1

1
Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education
«Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation»
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation»
School of Governance and Politics
Department of Public Governance
MASTER’S THESIS
IN THE FIELD OF 38.04.04 PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
‘LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL ISSUES OF THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN
THE CONTEXT OF SANCTION POLICY’
Author:
Second year master’s degree student
Sofia Del Coco
Scientific supervisors:
Professor of the Department of Legal Foundations of Administration,
MGIMO University
Vitaly V. Subochev
Professor of International Politics and Economic Relations,
University of Macerata
Federica Monti
Moscow
2020

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 3
CHAPTER 1: THE ROOTS, REASONS AND TRIGGER FACTORS OF THE
SANCTION POLICY IN THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS..................................8
1.1. Development and dynamics of the EU-Russia relations in the pre-sanction
period: 1994-2013 ......................................................................................................8
1.2. Basic reasons and symptoms of the sanction policy ........................................ 18
1.2.1. Complex socio-economic and political foundations for the deterioration in
the EU-Russia relations ........................................................................................... 18
1.2.2. Ukrainian crisis as the main trigger factor of the sanction policy ..............23
CHAPTER 2: LEGAL GROUNDS AND JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE EU SANCTION POLICY............................................................................. 29
2.1. EU sanctions: issues of legal nature and legitimacy ........................................ 29
2.2. EU bodies and the European Nation States: imposition of the sanction policy
vs. its implementation...............................................................................................36
2.3. Sanction policy and its impact on the international treaties and contractual
discipline in EU-Russia relations............................................................................. 46
CHAPTER 3. COMMERCIAL ISSUES OF THE SANCTION POLICY IN EU-
RUSSIAN RELATIONS........................................................................................64
3.1. Restrictive measures of the EU and Russia’s counter-sanction policy: correlative
analysis ................................................................................................................... 64
3.1.1. EU sanctions, the Russian import substitution policy and the move towards
non-western markets: winners and losers..................................................................64
3.1.2. Sanction policy and its influence on the agri-food sector ........................ 80
3.2. The sanction policy and the dynamics of the trade turnover between the EU and
Russia: statistical comparative analysis ....................................................................88
3.3. Perspectives and ways of optimising EU-Russia relations ..............................95
Conclusion ............................................................................................................103
Bibliography .........................................................................................................108

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INTRODUCTION
The urgency of the research is defined by the importance of studying the
issues that arose from the imposition of sanctions between the Russian Federation
and the European Union relations in the context of sanction policy.
Relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation have never been
simple, starting with the collapse of the Soviet Union which subsequently became a
Federation. Despite everything, a collaboration between the two powers has been
sought over the years, which has led to the creation of new partnerships, which have
turn represented very important steps for the Russian Federation.
Therefore, particular attention has also been paid to the pre-sanctions period to
effectively understand how the relationships between the two powers were before,
what other factors have contributed in recent years and whether the sanctions have
truly and effectively had such a negative impact from the relations point of view
between the European Union and the Russian Federation.
The relevance of the topic of this research is fundamentally relevant today, as it is
an ongoing theme, within a constantly evolving situation, of which the possible
developments are still not known with certainty, and which is also considered a
thorny topic to be addressed even today as it is strictly dominated by the political
sphere.
This analysis was also possible thanks to two internships, carried out in embassy of
Italy located in Moscow and ‘Confindustria Russia’. The internship at the political
office of the Embassy has allowed close contact with the diplomatic world, in order
to better analyse the international relations between the two powers. Instead, the
internship at 'Confindustria Russia' has been useful in the close analysis of the real
interests of the different parties and of the various dynamics that have followed over
the years.
The legislative and regulatory framework of this dissertation includes the
regulations of the Russian Federation issued in response to western sanctions as per

4
regulation dated July 14, 2014 No. 656, ‘on prohibition of admission of certain
engineering goods, originating from foreign states, for the purposes of central and
local government procurement’, the Decree of August 11, 2014 No. 791, ‘On the
establishment of a ban on the admission of light industry goods originating from
foreign states, in order to make purchases to meet federal needs’. As far as European
Union is concerned, the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014
‘concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation
in Ukraine’ and Council Regulation EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 ‘concerning
restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine’.
The degree of scientific development has also been addressed through the
analysis of scientific elaboration of this research topic shows that the subject matter
of sanction policy in the sphere of international relations has gained some extension
in current literature. However, opinions on this issue are highly debated among
scholars and do not always coincide, especially among authors from different
countries. The majority of research is mainly addressed by western authors, which
supports the thesis of the violation of international law, which has as a consequence
of the imposition of sanctions. On the contrary it is very rare to come across
publications of authors, mainly Russian authors, who contest this and who claim the
illegality of the sanctions imposed. In addition, there are also very few pieces of work
that analyse the topic from an economic point of view, to understand if these
sanctions have really brought about changes in the economies of the affected
countries and in their policies.
The object of this research is the relations created, maintained and developed
between the Russian Federation and the European Union both before the sanctions
and after the imposition of sanctions in the sphere of international relations and in
terms of political, economic and legal aspects.
The subject of the research carried out are the theoretical, practical, commercial
and legal aspects of issues which arose in the context of sanction policy in the sphere
of international relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union.

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The goal hereof is to analyse the current issues of relations between the Russian
Federation and the European Union and how they have developed in the sphere of
international relations, including the identification of the issues that have arisen in a
bid to understand whether a way exists to finally bring an end to this situation in the
near future.
In order to accomplish the established goal, it is necessary to identify the following
targets:
- To analyse the legal framework in the sphere of international relations.
- To analyse the international relations between the Russian Federation
and the European Union which has been in existence since the nineties, in
order to understand what the problems were that led to the imposition of the
sanctions.
- To find the possible ways to optimise EU-Russian relations
- To identity and compare the different problems that arose in the relations
between the Russian Federation and the European Union from 2014 to the
present day.
- To study the data of the various exchanges between the European Union
and the Russian Federation to understand if the parties were affected actually.
The methodological framework of the dissertation consists of general scientific
and special methods, including the comparative legal method, methodology in
international relations research and the statistical method. The comparative legal
method was used to compare the different legal framework applied for the imposition
of sanctions. The methodology in international relations research explained the broad
range of political interaction and relations between the Russian Federation and the
European Union. The statistical method was applied to analyse the exchange that
took place in recent years between the Russian Federation, the European Union and
other countries, in order to try to understand what degree the sanctions may have
affected the aforementioned.

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The theoretical basis of the research consists of writings of international
scholars dedicated to the study of international law, history, international relations,
economics and the sanction policy: A.A. Gnidchenko, O.V. Danilova, D. Grosand, F.
Mustilli, E. Ashford, C. Morviducci, L. Gruszczynski, M. Menkes, Y.S. Kozheurov,
V.Voinikov, E. Leonaite, D. Zalimas, R. Alcaro, V. Briani, M. Happold, O. P.
Ivanov, V.A. Kopylov.
The structure of the dissertation consists of the introduction, three chapters,
which, in turn, are divided into paragraphs, conclusion and bibliography.
The first chapter is dedicated to a historical analysis in which the relationship of the
nineties are retraced, from after the fall of the Soviet Union, until 2013, before the
start of the Ukrainian crisis. Also included are the years of partnerships and a series
of agreements between the European Union and the Russian Federation which have
enabled the establishment and development of future relationships. In order to better
understand the sanctions that have been imposed on the Russian Federation by the
States, it is essential to analyse what happened before said sanctions were put into
effect.
The second chapter analyses the legal aspects of the crisis. The violations of
international law reported by both parties will be analysed, including the repeated
violations of international law in which the parties involved have generated strong
tensions in the relations between the main protagonists of the crisis.
Additionally, the effective effectiveness of the sanctions is questioned, since what
having case of the Russian Federation it has not provided any change since having
entered into force, on the contrary the States which have applied them have obtained
the response of the Russian Federation through an embargo which also had
repercussions on other economies. Finally, the case 'C 72/15' is analysed through
Rosneft, which forms a part of the sanctioned companies, affected by the sanctions.
The third chapter, on the other hand, presents an analysis from the commercial point
of view, in order to better understand how the sanctions and the embargo have
influenced the Russian and European economies, analysing, however, also the

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context in which they occurred, in addition to analysing the strategies that the
Russian Federation has adopted in response to them. To conclude, an analysis of the
exchange between the two powers is presented, to better understand who the winners
and who the losers were and whether they can truly be defined as such in this
situation.

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CHAPTER 1. THE ROOTS, REASONS AND TRIGGER FACTORS OF THE
SANCTION POLICY IN THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
1.1. Development and dynamics of the EU-Russian relations in the pre-
sanction period: 1994-2013
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, world fortunes have changed
profoundly and rapidly, redesigning not only geographical borders but also political
and strategic balances. Testimony to which are the cases of the Russian Federation
and the European Union, which have undergone intense internal transformation
processes since the 1990s1
. These aforementioned processes have consequently had
significant effects on the system of international relations. On one hand, there is the
Russian Federation, which after a rapid and painful transformation became a
Federation. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the president of the then
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Boris Yeltsin remained in office as president of
the new State. He presented himself as an alternative to communism, capable of the
enormous task of reforming and transforming the country post-Soviet Union, in order
to make it more similar to the western model.
On the other hand, there is the European Union, which has also undergone an
important phase of reconfiguration of its institutional system. Starting in the 1990s,
the European Union was the protagonist of a gradual enlargement process starting
with the 12 member states of 1991. This phenomenon is essentially attributable to the
Copenhagen criteria2
, contained in the final document of the 1993 European Council.
However, the Union has not only enlarged from a numerical point.
1
I rapporti tra l’Unione Europea e la Russia, 1995 // MEMO/95/85 // Commissione Europea.
Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO_95_85
2
The Treaty on the European Union sets out the conditions (Article 49) and principles (Article 6(1))
to which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform. They include: the stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection
of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the

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Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union have not
always been as difficult as that seen at present. There are many points of contact,
since the European Union and the Russian Federation are linked by a multiplicity of
relationships: the Russian Federation is the third trading partner of the European
Union, fourth trading partner of the Euro area and an essential energy supplier for the
European Union. On the other hand, the European Union has not only economic and
commercial interests with the Russian Federation, but in addition the further
objective of acting in the international arena, also including responsibility for global
issues and issues concerning neighbouring common European countries.
In 1993, negotiations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (also known
as PCA1
) began. The agreement2
, which had a ten-year duration, but which was
automatically renewable every year after its expiry, constituted a reference
framework for the development of the Russian Federation's relations with the EU. It
was however, only signed in 1994, and did not enter into force until 1997, due to the
war in Chechnya3
. This agreement took into account all the main aspects of
cooperation between the two powers, including trade, human rights and democracy,
science and technology, education and training, customs, anti-crime, transport,
energy and telecommunications, the environment and culture. The aim was to create
a more stable climate for traders and better relations between the populations of the
EU and the Russian Federation. This agreement covered three main areas: political
dialogue, trade relations and the investment and business environment. It definitively
capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law
(the 'acquis'), and the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
For EU accession negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criterion.’
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html?locale=en
1
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A28010102_2
2
Accordo Storico fra la Russia e l’Unione Europea per rafforzare i legami commerciali e
politici // IP/94/565 // Commissione Europea. Available at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/IP_94_565
3
The first Chechen war took place between 1994 and 1996 and saw Russian armed forces attempt
to regain control over the country that had declared itself independent in 1991.

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closed the Cold War period and made the EU's recognition of the Russian
Federation's achievements in the democratic and economic reform process manifest.
In 1997 there was another event that marked an important step for the "new"
Russia: it joined the G71
.
The entry of the Russian Federation into G72
, which later evolved into G8, was a
lengthy and difficult process, hindered, by internal and external factors that followed
one another successively over the years. Indeed, initial negotiations first began in
1989 when the then president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, started this
transition period, which saw the beginning of cooperation between the G7 and the
Soviet Union.
However, what really marked the beginning of the integration of the Soviet Union
into the G7, however, was the London Summit3
in 1991, during which the G7 leaders
declared themselves ready to aid and support the Soviet Union, with the aim of
creating an open democracy and pluralistic. The main objective of this Summit was
to take steps to undertake the long process aimed at fully integrating the Soviet Union
into the world economy.
In 1992 during the Munich Summit4
the new President Boris Yeltsin and the then
American President George H.W. Bush applied for the Russian Federation to join the
1
Lukov. V., Russia’s G8 history: from guest to president, 2006
2
The G8 is an informal group (not an International Institution) which annually brings together the
heads of state and government of the major industrial democracies (Canada, France, Great Britain,
Germany, Japan, Italy, The Russian Federation and the United States) in accordance with the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) supported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (BM) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
3
‘Official Documents. July 15-17, 1991, London’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Economic Policy; International Trade;
Energy; Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union; The Middle East; The Developing
Countries and Debt; Environment; Drugs; Migration
4
‘1992 Munich Summit: Official Documents; Munich 6-8 July 1992’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: World Economy; the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED); Developing Countries; Central and

11
G7, but the application did not acquire the desired result. That being said, although
the Russian Federation's application for membership was rejected, the G7 continued
to financially support Russia's transition into the democratic market system by
granting an aid package.
A series of meetings followed in 1993 and 1994 and during this time Yeltsin stated
his intention to abolish the former Communist Export Control Committee (COCOM)
and to decrease inflation rates. Following the significant Russian progress towards
accession, the G7, the World Bank and the IMF began to increase subsidies to the
Russian Federation, with the hope that this would lead to a progressive improvement
in the Russian Federation's situation.
During the Naples Summit1
in 1994, permission was given to the Russian
Federation to participate in political discussions. From this moment the term 'eight
politicians' (P8) was coined, which specifically indicated the participation of the
Russian Federation in the summit whilst also limiting involvement to political issues.
During the 1997 American presidency, the nations gained a new name and became
known as the 'Summit of eight'. However, the Russian Federation was still not yet
given full powers during this Summit, nor in the subsequent summit, as even the
Denver Summit2
in 1997 represented no change for the Russian Federation.
However, during the Birmingham Summit3
in 1998 there was the first meeting of
the group of eight (G8). The completion of the membership was made possible by the
Eastern Europe; New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union; Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern
Europe
1
‘G7 Naples Summit: Official Documents; July 9, 1994, Naples’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Jobs and economic growth; Trade;
Environment; Developing Countries; nuclear safety; Ukraine; Russia; Other countries in transition;
Cooperation against transnational crime and money-laundering.
2
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Plutonium Management; Anti-Personnel
Landmines; Transnational Organized Crime; Counterterrorism; UN Reform and Political Situations.
3
‘1998 Birmingham Summit’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: the environment; Nuclear safety; UN issues;

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great steps forward that had moved the Russian Federation in recent years towards
economic reforms and a free market. Despite the fact that during its first 'official
appearance', the Russian Federation showed that it was still lacking in some political
and economic areas, and that it was unable to finance certain agreements.
During the 2002 Summit in Kananaskis1
the leaders of joint agreements decided2
that the Russian Federation would host the next summit in 2006, stressing that this
decision reflected the recent economic and democratic transformation of the Russian
Federation. Despite the long years of negotiations that saw the Russian Federation as
the main protagonist in 2014, the G7 leaders subsequently decided3
to suspend the
Russian Federation's participation in the G8.
Non-Proliferation, Arms control and disarmament; Anti-personnel landmines; Democracy and
human rights; Terrorism; Infectious Diseases; Intellectual property-related crime and regional
issues.
1
‘2002 Kananskis Summit: Documents June 26-27, 2002’
Issues which were discussed at this summit included: Promoting Peace and Security; Strengthening
Institutions and Governance; Fostering Trade, Investment, Economic Growth and Sustainable
Development; Implementing Debt Relief; Expanding Knowledge: Improving and Promoting
Education and Expanding Digital Opportunities; Improving Health and Confronting HIV/AIDS;
Increasing Agricultural Productivity and Improving Water Resource Management.
2
‘Russia's role in the G8’
"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia
(IASA), The University of Tokyo
3
‘7 Leaders Statement on the Situation in Ukraine’
"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia
(IASA), The University of Tokyo

13
In 2003, during the 11th
summit in St. Petersburg1
, a joint declaration was adopted
in which the parties decided to strengthen cooperation between themselves in order
to create four common spaces in the long term2
: economic, freedom, justice and
internal security, external security and research and education.
In the common area of economy, the goal was to create an open and integrated
market between the EU and Russia, by removing barriers to trade and investment and
by promoting reforms, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency
and governance.
In the second, in the common area of freedom, security and justice: cooperation in
this area had assumed a decisive importance with the expansion of common borders,
following the enlargement of 1 May 2004, and intended to contribute to the general
objective of creating a new Europe without dividing lines, facilitating travel for all
Europeans while effectively combating illegal immigration.
In the third common area was requested cooperation in the field of external
security. This included three shared responsibility of the EU and the Russian
Federation for an international order based on effective multilateralism and their
determination to work together to strengthen the role of the United Nations as well as
relevant international organizations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Finally, in the area of research and education which also included cultural aspects,
the intention was to promote economic growth, strengthen the links between research
1
The Summit agenda spanned all areas of relations between Europe and The Russian Federation as
a whole, analysing the results already achieved and forecasting possible future developments. In the
Join statement, at the end of the summit, it reads «We agreed to reinforce our co-operation with a
view to creating in the long term a common economic space, a common space of freedom, security
and justice, a space of co-operation in the field of external security, as well as a space of research
and education, including cultural aspects. The gradual development of these spaces should
take place in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)»
‘Road map for the Common Economic Space – Building blocks for sustain economic growth –
annex 1
2
IP/03/768; Bruxelles, 28 maggio 2003
‘Undicesimo vertice UE-Russia, San Pietroburgo, 31.05’

14
and innovation, encourage close cooperation in the education sector and promote
cultural and linguistic diversity.
Subsequently in 2005, four road maps were agreed to achieve these objectives,
which are listed and defined as: ‘The Common Economic Space’ which covered
economic and trade relations and aimed to make the Europe’s and the Russian
Federation’s economic and regulatory frameworks more compatible, thus boosting
investment and trade;
‘The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice’ which covered justice and
home affairs, including the rule of law, and human rights; ‘The Common Space of
External Security’ which includes crisis management and non-proliferation, and also
dealt with bilateral and global cooperation between the EU and the Russian
Federation; and finally ‘The Common Space of Research and Educational laws’
which was created in order to enhance cooperation in these fields, including cultural
aspects1
.
Unfortunately, even this agreement did not give the expected results. Too many,
indeed, were the cultural differences and the difference in values between the two
protagonists, which among other things, promoted very different integration models
in the vast post-Soviet area.
After the automatic expiry of the PCA in 2007, economic interdependence between
the two countries had led to further negotiations, in a bid to give new impetus to
bilateral relations, however these negotiations stopped after the outbreak of the war in
Georgia2
, in which the Russian Federation played a fundamental role.
1
The EU-Russia Partnership -basic facts and figures,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-104_en.htm?locale=en
2
Georgia, once a part of the Soviet Union, gained independence in 1991, after which the first
separatist clashes took place in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which led to a war in
which the Georgian army was deployed on the one hand and the oppressed secessionists were
supported by The Russian Federation on the other. The conflict, after numerous negotiations, ended
in a "ceasefire" which was accepted by both sides in 1992. In 2008 however hostilities resumed
between Georgia, and the separatists of South Ossetia and The Russian Federation who actively

15
In 2010 the dialogue was reopened, materializing in the political project of
Partnership for Modernization1
, which undoubtedly contributed to the growth of trade
relations between the Russian Federation and Europe.
The continued persistence of frictions in relations between Moscow and Brussels
can be explained by the profound differences existing between their respective
political and economic models. In particular, the Russian Federation has seen and
continues to see with much concern the enlargement to the east of the Union, in effect
since the early post-Soviet years with the aim of stabilizing the neighbouring areas,
which have long remained on the margins of Europe.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)2
intervention which has been
implemented by the European Union with the aim of rebalancing the disparities
existing between the various countries and stabilizing the surrounding regions, is in
stark contrast to Moscow's foreign policy that, while not having the intention of
reviving the Soviet empire, has always tried to reaffirm its leadership in the post-
communist area and to this end has woven a dense network of relations with
neighbouring States giving birth to the Commonwealth of the Independent States.
A few years before the entry into force of the provisions, another important step taken
by the Russian Federation was the entry into the WTO in 2012.
The Russian Federation's entry into the WTO3
was a bid to try to restructure and
reform the country's economy in the post-Soviet era. The economic transition has
been longer and more difficult than in other States. This is due to the fact that the
Russian Federation, at the time, had no experience with respect to the market
economy in general and more specifically the Russian economy was structured in
such a way as to favour military production.
participated in the conflict with the employment of military troops in support of separatists. The
Russian intervention was decisive for the victory of the latter and led to the secession of the region.
1
Serena Giusti, ‘L’alleanza per la modernizzazione fra Bruxelles e Mosca’
2
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/commonwealth-independent-states-cis/
3
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm

16
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union did not participate in the General
Agreement on tariffs and trade (also known as GATT)1
due to the positions of the
Soviet government of that period. The cause of this can be attributed to the
substantial incompatibility of market liberalism, on which GATT was founded, with
the planned economy system of the USSR. The USSR's critical unilateral approach to
GATT activity predominated until the late 1980s.
In 1990 the Soviet Union applied for observer status and was granted said status,
subsequently then passing it to the Russian Federation in 1992.
In 1993 Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin started the Russian accession process to the
WTO. The realization of this project however was then hindered by various political
instabilities that characterized the early nineties post-regime. Furthermore, in this
period the economy was battling a severe in crisis due to high inflation, high interest
rates and additionally the fall of the foreign rouble exchange rate. Obviously, this
environment, both political and economic, was far from favourable to lay the
foundations for future annexation to the WTO.
The situation began to change with the election of President Vladimir Putin, who
had promoted Russian integration into the world economy as part of his country's
development and reorganization strategy. Indeed, this strategy laid the foundations
for faster membership into the organization. In order to become part of the
organization Moscow has agreed to comply with the 'rules' dictated by the WTO,
including important legislative changes, expected to be admitted to the organization.
The long road to be granted such access was very troubled, however due not only to
the difficulties related to the adaptation of the Russian legislative and customs system
to the WTO regulations, but also to some internal and external political problems.
Both the European Union and the United States, which had already declared
themselves in favour of Russian accession, continued to support it, focusing on the
greater opening of the country's markets.
1
Santana R., GATT 1947: How Stalin and the Marshall Plan helped to conclude the negotiations,
World Trade Organization.

