A Solid Foundation of Savings and Competition: Why Competitive Bidding Works for Small, Readily-Specifiable Construction-Related Projects in Federal Contracting

A SOLID FOUNDATION OF SAVINGS AND COMPETITION:
Why Competitive Bidding Works For Small,
Readily-Specifiable Construction-Related
Projects In Federal Contracting
A White Paper from
The Reverse Auction Research Center
Author: David C. Wyld
Professor of Management
Southeastern Lousiana University
November 2012
© 2012 The Reverse Auction Research Center. All Rights Reserved. | www.reverseauctionresearch.org

2 A Solid Foundation of Savings and Competition
A SOLID FOUNDATION
OF SAVINGS
AND COMPETITION:
Why Competitive
Bidding Works
For Small,
Readily-Specifiable
Construction-
Related Projects In
Federal Contracting
Introduction
In the recently completed research report for the IBM Center for the
Business of Government, Reverse Auctioning: Saving Money and
Increasing Transparency, this author outlined the many benefits of
reverse auctioning for organizations in both the public and
private sector, including:
• Lower prices – Lowering the price to be paid by the organization
across a wide swath of its procurement outlays for appropriate
categories of goods and simple services.
• Increased competition – Opening access to bidding from an
expanding pool of suppliers to heighten competition in the
procurement process.
• Real-time market pricing – Enabling competitors to adjust their
bids multiple times in response to other competitors’ prices to the
benefit of both the buyer, who saves hard dollars, and the seller,
who ultimately gains the business.
• Process efficiencies – Leveraging the reverse auction tool to
improve the acquisition function and generate soft-dollar savings
through efficiency gains and more productive use of time,
manpower, and resources.
• Time savings – Compressing the buying process from weeks or
months to days or even hours, benefiting both sides of the
procurement equation.
• Increased number of suppliers – Encouraging new entrants into
the contracting process to provide benefits to small businesses
that enter.
• Sustainable cost savings – Delivering not just cost savings in the
initial round of reverse auctioning, but ensuring that the organization
is paying a real-time market price on subsequent like acquisitions
(Wyld, 2011, p. 6).

With a decade’s worth of successful performance,
reverse auctions have become a proven acquisition
method across the federal government. Each year,
contracting offices in both the Department of
Defense (DoD) and civilian federal agencies are
making over $2.5 billion dollars in awards
annually through competitive bidding. The use of
reverse auctions is growing rapidly across the
federal sector, as use of reverse auctions as an
acquisition tool has proven to:
• Produce significant levels of savings.
• Be useful across a wide variety of goods and
services comprising a significant portion of
spending for a governmental agency.
• Make acquisition processes more efficient and
faster, enabling agencies to deliver improved
service levels and results with the same or less
staff than before.
• Introduce new levels of competition by providing
improved access to governmental contracting
for small businesses.
• Improve transparency in the acquisition process,
assuring competing suppliers and taxpayers
of a fairer, open competition among a wider
field of competition than alternative procurement
methods. (Wyld, 2011, p. 42)
Today, reverse auctions are being used by
government agencies to produce consistent,
positive results that are significantly
impacting government acquisitions operations.
With pressure mounting throughout the government
to “do more without more,” reverse auctions are
making acquisition efforts better, faster and cheaper
while boosting accountability and transparency.
In agency after agency, the competitive reverse
auction environment has proven to effectively
level the playing field, enabling new suppliers to
participate and improving the transparency of
both opportunity access and the competitive process.
And while incumbent suppliers may vehemently
dislike having their incumbent contracts subjected
to competition, the openness works for all parties,
especially the United States taxpayer.
Yet, there still exists a widespread belief that reverse
auctions are not appropriate to respond to one
specific acquisition need for all federal agencies:
fixed price, small dollar construction projects.
But hard evidence from the private sector points to
the contrary.
For many years, companies across private industry,
both in the U.S. and around the world, have
successfully employed reverse auctions to their
procurement of a wide array of building-related
services. In fact, almost all Fortune 500 companies
today employ reverse auctioning to some extent.
(Moorhouse, 2008)
Simple construction and building-related services,
ranging from carpeting and flooring work to plumbing
and air conditioning installation and maintenance,
have been successfully procured using reverse
auctions. For example, pharmaceutical giant
GlaxoSmithKline, has been using reverse auctions
for construction projects for almost a decade. They
established a successful process where general
contractors are selected through a reverse auction,
then the winning contractor is able to use their
reverse auction solution to drive further savings
associated with the subcontracted components of the
project. This became the standard approach for small
construction projects at GlaxoSmithKline’s many
site and corporate facilities. Related approaches have
since been adopted throughout industry for simple
construction projects with fixed price outcomes.
(Hannon, 2004)
Similarly, the expansive European retail chain, Tesco,
has been using “e-tendering” for a number of
years. Tesco uses this electronic competitive bidding
process on both new store building projects and
renovation of existing facilities for everything from

