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Global 2
Respond to ALL of the following questions, using Times New
Roman, 12 pts., double spaced,
ranging from 300 to 500 words. The file will be submitted in a
.pdf format.
Include: Full Name, TA Name, Section Time/Date. No citation
required.
1. What is the main idea of EACH reading? (5 pts)
2. Compare and contrast the main ideas of ALL the readings,
and explain how do ALL of
them relate to Global Studies? (5 pts)
Grading Rubric per question
Grade Description
1 Demonstrates very limited knowledge and understanding of
the subject;
almost no organizational structure in the answers; inappropriate
or inadequate
use of terminology; a limited ability to relate content to the
class.
2 Demonstrates some knowledge and understanding of the
subject; a basic sense
of structure that is not sustained throughout the answers; a basic
use of
terminology appropriate to the subject; some ability to establish
links between
facts and the class.
3 Demonstrates a secure knowledge and understanding of the
subject going
beyond the mere citing of isolated, fragmentary, irrelevant or
“common sense”
points; some ability to structure answers but with insufficient
clarity and
possibly some repetition; an ability to express knowledge and
understanding
in terminology specific to the subject
4 Demonstrates a sound knowledge and understanding of the
subject using
subject-specific terminology; answers which are logically
structured and
coherent but not fully developed; a tendency to be more
descriptive than
evaluative although some ability is demonstrated to present and
develop
contrasting points of view;
5 Demonstrates detailed knowledge and understanding; answers
which are
coherent, logically structured and well developed; consistent
use of
appropriate terminology; an ability to analyse, evaluate and
synthesize
knowledge and concepts; an ability to analyse and evaluate the
reading or to
solve problems competently.
THINKINGGLOBALLY
THINKINGGLOBALLY
AGlobalStudiesReader
EDITEDBY
MarkJuergensmeyer
UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESS
Berkeley Los Angeles London
University of California Press, one of the most distinguished
university
pressesintheUnitedStates,enricheslivesaroundtheworldbyadvanci
ng
scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural
sciences. Its
activitiesaresupportedbytheUCPressFoundationandbyphilanthro
pic
contributionsfromindividualsandinstitutions.Formoreinformatio
n,visit
www.ucpress.edu.
UniversityofCaliforniaPress
BerkeleyandLosAngeles,California
UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.
London,England
©2014byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Thinking globally : a global studies reader / edited by Mark
Juergensmeyer.
pagescm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-0-520-27844-8(pbk.:alk.paper)
eISBN9780520958012
1.Globalization—Textbooks. I.Juergensmeyer,Mark.
JZ1318.T456 2014
303.48’2—dc23 2013022129
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Inkeepingwithacommitmenttosupportenvironmentallyresponsibl
eand
sustainableprintingpractices,UCPresshasprintedthisbookonNatur
es
Natural, a fiber that contains 30% post-consumer waste
andmeets the
minimumrequirementsofANSI/NISOZ39.48-
1992(R1997)(Permanenceof
Paper).
http://www.ucpress.edu
CONTENTS
Preface:AFriendlyIntroductiontoGlobalStudies
PARTI:INTRODUCTION
1. ThinkingGlobally
Whatisglobalizationandhowdowemakesenseofit?
ManfredSteger,“Globalization:AContestedConcept”
fromGlobalization:AVeryShortIntroduction
ThomasFriedman,“TheWorldIsTenYearsOld”
fromTheLexusandtheOliveTree
PaulJames,“ApproachestoGlobalization”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
StevenWeber,“HowGlobalizationWentBad”
fromForeignPolicy
FurtherReading
2. GlobalizationoverTime
Globalization has a history: the current global era is prefaced by
periods of
economicinteraction,socialexpansion,andintenseculturalencount
ers
WilliamMcNeill,“Globalization:LongTermProcessorNewErainH
uman
Affairs?”
fromNewGlobalStudies
JaneBurbankandFrederickCooper,“ImperialTrajectories”
fromEmpiresinWorldHistory
ImmanuelWallerstein,“OntheStudyofSocialChange”
fromTheModernWorldSystem
DominicSachsenmaier,“MovementsandPatterns:Environmentsof
Global
History”
fromGlobalPerspectivesonGlobalHistory
FurtherReading
PARTII:THEMARCHOFGLOBALIZATION,BYREGION
3. Africa:TheRiseofEthnicPoliticsinaGlobalWorld
The impact of the slave trade and colonialization on Africa,
influence of
African culture on the Americas, and African aspects of the
global rise of
ethnicpolitics
NayanChanda,“TheHiddenStoryofaJourney”
fromBoundTogether
DilipHiro,“Slavery”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
JeffreyHaynes,“AfricanDiasporaReligions”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
JacobK.Olupona,“ThinkingGloballyaboutAfricanReligion”
fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions
OkwudibaNnoli,“TheCycleof‘State-Ethnicity-
State’inAfricanPolitics”
fromMOSTEthno-NetAfrica
FurtherReading
4. TheMiddleEast:ReligiousPoliticsandAntiglobalization
TheriseofglobalreligiousculturesfromtheMiddleEast,andcurrentr
eligious
politicsaspartofaglobalchallengetosecularism
MohammedBamyeh,“TheIdeologyoftheHorizons”
fromTheSocialOriginsofIslam
SaidAmirArjomand,“ThinkingGloballyaboutIslam”
fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions
JonathanFox,“AreMiddleEastConflictsMoreReligious?”
fromMiddleEastQuarterly
BarahMikaïl,“ReligionandPoliticsinArabTransitions”
fromFRIDEpolicybrief
FurtherReading
5. SouthandCentralAsia:GlobalLaborandAsianCulture
ThespreadofAsianculturesfromIndiaandCentralAsiaviatraderoute
s;the
roleofSouthAsiainglobaltradeandinformationtechnology
RichardFoltz,“ReligionsoftheSilkRoad”
fromReligionsoftheSilkRoad
MorrisRossabi,“TheEarlyMongols”
fromKhubilaiKhan:HisLifeandTimes
VasudhaNarayanan,“Hinduism”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
BarbaraD.MetcalfandThomasR.Metcalf,“Revolt,theModernState,
and
ColonizedSubjects,1848–1885”
fromAConciseHistoryofIndia
CarolUpadhyaandA.R.Vasavi,“OutpostsoftheGlobalInformation
Economy”
fromInanOutpostoftheGlobalEconomy:WorkandWorkersinIndia’
s
TechnologyIndustry
FurtherReading
6. EastAsia:GlobalEconomicEmpires
The role of East Asia in global economic history, and the rise of
new
economiesinChina,Japan,andSouthKoreabasedonglobaltrade
KennethPomeranz,“TheGreatDivergence”
fromTheGreatDivergence:China,Europe,andtheMakingoftheMod
ern
WorldEconomy
AndreGunderFrank,“The21stCenturyWillBeAsian”
fromTheNikkeiWeekly
StevenRadelat,JeffreySachs,andJong-
WhaLee,“EconomicGrowthinAsia”
fromEmergingAsia
Ho-FungHung,“IstheRiseofChinaSustainable?”
fromChinaandtheTransformationofGlobalCapitalism
FurtherReading
7. SoutheastAsiaandthePacific:TheEdgesofGlobalization
TheemergenceofSoutheastAsia fromcolonial control; the
riseofAustralia
andNewZealand,andthePacificIslandsontheedgesofglobalization
GeorgesCoedès,“TheIndianizedStatesofSoutheastAsia”
fromTheIndianizedStatesofSoutheastAsia
BenedictAnderson,“ImaginedCommunities”
fromImaginedCommunities
SuchengChan,“Vietnam,1945–2000:TheGlobalDimensionsof
Decolonization,War,Revolution,andRefugeeOutflows”
CelesteLipowMacLeod,“AsianConnections”
fromMultiethnicAustralia:ItsHistoryandFuture
JoelRobbins,“PacificIslandsReligiousCommunities”
fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions
FurtherReading
8. EuropeandRussia:NationalismandTransnationalism
TheroleofEuropeincreatingtheconceptofthenation,transnationalp
olitics
intheSovietUnion,andtheriseoftheEuropeanUnion
PeterStearns,“The1850sasTurningPoint:TheBirthofGlobalization
?”
fromGlobalizationinWorldHistory
EricHobsbawm,“TheNation”
fromTheNationasNovelty
SeylaBenhabib,“Citizens,Residents,andAliensinaChangingWorld
”
fromThePostnationalSelf
OddArneWestad,“SovietIdeologyandForeignInterventionsintheG
lobal
ColdWar”
fromTheGlobalColdWar
JürgenHabermas,“CitizenshipandNationalIdentity”
fromPraxisInternational
FurtherReading
9. TheAmericas:DevelopmentStrategies
The European conquest of the Americas, the rise of new
societies, and
varyingpatternsofeconomicdevelopmentwithinaglobalcontext
CharlesC.Mann,“DiscoveringtheNewWorldColumbusCreated”
from1493:DiscoveringtheNewWorldColumbusCreated
TzvetanTodorov,“TheReasonsfortheVictory”
fromTheConquestofAmerica
FrancisFukuyama,“ExplainingtheDevelopmentGapbetweenLatin
America
andtheUnitedStates”
fromFallingBehind
DenisLynnDalyHeyck,“SurvivingGlobalizationinThreeLatinAme
rican
Communities”
fromSurvivingGlobalizationinThreeLatinAmericanCommunities
FurtherReading
PARTIII:TRANSNATIONALGLOBALISSUES
10. GlobalForcesintheNewWorldOrder
Paradigms for thinking about the newworld order (or disorder)
in the post–
ColdWarglobalera
BenjaminBarber,“Jihadvs.McWorld”
fromJihadvs.McWorld
SamuelHuntington,“AMultipolar,MulticivilizationalWorld”
fromTheClashofCivilizationsandtheRemakingofWorldOrder
MichaelHardtandAntonioNegri,“Empire”
fromEmpire
SaskiaSassen,“GlobalCities”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
FurtherReading
11. TheErosionoftheNation-State
The fadingstrengthof thenation-stateand the
riseofalternativeconceptions
ofworldorder
KenichiOhmae,“TheCartographicIllusion”
fromTheEndoftheNation-State
SusanStrange,“TheWestfailureSystem”
fromReviewofInternationalStudies
ZygmuntBauman,“AftertheNation-State—What?”
fromGlobalization:TheHumanConsequences
WilliamI.Robinson,“TheTransnationalState”
fromATheoryofGlobalCapitalism
FurtherReading
12. ReligiousPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder
The religious challenge to the secular state in new conceptions
of political
order
MonicaDuffyToft,DanielPhilpott,andTimothySamuelShah,“TheT
wenty-first
CenturyasGod’sCentury”
fromGod’sCentury:ResurgentReligionandGlobalPolitics
MarkJuergensmeyer,“ReligionintheNewGlobalOrder”
fromEurope:ABeautifulIdea?
OlivierRoy,“AlQaedaandtheNewTerrorists”
fromGlobalizedIslam:TheSearchforaNewUmmah
RichardFalk,“ReligionandHumaneGlobalGovernance”
fromReligionandHumaneGlobalGovernance
FurtherReading
13. TransnationalEconomyandGlobalLabor
Economic globalization: its relation to national economies, the
growth of
transnationalcorporations,andthechangingroleoflabor
RichardAppelbaum,“Outsourcing”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
NelsonLichtenstein,“Wal-
Mart:Templatefor21stCenturyCapitalism?”
fromNewLaborForum
RobertB.Reich,“WhoIsUs?”
fromHarvardBusinessReview
JagdishBhagwati,“TwoCritiquesofGlobalization”
fromInDefenseofGlobalization
JosephStiglitz,“TowardaGlobalizationwithaMoreHumanFace”
fromGlobalizationandItsDiscontents
FurtherReading
14. GlobalFinanceandFinancialInequality
Changesintheconceptofmoneyandinternationalfinancialmarkets
BenjaminJ.Cohen,“MoneyinInternationalAffairs”
fromTheGeographyofMoney
StephenJ.Kobrin,“ElectronicCashandtheEndofNationalMarkets”
fromForeignPolicy
GlennFirebaugh,“TheRiseinIncomeDisparitiesovertheNineteenth
and
TwentiethCenturies”
fromTheNewGeographyofGlobalIncomeInequality
DaniRodrik,“GlobalizationforWhom?”
fromHarvardMagazine
FurtherReading
15. DevelopmentandtheRoleofWomenintheGlobalEconomy
Competing views of development and the role of women in the
global
economy
AlvinY.So,“SocialChangeandDevelopment”
fromSocialChangeandDevelopment
MayraBuvinić,“WomeninPoverty:ANewGlobalUnderclass”
fromForeignPolicy
Kum-
KumBhavnani,JohnForan,PriyaA.Kurian,andDebashishMunshi,“
From
theEdgesofDevelopment”
fromOntheEdgesofDevelopment:CulturalInterventions
FurtherReading
16. TheHiddenGlobalEconomyofSexandDrugs
Illegaltraffickinginpeopleanddrugs,andtheglobalattemptstocontr
olthem
DavidShirk,“TheDrugWarinMexico”
fromTheDrugWarinMexico:ConfrontingaCommonThreat
EduardoPorter,“NumbersTellofFailureinDrugWar”
fromtheNewYorkTimes
KevinBales,“TheNewSlavery”
fromDisposablePeople:NewSlaveryintheGlobalEconomy
BarbaraEhrenreichandArlieRussellHochschild,“Nannies,Maids,a
ndSex
WorkersintheGlobalEconomy”
fromGlobalWoman
FurtherReading
17. GlobalEnvironmentalandHealthCrises
The principal environmental and health problems that transcend
national
boundaries,andglobalattemptstoalleviatethem
CatherineGautier,“ClimateChange”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
RonFujita,“TurningtheTide”
fromHealtheOcean:
Solution
sforSavingOurSeas
HakanSeckinelgin,“HIV/AIDS”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
FurtherReading
18. GlobalCommunicationsandNewMedia
The role of new media—video, internet, and social
networking—in global
cultureandpolitics
YudhishthirRajIsar,“GlobalCultureandMedia”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
MichaelCurtin,“MediaCapitalinChineseFilmandTelevision”
fromPlayingtotheWorld’sBiggestAudience:TheGlobalizationof
ChineseFilmandTV
NatanaJ.DeLong-Bas,“TheNewSocialMediaandtheArabSpring”
fromOxfordIslamicStudiesOnline
PippaNorris,“TheWorldwideDigitalDivide”
fromHarvardUniversityKennedySchoolofGovernment
FurtherReading
19. TheGlobalMovementforHumanRights
Transnationalnetworkssupportinghumanrightsandlegalprotection
forall
MichelineIshay,“GlobalizationandItsImpact”
fromTheHistoryofHumanRights:FromAncientTimestothe
GlobalizationEra
AlisonBrysk,“TransnationalThreatsandOpportunities”
fromGlobalizationandHumanRights
EveDarian-Smith,“HumanRightsasanEthicsofProgress”
fromLawsandSocietiesinGlobalContexts:ContemporaryApproach
es
DavidHeld,“ChangingFormsofGlobalOrder”
fromCosmopolitanism
FurtherReading
20. TheFutureofGlobalCivilSociety
Theemergingsenseofglobalcitizenship,andnongovernmentalorgan
izations
and movements comprising a new “global civil society”: is this
the global
future?
MaryKaldor,“SocialMovements,NGOs,andNetworks”
fromGlobalCivilSociety
JanNederveenPieterse,“ShapingGlobalization:WhyGlobalFuture
s?”
fromGlobalFutures
GilesGunn,“BeingOther-
Wise:CosmopolitanismandItsDiscontents”
fromIdeastoDieFor:CosmopolitanisminaGlobalEra
KwameAnthonyAppiah,“MakingConversation”
fromCosmopolitanism:EthicsinaWorldofStrangers
FurtherReading
Acknowledgments
Index
PREFACE
AFriendlyIntroductiontoGlobalStudies
IhavealotoffriendsonFacebook,andtheyliveinallpartsoftheworld.I
f
Ipostsomethingaboutglobaltrade,IgetresponsesfromfriendsinChi
na
andBrazil. If Iputupa linkabout interfaithharmony,
Igetappreciative
“likes” from friends in Indonesia, India, and Northern Ireland.
When I
comment about domestic politics in theUnited States, I’m often
politely
ignored bymy friends in the other part of theworld,who findmy
local
obsessions as arcane as I view their postings on Eritrean
political
squabbles.ButwhenIposta linktoawebsite thatportraysnothingbut
picturesofbouncingcats,
Ireceiveappreciativenoticesfromaroundthe
world.Everyone,itseems,lovesbouncingcats.
Itisnotjustthebouncingcatsthatareglobal,however.It’severything.
The very process of interaction and communication beyond
national
bordersisafeatureofourglobalizedworld.Andit isnot
justFacebook.
Everytimeyougoonline,yougoglobal.
Whenyouturnoff thecomputerandgotothestore,chancesareyou
willencounternotjustyourlocalmilieu.AtriptoWalmartisajourneyi
nto
theglobalarena.Andwhenyoubringhomeallthatstuffmadenotonlyi
n
China but also in myriad countries around the world, you are
literally
bringingglobalizationhome.Trythissimplepartygamewithyourfrie
nds.
Guessthecountryoneveryone’sclothinglabels,thenchecktoseewher
e
the t-shirts and jackets and everything else you and your friends
are
wearing were made—Bangladesh, Trinidad, Cambodia, Yemen,
or
wherever.Seehowmanycountriesarerepresented.Andthenimaginet
he
journeythattheclothinghadtomake,fromcottonfieldstotextilefacto
ries
to seaports and cargo containers to distribution centers to retail
stores
and eventually to the closets of you and your friends. Perhaps
themost
globalareaofyourhouseisthatcloset.
In some cases, you do not have to go anywhere to find examples
of
globalizationbecause theycome to you.Globalizationpermeates
theair
thatyoubreathe—
includingtinyparticlesemittedfromvolcaniceruptions
half a world away. It affects your weather, as cycles of warming
and
coolingairreacttoglobalclimatechange.Andglobalizationispartoft
he
foodthatyoueat.ThisisobviousifyouhaveatasteforChinesetake-out
orpadThainoodlesorMexicanburritos.Butevenifyouareameat-and-
potatoeskindofpersonwholikesalittletomatosaladontheside,youar
e
enjoyingtheeffectsofglobalizationaboutfivehundredyearsago.Itw
as
then that potatoes and tomatoes, plants originally found only in
South
America,weretakenelsewherebyexplorerstobecomeapartofthefoo
d
habits in North America, Europe, and around the world. Their
dissemination was part of the extraordinary global diffusion of
plants,
germs, and cultures that followed European contacts with the
Western
Hemisphere,beginningwithColumbusin1492.