17
Finally, even the Russian authorities were convinced that although the act of
joining the WTO would have mean adapting to certain standards, but this would
subsequently have brought benefits for the modernization and development of the
modern industrial sectors that the Russian Federation had a great need for. After
eighteen years of negotiations, the president Vladimir Putin has ratified1
the entry
after the approval of the Duma2
and the go-ahead was given from the Federation
Council3
. The Russian Federation's accession4
to the WTO was defined by the EU
commissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, as a great step forward for the Russian
Federation's further integration into the world economy.
The objectives declared for the Russian Federation during the negotiations in
addition to acquiring a greater international status was also to have a better and easier
access to the markets of the WTO member countries and in particular that of
European5
. It also aimed to create a climate in the country that would be most
favourable to direct foreign investment. In addition, the increased competition that
would be created with the opening of the Russian market to other markets should
favoured the qualitative adjustment of Russian production. Finally, there was a desire
for greater integration of the Russian financial and banking market with that of other
countries.
This latter point was with regard to the economic objectives that should have a
positive growth impact for the Russian market, thanks to a greater diversification of
the Russian economy as direct consequences of the benefits of international trade.
While, as regards to other sectors, first of all the rules on the commercial policy of
the WTO do not apply to trade in gas and oil and therefore to 70% of Russian
1
Lamy hails Russia’s WTO accession ratification
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr668_e.htm
2
The lower house of the Parliament
3
The Moscow Senate
4
EU welcomes Russia's WTO accession after 18 years of negotiations // European Commission//
Press release // Brussels, 22 August 2012.
5
Main outlet market for Russian goods.

18
exports. This means that the excess of international markets concerned the export of
Russian agricultural goods and manufactured goods, which were limited. On the
contrary, the Russian Federation mainly imported manufactured goods, and, in this
sector, it had to open its own market.
1.2. Basic reasons and consequences of the sanction policy.
1.2.1. Complex socio-economic and political foundations for the
deterioration in EU-Russian relations
The Russian Federation and the European Union must be considered two
fundamental players in the field of international relations. The recent Ukrainian crisis
has further deteriorated relations, which in recent years and for various reasons have
been characterized by both ascending phases, yet more frequently by periods of
difficulty.
The current crisis is the manifestation of the contradictions that have accumulated
over the years and has exposed the systemic flaws of European security architecture,
which has not been updated in relation to the possibilities that arose after the end of
the ideological clash. Therefore, it would be limited to attribute everything solely to
the legal and political aspects1
. In order to understand the deep reasons and the
intensity of the current crisis it is necessary to take into account a plurality of other
aspects: such as those relating to economic, social and cultural spheres. These were
characterized by a divergent political and economic vision between the EU and the
Russian Federation.
In the post-Cold War period there were profound political, economic and social
changes within the Russian Federation2
. The European Union began to develop closer
relations with States belonging to the former Soviet bloc, many of which made the
1
Ferrari A., Oltre la Crimea Russia contro l’Europa? Ispi, 2014 (pp.72-78).
2
Арбатова Н.К. Отношения Евросоюз-Россия и Украиский кризис, Москва, ИМЭМО РАН
2014 (pp. 6-24)

19
decision to contribute to the enlargement of the European Union that was taking place
in those years and many also decided to join NATO. On this basis, it can be said,
therefore, that important changes were not only taking place within the Russian
Federation, but also that the geopolitical context around it was changing. The most
pertinent being that, after the Cold War, Western strategies have always been
perceived by the Russian Federation as 'without the Russian Federation, means
against the Russian Federation'. Both powers had 'too high expectations' for each
other.
The European Union believed that a European-style democracy could be created in
the Russian Federation, while the latter believed that relations with Europe, under
various factors, would develop better, gaining the Russian Federation a privileged
place of partnership within the European Union. Continuous European criticism has
concerned many aspects of the Russian Federation's internal and external policy.
The latter is accused of a departure from the values and principles that underpin the
partnership and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
There are serious disagreements on a number of fundamental issues, in particular
democracy, protection of human rights and the fight against terrorism.
There has been mutual dissatisfaction on both sides relating to mutual policies
towards the CIS countries. The EU was concerned about the prospect of some form
of restoration of the new ‘Russian empire’, while the Russian Federation was afraid
of the complementarity of EU and NATO expansion strategies in the CIS as a
Moscow expulsion policy. At the same time, despite said mutual dissatisfaction, in
the most difficult moments of the international crises, such as in the Yugoslav
situation in 1999 and in the 2008 Caucasus conflict, the EU took on the task of
establishing relations between the Russian Federation and the US / NATO.
The current crisis1
of relations between the Russian Federation and the West, in
addition to mistakes and erroneous calculations, is a consequence of the tension that
1
Арбатова Н. Евро-Атлантические отношения в XXI веке: проблемы и сценприи, мировая
экономика и международные отношения, 2015

20
arose in some parts of the multipolar system caused by the dynamics of international
relations after the end of bipolarism.
Towards the end of the twentieth century the attention of the European Union and
the United States / NATO focused mainly on post-communist Europe, namely on: the
war in Yugoslavia and on the preparation of the Central and Baltic countries for
accession into NATO and the EU.
After having solved the problems relating to the USSR nuclear heritage, the
European Union and the US / NATO began to consider the CIS countries, helping
them to achieve a model of democracy and as a further guarantee that the USSR
would not be reborn in one form or another. By doing so, West began to erect a new
border in Europe.
Regarding ideological reason it can be said that the main principle of the NATO
and EU regional strategy was to achieve the maximum separation possible of the
CIS1
countries from the Russian Federation. This proved to be an incorrect and
counterproductive policy. This policy confirmed Moscow's worst fears and spurred
nationalist sentiments in Russia.
Another problem that can be identified and that led to a completely different vision
between the two subjects was the economic sphere, as is stated by some scholars the
capitalist model of the Russian Federation had not evolved in a manner that was
deemed compatible with the market economies of the Member States of the EU or
with the single market. Obviously, this factor has also played a part in the
development of increasingly difficult relations between the powers.
Among the political reasons it is worth mentioning two very important crises of the
post-bipolar era, which further contributed to the deterioration of relationships. One
would be the NATO operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the other being the
conflict around South Ossetia in 2008, which were in fact, the embodiment of the
fundamental contradictions between the Russian Federation and the West in the field
1
Арбатова Н. Фактов СНГ в отношения России и Запада: истоки конфлткта, мировая
экономика и международные отношения, 2018

21
of security commonly and informally known as the "NATOization" of the European
security system. Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO has
traditionally been presented by Brussels as complementary processes. Although
NATO membership as a prerequisite for EU membership is not recorded in the
Copenhagen criteria, the latest waves of EU expansion in the post-communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe indicate that it has de facto become a
prerequisite. This changed the initially positive attitude of the Russian Federation
towards the enlargement of the European Union and its neighbourhood policy.
The ideological or idealistic approach which prevailed in the politics of the United
States and its European allies, whose goal was the transformation of the world
according to its own ideas about what should be, seriously damaged the international
relations. The NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, the secession of Kosovo, the war in
Iraq, the humanitarian intervention of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Libya that has
circumvented the United Nations and, finally, the active intervention of the West in
the ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine are the most vivid proof of this.
Eight years after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, the United States explained the
need for Kosovo's independence by stating that ‘Albanians simply do not want to live
with Serbs’. However, if the desire of the national minority is a sufficient reason for
separation, then, apparently, it applies to the Abkhazians who ‘simply do not want to
live with the Georgians’, and to the Crimeans who ‘simply do not want to live with
the Ukrainians’.
Among socio-economic reasons it is worth mentioning problems relating to
disagreements over the WTO + and the third energy package. As for the WTO +, the
European Union would have liked the economic section to be as detailed as possible.
One instrument for the Russian Federation's further rapprochement with the EU was
the new basic agreement, which replaced the Partnership and Cooperation agreement.
While in the Russian Federation, it was believed that the document should not
describe the details of commercial and economic relations, establishing only general
principles of cooperation and that specific issues should be resolved in the framework
of further agreements. In the economic part of the agreement, Moscow would like to

22
reproduce exactly the conditions agreed in the context of accession to the WTO. In
Brussels, however, they believed that this was not enough, so the EU insisted on
introducing a number of points1
into the agreement that were not covered by the
Russian Federation agreements with the WTO.
Another obstacle was the disagreement over the third energy package. Gazprom
was not part of the Brussels policy of liberalizing the European electricity and gas
market. The third energy package, approved by the European Union in 2009, includes
six legislative acts which provide for restrictions to vertically integrated companies
on the right to own and manage energy transmission grids. The reason for the
activation of the European Union to create a unified energy market was the start of an
official investigation by the European Commission on the monopolistic activity of the
Russian Gazprom (which is more than 50% owned by the state), which prevents free
competition in Europe.
The escalation of tension in Ukraine has led to the reduction of practical
cooperation between the Russian Federation and the EU and to the mutual ‘war of
sanctions’, which has affected not only their economic ties, but also their political
relations. The main reason is that in the Russian Federation and the EU there are two
directly opposing views on the dramatic events in Ukraine.
From Moscow’s point of view, through the Association Agreement, the European
Union has sought to tear Ukraine from the Russian Federation and the CIS integration
structures, subordinate it to its financial and economic standards and destroy the
greatest scientific potential, post-Soviet technology and industrialiam after the
Russian Federation. In the future, Ukraine would have agreed to join NATO, and
placed the American fleet and missile defence bases there. A completely different
interpretation of the events prevails in the countries of Europe, members of NATO
and the European Union, who have claimed that the goal of Moscow is to keep the
country at risk of further collapse and either subjugate the new democratic leadership
of Kiev or overthrow it. The support of separatists in the eastern regions of Ukraine,
1
It concerned trade and investment legislation, competition and public procurement.

23
according to the West, is the first step on the road to Moscow's strong gathering and
nurturing of the ‘Russian world’. With the application of sanctions and the limitation
of multifaceted ties with the Russian Federation, the West has tried to make Moscow
change its attitude towards Crimea and force it to stop supporting the Ukrainian
rebels so that Kiev can regain power over the country.
1.2.2. The Ukrainian crisis as the main trigger factor of the sanction policy.
The rise to power of a pro-Russian president in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych
marked the beginning of a new phase in the country1
. A series of protests began by
demonstrators from the 'Euromaidan' group following the announcement by president
Yanukovych, on the occasion of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Vilnius, to
renounce the association agreement with the European Union, which had already
been underway for several years previously, and which was necessary to complete the
accession agreements to become a part of the European Union.
From these protests2
the internal division of the country became even more
evident. From this moment on, Ukraine became increasingly chaotic, especially after
Yanukovych’s escape. This led to new elections in May 2014. A popular referendum
was subsequently held which sanctioned the 'yes' victory for the return of Crimea
under Moscow's sovereignty. This referendum was contested by most of the
international, purely western community. The countries which were opposed to this
manoeuvre decided to sanction Russia.
Following this referendum, the People's Republic of Donetsk (DPR) was
proclaimed on April 7, followed by the institution of the People's Republic of
Luhansk (LPR) on April 27, endowed with popular armies and a self-styled
government. A popular republic was also proclaimed in Kharkiv on April 8 but has
never enjoyed wide acceptance. The separatist leaders of Donetsk, Luhansk and
1
Ferrari A., Oltre la Crimea Russia contro l’Europa? Ispi, 2014 (pp.1-11)
2
Burke J., Panina-Burke S., the reunification of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol with the
Russian Federation, Russian Journal, 2017 (pp.39-55)

24
Kharkiv held a referendum on independence on May 11, which would be held
simultaneously in the three regions. Similarly, even this referendum was not viewed
positively by Ukraine and western countries. On May 25, the national presidential
elections took place in a generally peaceful climate, except for the neo-republics of
Donetsk and Luhansk. The elections were not held in Crimea and Simferopol nor in
the Kiev government. Following the elections in Kiev, a new president, Petro
Poroshenko, who was pro-European, was elected against his rival Julia Tymoshenko.
During this phase a new sequence of clashes began within the two rebel regions.
After the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, while flying over the
Republic of Donetsk, the tension between Ukraine, the West and the Russian
Federation increased even more, followed by a series of diplomatic interventions and
meetings between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in a bid to cool down and
mitigate the conflict.
In November 2014, the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the
two separatist republics, independently from the national parliamentary elections.
Their result was recognized only by the Russian Federation, while the government of
Kiev, supported by the US and the EU, declared them illegitimate as they did not take
place in accordance with the Minsk protocol and Ukrainian legislation. Aleksandr
Zakharchenko in the Donetsk People's Republic and Igor Plotnitsky in the Luhansk
People's Republic won the presidential election.
The position declared by the European Union in the face of the escalation of the
conflict with the outbreak of the crises in Crimea and Donbass was in support for the
independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, support for economic and political
reforms in the country, condemnation and non-recognition of the annexation of
Crimea to the Russian Federation, defined as an occupation.
This situation did not trigger positive reactions from the other States, which were
followed by sanctions, which will be analysed in more detail in the following
chapters. Starting in March 2014, EU foreign ministers proposed the first diplomatic
and political sanctions. The EU and the Member States of the G8 also ordered the
suspension of participation in the preparatory work for the G8 in Sochi, scheduled for

25
the following June. Additionally, the European Council, meeting on March 6,
confirmed the suspension of negotiations with the Russian Federation on visa
liberalization and on the new agreement replacing the 1997 treaty. These first
sanctions have seen the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Brussels,
which then have deteriorated with the imposition of other sanctions. Indeed, only in
1997 the Russian Federation had joined the G7 after the difficult negotiations that
have followed over the years. Moreover, the EU-Russia summit, scheduled for June
of the same year, was cancelled due to ‘the seriousness of the situation’.
The elimination of sanctions is subject to the implementation of the Minsk
agreements, but this has not occurred, indeed since their entry into force they are
renewed every six months. At the summit that took place in Wales, new methods for
collective defence were approved and new tools such as the RAP (also known as
Readiness Action Plan) were established and all forms of cooperation with the
Russian Federation were suspended. The major issues that were addressed concern:
increasing the military presence in Eastern Europe, improving the reactivity and
speed of troop action-response to attacks and improving political reactivity. Indeed,
this action plan allowed NATO forces stationed in the border countries of the
Alliance to intervene quickly in the event of a military attack or threat.
The first mediation effort occurred in Geneva, although it was considered totally
bankrupt. It was a meeting between Russia, Ukraine, the USA and the EU,
represented by the High Representative Catherine Ashton. The result was a five-point
agreement, which included, among other things, the cessation of hostilities, the
disarmament of all illegal groups and the start of a constitutional reform that would
guarantee the decentralization of powers.
In those months, several trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia meetings were held, to
discuss the consequences of the implementation of the European free trade area on
the agreements already in force between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and on
the economy of the countries included in the EEC customs union.
In September, a new meeting was reached between Ukraine, the Russian
Federation, the OSCE and representatives of the pro-Russian provinces of Donetsk

26
and Lugansk in Minsk and the goal of the ceasefire was reached. The Minsk Protocol
provides for the creation of a 30km-wide demilitarized zone, which is placed under
the protection of the OSCE, in addition to which Ukraine must guarantee the regions
of Donetsk and Lugansk greater autonomy at the regional level and grant it new
elections on the inside the area.
The truce did not last long, in fact by October the conflict had rekindled near
Donetsk, when Ukrainian army and separatists clashed for control of the airport.
Both the parties involved accused each other of violating the ceasefire. In November,
the self-proclaimed republics held new elections for independence and annexation to
the Russian Federation, which were not recognized by the Kiev government, the
OSCE and the international community, and were also considered in violation of
Ukrainian law and protocol.
In 2015 in Minsk, after Putin, Poroshenko and representatives of the autonomous
republics of eastern Ukraine laid the foundations for peace by signing a new
document, called ‘Minsk II’. The turning point of the agreement was the decisive
entry of two countries of the European Union, namely France and Germany, to act as
a meeting point between Russia, Ukraine and rebels.
To sum up, obviously this situation has had a great impact on relations between the
Russian Federation and the European Union, leading to a deteriorate of agreements
and collaborations that had been built over the years, as has been previously
described, that was to bring to ruin a situation that over the years had still not been
successful in establishing complete stability.
The Ukrainian crisis is considered to be the metaphorical ‘straw that broke the
camel’s back’ due to the already unstable situation of previous years, as previously
described. This situation did not trigger a positive reaction in other States and the
sanctions imposed were not only diplomatic in nature, as already mentioned. These
diplomatic sanctions were followed by other sanctions that deteriorated the economic
relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, affecting the
financial, energy and commercial sectors and also single individuals, who were held
responsible for certain actions.

27
To date, six years after the imposition of sanctions, they have not succeeded in
changing the situation, although it may be said that have contributed to the worsening
of relations between Europe and the Russian Federation and also failing in their
objective which was to push Moscow to review its foreign policy in Ukraine. In
addition to reaffirming the ineffectiveness of the two Minsk agreements.
In subsequent chapters these sanctions will be analysed in more detail both from a
legal point of view, to better understand the accusations that have been imputed to the
Russian Federation after their imposition, and from a commercial point of view to
understand what impact they have had on the various States and sectors most
affected.
Conclusions:
As has been seen since the beginning of this chapter, relations between the
European Union and the Russian Federation have never been simple, starting with the
collapse of the Soviet Union which subsequently became a Federation. Despite
everything, over the years a collaboration between the two powers has been sought,
which has led to the creation of new partnerships, which represented very important
steps for the Russian Federation.
From a Russian perspective, the European Union is not necessarily a danger akin
to NATO, yet the fact that the two organizations (and their membership) are
increasingly connected, however, suggests that the Union is not an interlocutor , but
essentially the Trojan horse of the US presence in the ex-Soviet area. This challenge
for the influence finds its ideal field of competition on the European continent and in
the double neighbourhood, which since the 1990s has been increasingly restricted and
less and less capable of acting as a screen for the Russian Federation. The latter's
position is essentially to maintain a previously acquired position, and not to conquer
new spaces. At the time when the famous red line is violated, a series of defensive
behaviours are put in place to counter this interference and recover the influence
affected in the country, with peaceful or aggressive methods. It then remains to be

28
considered that precisely in the matter of foreign policy, in this as in many other
matters, it seems that it is going in the opposite direction to that of
communitarization: substantially, within the Union there are too many voices, now
twenty-seven , so that only one can be expressed. To understand how the situation
will evolve in the future and what role the European Union will play in this process,
we will have to wait for the facts to provide the answer to some questions: does a
unitary interest of the Union exist or can it ever exist?
If so, will it be determined collectively or by the group that will eventually manage
to achieve hegemony within it? If this happens, then it is possible that the European
Union will finally succeed in assuming an autonomous and credible international
position in the eyes of its interlocutors; otherwise, the risk is that this organization,
undermined by internal disagreements and attacks from numerous fronts, will become
less supranational and increasingly intergovernmental.