demolition, mechanical and engineering services to
routine facility maintenance needs such as painting,
electrical and security installation services.
(Pearman, 2005)
In this white paper, we show how the perception
that reverse auctions will not work for federal
acquisition of construction-related services is a
myth – a myth perpetuated by the continuing adoption
resistance of the major construction trade associations
and the construction-building trade media.
To bring an end to this myth, we will first show the
weaknesses in the trade groups’ arguments in
this area. Then, we will outline the results of new
research in this area examining how the Department
of Defense and a variety of federal civilian agencies
are presently saving taxpayer dollars and creating
new opportunities for small business by successfully
using reverse auctioning for a whole host of simple,
fixed price, small construction and building-related
service acquisitions.
Construction Industry Opposition
For well over a decade, top construction industry
trade groups have lined up to oppose the use
of reverse auctions in federal contracting. The list
of contractor associations and organizations
representing a wide variety of building trades opposing
electronic-based competitive bidding is headlined
by the American General Contractors Association
(AGCA), the Associated Builders and Contractors
(ABC) and the Associated Specialty Contractors
(ASC). The ASC is actually an umbrella group that
includes nine different, industry-specific construction
trade associations:
1. Finishing Contractors Association
2. Mechanical Contractors Association of America
3. National Electrical Contractors Association
4. National Insulation Association
5. National Roofing Association
6. National Subcontrators Alliance
7. Painting and Decorating Contractors of America
8. Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors
Association
9. Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’
National Association
Since the early 2000s, these groups have aligned to
lobby against the use of reverse auctioning for
construction-related services. Their campaign has
led to the production and dissemination of a
variety of position statements and white papers
raising assorted arguments against reverse auctions.
Most of these group-generated pieces claim that
construction, building and maintenance services are
somehow unique and different from all other services
and thus, are not appropriate for awards based on
competitive bidding.
For instance, the AGCA’s (2012) position statement
on reverse auctions holds that:
“Due to the complexities of federal construction
projects, the procurement of construction services
using the reverse auction method fails to take
into account construction’s unique mix of services
and systems tailored to individual owner needs
and budgets, site requirements and the changing
composition of the project team, while products
and commodities are manufactured with little or
no variability.” (n.p.)
Stan Berger (2005), then President of the Mechanical
Contractors Association of America (MCAA), stated
that, “Reverse auctions are nothing like sealed bids
- they are apples and oranges.” (n.p.) From these
groups’ perspective, the sealed bid process is a far
more effective way of ensuring that the government
receives the best and fairest price, both for the
taxpayers and for the firm that wins the contract.