Soglobalizationiswovenintothefabricofourdailylives.Tostudyitis
tofocusonthecentralfeatureoflifeinthetwenty-
firstcentury.Buthow
doyougoabout studyingglobalization? Is it reallypossible to
study the
whole world? Doesn’t this mean studying almost everything?
And if so,
wheredoyoubegin?
Thesewerethequestionsinthemindsofagroupofscholarswhometin
Tokyoin2008.TheyhadmettheyearbeforeinSantaBarbara,Californ
ia,
toexplorethepossibilityofcreatinganewinternationalorganizationf
or
representatives of graduate programs in global studies—a whole
new
academic field that had been created in various universities
around the
world. The first college programs to be called “global studies”
were
formed in the mid-1990s, and within a decade there were
hundreds.
Students flocked to the new programs, intuitively knowing that
thiswas
something important. By the end of the first decade of the
twenty-first
century,graduateprogramshadbeenestablishedindozensofuniversi
ties
inAsia,Europe,andNorthAmerica,includingJapan,SouthKorea,Ch
ina,
India,Germany,Denmark,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,Australia,Ca
nada,
andtheUnitedStates.Thefieldofglobalstudieshadarrived.
But what was in this new field of study? When the scholars
came
togetherinTokyoin2008,theirmaingoalsweretoanswerthisquestion
andtodefinethemajorfeaturesofthefieldofglobalstudies.Theycame
expectingtohavesomethingofa fight.Afterall,eachof
theseprograms
haddevelopedindependentlyfromtheothers.Whenrepresentativeso
fall
these different programs came together, they did not know what
they
wouldfind,thinkingthatthefieldofglobalstudieswouldbedefinedva
stly
differentlyinTokyo,Leipzig,andMelbourne.Butasitturnedout,this
was
notthecase.Happily,therewasagreatdealofagreementattheoutset
regardingwhatthefieldofglobalstudiescontainedandhowtogoabout
studyingit.
Thefivecharacteristicsofglobalstudiesthatthescholarsagreedonat
that memorable founding meeting of the international Global
Studies
ConsortiuminTokyoarediscussedbelow.
Transnational.
ThescholarsinTokyoagreedthatthefieldofglobalstudies
focuses primarily on the analysis of events, activities, ideas,
trends,
processes, and phenomena that appear across national
boundaries and
cultural regions. These include activities such as economic
distribution
systems, and ideologies such as nationalism or religious beliefs.
The
scholars used the term cultural regions as well as nations, since
these
kinds of global flows of activity and ideas transcend the
limitations of
regions even when they are not the same as national boundaries.
Historically,muchof theactivity thatwecall
“transnational”mightmore
properlybecalled“transregional,”sinceitoccurredbeforetheconcep
tof
nationwasappliedtostates.
Interdisciplinary. Since transnational phenomena are complex,
these are
examined frommany disciplinary points of view. In general, the
field of
global studies does not keep strict disciplinary divisions among,
for
instance, sociological, historical, political, literary, or other
academic
fields.Rather, it takesaproblem-focusedapproach, lookingat
situations
such as global warming or the rise of new religio-political
ideologies as
specific cases. Tomake sense of these problem areas
requiresmultiple
perspectives,whichmaybeeconomic,political,social,cultural,
religious,
ideological, or environmental. Scholars involved in global
studies often
work in interdisciplinary teams or freely use terms and concepts
across
fieldsof study.Thesescholarscome fromall fieldsof thesocial
sciences
(especiallyfromsociology,economics,politicalscience,andanthrop
ology).
And many of the fields are also related to the humanities,
including
particularlythefieldsofhistory,literature,religiousstudies,andthea
rts.
Somescholarshaveexpertise
inareasofscience,suchasenvironmental
studiesandpublichealth.
Contemporary and Historical. We think of globalization as
being primarily
contemporary,somethinguniquetoourtime.Butitisalsohistorical.T
rue,
thepaceand intensity ofglobalizationhave increasedenormously
in the
post–ColdWar period of the twentieth century and evenmore so
in the
twenty-first century. But transnational activities have had
historical
antecedents. There are moments in history—such as in the
ancient
MediterraneanworldduringtheRomanandGreekEmpires—
whenthere
was a great deal of transnational activity and interchange on
economic,
cultural, and political levels. The global reach of European
colonialism
from the sixteenth century to the twentieth century provides
another
example of a global stratum of culture, education, technology,
and
economicactivityuponwhicharebasedmanyaspectsoftheglobalizat
ion
of the twenty-first century. Thus, to fully understand the
patterns of
globalizationtoday,itisnecessarytoprobetheirhistoricalprecedents
.
CriticalandMulticultural.
TheAmericanandEuropeanviewofglobalization
isnottheonlyone.Althoughmanyaspectsofcontemporaryglobalizat
ion
arebasedonEuropeancolonialprecedents,mostglobalstudiesschola
rs
donotacceptuncriticallythenotionthatpeopleintheWestshouldbeth
e
only ones to benefit from economic, political, and cultural
globalization.
Someglobalstudiesscholarsavoidusingthetermglobalizationtodes
cribe
theirsubjectofstudy,sincethetermsometimesisinterpretedtoimplyt
he
promotionofaWestern-
dominatedhegemonicprojectaimedatspreading
the acceptance of laissez-faire liberal economics throughout the
world.
Otherscholarsdescribetheirapproachas“criticalglobalizationstudi
es,”
implyingthattheirexaminationofglobalizationisnotintendedtopro
mote
or privilege Western economic models of globalization, but
rather to
understandit.
Tounderstandglobalizationwellrequiresviewingitfrommanycultur
al
perspectives—
fromAfricanandAsian,aswellasEuropeanandAmerican,
points of view.Scholars of global studies acknowledge that
globalization
andotherglobalissues,activities,andtrendscanbevieweddifferently
in
differentpartsoftheworldandfromdifferentsocio-
economiclevelswithin
eachlocality.Forthatreason,scholarsofglobalstudiessometimesspe
ak
of“manyglobalizations”or“multipleperspectivesonglobalstudies.
”This
positionacknowledgesthatthereisnodominantparadigmorperspecti
ve
inglobalstudiesthatisvaluedoverothers.
Globally Responsible. Scholarswhowork in global studies often
advance
anadditionalcriterionforwhattheydo:tohelpmaketheworldabetter
placeinwhichtolive.Byfocusingonglobalproblems,scholarsimplyt
hat
theywanttohelpsolvethoseproblems.Theyalsohopetofosterasense
of
global citizenship among their students. They like to think that
they are
helpingtocreate“globalliteracy”—
theabilitytofunctioninanincreasingly
globalized world—by understanding both the specific aspects of
diverse
cultures and traditions and the commonly experiencedglobal
trends and
patterns.Otherteachersassertthattheyareprovidingtrainingin“glob
al
leadership,” giving potential leaders of transnational
organizations and
movements the understanding and skills that will help them to
solve
problemsanddealwithissuesonaglobalscale.
Inthisbookwewillembraceallof theseaspectsofglobalstudies. In
Part2,wewillmovearoundtheworldfromregiontoregion—
fromAfrica,
theMiddleEast,SouthandCentralAsia,EastAsia,andSoutheastAsia
and
thePacificareatoEuropeandbicontinentalRussiaandtheAmericas.
We
explore readings that show how globalization is viewed from
the
perspective of each region, both historically and today.Wewill
consider
how global factors have affected each region and how each
region has
contributed to the larger currents of globalization during
different
historicalperiods.
InPart3,wewilllookatmajortransnationalissuestoday,includingthe
declineof thenation-state, the
riseofnewreligiouspolitics,andseveral
economic issues—such as finance, currency, and labor in the
global
economy;problemsofdevelopmentandtheroleofwomenintheworld
’s
workforce;andthehiddeneconomyinvolvingtradeinsexandillicitdr
ugs.
We will also explore global environmental problems, including
climate
change, transnationaldiseasesandotherglobalhealth
issues,andglobal
communicationsandnewmedia,andendwithasectionontheroleofciv
il
society in the global future. In choosing the readings to explore
these
issues, Ihave tried
toachieveabalanceamongdisciplinaryandcultural
perspectives.AndIhopeformyreaderstonotonlyunderstandthenatur
e
ofglobalproblems,butalsotoconsidersomeofthepossibilitiesinsolv
ing
them.
So when you enter the field of global studies, you are
encountering
someof
themostsignificantaspectsofourcontemporaryworld.Youare
engagingwiththetransnationalissuesthathaveshapedtheregionsoft
he
world from ancient times to the present and that are among the
most
pressingissuesofourcontemporaryera.LiketheInternet,globalstudi
es
drawsyouintothiswiderworld.Butglobalstudies,atitsbest,doesmor
e
than that. As these readings will show, the scholars engaged in
these
studieshavehoned theiranalytic skills tomakecritical
assessmentsand
reasonedjudgmentsaboutthecharacteroftheglobaltransformationst
hat
areoccurringaroundus.Thisdoesnotmake thesescholars infallible;
in
fact,theyfrequentlydisagreewithoneanother.Buttheirinsightsdom
ake
them friends—not only to be liked, but also to be challenged by,
to be
emulated,andtobeknown.
PARTI
INTRODUCTION
1
THINKINGGLOBALLY
Yourfriendsmayhavepeekedoveryourshouldersatthisbookandaske
d
whyyouareinterestedinglobalstudies.Andtheymighthaveadded,ju
st
whatisthat,anyway?Sowhatdoyoutellthem?Youcouldsaythatyouar
e
studying what goes on in the world that knits us all together—
but that
soundssortofsoftandsquishy.Oryoucouldtellthemthatyouarestudy
ing
theeconomicandtechnologicalnetworksthat
interactonaglobalplane.
Butthat’sonlypartofthestory.
The honest truth is that “global studies” can mean a lot of
different
things,boththehardandthesquishy.Itisusuallydefinedastheanalysis
of
events,activities,ideas,processes,andflowsthataretransnationalort
hat
canaffectallareasoftheworld.Theseglobalactivitiescanbestudieda
s
one part of the established disciplines of sociology, economics,
political
science,history,religiousstudies,andthelike.Orglobalstudiescanb
ea
separatecourseorpartofawholenewprogramordepartment.
Asanacademicfield,globalstudiesisfairlynew.Itblossomedlargely
aftertheturnofthetwenty-
firstcentury.Buttheintellectualrootsofthe
field lie in thepioneeringwork of themanydifferent
scholarswhohave
thought globally over many decades. These thinkers have
attempted to
understand how things are related and have explored the
connections
amongsocieties,polities,economies,andculturalsystemsthroughou
tthe
world.
Onecouldarguethatthefirstglobalstudiesscholarswereamongthe
foundersofthesocialsciences.Overahundredyearsagothepioneerin
g
GermansociologistMaxWeber (1864–
1920)wroteaseriesofworkson
the religionsof India,China,
Judaism,andProtestantChristianity.Weber
was interested in finding what was distinctive about each of
them, and
what was similar among all of them. Weber also attempted to
discern
universal elements in the development of all societies. He
showed, for
example, that a certain kind of rational and legal authority and
its
associated bureaucratization was a globalizing process. Though
his
intellectualinterestswereEuropocentric,hiscuriosityspannedthegl
obe.
Other early social scientists were also global thinkers. The
French
sociologistÉmileDurkheim (1858–1917) focused
firstonsomethingvery
local: case studies of tribal societies. What he found, however,
was
somethingheregardedasquiteglobal:theriseoforganicsolidaritybas
ed
on functional interdependence.TheGermanphilosopherand social
critic
KarlMarx(1818–
1883)likewiseassumedthathistheorieswereuniversal.
Marxshowedthatcapitalismwasaglobalizingforce,onethatwouldca
use
bothproductionsystemsandmarkets toexpandtoencompass
theentire
world.
IdeasinEurope,NorthAmerica,andtherestoftheWesternizedworld
were influencedby thinkers such as these.At the same time,
significant
thinking about intercultural commonalities and global awareness
was
being developed in intellectual centers in other parts of the
world. The
tolerantidealsoftheMuslimthinkerIbnKhaldunwereinfluentialinN
orth
Africa and the Middle East, and notions of universal
brotherhood
advocatedby the IndianphilosopherRabindranathTagorehadan
impact
on the intellectual circles of South Asia as well as on his
admirers in
Westernsocieties.
Allof theseearly thinkers,bothEuropeanandnon-European,
focused
on two ways of thinking globally: comparison and universality.
In some
cases,theylookedatcomparativeandnon-
Westernexamplestodetermine
differences and similarities. In other studies, they adopted
intellectual
positions that assumed a universal applicability. Hence early
European
theoristssuchasWeberandMarxthoughtthatthesocialforcesthatwer
e
transforming Europe in the nineteenth century would eventually
have
relevanceglobally.Currentscholarshipinallareasofthehumanitiesa
nd
social sciences—includingglobal studies—is indebted to
thesepioneering
scholars.
Butthespecificfocusonglobalizationitselfisfairlynew.Onlyrecentl
y
havescholarsbeguntoexaminetransnationalandglobalnetworks,flo
ws,
processes, ideologies, outlooks, and systems both historically
and in the
contemporaryworld.Infact,thefirstexplicitlyglobalworksofschola
rship
ofthissortonlyemergedafewdecadesago,attheendofthetwentieth
century.
Oneofthepioneersofcontemporaryglobalstudieswasthesociologist
ImmanuelWallerstein,whohelpedtoformulateworldsystemstheory
.He
incorporatedinsightsfrompoliticaleconomy,sociology,andhistoryi
norder
to understand global patterns of hegemonic state power. Other
sociologists, including Roland Robertson, Saskia Sassen, and
Manfred
Steger,explicitlyexaminedtheconceptoftheglobal,asopposedtoloc
al,
pointsofview.
Perspectives from other disciplines have also contributed to
global
studies.TheanthropologistArjunAppaduraibroadenedtheundersta
nding
ofglobalperspectivesfromlandscapetoavarietyof“scapes”—
culturally
shaped understandings of the world. The political scientist
David Held
helpedtoformulatetheoriesofpoliticsinrelationtoglobalization.Wi
lliam
H.McNeill,AkiraIriye,andBruceMazlish,amongotherhistorians,h
elped
to develop the subfields of world history and global history.
Economists
such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jagdish Bhagwati have analyzed
economic
interactions and changes in global terms. And in the field of
religious
studies,WilfredCantwellSmithandNinianSmartmovedbeyondthes
tudy
of particular religious traditions to the study of world theology
and
worldview analysis, respectively. Other scholars developed
analytic
approaches to describe new forms of global society: Mary
Kaldor
examined an emerging global civil societywhile KwameAnthony
Appiah
andUlrichBeckhavedescribedwhattheyregardasacosmopolitanstra
nd
inthenewglobalorder.
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, an imposing
body of
scholarlyliteratureandaflurryofnewjournals,bookseries,andschol
arly
conferences and associations emerged under the label of global
studies.
Thefieldhadarrived.Thisbookprovidesaroadmaptotheemergingfie
ld.
At the same time—to mix metaphors—it provides a sampling of
the
intellectualfeastthatthecurrentfieldprovides.
Globalstudiesusesthetermtransnationalalot.Whatthismeansisthat
global studies focus not just on the activities and patterns that
are
international—among nation-states—but also on those that exist
beyond
thebordersofnationsandregionsandstretchacrossthevariousareaso
f
the world. This is one way of thinking of global activity—not
that it is
universal,foundeverywhereontheplanet,butthatittranscendstheus
ual
boundaries thatseparatenation fromnation.Transnational
relationscan
beconfinedlargelywithinaparticularareaoftheworld(suchasecono
mic
cooperationwithinEurope, for instance, or among thenations
along the
PacificRim)andnotnecessarilyoccurthroughoutthewholeworld.
Atthesametime,therearephenomenathataretrulyglobalinthatthey
arefoundeverywhere,suchassatellitecommunicationsystemsthatca
nbe
accessed anywhere on the planet. These are by definition
transnational,
sincetheyoccurbeyondthelimitationsofnationalboundariesorcontr
ol.
Allglobalphenomenaencompasstransnationallinkages,butnotever
ything
thatistransnationalisglobal.Termscanbeconfusing,butit’susefulto
try
tobeasclearaspossibleaboutwhatwemean.
Inthefieldofglobalstudies,wetendnottousetheterminternational
veryoften,sinceitimpliesinteractionsbetweennation-
states.Incommon,
everydaylanguage,however,manytransnationalphenomenaaredesc
ribed
as international, as in the description of some environmental
issues as
internationalproblems,even though thephenomena themselves—
suchas
the pollution of the oceans and global warming—are
transnational. The
wordinggets trickywhenone considers thatmanyof theefforts
todeal
withtransnationalproblemslikeglobalclimatechangeareinternatio
nal—
suchasthecollaborationofnationsineffortstoagreeonlimitingcarbo
n
emissionsintotheatmosphere.
Global studies has to dowith globalization, of course, butwhat
does
thatmean?Often,globalization isdefinedas theprocessofbringing
the
worldtogetherinmoreintenseinteractionthroughallofthetransnatio
nal
activitythatwehavebeentalkingabout—
economic,demographic,social,
cultural, technological, and so on. Scholars such as Roland
Robertson
beganusing the termglobalization in the 1980s. And a book
byMartin
AlbrowandElizabethKingused the termglobalization in its title
in the
early 1990s. What they meant by the term was the process of
social
change that involved transnational interactions in all aspects of
social,
economic, and technological relationships. Thus, the word
globalization
describesaprocess.
The resultofglobalization isamoreunifiedand interactiveplanet—
a
globalized world. Some scholars have called this globalized
society
“globality”ortheeraof“theglobal.”Theattitudethatpeopleadoptint
his
moreintenselyinteractiveworldcanbesaidtobeoneof“globalism,”o
r
“global consciousness,” or one embracing the “global
imaginary.” These
areallwaysofthinkingaboutthenewstateofglobalawarenessinaworl
d
where transnational activity is the norm and everyone is
affected by
everyoneelseeverywhereontheplanet.
Thesebroadglobal trendsseemvast,andtheyare.Buttheyalsoare
feltonaverylocallevel.Therearepocketsofglobalism,forexample,in
neighborhoods that are multicultural and contain different
immigrant
communitiesthatinteractwithoneanother.Somecitiesaredescribeda
s
“global cities,” both because of their importance as global
nodes of
economicandculturalnetworksandbecausetheirownpopulationsare
a
tapestryofpeoplesfromdifferentpartsoftheworld.InLosAngeles,
for
instance, you can find areas that are entirely Filipino, and other
areas
whereonlyVietnameseisspoken.LosAngelescontainsoneofthelarg
est
Mexican populations in the world and also one of the largest
groups of
Iranians.Inmanyways,itisasocialmicrocosmoftheworld,andyetall
of
theseimmigrantneighborhoodsinteractinacommonurbanlocale.