29
CHAPTER II. LEGAL GROUNDS AND JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE EU SANCTION POLICY
2.1. EU sanctions: issues of legal nature and legitimacy.
The term 'sanctions' encompasses multiple meanings that vary according to the
context in which they are used. The first definition that can be given is any means by
which authority is affirmed and a respect for a norm (moral, religious, juridical) is
required. In particular, in in terms of law it can be considered as an afflictive measure
(in a broad sense) prepared by the legal system against the person responsible for an
illegal act.1
The second definition, in terms of international law sanctions are defined as a
measure or set of measures, consisting of various forms of retaliation that can be
decided by a single State (individual sanctions) or by a plurality of States (collective
sanctions) against a country that has violated the rules governing international
relations; if the measures concern interests and commercial, financial, or economic
exchanges with other countries, there is talk of economic sanctions (of which one of
the most severe is the embargo).2
The latter are used by the States, supranational institutions such as the European
Union and international organizations such as the United Nations against those
countries, not with a punitive character, but only for the purpose of ending illegal
conduct. They can be both unilateral and multilateral. In most cases bilateral
sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are widely
criticized as they violate the principle of State sovereignty and the rule of law and
risk violating other principles of international law. The sanctions may include travel
bans, arms embargo, capital movement restrictions, reductions in foreign aid and
trade restrictions.
1
http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/sanzione/
2
Ibidem.

30
That being said, it is useful at this point to distinguish the difference between the
terms 'sanction' and 'countermeasure', which are not synonymous.
The first case refers to the existence of an international organization that enjoys
particular powers, while the second case of ‘countermeasure’ is made in reference to
the decisions of individual States or international organizations against a third State1
.
Sanctions can be divided into three categories, depending on the context in which
they are applied and the objective that the country or the supranational sanctioning
institution wants to pursue on the sanctioned country2
.
- The first category of sanctions emphasizes respect for international law. An
example can be provided by the embargo put into effect by the UN Security Council
against Iraq in 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait.
- In the second category, the intention is to contain the threat to peace. In this case
an example is nuclear proliferation in Iran.
- Finally, the third category concerns the condemnation by the United Nations of
the actions or policies of States.
Punitive sanctions can be divided into 'general' and 'targeted'.
In the first case, no specific section is affected, whilst in the case of the 'targeted'
sanctions these are directed towards particular sectors or specific geographical areas.
In contemporary international law3
, sanctions involving the use of force are
considered illegal, except for the power of the United Nations Security Council to
impose collective military sanctions if the sanctioned country has threatened or
violated peace or has committed acts of aggression against other States.
The sanctioned country can appeal and declare them illegal. In the case of military
sanctions, States can appeal to infringement of the right of defence. The sanctions can
be applied by the United Nations Security Council, on the basis of the powers
1
Gioia A., Diritto Internazionale, Giuffrè Editore, 2015, pag. 143.
2
Sanctions, Countermeasures and Human Rights // Event Report British Institute of International
and Comparative Law.
3
The discipline of international sanctions has changed profoundly since the era before the United
Nations Charter came into force.

31
attributed to it by the UN Charter1
for the maintenance of international peace and
security. States whose subjective right has been infringed by the violation of an
international obligation are also entitled to adopt sanctions or countermeasures. In
addition, an unharmed State is entitled ‘to invoke the responsibility of another State’
even in the event that ‘the violated obligation arises towards the international
community as a whole’.
The European Union, given its geopolitical weight and the size of the market, it is
one of the most involved subjects when it comes to sanctions2
. They are applied
following violations of international rules, sanctioning regimes defined as ‘sanctions’
in the event that, similarly to what happens for those adopted by the Security Council
pursuant to Art. 41 of the UN Charter3
, are configured as reactions to a threat to peace
or an act of aggression, or ‘countermeasures’ when dealing with decentralized
actions, such as, for example, unilateral measures taken by one injured State against
another which is deemed responsible for the international violation that damaged it.
International organizations, as well as States, have the power to use countermeasures
under international law in response to acts that, in contrast to it, have directly
damaged them.
The use of EU sanctions can contribute to the achievement of numerous objectives
in the context of the common foreign and security policy: from the management of
ongoing conflicts to the promotion of democracy and human rights, from the
consolidation of institutions in post-war situations to non-conflict proliferation of
nuclear weapons, from the international fight against terrorism to the safeguarding of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as happened in the Russian case of 2014.
1
The Charter of the United Nations indicates the conditions under which force can be used in
relations between States, for example in self-defence or if authorized by the Security Council. The
United Nations may resort to international sanctions as a collective security tool.
2
Hörbelt C., A Comparative Study: Where and Why Does the EU Impose Sanctions, Revista
UNISCI, 2017.
3
Chapter VII: Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression, article 41, Charter of the United Nations.

32
There are basically three types of sanctions applied by the European Union in close
connection with the sanctioning regimes of the United Nations1
.
The first type, as previously mentioned, consists of those aimed at strengthening
the restrictive measures adopted by the Security Council and which the UN member
States are bound to apply. This means that they become part of the sanctions
applicable according to the criteria of the United Nations and as such arelegitimized.
The second category is represented by the sanctions applied autonomously by the
Union which go beyond those decided by the Security Council and therefore
constitute a sort of surpassing of UN regimes. They often refer to particular requests
from the Council to the Member States of the United Nations and can therefore be
considered as ‘additional’. These sanctions are sometimes concomitant with the
implementing mandates of the United Nations but can be adopted even years after the
implementation of the UN measures. It may also happen that EU sanctions are
applied to recipients already subject to restrictions by the United Nations, as has often
happened in the event of a crisis that subsequently worsened at a point in time
following the adoption of restrictive measures by the Security Council.
The third type of sanctions adopted by the Union are represented by the restrictive
measures taken in the absence of other measures decreed by the UN. They are often
inherent in disputes on which the Security Council is unable to take action due to a
lack of agreement due to the opposition of at least one of its permanent members and
have become one of the foreign policy instruments most recently used by the EU.
Often these sanctions can add to the restrictive measures applied by other subjects
towards the same recipient, so as to integrate with them, thereby strengthening them.
In practice, EU sanctions have repeatedly followed measures taken by Washington,
although they have not always been identical. On a final note, when looking to the
past it has happened that the sanctions imposed by the EU were a prelude to
restrictive measures subsequently taken by the United Nations.
1
Biersteker T., and Portela C,. EU sanctions in context: three types, European Union Institute for
Security Studies, 2015

33
Other aspects of these restrictive measures are also considered important. The first,
of which being that, the restrictive measures have a deadline, after which they are, if
necessary, renewed with a unanimous vote.
Secondly, targeted sanctions contain multiple exceptions and exemptions to
prevent them from translating into violations of the rights of those who are not
directly targeted.
Thirdly, European sanctions have no extra-territorial effects, which means that the
EU's restrictive measures do not apply to non-European companies that do business
with countries against which the EU has adopted sanctions when operating outside
the EU's borders.
The restrictive measures adopted by the European Union following the crisis in
Ukraine fall within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
decisions.
The CFSP1
is governed by Title V of the TEU ‘General provisions on the Union's
external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy2
’.
These matters are specifically excluded from the TFEU, so that the CFSP differs
from other Union policies. The action of the Member States is conducted according
to the ‘intergovernmental’ method3
. The CFSP ‘is defined and implemented by the
European Council and the Council’, as established by Art. 244
, par. 2 of the TEU,
thus leaving a marginal role for Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice.
1
Former second pillar of the Union before the Lisbon Treaty.
Keukeleire S., Delreux,T ., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014
2
https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/7414df8f-5f75-4110-a487-c04034c6e4aa
3
It differs from the ‘Community’ method of decision mainly in that decisions, in order to be
adopted, require not only the majority, but unanimity, ‘except in cases where the treaties provide
otherwise’. The intergovernmental method provides that the Commission's right of initiative is
shared with the Member States of the Union or limited to specific areas of activity, where the
European Council is endowed with deliberative power, unlike the Parliament which instead has a
purely consultative role, and that the Council, as already mentioned, deliberates unanimously.
4
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Titolo V Disposizioni Generali sull’azione Esterna dell’Unione e
Disposizioni Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Capo 2, Disposizioni

34
The objectives to be pursued are defined in Article 21 of the TEU. These include
the promotion of the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality.
The competences of the CFSP remain not fully defined, as they cannot be classified
as competitive or as competitors, and concern ‘all areas of foreign policy and all
matters relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive definition of a
common defence policy which can lead to a common defence’.
Coordination is needed between the Union's external action on the basis of the
CFSP and the Union's external action on the basis of material skills, a requirement
that emerges from Art. 211
of the TEU where it states that ‘the Union ensures
coherence between the various sectors of external action and between these and other
policies’. However, this provision does not establish with certainty that material skills
are sufficient for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the case of the existence
of a CFSP act.
The common foreign and security policy is enforced by the Union by adopting two
types of legal acts: general systems and decisions. The general orders are acts of the
European Council which define the guidelines on which to move in the context of the
CFSP. Decisions are Council acts that define the actions that the Union must take, the
positions it must take, and the methods for implementing these decisions, favouring
systematic cooperation between Member States for the conduct of their policy.
Through decisions, specific situations are addressed that require operational activity
and therefore require the definition of the means to be used, the scope of the
interventions to be carried out and, if necessary, their duration and conditions of
Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Sezione 1, Disposizioni Comuni, articolo 24
(ex articolo 11 del TUE) // C326/13 // 26.10.2012 // Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea.
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Titolo V Disposizioni Generali sull’azione Esterna dell’Unione e
Disposizioni Specifiche sulla Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune, Capo 1, Disposizioni Generali
sull’azione esterna dell’Unione, articolo 21 // C326/13 // 26.10.2012 // Gazzetta ufficiale
dell’Unione Europea.

35
implementation. The acts are adopted not on the initiative of the Commission, but on
the initiative of the Member States or the High Representative.
An integral part of the CFSP is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
which establishes how many procedures and by what means the need for
peacekeeping are obtained, including conflict prevention and strengthening
international security. This being said however, the acts adopted in the CFSP field do
not have a legislative value pursuant to Art. 24 of the TEU but only bind the Member
States ‘in their position and in the conduct of their action1
’.
On a further note, with further reference to part 1 of Art. 24 of the TEU it is stated
that 'the common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and
procedures2
'.
Therefore, on the basis of the CFSP decisions which are taken in reference to the
violations of international law by the Russian Federation, numerous Regulations and
Implementing Regulations have also been adopted to give full implementation and
legislative character to the measures taken. On the basis of what has just been said,
one can see the path that the European Union has chosen to take in order to give a
decisive and clear-cut response in support of the customary principles and violated
agreements of the Russian Federation.
To sum up, sanctions are exceptional foreign policy measures that are used on rare
occasions to manage international crises or to respond to serious violations of
international law. Their effectiveness has been widely debated in the past, a debate
which still continues even now, and an exact assessment is not always possible.
However, the discussions of the last decade have allowed us to define a series of
factors to consider when assessing the effectiveness of said sanctions or of the
opportunity to lift them. The EU has gradually intensified its foreign policy activity
and, consequently, sanctions have also been used with greater frequency when
responding to increasingly varied crises, from human rights and conflict management
1
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-
fd71826e6da6.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
2
Ibidem

36
through to the democratic consolidation of new regimes. The evolution of sanctions
from overall measures to targeted measures has increased the flexibility of the tool.
2.2. EU bodies and the European Nation States: imposition of the sanction
policy vs. its implementation.
Within the European Union, the authority responsible for adopting restrictive
measures is the Council of Ministers, which may decide to impose on sanctions
entities, or individual restrictive measures, towards third countries which must be
consistent with the CFSP objectives, in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU).
Restrictive measures are imposed by the EU to induce a change in the policy or
activities of the country, region of a country, government, entity or individuals to
whom they are directed, in accordance with the objectives set out in the Council's
CFSP decision. Consequently, the EU will modify the restrictive measures according
to the developments registered with regard to the objectives of the Council's CFSP
decision.’1
In the European Union, there will no longer be any talk of sanctions, but of
'restrictive measures'. In any case, these restrictive measures must always comply
with international law: they must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Sometimes these are, or have been, unilateral acts which, however, since the Union is
a collective of States, cannot be defined as such, but simply countermeasures. In
other cases, restrictive measures have been adopted aimed at the implementation of
binding sanctions already previously imposed by the Security Council.
The countermeasures decided by the European Union were very different from
those adopted by the UN in the 1990s; in fact, it generally involved smart sanctions
and, therefore, blocks of products or travel bans addressed to particular companies or
1
Orientamenti sull’attuazione e la valutazione delle misure restrittive (sanzioni) nel contesto della
politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell’UE p.5 part 4
Bruxelles,4 maggio2018. 5664/18

37
individuals. As already seen, since the countermeasures in themselves are measures
which are not compliant with international law, but legitimized as responses to
violations of others, it is up to the Union to provide adequate justification for their
adoption.
Restrictive measures are adopted on the proposal of the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy by means of a specific regulatory act, the EU
decision, as established by Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(TUE).
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in
addition to holding the office of Vice-President of the Commission, chairs the
Foreign Affairs Council and implements the CFSP 'as an agent of the Council1
'.
The task of which is to decide on the validity of the sanctioning tool and to give life
to it by establishing which types of measures to use.
When the restrictive measures concern commercial or financial restrictions, an
implementing regulation is needed, normally drawn up in collaboration with the
Commission, but approved by the Council of Ministers as required by Article 215 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union2
(TFEU).
Furthermore, the Union can also decide on sanctions on the basis of Article 75
TFEU; but in the international case the sanctions of art 215 are those that must be
applied, as they are intended to protect international security. The basic sanctions on
article 753
are, however, aimed at guaranteeing the Union a high level of internal
security. The CFSP decision is the legal prerequisite for the second act, which must
be adopted by majority vote, on a joint proposal from the High Representative and
the Commission, after informing Parliament.
The EU regulation, the second EU regulatory act, has direct application in all
Member States. It performs the function of giving uniform execution to the measures
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea article 28 Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea
326/15 26.10.2012
2
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea // 326/15 26.10.2012
3
Ibidem

38
contemplated in the CFSP decision. To avoid regulatory gaps, the CFSP decision and
the EU regulation are approved in the same session so as to enter into force
simultaneously. In the Russian case of 2014, the acts that gave rise to the sanctions
were decision 2014/119 / CFSP and regulation no. 208/2014. Decisions almost
always have a deadline in order to establish, after an appropriate review of the
situation, whether the measures envisaged in them should be extended or on the
contrary repealed. The regulations do not provide for a deadline, since if the
restrictive measures are repealed, they automatically lapse, while if the existing
regulations are extended, they simply continue to apply.
For the implementation of these restrictive measures the European Union follows
the legal foundations and among these some of which are particularly highlighted
such as1
: the 'Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures ' which was adopted
in 2004 and illustrates the modalities and circumstances in which the restrictive
measures can be applied and goes on to specifies that these can be adopted either in
coordination with the UN or in an independent manner . In the first case, it is easier to
maintain the sanctions over time, as any extensions, tightening or on the contrary
reductions or suspensions of the restrictive measures are always decided by the
United Nations and simply implemented at European level. When sanctions,
however, are decided autonomously, it may be more difficult to obtain the necessary
consensus from all States, a consensus which must then be maintained for a period of
time sufficient for the sanctions to produce any result.
Secondly, 'the best EU practices for the effective implementation of the restrictive
measures' of which the last modification dates to 2018 and contains information
fundamental for correctly defining the lists and the application of financial sanctions.
Finally, the 'Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive
measures (sanctions) in the context of the EU's common foreign and security policy '
which give technical indications for the formulation, implementation and control of
1
Sanctions: how and when the EU adopts restrictive measures// European Council. Available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/

39
restrictive measures and which also contain the standard formulas to be used for
drafting the CFSP legal instruments.
When the restrictive measures concern trade in goods or services with third
countries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) apply.
The reactions to the repeated violations of the territorial integrity of Ukraine have
been manifold and in particular several States, including the United States and some
member countries of the European Union, have individually adopted sanctioning
measures in order to induce to termination and reparation of the international offense
the Russian Federation. These are restrictive measures ranging from the limitation of
the granting of visas, reductions in imports of specific goods and also includes the
freezing of assets, capital and funds belonging to certain natural or legal persons, of
Russian and Ukrainian nationality, who are deemed responsible for compromising
territorial integrity and the independence of Ukraine in any way.
These restrictive measures find legal basis in general international law thanks to
the draft articles adopted in 20011
by the Commission on International Law which
establishes the rules on the international responsibility of States. According to art. 48
of the Project, in accordance, among other things, with what is established by
customary law, also third States, which are States other than the injured State, are
entitled 'to invoke the responsibility of another State' even in the event that the
'violated obligation arises towards the international community as a whole'.
Furthermore, the sanctions comply with the general eligibility criteria and the limits
of the countermeasures provided for by the Project in Articles 49 and 50. They,
indeed, are of an economic nature, are of a temporary nature, have been declared
1
The draft articles on State responsibility were approved by the Commission on international law.
at second reading in 2001 and even if it does not bind all States, it is increasingly taken into
consideration by international and State jurisprudence as a point of reference. For this reason, it can
be assumed that it corresponds to customary international law and that, as such, it imposes itself on
States.

40
revocable or modifiable at any time and are executable before internal courts or
international jurisdictions.
As already mentioned, many States have taken the initiative by taking
countermeasures to induce those responsible for the violations to change course, but
it has not been possible to obtain an institutionalized position from the UN Security
Council. Indeed, the latter, the only body within the United Nations that can adopt
legally binding acts, in particular for matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security, was unable to make any decision due to the
involvement of its permanent member1
.
Following the first package of sanctions adopted by the west and just a few days
before the referendum confirming the proclaimed independence of Crimea from
Ukraine, the United States presented a draft2
resolution3
to the Security Council
aimed at reaffirming respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity and
independence of Ukraine, and furthermore to referring to Art. 2 of the United Nations
Charter, which requires members in their international relations to abstain from the
threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence4
, and
subsequently reaffirms the principle of non-recognition of the acquisition of
territories taken by force or through threats.
The document was presented, in addition to the United States, by 41 other
countries including the 28 Member States of the European Union, however it clashed
at the time of the vote in the Council with the abstention of the Chinese representative
and, clearly , with the Russian veto.
1
Indeed, the Russian Federation is a permanent member of the Security Council and as such has the
right of veto pursuant to Chapter V of the United Nations Charter, in which Art. 27, part. 3 it is
established that for any non-procedural matter the decisions must be taken 'with a favourable vote
of nine Members, which includes the votes of the permanent Members'.
2
United Nations S/2014/189Security Council Distr.: General15 March 2014.
3
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of
Crimea Region, United Nations, 2014
4
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Part. 2, par. 4.

41
Sometime later the General Assembly also expressed itself, adopting on March 27,
2014 Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, of which however no
legally binding power is held1
. The document, adopted by a majority of its members,
urges Members to abstain from any action that has as their objective the total or
partial compromise of Ukrainian national unity and territorial integrity and not to
recognize any change in the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of the
city of Sevastopol, in light of the invalidity of the referendum of 16 March.
Subsequently, during the meeting of the Security Council on 28 August 2014, a
request for help was made by the Ukrainian representative, for the first time since the
beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, who made a request for assistance from the
international community, referring to Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter.
By doing so, he explicitly invoked the right to defend himself to repel the armed
aggression suffered on his territory and further legitimized a collective defence
intervention, remaining pursuant to Art. 51 of the Charter. Some members of the
international community, States and international organizations, have individually
taken countermeasures to induce the end of the violations of international law by the
Russian Federation. Among them, the major players are the member countries of the
European Union.
Wanting at this point to reflect on the sanctioning action of the Union during the
Ukrainian crisis, it is appropriate to distinguish the internal plan, relating to the ability
shown by the Union to create and maintain restrictive measures, from the external
one, concerning the impact that these measures have had on the recipients and on the
rest of the international community.
With regard to the internal plan, during the crisis, the Union, despite a first phase
of uncertainty, even in the face of the blockade of the Security Council, managed to
create a complex set of measures which, as seen, with the succession of events, has
become increasingly broad and diverse, both for the nature of the recipients and for
1
According to Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter, in fact, the General Assembly has the
power to only adopt ‘recommendations’ and therefore non-legally binding acts.