Some groups however go even further in their
positions against reverse auctioning, claiming that the
process itself promotes “imprudent bidding”. In what
can only be regarded as an almost paternalistic
and even condescending tone, some have stated
that construction-related firms and their employees
may not be able to recalculate their costs quickly
enough to make informed choices regarding whether
or not to lower their bid prices in a reverse auction
environment. (Associated Specialty Contractors, 2004)
Stan Berger (2005) also stated that: “The competitive
dynamic of the auction process leads to mistakes –
both in technical/administrative clerical assessments
and in judgment as well.” (n.p.) Yet, Mike Murphy
(2005), who was then Editor-in-Chief of Air Conditioning
Heating & Refrigeration News, pointed-out that
electronic competitive bidding was, in truth, just a
more modern and far less time-consuming and
labor intensive version of plan-and-spec bidding.
He argued that the construction associations were
mistaken in their constant opposition of reverse
auctions from the standpoint of protecting contractors
from making bidding mistakes just because the
process takes place online.
Finally, some groups hold to the counterintuitive
position that reverse auctions can actually lead to
higher prices and decreased competition.
For example, the ABC, holds in its position
statement that:
“The use of reverse auctions also may lead to
higher costs due to decreased competition in the
marketplace. If contractors opt out of bidding in
reverse auctions because of slim profit margins or
philosophical or ethical objections, owners will
have a smaller, less competitive pool of contractors
bidding their projects. The result may be higher
costs for the owner community in the long run”
(2012, p. 2) (emphasis in the original).
Despite significant proven arguments to the contrary,
trade associations continue to staunchly oppose
reverse auctioning for governmental procurement
of construction-related services in all forms. In fact,
earlier this year, the American Subcontractors
Association (2012) called for support at the federal
and state levels “to stop unethical practices like
‘electronic reverse bid auctions.” (n.p.).
The construction industry media has also played a
role in perpetuating the myth that reverse auctioning
is counter-productive in the case of all federal
contracting for building services. In various editorials
and articles, construction trade journals have
consistently attacked competitive bidding and
reinforced the perception that reverse auctions are
not just inappropriate for building, mechanical and
demolition services, but that the practice is unethical,
even evil at best, and may be, or should be, illegal.
For example, Rob Willock, then-editor of Contract
Journal, opined on, “that most-hated and cynical of
procurement methods –the reverse auction,” adding
that, “anyone who knows anything about construction
knows that Dutch auctions are a recipe for a
lowest-price, litigious disaster, except when used for
basic commodity items.” (n.p.) Contractor Magazine
criticized, “the Vegas-like frenzy of an auction
atmosphere.” (McGreevy, 2004, n.p.) Florence (2005)
cited concerns that the intense price-pressures of
reverse auctions would lead contractors and
construction-service providers to cut corners that
would not just reduce the quality of the work,
but endanger the safety of workers on the job. And
Warner (2002) expressed his belief that the whole
reverse auction process was an unnecessary waste
of time for all involved, claiming that, “If contractors
know that the whole bidding process is going to wind
up with a reverse auction, they’ll put in higher prices
to start with. In the end, clients probably get the same
price they would have got by normal methods.” (n.p.)

Analysis – Why Reverse Auctions
Work for Small, Readily-Specifiable
Construction-Related Services
Acquisitions
Although much of the vilification of reverse auctions
made by these construction-industry and union
trade groups is simply hyperbole, their positions do
have some merit in the case of general construction.
Indeed, for such projects, including building new
buildings, major remodeling of existing facilities and
complex demolition projects (often with inherent
environmental concerns), reverse auctions are simply
not an appropriate decision-making mechanism,
whether the project be in the public or private sector.
General construction projects are simply too
complex, too big, and quite often, too unpredictable
for a firm fixed-price to be determined a priori
through any mechanism.
However, these big projects, while often costing
millions, and quite often tens and even hundreds of
millions of dollars, do not represent the vast
majority of construction-related services that are
actually being procured by federal agencies. While
big dollar construction projects grab the spotlight,
they are an anomaly in the area of acquisition – a
rare event. The day-to-day needs of agencies require
them to rather routinely procure a whole host of
construction, remodeling and demolition services.
These are rather small acquisitions that are simple
and straight-forward. Thus, they can be clearly
specified, with defined needs and starting/completion
dates. Whether it is recarpeting a floor of an office
building, replacing an HVAC unit, doing plumbing
work, or tearing down and removing a shed, all of
these services can, and are, being acquired through
the use of reverse auctioning at federal agencies
today. And all of this “works” just as well for
construction services as it works for other services
being procured through reverse auctioning, both
in the private and public sectors.
Overall, procurement research has shown
that if a good or service can be properly
specified, it can be successfully procured
through competitive bidding.
In this regard, Kaufmann and Carter (2004) categorized
“specifiability” as the most important criterion for
determining if a reverse auction is appropriate for a
particular acquisition. They defined this concept
as the ability to provide a thorough and unambiguous
description of all the requirements of a good or
service being procured. Procurement research has
also clearly shown that when dealing with well-
specified services, providers are more willing to
compete in competitive bidding procurements
because their relative certainty as to precisely what
they are bidding on allows them to compete with
confidence. (Hawkins, Randall, and Whitman 2009;
Schoenherr and Mabert 2007)
In the next section of this report, we will analyze
how the federal government has been successfully
employing reverse auctions in the acquisition
of such readily-specifiable services – both across
a range of agencies and a wide array of
construction-related services.

