICS threat indicators in an
effort to actively modify defense
systems against new threats, respond
to intrusions and perform triage to
prevent future intrusions.
S O L U T I O N S
Industrial Control
Systems (ICS)
A term used
to describe the
personnel, hardware,
and software
components that
read inputs and
control outputs in a
manner that bridges
the Cyber and
Physical worlds.
© 2000-2017 SANS™ Institute
paloaltonetworks.com
Next-generation Security
for SCADA and ICS
rockwellautomation.com
Design Considerations for
Securing Industrial Automation and
Control System Networks
nexdefense.com
SeeingThrough the Fog of Complexity –
How a foundational tool like NexDefense’s SOPHIA can ensure
ICS/SCADA systems stay reliable, predictable, and secure
Expendible ICS Networks
waterfallsecurity.com
To get your free vendor-
sponsored whitepaper, visit
sans.org/tools.php
Strategies for Industrial DeviceTesting
securicon.com
yokogawa.com
Yokogawa’s Comprehensive
Lifecycle Approach to
Process Control System Cyber-Security
ICS-PSTR_32nd EDITION_0617_v1
G A S
N A T U R A L
Gas flow metering
Flow control and pressure
management
Alert and alarm systems
Monitor temperature levels
Pipeline pressure monitor
Odorant management systems
Condensate tank levels
Liquefaction control systems
Vaporization control systems
Boiloff control systems
Well head control
Field compression
Transmission
Switching
Circuit breaker control
Protective relaying
Distribution automation logic
components
Generation
Turbine control systems
Boiler control systems
Acoustic monitoring systems
Heat rate systems
Coal handling systems
Emission monitoring systems
Water chemistry systems
Vibration control systems
AGC systems
E L E C T R I C
B U I L D I N G M G T
S Y S Y E M S
Switch gear management
Lighting control
HVAC control systems
Fire suppression systems
Physical access control and
monitoring systems
Facility management systems
Air quality systems
Water treatment systems
Boiler control systems
Batch process control and continuous process control systems
Monitoring and control of process temperature, pressure, flow rate,
liquid level, gas level, and chemical makeup
Chemical reactor control
Mixing systems
Distillation column control
Evironmental monitoring of gas, liquid, and solid discharge
Safety-instrumented systems
C H E M I C A L
Rail
Switching
Sensor monitoring
Signal monitoring
Traction systems
Safety systems
Shipping
Terminal operations
Crane control
Cargo management
systems
Aviation
Air traffic control
systems
Warehouse Distribution
Inventory tracking
Conveyor systems
Automated product delivery
Automated storage and retrieval systems
Automated guided-vehicle systems
Highway/Road
Traffic control systems
Bridge monitoring systems
Traffic monitoring systems
T R A N S P O R T A T I O N
Monitoring source water
Treatment process control
Pressure control
Flow control
Wastewater collection system monitoring
Pump station monitor and control
Valve pump and mixing monitor and control
W A T E R
O I L
Upstream systems:
Ballast control systems
Drilling control systems
Gas compressor control
Power generation control
Water treatment systems
Concrete batch control systems
Helicopter fueling systems
Safety-instrumented systems
Midstream systems:
Process control systems
monitoring and controlling
temperature, flow, pressure,
weight, and viscosity
Safety-instrumented systems
Downstream systems:
Storage, pretreatment, distillation,
and dispatch control systems
Safety-instrumented systems
Light manufacturing
Etching control – Chemical
Mechanical Planarization (CMP)
Lithography control
Processing temperature
Process pressure
Cooling and heating rates
Heavy manufacturing
Robotic arm assembly
Weld controllers
Sealing and dispensing systems
Quality test systems
Production line control systems
Press control systems
Hydraulic press controls
Flat metal line feeder control
CNC systems
M A N U F A C T U R I N G
Control Centers
Energy management systems
Communications front end
Inter-control center
communication systems
Operator alarm systems
Contingency analysis
State estimation
Automatic generation
Control Centers
C O N T RO L C E N T E R
O P E R AT I O N S
Patient vital sign monitoring systems
MRI monitoring systems
Infusion systems
Implanted medical devices
Nurse monitoring stations
Operating room environmental
control systems
H E A L T H C A R E
Amusement Parks
Amusement park ride
control
Theme element
activation
Safety systems
Mining
Dust management systems
Ventilation performance
systems
Machine long travel
monitoring systems
Conveyor alignment detection
Ground water level monitor
Food and Beverage
Packaging systems
Food safety systems
Batch mixing process systems
Clean and sterilizing in-place
systems
Ingredient, work in progress, and
finished goods tracking systems
O T H E R S E C T O R S
Learn why ICS security
should be on your career map
ics.sans.or g
Visit SANS’ CyberCity: sans.org/netwars/cybercity