42
the type of measures taken. This result demonstrates how the Union, over time, has
been able to develop a mechanism for developing sanction systems that is now quite
efficient, capable, even in complex situations, of giving rise to direct measures
against States and individuals.
However, there are areas of uncertainty, not connected to the sanctions as such, but
rather mostly connected to the political and strategic context in which they have been
inserted, or rather to the substantial lack of such a context. Indeed, it should once
again be underlined that sanctions have been practically the only tool to with which
the Union has had at its disposition to face the Ukrainian crisis, in particular after the
Russian annexation to the Crimean Peninsula.
In part, this situation has objective justifications. First of all, immediately and for
obvious reasons, the use of the military was excluded, while the absence of relations
of cooperation or partnership with the Russian Federation, formalized in international
agreements or in any case sufficiently structured, prevented the Union from using the
other two tools which are often used to give greater substance to its international
action: or that of pressure, to be exercised through the total or partial suspension of
the aforementioned agreements or relationships (with consequent interruption of any
financial aid or support program that may exist), and that of persuasion, usually
implemented through dialogues, on which the aforementioned agreements or
relationships have practically always been established.
Less justifiable, however, is that during the various phases of the crisis the Union
has almost never managed to develop and express its own foreign policy which,
alongside the sanctioning instrument, could give it greater weight and effectiveness.
Political management of the crisis has mostly been left to the individual initiative of
individual Member States which have acted on many occasions as a sort of
representation of the Union and with the its support, although not necessarily in its
interest. Nonetheless, the member States nevertheless initially managed to create a
climate of exchange and collaboration between themselves and with the Union (in
particular with the High Representative), which supported and favoured the
development of the sanctioning systems. In reality, this way of proceeding does not

43
stand in full contrast with the nature of European foreign policy which, as is known,
is a far from perfect example of supranational logic, relying mostly on a continuous
exchange of national foreign policies, which are expressly called to support and give
greater authority to the European one.
This however, over time, has started to show serious limitations. Due to the
growing strategic role played by the Russian Federation in the solution of the Syrian
conflict and more generally in the fight against international terrorism, a progressive
‘distancing’ of European States from the Ukrainian crisis and a lessened emphasis on
condemning the behaviour of the Russian Federation has begun.
Paradoxically, this has not affected the sanctioning systems prepared by the Union
which, thanks also to the habit of resorting to simplified procedures for the adoption
of renewal decisions, have all been extended several times without any particular
problems. These same procedures, however, precisely because of their substantial
‘automaticity’, prevented the adoption of the renewal decisions from being preceded
by a political confrontation between the European leaders, in which they could
discuss in depth the opportunity and effectiveness of the measures to be renewed,
which, indeed, has disempowered these leaders in front of their public opinions.
As a result of this, a situation has arisen whereby some Member States, also
pressured by the negative economic repercussions of Russian ‘counter-sanctions’ on
the national economy, have ended up expressing dissent and criticism more and more
frequently towards measures established by the Union, undermining the integrity and
coherence of European action.
Since the entry into force of the sanctions in 2014 between the States of the
European Union, there has never been unanimity for an extension of the aforesaid.
The different positions of the States are dictated by the economic, political and
geopolitical factors that entertain or have been entertained over the years with the
Russian Federation. The underlying problem with sanctions is that they are always
established on a very strenuous decision, whose labour leaves no time even for a
negotiation on their expiry. To lift sanctions, another unanimous decision is usually
required. It is not a mystery then, and it has not been since the times of enlargement

44
in the east of 2004, that on the issue of relations with the Russian Federation, Europe
is at least partially divided.
On one side are the countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact or even the Soviet
Union, which suffered over the centuries from Russian and / or Germanic
imperialism (the case of Poland is obviously the most emblematic) and which today
legitimately and understandably express fears or even hostility towards Moscow.
The Ukrainian crisis has thrown oil on this fire, multiplying the fears of Russian
invasion, but the perceptions just described precede the facts of Maidan, Crimea and
Donbass. On the other hand, the ‘old’ Europe developed instead from the end of the
cold war and from the fall of the USSR until the entry into force of the sanctions of
an attempt to approach Russian semi-democracy, are of a partnership that was
supposed to help the process of democratization in the great eastern neighbour.
The most hostile States against Moscow continue to push to tighten the sanctions that
have already been in place since 2014, and would like, for example, to extend their
application to one year1
. The current practice is as described: before each extension, a
political transfer is made to the European Council, with Merkel and Macron taking
stock of compliance with the Minsk agreements. Having ascertained the absence of
progress, the green light for renewal is given.
Countries that support a tougher line include2
Germany, the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Poland, the Baltic States, Denmark and Finland. Denmark and the United
Kingdom particularly support a tougher transatlantic position, while other countries
see the Russian Federation as a threat to security and support the strengthening of
sanctions. Germany's position, however, deteriorated after the flight of the MH17 was
shot down. As for France, the close Franco-Russian relationship made it difficult for
France to take a tough stance towards the Russian Federation. While in the case of
Spain and Portugal, however, also due to their geographical distance and the
dependence of the Russian Federation in some sectors, they led to a 'calmer' attitude
1
Today sanctions last six months, renewable.
2
Shagina M., Friend or Foe? Mapping the positions of EU Member States on Russia sanctions,
European Leadership Network, 2017.

45
towards sanctions. The attitude of the Netherlands has also changed after the flight
was shot down, the latter having good economic relations with the Russian
Federation, which in fact had led them to take a position contrary to the strengthening
of the sanctions. As for countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Bulgaria, however, theirs is a rather ambiguous position, deriving from the tensions
between political forces for and against sanctions, led by geopolitical concerns and
economic relations with the Russian Federation.
Italy, Hungary, Greece, Cyprus and Austria have never shown themselves
favourable to the extension of sanctions, and have always been united by close
political, economic, cultural and religious ties, in addition to energy, tourism and
economic based relationships.
Last, but not least, Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Malta have always shown
themselves to be fairly neutral during the EU discussions on the renewal of sanctions,
showing neither support nor objection.
In light of what has been described, it does not seem risky to recognize in the
behaviour of those States a violation of the principle of loyal cooperation, specifically
provided for in the CFSP matter by art. 24, par. 3, TEU. The latter, in fact, in
providing that States must '... actively and without reserve show support for the
common foreign and security policy ... refraining from any action contrary to the
interests of the Union or such as to harm its effectiveness…1
’, does nothing but recall
what was considered previously, which is, that in this sector the Union cannot ignore
neither a strong cohesion between the Member States, nor a clear support of these for
its international conduct. Consequently, member States cannot act differently from
these indications without infringing the aforementioned principle.
On the other hand, however, sanctions are also indispensable, as they currently
represent the only way remaining for the Union to ‘make its voice heard’ in the
international community. This is in order to stigmatize (at least formally) Russian
politics and thus demonstrate that it has not remained completely inert in the face of
1
Trattato sull’Unione Europea, Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione Europea // 326/15 26.10.2012

46
the perpetuated aggression against Ukraine, while giving greater substance to the
non-recognition of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and by Sevastopol.
2.3. Sanction policy and its impact on the international treaties and
contractual discipline in EU-Russia relations
After describing the situation from the historical and geopolitical point of view on
the conflict in Ukraine in the first chapter and based on what has been said from the
legal point of view in the previous paragraphs, this paragraph will analyse the
accusations made against the Russian Federation, following which the sanctions were
imposed, as a 'justification' for the entry into force of the sanctions by the States that
imposed them.
At the outbreak of the conflict, the States made several accusations against the
Russian Federation, as a result of which the sanctions imposed by the States came
into force. From a legal point of view, the accusations that have been imputed in
Moscow since the beginning were the illegal annexation of Crimea, followed by the
charge for the conflict in Ukraine.
The Russian Federation has been accused of violating the Charter of the United
Nations1
, international law2
, the Statute of the Council of Europe3
, the Helsinki Final
1
The Russian Federation is part of the organization and is a member of the Security Council.
2
However, it would also be worth mentioning other violations of international law that have
occurred over the years. The US and its allies have initiated various military interventions in recent
years by transgressing the United Nations Charter and acting without endorsement by the UN
Security Council. The 1999 bombing of Serbia by NATO was without the seal of international law
and was carried out despite the objections of Russia, Serbia's ally. The subsequent declaration of
independence of Kosovo from Serbia, recognized by the US and most EU countries, constitutes a
precedent to which the Russian Federation has appealed to legitimize the work in Crimea. After the
Kosovo war, the US led those in Afghanistan and Iraq, fought without the approval of the Security
Council and, in the case of Iraq, in spite of vigorous objections and other cases where international
law has been violated.
3
Of which the Russian Federation is a part of.

47
Act, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the treaty of friendship, cooperation and
partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine of 19971
, as well as the
Constitutions of Ukraine and Crimea.
In 2017, the OHCHR published a report2
accusing the Russian Federation of
‘serious and frequent violations of fundamental rights’. After the referendum held in
2014 which saw the victory of the 'yes' by a Russian majority. The United Nations
General Assembly did not recognize this referendum as valid and considered the
Crimean Peninsula to be illegally occupied by Russian forces.
In addition, resolution 68/262 of the United Nations General Assembly of March
2014 underlined the invalidity3
of the referendum and urged the States not to
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol.
The United Nations Security Council was unable to make any decision on Crimea
since the Russian Federation is part of the five permanent members and also because
of the Russian veto4
and China's distinct position.
This resolution stated that member States had to refrain from changing the borders
of Ukraine through the use of force or other methods deemed illegal. Furthermore,
this resolution does not recognize the legality of the referendum and does not
recognize the autonomy of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.
Through this referendum, the Russian Federation was accused not only of violating
1
P8_TA (2016)0043
Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 4 febbraio 2016 sulla situazione dei diritti umani in
Crimea, in particolare dei tatari di Crimea (2016/2556(RSP))
2
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city
of Sevastopol (Ukraine)
3
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 [without reference to a Main
Committee (A/68/L.39 and Add.1)] 68/262.
Territorial integrity of Ukraine.
.

48
the Ukrainian Constitution1
, but also of all procedural requirements required by
international law.
Immediately after the referendum, Moscow amended the rule defining Russian
territory through a constitutional law, allowing the peninsula and the city of
Sevastopol to be included in the territory.
Lastly, an agreement was entered into between the Russian government and the
newly proclaimed independent State of Crimea, under which it was decided to
incorporate Crimea into the Russian legal system, thus leading to the so-called
secession by incorporation.
In this case the Crimean decision runs counter to the principle of territorial
integrity, a fundamental principle of international law2
.
From the point of view of international law, the secession and then the
incorporation of Crimea was considered a clear violation of the rules, as the
conditions absolutely did not exist. The right to safeguard the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine, enshrined in Art. 23
of the Charter of the United
Nations, which in paragraph 4 requires Member States to abstain from the use of
force in international relations and to prohibit conduct which poses a threat to the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.
1
The Ukrainian constitution provides for the possibility of holding referendums to decide the status
of a part of the territory, but expressly establishes that the same can take place only if extended to
the whole of Ukraine. It is therefore not possible that the decision to detach a part of the territory
takes place through a local referendum, in which case there is a violation of the constitutional rules
of Ukraine.
2
All peoples have the right to self-determination. However, self-determination can also include, in
very exceptional cases, the right to secession. This however only occurs if there are several peoples
in a given State and the central government acts in a discriminatory way towards individual peoples.
Only then is it believed that the right to self-determination can also include the right to secession.
In this case, however, the doubts from the point of view of the law concern first of all if the
Russian-speaking part of the inhabitants of Crimea can really be defined as one of the "peoples" and
therefore as the bearer of the right to self-determination.
3
Art. 2 part 4 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I

49
The occupied territories have become subject to Russian jurisdiction and
legislation. Having imposed the Russian regulatory framework again constitutes a
violation of humanitarian law1
and in this case is taken into account by Article 64 of
the Geneva Convention2
.
The Russian Federation's prompt response was to use the right to intervene in
defence of its compatriots who are in Russian bases in Crimea. However, the doctrine
of the intervention to protect citizens abroad provides that it is possible to intervene
in the territory of others when their citizens are really in danger of life and the
territorial sovereign does not want or cannot defend them, a situation that has not
occurred in Crimea.
Furthermore, ‘whereas all religious communities, including Christian churches
independent of Moscow, have had restrictions put on their activities; whereas these
difficulties are due to the severe restriction of the freedom of association,
expropriations, the non-extension of documents, and regular searches conducted in
the remaining premises of these religious organisations’3
, therefore religious freedom
has also been violated, protected by fundamental documents and by conventions on
humanitarian law.
Furthermore, in January 2014, the Russian Federation was suspended from the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe4
, violating Articles 11
and 32
of the
London Statute3
.
1
Klymenko A. Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Atlantic Council, Freedom
House, 2015
2
Convenzione di Ginevra per la protezione delle persone civili in tempo di guerra, sezione III
“territori occupati”
3
P8_TA (2016)0043Human rights situation in Crimea, in particular of the Crimean Tatars
European Parliament resolution of 4February2016 on the human rights situation in Crimea, in
particular of the Crimean Tatars (2016/2556(RSP)) part. E.
4
Which the Russian Federation joined in 1996 and as a member is required to respect the principles
on which the Council is based. The main objectives of the Council of Europe are the promotion of
democracy, the protection of the rule of law and human rights, the facilitation of cooperation
between the Member States in the economic, cultural, legal and social fields.

50
In addition, another accusation brought against the Russian Federation is that of
violating the Helsinki4
final act establishing the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)5
. In particular, there are four main areas of
intervention of this body: territoriality and sovereignty, (explicitly referred to in the
ten points reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act), the economy, human rights and the
fulfilment of international obligations.
The Russian Federation has been a part of this organization since the beginning, so
it should be required to support and respect the principles on which it is based. The
1975 Helsinki Conference established the obligation to respect borders between
States in Europe and defined rules supporting the United Nations Charter. Other
1
‘The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the
purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and
facilitating their economic and social progress. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the
Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common
action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’
Statute of the Council of Europe*London, 5.V.1949
2
‘Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in
Chapter I.’ Ibidem.
3
A statute that was signed by the States participating in the Council of Europe. The statute entered
into force in 1945 in London. The Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe in 1996 and
therefore, as a member, is required to respect its inspiring principles. For this reason, the powers of
its delegation have been repeatedly suspended by the Parliamentary Assembly, just as its
participation in the various Assembly committees has been suspended due to violations of the
principles of international law.
4
Dichiarazione di Helsinki e risoluzione approvate dall’assemblea parlamentare dell’OSCE, alla
ventiquattresima sessione annuale Helsinki, 5-9 luglio 2015.
5
https://www.osce.org/it/who-we-are
The objectives of which are to strengthen military security and promote cooperation and
transparency between States, through an arms control system and increasing mutual trust.

51
purposes and inspiring principles of the OSCE are the peaceful resolution of disputes,
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a State, respect for human
and minority rights, the right to self-determination of peoples and the fulfilment of
obligations deriving from international law. Furthermore, in order to strengthen
military cooperation and security, member States are required to notify the possible
use of their military assets in any situation. The Russian Federation's intervention in
Crimea and Ukraine has been accused of repeatedly violating all elements of the
Treaty, in particular point II ‘Do not resort to the threat or use of force’.
Another accusation made against the Russian Federation after the outbreak of the
conflict was that of violating the 'Budapest Memorandum1
'. After the signing of the
memorandum, the three nuclear States undertake not to use nuclear weapons against
Ukraine and, in the event of aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons,
to immediately bring the matter before the UNSC for adequate assistance. This
memorandum provided for the dismantling2
of Ukraine nuclear arsenal, through the
'nuclear non-proliferation treaty' in exchange for the protection of the signatory
States, if Ukraine had been attacked.
In addition, the Russian Federation undertook not to use nuclear weapons against
Ukraine. There is also an obligation to consult between the States parties to the
memorandum, but only in the event of a nuclear threat. This is not the case, however
seeing as during the signing of the memorandum the conservation of Ukraine's
territorial integrity within the ‘existing borders’ was also declared. Thus, Crimea's
belonging to Ukraine, of which it formed a part in 1994, was recognized, including
by the Russian Federation.
The memorandum contains provisions aimed at preventing Ukraine's territorial
integrity and political independence from being endangered with intimidation or with
1
The Memorandum was signed by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Ukraine when Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State, after
the atomic arsenal that was stationed in its territory at the time of the Soviet Union , was transferred
to Russia.
2
Ukraine was the third largest State in the world in terms of nuclear weapons.

52
the use of force and therefore the achievement of its denuclearization, in exchange for
respect for its borders and customs barriers. The Russian Federation, therefore, with
the intervention in the Donbass conflict, also violated this agreement and the
Ukrainian Parliament, appealing to the principles and provisions contained therein,
turned to the signatories of the memorandum asking for their intervention.
The Russian Federation's response to such an accusation was that it had not
violated the treaty and Lavrov asserted1
that the only obligation was ‘not to use
nuclear weapons against a State that does not have it’ and accused the Western
governments of having in turn violated the commitment to respect Ukraine's political
independence with support, including financial support, for the dismissal of former
President Yanukovych.
In addition, President Putin added that the Russian Federation was not bound by
the obligations of the memorandum. From the beginning the Kremlin has always said
that the annexation of Crimea and the violation of Ukrainian borders were legitimate
and after the Maidan revolution and the escape of the former President Yanukovych,
Moscow no longer had any obligation with the ‘new State’ which took office.
In 1997, an agreement was signed called the 'Agreement between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black
Sea Fleet's Stay on Ukrainian Territory'2
, which was then renewed in 2010.
The Treaty was intended to agree on the distribution of the armaments and military
bases of the two countries and above all to establish, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, two independent national fleets. In this case, the Russian Federation was
accused of violating the agreement regarding the number of troops in Crimea at the
time of the region's illegal annexation, while according to the agreement, the number
had to be agreed by both parties and the stationing of the troops respected a series of
conditions established by the agreement itself.
1
“Russia-Ucraina, Lavrov: rispettate disposizioni del Memorandum di Budapest
Onorati tutti gli accordi sulla tutela della sicurezza di Kiev”.
Mosca, 26 Novembre 2018
2
‘The Use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea’, Veronika Bílková

53
Subsequently Putin presented to the Duma the proposal to extinguish a series of
agreements between the two countries and among these the aforementioned was also
extinguished.
The legality and effectiveness of sanctions are a hotly debated topic among various
scholars. It is a much-debated topic as there is currently no universally accepted
international body or mechanism authorized to govern the legality of these sanctions.
A legal assessment of the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine and which supports
the thesis of violation of international law, as seen in the previous paragraph, is
mainly addressed by western authors. On the contrary publications by mainly Russian
authors argue that the Russian Federation's actions are somewhat restricted but are
fundamental in understanding how the established international legal concepts and
norms and principles are adapted to justify Russian actions.
In recent times however articles have been taken into consideration which instead
declare that the sanctions adopted are not legal, contrary to what was stated in the
previous pages, analysing the violations committed by the Russian Federation and the
accusations that have been made by the States that have themselves imposed
penalties.
The first article1
taken into consideration in this analysis investigates in detail the
sanctions imposed by the EU against the Russian Federation and considered them
illegal as they would not be compatible with the legal nature of the measures.
The author begins by analysing the restrictive measures which have been
adopted against the Russian Federation and giving the definition of sanctions, which
as was said at the beginning of the chapter, should be preventive and non-punitive
measures for the sanctioned country and have the purpose of provoking a change in
that country's politics. On the contrary, the author says that this principle has never
been respected when speaking in terms of the Russian Federation and that from the
beginning of their entry into force it was clear that they would not bring about any
1
Voinikov, V., The EU vs. Russia: legal nature and implementation of the Union's restrictive
measures.