Data Analysis of Results from FedBid
Reverse Auctions for Construction-
Related Services
In mid-2012, this researcher conducted an analysis
of reverse auction-based competitions for a variety of
federal agencies in construction and building
renovation-related auctions conducted by FedBid, a
Vienna, Virginia-based firm that is the leading facilitator
of reverse auctioning for the federal government. For
the purposes of the present project, the researcher
was granted access to the results of tens of thousands
of successfully completed reverse auctions conducted
by FedBid for agencies across the federal government.
This analysis was carried-out in two stages:
1. An overall examination of the competition
and savings generated for small, simple,
fixed price construction-related services
auctions carried-out over the most recent
two and a half years.
2. An in-depth examination of results of the same
categories of small, simple, fixed price auctions
(with award values up to $150,000) for the
2011 calendar year, to gain insight into how the
auction mechanism worked in the most common
area of construction-related services
(i.e., maintenance functions, as opposed to
new construction).
Overall Analysis
A comprehensive analysis was initially conducted
using data on auctions completed between January
1, 2010 and May 31, 2012. In this analysis, all
construction-related service reverse auctions
conducted for federal agencies through FedBid were
examined. To ensure that only construction-related
services were studied, only auctions that fell within
three categories in the FPDS included in the data set:
1. Category C - Architect and Engineering
2. Category Y - Construction of Structures
3. Category Z - Maintenance of Real Property.
Whether it is recarpeting a floor
of an office building, replacing an
HVAC unit, doing plumbing work,
or tearing down and removing a
shed, all of these services can,
and are, being acquired through
the use of reverse auctioning at
federal agencies today.

Table 1 – Overall Results Produced by Construction-Related Reverse Auctions:
January 1, 2010 - May 31, 2012
DoD: Department of Defense
FedCiv: All Other Federal Agencies
* The number of unique sellers who submitted at least one bid in the reverse auction
In all, 103 reverse auctions involving federal agencies
procuring services in these three categories of actions
were identified during this time span. All of these
actions were for small, fixed-price construction-related
services for award amounts under $150,000. These
were small to moderate size acquisitions in terms
of federal procurement, averaging just under $30,000
per buy. Collectively however, the awards totaled
over $3 million. The results of these auctions are
summarized in Table 1 (Overall Results Produced by
Construction-related Reverse Auctions: January 1,
2010 - May 31, 2012).
As can be seen, the savings rate in
reverse auctions conducted on behalf of
the DoD (Department of Defense) was
far higher (22%) than that generated
by construction-related buys across all
other civilian federal agencies (7%). The
reverse auctions produced an average
15% savings, meaning that the federal
government and taxpayers saved over
$400,000 through the application of this
acquisition tool to construction-related
service buys.
These significant savings were produced through
the competition spurred in the reverse auction
environment, with an average of three bidders
participating in each such auction. FedBid actively
works to recruit new participants to federal contracting
into its fully-managed online marketplace, and
by and large, these are small, disadvantaged and
woman-owned businesses. These service providers
are largely locally-focused, and as such, provide
new competition for entrenched service providers
and create economic opportunities for their
companies and employees through involvement in
federal contracting.
In order to further examine precisely what types of
construction services were bought by federal agencies
using reverse auctions, the author organized the
buys by category. What was found was that a wide
range of disparate construction, building and facility
maintenance services were successfully acquired
through competitive bidding, both by the Department
of Defense and civilian agencies. The majority of
buys however were found to be in Category Z
(Maintenance of Real Property). This distribution is
to be expected, as maintenance of existing
structures, as opposed to design and construction of
new structures, necessarily comprise the majority
of construction-related actions and spend across
federal agencies.
AGENCY TYPE
DoD
FedCiv
Total
BUYS AVERAGE BUY SIZE
AVERAGE
SELLER COUNT*
AVERAGE
SAVINGS ($)
AVERAGE
SAVINGS (%)
53
50
103
$22,881.52
$37,152.73
$29,809.29
$4,962.29
$2,944.63
$3,982.84
2.4
3.8
3.1
22%
7%
15%