RolandRobertsoncoinedthetermglocaltodescribetheseexamplesof
globalism in a local setting. In his description, glocalization is a
logical
extensionofglobalization.Itisthewaythatlocalcommunitiesareaffe
cted
by global trends. The appearance of big-box stores selling
Chinese-
manufacturedproductsinsleepyruraltownsofArkansasisoneexamp
leof
glocalization.AnInternetcaféthatIfoundonaremotesegmentoftheIn
ca
trailnearMachuPicchuinPeruisanother.
Atthesametimethatglobaltrendsinfluencelocalsettings,thereverse
canalsohappen:globalpatternscanbereinterpretedonalocallevel.T
he
spread of the McDonald’s fast-food franchise around the world
is an
example. When I visit the McDonald’s in Delhi, I find that none
of the
hamburgersare,infact,beefburgers;theyarechickenorveggieburger
s,
reflectingthepredominantlyvegetarianeatingcustomsofpeopleinIn
dia.
In Kyoto’s McDonald’s, you can get a Teriyaki McBurger; and
in the
McDonald’s restaurant in Milan, the sophisticated Italians may
choose
pastaratherthanfries.Sowhenglobalizationisglocalized,globalpatt
erns
canadapttolocalsituations.
In the readings in this section, these concepts of globalization
and
globalismareexploredbyseveralinfluentialscholarsinthefieldofglo
bal
studies.ThefirstessayisbyManfredSteger,anativeAustrianwhohel
ped
to create the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at
RMIT
University inMelbourne, Australia. Steger’s bookGlobalization:
A Very
ShortIntroductionisoneofthemostwidelyreadbooksonthetopic.Ina
n
excerptfromthisbook,Stegerdescribesthephenomenonofglobalizat
ion
in the post–Cold War era—that is, since roughly 1990. He
argues that
globalization has increased even more since the turn of the
century in
2000andtakesashisexampletheterroristactonSeptember11,2001.
Stegershowsthatthisincident,andthetechnology,media,andideolog
ical
elements related to it, exhibit the global interconnectedness of
our
contemporaryworld.
TheNewYorkTimescolumnistThomasFriedmanalsoagreesthatthe
era of globalization is relatively recent. In his calculation,
however, it
begins around 1989, at the end of the Cold War, when the Berlin
wall
tumbledandtheideologicalconfrontationbetweensocialistandcapit
alist
societieswasreplacedbyamorefluidandvariedconceptofworldorde
r.
In Friedman’s view, thewrestlingmatches between two huge
lumbering
superpowers has been replaced by the sprints to economic
success by
leaner independent economies. And though previous periods of
globalizationinhistoryhaveshrunktheworldfromasize“large”toasi
ze
“medium,”thecurrenterashrinkstheworldtoasize“small.”
PaulJames,asociologistwhohelpeddeveloptheglobalstudiesprogra
m
at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, tries to put this
global
phenomenon in order. He describes the various aspects of
globalization
and the different approaches to studying it. In James’s
comprehensive
surveyofthefield,heshowsthatthestudyofglobalizationcomesfrom
all
themajordisciplinesofthesocialsciencesandhumanities.
Globalizationisabasicfeatureofmodernlife.Butisitalwaysgood?In
anessayfromForeignPolicy,StevenWeber,aprofessorofpoliticalsci
ence
anddirectoroftheInstituteforInternationalStudiesattheUniversityo
f
California, Berkeley, argues that globalization often seems to
have gone
bad.ThisisespeciallytrueforthosewhoexpectedAmerica’smilitarya
nd
economic superiority in apost–ColdWarera togive it unbridled
control
overtherestoftheworld.ButWeberarguesthatglobalizationmaynotb
e
suchabad thingafterall.America’s security—and theworld’s—
depends
not on just one superpower exerting its authority, but also on an
interconnected set of relationships that reduces conflict through
cooperation.Perhaps,Webersuggests,thebestapproachtodealingwi
tha
globalizedworld isnot foronecountrytotrytocontrol it,butto let
the
political interconnectednessof theworldprovide foramutual,
collective
security.
GLOBALIZATION:ACONTESTEDCONCEPT
ManfredSteger
Intheautumnof2001,Iwasteachinganundergraduateclassonmodern
politicalandsocialtheory.Stilltraumatizedbytherecentterroristatta
cks
ontheWorldTradeCenterandthePentagon,mostofmystudentscould
n’t
quite grasp the connection between the violent forces of
religious
fundamentalism and the more secular picture of a
technologically
sophisticated,rapidlyglobalizingworldthatIhadsoughttoconveyin
class
lecturesanddiscussions.“Iunderstandthat ‘globalization’
isacontested
conceptthatreferstosometimescontradictorysocialprocesses,”abri
ght
historymajoratthebackoftheroomquipped,“buthowcanyousaythat
the TV image of a religious fanatic who denounces modernity
and
secularism from a mountain cave in Afghanistan perfectly
captures the
complexdynamicsofglobalization?Don’ttheseterribleactsofterrori
sm
suggest the opposite, namely, the growth of parochial forces
that
undermineglobalization?”Obviously, the studentwas referring
toSaudi-
born Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, whose videotaped
statement
condemning the activities of “international infidels” had been
broadcast
worldwideon7October.
Struck by the sense of intellectual urgency that fuelled my
student’s
question, I realized that the story of globalization would remain
elusive
without real-life examples capableof breathing shape, colour,
and sound
intoavagueconceptthathadbecomethebuzzwordofourtime.Hence,
before delving into necessary matters of definition and
analytical
clarification,weoughttoapproachoursubject in
lessabstractfashion.I
suggest we begin our journey with a careful examination of the
aforementioned videotape. It will soon become fairly obvious
why a
deconstructionofthoseimagesprovidesimportantcluestothenaturea
nd
dynamicsofthephenomenonwehavecometocall“globalization.”
DECONSTRUCTINGOSAMABINLADEN
The infamous videotape bears no date, but experts estimate that
the
recording wasmade less than two weeks before it was broadcast.
The
timing of its release appears to have been carefully planned so
as to
achievethemaximumeffectonthedaytheUnitedStatescommencedit
s
bombing campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda (“The Base”)
forces in
Afghanistan.AlthoughOsamabinLadenandhistoplieutenantsweret
hen
hidinginaremoteregionofthecountry,theyobviouslypossessedtheh
i-
tech equipment needed to record the statement. Moreover, Al
Qaeda
members clearly enjoyed immediate access to sophisticated
information
andtelecommunicationnetworksthatkepttheminformed—inreal-
time—of
relevant
internationaldevelopments.BinLadenmayhavedenounced the
forcesofmodernitywithgreatconviction,butthesmoothoperationof
his
entire organization was entirely dependent on advanced forms
of
technologydevelopedinthelasttwodecadesofthe20thcentury.
To further illustrate thisapparentcontradiction,consider
thecomplex
chainofglobal
interdependenciesthatmusthaveexistedinorderforbin
Laden’smessagetobeheardandseenbybillionsofTVviewersaroundt
he
world. After making its way from the secluded mountains of
eastern
AfghanistantothecapitalcityofKabul,thevideotapewasdroppedoff
by
anunknowncourieroutside the localofficeofAl-Jazeera, aQatar-
based
televisioncompany.Thisnetworkhadbeenlaunchedonlyfiveyearsea
rlier
asastate-financed,Arabic-
languagenewsandcurrentaffairschannelthat
offered limited programming. Before the founding of Al-
Jazeera, cutting-
edgeTVjournalism—suchasfree-
rangingpublicaffairsinterviewsandtalk
showswithcall-inaudiences—
simplydidnotexistintheArabworld.Within
only three years, however, Al-Jazeera was offering its Middle
Eastern
audienceadizzyingarrayofprogrammes,transmittedaroundthecloc
kby
powerfulsatellitesputintoorbitbyEuropeanrocketsandAmericansp
ace
shuttles.
Indeed,thenetwork’smarketshareincreasedevenfurtherasaresult
ofthedramaticreductioninthepriceandsizeofsatellitedishes.Sudde
nly,
suchtechnologiesbecameaffordable,evenforlow-
incomeconsumers.By
theturnofthecentury,Al-
Jazeerabroadcastscouldbewatchedaroundthe
clock on all five continents. In 2001, the company further
intensified its
global reach when its chief executives signed a lucrative
cooperation
agreement with CNN, the leading news network owned by the
giant
multinationalcorporationAOL-Time-
Warner.Afewmonthslater,whenthe
world’sattentionshiftedtothewarinAfghanistan,Al-
Jazeerahadalready
positioned itself as a truly global player, powerful enough to
rent
equipment to such prominent news providers as Reuters and
ABC, sell
satellite time to theAssociatedPressandBBC,anddesignan
innovative
Arabic-languagebusinessnewschannel togetherwith
itsotherAmerican
networkpartner,CNBC.
Unhampered by national borders and geographical obstacles,
cooperation among these sprawling news networks had become
so
efficientthatCNNacquiredandbroadcastacopyoftheOsamabinLade
n
tapeonlyafewhoursafterithadbeendeliveredtotheAl-
Jazeeraofficein
Kabul. Caught off guard by the incredible speed of today’s
information
exchange,theBushadministrationaskedtheQatarigovernmentto“re
inin
Al-Jazeera,” claiming that the swift airing of the bin Laden
tapewithout
priorconsultationwascontributingtotheriseofanti-
Americansentiments
in theArabworld and thus threatened to undermine theUSwar
effort.
However, not only was the perceived “damage” already done,
but
segments of the tape—including the full text of bin Laden’s
statement—
couldbeviewedonlinebyanyonewithaccesstoacomputerandamode
m.
TheAl-Jazeerawebsitequicklyattractedan
internationalaudienceas its
dailyhitcountskyrocketedtooversevenmillion.
Therecanbenodoubtthatitwastheexistenceofthischainofglobal
interdependencies and interconnections that made possible the
instant
broadcastofbinLaden’sspeech toaglobalaudience.At thesame
time,
however, it must be emphasized that even those voices that
oppose
modernity cannot extricate themselves from the very process of
globalizationtheysodecry.Inordertospreadtheirmessageandrecruit
new sympathizers, antimodernizers must utilize the tools
provided by
globalization.ThisobvioustruthwasvisibleeveninbinLaden’sperso
nal
appearance.The tapeshows
thathewaswearingcontemporarymilitary
fatiguesovertraditionalArabgarments.Inotherwords,hisdressrefle
cts
the contemporary processes of fragmentation and cross-
fertilization that
globalizationscholarscall“hybridization”—
themixingofdifferentcultural
formsandstylesfacilitatedbyglobaleconomicandculturalexchange
s.In
fact, the pale colours of bin Laden’s mottled combat dress
betrayed its
Russianorigins,suggestingthatheworethejacketasasymbolicremin
der
ofthefierceguerrillawarwagedbyhimandotherIslamicmilitantsagai
nst
the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan during the
1980s.His ever-
present AK-47 Kalashnikov, too, was probablymade in Russia,
although
dozensofgunfactoriesaroundtheworldhavebeenbuildingthispopul
ar
assault rifle for over 40 years. By themid-1990s,more than
70million
Kalashnikovs had beenmanufactured in Russia and abroad. At
least 50
national armies include such rifles in their
arsenal,makingKalashnikovs
trulyweaponsofglobalchoice.Thus,binLaden’sAK-
47couldhavecome
fromanywhereintheworld.However,giventheastonishingglobaliza
tion
oforganizedcrimeduringthelasttwodecades,itisquiteconceivablet
hat
binLaden’sriflewaspartofanillegalarmsdealhatchedandexecutedb
y
such powerful international criminal organizations as Al Qaeda
and the
RussianMafia. It isalsopossible that the riflearrived
inAfghanistanby
meansofanundergroundarms tradesimilar to theone that surfaced
in
May1996,whenpolice inSanFrancisco seized2,000 illegally
imported
AK-47smanufacturedinChina.
AcloselookatbinLaden’srightwristrevealsyetanothercluetothe
powerfuldynamicsofglobalization.Ashedirectshiswordsofcontem
ptfor
theUnitedStatesanditsalliesathishand-
heldmicrophone,hisretreating
sleeve exposes a stylish sports watch. Journalists who noticed
this
expensiveaccessoryhavespeculatedabouttheoriginsofthetimepiec
ein
question. The emerging consensus points to a Timex product.
However,
given thatTimexwatchesareasAmericanasapplepie, it seems
rather
ironic that the Al Qaeda leader should have chosen this
particular
chronometer.Afterall,TimexCorporation,originallytheWaterbury
Clock
Company, was founded in the 1850s in Connecticut’s Naugatuck
Valley,
known throughout the 19th century as the “Switzerland of
America.”
Today,thecompanyhasgonemultinational,maintainingcloserelatio
nsto
affiliated businesses and sales offices in 65 countries. The
corporation
employs 7,500 employees, located on four continents.
Thousands of
workers—mostlyfromlow-wagecountries intheglobalSouth—
constitute
thedrivingforcebehindTimex’sglobalproductionprocess.
Ourbriefdeconstructionofsomeofthecentralimagesonthevideotape
makesiteasiertounderstandwhytheseeminglyanachronisticimages
of
anantimodernterroristinfrontofanAfghancavedo,infact,captureso
me
essential dynamics of globalization. Indeed, the tensions
between the
forces of particularism and those of universalism have reached
unprecedented levels only because interdependencies that
connect the
local to theglobalhavebeengrowing faster thanatany time
inhistory.
Theriseof internationalterroristorganizations
likeAlQaedarepresents
but one of themanymanifestations of globalization. Just as bin
Laden’s
romantic ideology of a “pure Islam” is itself the result of the
modern
imagination,sohasourglobalagewithitsobsessionfortechnologyan
dits
mass-market commodities indelibly shaped the violent backlash
against
globalization.
OurdeconstructionofOsamabinLadenhasprovideduswithareal-life
exampleoftheintricate—andsometimescontradictory—
socialdynamicsof
globalization. We are now in a better position to tackle the
rather
demanding task of assembling a working definition of
globalization that
bringssomeanalyticalprecisiontoacontestedconceptthathasproven
to
benotoriouslyhardtopindown.
THEWORLDISTENYEARSOLD
ThomasFriedman
On the morning of December 8, 1997, the government of
Thailand
announcedthat itwasclosing56of thecountry’s58 top
financehouses.
Almostovernight,theseprivatebankshadbeenbankruptedbythecras
hof
theThaicurrency, thebaht.The financehouseshadborrowedheavily
in
U.S.dollarsandlentthosedollarsouttoThaibusinessesforthebuildin
gof
hotels,officeblocks,luxuryapartmentsandfactories.Thefinanceho
uses
allthoughttheyweresafebecausetheThaigovernmentwascommitted
to
keeping the Thai baht at a fixed rate against the dollar. But
when the
government failed to do so, in the wake of massive global
speculation
against the baht—triggered by a dawning awareness that the
Thai
economy was not as strong as previously believed—the Thai
currency
plummetedby30percent.Thismeantthatbusinessesthathadborrowe
d
dollarshadtocomeupwith30percentmoreThaibahttopaybackeach
$1ofloans.Manybusinessescouldn’tpaythefinancehousesback,ma
ny
financehousescouldn’trepaytheirforeignlendersandthewholesyste
m
wentintogridlock,putting20,000white-
collaremployeesoutofwork.The
next day, I happened to be driving to an appointment in
Bangkok down
Asoke Street, Thailand’s equivalent of Wall Street, where most
of the
bankrupt financehouseswere located.Aswe
slowlypassedeachoneof
these fallen firms, my cabdriver pointed them out, pronouncing
at each
one:“Dead!...dead!...dead!...dead!...dead!”
I did not know it at the time—no one did—but these Thai
investment
houseswerethefirstdominoesinwhatwouldprovetobethefirstglobal
financialcrisisof theneweraofglobalization—theera that
followedthe
Cold War. The Thai crisis triggered a general flight of capital
out of
virtuallyalltheSoutheastAsianemergingmarkets,drivingdownthev
alue
of currencies in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. Both
global and
local investors started scrutinizing these economies more
closely, found
them wanting, and either moved their cash out to safer havens
or
demanded higher interest rates to compensate for the higher
risk. It
wasn’t longbeforeoneof themostpopular sweatshirts
aroundBangkok
wasemblazonedwiththewords“FormerRich.”
Withina fewmonths, theSoutheastAsianrecessionbegantohavean
effectoncommoditypricesaroundtheworld.Asiahadbeenanimporta
nt
engine for worldwide economic growth—an engine that
consumed huge
amountsofrawmaterials.Whenthatenginestartedtosputter,theprice
s
ofgold,copper,aluminumand,mostimportant,crudeoilallstartedtof
all.
This fall inworldwidecommodityprices turnedout tobe
themechanism
for transmitting the Southeast Asian crisis toRussia. Russia at
the time
wasmindingitsownbusiness,trying,withthehelpoftheIMF,toclimb
out
of its own self-made economic morass onto a stable growth
track. The
problemwithRussia, though,was that toomanyof its factories
couldn’t
makeanythingofvalue.Infact,muchofwhattheymadewasconsidere
d
“negativevalueadded.”Thatis,atractormadebyaRussianfactorywas
sobad itwas actuallyworthmore as scrapmetal, or just raw
ironore,
than it was as a finished, Russian-made tractor. On top of it all,
those
Russian factories that were making products that could be sold
abroad
were paying few, if any, taxes to the government, so the
Kremlin was
chronicallyshortofcash.
Without much of an economy to rely on for revenues, the
Russian
government had become heavily dependent on taxes from crude
oil and
othercommodityexportstofunditsoperatingbudget.Ithadalsobeco
me
dependent on foreign borrowers, whosemoney Russia lured by
offering
ridiculousratesofinterestonvariousRussiangovernment-
issuedbonds.
AsRussia’seconomycontinuedtoslideinearly1998,theRussianshad
toraisetheinterestrateontheirrublebondsfrom20to50to70percent
tokeepattractingtheforeigners.Thehedgefundsandforeignbankske
pt
buying them, figuring that even if the Russian government
couldn’t pay
themback,theIMFwouldstepin,bailoutRussiaandtheforeignerswo
uld
get their money back. Some hedge funds and foreign banks not
only
continued to put their own money into Russia, but they went out
and
borrowedevenmoremoney,at5percent,andthenboughtRussianT-
bills
withitthatpaid20or30percent.AsGrandmawouldsay,“Suchadeal!”
ButasGrandmawouldalsosay,“Ifitsoundstoogoodtobetrue,itusuall
y
is!”