54
change in the country's policy.
Thus, from the outset it was clear that these restrictive measures were in fact
punitive actions against the Russian Federation and due to this he claims that
international law has been violated, as the aim was not to change the country's
policies, but to punish the Russian Federation.
According to the explicit provision of article 275 of the Treaty on Operation
(TFEU), the Court of Justice of the European Union is not competent as regards to
the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy, nor with regard to
the acts adopted in accordance with these provisions. However, the Court has
jurisdiction to rule on appeals, brought under the conditions set out in the fourth
paragraph of Article 263 of the TFEU, concerning the review of the legality of
decisions which provide for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons
adopted by the Council and based on Title V, Chapter 2 of the TEU containing
'specific provisions on the common foreign security policy'.
The author gives some examples of sanctions which have been applied by the EU
to other countries where, in some cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union
has re-examined the cases and accepted the annulment of them. Among the
examples cited two Iranian companies are considered in which in the first case the
Court considered that the reasons for imposing the sanctions were not sufficient and
also decided that the Council did not have the necessary evidence to find them
guilty. In the second case the Court decided that the case files did not contain the
required evidence to support the Council's claims and the Court decided to annul the
acts imposing sanctions against the latter. However, this has not been the case with
the Russian Federation, where companies have been sanctioned because of their
relations with the State, even if however this does not imply their direct involvement
in Ukrainian actions. The author identifies the intention to damage the Russian
economy as a result as all the sanctioned companies are very important for the
Russian economy and for this reason, he says that it would be much easier for the
Council to justify the insertion of Russian companies with respect to the Iranian
cases.

55
Furthermore, the author states that foreign and security policy issues outside the
jurisdiction of the Court as being the real reasons why the EU holds the Russian
Federation accountable for the facts in Ukraine and if the reasons are reliable, they
will never be taken into. consideration. As an example of the sanctions imposed on
Russia, on the other hand, the Rotenberg case is taken into consideration, who is
accused of being an acquaintance of Putin, of being favoured by the Russian
authorities for the assignment of lucrative government contacts and the reason finally
why Rotenberg is a shareholder of OAO Giprotransmost, to whom the construction of
a bridge in Crimea was assigned, which contributes to the integration of the peninsula
into the Russian Federation and therefore believed to undermine the territorial
integrity of Ukraine. However, what is disputed is that the first two reasons are not
sufficient to insert the subject in the list of sanctioned persons, as they do not
constitute illegal activities, while as regards to the third reason, the construction of a
bridge cannot be considered as a threat to the integrity of Ukraine. Furthermore,
‘based on the general principles of civil legislations, shareholders are responsible for
the company’s activities only to the extent permitted by applicable law. Therefore,
this justification is not sufficient for the listing of the applicant.’
To this he adds that the sanctions were processed, before application, in a limited
amount of time and without taking into account reliable sources and that more data
on the sanctioned person should be provided, according to 'the Guidelines on
Implementation of Restrictive Measures', which has not been respected by the
Council Regulation 2014/658 / CFSP of 8 September 2014.
In summation, the conclusions that the author reached are that the sanctions were
applied in compliance with the EU's competences within the framework of an
established procedure, but without sufficient evidence and based on subjective
assessments. Secondly, that the sanctions against the Russian Federation are not
intended to change the behaviour adopted but have been used as a punitive
instrument against the Russian Federation going against the definition of restrictive
measures. Thirdly, some suspensions against certain individuals were adopted
without justification, without providing sufficient reasons and based on unverified

56
information.
The second article1
that is analysed claims the illegality of the sanctions imposed
on the Russian Federation by the European Union in which, in addition to supporting
the theses already described by the previous author, he cites the case of Almaz-
Antey2
in which the court rejected the requests of the Russian society, continuing to
maintain the restrictive measures against him. The Russian society has been accused
of supplying weapons which were then used in Donbass, charges denied by the latter.
Also, this case has not been examined in detail by the Court, who has not fully
investigated by whom the Donbass weapons were actually produced. For this reason,
the Court ruled that the risk of the company's illegal activity could be sufficient for a
decision to freeze its assets.
Another very similar case which is cited alongside to the Rotenberg case described
by the previous author, is the case of the Russian pro-government journalist Dmitry
Kiselev in which the Court rejected all the complainant's claims. However, the
restrictions imposed by European law do not interfere with his journalistic activities
in the Russian Federation and do not violate his right to express his views as a
Russian citizen in his State.
The conclusions that are outlined in this article are all attempts to challenge the
restrictive measures imposed on the Russian Federation have proved fruitless
contrary to what was said with the Iranian examples in the first article.
Finally, the third article3
taken into consideration in the analysis also questions the
legality of economic sanctions, as they are believed to violate public international
law, for three main reasons: first of all, because these sanctions were imposed without
the decision of the United Nations Security Council and were contrary to the United
1
Kalinichenko P., Post-Crimean Twister: Russia, the EU and the law of sanctions.
2
A Russian State-owned company, and one of the largest arms manufacturers in the Russian
Federation.
3
Burke J., Economic Sanctions against the Russian Federation are illegal under Public International
Law, 2018

57
Nations recognized principle of the sovereign equality of States. Secondly, because
they do not allow the application of Article XXI GATT and on this point also the
President of the Russian Federation has expressed himself claiming that the
restrictive measures were nothing but a rejection by some of our partners of basic
WTO principles, including the principle of free and fair competition. Adding that in
taking responsive measures, the Russian Federation was not seeking to ‘condemn’ the
West for the sanctions it imposed on the Federation, but only to preserve its own
interests1
. The third reason that the authors identify was the 'lack of legal authority
based on draft articles of the Commission under international law on the
responsibility of States for internationally incorrect acts2
'.
In addition, another question that is asked in said article is whether the sanctions
are really effective. To date, sanctions have been one of the few tools the
international community has found to put pressure on a State, but many experts are
divided in their views on their effectiveness to judge their validity. As already said
and as has happened in the case of the Russian Federation, the sanctions have been
applied to individual subjects or companies very close to the government.
However, when these sanctions are imposed, the impact that they may have on the
population of the recipient country, in particular on the weakest elements of the
country, is not taken into account. Therefore, whilst their main objective is thought
to be in the punishing of only the political elite of that particular country, the
country as a whole suffers, hence they should be considered as ineffective foreign
policy tools and they rarely reach their goal. The damage they cause to the economy
of the sanctioned country is undeniable, also limiting trade with other countries and
'locking up' the sanctioned country in an 'ever closer circle' even if, as already said
in the definition, these should 'modify 'the behaviour of the sanctioned country and
should not cause damage.
Indeed, this is evident in the case of the sanctions imposed on the Russian
1
‘Russia Putin Says Western Sanctions Violate WTO Principles’, Reuters, 2014
2
Ibidem

58
Federation which not only did not solve the problem, relating to the independence
of Crimea, but which have become a catalyst for new problems relating to the
economic damage suffered by all the States involved.
Rosneft case:
To date, several Russian companies and individuals have contested the Council's
decision on imposing sanctions on the EU Court of Justice. So far, the allegations
made by both sides from a theoretical point of view have been analysed, in line with
the treaties adopted over the years by the various bodies. In this paragraph will be
analysed in detail one of the cases that filed an appeal with the Court of Justice of the
European Union, the Rosneft case, as it is important to understand also from a
practical point of view what has been explained in the previous pages, to have a
complete understanding of the situation that has arisen after the imposition of these
sanctions. This company also appealed, an appeal which was not accepted, resulting
in a similar situation to many aforementioned cases that were cited in the previous
examples, such as in the cases of Rotenberg, Almaz-Antey and Dmitry Kiselev.
As already mentioned, the first package of sanctions was imposed by the EU
member States on the Russian Federation in March in response to actions by the
Russian Federation over the situation in Ukraine.
In July of the same year the European Union decided to impose further restrictive
measures within the framework of the CFSP1
, through a series of decisions and
1
Decision 2014/512 /CFSP and as subsequently amended through Council Decision 2014/872 /
PESC of 4 December 2014 and Council Regulation (EU) n.833/2014 , also issued and amended on
the same date, Regulation (EU) no.1290/2014 of the Council.
The decision 2014/512 CFSP was taken pursuant to Article 29 TEU. It establishes that the direct or
indirect purchase or sale, the direct or indirect provision of investment services or the issuance
assistance with a maturity of more than 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014, by entities based
in the Russian Federation that are publicly controlled or publicly owned for more than 50%, whose
estimated revenues are at least 50% from the sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum

59
regulations, since these restrictive measures did not make any changes and the
Russian Federation did not change its position over the situation in Ukraine. The goal
was to increase the cost of actions taken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine's
sovereignty. These measures reduced certain financial transactions and the export of
certain goods and technologies, restricted the access of some Russian entities to the
capital market and prohibited the provision of services necessary for certain oil
operations.
One of the receivers of these implementations was the Russian company Rosneft.
Rosneft is a specialist oil and gas company partly owned by a British company, with
a 19.75% stake in BP Russian Investments Ltd, and a 69.5% stake in OJSC
Rosneftegaz, a proprietary organization of the Russian State and 10.75% of the share
capital of Rosneft is listed on the stock exchange.
In case 'C- 72/1511
' a procedure was initiated in which the applicants were
found to be 'The Queen' at the request of 'OJSC Rosneft Oil Company', while the
defendants' Her Majesty's Treasury ',' Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and
Skills' which are the authorities responsible for implementing EU legislation that
imposes sanctions on the Russian Federation and finally 'The Financial Conduct
Authority'.
In 2014 Rosneft retained that it had been unfairly damaged by the imposition
of these sanctions and therefore decided to appeal to British justice system, claiming
that the sanctions imposed by the EU were not valid as they violated the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 and the World Trade Organization (WTO)2
. In
addition, the Russian oil company relied on the fact that the United Kingdom
implemented EU oil sanctions through the 2014 Export Control Order and found it
products (Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft); any legal person, entity or body established
outside the Union owned by more than 50% of Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft; any legal
person, entity or body acting on behalf of, or under the direction of, an entity within Rosneft,
Transneft and Gazprom Neft.
1
Sentenza della Corte (Grande Sezione) del 28 marzo 2017, C-72/15 - Rosneft
2
Which the Russian Federation had signed in 2012.

60
illegal under common law and according to Article 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
In particular, Rosneft, in the appeal to the High Court of Justice claimed that
the provisions concerning ‘financial assistance’ were not in line with article 521
of the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Among other accusations, the company
declared that the provisions relating to the oil sector were also not in line with the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. To this it was added that the restrictive
measures did not concern products and services pertaining to the military sector,
therefore the security problem did not exist.
The company also reported the absence of valid reasons for the restrictive
measures adopted by the Council of the EU and that this lack implied a violation of
the principle of equal treatment, which prohibits similar situations from being treated
differently, unless such treatment is not objectively justified. The oil company
claimed that there was no evidence in the allegations that were made that the
companies concerned were in a position different from any other economically
relevant activity for the Russian Federation. In particular, the affected activities had
no connection with events in Ukraine.
To this it was added that the Court of Justice has always affirmed that the
measures adopted should have a sufficient connection with the country's regime and
with the objectives pursued. Furthermore, Rosneft declared that companies belonging
to sectors that had no connection with events in Ukraine cannot be subject to the
aforementioned sanctions, solely because the sector to which they belong was of
particular relevance to the economy of the Federation. In addition, it said that the
measures taken were disproportionate to what was necessary to achieve the stated
goal, in defence of Ukraine's state sovereignty.
In 2016 Rosneft asked for the reopening of the oral procedure in which it was
stated that the analysis made in the present case by the advocate general in his
1
Which provided for the free movement of payments and the free movement of capital between the
Russian Federation and the European Union.

61
conclusions was incorrect. This analysis showed an inaccurate understanding of the
differences between the aforementioned restrictive measures and those adopted by
the Union in the context of Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, the Advocate
General was 'accused' of having analysed differently the notion of 'legislative acts',
within the meaning of Article 31 of the TEU, to the approach suggested in Advocate
General Wahl's Opinion in the case which ended in the ruling of 19 July 2016.
The European Court of Justice on 28 March 2017 rejected the appeal1
filed by
Rosneft considering that it was competent to rule on the validity of an act adopted on
the basis of the provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP)2
. The EU Court then observed that the EU Council had sufficiently validated
its decision, and that the interference with Rosneft's freedom of business and property
rights was not disproportionate, compared to the importance of the objectives
pursued, and was justifiable in adopting measures that result in negative
consequences for certain operators. The Court also considered that a Member State
(in this case the UK) could impose criminal sanctions for violating the provisions of
the EU regulation. The Court concluded that there was no element capable of
affecting the validity of the decision or regulation adopted by the EU Council. In
addition, it highlighted that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the
European Union and the Russian Federation did not hinder the adoption of these acts,
among others those sufficiently motivated by the Council.
As regards to where the treatment of bank payments were concerned, the Court
stated that the restrictive measures did not concern it, claiming that the EU legislator
would have used terms other than 'financial assistance' if it intended to subject the
processing of any bank transfer to an additional application for authorization, and
states that neither the freezing of assets nor the restrictions on transfer of funds were
1
C-72/15 – Rosneft. Sentenza della Corte. Conclusions. Available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=189262&pageIndex=0&doclang=
it&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6324009
2
There was no element that denied the validity of the decision or regulation.

62
mentioned. However, the Court did state that the measures prohibit the issue of
international certificates of securities representing shares issued before the adoption
of the measures in question.
Conclusions:
Since the second half of the 1900s, sanctions have always been used not for
punitive purposes, but to encourage those who have made themselves responsible for
legal violations to change their attitude. The practice has meant that the legal bases on
which these restrictive measures are based were consolidated in this sense, leading to
a detailed and precise codification of the steps to be followed for their correct
application.
The international community and international organizations have moved in this
direction the resolution of many disputes in recent decades, including the difficult
situation that has arisen in Ukraine, which is the subject of this study. The sanctions
adopted by all those who have taken a position, particularly by the European Union,
fall into the category of so-called smart sanctions, a choice, which expresses the
intention to persuade the Russian Federation to change course with respect to the
actions taken in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, there has been no lack of
debates and doubts regarding both the real effectiveness and the legal correctness of
the restrictive measures implemented and, indeed, in some cases the subjects affected
by the sanctions have filed an appeal. Nonetheless, it is necessary to observe how the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice continues to contribute to the evolution of smart
sanctions, which are increasingly detailed and effective.
It should also be stressed that although the sanctions have not yet led to an
effective change of direction in the Russian Federation’s aggression policy. The
restrictive measures applied by the European Union also marked a radical change of
course in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. The sanctions have in fact
caused particularly significant economic damage also to the Union, of which the

63
Russian Federation is one of the main trading partners, and for many western
countries it has been necessary to review their relations with the Federation not only
from an economic point of view.
In conclusion, in the case of the sanctioning regime connected to the crisis in
eastern Ukraine, there is clearly a development of international law consistent with
the evolution of international legal legislation that has been gaining ground since the
Second World War onwards. States and international organizations, in applying
sanctioning regimes, pay particular attention to the protection of human rights,
therefore preferring the adoption of smart sanctions, increasingly detailed and
complete in their legal form.
However, it should also be noted that most of the international rules concerning
sanctioning regimes originate from customary law and are therefore full of gaps. An
increasingly detailed and precise codification of the matter is needed to harmonize it
with all the rules of international law, in particular in terms of international
humanitarian law and human rights. If this has not yet happened, it is probably due to
the frequent opposition of the stronger States that seek to maintain autonomy and
freedom of manoeuvre in the use of restrictive measures.

64
CHAPTER 3. COMMERCIAL ISSUES OF THE SANCTION POLICY IN
EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
3.1. Restrictive measures of the EU and Russia’s counter-sanction policy:
correlative analysis.
3.1.1. EU sanctions, the Russian import substitution policy and the move
towards non-western markets: winners and losers.
After the referendum, the European Union began to apply the first package of
sanctions against Moscow. The restrictive measures imposed by the European Union
were of various character1
: diplomatic measures, individual restrictive measures
(freezing of assets and travel restrictions), restrictions on economic relations with
Crimea and Sevastopol, economic sanctions and restrictions on economic
cooperation.
In fact, even prior to the referendum, a series of measures which had to be taken
against the Russian Federation were being studied by the European Union and the
problem that arose was to choose which measures would be the most effective. In this
decision the close energy dependence of the European Union with regards to the
Russian Federation also weighed heavily, above all that of oil and gas. Additionally,
it was also important to choose restrictive measures that were in line with the trend of
adopting smart sanctions, aimed, that is, at targeting specific individuals and
companies or entities, avoiding possible subsequent ‘side effects’ on the Russian
population.
On March 6, 2014, the heads of government of the 28 European States condemned
the Russian Federation, accusing it of violating a series of treaties, as mentioned
previously in the second chapter, concerning the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In
addition, the European Union ‘urged the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw
1
Gutterman I., Grojec W., A Timeline Of All Russia-Related Sanctions. Available at
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sanctions-timeline/29477179.html

65
its armed forces to areas where they were permanently stationed, in accordance with
the relevant agreements1
.’
However, following these declarations and requests from the European Union, and
after having received no response from the Russian Federation, the Council of the
European Union on 17 March 2014 adopted Decision 2014/145 / CFSP 'concerning
restrictive measures relating to actions which jeopardize or threaten Ukraine's
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence2
.' With this decision of the Council
of the European Union of 17 March 2014, sanctions were imposed on 21 Russian and
Crimean politicians and officials (individuals), in particular: forbidding them to enter
the European Union including transit, as well as to freeze ‘ all funds and economic
resources that belong to and are owned or controlled by these people.’
A few days later, on March 20, the EU-Russian summit scheduled for June of the
same year was cancelled due to' the seriousness of the situation ' and other individuals
were added to the 'EU sanctions list'.
On March 253
, EU embassies in the Russian Federation were barred from
issuing all types of visas to residents of Crimea. Among the other diplomatic
measures that were adopted, it should be mentioned the exclusion of the Russian
Federation from the G84
, with the cancellation of the subsequent summit that was
scheduled for Members. Additionally, worth mentioning, was the interruption of the
1
31.07.2014 Gazzetta Ufficiale dell’Unione europea, L 229/13. Decisione 2014/512/PESC del
Consiglio del 31 luglio 2014, concernente misure restrittive in considerazione delle azioni della
Russia che destabilizzano la situazione in Ucraina.
2
17.03.2014 Gazzetta Ufficiale dell’Unione europea, L78/16. decisione 2014/145/PESC del
Consiglio, concernente misure restrittive relative ad azioni che compromettono o
minacciano l'integrità territoriale, la sovranità e l'indipendenza dell'Ucraina.
3
Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/
4
Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4-5 June 2014. Since
then, the meetings have continued under the G7 process.