Table 2 (Results by Category for Construction-Related Reverse Auctions) shows the top five categories of
activity for construction-related reverse auctions during this time frame. The first four service categories were
for services that fall under Category Z. It should be noted that in all of these common facility maintenance
needs, savings in excess of 12% were generated through the use of competitive bidding. Furthermore, the
competition level for the road/gravel repair category was intense, drawing on average more than five firms to
compete in the reverse auctions for this basic building and parking lot need. It is important to note findings in
the last category listed in Table 2 – General Contracting. As previously mentioned, contractor groups have
staunchly maintained that reverse auctions are inappropriate, and would not work for such construction
services. However, the FedBid results clearly show that reverse auctions can work to generate true competition
to produce savings of 8% across all actions in this area. Since the majority of all actions for construction
and building-related services were for items in Category Z (Maintenance of Real Property), the researcher
conducted a follow-on analysis focused on awards made for building and property maintenance services.
Analysis of Maintenance-Focused Construction-Related Reverse
Table 2 – Results by Category for Construction-Related Reverse Auctions
* Indicates the number of unique sellers who submitted at least one bid in the reverse auction
AGENCY TYPE
Flooring Installation
and Repair
Door Repair
HVAC Installation
and Repair
Road/Gravel Repair
General Contracting
BUYS AVERAGE BUY SIZE
AVERAGE
SELLER COUNT*
AVERAGE
SAVINGS ($)
AVERAGE
SAVINGS (%)
12
11
5
6
10
$14,318.33
$29,670.00
$51,184.60
$11,303.52
$31,144.60
$2,680.18
$17,276.33
$8,528.98
$1,645.27
$4,416.25
2.8
2.2
5.4
1.7
3.2
21%
29%
12%
19%
8%

Auction Results
The data set for the follow-on study was a subset
of the initial data, comprised of all auctions in the
relevant areas that were successfully completed
within calendar year 2011 (from January 1, 2011 to
December 31, 2011). Again, these auctions were only
for services in Categories Z, C and Y in the FPDS
classification system. The data set included reverse
auctions conducted for the following federal agencies:
• Department of Interior (DOI)
• Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
• Department of Defense (DOD)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Department of State (DOS)
• Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)
• Department of Justice (DOJ)
• Independent Agency Government Corporation
(IAGC)
A total of 55 successfully completed auctions (meaning
that the auction produced competition that reduced
the final price from the Independent Government Cost
Estimate) were identified to be the data set for the
present analysis. As was seen in the initial,
comprehensive analysis of 2010-2012 to date data, of
the total auctions in construction-related areas, 41
(or 74.6% of the auctions) were from Category Z.
Examples of the types of construction and building-
related services included in Category Z in 2011
were auctions for:
• Delivery and spread of crush and run/aggregate
• Fence repair
• Road painting and repair
• Building modifications
• Flooring replacement and maintenance
• Electrical wiring maintenance
• Bathroom and shower repair/modification
• Controlled entryway construction.
Out of the 55 successfully completed auctions across
all three categories, the various agencies made 40
awards. This comprised a total of $1,537,626.77,
making the average award size in this area $38,440.67.
The following case studies detailing three reverse
auctions for property and building maintenance
conducted by FedBid for the DOI provide a more
granular examination of how savings can be
generated through the use of competitive bidding for
Category Z (Maintenance of Real Property) services.
The first case study examines an auction conducted
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
remaining two were conducted by the National Park
Service (NPS). All three auctions were competed
as small business set-asides, meaning that only
qualified small and disadvantaged businesses could
participate in these opportunities.
With a decade’s worth of successful
performance, reverse auctions
have become a proven acquisition
method across the federal
government. Each year, contracting
offices in both the Department of
Defense (DoD) and civilian federal
agencies are making over $2.5
billion dollars in awards annually
through competitive bidding.

Case Study 1: U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service
The first case study involves a buy made by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). In this particular
scenario, the agency buyer was seeking a small
business provider to install new flooring in an existing
FWS office building located in Delaware. The
auction’s key statistics are summarized in Table 3
(Results of the Fish and Wildlife Service Auction
for Installation of Flooring). In all, five competing sellers
submitted ten bids over the course of the auction.
This competition served to produce savings in excess
of 10% on the procurement.
Table 3 – Results of the Fish and Wildlife Service
Auction for Installation of Flooring
Criterion
Independent Government
Cost Estimate
Award Price
Savings Amount
Savings Percentage
Number of Competing Firms
Number of Bids Submitted
Statistic
$26.651.25
$19,003.50
$7,647.75
28.7%
6
30
Case Study 2: National Park Service
This second case study focuses on a buy made by
the National Park Service. The contracting officer
involved was seeking to obtain repairs for the
numerous elk fences damaged by fallen trees in the
aftermath of the Las Conchas Fire in and around the
Santa Fe National Forest in New Mexico. According
to the auction specifications, sellers were bidding
to both repair the fences and clean up nearby debris.
The results of the auction are shown in Table 4
(Results of National Park Service Reverse Auction
for Repair of Elk Fences). As evidenced, six small
businesses participated in the reverse auction, and in
all, these companies submitted thirty bids over
the seven-day duration of the auction. In the end,
the award for the contract at just over $19,000
dollars represented a 28.7% savings over the
Independent Government Cost Estimate, saving
taxpayers well in excess of $7,000 dollars in the
process, while the terms of the auction ensured
that a qualified small business was the recipient
of the contract.