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  • 1. 2011 PRESENT Automation of Cyber-physical Systems and the Internet of Things 2005 2010 2001 2004 1970 2000 3RD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Automation of Production by Electronics 1900 1970 2ND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Mass Production Powered by Electricity TH E HI S TO RY O F ICS Detailed History of ICS whitepaper available at ics.sans.org/resources 1700 1900 1ST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION Mechanical Production Powered by Steam René-Antoine Ferchault de Réamur proposed ideas for automatic devices to provide feedback for the purposes of control James Watt’s steam governor provided proportional control of the throttle A U T O M A T I O N E V E N T S I C S S E C U R I T Y E V E N T S Use of relays and control cabinets in remote rooms to turn things on/off by use of switches and monitor recorders Machine tools were automated with Numerical Control (NC) using punched paper tape Modicon 084 the first programmable controller implemented. (Modicon stood for MOdular DIgital CONtroller.) Allen-Bradley designed and named the Bulletin 1774 PLC and coined the term “Programmable Logic Controller” First use of distributed control throughout a large industrial plant 1788 1900s 1950s 1959 1969 1971 Fieldbus protocols to include ControlNet, DeviceNet, Profibus, and Fieldbus Foundation. Quickly followed by Ethernet and TCP/IP connectivity for PLCs 1990s Modbus introduced to allow PLCs to talk with one another 1973 First controllers with embedded web server 2003 Open Technology Movement ICS Vendors begin migration from proprietary networks, software, and hardware platforms to open architectures 2000 & BEYOND Remote I/O introduced 1976 PLCs are linked to PCs 1986 First PAC is introduced 2001 NERC CIP Standards become enforceable JUL 2008 DHS ICS-CERT is created NOV 2009 First ePAC is introduced 2013 EARLY 1700s Uncorroborated report of a Trojan program inserted into SCADA system software that caused an explosion along the Trans-Siberian pipeline A former consultant accessed the control system of the plant and released up to one million litres of sewage into the surrounding waterways Media reports about GAZPROM cyber incident impacting operational systems 1982 Breach into Pennsylvania water plant installation of spyware on plant’s computer systems NOV 2006 Conficker Worm gets into ICS along with 12 million general computers. It infected power generation plants in the U.S. FEB 2009 Stuxnet worm discovered. Stuxnet is a computer worm that was discovered in June 2010 but evidence suggests variations may have dated back to 2005 and was designed to target ICS and impact a specific process 2010 Commuter tram collision by glancing blow and derailment due to unauthorized switching in the city of Lodz, Poland JAN 2008 Revelation by U.S. government official that cyber attacks have resulted in power outages in multiple regions outside the United States MAR 2000 Plant computers infected by Slammer worm. The worm entered the plant network via a contractor’s infected computer connected via telephone dial-up directly to the plant network, thus bypassing the firewall JAN 2003 The Blaster worm infected the communication system of a U.S. railway company – the dispatching and signaling systems were affected and passenger and freight traffic systems were disrupted AUG 2003 Off-shore oil platform hacks impact leak detection systems. Unauthorized access and control of off shore platform leak detection and monitoring system 2009 APR 2000 DCS system found infected with Nachi (AKA Welchia) virus on 8 APCs DEC 2003 Zotob worm infects 13 U.S. auto plants causing shutdowns and delays AUG 2005 Los Angeles traffic system cyber intrusion by insiders (labor strike) AUG 2007 Utility smart meters are compromised in scale resulting in lost revenue SEP 2009 Virus infection of OPC servers at Petro-chemical plant in South Africa DEC 2009 Telvent intrusion, company warns ICS customers (ICS supplier) SEP 2012 Havex Trojan is discovered in ICS-focused water-holing attacks – observed capability to locate OPC servers and attempts to exfiltrate collected data JUN 2014 Duqu malware discovered SEP 2011 APT attacks on gas pipeline sector DEC 2011 Flame malware discovered MAY 2012 Houston water system compromise 2012 SCADA workstations shipped to utility with infections 2005 I C S S E C U R I T Y S O L U T I O N S M A P I C S C U R R I C U L U M Securing the Human (STH) Security Awareness Products STH End User These modules cover the broadest set of users and a wide range of cybersecurity awareness topics. STH Utility These modules focus on cybersecurity awareness and NERC CIP training program needs for utilities. STH Engineer These modules focus on individuals who support, engineer, or interact with control system cyber assets. Intro to the ICS Curriculum This GIAC certification is being leveraged across industries to ensure a minimum set of knowledge and capabilities that IT, engineers, and security professionals should know if they are in a role that could impact the cybersecurity of an ICS environment. This course is for individuals who interact with or who could impact Industrial Controls System environments. The roles performed by personnel specific to this field can roughly be divided into four domains: IT (includes OT support) IT Security (includes OT security) Engineering Corporate, industry, and professional standards T R A D I T I O N A L C O U R S E T R E N D A D V A N C E D I C S C O U R S E S SEC301 Intro to Information Security GIAC: GISF ICS410 ICS/SCADA Security Essentials GIAC: GICSP HOSTED Critical Infrastructure and Control System Cybersecurity HOSTED Assessing and Exploiting Control Systems ICS515 ICS Active Defense and Response SANS’ Advanced Cybersecurity Courses: Cyber Defense: SEC501 • SEC502 • SEC503 • SEC511 Forensics: FOR408 • FOR508 • FOR610 Hands-on Exercise: SEC562 (CyberCity) This course is for individuals new to information technology that need to understand the basics of information assurance, computer networking, cryptography, and risk evaluation. Hosted by: This course is for individuals with responsibility for performing pentesting and vulnerability discovery within ICS environments. Hosted by: This hands-on course is for individuals with the responsibility of securing control systems and control system components. Application Security • Directory Integration • App Armor • SE Linux • chroot() • MS EMET Host Defense Products: • Traditional AV • Host IDS • Application Whitelisting • File Config Management Monitoring Products: • Process Monitoring • Event Monitoring • Network Communications Monitoring • Control System Management • Health Monitoring Device Testing: • Device Fuzzing • Performance Testing • Pen Testing • Vulnerability Scanning P O S T E R i c s . s a n s . o r g T R A I N I N G T R E N D S This course is for individuals with responsibility for generating and using ICS threat indicators in an effort to actively modify defense systems against new threats, respond to intrusions and perform triage to prevent future intrusions. S O L U T I O N S Industrial Control Systems (ICS) A term used to describe the personnel, hardware, and software components that read inputs and control outputs in a manner that bridges the Cyber and Physical worlds. © 2000-2017 SANS™ Institute paloaltonetworks.com Next-generation Security for SCADA and ICS rockwellautomation.com Design Considerations for Securing Industrial Automation and Control System Networks nexdefense.com SeeingThrough the Fog of Complexity – How a foundational tool like NexDefense’s SOPHIA can ensure ICS/SCADA systems stay reliable, predictable, and secure Expendible ICS Networks waterfallsecurity.com To get your free vendor- sponsored whitepaper, visit sans.org/tools.php Strategies for Industrial DeviceTesting securicon.com yokogawa.com Yokogawa’s Comprehensive Lifecycle Approach to Process Control System Cyber-Security ICS-PSTR_32nd EDITION_0617_v1
  • 2. G A S N A T U R A L Gas flow metering Flow control and pressure management Alert and alarm systems Monitor temperature levels Pipeline pressure monitor Odorant management systems Condensate tank levels Liquefaction control systems Vaporization control systems Boiloff control systems Well head control Field compression Transmission Switching Circuit breaker control Protective relaying Distribution automation logic components Generation Turbine control systems Boiler control systems Acoustic monitoring systems Heat rate systems Coal handling systems Emission monitoring systems Water chemistry systems Vibration control systems AGC systems E L E C T R I C B U I L D I N G M G T S Y S Y E M S Switch gear management Lighting control HVAC control systems Fire suppression systems Physical access control and monitoring systems Facility management systems Air quality systems Water treatment systems Boiler control systems Batch process control and continuous process control systems Monitoring and control of process temperature, pressure, flow rate, liquid level, gas level, and chemical makeup Chemical reactor control Mixing systems Distillation column control Evironmental monitoring of gas, liquid, and solid discharge Safety-instrumented systems C H E M I C A L Rail Switching Sensor monitoring Signal monitoring Traction systems Safety systems Shipping Terminal operations Crane control Cargo management systems Aviation Air traffic control systems Warehouse Distribution Inventory tracking Conveyor systems Automated product delivery Automated storage and retrieval systems Automated guided-vehicle systems Highway/Road Traffic control systems Bridge monitoring systems Traffic monitoring systems T R A N S P O R T A T I O N Monitoring source water Treatment process control Pressure control Flow control Wastewater collection system monitoring Pump station monitor and control Valve pump and mixing monitor and control W A T E R O I L Upstream systems: Ballast control systems Drilling control systems Gas compressor control Power generation control Water treatment systems Concrete batch control systems Helicopter fueling systems Safety-instrumented systems Midstream systems: Process control systems monitoring and controlling temperature, flow, pressure, weight, and viscosity Safety-instrumented systems Downstream systems: Storage, pretreatment, distillation, and dispatch control systems Safety-instrumented systems Light manufacturing Etching control – Chemical Mechanical Planarization (CMP) Lithography control Processing temperature Process pressure Cooling and heating rates Heavy manufacturing Robotic arm assembly Weld controllers Sealing and dispensing systems Quality test systems Production line control systems Press control systems Hydraulic press controls Flat metal line feeder control CNC systems M A N U F A C T U R I N G Control Centers Energy management systems Communications front end Inter-control center communication systems Operator alarm systems Contingency analysis State estimation Automatic generation Control Centers C O N T RO L C E N T E R O P E R AT I O N S Patient vital sign monitoring systems MRI monitoring systems Infusion systems Implanted medical devices Nurse monitoring stations Operating room environmental control systems H E A L T H C A R E Amusement Parks Amusement park ride control Theme element activation Safety systems Mining Dust management systems Ventilation performance systems Machine long travel monitoring systems Conveyor alignment detection Ground water level monitor Food and Beverage Packaging systems Food safety systems Batch mixing process systems Clean and sterilizing in-place systems Ingredient, work in progress, and finished goods tracking systems O T H E R S E C T O R S Learn why ICS security should be on your career map ics.sans.or g Visit SANS’ CyberCity: sans.org/netwars/cybercity