66
country's accession process to the OECD and the International Energy Agency and
the suspension of the regular EU-Russian bilateral summits.
Subsequently, however, relations between the European Union and the Russian
Federation became more tense1
after the shooting down of flight MH17, on 17 July
2014. The Malaysia Airlines plane crashed near Grabovo, in an area of eastern
Ukraine. Following this event, Brussels began to develop more drastic measures
against the Russian Federation, extending and expanding the existing sanctions.
Among these were the economic sanctions that affected the export of upstream
technology and in particular those of the products listed in EU Regulation 833/2014
and subsequently integrated by EU Regulation 1290/2014 which clarified certain
points and provided some definitions. Among other things, those who wished to
export the goods listed in the article to the Russian Federation had to necessarily
obtain a specific authorization issued by the competent offices.
Also, in regulation 833 there was a total ban on the sale, the supply, the transfer
and the exportation Russian end-users of equipment intended for exploratory and
extractive activities in deep or arctic waters. In addition, with the subsequent
amendment to the regulation, the ban also became valid for dual-use products
intended for the Russian companies mentioned in the regulation of the technological
and military sector. Furthermore, European sanctions against the Russian Federation
have further affected the military sector with a ban on exporting military equipment
to Russian end-users, and the financial sector2
. As for the latter, the European
Investment Bank, on the recommendation of the European Council, has ceased to
finance new projects in the Russian Federation, and an expansion of the list of
individuals and Russian state-controlled banks was also included.
1
Korhonen L., Simola H., Solanko L., Sanctions, Counter-Sanctions and Russia – Effects on
Economy, Trade and Finance, Bank of Finland – Instituite for Economies in Transition, Helsinki,
2018
2
Gurvich E., Prilepskiy I. The impact of financial sanctions on the Russia economy, Russian
Journal of Economics, 2015

67
Europeans were prohibited from buying shares and bonds issued by these banks,
who were also prohibited from issuing new securities on European markets. In
addition, an arms trade embargo was imposed, the export of dual-use goods and
sensitive technologies was limited, and sanctions were introduced in the energy
sector. These sanctions include 155 individuals and 44 organizations. Furthermore,
the EU introduced the latest sanctions against legal entities in July of last year, adding
six companies involved in the construction of the Kerch bridge to the list1
. Among
others, include organizations that have been subjected to EU restrictive measures,
include several companies that produce military and civilian products, defense-
related companies (such as Almaz-Antey, Kalashnikov, and the Tula Arms Plant), oil
companies (such as Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft) and state-owned banks
(such as Sberbank, VTB, VEB, Gazprombank, and the Russian Agricultural Bank,
RNKB).
A sensitive issue is that of the sanctions against the Russian energy sector, which
involves the major western multinationals, such as the Italian company ENI, and for
which a ban is imposed on the export to the Russian Federation of all the
technologies and machinery necessary for the 'mining industry’. Contemporaneously,
the banking sector of the Russian Federation continued to hit with a further restriction
on the issue of securities and the oil sector, aggravating the debt situation by closing
the European financial markets against them.
However, the consequences of the restrictive measures must be contextualized
in the wider negative economic situation2
that the Russian Federation faced between
2014 and 2016, which also led to the weakening of the Russian economy: such as the
collapse of the oil price, following by the devaluation of the ruble, the slowdown in
Russian GDP, the drop in exports, the collapse of the state budget, unemployment,
the loss of human capital, the paralysis of foreign investments, the collapse of
1
EU hits six new firms with sanctions over construction of Crimea bridge, Emerging Europe, 2018.
2
Tracey G., How the 2014 Economic Crisis Changed Russia’s Economy, Geohistory, 2018

68
confidence in the Russian economy, the decline capitalization, financial instability,
capital flight, and the worsening of internal living standards.
During 2014 and 20151
there was a sharp drop in the price of oil. This collapse
significantly damaged the Russian economy, heavily dependent on the production
and export of what is known as ‘black gold’. Russian GDP growth slowed in 2014,
while in 2015 it entered into a recession. The difficult three-year period from and
including the years from 2014 to 2016 was also marked by the depreciation of the
rouble against the dollar.
In the autumn of 2014, the exchange rate of the rouble collapsed2
in the Russian
Federation and this led to a reduction in the purchasing power of the population.
Among the reasons that caused this: the drop in oil prices, geo-political tensions, the
less favourable outlook for the economy and the high demand for currency
(especially dollars) to honour payments due can be cited.
At the time of the fall in the world oil prices, the influx of dollars to the country's
budget declined sharply, which led to a shortage of foreign currency. This situation in
the money market led to an excess of demand for foreign currency compared to its
supply, therefore, foreign currency started to increase in price and the national
currency started to become cheaper. These changes in the money market lead to a
change in the country's external trade and internal consumption balance.
Another factor that influenced the national currency is the movement of capital.
During the crisis period, there was a significant outflow of capital abroad, which led
to a trade deficit and, consequently, a depreciation of the rouble. On one of the days
of the crisis, the exchange rate of the American currency touched 80 roubles and the
euro reached 100 roubles; against 35 roubles on the dollar and 48 of the euro at the
beginning of the year.
1
Domanska M., Crisis in Russia the Degradation of the Model of Economic Governance (pp. 15-
19), Osw Studies, 2017
2
This has not happened since the 1998 default. The Russian currency then devalued heavily, with
the dollar rising from 6 to 24 roubles in a few months, and inflation reached 84 percent.

69
On December 15, 2014 Brent fell below sixty dollars a barrel compared to 107 in
2013 on average. For a country like the Russian Federation, which indeed thrives on
hydrocarbon exports, the consequences of such a meltdown have been deleterious.
The reasons for the drop in oil prices are different however. First of all,
during 2014 there was an increase in world production: in the United States, for
example, but also in Libya and Canada1
. Another reason for the drop in the price of
crude oil concerns a general reduction in oil consumption, in turn determined by the
economic crisis, by precise political choices or by the use of alternative sources.
In addition, OPEC's decision to keep the extractive quotas at 30 million barrels per
day led to a further drop in the price of the aforementioned and commonly known and
understood black gold. The price of oil had already lost around 30% in the recent
months.
After the drop in oil prices in 2014, the Russian Central Bank introduced the
floating exchange rate of the rouble. Until now, state bodies controlled the exchange
rate and, if the rouble fell, the Central Bank began to intervene on a large scale in the
market, for example by selling dollars. The result was that the rouble lost 60%
against the dollar and 40% against the euro in one year. From the point of view of the
functioning of exchange rates, however, the fluctuations of the rouble also depended
on the choice of the Russian Central Bank, which on 15 December 2014 raised
interest rates from 10.5 to 17 per cent in an attempt to block the devaluation of the
rouble.
1
If production increases, there is more supply and therefore the price drops.

70
1
Figure 1: Rouble/Euro Chart.
2
Figure 2: Rouble / US Dollar Chart
In addition to the drop in oil prices, there are other reasons for the Russian
Federation's financial and economic crisis. The crisis in eastern Ukraine has caused
tensions and fears on the international level and on the markets. Western sanctions
have prevented the Russian Federation from using the classic solutions that are
adopted when the value of the national currency collapses, that is, more exports, more
domestic consumption and more foreign direct investment. If a country's currency
drops in value, it becomes cheaper to buy goods produced in that country (both
abroad and for citizens of the country itself). Sanctions have curbed these
1
Source: https://www.xe.com/it/currencycharts/?from=RUB&to=EUR&view=10Y
2
Source: https://www.xe.com/it/currencycharts/?from=RUB&to=USD&view=10Y

71
possibilities: foreign investments in the Russian Federation have become more
complicated at that time than in the past, as have exports of Russian goods abroad.
1
Figure 3: drop in oil prince from 2014 to 2019
The chart clearly shows the collapse of the oil price in 2014, continuing also in
2015. From 2016 the price of oil started to rise again, but only from 2017 did Russian
GDP return to positive growth rates. This improvement trend also remains in 2018,
until a decline between 2018 and 2019, and then undergoes a subsequent rise. Even
though sanctions are still in place. Given the numerous factors involved, it is
therefore difficult to isolate the economic effect of sanctions on the Russian
economy, although it is not disputed that they have had a negative impact.
The debate on sanctions and their effects therefore remains open, as it is currently
difficult to determine to what degree they have affected the Russian economy and to
what degree the other factors have played a role in it.
The response of the Russian Federation was the introduction of countersanctions2
against western countries. A few days after the adoption of the first sanctions
imposed on the Russian Federation was published, in response to such measures, a
1
Source: macrotrends. WTI Crude Oil Prices - 10 Year Daily Chart.
2
Russian counter-sanctions, Review of 2018 and outlook for 2019, Noerr.

72
number of restrictive measures affecting a list of ten American citizens was also
published, including prominent figures from the Washington government and people
close to President Obama. Subsequently, restrictive measures were also applied
against thirteen Canadian citizens, including some Members of Parliament, which
prohibited their entry into the territory of the Federation.
The heaviest sanctions, however, were those applied in the summer of 2014, on
August 61
, when President Putin signed the decree ‘On the application of individual
special economic measures in order to guarantee the security of the Russian
Federation’. It prohibits imports of agricultural products, raw materials and food
products from the United States, the Member States of the European Union, Canada,
Australia and the Kingdom of Norway. The official reason for prohibition on the food
import of was the failure to comply with the health parameters of the country
envisaged by the Rosselkhoznadzor, or by the federal health authority.
On July 14, 2014, a measure2
was adopted which established a ban on the import of
engineering products from foreign countries in order to protect the internal market of
the Russian Federation for State and municipal needs. It should be noted that this ban
was applied to all goods from countries other than the Russian Federation, Belarus or
Kazakhstan, i.e. countries that are not members of the Eurasian Customs Union.
On August 11, 2014, the Government Decree No. 7913
was adopted, which
prohibits the introduction of light industrial goods from foreign production by public
entities from 1 September 2014. The purchase of textiles, clothing, footwear,
1
https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/international_affairs/eu_russia/russian_import_ban_eu_products_e
n
2
Government of the Russian Federation, Regulation dated July 14, 2014 No. 656, ‘on prohibition of
admission of certain engineering goods, originating from foreign states, for the purposes of central
and local government procurement’.
3
Правительство Российской Федерации. Постановление от 11 августа 2014 г. № 791, ‘Об
установлении запрета на допуск товаров легкой промышленности, происходящих из
иностранных государств, в целях осуществления закупок для обеспечения федеральных
нужд’.

73
suitcases and leather goods which have not been produced within the Euro-Asian
Customs Union has thus been prohibited.
In addition to these measures, at the end of May 2015, a blacklist of politicians and
officers of the European Union to whom restrictions on entry into the territory of the
Russian Federation were applied was drawn up by the Russian authorities.
The food embargo1
raises the problem of the country's capacity for self-sufficiency
in food. To this end, actions to implement the import substitution policy have been
stepped up in the Russian Federation. Prior to the entry into force of the sanctions, the
formula was ‘the Russian Federation supplies gas and oil and imports food.’
In the Russian Federation, the concept of import substitution2
has become
particularly relevant in relation to the need to respond to sanctions and the real threat
of being excluded from the supply of vital technologies and equipment for the
Russian Federation.
Therefore, it can be said that the issue of import substitution has been constantly
raised3
over the years in public and scientific discussions, but never actually
implemented, as in the Russian Federation, there was no consensus on the nature,
objectives and methods of implementing the import substitution policy, which led to
a different understanding of this phenomenon and, consequently, to the use of the
concept of ‘substitution of imports’. Therefore, in modern Russian economic science,
the need remains to formulate a universal concept of ‘import substitution’, its
principles and its relations with the concept of ‘import substitution policy’.
The sanctions of western countries, the reduction of revenues from oil and gas
exports and the devaluation of the rouble made it impossible to keep imports at the
same level. Yet at the same time, it was without a doubt time for the prerequisites for
the more effective implementation of import substitution policies to appear, the need
1
Smale A., MacFquahar N, Russia Responds to Western Sanctions with Import Bans of Its Own,
the New York Times, 2014.
2
S V Novikov et al, Import substitution in the industrial sector: analysis and facts, IOP Conf. Ser.:
Mater. Sci. Eng, 2019.
3
Кравченко Н.А. История Импортзамещения, 2015.

74
for which in the modern Russian Federation is defined by many authors as the ability
to get rid of import dependency and ensure economic security of the state.
A significant turning point in the implementation of the import substitution
strategy is represented by the Russian Federal Law n. 488 of 31 December 20141
on
the ‘Development of the industry and increasing its competitiveness’, which entered
into force on 1 July 2015. The law indicates the strengthening of the national industry
as a primary economic objective, replacing a development model based on the export
of raw materials, and introduced tools to support Russian and foreign investors2
such
as the new ‘Fund for the Development of Industry’ administered by the Russian
Ministry of Industry, which provided capital at interest-rate rates for the realization
and modernization of production plants in the country, and the so-called ‘Special
Investment Contract’, i.e. a binding agreement that could be entered into between the
investor and the Russian public authority (federal, regional and / or municipal) in
order to formalize relief, incentives, guarantees and various other favourable
conditions for up to a maximum period of 10 years.
Eighteen priority sectors for import substitution were identified. Among these, the
most promising according to the experts were3
: the construction of machine tools
(import quota - over 90%), the construction of heavy machines (60-80% are
imported), light industry (70-90%), the electronics industry (80-90% imported),
pharmaceuticals, medical industry (70–80%) and the mechanical engineering for the
food industry (60–80%).
Furthermore, due to the devaluation of the rouble and the economic situation that
followed, imported products became more expensive. This not only concerned the
final consumers, but also the purchase of raw materials and equipment by the
producers. In turn, when the rouble began to stabilize, imported products became
1
Российская Федерпция. Федеральный Закон о промышленной политике в Российской
Федерации.
2
Always acting however through legal entities registered in the Russian Federation.
3
Ивановский Б.Г., Оценки Влияния Санкций на Экономику России и Проблемы
Импортзамещение.

75
available again, causing damage to local producers who no longer benefited from
price or quality.
It is important to note that the devaluation of the rouble could have had a positive
impact on Russian business if it had stimulated the export of domestic products due
to more competitive prices on the world market. However, in the context of the
economic crisis and the decline in production in the country, as well as a number of
restrictions related to the political situation, this has not been the case.
Furthermore, devaluation has made the consumption of foreign goods more
expensive, which, on the one hand, encourages consumers to switch to domestic
products, whilst on the other, makes production with imported equipment and raw
materials more expensive.
Historically, the importance of imports into the Russian Federation is so great that
the rise in price levels has produced success in growing demand for domestic
products. The corporate environment in this situation was characterized by an
extremely low level of competition and the ability to save on quality. Local producers
had the opportunity to raise the prices of their goods, as there were no cheaper
alternatives in the form of imported products on the market. Therefore, the lack of
competition has undoubtedly had a negative impact on the development of the
country's economy.
In the VTB Capital Investment Forum ‘Russia Calling’ the president of the
Russian Federation1
, Vladimir Putin, has made an account of the last five years since
the policy of import substitution was adopted stating that it also had many positive
aspects on the Russian economy. As ‘the sanctions actually forced us to focus on
import substitution, especially in industries we deemed critical for the country's
security. This is a wide range of industries: agriculture, medicine, pharmaceuticals,
and the defence industry. In general, we have achieved very serious and positive
1
‘Russia Calling! Investment Forum’; President of Russia, November 20, 2019

76
results." Food imports were reduced1
by 31.2%, from $ 43.3 billion in 2013 to $
29.8 billion in 2018. In addition, thanks to the implementation of the import
substitution policy, the Russian Federation has reached and exceeded the threshold
values of the Doctrine on food safety for a series of key food products.
In 2017, the Russian Federation, which was already an important producer, became
the first exporter of wheat2
in the world with a production of 85 million tons, higher
than in 1978 when the agricultural area included the whole Soviet Union.
In 2018, the Russian Federation exported 25.8 billion dollars worth of food,
compared to 16.8 billion dollars in 2013. A significant increase was recorded in
exports of meat and oil and also in fatty products, fish and seafood, food and
processing. As for the industrial sector, the shares of machinery and equipment in the
structure of imported products has not changed. According to state statistics, it was
recorded as 48.6% in 2013 47.3%3
in 2018.
From a medical sourcing point of view, in early 2015, the government of the
Russian Federation banned4
state medical institutions from purchasing certain foreign
goods, the list of which included 608 drugs, of which only 282 were produced in the
Russian Federation.
In 2015-2016, with state support, at least 75 imported replacement medical devices
were introduced onto the market. In the summer of 2019, the government expanded
the list of prohibited goods for the purchase of another 14 products, adding to it
devices for inhalation anaesthesia and mechanical ventilation, endoprosthesis of the
1
За последние 5 лет Россия сократила импорт продовольствия на треть’
Министерство сельского хозяйства Российской Федерации
2
Anatoly Medetsky, ‘Soviet-Era Grain Record Seen Tumbling on Bumper Russian Crop’.
Bloomberg, 21 August 2017.
3
'Экспорт-импорт важнейших товаров в январе-декабре 2018 года
6 февраля 2019’
Федеральная таможенная служба.
4
Анастасия Мануйлова, ‘Иностранным таблеткам отказывают в визе’, Газета
"Коммерсантъ".

77
extremity joints and other goods. The analogues of each of these products ‘are
produced in sufficient quantities by at least two Russian companies,’ said the
government.
Putin went on to say that obviously this situation has also had negative aspects for
both Europe, where the losses amounted to approximately 50 billion and losses also
occurred for the United States.
In addition to the import substitution policy implemented by the Russian
Federation when sanctions came into force, it was decided to supply the necessary
goods on the domestic market by importing from countries that had not introduced
anti-sanctions and replacing imports.
The abandonment of European sources of supply has made it essential for the
Russian Federation to obtain supplies from other countries, with all the related
disadvantages. First of all, the excessive costs of transporting goods derived from
trading with countries which are very distant, such as Egypt, Latin America and
Brazil. Furthermore, precisely these States, realizing that they have become
indispensable to the existence of their commercial partner, at times began to
exaggeratedly raise the prices of goods to be exported to obtain better profits. No less
important is the problem of the safety and hygiene of food from less developed
countries, which in most cases do not comply with the health standards set by the
Federation.
The Russian Federation first presented1
the ‘Turn East’ strategy in 2012. The goal
of this strategy was to expand political and economic influence in the Asia-Pacific
region2
. However, many scholars believe that the immediate cause of the
implementation of the "Turn to the East3
" strategy was the Ukrainian crisis of March
2014, since after the crisis in relations with Ukraine, serious Western sanctions were
1
Носов М., Поворот на Восток: итоги пять лет, ИЕ РАН, 2019
2
Russia’s turn to the East: a new driver of Russian Arctic development? Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2014.
3
Storey I., What Russia’s “Turn to the East” Means for Southeast Asia, ISEAS Yousof Ishak
Institute//No67, 2015

78
imposed on the Russian Federation, which were followed by western counter-
sanctions and which saw the interruption of relations in many sectors.
In 2014, Russian President announced that the Russian Federation supported the
Chinese ‘One Belt, One Way’ initiative, and which it then officially joined in 2017.
'One Belt, One Way' envisaged the creation of a land route and shipping route
between China and Europe and the widespread development of infrastructure
throughout the transport structure. Furthermore, in October 2014, the Russian
Federation and China signed a package of bilateral trade agreements on economic
cooperation, including in the field of energy, the construction of high-speed railways
for the convertibility of the yuan and the construction of another 30. projects.
One of the largest ‘Asian’ projects of the Russian Federation was the construction
of the Power of Siberia pipeline1
that ran from the Chayandinskoye field in the Sakha
Republic and the Kovykta field in the Irkutsk region of Vladivostok along the
Chinese-Russian border. The project, co-financed by Gazprom and the Chinese
company CNPC, provides for an annual supply of 38 billion tons of Russian gas to
China for 30 years, in accordance with the Russian-Chinese contract signed in 2014.
On May 8, 2015, the heads of two states, the Russian Federation and China, signed
a ‘Joint Declaration on cooperation for the construction of the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union between the People's Republic of China and
the Russian Federation’ by establishing mutual support for national strategies and
policies, by attempting to adhere to strategic bilateral relations towards a new stage of
development.
In December 2014, the president stressed that the choice of the ‘Turn to the East’
strategy was the result of prevailing circumstances, the huge demand for Russian
energy resources by China, Japan, Korea among other countries and which offered
new opportunities for the development of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, by
observing the similarity of the Turn to the East strategy with the Asian strategy of the
United States.
1
The Power of Siberia Pipeline, Russia-China, NS Energy.

79
In 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was created which, in addition to
the Russian Federation, includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
Under the pressure of sanctions, the Russian Federation, through the export of its
energy resources, has intensified cooperation in the field of energy with Asian
countries. This was the first step of the implementation of the ‘Turn to the East’
strategy. The Russian Federation has not only started collaborating with China in the
energy supply sector but has also actively started looking for partners in other
countries in the Asia-Pacific region to strengthen bilateral cooperation in this sector.
Another country that it is worth mentioning is Vietnam, in which the interest of the
Russian Federation has gradually increased. The Russian Federation has started to
consider this country as a bridge leading to the markets of Southeast Asia.
In 2001, Putin visited Vietnam for the first time and both countries decided to form a
‘strategic partnership’ and, over the following ten years, since then bilateral relations
have made significant progress.
In 2012, Vietnam and the Russian Federation formed a ‘global strategic
partnership’, concentrating cooperation in the energy and arms sectors. In addition, in
May 2014, the Russian oil company Rosneft and the National Oil Company of
Vietnam signed a contract for the supply of oil and gas to the amount of 6 million
tons per year from 2014 to 2039.
In October 2014, the Russian Federation and Vietnam signed the ‘New Economic
Plan of Russia and Vietnam’, initiating global scientific and technical cooperation
and also reached an agreement on the construction of the first nuclear power plant in
Vietnam. In addition to that fact Vietnam was the first Asian country to join the
Customs Union1
.
India was undoubtedly the principle target of the Russian ‘Turn to the East’
strategy, since the military presence of the Russian Federation in the Indian Ocean
region could guarantee the safety of energy routes in Western Asia, in addition to be
1
Storey I., What Russia’s “Turn to the East” Means for Southeast Asia, ISEAS Yousof Ishak
Institute//No67, 2015

80
the largest importer of Russian weapons. On this note, a contract was also signed for
the supply of electricity, fuel and weapons between India and the Russian Federation.
To sum up, this 'war of sanctions' can be divided into three main periods ranging
from the Ukrainian conflict, in which tensions began to grow at the end of 2013, to a
second period that sees the imposition of smart sanctions against the Russian
Federation in March 2014 and finally a third period in which commercial restrictions
and financial sanctions were implemented against the Russian Federation and the
implementation of the latter of the counter-sanctions, concerning food and
agricultural products.
Moreover, it can be said that the import substitution policy in the Russian
Federation was not adopted as a deliberate strategic decision, but as a forced reaction
in relation to the fight against sanctions and the aggravation of political relations with
foreign countries. This became an impetus for the development of the Federation's
production, which led to cooperation with new partners.
3.1.2. Sanction policy and its influence on the agricultural sector.
The scenario that emerged following the introduction of the restrictive measures
relating to agricultural products certainly represented a reason for criticality, directly
impacting all the specialized operators upstream and downstream of the distribution
chain, with particular reference to importers. For some importers this process was
traumatic and, in some cases, led to a sharp downsizing of the facilities, with
dismissal of employees, reduction of deposits used and in general a reduction in
turnover of up to 30/40%.
The embargo entered into force the following day and therefore large quantities of
these goods, which were ready to be exported to the Russian Federation, were
destroyed1
, because they were no longer edible, and only a minimal part of those still
available in the warehouses reached destination by other means. The blockade
1
Russia Destroys 26K Tons of Food in Response to Sanctions, the Moscow Times, 2018.

