1.         Nonproliferation & Verification — 25 Points Part A . What are the key factors that have motivated the development of biological weapons by states since its inception? What are the key factors that have led states to abandon biological weapon programs since the BWC came into effect? Explain why the verification protocol for the BWC collapsed in 2001. Explain why the U.S. opposed the protocol even to this day, after several presidents and their administrations have come and gone? Use historical and contemporary examples to support you argument. Part B . No new states have been added to public lists of countries with probable or knowledge of biological weapons programs in recent years. Since all of you have written that the BWC has "no teeth," to what do you attribute the restraint in biological weapons proliferation among states? Do you expect it to continue? Be sure to discuss the potential roles of strategy, science, arms control and norms in such decisions. 2.         Policy & Intelligence — 25 Points Part A . What are the challenges faced by intelligence agencies including, but not limited to, inspection regimes in collecting and analyzing information about biological weapons programs conducted by states and by terrorist groups? Use historical and contemporary examples to support your analysis. Propose two recommendations for how the United States could improve its intelligence on biological warfare or bioterrorism programs. Part B . What are the three most important lessons learned relating to science, medicine, public health, law enforcement and homeland security from the use of biological agents by the Rajneesh cult in The Dalles, a small town in Oregon in 1984? To what extent do you believe current biodefense strategies, programs and policies reflect these lessons? 3.         Terrorism — 35 Points Part A . In 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism wrote that, "Given the high level of know-how needed to use disease as a weapon to cause mass casualties, the United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists." Explain with all the passion you can muster why you agree or disagree with that assessment. Part B. Compare the potential for a large-scale terrorist attack on the Washington D.C. Metro Transit system using (i) anthrax spores, (ii) sarin gas and (iii) a conventional suicide attack. What are the pros and cons of choosing one specific agent over another from the perspective of a terrorist group? Discuss each agent, how it works within the attack scenario and how first responders attempt to counter the attack. Part C . What would a non-state actor require to (i) obtain and (ii) successfully use the weapons described above in Part B? Are there significant differences between chemical and biological agents that could affect the level of difficulty for successful acquisition and use? ...

1. 1. Nonproliferation & Verification — 25 Points
Part A
. What are the key factors that have motivated the development
of biological weapons by states since its inception? What are
the key factors that have led states to abandon biological
weapon programs since the BWC came into effect? Explain why
the verification protocol for the BWC collapsed in 2001.
Explain why the U.S. opposed the protocol even to this day,
after several presidents and their administrations have come and
gone? Use historical and contemporary examples to support you
argument.
Part B
. No new states have been added to public lists of countries with
probable or knowledge of biological weapons programs in
recent years. Since all of you have written that the BWC has "no
teeth," to what do you attribute the restraint in biological
weapons proliferation among states? Do you expect it to
continue? Be sure to discuss the potential roles of strategy,
science, arms control and norms in such decisions.
2. Policy & Intelligence — 25 Points
Part A
. What are the challenges faced by intelligence agencies
including, but not limited to, inspection regimes in collecting
and analyzing information about biological weapons programs
conducted by states and by terrorist groups? Use historical and
contemporary examples to support your analysis. Propose two
recommendations for how the United States could improve its
intelligence on biological warfare or bioterrorism programs.
Part B
. What are the three most important lessons learned relating to

2. science, medicine, public health, law enforcement and homeland
security from the use of biological agents by the Rajneesh cult
in The Dalles, a small town in Oregon in 1984? To what extent
do you believe current biodefense strategies, programs and
policies reflect these lessons?
3. Terrorism — 35 Points
Part A
. In 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism wrote that, "Given the
high level of know-how needed to use disease as a weapon to
cause mass casualties, the United States should be less
concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more
concerned that biologists will become terrorists." Explain with
all the passion you can muster why you agree or disagree with
that assessment.
Part B.
Compare the potential for a large-scale terrorist attack on the
Washington D.C. Metro Transit system using (i) anthrax spores,
(ii) sarin gas and (iii) a conventional suicide attack. What are
the pros and cons of choosing one specific agent over another
from the perspective of a terrorist group? Discuss each agent,
how it works within the attack scenario and how first
responders attempt to counter the attack.
Part C
. What would a non-state actor require to (i) obtain and (ii)
successfully use the weapons described above in Part B? Are
there significant differences between chemical and biological
agents that could affect the level of difficulty for successful
acquisition and use? Be sure to analyze hurdles that must be
overcome during each stage of the acquisition process, why a
particular agent may be chosen, and why a particular approach
may be chosen for dispersal.

3. 4. The Future – 15 Points
While not being political, during the current pandemic, a point
was made in the media that the Trump Administration
eliminated the White House Health and Security Office. Some
individuals have claimed that this elimination resulted in the
lack of preparedness of the US. But is that true?
FACTS:
The National Security Council staff is supposed to help the
president coordinate the government response to international
crises and homeland security issues, by identifying emerging
problems and making sure Cabinet agencies and other
departments are working cooperatively.
After Barack Obama became president in January 2009, he
eliminated the White House Health and Security Office, which
worked on international health issues. However, after multiple
issues arose with the 2014 Ebola epidemic, President Obama
established a Directorate for Global Health Security and
Biodefense at the NSC in 2016. This directorate had its own
staff and was headed by an individual who no longer reported to
the President but to the national security adviser.
This structure survived during the early part of the Trump’s
Administration, when the office was headed by Rear Adm.
Timothy Ziemer. After John Bolton became the national
security adviser, he decided the organizational chart was a mess
and led to too many conflicts. He also thought the staff was too
large, having swollen to 430 people, including staffers in the
pipeline.
Bolton reorganized the directorate and eliminated a number of
deputy national security advisers so there was just one. And he
folded the global health directorate into a new one that focused

4. on counterproliferation and biodefense. Bolton thought there
was obvious overlap between arms control and nonproliferation,
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and global health and
biodefense. Morrison, who headed the combined office
beginning in July 2018, was named Deputy Assistant to the
President and thus had more clout and access than the head of
the previous Directorate under Obama.
One can see the dueling narratives between the Obama and
Trump administrations, neither entirely incorrect. The office —
as set up by Obama — was folded into another office in the
Trump Administration. Thus, one could technically claim the
office was eliminated. But the staff slots did not disappear, and
the key mission of team remained a priority. So, one can also
claim nothing changed. The positions that made up the old unit
still are filled within the NSC and their funding was actually
increased under Trump. Morrison answered directly to the
President and could get things quickly to his attention
Question:
The real change between the Obama and Trump
Administrations was a philosophical one. Under the Obama
policy, epidemics and pandemics were treated as global health
issues that could be addressed through international diplomacy,
transparency, and international cooperation. By improving
healthcare in third world countries, it was believed that
outbreaks could be prevented. Under the Trump policy, it was
felt that the epidemiology of a biological health emergency is
virtually identical to a bioterrorism attack. As a result, during
2018, the NSC merged three directorates into one to create a
seamless interaction between those preparing for biological
threats, regardless of whether they are man-made or naturally
occurring.
You are now the advisor to the President, based on what you
have learned in the BSBD program, which approach do you

5. agree with (or maybe something different). Based on your
concept, argue with all of your passion why this should be the
US policy. How would you implement your approach, who
would you use as advisors (expertise not names), how would
you maintain the National Strategic Stockpile and prioritize
what goes into it?