Anditwas.TheAsian-triggeredslumpinoilpricesmadeitharderand
harderfortheRussiangovernmenttopaytheinterestandprincipalonit
s
T-
bills.AndwiththeIMFunderpressuretomakeloanstorescueThailand
,
KoreaandIndonesia,
itresistedanyproposalsforputtingmorecashinto
Russia—unless the Russians first fulfilled their promises to
reform their
economy,startingwithgetting theirbiggestbusinessesandbanks
topay
some taxes. On August 17 the Russian economic house of cards
came
tumbling down, dealing the markets a double whammy: Russia
both
devalued and unilaterally defaulted on its government bonds,
without
givinganywarningto
itscreditorsorarranginganyworkoutagreement.
Thehedgefunds,banksandinvestmentbanksthatwereinvestedinRus
sia
began piling up massive losses, and those that had
borrowedmoney to
magnifytheirbetsintheKremlincasinowerethreatenedwithbankrup
tcy.
Onthefaceofit,thecollapseoftheRussianeconomyshouldnothave
hadmuchimpactontheglobalsystem.Russia’seconomywassmallert
han
thatof theNetherlands.But thesystemwasnowmoreglobal
thanever,
and just as crude oil prices were the transmission mechanism
from
SoutheastAsiatoRussia,thehedgefunds—
thehugeunregulatedpoolsof
private capital that scour the globe for the best investments—
were the
transmissionmechanismfromRussiatoalltheotheremergingmarker
sin
theworld, particularly Brazil. The hedge funds and other trading
firms,
havingrackeduphugelossesinRussia,someofwhichweremagnifiedf
ifty
timesbyusingborrowedmoney, suddenlyhad to raise cash
topayback
theirbankers.Theyhad to sellanything thatwas liquid.So
theystarted
sellingassetsinfinanciallysoundcountriestocompensatefortheirlos
ses
inbadones.Brazil, for instance,whichhadbeendoinga lotof
theright
thingsintheeyesoftheglobalmarketsandtheIMF,suddenlysawallits
stocksandbondsbeingsoldbypanicky investors.Brazilhad to raise
its
interest rates as high as 40 percent to try to hold capital inside
the
country.Variationsonthisscenariowereplayedoutthroughoutthewo
rld’s
emerging markets, as investors fled for safety. They cashed in
their
Brazilian,Korean,Egyptian,IsraeliandMexicanbondsandstocks,an
dput
themoneyeitherundertheirmattressesorintothesafestU.S.bondsthe
y
could find. So the declines in Brazil and the other emerging
markets
became the transmissionmechanism that triggered a herdlike
stampede
intoU.S.Treasurybonds.This,inturn,sharplydroveupthevalueofU.
S.
T-
bonds,drovedowntheinterestthattheU.S.governmenthadtoofferon
themtoattractinvestorsandincreasedthespreadbetweenU.S.T-
bonds
andothercorporateandemergingmarketbonds.
The steep drop in the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds was then the
transmissionmechanismwhichcrippledmorehedgefundsandinvest
ment
banks. Take for instance Long-Term Capital Management, based
in
Greenwich, Connecticut. LTCM was the Mother of All Hedge
Funds.
Because somany hedge fundswere attracted to themarketplace in
the
late 1980s, the field became fiercely competitive. Everyone
pounced on
the same opportunities. In order to make money in such a
fiercely
competitiveworld,thehedgefundshadtoseekevermoreexoticbetswi
th
ever
largerpoolsofcash.Toguidetheminplacingtherightbets,LTCM
drewontheworkoftwoNobelPrize–
winningbusinesseconomists,whose
research argued that the basic volatility of stocks and bonds
could be
estimatedfromhowtheyreactedinthepast.Usingcomputermodels,a
nd
borrowing heavily from different banks, LTCM put $120 billion
at risk
bettingonthedirectionthatcertainkeybondswouldtakeinthesummer
of1998.ItimplicitlybetthatthevalueofU.S.T-
bondswouldgodown,and
that the value of junk bonds and emerging market bonds would
go up.
LTCM’s computer model, however, never anticipated something
like the
globalcontagionthatwouldbesetoffinAugustbyRussia’scollapse,a
nd,
as a result, its bets turned out to be exactly wrong. When the
whole
investmentworldpanickedatonceanddecidedtorushintoU.S.T-
bonds,
theirvaluesoaredinsteadoffell,andthevalueofjunkbondsandemergi
ng
marketbondscollapsedinsteadofsoared.LTCMwaslikeawishbonet
hat
gotpulledapartfrombothends.Ithadtobebailedoutbyitsbankersto
preventitfromengaginginafiresaleofallitsstocksandbondsthatcoul
d
havetriggeredaworldwidemarketmeltdown.
Nowwegettomystreet.InearlyAugust1998,Ihappenedtoinvestin
myfriend’snewInternetbank.Thesharesopenedat$14.50ashareand
soared to$27. I felt likeagenius.But
thenRussiadefaultedandsetall
thesedominoesinmotion,andmyfriend’sstockwentto$8.Why?Beca
use
hisbankheldalotofhomemortgages,andwiththefallofinterestratesi
n
America,triggeredbytherushtobuyT-
bills,themarketsfearedthatalot
of peoplewould suddenlypayoff theirhomemortgages early. If a
lot of
people paid off their homemortgages early, my friend’s
bankmight not
have the income stream that it was counting on to pay
depositors. The
markets were actually wrong about my friend’s bank, and its
stock
bounced back nicely. Indeed, by early 1999 I was feeling like a
genius
again, as the Amazon.com Internet craze set in and drove my
friend’s
Internet bank stock sky high, as well as other technology shares
we
owned.But,onceagain,itwasn’tlongbeforetherestoftheworldcrash
ed
theparty.Onlythistime,insteadofRussiabreakingdownthefrontdoo
r,it
wasBrazil’sturntoupsetU.S.marketsandevendampen(temporarily)
the
Internetstockboom.
AsIwatchedallthisplayout,allIcouldthinkofwasthatittooknine
monthsfortheeventsonAsokeStreettoaffectmystreet,andittookone
week for events on the Brazilian Amazon (Amazon.country) to
affect
Amazon.com.USATodayaptlysummeduptheglobalmarketplaceat
the
end of 1998: “The trouble spread to one continent after another
like a
virus,”thepapernoted.“U.S.marketsreactedinstantaneously....Peo
ple
inbarbershopsactuallytalkedabouttheThaibaht.”
If nothing else, the cycle from Asoke Street to my street and
from
Amazon.country to Amazon.com served to educateme andmany
others
aboutthestateoftheworldtoday.Theslow,stable,chopped-
upColdWar
systemthathaddominatedinternationalaffairssince1945hadbeenfir
mly
replaced by a new, very greased, interconnected system called
globalization.We are all one river. If we didn’t fully understand
that in
1989,when theBerlinWallcamedown,wesureunderstood itadecade
later.
. . . From themid-1800s to the late 1920s theworld experienced
a
similar era of globalization. If you compared the volumes of
trade and
capitalflowsacrossborders,relativetoGNPs,andtheflowoflaboracr
oss
borders, relative to populations, the period of globalization
preceding
WorldWarIwasquitesimilartotheonewearelivingthroughtoday.Gr
eat
Britain,whichwasthenthedominantglobalpower,wasahugeinvesto
rin
emerging markets, and fat cats in England, Europe and America
were
oftenbuffetedbyfinancialcrises,triggeredbysomethingthathappen
edin
Argentine railroad bonds, Latvian government bonds or German
governmentbonds.Therewerenocurrencycontrols,sonosoonerwast
he
transatlanticcableconnectedin1866thanbankingandfinancialcrise
sin
NewYorkwerequicklybeingtransmittedtoLondonorParis.Iwasona
panel once with John Monks, the head of the British Trades
Union
Congress,theAFL-
CIOofBritain,whoremarkedthattheagendaforthe
TUC’s firstCongress inManchester, England, in 1868, listed
among the
itemsthatneededtobediscussed:“Theneedtodealwithcompetitionfr
om
theAsiancolonies”and“Theneed tomatch theeducationaland
training
standardsof theUnitedStatesandGermany.” In
thosedays,peoplealso
migratedmorethanweremember,and,otherthaninwartime,countrie
s
didnotrequirepassportsfortravelbefore1914.Allthoseimmigrants
who
floodedAmerica’s shores camewithout visas.When you put all of
these
factors together, along with the inventions of the steamship,
telegraph,
railroad and eventually telephone, it is safe to say that this first
era of
globalizationbeforeWorldWarIshranktheworldfromasize“large”t
oa
size“medium.”
Thisfirsteraofglobalizationandglobalfinancecapitalismwasbroke
n
apart by the successive hammer blows of World War I, the
Russian
Revolution and the Great Depression, which combined to
fracture the
world both physically and ideologically. The formally divided
world that
emergedafterWorldWarIIwasthenfrozeninplacebytheColdWar.Th
e
ColdWarwasalsoaninternationalsystem.Itlastedroughlyfrom1945
to
1989,when,with the fall of theBerlinWall, itwas replacedby
another
system:theneweraofglobalizationwearenowin.Callit“Globalizatio
n
RoundII.”Itturnsoutthattheroughlyseventy-five-
yearperiodfromthe
startofWorldWarItotheendoftheColdWarwasjusta longtime-out
betweenoneeraofglobalizationandanother.
Whiletherearealotofsimilaritiesinkindbetweenthepreviouseraof
globalizationandtheonewearenowin,whatisnewtodayisthedegree
and intensity with which the world is being tied together into a
single
globalizedmarketplace.What isalsonew is
thesheernumberofpeople
and countries able topartakeof thisprocess andbeaffectedby it.
The
pre-
1914eraofglobalizationmayhavebeenintense,butmanydeveloping
countriesinthaterawereleftoutofit.Thepre-1914eramayhavebeen
largeinscalerelativeto itstime,but itwasminuscule
inabsoluteterms
comparedtotoday.Dailyforeignexchangetradingin1900wasmeasur
ed
inthemillionsofdollars.In1992,itwas$820billionaday,accordingto
theNewYorkFederalReserve,andbyApril1998itwasupto$1.5trillio
n
aday,andstillrising.Inthelastdecadealonetotalcross-
borderlendingby
banksaround theworldhasdoubled.Around1900,privatecapital
flows
from developed countries to developing ones could be measured
in the
hundredsofmillionsofdollarsandrelativelyfewcountrieswereinvol
ved.
According to the IMF, in 1997 alone, private capital flows from
the
developedworld to all emergingmarkets totaled $215 billion.
This new
era of globalization, compared to the one before World War I, is
turbocharged.
Buttoday’seraofglobalizationisnotonlydifferentindegree;insome
very importantways it is also different in kind. AsThe
Economist once
noted, the previous era of globalization was built around falling
transportationcosts.Thankstotheinventionoftherailroad,thesteams
hip
and the automobile, people could get to a lot more places faster
and
cheaperandtheycouldtradewitha lotmoreplaces fasterandcheaper.
Today’s era of globalization is built around falling
telecommunications
costs—
thankstomicrochips,satellites,fiberopticsandtheInternet.These
newtechnologiesareabletoweavetheworldtogethereventighter.The
se
technologiesmeanthatdevelopingcountriesdon’tjusthavetotradeth
eir
rawmaterialstotheWestandgetfinishedproductsinreturn;theymean
thatdevelopingcountries canbecomebig-
timeproducersaswell.These
technologies also allow companies to locate different parts of
their
production,researchandmarketingindifferentcountries,butstilltiet
hem
togetherthroughcomputersandteleconferencingasthoughtheywere
in
one place. Also, thanks to the combination of computers and
cheap
telecommunications, people can now offer and trade services
globally—
from medical advice to software writing to data processing—
that could
neverreallybetradedbefore.Andwhynot?AccordingtoTheEconomi
st,
athree-
minutecall(in1996dollars)betweenNewYorkandLondoncost
$300in1930.TodayitisalmostfreethroughtheInternet.
Butwhatalsomakesthiseraofglobalizationuniqueisnotjustthefact
thatthesetechnologiesaremakingitpossiblefortraditionalnation-
states
andcorporationstoreachfarther,faster,cheaperanddeeperaroundth
e
worldthaneverbefore.Itisthefactthatitisallowingindividualstodos
o.
Iwasremindedofthispointonedayinthesummerof1998whenmythen
seventy-nine-year-old mother, Margaret Friedman, who lives in
Minneapolis, called me sounding very upset. “What’s wrong,
Mom?” I
asked. “Well,” she said, “I’ve been playing bridge on the
Internet with
threeFrenchmenandtheykeepspeakingFrenchtoeachotherandIcan’
t
understandthem.”WhenIchuckledatthethoughtofmycard-
sharkmom
playingbridgewiththreeFrenchmenontheNet,shetookalittleumbra
ge.
“Don’tlaugh,”shesaid,“IwasplayingbridgewithsomeoneinSiberiat
he
otherday.”
Toall thosewhosaythatthiseraofglobalization isnodifferent from
thepreviousone,Iwouldsimplyask:Wasyourgreat-
grandmotherplaying
bridgewithFrenchmenontheInternetin1900?Idon’tthinkso.Therea
re
some things about this era of globalization that we’ve seen
before, and
somethingsthatwe’veneverseenbeforeandsomethingsthataresone
w
wedon’tevenunderstandthemyet.Forallthesereasons,Iwouldsumu
p
thedifferencesbetweenthetwoerasofglobalizationthisway:Ifthefir
st
era of globalization shrank the world from a size “large” to a
size
“medium,” this era of globalization is shrinking the world from
a size
“medium”toasize“small.”
. . . This newera of globalizationbecame thedominant
international
systemattheendofthetwentiethcentury—
replacingtheColdWarsystem
—and . . . it now shapes virtually everyone’s domestic politics
and
internationalrelations.Thebodyofliteraturethathasbeenattempting
to
definethepost–ColdWarworld[includes]
fourbooks:PaulM.Kennedy’s
TheRise and Fall of theGreat Powers: Economic Change
andMilitary
Conflictfrom1500to2000,FrancisFukuyama’sTheEndofHistoryan
d
the Last Man, the various essays and books of Robert D. Kaplan
and
Samuel P. Huntington’sThe Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of
WorldOrder.
While all of these works contained important truths, I think
none of
themreallycapturedthepost–
ColdWarworldinanyholisticway.Kaplan’s
reportingwasvividandhonest,buthe took thegrimmestcornersof
the
globeandovergeneralizedfromthemtothefateoftherestoftheworld.
Huntington saw cultural conflicts around theworld andwildly
expanded
that into an enduring, sharply defined clash of civilizations,
even
proclaimingthatthenextworldwar,ifthereisone,“willbeawarbetwe
en
civilizations.”IbelievebothKaplanandHuntingtonvastlyunderesti
mated
how the power of states, the lure of global markets, the
diffusion of
technology, the rise of networks and the spread of global norms
could
trumptheirblack-and-white(mostlyblack)projections.
BothKennedyandHuntingtontriedtodivinethefuturetoomuchfrom
thepastandthepastalone.Kennedytraced(quitebrilliantly)thedeclin
e
oftheSpanish,FrenchandBritishempires,butheconcludedbysugges
ting
that the American empire would be the next to fall because of
its own
imperialoverreaching.HisimplicitmessagewasthattheendoftheCol
d
WarnotonlymeanttheendoftheSovietUnionbutwouldalsoheraldthe
declineoftheUnitedStates.IbelieveKennedydidnotappreciateenou
gh
that therelativedeclineof theUnitedStates in
the1980s,whenhewas
writing,waspartofAmerica’spreparingitselfforandadjustingtothen
ew
globalizationsystem—
aprocessthatmuchoftherestoftheworldisgoing
throughonlynow.Kennedydidnotanticipate thatunder
thepressureof
globalization America would slash its defense budget, shrink its
government,andshiftmoreandmorepowerstothefreemarketinways
thatwouldprolongitsstatusasaGreatPower,notdiminishit.
Huntington’sviewwasthat,withtheColdWarover,wewon’thavethe
Sovietstokickaroundanymore,sowewillnaturallygobacktokickingt
he
Hindus and Muslims around and them kicking us around. He
implicitly
ruled out the rise of some new international system that could
shape
eventsdifferently.ForHuntington,onlytribalismcouldfollowtheCo
ldWar,
notanythingnew.
Fukuyama’s pathbreaking book contained the most accurate
insight
aboutwhatwasnew—thetriumphofliberalismandfree-
marketcapitalism
as themosteffectiveway toorganizeasociety—buthis title (more
than
thebookitself)impliedafinalitytothistriumphthatdoesnotjibewitht
he
worldasIfindit.
Inaway,eachoftheseworksbecameprominentbecausetheytriedto
captureinasinglecatchythought“TheOneBigThing,”thecentralmov
ing
part, the underlying motor, that would drive international affairs
in the
post–ColdWarworld—
eithertheclashofcivilizations,chaos,thedeclineof
empiresorthetriumphofliberalism.
. . . Ibelievethat ifyouwanttounderstandthepost–ColdWarworld
you have to start by understanding that a new international
system has
succeeded it—globalization. That is “The One Big Thing”
people should
focuson.Globalizationisnottheonlythinginfluencingeventsinthew
orld
today,buttotheextentthatthereisaNorthStarandaworldwideshapin
g
force, it is this system.What is new is the system;what is old is
power
politics,chaos,clashingcivilizationsandliberalism.Andwhatisthed
rama
ofthepost–
ColdWarworldistheinteractionbetweenthisnewsystemand
these old passions. It is a complex drama, with the final act still
not
written. That is why under the globalization system you will
find both
clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations,
both
environmental disasters and amazing environmental rescues,
both the
triumphof liberal, free-marketcapitalismandabacklashagainst
it,both
thedurabilityofnation-
statesandtheriseofenormouslypowerfulnonstate
actors.
...Thepublisher...JonathanGalassicalledmeonedayandsaid,“I
was telling some friends of mine that you’re writing a book
about
globalization and they said, ‘Oh,Friedman, he loves
globalization.’What
wouldyousaytothat?”IansweredJonathanthatIfeelaboutglobalizati
on
alotlikeIfeelaboutthedawn.Generallyspeaking,Ithinkit’sagoodthi
ng
thatthesuncomesupeverymorning.Itdoesmoregoodthanharm.But
evenifIdidn’tmuchcareforthedawnthereisn’tmuchIcoulddoaboutit
.
Ididn’tstartglobalization,Ican’tstopit—
exceptatahugecosttohuman
development—andI’mnotgoingtowaste timetrying.All Iwant to
think
about ishow I canget thebestoutof thisnewsystem,andcushion the
worst,forthemostpeople.