81
therefore created an urgent need to find other outlets for these goods as soon as
possible.
At the time of its entry into force, the government had predicted that the embargo
would create serious inconvenience to those countries that, like Italy, have close
commercial ties with the Federation, but which had not calculated with sufficient
accuracy the national consequences which would follow.
First of all, the decision to suspend imports was taken suddenly and this implied an
abrupt termination of contracts with suppliers. This led to a substantial waste of
money because many merchants had been paid in advance. There was also the fact
that tons of goods were already in ships or other means of transport and were ready
for delivery. Instead of being delivered they had to be repatriated, creating further
expenditure and logistical problems.
According to Eurostat1
estimates, the Russian Federation represented 10% of
European agricultural exports, approximately 12 billion euros per year, before the
sanctions entered into force. In the main Russian supermarkets, the vegetables and
fruits once originating in European countries were gradually replaced by competing
countries: such Turkey, Maghreb, Israel, Iran, South America and China.
Subsequently, problems immediately arose that required a rapid and urgent
solution, related to the impromptu exclusion from the imports of basic medical
supplies for people suffering from chronic diseases such as diabetes or food allergies.
It should be noted, however, that almost six years after the introduction of the
embargo, the situation on the market can certainly be said to have stabilized with the
presence on the one hand of local importers and distributors who have been able to
reposition themselves and review their product portfolio and on the other with new
suppliers of products which, after an initial adjustment phase, are now able to supply
sufficient quantities to cover the entire local market, especially in the fresh fruit and
vegetable sector.
1
Qui pâtira de l'embargo russe sur les produits européens?
Par Challenges.fr

82
Undoubtedly the most dynamic scenario is that of dairy products where, in
addition to the increase in imports from new and old suppliers (Argentina, Brazil and
Belarus) there is a strong stimulus that is being registered in on the possibility of
strengthening or starting on-site production activities involving both fresh and aged
cheeses. It should be noted that in this sense great efforts have been made by the
central and regional local authorities which, with specific investment facilities and
the creation of dedicated clusters, try to attract foreign investors in order to increase
the quantity of products made locally and decrease dependence on imports. A similar
approach was used in meat production. Also, in this case there are examples of good
quality local products in continuous growth. However, the keystone in this case is
also represented by the historical suppliers of the Russian Federation (Brazil,
Argentina and Paraguay) which have been called to increase the provision of supplies
over the years.
On August 6, 2014 the President of the Russian Federation, with Decree No. 5601
‘On the application of individual special economic measures to guarantee the security
of the Russian Federation’, introduced the ban on importing certain categories of food
into the Russian Federation for a period not exceeding one year.
The following day, August 7, 2014, the Government of the Russian Federation
issued the Implementing Decree ‘On the measures to implement the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation of August 6, 2014 no. 560’ which formalised the
introduction of the ban on imports into the Russian Federation for one year of certain
agricultural products, such as raw materials and foodstuffs, including beef and pork,
poultry, fish, cheese and dairy, fruit and vegetables produced (as attested by the
certificate of origin of the goods) in the United States of America, the European
Union, Canada, Australia and Norway2
. Alcohol, beverages, pasta and bakery
products, childcare products and goods purchased abroad for private consumption
1
Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 06.08.2014 г. № 560 ‘о применении отдельных
специальных экономических мер в целях обеспеения безопасности Российскрй Федерации’
2
Russia’s sanctions threaten both EU farmers and policymakers, Euroactiv, 2015.

83
were excluded from the scope of the measures. Finally, with Decree no. 8301
of 20
August 2014 exceptions have been introduced to the notice in question.
As European countermeasures to the embargo on the import of certain categories
of agricultural products established by the Russian Federation, the European
Commission has officially approved, with an urgent procedure, two regulations
aimed at disbursement of funds to support European producers affected by the
consequences of the ban. Firstly, EU Regulation 932/20142
on specific customs items
in the fruit and vegetable sector which provides, in summary, for the allocation of
125 million Euros with measures ranging from withdrawal from the market for free
distribution compensation for failure to harvest or early collection; Secondly, EU
Regulation 950/20143
on specific customs items of cheese which provides, in
summary, aid for the private storage of cheese up to a total quantity of 155,000 tons.
Lately, the Russian Government Decree n. 625 of 25 June 2015 eliminated from
the list of products under embargo products such as oyster eggs and tadpoles of,
mussels and other molluscs, the decree also considerably restricted the spaces that
Decree 830 had reopened for the export of milk and dairy products.4
In addition, from
1
Specifically, the possibility of importing the following products into the Russian Federation has
been restored: Atlantic salmon and juvenile trout fishes, lactose-free milk and lactose-free dairy
products, potatoes seeds, onions seeds, hybrid corn seeds, peas seed, Biologically active additives,
vitamin and mineral complexes, protein concentrates (of animal and vegetable origin) and their
mixtures, dietary fibre and food additives. In order to accurately identify the products affected by
the block, reference must always be made to the customs codes indicated in the translation of the
official decree.
2
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 932/2014; laying down temporary exceptional
support measures for producers of certain fruit and vegetables and amending Delegated Regulation
(EU) No 913/2014.
3
Commission delegated Regulation (EU) No 950/2014; opening a temporary exceptional private
storage aid scheme for certain cheeses and fixing in advance the amount of aid.
4
In order to accurately identify the products affected by the block, reference must always be made
to the customs codes indicated in the decrees.

84
January 1, 2017, with the entry into force of the Russian Government Decree no. 9251
of 16 September 2016, all Russian companies subjected directly or indirectly to
public control and a number of other entities (essentially, companies and entities
whose supplies are governed by Russian Federal Law No. 223-FZ of 2011 ‘On the
supply of goods, works and services by certain legal entities’ (Law 223)) are required
to adopt a priority regime of Russian suppliers and of the member countries of the
Eurasian Economic Union over suppliers from other countries
The Government of the Russian Federation on December 29, 2018, issued decree
no. 1716-832
with which it prohibited the importation into the Russian Federation of
a list of products whose country of origin or country of origin is Ukraine or products
transported through Ukrainian territory.
The significant decrease in exports to the Russian Federation concerns both the
sectors affected by the embargo, which entered into force on August 6, 2014 namely
fruit and vegetables, cheese, meat, sausages and fish, and extends to other sectors of
the agricultural sector, where the generalized reduction in consumption and
devaluation of the rouble which makes imported products less accessible.
The EU3
was the trading partner of the Russian Federation most affected by the
embargo on agricultural products out of the total value of agricultural exports subject
to embargo, as the EU weighed in at 73%. The Russian Federation was also the
second largest market outlet for EU agricultural products was equal to 4.2%, the
1
Правительство Российской Федерации постановление от 16 сентября 2016 г.No 925 Москва
‘О приоритете товаров российского происхождения, работ, услуг, выполняемых,
оказываемых российскими лицами, по отношению к товарам, происходящим из
иностранного государства, работам, услугам, выполняемым, оказываемым иностранными
лицами’.
2
Правительство Российской Федерации. Постановление от 29 декабря 2018 г. Москва No
1716-83 ‘о мерах по реализации Указа Президента Российской Федерации от 22 октября 2018
г. No 592.
3
The Russian Embargo: Impact on the Economic and Employment Situation in the EU, European
Parliament, briefing, 2015.

85
weight of exports of products subject to embargo on total EU agricultural exports.
Within the EU1
, it was the Eastern European countries that paid the most in terms of
weight of exports subject to embargo on agricultural exports to the Russian
Federation (approximately 51%). In particular, blocked exports from Lithuania and
Poland represented 67% and 66% of agricultural exports to the Russian Federation
respectively.
On the other hand, as regards to the weight of each country on the total value of the
blocked exports, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and Holland were the first four partners
most affected, with percentages, in order, equal to 18%, 16%, 11 % and 10%. At
sector level, the weight of European exports subject to the embargo on overall
exports in the sector was 29% for fruit and vegetables, 33% for cheeses, 28% for
butter and pork and 20% for beef.
Looking, however, at the weight of individual sectors on the value of blocked
exports, the sector most affected was that of fresh fruit and vegetables with a
percentage of approximately 38% and a value of just under 2 billion euros, followed
by the dairy sector (24%).
In 2013 Italy was the sixth European country for agricultural exports to the
Russian Federation. The productions affected by the block were fruit and vegetables,
meat, milk and its derivatives, fish products and other products.
Certainly, the data given is realistic but only considered partial, as it only measures
the direct effect of missed exports due to recently renewed sanctions and restrictive
measures together with the effect of the more general slowdown in imports also on
products not affected by the embargo which only saw a new acceleration in 2017.
Indeed, an indirect impact of embargoes and sanctions must be subsequently added,
the aforesaid are much more difficult to estimate precisely, but are certainly much
larger in size.
1
Kapsdorferova Z., Sviridova O. Impact of sanctions on agricultural policy in European Union and
Russia, 2016

86
1
Source: export planning.
RussianembargoonEUagri-foodproducts(€bn)
fresh fruit and vegetables
fresh meat and fish
cheeses, milk and dairy products
packaged meat and fish
packaged fruit and vegetables
salt
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
The following graph permits the highlighting of the trend recorded by EU exports
over the past few years. It is clear that EU exports have experienced a significant
reduction phase from 2014 to today. The contraction in European exports is
particularly evident for the years 2015 and 2016, after which there was a slight
recovery, without however returning to levels seen in 2013.
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
1
Figure 4: EU exports from 2013 to 2019
Due to the sanctions, an extra quota of goods from EU countries, initially destined
for export to the Russian Federation, has been placed on the European market. This
surplus resulted in an increase in the supply on the European market, which translated
into a drop in the prices of products (especially fruit and vegetables), going on to
aggravate the decline that was already occurring in the period prior to 2014. In
particular, the products whose world price is most influenced by the Russian embargo
were fish products, those deriving from breeding and sugar.
2
2
Source: export planning. Figure 5

87
The sector of fresh food was the most heavily affected, on which the existing
embargo more than halved the value of European exports to the market between 2013
and 2019.
Exports from Poland, Germany and the Netherlands were also particularly
affected, mainly due to the reduction of fruit and vegetables, meat and fresh fish. As
regards to packaged products, however, exports from Holland, France and Germany
recorded the biggest drops, which affected not only the products subject to sanctions,
such as cheese, fish and packaged meat, but also affected other types of goods, such
as confectionery products and wine. In particular, the reduction seen in these types of
goods must be linked above all to the loss of the purchasing power of the Russian
population due to the economic crisis.
After 2016, indeed, the imports of these categories of food products showed a
timid increase, without however returning to pre-embargo values, nevertheless the
sanctions were still in forced.
As for Europe, the countries that have felt the weight of the embargo more heavily
on their economies are the former Benelux States, Spain and Eastern Europe. On the
contrary, there are nations which have benefited from a modest and temporary benefit
from the embargo, that is, those outside the EU directly bordering on the Russian
Federation. Indeed, they have acquired, so to speak, the status of ‘commercial
intermediary’, thanks to a triangulation effect that allows them to sell the products
that other EU states export to them in the Russian Federation, since they are not
limited by the sanctions. As a direct result their trade flows underwent a slight
increase.
In conclusion it can be affirmed that the growth that occurred again in 2017 went
again the expectations of the Russian Federation to create, especially in the
agricultural sector, a level of self-sufficiency from imports. Indeed, from the data it is
clear that in 2018 the import of fruit by the Russian Federation was even greater than
the previous year and this was a trend that continued even into 2019. However, this
argument is not valid for all sectors, for example meat production has seen an
increase, seeing a 38% decrease in imports.

88
3.2 The sanction policy and the dynamics of the trade turnover between the
EU and Russia: statistical comparative analysis.
Briefly summarizing what has been presented in the previous pages, it can be said
that since 2014, namely the imposition of sanctions by the US and the EU on the
Russian Federation, the consequences that have resulted are that the Russian
Federation has seen its trade with the world decrease by 45 % of the previous value in
the first three years1
. The countries that introduced the sanctions mainly paid the
highest price for it. Also, in these years, China has increased its turnover with the
Russian Federation by 20%, in addition to new partnerships that have been created
with the Asian countries. In addition, there was the introduction of the import
substitution by the Russian Federation. There was also the notable devaluation of the
rouble which led to a double increase in imports for the Russian side. In the following
pages, these consequences will be analysed from a practical point of view, showing
the real numbers of the exchange for a more in-depth analysis.
In an interview2
for the project entitled ‘20 questions to Vladimir Putin’
recently released by the president to the TASS newspaper on what can be said today
about the sanctions, six years after their entry into force, the president said that the
losses of the Russian Federation amount to 50 billion dollars. It did however manage
to earn and to compensate a similar sum through the various policies that have been
put in place, including the policy of replacing imports. A lot of money was spent on
the implementation of the latter which, however, then resulted in allowing the
Russian Federation to start producing products independently that were previously
always imported. In addition, the counter sanctions have contributed to strengthening
the agricultural sector.
1
2014-2016
Russia’s and the EU’s sanctions: economic and trade effects, compliance and the way
forward//Directorate-General for external policies. Policy department//European Parliament, 2017
2
‘20 questions to Vladimir Putin’, TASS

89
The Russian Federation benefited from this, allowing it to diversify its economy.
The president said that through exports, it has come to a gain 25 billion dollars last
year, while for the current year it is expected to be at 24 dollars billion.
However, the president added that if on the one hand they are seen as something
positive, the negative side can also be seen as they are changing the entire global
economic space as competition should be something natural, without the use of
restrictions. In addition, Putin said that it was Europe that was in actual fact hit the
hardest by the sanctions compared to the Russian Federation, as it suffered many job
cuts due to failed imports, while unemployment in the Russian Federation is now at
historical lows.
The following chart takes into account the total exchange, imports and exports to
and from the Russian Federation in the months from January to November 2019,
compared to those from previous years1
, since the sanctions entered into force.
In the period from January-November 2019, according to the Russian Customs
statistical source, the total exchange of the Russian Federation reached the value of
539,8 billion euros (up by 2.1% compared to the same period of the previous year).
Imports amounted to 197,4 billion euros (up by 7.6%), while exports grew to 342.5
billion euros (-0.8%), with a positive trade balance of 145,1 billion euros (-10.2%
compared to the same period of 2018).
1
2018 also includes eleven months, from January to November, to allow for a better comparison to
the following year.

90
Figure 6: total interchanges from/to the world1
.
In the eleven months of 2019 (January-November), the main products exported to
the world were: mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, for a
value of 180,7 billion euros (down 2,1% compared to the same period last year) equal
to a share of 52,8% of total exports; cast iron, iron and steel for a value of 15,1 billion
euros (4,4% share), but which had seen a decrease of 16,6% compared to the previous
year; fine or cultured pearls, precious and semiprecious stones and, precious and
semiprecious metals, for a value of 12 billion euros equal to a share of 3,5% and, an
increase of 52,5%; nuclear reactors, boilers, machines, appliances and mechanical
devices for a value of 7,1 billion euros (2,1% share), an increase of 4,9%; wood and,
charcoal, for 7 billion euros (+ 0,8%), with a 2,1% share.
In the same period, the main products imported from the world in the period from
January - November 2019 were: nuclear reactors, boilers and mechanical machinery
for a value of 34,7 billion euros (17,6% share of total imports), with a 3,4% increase
over the same period of 2018, machinery and electrical equipment including,
equipment for the recording and the reproduction of images and sound for 23,9
billion euros (12,1% share), up by 3,6%; vehicles for a value of 19,3 billion (with a
share of 9,8%), up by 6%, pharmaceutical products for 11,6 billion (5,9% share), an
1
Source: Federal customs service of the Russian Federation.

91
increase of 43,9%, plastics for a value of 8 billion euros (4,1% share), up by 5,9%;
and finally, optical instruments and apparatus, for photography and cinematography,
medical and surgical instruments and apparatus with their components, for 5,8 billion
euros (2,9% share), with an increase of 13,8%.
1
2
1
Source: Federal customs service of the Russian Federation.
2
Ibidem

92
in
millions
of
dollars
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
World
Export
Import
527.266,4 497.833,7 343.426,7 285.772,5 357.816,6 449.617,3 422.777,2
314.967,0 286.669,1 182.403,5 182.346,9 227.502,6 238.493,4 243.780,6
USA
Export
Import
11.135 10.635 9.506 9.269 10.614 124.96,6 130.49,0
16.502 18.496 11.453 10.702 12.584 125.25,1 131.87,8
EU
Export
Import
238.418 259.052 165.566 130.667 159.683 205.109,1 189.165,9
134.241 118.487 70.156 69.878 86.910 893.00,9 886.30,2
China
Export
Import
35.625 37.494 37.494 28.018 38.919 560.19,4 567.91,6
53.173 50.856 50.856 38.104 48.056 522.25,4 541.27,0
Figure 9: import/export from/to Russia from 2013 to 2019. Source: Federal custom service
According to the latest available data from the Russian Customs, the main
suppliers of the Russian Federation in the period from January-November 2019 were:
China, for a value of 43,7 billion euros (market share equal to 22,2%); Germany, with
20,4 billion euros (10,3% share); and the United States, for a value of 10,8 billion
euros (5,5% share). On the opposite side, relating to the same period, the three main
client countries of the Russian Federation were: China, with 45,2 billion euros and a
market share of 13,2%; The Netherlands, for a value of 37 billion euros (10,8%
share) and; Germany, with 22,9 billion euros and a 6,7% share. The following graphs

93
and tables show foreign trade with the main countries in more detail, including all
twelve months of 2019.
Figure 10: foreign trade with the main countries. Source: Russian federal custom service
The following tables, on the other hand, represent the volumes of trade with the
CIS countries.
Export
Country
2014
2015 2016 2017
January- November
2018
January-
November
2019
AZERBAIJAN 3373.2 2287,1 1 507,1 1 935,1 1560,8 2099,5
ARMENIA 1087.9 1050,9 964,6 1 231,9 1217,7 1345,3
BELARUS 19717.7 16863,7
15
284,3
19
384,6 21114,2 19611,3
KAZAKHSTAN 13891.6 10866,2
9 613,5 12
323,9 11896,9 12871,1

94
KYRGYZSTAN 1743.4 1302,4 1 035,0 1 388,9 1515 1439,6
MOLDOVA 1480.4 1036,4 912,0 864,5 1058,5 1116,6
TAJIKISTAN 891.0 762,5 661,5 692,3 788,2 878,8
TURKMENISTAN 1156.0 913,6 570,6 343,8 263,9 449,1
UZBEKISTAN 3122.6 2235,2 1 965,4 2 625,4 2937,8 3476,5
UKRAINE 17114.4 9294,1
6 341,9 7 942,
8 8643,6 6217,6
Country
Import
2014
2015 2016 2017
January-
November 2018
January-
November
2019
AZERBAIJAN 634.9 517,8 446,4 692,1 687,7 773,5
ARMENIA 313.5 209,6 389,3 514,7 575,1 762,9
BELARUS 11786.3 9664,5
10
348,3
12
471,5 11867,6 12376,6
KAZAKHSTAN 7159.2 4895,2 3 636 4 916,7 4880,2 5054,3
KYRGYZSTAN 73.8 71,7 176,7 206,1 228,8 296,7
MOLDOVA 315.9 185,9 248,7 352,7 320,7 346,8
TAJIKISTAN 37.3 52,2 26,4 25,2 39,3 33,2
TURKMENISTAN 90.9 73,5 331,3 84,4 109,2 135,1
UZBEKISTAN 874.6 601,8 761,5 1 026,4 968,4 1058,3
UKRAINE 10747.5 5672,5 3 891,8 4 912,3 4976,9 4431
Figure 10-11: volumes of trade with the CIS countries. Source: Federal custom service
To sum up, the Russian Federation is an economically stable country, which has
been strengthened even after six years of sanctions and geopolitical uncertainties.
The energy sector is the driver of Russian economic development and constitutes
25% of the country's GDP, bringing 40% of the revenue into the budget. The
economic recovery, timidly resurfacing at the beginning of 2017, has been
consolidating since 2018. The revival of the economy was also supported by the