Table 4 – Results of National Park Service
Reverse Auction for Repair of Elk Fences
Criterion
Cost Estimate
Award Price
Savings Amount
Savings Percentage
Statistic
$13,831.18
$12,379.57
$1,451.61
10.5%
5
10

Case Study 3: National Park Service
In this final case study, a National Park Service buyer
was seeking a small business to make necessary
roofing and restroom repairs for the Gila Cliff Dwellings,
a U.S. National Monument located in the Gila
Wilderness in southwestern New Mexico. The key
metrics for the reverse auction are shown in Table 5
(Results of National Park Service Reverse Auction
for Repairs to Facilities at the Gila Cliff Dwellings).
This auction produced a large amount of savings for
the government, as the interplay of the four competing
firms generated a final award price that was over
$47,000 less than the Independent Government Cost
Estimate. This meant that a small business won the
contract in this set-aside auction, and the government
and taxpayers saved well over a third in the process.
This is an excellent example of the “win-win”
produced by reverse auctions for such services,
as both the government “won” (in significant
savings generated by competitive bidding) and
the small business provider “won” by gaining
access to this contracting opportunity for
his/her company.

Table 5 – Results of National Park Service
Reverse Auction for Repairs to Facilities at the
Gila Cliff Dwellings
Criterion
Cost Estimate
Award Price
Savings Amount
Savings Percentage
Statistic
$138,452.00
$91,277.10
$47,224.90
34.1%
4
5
Conclusion
The results of this study show that reverse auctions
are currently being successfully employed by
agencies across the public and private sector to
promote competition in contracting for building-related
service acquisitions.
Research analysis clearly demonstrates the capability
reverse auctions have to produce savings and
increase small business opportunities in federal
contracting when dealing with construction and
related services when it comes to for small, simple,
fixed-price acquisitions.
With the power of its fully-managed, online
marketplace, in which FedBid actively recruits small
business providers of a wide variety of goods and
services, including construction and building
maintenance, the company has shown the capacity
to make contracting awards highly competitive,
ultimately saving taxpayers significant dollars on
service buys involving a wide variety of
construction-related services.
FedBid seems particularly well-positioned to aid in
matching federal buying needs for routinely
needed Category Z services (Maintenance of Real
Property) with small businesses that can fulfill
those requirements.
Bobby Feigler, FedBid’s Chief Marketplace Officer,
commented that, “As evidenced by this report’s
findings, these relatively ‘small buys’ (generally less
than $150,000) can collectively produce substantial
savings for the government and for taxpayers while
providing new and exciting opportunities for small
businesses to compete and win federal dollars.
In many instances, these small businesses’ growth,
and even survival, can be traced to their ability
to participate in and win federal business in reverse
auctions facilitated by FedBid.”

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David C. Wyld (dwyld@selu.edu) currently serves as the Robert Maurin
Professor of Management at Southeastern Louisiana University in
Hammond, Louisiana. He is the Director of the College of Business’
Strategic e-Commerce/e-Government Initiative, the Founding Editor
of the International Journal of Managing Information Technology and
a frequent contributor to both academic journals and trade publications.
He has established himself as one of the leading academic experts
on emerging applications of technology in both the public and private
sector. He has been an active consultant, a qualified expert witness
and an invited speaker on the strategic management of technology to
both trade and academic audiences, as well as an invited panelist on
technology issues on The Discovery Channel, Federal News Radio and
other media outlets.
He presently serves as the Executive Director of the Reverse Auction
Research Center (http://www.reverseauctionresearch.com/), which
serves as a hub of research and news in the expanding world of
competitive bidding. In recognition of his research accomplishments, Dr.
Wyld has been awarded Southeastern Louisiana University’s “President’s
Award for Excellence in Research” and been named a Rising Star
in Government Information Technology by Federal Computer Week
Magazine. Dr. Wyld and his family reside just outside New Orleans in
the small town of Hammond, Louisiana.
About the Author
Contact Information:
David C. Wyld
Robert Maurin Professor of Management
Department of Management
SLU - Box 10350
Hammond, LA 70402-0350
Phone: 985-549-3079, 985-542-6831
Cell: 985-789-2127
Fax: 985-549-2019
Email: dwlyd@selu.edu

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