APPROACHESTOGLOBALIZATION
PaulJames
There are many different approaches to the study of
globalization,
testifying to the diversity and vitality of the field of global
studies. The
diversityof theseapproaches isnoteasy tocategorize,however,
inpart
because of the intellectual climate in which most of the studies
of
globalizationhaveemerged.
Studies of globalization and,moregenerally, studies in
thebroadand
loosely defined field of global studies did not become conscious
of
themselvesassuchuntilthe1990s;andbythenthedirect-
linelineagesof
classic social theory had either been broken or segmented. The
social
sciencesandhumanitieswereinthemidstofaretreatfromgrandtheory
.
Therewas a growing suspicion, in part influenced by a
poststructuralist
turn,ofanygeneralizingtheoreticalexplanationsofparticularpheno
mena.
This suspicion was paralleled by a claim made by some that the
postmodern condition could be characterized by the end of
grand
narratives of all kinds: nationalism, socialism, liberalism, and
by
implication,globalism.Althoughinthepast,approachestoanytheore
tical
field could be comfortably organized according to three
foundational
considerations—theoretical lineage, scholarly discipline, and
normative
orientation—
thiswaschanging.Bytheendofthe20thandintotheearly
21st century, those kinds of considerations remained useful by
way of
backgroundorientation,butthepatternofapproacheswasbecomingl
ess
obviousandwithmorecrossovers.
There is an irony in this retreat from generalizing theory that is
importanttonote.Itconcernsaparadoxthatisyettobeexplained.Atthe
sametimethatgeneralizingtheorylostitshold,ageneralizingcategor
yof
social relations gripped the imagination of both academic
analysts and
journalistic commentators—this, of course, was the category of
“the
global.” In this emerging imaginary, globalization was
understood as a
process of social interconnection, a process that was in different
ways
connecting people across planet Earth. Globalization as a
practice and
subjectivityconnectingthe(global)socialwholethusbecamethestan
dout
object of critical enquiry. In other words, globalization
demanded
generalizingattentionattheverymomentthatresidual
ideasthatanall-
embracing theory might be found to explain such a phenomenon
was
effectively dashed. This has profound consequences for the
nature of
globalizationtheoryandhowwemightunderstanddifferentapproach
es...
.
EARLYAPPROACHESTOGLOBALIZATION
Although there were some isolated articles across the 1960s to
1980s
directlyreferringtoglobalization—
withthemostprominentofthesebeing
by Theodore Levitt on the globalization of markets in 1983—
more
elaborateacademicapproachestoglobalizationlaggedbyadecadeors
o.
Theburgeoninganddominant journalisticandbusinessdiscoursesof
the
firstwaveofintenseattentionintothe1980stendedtobethinonanalysi
s
and thick on hyperbole. Most suggested that globalization was a
completely newphenomenon symbolized by the triumph of the
capitalist
market.Levitt’swritingsignaledtheriseoftheglobalcorporationcarr
ied
byaworldwidecommunicationsrevolution.
It took a sociologist of religion and a couple of anthropologists
and
socialtheoristsinthe1990s—
scholarssuchasRolandRobertson,Jonathan
Friedman,ArjunAppadurai,andMikeFeatherstone—towriteoredit
the
firstmajorexplorationsofglobalization-as-
such,contributionsthatmoved
beyondhyperboleorthindescription.JournalssuchasTheory,Cultur
eand
Societywere in thevanguardof thenewthinkingof
thissecondwaveof
attention. Earlier work, such as that of Immanuel Wallerstein
and the
world-systems theorists, or Andre Gunder Frank and the
dependency
theorists,hadsignaledashiftawayfromclassicimperialismstudiesas
the
major carrier of work on globalizing relations. However, in
relation to
understanding globalization itself, this did not lead to
significant
developmentsintheory,exceptintherecognitionthatglobalizationw
asa
centuries-oldprocess.
The work of Wallerstein in the discipline of international
political
economycanherebeusedasan indicationof thedifficultyof coming
to
termswithissuesofglobalization.Insteadofexploringtheconsequen
cesof
processes of globalization—economic, ecological, cultural, and
political—
forunderstandingthecomplexitiesofcapitalism,Wallersteinrework
edthe
verities of a world system’s understanding: namely, that
capitalism had
gone through twomajor overlapping cycles of development:
from 1450,
andfrom1945tothepresent,suggestingthatcapitalismwasnowenteri
ng
atransitionphaseofterminalcrisis.Whatotherscalledglobalization,
he
said,wasjusttheepiphenomenonofthetransition.Herethesophistica
ted
criticofmainstreammodernizationtheorythusreducedglobalization
toa
reflection of the phases of capital. He limited its consequences
to the
domainofeconomicsorthenexusbetweencapitalandeverythingelse.
Alternativelyandmoreproductively,theworkofRolandRobertsonto
ok
aculturalturn.Likethecriticalpoliticaleconomists,Robertsonrecog
nized
the long-termand changinghistory of globalization.However,
unlike the
dominanttrendthatforatimedefinedglobalizationintermsofthedemi
se
ofthenation-
state,perhapsmostprominentlysurfacinginthewritingsof
Arjun Appadurai and Ulrich Beck, Robertson recognized the
complex
intersection and layering of nationally and globally constituted
social
relations.One of hismajor contributionswas to show how
globalization
across its long uneven history contributed to a relativization of
social
meaningandsocialpractice,includingthenotionofa“worldsystem.”
His
workstillstandsuptoscrutinytoday,andhecontinuestobeamajorfigu
re
inthefield.
Another key figure of this time, Arjun Appadurai, also followed
the
cultural turn, but instead of taking a critical modernist position
on the
changing order of things as Robertson did, he headed down the
postmodernpathtoemphasizefluidity.Thekeycontributionforwhic
hheis
known is the notion of global “scapes,” unstructured
formationswith no
boundariesor regularities.Hedistinguisheddifferent
formationsofwhat
he called ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes,
financescapes, and
ideoscapes.Thisapproachwasavidlyused foraperiodbefore it lost
its
standing as differentwriters realized that, apart from the
categories of
ethnoscapes and perhaps ideoscapes, his global landscape
focused too
narrowlyontheculturalpresentandtherecentpast.Broadercategorie
s
of analysis were needed to understand the unevenness of social
continuitiesanddiscontinuities.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEDOMAINOFE
NQUIRY
Athirdwaveofattentionemergedacrosstheturnofthecenturyintothe
present. Journals such as Globalizations, Global Society, and
Global
Governanceemergedas thenumberofpublicationsexploded
innumber.
Oneofthemostimportantbroaderrenderingsofglobalizationcamefr
om
ajointlywrittenbookcalledGlobalTransformations(1999)byDavid
Held,
a political philosopher; Anthony McGrew, an international
relations
theorist;DavidGoldblatt,atheoristofenvironmentalpolitics;andJon
athan
Perraton,aneconomist.
Interdisciplinarystudieshadbecomethekey.As
signaledinthesubtitleofthebook,Politics,EconomicsandCulture,an
d
extendedinthechapterstructureto includea
focusonglobalizationand
environment,thisapproachworkedacrossthebroaddomainsofecono
my,
ecology,politics,andculture.Similarly
JanAartScholteworkedacrossa
broad series of domains. In his case, the domains were
production,
governance, identity, and knowledge. And, when Chamsy el-
Ojeili and
PatrickHaydencametowritetheirbookCriticalTheoriesofGlobaliza
tion
(2006),lookingbackonmorethanadecadeofdevelopingapproachest
o
globalization they returned to the useful categorization of
economics,
politics,andculture.Inallofthesecases,however,therewasnoattemp
t
to develop a theory of globalization as such. Rather these and
other
relatedwriters—
writersasdiverseasJamesMittleman,GeorgeRitzer,Ulf
Hannerz, and Heikki Patomaki—sought to explore the
complexity of
globalizationacrossdifferentdomains.
In the domain of culture, for example, a penetrating critique of
the
dominantideologyofglobalizationbyManfredStegerjoinedwithoth
ersin
introducingthenotionof“globalism.”Initsmidrangeuse,globalismc
anbe
defined as the ideologies and/or subjectivities associated with
different
historicallydominantformationsofglobalextension.Steger
inhisearlier
writingsfromtheearly1990sfocusedonglobalismasneoliberalism,b
ut
as his analysis developed, he came to distinguish different kinds
of
globalism, including justice globalisms, imperial globalisms,
and religious
globalisms.Hehelpedus tounderstandthatglobalism is
thereforemuch
morethantheideologyassociatedwiththecontemporarydominantva
riant
ofglobalism—marketglobalismandideasofaborderlessworld.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFNORMATIVEORIE
NTATION
Other ways to differentiate approaches to globalization include
their
normativeorethicalorientationandtheirpoliticaldescriptivestance.
The
mostcitedcategorizationofdifferentkindsofapproachestoglobaliza
tion,
which comes from Global Transformations, a book mentioned
earlier,
combines both of these categorizations and posits what it calls
“three
broad schools of thought”: the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and
the
transformationalists.Theyarenotactuallyschoolsatallbutorientatio
ns.
ThehyperglobalizersincludewriterssuchasKenichiOhmae(aneolib
eral)
and Martin Albrow (a critical theorist) who argue that a wave of
globalization is changing the world fundamentally and
supplanting older
national sovereignties. The sceptics include Paul Hirst and
Grahame
Thompsonwhoarguethatwithcontemporaryso-
calledglobalizationwhat
we are witnessing is just another wave of internationalization.
The
transformationalists, including James Rosenau and Saskia
Sassen, who
suggestthatwhileintensifyingglobalizationischangingthenatureof
world
politics,culture,andeconomy,theprocessisuneven.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFSCHOLARLYDISC
IPLINE
With the realization in the 1990s that “the global” required
direct
attention, the taken-for-granted assumptions of fields of study
such as
internationalrelations,politics,andsociologycameunderdirectchal
lenge.
In international relations, the realist emphasisonnation-
statesasblack-
boxentitiesinpoliticalinter-
relationcameunderconsiderablepressure,as
didtheemphasesofitscriticalcounterparts,includingevenMarxisma
nd
rationalism that had long recognized the long reach of both
material
processes and ideas across the world. International relations as
a
discipline had profoundproblemsdealingwith globalization, but
into the
newcentury,booksstartedtocomeoutbywriterscrossingtheboundari
es
of thediscipline, including international critical theorist
JanAartScholte
andinternationalpoliticaleconomistMarkRupert.
Onedisciplinethatsawaseachangeinitsapproachwasanthropology.
Itmaintaineditsclassicalemphasisonethnographicdepth,butitshifte
dits
orientation from internally focused microstudies of remote
locales to
attempting to understand communities, whether they be remote
or
metropolitan,intermsoftheirplaceinaglobalizingworld.Newsubfie
lds
ofhistorydeveloped,including“bighistory”and“worldhistory.”The
field
ofglobal studies itselfemergedduring thisperiodasan
interdisciplinary
approach tounderstanding therelationbetween the localand
theglobal
acrossthedomainsofsociallife.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEORETICALLI
NEAGE
Adevelopingaversiontograndtheorydidnotmeanthattheoldtheoreti
cal
lineages became completely irrelevant, although it did mean
that
approaches associated with the classical social theories of Karl
Marx,
ÉmileDurkheim,andMaxWeber tendedeither todrawmore
looselyon
thosepastwritingsortoworkacrossthemsynthetically.Outofacritica
l
reading of the Durkheimian–Weberian tradition came the work
of such
writersasRolandRobertsonandAmerican sociologist ofglobal
religion,
MarkJuergensmeyer—
althoughitshouldbesaidthatRobertsonwasalso
influencedbyanopenversionofneo-
Marxisthistoricalmaterialism.Outof
theneo-
MarxistlineagecamethevariedworkofPaulHirst,MarkRupert,
Christopher Chase-Dunn, Tony McGrew, and via Karl Polanyi,
Ronnie
Munck.Third,severalwritersexplicitlysetouttoformulateapostclas
sical
synthesis. The most prominent of these writers was British
sociologist
AnthonyGiddens.Hehadbeenworkingacrossthe1980sand1990sona
grandtheoreticalapproachtothesocialcalledstructurationism;howe
ver,
by the time that he wrote in an elaborated way on globalization,
his
approachhadbecomelesstheoretically
integratedandmoredescriptive.
Hismajorpointbecamethatglobalizationiscomplex,shapesthewayt
hat
welive,andislinkedtotheexpansivedynamicoflatemodernity.
Marxistwriter JustinRosenberg
immediatelytookGiddenstotaskfor
theoreticalincoherence.Inparticular,hecriticizedatendencyinGidd
ens’s
writing(andinmanyotherwritersonglobalization)totreatglobalizati
on
and the extension of social relations across world space as both
the
explanationandtheoutcomeofaprocessofchange.Thatis,heaskedho
w
ifglobalization involves spatialextensioncan itbeexplainedby
invoking
the claim that space isnowglobal.Theexplanationand the thing-
being-
explained,he rightly says, are thus reduced intoa self-
confirmingcircle.
Takingintoaccounthiscritique,it isstill
legitimatetotreatglobalization
as a descriptive category referring to a process of extension
across a
historically constituted world-space as we have been doing
across this
entry, but it is problematic to posit globalization as the simple
cause of
otherphenomena,muchlessofitself.
CONCLUSION
Now,afterthreedecadesofwritingonglobalization,wehavemadeso
me
extraordinarygainsinunderstanding.Thehistoricallychangingandu
neven
nature of globalization is now generally understood. In the
various
scholarlyapproaches,muchofthehyperbolehastendedtodropawaya
nd
the normative assessment of globalization has become more
sober and
qualified. Scholarly approaches have tended to move away from
essentializing the phenomenon as necessarily good or bad.
Similarly, at
leastinthescholarlyarena,therehasbeenasignificantmovebeyondth
e
reductive tendency to treat globalization only in terms of
economic
domain.
Ontheothersideoftheledger,ourcentralweaknessofunderstanding
goesbacktothecentralparadoxofglobalizationstudies—
theemergence
ofanaversiontogeneralizingtheoryatatimewhentheimportanceofa
generalizing category of relations came to the fore.
Globalization may
simply be the name given to a matrix of processes that extend
social
relations across world-space, but the way in which people live
those
relationsisincrediblycomplex,changing,anddifficulttoexplain.Th
us,we
remain in search of generalizing methodologies (not a singular
grand
theory)thatcansensitizeustothoseempiricalcomplexitieswhileena
bling
ustoabstractpatternsofchangeandcontinuity.
HOWGLOBALIZATIONWENTBAD
StevenWeber
Theworldtodayismoredangerousandlessorderlythanitwassuppose
d
tobe.Tenor15yearsago,thenaiveexpectationswerethatthe“endof
history”wasnear.Therealityhasbeentheopposite.Theworldhasmor
e
internationalterrorismandmorenuclearproliferationtodaythanitdi
din
1990. International institutions are weaker. The threats of
pandemic
disease and climate change are stronger. Cleavages of religious
and
cultural ideology are more intense. The global financial system
is more
unbalancedandprecarious.Itwasn’tsupposedtobelikethis.Theendo
f
theColdWarwassupposedtomakeglobalpoliticsandeconomicseasi
erto
manage,notharder.
What went wrong? The bad news of the 21st century is that
globalization has a significant dark side. The container ships
that carry
manufactured Chinese goods to and from the United States also
carry
drugs. The airplanes that fly passengers nonstop from New York
to
Singaporealsotransportinfectiousdiseases.AndtheInternethasprov
ed
just as adept at spreading deadly, extremist ideologies as it has
e-
commerce.Theconventionalbeliefisthatthesinglegreatestchalleng
eof
geopoliticstodayismanagingthisdarksideofglobalization,chipping
away
at the illegitimate co-travelers that exploit openness, mobility,
and
freedom, without putting too much sand in the gears. The
current U.S.
strategyistopushformoretrade,moreconnectivity,moremarkets,an
d
more openness. America does so for a good reason—it benefits
from
globalizationmorethananyothercountryintheworld.TheUnitedStat
es
acknowledges globalization’s dark side but attributes it merely
to
exploitative behavior by criminals, religious extremists, and
other
anachronistic elements that can be eliminated. The dark side of
globalization,Americasays,withvery
littlesubtlety,canbemitigatedby
the expansion ofAmericanpower, sometimesunilaterally and
sometimes
throughmultilateralinstitutions,dependingonhowtheUnitedStatesl
ikes
it. In other words, America is aiming for a “flat,” globalized
world
coordinatedbyasinglesuperpower.
That’sniceworkifyoucangetit.ButtheUnitedStatesalmostcertainly
cannot.Notonlybecauseothercountrieswon’tletit,but,moreprofoun
dly,
because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of
American
powerhasmanybenefits,butthemanagementofglobalizationisnoton
e
of them. Themobility of ideas, capital, technology, and people
is hardly
new.Buttherapidadvanceofglobalization’sevilsis.Mostofthatadva
nce
hastakenplacesince1990.Why?Becausewhatchangedprofoundlyin
the
1990swas thepolarity of the international system.For the first
time in
modernhistory,globalizationwassuperimposedontoaworldwithasi
ngle
superpower.Whatwehavediscoveredinthepast15yearsisthatit isa
dangerousmixture. The negative effects of globalization since
1990 are
not the resultofglobalization itself.Theyare thedark
sideofAmerican
predominance.
THEDANGERSOFUNIPOLARITY
Astraightforwardpieceoflogicfrommarketeconomicshelpsexplain
why
unipolarity and globalization don’t mix. Monopolies, regardless
of who
holdsthem,arealmostalwaysbadforboththemarketandthemonopoli
st.
Weproposethreesimpleaxiomsof“globalizationunderunipolarity”
that
revealthesedangers.
Axiom1:
Aboveacertainthresholdofpower,therateatwhichnewglobal
problems are generatedwill exceed the rate atwhich old
problems are
fixed. Power does two things in international politics: It
enhances the
capabilityofastatetodothings,butitalsoincreasesthenumberofthing
s
that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts
to
overtaketheformer.It’sthefamiliarlawofdiminishingreturns.Becau
se
powerful states have large spheres of influence and their
security and
economicintereststoucheveryregionoftheworld,theyarethreatened
by
theriskofthingsgoingwrong—
anywhere.Thatisparticularlytrueforthe
UnitedStates,whichleveragesitsabilitytogoanywhereanddoanythi
ng
throughmassivedebt.Nooneknowsexactlywhenthelawofdiminishi
ng
returnswillkickin.But,historically,itstartstohappenlongbeforeasi
ngle
greatpowerdominatestheentireglobe,whichiswhylargeempiresfro
m
ByzantiumtoRomehavealwaysreachedapointofunsustainability.T
hat
may already be happening to theUnitedStates today, on issues
ranging
from oil dependency and nuclear proliferation to pandemics and
global
warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not
the
answer;it’sactuallypartoftheproblem.Amultipolarworldwouldalm
ost
certainly manage the globe’s pressing problems more
effectively. The
larger thenumberofgreatpowers in theglobalsystem, thegreater
the
chancethatatleastoneofthemwouldexercisesomecontroloveragive
n
combinationofspace,otheractors,andproblems.Suchreasoningdoe
sn’t
rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together.