95
replacement plan for imports affected by the sanctions, by the diversification of the
economy through an expansion of production capacity, by the modernization of the
industrial apparatus and with the introduction of new technologies.
Furthermore, it has also been shown that the countries of Central Asia and the
Caucasus are growing, and opportunities must be seized on these markets.
3.3 Perspectives and ways of optimising of EU-Russia relations.
Summarizing what has been said previously about the relations between the
Russian Federation and the European Union, which have resulted in aforementioned
parties finding themselves in a profound crisis. This paragraph aims to detail what
future there could be and what the solutions, if any, there could be to end it.
Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union that began
under the banner of hope, ambition and enthusiasm in the 1990s are now associated
with great disappointments. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation has never had truly stable relations with the EU, despite their geographical
proximity and economic interdependence which ‘condemn’ both sides to cooperation.
2014 was a watershed in the history of relations between the West and the Russian
Federation. The slow diplomatic normalization that began in the last years of the
Soviet Union's life with Mikhail Gorbachev and which was continued by his
successors Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin abruptly stopped with Ukraine, sending
important signals to both the Russian Federation and the EU. Furthermore, relations
between the Russian Federation and the EU during the period from 2000 to 2014
were based on the separation between politics and the economy, a gap that has
increased over the past few years.
First of all, the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the Russian Federation and the EU
have fundamentally divergent positions on the international order, starting with
Europe itself. The Ukrainian crisis has also shown that differences of views with
respect to the international order have overpowered the factor of economic
interdependence and therefore undermined the belief that such interdependence

96
served as a natural barrier to the possible disintegration of relations between the
Russian Federation and the EU.
Overall, the Russian Federation and the EU have seemed more distant than ever
over the years, giving no reason to expect rapid and drastic changes in the coming
years. However, despite the losses that the two powers have suffered over the years,
as have been listed in the previous pages, it has been possible to note the total
absence of strong incentives to improve relationships, even if many times an attempt
has been made to find a common solution which would also have included the final
abolition of the restrictive measures. Indeed, since the entry into force of the
sanctions, many attempts have been made to remove them. As, as was said in the
second chapter, within the European Union itself there are completely different views
on this issue which in the end, however, have always led to the reconfirmation of the
restrictive measures. This encouraged the Russian leadership to prioritize bilateral
relations with individual States rather than those with the EU as a single entity, also
undermining the limited success that the EU enjoyed initially.
Among the examples that can be cited, Poland still actively supports sanctions,
even if it is solely due to the purely political reason to ‘contain’ the Russian
Federation. While the Baltic countries have taken the initiative to lift anti-Russian
restrictions. Indeed, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, during an April visit to
Moscow, said that Tallinn was ready for dialogue with the Kremlin1
, noting that ‘all
Estonians would like to have good relations with neighbours’.
The same can be said for Rome, which has always shown itself active against
sanctions. Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, said that his country continues to
work to lift sanctions against the Russian Federation. Giuseppe Conte said ‘We
cannot achieve this tomorrow morning, but we all have to work for it. This would
mean easing tensions and fostering dialogue with the countries most affected by the
1
Sputnik 18.04.2019 ‘La presidente estone apre al dialogo con la Russia’.

97
Russian Federation1
’. So far, however, Rome has never gone against the progressive
renewal that is voted by Europe periodically.
The French president has also worked hard to find a peace format between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation which culminated in the meeting of 9 December 2019 in
Paris with the 'Normandy format'2
.
However, the aforesaid are European measures, not undertaken by individual
States and not respecting them would have subsequent consequences with Brussels.
The lifting of sanctions is supported not only by individual EU countries, but also
by international organizations in Europe. Therefore, the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, asked for the lifting of the sanctions from the
Russian Federation and for his right to vote in the PACE be reinstated, fearing that
the Russian Federation would leave the organization3
.
The compromise that was reached this summer, regarding the participation of the
Russian Federation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe shows
that, despite the numerous difficulties, both sides have a desire to maintain contact.
The decision is relevant both from a political and an economic point of view, given
that the suspension of the Russian Federation and its parliamentarians led to the non-
payment of the Russian quota of the institution's budget. As a consequence, the
survival and very nature of the Council of Europe4
was therefore at stake. Despite the
clear majority of the votes cast in favour of the readmission of the Russian
Federation, the discussion that preceded the vote was long and demanding, especially
due to the obstructionism exercised by the conservatives of neighbouring countries or
neighbouring the Russian Federation and the British. On this occasion, one of the
members of the delegation of the Russian Federation did not waste time in presenting
1
Concetto Vecchio, ‘La Repubblica’, ‘Italia-Russia, Conte: "Lavoriamo per superare le sanzioni".
Putin: "Roma ne parli con l'Ue".
2
‘La Repubblica’ 10 dicembre 2019, ‘Russia-Ucraina, al vertice di Parigi primi passi verso il
disgelo’.
3
Sputnik, 27.11.2017 ‘FT: Consiglio d’Europa ritiene di poter revocare le sanzioni antirusse’.
4
The purpose of which is to protect the human rights of over 800 million citizens.

98
the return to the Assembly to the Russian public as its acceptance of the annexation
of Crimea.
The European Council has decided to extend the economic sanctions against the
Russian Federation decided for the first time in July 2014 and then strengthened in
September of the same year, for the failure to implement the Minsk protocol, signed
in September 2014, which aimed to put an end to the war in Eastern Ukraine.
Since the agreements have never been respected, the penalties are automatically
extended, usually on a six-month basis. The last time they were extended was in
January 31, 2020, so they are expected to last until the end of July of the same year.
Furthermore, there are those who say that only the return of Crimea under Ukrainian
administrative control, with compensation for the damage suffered and at the same
time the return of the Ukrainian rule of law on the occupied territories of the East will
allow the complete end of the sanctioning regime.
Therefore, it can be said that among the ways to optimize the future of sanctions
there are a few worth mentioning firstly, by resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine
as it is clear that any easing of sanctions should be directly related to specific
measures taken by the Russian Federation to compensate for the damage it has caused
to international security. This is because they believe that easing or lifting sanctions
without a quid pro quo ‘would send the wrong signal’ to those who in the future may
find themselves faced with the possibility of violating international law. In the event
that the path of easing sanctions should be taken, it would be better to start with
diplomatic sanctions before changing the economic ones, to guarantee further
pressure instruments for future talks with the Russian Federation.
In this case Moscow would be ready to respond in the same way if the European
Union began to lift the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation.
Secondly, determine the format of relations with the Russian Federation, as,
mutual recognition of the structural differences between the EU and the Russian
Federation and the diversity of interests of the said parties are needed. The
relationship between the two powers has always been characterized by ups and
downs, but it is essential to find common grounds. With great difficulty, the lifting of

99
sanctions by Brussels will take place in the near future. However, it is possible to
strengthen economic ties in those areas that have not been affected by the sanctions,
placing emphasis on non-political issues, from business projects and the transfer of
technology to cultural and humanitarian initiatives.
However, even if the government of the Russian Federation were to lift the
sanctions on agricultural companies which had suffered serious damage to exports,
said companies would find themselves competing in a market which had already been
saturated with similar cheaper products. It should also not be forgotten that many
companies exporting agricultural products have recovered the market indirectly,
exporting to non-Western markets and from there to the Russian Federation. It is no
coincidence that in 2017 there was a considerable increase in exports.
There has been no significant progress in the past six years, on the contrary
sanctions have continued to be renewed every six months. This means that the
political goal has not been achieved. It would then be fair to ask the question why
should sanctions be maintained and why should the interest parties not look for a way
out? This question is very difficult to answer, much less try to find ways to optimize
relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation taking into
consideration that the main problem would be, as has also been found in the past,
they completely visions enormous differences of the aforesaid, which make
subsequent steps difficult. Additionally, there are also the different positions of
Member States on the subject, which should be highlighted and considered.
What can be said about Europe is that it has always taken a position of ambiguity
trying to maintain relations with the Russian Federation in some way but being
adamant on the question of sanctions. In addition, there is the added point of finding
ourselves in a difficult period for Europe which sees it more divided than ever.
Among the points to be excluded would also be the entry of the Russian Federation
into Europe, excluding the project from Lisbon to Vladivastok.
The current spread of a global pandemic is one of the recent events that mark
another question mark on future relationships, making it impossible to make
predictions today. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic sees Italy most affected, one of

100
the members of the European Union, and this has created a rift between Member
States, making Europe appear more divided than ever. In addition to this, there has
been no lack of controversy from some States following the aid provided by the
Russian Federation to Italy. Russian military aid plans for Italy to combat the spread
of coronavirus have highlighted the European Union's inability to provide rapid help
to a member in crisis.
However, in light of these developments some diplomats and officials from the EU
and NATO view the Russian assistance more as a geopolitical move that affirms
Russian power, of which Italians have fallen into the trap. Rome from the first
moment denied that the aid signals a fusion of geopolitical interests. ‘There are no
new geopolitical scenarios to track down, there is a country that needs help and other
countries that are helping us1
,’ said Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio.
However, when asked if the Russian Federation expected Italy to return the favour by
trying to lift EU sanctions, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied these rumours,
simply saying that Italy really needed help.
Even in this situation, the issue of removing sanctions has been raised. A joint
letter to the United Nations Secretary-General Anthony Guterres was sent from
Russia, China, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea and Venezuela. These
countries urged the head of the world organization to ask a number of other States to
lift unilateral sanctions. ‘I call for the lifting of sanctions imposed on countries to
provide them with access to food, essential medical supplies and medical care in the
fight against COVID-19’ said Guterres. He also stressed to the countries that now ‘it
is not the time to isolate oneself, it is time to show solidarity’. According to him, all
countries in the world should have equal opportunities to respond to the global crisis.
‘The world is looking forward to concerted and decisive action by world leaders,’ he
concluded.
To sum up, currently relations between Moscow and Brussels cannot be called
normal, since they are ‘poisoned by anti-Russian sanctions’. However, the
11
Sicurezza internazionale 26 marzo 2020, ‘Le risposte della Polonia alle accuse della Russia’.

101
interdependence of the parties has diminished, but not disappeared.
Therefore, it is premature to expect the lifting of the sanctions. Despite the mutual
economic interests and the general fatigue of Europeans due to the war of the
sanctions, the EU still does not have enough political momentum to make such a
decision. Furthermore, the European Union cannot simply lift the sanctions it has
extended over the years. To put this into action there is the requirements of at least
one formal reason, otherwise such a step would seem an open acknowledgment of
their political error, which has led to serious economic consequences, of which the
Europeans would certainly not allow, even if only to protect their reputation on the
international scene.
Conclusions:
Sanctions are exceptional foreign policy measures that are used on rare
occasions to manage international crises or respond to serious violations of
international law. Their effectiveness has been widely debated in the past and an
exact assessment is not always possible. However, the discussion of the last decade
has allowed us to define a series of factors to consider in assessing the effectiveness
of the sanctions and of the opportunity to lift them. The EU has gradually intensified
its foreign policy activities and, consequently, sanctions have also been used more
frequently and to respond to ever more varied crises, from human rights to conflict
management through two the democratic consolidation of new regimes.
The evolution of sanctions from overall measures to targeted measures has
increased the flexibility of the tool. During 2014, the EU adopted sanctions against
the Russian Federation in defence of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, endangered
by the illegal annexation of Crimea and direct support for rebels in the Donetsk and
Lugansk regions.
Economic sanctions, together with counter sanctions imposed by the Russian
Federation and parallel sanctions imposed by the United States, have had an impact
on trade with some member countries of the European Union. The economic

102
recovery, timidly resurfacing at the beginning of 2017, has been consolidating since
2018. The revival of the economy was also supported by the replacement plan for
imports affected by the sanctions and by the diversification of the economy through
an expansion of production capacity, by the modernization of the industrial apparatus
with the introduction of new technologies.
The banking sector, after a period of profound crisis has started to return to
profitability, even if a third of the banks are still not profitable. The consolidation of
this, of which the Central Bank was a skilful director, saw in four years the number of
banks go from 900 to 400, making the system more robust, but also reducing the
competitive tone in many regions of the Federation, where a single bank often
remains. Loans grew by 10.8% in 2019, a figure substantially lower than in 2018,
which stood at 13.1%.
Despite these improvements which have been noted since the beginning of the
imposition of the sanctions leading to a new stabilization, but still no clarity has been
made from the international point of view, leaving the future still uncertain.

103
CONCLUSION:
After having conducted a detailed analysis of the legal and commercial issues in
the context of sanction policy and their role on the international scene, with a
particular focus on the relations between the Russian Federation and the European
Union, including the main problems and prospects of improving the future relations
between the Russian Federation and the European Union, several conclusions can be
drawn.
First of all, considering the boomerang effect of the Russian embargo on
western products and also taking into consideration the fact that the Russian economy
was already structurally weakened before the annexation of Crimea, the balance of
the impact of sanctions on the Russian Federation has certainly not been negligible.
Among the direct effects that are noteworthy: are inflation, the decline in GDP and
growth, the paralysis of financial supply, the worsening of the standard of living in
the countryside and the drop in the standard of living also seen in Russian cities, the
fall in real wages, the blockage of the inflow of foreign capital, the flight of capital
the blockade of innovation in extractive research, seen especially in the Arctic.
However, indirect effects can also be identified including: price control, autarchic and
protectionist policies, rising interest rates, losses in the aviation sector, rising costs for
Russian travel abroad, household debt and, the decline in consumption.
Western financial sanctions, although aimed at targeting individuals and key
economic players, through the use of smart sanctions, have also damaged the Russian
economy as a whole. However, after the study that has been conducted in this
dissertation through a statistical method by comparing various graphs and tables,
including the years in which the sanctions were imposed, in a bid to understand what
the real consequences were, it can be said that in the case of the Russian Federation a
period of instability was initially created, as the Russian Federation was heavily
dependent on imports from European countries, but that the sanctions also benefited
the Russian economy. Indeed, the revitalization of the economy was also supported
by the plan of import substitution for the products affected by the sanctions, by the

104
diversification of the economy through an expansion of production capacity and, by
the modernization of the industrial system with the introduction of new technologies.
As a result, as has also been analysed in this dissertation, through the analysis of
President Putin's speeches it can also be said that the sanctions have caused greater
damage to the European economy rather than to the Russian economy, indeed the
latter has managed to find its own stability, which is becoming more and more
strengthened over the years.
However, another consideration that can be drawn from what has been
analysed in this dissertation is that although sanctions have affected the Russian and
European economy in a negative way, they must always be contextualized in a much
wider context. Having arrived at a time when the Russian economy had to deal with
serious structural weaknesses and also at a time when the price of oil had plummeted,
the sanctions acted as a catalyst, reinforcing their effects, on inflation, on the decline
of GDP and the recession, the drop in exports, the collapse of the state budget, and on
unemployment. Furthermore, as has also been seen thanks to the numerous data
analysed, an economic recovery timidly re-emerged at the beginning of 2017 and
subsequently consolidated more and more starting from 2018, even though the
sanctions were still in force. Due to this, it is extremely difficult to be able to say in
what percentage the sanctions influenced the economy and in what percentage the
economy was influenced by the other factors that occurred in 2014.
Another topic that has been raised in this dissertation and analysed over the
years by many scholars is the true effectiveness of sanctions. As has already been
noted, the objective of the sanctions should be to dissuade the country sanctioned
from the policy adopted at that time, not to have punitive purposes. However, in the
case of the Federation, provided that this was their true purpose, not only did they not
induce the Russian Federation to change politics, but from the point of view of
internal politics, according to the ‘Levada1
’ polling institute, the approval of
President Putin increased compared to the pre-sanctions period. Indeed, in the period
1
https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/

105
prior to them, the president enjoyed 60% support which was seen to increase to 80%
after the implementation of the aforesaid. The fact remains, however, that the
sanctions did not produce a reorientation of the Kremlin's foreign policy and did not
convince the Russian authorities to change course, showing that Moscow was ready
to engage in an economic conflict while recognizing the economic asymmetries with
the West that already existed. The withdrawal from Crimea remains unimaginable.
Deterrence against aid to separatism in eastern Ukraine seems to have failed and no
concrete political concessions have been seen. The sanctions have not succeeded in
affecting the fundamental cause of the conflict. Indeed, it has been found that the
conditions of the effectiveness of the sanctions depend on the degree of
substitutability of the commercial partners and of the goods that become no longer
reachable, which did not become an issue in the case of the Russian Federation. So, a
question that is legitimate to ask is why these sanctions have not been removed?
Despite their ineffectiveness which has been demonstrated not only on this occasion,
they remain the only tool available to the European Union in 'a period of peace'. In
addition, the European Union could not decide overnight to eliminate the sanctions
because in this way its own policy of adherence adopted from 2014 to today would be
jeopardized, going against the founding principles of the Union.
Finally, after analysing the relationships, which are not always easy, which have
characterized relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation since
the 1990s and which have seen a tightening in 2013 with the entry into force of
sanctions. However, these years have been characterized by ambiguous positions that
have seen some European States continue relations with the Federation, yet despite
this they have never opposed the renewal of sanctions. From an economic and
cultural point of view, the Russian Federation has always been closely connected to
Europe and vice versa. However, one of the most frequent questions that can be
asked is what will the future be for these two powers? In the future, Europe should, in
order to maintain its stability, conceive a common security space with, and not
against, the Russian Federation.

106
For some time, there has been talk of a space that constituted a 'great Europe', a
Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok in order to permit the improvement of these
relationships more and more. The problem, however, lies in the fact that a merger of
the western and eastern parts of Europe would require completely new institutions,
since the Russian Federation cannot become a member of the European Union and
NATO. Such a ‘great Europe’ would no longer be a community united by liberal
values, but a community of interests, which would rise together against global
challenges. The current ruling classes of the EU are unwilling to weaken institutions
such as NATO and the EU itself and to narrow the discussion around their values due
to the Russian Federation. The entry into Europe of a country as large as the Russian
Federation would disintegrate the transatlantic community, forming a continental
Europe in which the American influence would be destined to decrease significantly.
The Russian Federation has always shown its willingness to negotiate with Europe
and lay the foundations for future security cooperation. However, current European
elites, as well as American ones, prefer instead to keep the Russian Federation at a
distance.
Seen in what is happening today, and which has characterized relations
between Europe and the Russian Federation over the years, there is no denying the
influence of the United States. Indeed, the EU remains dependent on the United
States, mainly in economic and military terms. For Washington, sanctions, in addition
to political importance, have purely pragmatic tasks: limiting competition from the
Russian Federation and making Europe the main buyer of liquefied natural gas
(LNG). However, the ‘common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok’, which speaks of
a path of normalization of relations with the Russian Federation in term of the
definition of Ukrainian non-alignment or neutrality, disarmament, in the first instance
in the field of cyberspace, conceptions of an enlarged Europe, and which also sees a
strategic partnership between NATO and the collective defence pacts of European
countries. The Russian Federation, for example, could be included in the new EU
security strategy for the common fight against terrorism, among the long-term goals.
Among the short-term objectives, however, the Minsk protocols in eastern Ukraine

107
should finally be implemented, to start negotiations for the lifting of sanctions. Once
the Minsk process is set in motion, the abandonment of sanctions should follow.
At this point there would be the problem of American sanctions. These have
little to do with the Ukrainian crisis, serving only the new goal of the Americans,
which relates to the curbing of and of ensuring geopolitically damage to a significant
gas rival. In this instance Europe should undertake the task of mediating. However,
Europe itself is divided between States that want a normalization of relations with the
Russian Federation and States that want the Russian Federation forever excluded
from Europe. Without a doubt, an urgent relaxing policy is critically required, which
should lay the foundations for a dialogue with the Russian Federation and which
should promote common security for all: for Europe, the Russian Federation and for
the small States that are in the balance. It is evident that the current European security
architecture is in a moment of imbalance. As a first, necessary step, we could start
talking about cooperation between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic
Union.

108
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