1. Chatham House, London 25-26th February 2010 Mogens Schou: msc@fvm.dk
New Common Fisheries Policy
Wealth of fisheries
More material at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish

2. Wealth of fisheries
1. When the capital used to catch the fish does not
exceed the necessary
2. When the value of the resource is obtained on basis
of its full productive capacity, not just the highest
valued fraction.
3. When impacts other than outtake of target species
are competitive to other uses or to protection

3. First issue: Optimizing capital input
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4 1,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Note: World Bank
Catch pr unit vessel – The more you invest the lower the productivity !

4. Second issue: Optimizing stock output
120
100
80
'000 tonnes
60
Unallocated mortality
40
Discard
20
Landings
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
Cod in the North Sea

5. New Fisheries Policy
Two strategic principles
- and a facility to solve Relative Stability rigidity
1. Management by transferable rights gives the optimal
incentive to optimize capital input
It is the key to balancing fleet capacity to catch
opportunities and to regain a sound economy
2. Management by catch quotas will replace the incentive
to discard with the incentive to fish selectively and to
bring all fish to the market
It is the key to optimal outtake of fish stocks

6. Danish ITQ expectations
ITQ would result in
• Balance in fleet capacity
• High profitability
• Freedom to plan the fishery
• Increased investment in added value
ITQ could offer
• A competitive coastal fishery
• Thriving fishing communities
• Improved entrance for young fishermen
• Reduction of discards

7. Danish ITQ model
Allocation and Ownership
• Only for active fishermen
• Initial allocation based on historic fishery
• Public resource (withdrawal with 8 years notice)
Flexible transferability
• Structural adaptation: Selling of rights
• Daily adaptation: Leasing and pooling
Societal policies
• Rules of concentration
• Fishfund
• Support young fisher’s entrance
• Coastal fishery premium (demersal vessels below 17 m)

8. Danish ITQ effects
• Balance in capacity v Obtained in less than 2 years
• High profitability v from 9% to 20%
• Freedom to plan the fishery v landing pattern have changed
• Increased investment in added value v Investments doubled+
• Coastal communities are competitive v
• A viable coastal fishery v Increased share of total catch
• Improved entrance for young fishermen v The FishFund
• The “blue license” attractive to young fishermen v
• Reduction of discards (v) less capacity and a new code
Reports by the Danish University and The Nordic Council.
The results are prior to the ”levelling down effect ”of the financial crisis

9. Conclusion on ITQ
• ITQ is a strong tool – and it works
• It will adapt fleet capacity to fishing opportunities
• Objectives must be clear
• It can be designed to support policy issues
e.g. coastal fishery and exit/entry policy

10. Are ITQ’s enough to ensure sustainability?
No
It gives the fisher the choice of quota portfolio
and planning of fishery
It will balance capacity to catch opportunities
(which may include upgrading)
- It does not exclude upgrading or ensure selective fishing
- It may lead to specialized one-species catches in mixed
fisheries

11. Catch quota management (CQM)
1. Allocate catch quotas – not landing quotas, and make the
fisher accountable for his total catches
2. Make it voluntary and give the fisher a quota premium,
reflecting that all fish are registered and counted
3. To participate in the scheme, the fisher must take upon
him to document his fishery by CCTV
----------------
It will exchange the fisher’s incentive to optimize the value
of the fish landed by discarding with his incentive to
optimize the value of his total catch by fishing selectively

12. CQM effects
• Precise outtake of each stock (single stock management)
• Reliable biological data – better advice
• User driven development of selective fishing methods
• General rules to protect most vulnerable species (e.g. kW,
by catch rules etc) are replaced by a requirement for the
individual fisher to adapt his fishery to the catch quota
available

13. “We believe there are strong arguments for making
fishermen more accountable for their total catches. It would
improve information and management of removal levels of
fish stocks and incentivise the development of selective
fishing methods…..We would wish that fishermen choosing
such an option carry the responsibility of documenting their
total catches”

14. Can it be done?
England, Denmark, Germany, Scotland, Sweden
plan for app. 80 vessels in 2010 with CCTV
Danish results september 2009 (6 vessels with CCTV and sensors)
See report and video at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish)
•Technically simple with high reliability
•Positive incentive effect
•Better utilization pattern
•Reliable data

15. Comparing landing quota with catch quota management
Simplified figures for cod based on findings in Danish camera project
Size Vessel A Vessel A Vessel B Vessel B Fish Share of
grades Tonnes 1.000 Tonnes 1.000 price catch
DKK DKK DKK/kg kept on
vessel A
Size 1 10 290 8 224 28 1
Size 2 18 453 14 3500 25 1
Size 3 48 1053 37 814 22 1
Size 4 19 272 30 420 14 0,5
Size 5 4 34 11 88 8 0,3
Total 100 2101 100 1896
Discard 29 0
A landing quota management (A) compared to catch quota management (B)
If ICES figures had been used the discard would be 65 instead of 29

16. Wealth to be made by ITQ and CQM
Baseline ITQ ITQ and CQM
Landings (tonnes) 100.000 100.000 100.000
Profit (million €) 9 46 39
Profit (million €)
discard included -16 21 39
Note: Model calculations by www.foi.dk, for assumptions used, contact Hans Frost, associate professor at Institute of Food and
Resource Economics, University of Cph. See background paper at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish
Baseline: Landings of 100.000 tonnes demersal fish. An over capacity of 38% and a
discard of 20% is assumed
ITQ show the improvement in profit with an ITQ system with full market effect (discard
20%). This can generate a catch surplus of 34.200 tonnes that can be distributed for
sociopolitical purposes
ITQ and CQM show the profit introduction of an ITQ and CQM management

17. What is in it for the fisher?
1st year
• Quota premium
• Correct data for biologists
2nd year
• Doing away with kW restrictions
• Simplified regulation and control
• Better advice
Succeeding years
• Market appreciation – reliable certifications
• Multiannual management and effective year to year flexibility
• Simplified gear regulation
• Establishing the fishers own integrated management system for
optimal use of the resources

18. A ”tracebase” for documentation, control and certification
vessel 1. sale process sale consumer
CCTV added data added data added data
Documented
catch data
Data base
Output of informations designed for individual user groups
control certification Process and consumer
labelling sale

19. Relative Stability – a new facility for 2012
Objective
Optimal use of yearly quotas
No need of:
• Changing relative stability
• EU ITQ’s
Introduce a facility for Relative Stability
1. An EU quota pool for swapping or leasing between fishermen
2. Let Member states define the level of transnational activity
Effects
Reduction of discards , improved economy, better planning

20. The Danish pool
• Transparency
• Swap fish to fish
• Lease fish
Cover your by-catches
by leasing
Do it from day to day

21. New Common Fisheries Policy
Wealth of fisheries
A comprehensive CFP model based on CQM, that can
• Be implemented gradually in a ”second management track”
• Be adapted to national or regional priorities
• Release of fisher’s choice of methods and innovation