They
mightdoso.Buteven if theydon’t, the result
isdistributedgovernance,
where some great power is interested in most every part of the
world
throughproductivecompetition.
Axiom2:
Inanincreasinglynetworkedworld,placesthatfallbetweenthe
networksareverydangerousplaces—
andtherewillbemoreungoverned
zones when there is only one network to join. The second axiom
acknowledgesthathighlyconnectednetworkscanbeefficient,robust
,and
resilient to shocks. But in a highly connectedworld, the pieces
that fall
between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits
of
connectivity.Theseproblemsfesterintheformoffailedstates,mutate
like
pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in
subterranean
networks such as al Qaeda. The truly dangerous places are the
points
wherethesubterraneannetworkstouchthemainstreamofglobalpoliti
cs
and economics.Whatmade Afghanistan so dangerous under the
Taliban
wasnot that itwasa failedstate. Itwasn’t. Itwasapartially
failedand
partially connected state that worked the interstices of
globalization
through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism. Can any
single
superpowermonitoralltheseamsandbackalleysofglobalization?Ha
rdly.
In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these
problems,
becausemorepressing issuesarehappeningelsewhere,
inplaceswhere
tradeand technologyaregrowing.Bycontrast,aworldof
severalgreat
powersisamoreinterest-
richenvironmentinwhichnationsmustlookin
lessobviousplacestofindnewsourcesofadvantage.Insuchasystem,i
t’s
harder for
troublemakerstospringup,becausethecracksandseamsof
globalizationareheldtogetherbystrongerties.
Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a
superpower,opponentswilltrytoneutralizepower,bygoingundergro
und,
going nuclear, or going “bad.” Axiom 3 is a story about the
preferred
strategiesof theweak. It’s abasic insightof international relations
that
states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining
groups
that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. Butwhat if there is no
viable
group to join? In today’sunipolarworld, everynation
fromVenezuela to
NorthKoreaislookingforawaytoconstrainAmericanpower.Butinth
e
unipolarworld, it’sharder forstates to join together todo that.So
they
turn to othermeans. Theyplay a different game.Hamas,
Iran,Somalia,
NorthKorea,andVenezuelaarenotgoingtobecomealliesanytimesoo
n.
Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult
for
Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S.
currency is
another.Raisinguncertaintyaboutoilsuppliesisperhapsthemostobv
ious
methodofall.Here’stheimportantdownsideofunipolarglobalizatio
n.Ina
world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would
be less
troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice
among
potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their
influence.Without
that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of
globalization
becomesthemosteffectivemeansofconstrainingAmericanpower.
SHARINGGLOBALIZATION’SBURDEN
The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by
the
combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United
States is
bearingmost of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear
proliferation.
There’seffectivelyamarketoutthereforproliferation,withitsownsu
pply
(stateswillingtosharenucleartechnology)anddemand(statesthatba
dly
want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with
globalization
ratchetsupboththesupplyanddemand,tothedetrimentofU.S.nationa
l
security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war,
to
comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much
of this
analysisisoverblown.TheUnitedStatesmaynotbeabletostabilizean
d
rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective
of a
government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In
Tehran,
Pyongyang,andmanyothercapitals, includingBeijing, thebottom
line is
simple:TheU.S.militarycould,withconventionalforce,endthosereg
imes
tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can
dream of
challengingU.S.conventionalmilitarypower.Buttheycancertainly
hope
todeterAmericafromusingit.Andthebestdeterrentyetinventedisthe
threatofnuclearretaliation.Before1989,states that felt
threatenedby
theUnited States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear
umbrella for
protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having
your own
nuclearweaponusedtobealuxury.Today,itisfastbecominganecessit
y.
NorthKorea is theclearestexample.Fewcountrieshad
itworseduring
the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-
armed
communistneighbors, itwasofficially atwarwith its
southernneighbor,
anditstaredcontinuouslyattensofthousandsofU.S.troopsonitsbord
er.
But,for40years,NorthKoreadidn’tseeknuclearweapons.Itdidn’tne
ed
to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.Within five years
of the
Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full
steam on
plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea’s founder, Kim
Il Sung,
barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s
administration
readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations
preemptively. That
brinkmanshippaidoff.TodayNorthKorea is likely anuclearpower,
and
Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. America’s
conventional
military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea.
Saddam
Hussein’sgreatstrategicblunderwasthathetooktoolongtogettothe
sameplace.
Howwouldthingsbedifferentinamultipolarworld?Forstarters,great
powerscouldsplitthejobofpolicingproliferation,andevencollabora
teon
someparticularlyhardcases.It’softenforgottennowthat,duringtheC
old
War,theonlystatewithatoughernonproliferationpolicythantheUnit
ed
States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a
formal
alliancewithMoscoweverbecameanuclearpower.TheEasternblocw
as
full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in
every area
except one—nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit
it. But
today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-
superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans
dangle
carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks.
The
Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the
Russians are
aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove,
nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. The
same is
true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world
into an
enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease.
Humans
cannotoutsmartdisease,becauseitjustevolvestooquickly.Bacteriac
an
reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it
takes us
decadestocomeupwithanewgenerationofantibiotics.

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Reading Notes Instructions Global 2 Respond to .docx

  • 1. Reading Notes Instructions Global 2 Respond to ALL of the following questions, using Times New Roman, 12 pts., double spaced, ranging from 300 to 500 words. The file will be submitted in a .pdf format. Include: Full Name, TA Name, Section Time/Date. No citation required. 1. What is the main idea of EACH reading? (5 pts) 2. Compare and contrast the main ideas of ALL the readings, and explain how do ALL of them relate to Global Studies? (5 pts) Grading Rubric per question Grade Description 1 Demonstrates very limited knowledge and understanding of the subject; almost no organizational structure in the answers; inappropriate or inadequate use of terminology; a limited ability to relate content to the
  • 2. class. 2 Demonstrates some knowledge and understanding of the subject; a basic sense of structure that is not sustained throughout the answers; a basic use of terminology appropriate to the subject; some ability to establish links between facts and the class. 3 Demonstrates a secure knowledge and understanding of the subject going beyond the mere citing of isolated, fragmentary, irrelevant or “common sense” points; some ability to structure answers but with insufficient clarity and possibly some repetition; an ability to express knowledge and understanding in terminology specific to the subject 4 Demonstrates a sound knowledge and understanding of the subject using subject-specific terminology; answers which are logically structured and coherent but not fully developed; a tendency to be more descriptive than evaluative although some ability is demonstrated to present and develop contrasting points of view; 5 Demonstrates detailed knowledge and understanding; answers which are coherent, logically structured and well developed; consistent use of appropriate terminology; an ability to analyse, evaluate and synthesize
  • 3. knowledge and concepts; an ability to analyse and evaluate the reading or to solve problems competently. THINKINGGLOBALLY THINKINGGLOBALLY AGlobalStudiesReader EDITEDBY MarkJuergensmeyer UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university pressesintheUnitedStates,enricheslivesaroundtheworldbyadvanci ng scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activitiesaresupportedbytheUCPressFoundationandbyphilanthro pic
  • 4. contributionsfromindividualsandinstitutions.Formoreinformatio n,visit www.ucpress.edu. UniversityofCaliforniaPress BerkeleyandLosAngeles,California UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd. London,England ©2014byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Thinking globally : a global studies reader / edited by Mark Juergensmeyer. pagescm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-0-520-27844-8(pbk.:alk.paper) eISBN9780520958012 1.Globalization—Textbooks. I.Juergensmeyer,Mark. JZ1318.T456 2014 303.48’2—dc23 2013022129 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inkeepingwithacommitmenttosupportenvironmentallyresponsibl eand sustainableprintingpractices,UCPresshasprintedthisbookonNatur es Natural, a fiber that contains 30% post-consumer waste andmeets the minimumrequirementsofANSI/NISOZ39.48-
  • 6. uman Affairs?” fromNewGlobalStudies JaneBurbankandFrederickCooper,“ImperialTrajectories” fromEmpiresinWorldHistory ImmanuelWallerstein,“OntheStudyofSocialChange” fromTheModernWorldSystem DominicSachsenmaier,“MovementsandPatterns:Environmentsof Global History” fromGlobalPerspectivesonGlobalHistory FurtherReading PARTII:THEMARCHOFGLOBALIZATION,BYREGION 3. Africa:TheRiseofEthnicPoliticsinaGlobalWorld The impact of the slave trade and colonialization on Africa, influence of African culture on the Americas, and African aspects of the global rise of ethnicpolitics NayanChanda,“TheHiddenStoryofaJourney” fromBoundTogether DilipHiro,“Slavery” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies JeffreyHaynes,“AfricanDiasporaReligions” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
  • 7. JacobK.Olupona,“ThinkingGloballyaboutAfricanReligion” fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions OkwudibaNnoli,“TheCycleof‘State-Ethnicity- State’inAfricanPolitics” fromMOSTEthno-NetAfrica FurtherReading 4. TheMiddleEast:ReligiousPoliticsandAntiglobalization TheriseofglobalreligiousculturesfromtheMiddleEast,andcurrentr eligious politicsaspartofaglobalchallengetosecularism MohammedBamyeh,“TheIdeologyoftheHorizons” fromTheSocialOriginsofIslam SaidAmirArjomand,“ThinkingGloballyaboutIslam” fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions JonathanFox,“AreMiddleEastConflictsMoreReligious?” fromMiddleEastQuarterly BarahMikaïl,“ReligionandPoliticsinArabTransitions” fromFRIDEpolicybrief FurtherReading 5. SouthandCentralAsia:GlobalLaborandAsianCulture ThespreadofAsianculturesfromIndiaandCentralAsiaviatraderoute s;the roleofSouthAsiainglobaltradeandinformationtechnology
  • 8. RichardFoltz,“ReligionsoftheSilkRoad” fromReligionsoftheSilkRoad MorrisRossabi,“TheEarlyMongols” fromKhubilaiKhan:HisLifeandTimes VasudhaNarayanan,“Hinduism” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies BarbaraD.MetcalfandThomasR.Metcalf,“Revolt,theModernState, and ColonizedSubjects,1848–1885” fromAConciseHistoryofIndia CarolUpadhyaandA.R.Vasavi,“OutpostsoftheGlobalInformation Economy” fromInanOutpostoftheGlobalEconomy:WorkandWorkersinIndia’ s TechnologyIndustry FurtherReading 6. EastAsia:GlobalEconomicEmpires The role of East Asia in global economic history, and the rise of new economiesinChina,Japan,andSouthKoreabasedonglobaltrade KennethPomeranz,“TheGreatDivergence” fromTheGreatDivergence:China,Europe,andtheMakingoftheMod ern WorldEconomy AndreGunderFrank,“The21stCenturyWillBeAsian” fromTheNikkeiWeekly StevenRadelat,JeffreySachs,andJong-
  • 9. WhaLee,“EconomicGrowthinAsia” fromEmergingAsia Ho-FungHung,“IstheRiseofChinaSustainable?” fromChinaandtheTransformationofGlobalCapitalism FurtherReading 7. SoutheastAsiaandthePacific:TheEdgesofGlobalization TheemergenceofSoutheastAsia fromcolonial control; the riseofAustralia andNewZealand,andthePacificIslandsontheedgesofglobalization GeorgesCoedès,“TheIndianizedStatesofSoutheastAsia” fromTheIndianizedStatesofSoutheastAsia BenedictAnderson,“ImaginedCommunities” fromImaginedCommunities SuchengChan,“Vietnam,1945–2000:TheGlobalDimensionsof Decolonization,War,Revolution,andRefugeeOutflows” CelesteLipowMacLeod,“AsianConnections” fromMultiethnicAustralia:ItsHistoryandFuture JoelRobbins,“PacificIslandsReligiousCommunities” fromTheOxfordHandbookofGlobalReligions FurtherReading 8. EuropeandRussia:NationalismandTransnationalism TheroleofEuropeincreatingtheconceptofthenation,transnationalp olitics intheSovietUnion,andtheriseoftheEuropeanUnion
  • 10. PeterStearns,“The1850sasTurningPoint:TheBirthofGlobalization ?” fromGlobalizationinWorldHistory EricHobsbawm,“TheNation” fromTheNationasNovelty SeylaBenhabib,“Citizens,Residents,andAliensinaChangingWorld ” fromThePostnationalSelf OddArneWestad,“SovietIdeologyandForeignInterventionsintheG lobal ColdWar” fromTheGlobalColdWar JürgenHabermas,“CitizenshipandNationalIdentity” fromPraxisInternational FurtherReading 9. TheAmericas:DevelopmentStrategies The European conquest of the Americas, the rise of new societies, and varyingpatternsofeconomicdevelopmentwithinaglobalcontext CharlesC.Mann,“DiscoveringtheNewWorldColumbusCreated” from1493:DiscoveringtheNewWorldColumbusCreated TzvetanTodorov,“TheReasonsfortheVictory” fromTheConquestofAmerica FrancisFukuyama,“ExplainingtheDevelopmentGapbetweenLatin
  • 11. America andtheUnitedStates” fromFallingBehind DenisLynnDalyHeyck,“SurvivingGlobalizationinThreeLatinAme rican Communities” fromSurvivingGlobalizationinThreeLatinAmericanCommunities FurtherReading PARTIII:TRANSNATIONALGLOBALISSUES 10. GlobalForcesintheNewWorldOrder Paradigms for thinking about the newworld order (or disorder) in the post– ColdWarglobalera BenjaminBarber,“Jihadvs.McWorld” fromJihadvs.McWorld SamuelHuntington,“AMultipolar,MulticivilizationalWorld” fromTheClashofCivilizationsandtheRemakingofWorldOrder MichaelHardtandAntonioNegri,“Empire” fromEmpire SaskiaSassen,“GlobalCities” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies FurtherReading 11. TheErosionoftheNation-State The fadingstrengthof thenation-stateand the riseofalternativeconceptions ofworldorder
  • 12. KenichiOhmae,“TheCartographicIllusion” fromTheEndoftheNation-State SusanStrange,“TheWestfailureSystem” fromReviewofInternationalStudies ZygmuntBauman,“AftertheNation-State—What?” fromGlobalization:TheHumanConsequences WilliamI.Robinson,“TheTransnationalState” fromATheoryofGlobalCapitalism FurtherReading 12. ReligiousPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder The religious challenge to the secular state in new conceptions of political order MonicaDuffyToft,DanielPhilpott,andTimothySamuelShah,“TheT wenty-first CenturyasGod’sCentury” fromGod’sCentury:ResurgentReligionandGlobalPolitics MarkJuergensmeyer,“ReligionintheNewGlobalOrder” fromEurope:ABeautifulIdea? OlivierRoy,“AlQaedaandtheNewTerrorists” fromGlobalizedIslam:TheSearchforaNewUmmah RichardFalk,“ReligionandHumaneGlobalGovernance” fromReligionandHumaneGlobalGovernance
  • 13. FurtherReading 13. TransnationalEconomyandGlobalLabor Economic globalization: its relation to national economies, the growth of transnationalcorporations,andthechangingroleoflabor RichardAppelbaum,“Outsourcing” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies NelsonLichtenstein,“Wal- Mart:Templatefor21stCenturyCapitalism?” fromNewLaborForum RobertB.Reich,“WhoIsUs?” fromHarvardBusinessReview JagdishBhagwati,“TwoCritiquesofGlobalization” fromInDefenseofGlobalization JosephStiglitz,“TowardaGlobalizationwithaMoreHumanFace” fromGlobalizationandItsDiscontents FurtherReading 14. GlobalFinanceandFinancialInequality Changesintheconceptofmoneyandinternationalfinancialmarkets BenjaminJ.Cohen,“MoneyinInternationalAffairs” fromTheGeographyofMoney StephenJ.Kobrin,“ElectronicCashandtheEndofNationalMarkets” fromForeignPolicy
  • 14. GlennFirebaugh,“TheRiseinIncomeDisparitiesovertheNineteenth and TwentiethCenturies” fromTheNewGeographyofGlobalIncomeInequality DaniRodrik,“GlobalizationforWhom?” fromHarvardMagazine FurtherReading 15. DevelopmentandtheRoleofWomenintheGlobalEconomy Competing views of development and the role of women in the global economy AlvinY.So,“SocialChangeandDevelopment” fromSocialChangeandDevelopment MayraBuvinić,“WomeninPoverty:ANewGlobalUnderclass” fromForeignPolicy Kum- KumBhavnani,JohnForan,PriyaA.Kurian,andDebashishMunshi,“ From theEdgesofDevelopment” fromOntheEdgesofDevelopment:CulturalInterventions FurtherReading 16. TheHiddenGlobalEconomyofSexandDrugs Illegaltraffickinginpeopleanddrugs,andtheglobalattemptstocontr olthem DavidShirk,“TheDrugWarinMexico” fromTheDrugWarinMexico:ConfrontingaCommonThreat
  • 15. EduardoPorter,“NumbersTellofFailureinDrugWar” fromtheNewYorkTimes KevinBales,“TheNewSlavery” fromDisposablePeople:NewSlaveryintheGlobalEconomy BarbaraEhrenreichandArlieRussellHochschild,“Nannies,Maids,a ndSex WorkersintheGlobalEconomy” fromGlobalWoman FurtherReading 17. GlobalEnvironmentalandHealthCrises The principal environmental and health problems that transcend national boundaries,andglobalattemptstoalleviatethem CatherineGautier,“ClimateChange” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies RonFujita,“TurningtheTide” fromHealtheOcean: Solution sforSavingOurSeas HakanSeckinelgin,“HIV/AIDS”
  • 16. fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies FurtherReading 18. GlobalCommunicationsandNewMedia The role of new media—video, internet, and social networking—in global cultureandpolitics YudhishthirRajIsar,“GlobalCultureandMedia” fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies MichaelCurtin,“MediaCapitalinChineseFilmandTelevision” fromPlayingtotheWorld’sBiggestAudience:TheGlobalizationof ChineseFilmandTV NatanaJ.DeLong-Bas,“TheNewSocialMediaandtheArabSpring” fromOxfordIslamicStudiesOnline PippaNorris,“TheWorldwideDigitalDivide” fromHarvardUniversityKennedySchoolofGovernment FurtherReading 19. TheGlobalMovementforHumanRights
  • 19. AFriendlyIntroductiontoGlobalStudies IhavealotoffriendsonFacebook,andtheyliveinallpartsoftheworld.I f Ipostsomethingaboutglobaltrade,IgetresponsesfromfriendsinChi na andBrazil. If Iputupa linkabout interfaithharmony, Igetappreciative “likes” from friends in Indonesia, India, and Northern Ireland. When I comment about domestic politics in theUnited States, I’m often politely ignored bymy friends in the other part of theworld,who findmy local obsessions as arcane as I view their postings on Eritrean political squabbles.ButwhenIposta linktoawebsite thatportraysnothingbut picturesofbouncingcats, Ireceiveappreciativenoticesfromaroundthe world.Everyone,itseems,lovesbouncingcats. Itisnotjustthebouncingcatsthatareglobal,however.It’severything. The very process of interaction and communication beyond national bordersisafeatureofourglobalizedworld.Andit isnot
  • 20. justFacebook. Everytimeyougoonline,yougoglobal. Whenyouturnoff thecomputerandgotothestore,chancesareyou willencounternotjustyourlocalmilieu.AtriptoWalmartisajourneyi nto theglobalarena.Andwhenyoubringhomeallthatstuffmadenotonlyi n China but also in myriad countries around the world, you are literally bringingglobalizationhome.Trythissimplepartygamewithyourfrie nds. Guessthecountryoneveryone’sclothinglabels,thenchecktoseewher e the t-shirts and jackets and everything else you and your friends are wearing were made—Bangladesh, Trinidad, Cambodia, Yemen, or wherever.Seehowmanycountriesarerepresented.Andthenimaginet he journeythattheclothinghadtomake,fromcottonfieldstotextilefacto ries to seaports and cargo containers to distribution centers to retail stores and eventually to the closets of you and your friends. Perhaps
  • 21. themost globalareaofyourhouseisthatcloset. In some cases, you do not have to go anywhere to find examples of globalizationbecause theycome to you.Globalizationpermeates theair thatyoubreathe— includingtinyparticlesemittedfromvolcaniceruptions half a world away. It affects your weather, as cycles of warming and coolingairreacttoglobalclimatechange.Andglobalizationispartoft he foodthatyoueat.ThisisobviousifyouhaveatasteforChinesetake-out orpadThainoodlesorMexicanburritos.Butevenifyouareameat-and- potatoeskindofpersonwholikesalittletomatosaladontheside,youar e enjoyingtheeffectsofglobalizationaboutfivehundredyearsago.Itw as then that potatoes and tomatoes, plants originally found only in South America,weretakenelsewherebyexplorerstobecomeapartofthefoo d
  • 22. habits in North America, Europe, and around the world. Their dissemination was part of the extraordinary global diffusion of plants, germs, and cultures that followed European contacts with the Western Hemisphere,beginningwithColumbusin1492. Soglobalizationiswovenintothefabricofourdailylives.Tostudyitis tofocusonthecentralfeatureoflifeinthetwenty- firstcentury.Buthow doyougoabout studyingglobalization? Is it reallypossible to study the whole world? Doesn’t this mean studying almost everything? And if so, wheredoyoubegin? Thesewerethequestionsinthemindsofagroupofscholarswhometin Tokyoin2008.TheyhadmettheyearbeforeinSantaBarbara,Californ ia, toexplorethepossibilityofcreatinganewinternationalorganizationf or representatives of graduate programs in global studies—a whole new academic field that had been created in various universities around the
  • 23. world. The first college programs to be called “global studies” were formed in the mid-1990s, and within a decade there were hundreds. Students flocked to the new programs, intuitively knowing that thiswas something important. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century,graduateprogramshadbeenestablishedindozensofuniversi ties inAsia,Europe,andNorthAmerica,includingJapan,SouthKorea,Ch ina, India,Germany,Denmark,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,Australia,Ca nada, andtheUnitedStates.Thefieldofglobalstudieshadarrived. But what was in this new field of study? When the scholars came togetherinTokyoin2008,theirmaingoalsweretoanswerthisquestion andtodefinethemajorfeaturesofthefieldofglobalstudies.Theycame expectingtohavesomethingofa fight.Afterall,eachof theseprograms haddevelopedindependentlyfromtheothers.Whenrepresentativeso fall these different programs came together, they did not know what
  • 24. they wouldfind,thinkingthatthefieldofglobalstudieswouldbedefinedva stly differentlyinTokyo,Leipzig,andMelbourne.Butasitturnedout,this was notthecase.Happily,therewasagreatdealofagreementattheoutset regardingwhatthefieldofglobalstudiescontainedandhowtogoabout studyingit. Thefivecharacteristicsofglobalstudiesthatthescholarsagreedonat that memorable founding meeting of the international Global Studies ConsortiuminTokyoarediscussedbelow. Transnational. ThescholarsinTokyoagreedthatthefieldofglobalstudies focuses primarily on the analysis of events, activities, ideas, trends, processes, and phenomena that appear across national boundaries and cultural regions. These include activities such as economic distribution
  • 25. systems, and ideologies such as nationalism or religious beliefs. The scholars used the term cultural regions as well as nations, since these kinds of global flows of activity and ideas transcend the limitations of regions even when they are not the same as national boundaries. Historically,muchof theactivity thatwecall “transnational”mightmore properlybecalled“transregional,”sinceitoccurredbeforetheconcep tof nationwasappliedtostates. Interdisciplinary. Since transnational phenomena are complex, these are examined frommany disciplinary points of view. In general, the field of global studies does not keep strict disciplinary divisions among, for instance, sociological, historical, political, literary, or other academic fields.Rather, it takesaproblem-focusedapproach, lookingat situations such as global warming or the rise of new religio-political ideologies as
  • 26. specific cases. Tomake sense of these problem areas requiresmultiple perspectives,whichmaybeeconomic,political,social,cultural, religious, ideological, or environmental. Scholars involved in global studies often work in interdisciplinary teams or freely use terms and concepts across fieldsof study.Thesescholarscome fromall fieldsof thesocial sciences (especiallyfromsociology,economics,politicalscience,andanthrop ology). And many of the fields are also related to the humanities, including particularlythefieldsofhistory,literature,religiousstudies,andthea rts. Somescholarshaveexpertise inareasofscience,suchasenvironmental studiesandpublichealth. Contemporary and Historical. We think of globalization as being primarily contemporary,somethinguniquetoourtime.Butitisalsohistorical.T rue, thepaceand intensity ofglobalizationhave increasedenormously
  • 27. in the post–ColdWar period of the twentieth century and evenmore so in the twenty-first century. But transnational activities have had historical antecedents. There are moments in history—such as in the ancient MediterraneanworldduringtheRomanandGreekEmpires— whenthere was a great deal of transnational activity and interchange on economic, cultural, and political levels. The global reach of European colonialism from the sixteenth century to the twentieth century provides another example of a global stratum of culture, education, technology, and economicactivityuponwhicharebasedmanyaspectsoftheglobalizat ion of the twenty-first century. Thus, to fully understand the patterns of globalizationtoday,itisnecessarytoprobetheirhistoricalprecedents
  • 28. . CriticalandMulticultural. TheAmericanandEuropeanviewofglobalization isnottheonlyone.Althoughmanyaspectsofcontemporaryglobalizat ion arebasedonEuropeancolonialprecedents,mostglobalstudiesschola rs donotacceptuncriticallythenotionthatpeopleintheWestshouldbeth e only ones to benefit from economic, political, and cultural globalization. Someglobalstudiesscholarsavoidusingthetermglobalizationtodes cribe theirsubjectofstudy,sincethetermsometimesisinterpretedtoimplyt he promotionofaWestern- dominatedhegemonicprojectaimedatspreading the acceptance of laissez-faire liberal economics throughout the world. Otherscholarsdescribetheirapproachas“criticalglobalizationstudi es,” implyingthattheirexaminationofglobalizationisnotintendedtopro mote or privilege Western economic models of globalization, but
  • 29. rather to understandit. Tounderstandglobalizationwellrequiresviewingitfrommanycultur al perspectives— fromAfricanandAsian,aswellasEuropeanandAmerican, points of view.Scholars of global studies acknowledge that globalization andotherglobalissues,activities,andtrendscanbevieweddifferently in differentpartsoftheworldandfromdifferentsocio- economiclevelswithin eachlocality.Forthatreason,scholarsofglobalstudiessometimesspe ak of“manyglobalizations”or“multipleperspectivesonglobalstudies. ”This positionacknowledgesthatthereisnodominantparadigmorperspecti ve inglobalstudiesthatisvaluedoverothers. Globally Responsible. Scholarswhowork in global studies often advance anadditionalcriterionforwhattheydo:tohelpmaketheworldabetter placeinwhichtolive.Byfocusingonglobalproblems,scholarsimplyt
  • 30. hat theywanttohelpsolvethoseproblems.Theyalsohopetofosterasense of global citizenship among their students. They like to think that they are helpingtocreate“globalliteracy”— theabilitytofunctioninanincreasingly globalized world—by understanding both the specific aspects of diverse cultures and traditions and the commonly experiencedglobal trends and patterns.Otherteachersassertthattheyareprovidingtrainingin“glob al leadership,” giving potential leaders of transnational organizations and movements the understanding and skills that will help them to solve problemsanddealwithissuesonaglobalscale. Inthisbookwewillembraceallof theseaspectsofglobalstudies. In Part2,wewillmovearoundtheworldfromregiontoregion— fromAfrica,
  • 31. theMiddleEast,SouthandCentralAsia,EastAsia,andSoutheastAsia and thePacificareatoEuropeandbicontinentalRussiaandtheAmericas. We explore readings that show how globalization is viewed from the perspective of each region, both historically and today.Wewill consider how global factors have affected each region and how each region has contributed to the larger currents of globalization during different historicalperiods. InPart3,wewilllookatmajortransnationalissuestoday,includingthe declineof thenation-state, the riseofnewreligiouspolitics,andseveral economic issues—such as finance, currency, and labor in the global economy;problemsofdevelopmentandtheroleofwomenintheworld ’s workforce;andthehiddeneconomyinvolvingtradeinsexandillicitdr ugs. We will also explore global environmental problems, including climate
  • 32. change, transnationaldiseasesandotherglobalhealth issues,andglobal communicationsandnewmedia,andendwithasectionontheroleofciv il society in the global future. In choosing the readings to explore these issues, Ihave tried toachieveabalanceamongdisciplinaryandcultural perspectives.AndIhopeformyreaderstonotonlyunderstandthenatur e ofglobalproblems,butalsotoconsidersomeofthepossibilitiesinsolv ing them. So when you enter the field of global studies, you are encountering someof themostsignificantaspectsofourcontemporaryworld.Youare engagingwiththetransnationalissuesthathaveshapedtheregionsoft he world from ancient times to the present and that are among the most pressingissuesofourcontemporaryera.LiketheInternet,globalstudi es drawsyouintothiswiderworld.Butglobalstudies,atitsbest,doesmor
  • 33. e than that. As these readings will show, the scholars engaged in these studieshavehoned theiranalytic skills tomakecritical assessmentsand reasonedjudgmentsaboutthecharacteroftheglobaltransformationst hat areoccurringaroundus.Thisdoesnotmake thesescholars infallible; in fact,theyfrequentlydisagreewithoneanother.Buttheirinsightsdom ake them friends—not only to be liked, but also to be challenged by, to be emulated,andtobeknown. PARTI INTRODUCTION
  • 34. 1 THINKINGGLOBALLY Yourfriendsmayhavepeekedoveryourshouldersatthisbookandaske d whyyouareinterestedinglobalstudies.Andtheymighthaveadded,ju st whatisthat,anyway?Sowhatdoyoutellthem?Youcouldsaythatyouar e studying what goes on in the world that knits us all together— but that soundssortofsoftandsquishy.Oryoucouldtellthemthatyouarestudy ing theeconomicandtechnologicalnetworksthat interactonaglobalplane. Butthat’sonlypartofthestory. The honest truth is that “global studies” can mean a lot of different things,boththehardandthesquishy.Itisusuallydefinedastheanalysis of events,activities,ideas,processes,andflowsthataretransnationalort hat canaffectallareasoftheworld.Theseglobalactivitiescanbestudieda
  • 35. s one part of the established disciplines of sociology, economics, political science,history,religiousstudies,andthelike.Orglobalstudiescanb ea separatecourseorpartofawholenewprogramordepartment. Asanacademicfield,globalstudiesisfairlynew.Itblossomedlargely aftertheturnofthetwenty- firstcentury.Buttheintellectualrootsofthe field lie in thepioneeringwork of themanydifferent scholarswhohave thought globally over many decades. These thinkers have attempted to understand how things are related and have explored the connections amongsocieties,polities,economies,andculturalsystemsthroughou tthe world. Onecouldarguethatthefirstglobalstudiesscholarswereamongthe foundersofthesocialsciences.Overahundredyearsagothepioneerin g GermansociologistMaxWeber (1864– 1920)wroteaseriesofworkson
  • 36. the religionsof India,China, Judaism,andProtestantChristianity.Weber was interested in finding what was distinctive about each of them, and what was similar among all of them. Weber also attempted to discern universal elements in the development of all societies. He showed, for example, that a certain kind of rational and legal authority and its associated bureaucratization was a globalizing process. Though his intellectualinterestswereEuropocentric,hiscuriosityspannedthegl obe. Other early social scientists were also global thinkers. The French sociologistÉmileDurkheim (1858–1917) focused firstonsomethingvery local: case studies of tribal societies. What he found, however, was somethingheregardedasquiteglobal:theriseoforganicsolidaritybas
  • 37. ed on functional interdependence.TheGermanphilosopherand social critic KarlMarx(1818– 1883)likewiseassumedthathistheorieswereuniversal. Marxshowedthatcapitalismwasaglobalizingforce,onethatwouldca use bothproductionsystemsandmarkets toexpandtoencompass theentire world. IdeasinEurope,NorthAmerica,andtherestoftheWesternizedworld were influencedby thinkers such as these.At the same time, significant thinking about intercultural commonalities and global awareness was being developed in intellectual centers in other parts of the world. The tolerantidealsoftheMuslimthinkerIbnKhaldunwereinfluentialinN orth Africa and the Middle East, and notions of universal brotherhood advocatedby the IndianphilosopherRabindranathTagorehadan impact on the intellectual circles of South Asia as well as on his
  • 38. admirers in Westernsocieties. Allof theseearly thinkers,bothEuropeanandnon-European, focused on two ways of thinking globally: comparison and universality. In some cases,theylookedatcomparativeandnon- Westernexamplestodetermine differences and similarities. In other studies, they adopted intellectual positions that assumed a universal applicability. Hence early European theoristssuchasWeberandMarxthoughtthatthesocialforcesthatwer e transforming Europe in the nineteenth century would eventually have relevanceglobally.Currentscholarshipinallareasofthehumanitiesa nd social sciences—includingglobal studies—is indebted to thesepioneering scholars. Butthespecificfocusonglobalizationitselfisfairlynew.Onlyrecentl y
  • 39. havescholarsbeguntoexaminetransnationalandglobalnetworks,flo ws, processes, ideologies, outlooks, and systems both historically and in the contemporaryworld.Infact,thefirstexplicitlyglobalworksofschola rship ofthissortonlyemergedafewdecadesago,attheendofthetwentieth century. Oneofthepioneersofcontemporaryglobalstudieswasthesociologist ImmanuelWallerstein,whohelpedtoformulateworldsystemstheory .He incorporatedinsightsfrompoliticaleconomy,sociology,andhistoryi norder to understand global patterns of hegemonic state power. Other sociologists, including Roland Robertson, Saskia Sassen, and Manfred Steger,explicitlyexaminedtheconceptoftheglobal,asopposedtoloc al, pointsofview. Perspectives from other disciplines have also contributed to global
  • 40. studies.TheanthropologistArjunAppaduraibroadenedtheundersta nding ofglobalperspectivesfromlandscapetoavarietyof“scapes”— culturally shaped understandings of the world. The political scientist David Held helpedtoformulatetheoriesofpoliticsinrelationtoglobalization.Wi lliam H.McNeill,AkiraIriye,andBruceMazlish,amongotherhistorians,h elped to develop the subfields of world history and global history. Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jagdish Bhagwati have analyzed economic interactions and changes in global terms. And in the field of religious studies,WilfredCantwellSmithandNinianSmartmovedbeyondthes tudy of particular religious traditions to the study of world theology and worldview analysis, respectively. Other scholars developed analytic approaches to describe new forms of global society: Mary Kaldor
  • 41. examined an emerging global civil societywhile KwameAnthony Appiah andUlrichBeckhavedescribedwhattheyregardasacosmopolitanstra nd inthenewglobalorder. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, an imposing body of scholarlyliteratureandaflurryofnewjournals,bookseries,andschol arly conferences and associations emerged under the label of global studies. Thefieldhadarrived.Thisbookprovidesaroadmaptotheemergingfie ld. At the same time—to mix metaphors—it provides a sampling of the intellectualfeastthatthecurrentfieldprovides. Globalstudiesusesthetermtransnationalalot.Whatthismeansisthat global studies focus not just on the activities and patterns that are international—among nation-states—but also on those that exist beyond thebordersofnationsandregionsandstretchacrossthevariousareaso f
  • 42. the world. This is one way of thinking of global activity—not that it is universal,foundeverywhereontheplanet,butthatittranscendstheus ual boundaries thatseparatenation fromnation.Transnational relationscan beconfinedlargelywithinaparticularareaoftheworld(suchasecono mic cooperationwithinEurope, for instance, or among thenations along the PacificRim)andnotnecessarilyoccurthroughoutthewholeworld. Atthesametime,therearephenomenathataretrulyglobalinthatthey arefoundeverywhere,suchassatellitecommunicationsystemsthatca nbe accessed anywhere on the planet. These are by definition transnational, sincetheyoccurbeyondthelimitationsofnationalboundariesorcontr ol. Allglobalphenomenaencompasstransnationallinkages,butnotever ything thatistransnationalisglobal.Termscanbeconfusing,butit’susefulto
  • 43. try tobeasclearaspossibleaboutwhatwemean. Inthefieldofglobalstudies,wetendnottousetheterminternational veryoften,sinceitimpliesinteractionsbetweennation- states.Incommon, everydaylanguage,however,manytransnationalphenomenaaredesc ribed as international, as in the description of some environmental issues as internationalproblems,even though thephenomena themselves— suchas the pollution of the oceans and global warming—are transnational. The wordinggets trickywhenone considers thatmanyof theefforts todeal withtransnationalproblemslikeglobalclimatechangeareinternatio nal— suchasthecollaborationofnationsineffortstoagreeonlimitingcarbo n emissionsintotheatmosphere. Global studies has to dowith globalization, of course, butwhat does thatmean?Often,globalization isdefinedas theprocessofbringing
  • 44. the worldtogetherinmoreintenseinteractionthroughallofthetransnatio nal activitythatwehavebeentalkingabout— economic,demographic,social, cultural, technological, and so on. Scholars such as Roland Robertson beganusing the termglobalization in the 1980s. And a book byMartin AlbrowandElizabethKingused the termglobalization in its title in the early 1990s. What they meant by the term was the process of social change that involved transnational interactions in all aspects of social, economic, and technological relationships. Thus, the word globalization describesaprocess. The resultofglobalization isamoreunifiedand interactiveplanet— a globalized world. Some scholars have called this globalized society “globality”ortheeraof“theglobal.”Theattitudethatpeopleadoptint his
  • 45. moreintenselyinteractiveworldcanbesaidtobeoneof“globalism,”o r “global consciousness,” or one embracing the “global imaginary.” These areallwaysofthinkingaboutthenewstateofglobalawarenessinaworl d where transnational activity is the norm and everyone is affected by everyoneelseeverywhereontheplanet. Thesebroadglobal trendsseemvast,andtheyare.Buttheyalsoare feltonaverylocallevel.Therearepocketsofglobalism,forexample,in neighborhoods that are multicultural and contain different immigrant communitiesthatinteractwithoneanother.Somecitiesaredescribeda s “global cities,” both because of their importance as global nodes of economicandculturalnetworksandbecausetheirownpopulationsare a tapestryofpeoplesfromdifferentpartsoftheworld.InLosAngeles, for instance, you can find areas that are entirely Filipino, and other areas whereonlyVietnameseisspoken.LosAngelescontainsoneofthelarg
  • 46. est Mexican populations in the world and also one of the largest groups of Iranians.Inmanyways,itisasocialmicrocosmoftheworld,andyetall of theseimmigrantneighborhoodsinteractinacommonurbanlocale. RolandRobertsoncoinedthetermglocaltodescribetheseexamplesof globalism in a local setting. In his description, glocalization is a logical extensionofglobalization.Itisthewaythatlocalcommunitiesareaffe cted by global trends. The appearance of big-box stores selling Chinese- manufacturedproductsinsleepyruraltownsofArkansasisoneexamp leof glocalization.AnInternetcaféthatIfoundonaremotesegmentoftheIn ca trailnearMachuPicchuinPeruisanother. Atthesametimethatglobaltrendsinfluencelocalsettings,thereverse canalsohappen:globalpatternscanbereinterpretedonalocallevel.T
  • 47. he spread of the McDonald’s fast-food franchise around the world is an example. When I visit the McDonald’s in Delhi, I find that none of the hamburgersare,infact,beefburgers;theyarechickenorveggieburger s, reflectingthepredominantlyvegetarianeatingcustomsofpeopleinIn dia. In Kyoto’s McDonald’s, you can get a Teriyaki McBurger; and in the McDonald’s restaurant in Milan, the sophisticated Italians may choose pastaratherthanfries.Sowhenglobalizationisglocalized,globalpatt erns canadapttolocalsituations. In the readings in this section, these concepts of globalization and globalismareexploredbyseveralinfluentialscholarsinthefieldofglo bal studies.ThefirstessayisbyManfredSteger,anativeAustrianwhohel ped to create the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT
  • 48. University inMelbourne, Australia. Steger’s bookGlobalization: A Very ShortIntroductionisoneofthemostwidelyreadbooksonthetopic.Ina n excerptfromthisbook,Stegerdescribesthephenomenonofglobalizat ion in the post–Cold War era—that is, since roughly 1990. He argues that globalization has increased even more since the turn of the century in 2000andtakesashisexampletheterroristactonSeptember11,2001. Stegershowsthatthisincident,andthetechnology,media,andideolog ical elements related to it, exhibit the global interconnectedness of our contemporaryworld. TheNewYorkTimescolumnistThomasFriedmanalsoagreesthatthe era of globalization is relatively recent. In his calculation, however, it begins around 1989, at the end of the Cold War, when the Berlin wall tumbledandtheideologicalconfrontationbetweensocialistandcapit alist societieswasreplacedbyamorefluidandvariedconceptofworldorde
  • 49. r. In Friedman’s view, thewrestlingmatches between two huge lumbering superpowers has been replaced by the sprints to economic success by leaner independent economies. And though previous periods of globalizationinhistoryhaveshrunktheworldfromasize“large”toasi ze “medium,”thecurrenterashrinkstheworldtoasize“small.” PaulJames,asociologistwhohelpeddeveloptheglobalstudiesprogra m at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, tries to put this global phenomenon in order. He describes the various aspects of globalization and the different approaches to studying it. In James’s comprehensive surveyofthefield,heshowsthatthestudyofglobalizationcomesfrom all themajordisciplinesofthesocialsciencesandhumanities. Globalizationisabasicfeatureofmodernlife.Butisitalwaysgood?In
  • 50. anessayfromForeignPolicy,StevenWeber,aprofessorofpoliticalsci ence anddirectoroftheInstituteforInternationalStudiesattheUniversityo f California, Berkeley, argues that globalization often seems to have gone bad.ThisisespeciallytrueforthosewhoexpectedAmerica’smilitarya nd economic superiority in apost–ColdWarera togive it unbridled control overtherestoftheworld.ButWeberarguesthatglobalizationmaynotb e suchabad thingafterall.America’s security—and theworld’s— depends not on just one superpower exerting its authority, but also on an interconnected set of relationships that reduces conflict through cooperation.Perhaps,Webersuggests,thebestapproachtodealingwi tha globalizedworld isnot foronecountrytotrytocontrol it,butto let the political interconnectednessof theworldprovide foramutual, collective security.
  • 51. GLOBALIZATION:ACONTESTEDCONCEPT ManfredSteger Intheautumnof2001,Iwasteachinganundergraduateclassonmodern politicalandsocialtheory.Stilltraumatizedbytherecentterroristatta cks ontheWorldTradeCenterandthePentagon,mostofmystudentscould n’t quite grasp the connection between the violent forces of religious fundamentalism and the more secular picture of a technologically sophisticated,rapidlyglobalizingworldthatIhadsoughttoconveyin class lecturesanddiscussions.“Iunderstandthat ‘globalization’ isacontested conceptthatreferstosometimescontradictorysocialprocesses,”abri ght historymajoratthebackoftheroomquipped,“buthowcanyousaythat the TV image of a religious fanatic who denounces modernity and secularism from a mountain cave in Afghanistan perfectly captures the complexdynamicsofglobalization?Don’ttheseterribleactsofterrori
  • 52. sm suggest the opposite, namely, the growth of parochial forces that undermineglobalization?”Obviously, the studentwas referring toSaudi- born Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, whose videotaped statement condemning the activities of “international infidels” had been broadcast worldwideon7October. Struck by the sense of intellectual urgency that fuelled my student’s question, I realized that the story of globalization would remain elusive without real-life examples capableof breathing shape, colour, and sound intoavagueconceptthathadbecomethebuzzwordofourtime.Hence, before delving into necessary matters of definition and analytical clarification,weoughttoapproachoursubject in lessabstractfashion.I
  • 53. suggest we begin our journey with a careful examination of the aforementioned videotape. It will soon become fairly obvious why a deconstructionofthoseimagesprovidesimportantcluestothenaturea nd dynamicsofthephenomenonwehavecometocall“globalization.” DECONSTRUCTINGOSAMABINLADEN The infamous videotape bears no date, but experts estimate that the recording wasmade less than two weeks before it was broadcast. The timing of its release appears to have been carefully planned so as to achievethemaximumeffectonthedaytheUnitedStatescommencedit s bombing campaign against Taliban and Al Qaeda (“The Base”) forces in Afghanistan.AlthoughOsamabinLadenandhistoplieutenantsweret hen hidinginaremoteregionofthecountry,theyobviouslypossessedtheh i- tech equipment needed to record the statement. Moreover, Al Qaeda
  • 54. members clearly enjoyed immediate access to sophisticated information andtelecommunicationnetworksthatkepttheminformed—inreal- time—of relevant internationaldevelopments.BinLadenmayhavedenounced the forcesofmodernitywithgreatconviction,butthesmoothoperationof his entire organization was entirely dependent on advanced forms of technologydevelopedinthelasttwodecadesofthe20thcentury. To further illustrate thisapparentcontradiction,consider thecomplex chainofglobal interdependenciesthatmusthaveexistedinorderforbin Laden’smessagetobeheardandseenbybillionsofTVviewersaroundt he world. After making its way from the secluded mountains of eastern AfghanistantothecapitalcityofKabul,thevideotapewasdroppedoff by anunknowncourieroutside the localofficeofAl-Jazeera, aQatar- based televisioncompany.Thisnetworkhadbeenlaunchedonlyfiveyearsea
  • 55. rlier asastate-financed,Arabic- languagenewsandcurrentaffairschannelthat offered limited programming. Before the founding of Al- Jazeera, cutting- edgeTVjournalism—suchasfree- rangingpublicaffairsinterviewsandtalk showswithcall-inaudiences— simplydidnotexistintheArabworld.Within only three years, however, Al-Jazeera was offering its Middle Eastern audienceadizzyingarrayofprogrammes,transmittedaroundthecloc kby powerfulsatellitesputintoorbitbyEuropeanrocketsandAmericansp ace shuttles. Indeed,thenetwork’smarketshareincreasedevenfurtherasaresult ofthedramaticreductioninthepriceandsizeofsatellitedishes.Sudde nly, suchtechnologiesbecameaffordable,evenforlow- incomeconsumers.By
  • 56. theturnofthecentury,Al- Jazeerabroadcastscouldbewatchedaroundthe clock on all five continents. In 2001, the company further intensified its global reach when its chief executives signed a lucrative cooperation agreement with CNN, the leading news network owned by the giant multinationalcorporationAOL-Time- Warner.Afewmonthslater,whenthe world’sattentionshiftedtothewarinAfghanistan,Al- Jazeerahadalready positioned itself as a truly global player, powerful enough to rent equipment to such prominent news providers as Reuters and ABC, sell satellite time to theAssociatedPressandBBC,anddesignan innovative Arabic-languagebusinessnewschannel togetherwith itsotherAmerican networkpartner,CNBC. Unhampered by national borders and geographical obstacles, cooperation among these sprawling news networks had become so
  • 57. efficientthatCNNacquiredandbroadcastacopyoftheOsamabinLade n tapeonlyafewhoursafterithadbeendeliveredtotheAl- Jazeeraofficein Kabul. Caught off guard by the incredible speed of today’s information exchange,theBushadministrationaskedtheQatarigovernmentto“re inin Al-Jazeera,” claiming that the swift airing of the bin Laden tapewithout priorconsultationwascontributingtotheriseofanti- Americansentiments in theArabworld and thus threatened to undermine theUSwar effort. However, not only was the perceived “damage” already done, but segments of the tape—including the full text of bin Laden’s statement— couldbeviewedonlinebyanyonewithaccesstoacomputerandamode m. TheAl-Jazeerawebsitequicklyattractedan internationalaudienceas its dailyhitcountskyrocketedtooversevenmillion. Therecanbenodoubtthatitwastheexistenceofthischainofglobal
  • 58. interdependencies and interconnections that made possible the instant broadcastofbinLaden’sspeech toaglobalaudience.At thesame time, however, it must be emphasized that even those voices that oppose modernity cannot extricate themselves from the very process of globalizationtheysodecry.Inordertospreadtheirmessageandrecruit new sympathizers, antimodernizers must utilize the tools provided by globalization.ThisobvioustruthwasvisibleeveninbinLaden’sperso nal appearance.The tapeshows thathewaswearingcontemporarymilitary fatiguesovertraditionalArabgarments.Inotherwords,hisdressrefle cts the contemporary processes of fragmentation and cross- fertilization that globalizationscholarscall“hybridization”— themixingofdifferentcultural formsandstylesfacilitatedbyglobaleconomicandculturalexchange s.In
  • 59. fact, the pale colours of bin Laden’s mottled combat dress betrayed its Russianorigins,suggestingthatheworethejacketasasymbolicremin der ofthefierceguerrillawarwagedbyhimandotherIslamicmilitantsagai nst the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.His ever- present AK-47 Kalashnikov, too, was probablymade in Russia, although dozensofgunfactoriesaroundtheworldhavebeenbuildingthispopul ar assault rifle for over 40 years. By themid-1990s,more than 70million Kalashnikovs had beenmanufactured in Russia and abroad. At least 50 national armies include such rifles in their arsenal,makingKalashnikovs trulyweaponsofglobalchoice.Thus,binLaden’sAK- 47couldhavecome fromanywhereintheworld.However,giventheastonishingglobaliza tion oforganizedcrimeduringthelasttwodecades,itisquiteconceivablet hat binLaden’sriflewaspartofanillegalarmsdealhatchedandexecutedb
  • 60. y such powerful international criminal organizations as Al Qaeda and the RussianMafia. It isalsopossible that the riflearrived inAfghanistanby meansofanundergroundarms tradesimilar to theone that surfaced in May1996,whenpolice inSanFrancisco seized2,000 illegally imported AK-47smanufacturedinChina. AcloselookatbinLaden’srightwristrevealsyetanothercluetothe powerfuldynamicsofglobalization.Ashedirectshiswordsofcontem ptfor theUnitedStatesanditsalliesathishand- heldmicrophone,hisretreating sleeve exposes a stylish sports watch. Journalists who noticed this expensiveaccessoryhavespeculatedabouttheoriginsofthetimepiec ein question. The emerging consensus points to a Timex product. However, given thatTimexwatchesareasAmericanasapplepie, it seems rather ironic that the Al Qaeda leader should have chosen this
  • 61. particular chronometer.Afterall,TimexCorporation,originallytheWaterbury Clock Company, was founded in the 1850s in Connecticut’s Naugatuck Valley, known throughout the 19th century as the “Switzerland of America.” Today,thecompanyhasgonemultinational,maintainingcloserelatio nsto affiliated businesses and sales offices in 65 countries. The corporation employs 7,500 employees, located on four continents. Thousands of workers—mostlyfromlow-wagecountries intheglobalSouth— constitute thedrivingforcebehindTimex’sglobalproductionprocess. Ourbriefdeconstructionofsomeofthecentralimagesonthevideotape makesiteasiertounderstandwhytheseeminglyanachronisticimages of anantimodernterroristinfrontofanAfghancavedo,infact,captureso me
  • 62. essential dynamics of globalization. Indeed, the tensions between the forces of particularism and those of universalism have reached unprecedented levels only because interdependencies that connect the local to theglobalhavebeengrowing faster thanatany time inhistory. Theriseof internationalterroristorganizations likeAlQaedarepresents but one of themanymanifestations of globalization. Just as bin Laden’s romantic ideology of a “pure Islam” is itself the result of the modern imagination,sohasourglobalagewithitsobsessionfortechnologyan dits mass-market commodities indelibly shaped the violent backlash against globalization. OurdeconstructionofOsamabinLadenhasprovideduswithareal-life exampleoftheintricate—andsometimescontradictory— socialdynamicsof globalization. We are now in a better position to tackle the rather demanding task of assembling a working definition of
  • 63. globalization that bringssomeanalyticalprecisiontoacontestedconceptthathasproven to benotoriouslyhardtopindown. THEWORLDISTENYEARSOLD ThomasFriedman On the morning of December 8, 1997, the government of Thailand announcedthat itwasclosing56of thecountry’s58 top financehouses. Almostovernight,theseprivatebankshadbeenbankruptedbythecras hof theThaicurrency, thebaht.The financehouseshadborrowedheavily in U.S.dollarsandlentthosedollarsouttoThaibusinessesforthebuildin gof hotels,officeblocks,luxuryapartmentsandfactories.Thefinanceho uses allthoughttheyweresafebecausetheThaigovernmentwascommitted to keeping the Thai baht at a fixed rate against the dollar. But when the
  • 64. government failed to do so, in the wake of massive global speculation against the baht—triggered by a dawning awareness that the Thai economy was not as strong as previously believed—the Thai currency plummetedby30percent.Thismeantthatbusinessesthathadborrowe d dollarshadtocomeupwith30percentmoreThaibahttopaybackeach $1ofloans.Manybusinessescouldn’tpaythefinancehousesback,ma ny financehousescouldn’trepaytheirforeignlendersandthewholesyste m wentintogridlock,putting20,000white- collaremployeesoutofwork.The next day, I happened to be driving to an appointment in Bangkok down Asoke Street, Thailand’s equivalent of Wall Street, where most of the bankrupt financehouseswere located.Aswe slowlypassedeachoneof these fallen firms, my cabdriver pointed them out, pronouncing
  • 65. at each one:“Dead!...dead!...dead!...dead!...dead!” I did not know it at the time—no one did—but these Thai investment houseswerethefirstdominoesinwhatwouldprovetobethefirstglobal financialcrisisof theneweraofglobalization—theera that followedthe Cold War. The Thai crisis triggered a general flight of capital out of virtuallyalltheSoutheastAsianemergingmarkets,drivingdownthev alue of currencies in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. Both global and local investors started scrutinizing these economies more closely, found them wanting, and either moved their cash out to safer havens or demanded higher interest rates to compensate for the higher risk. It wasn’t longbeforeoneof themostpopular sweatshirts aroundBangkok wasemblazonedwiththewords“FormerRich.” Withina fewmonths, theSoutheastAsianrecessionbegantohavean
  • 66. effectoncommoditypricesaroundtheworld.Asiahadbeenanimporta nt engine for worldwide economic growth—an engine that consumed huge amountsofrawmaterials.Whenthatenginestartedtosputter,theprice s ofgold,copper,aluminumand,mostimportant,crudeoilallstartedtof all. This fall inworldwidecommodityprices turnedout tobe themechanism for transmitting the Southeast Asian crisis toRussia. Russia at the time wasmindingitsownbusiness,trying,withthehelpoftheIMF,toclimb out of its own self-made economic morass onto a stable growth track. The problemwithRussia, though,was that toomanyof its factories couldn’t makeanythingofvalue.Infact,muchofwhattheymadewasconsidere d “negativevalueadded.”Thatis,atractormadebyaRussianfactorywas sobad itwas actuallyworthmore as scrapmetal, or just raw ironore, than it was as a finished, Russian-made tractor. On top of it all, those
  • 67. Russian factories that were making products that could be sold abroad were paying few, if any, taxes to the government, so the Kremlin was chronicallyshortofcash. Without much of an economy to rely on for revenues, the Russian government had become heavily dependent on taxes from crude oil and othercommodityexportstofunditsoperatingbudget.Ithadalsobeco me dependent on foreign borrowers, whosemoney Russia lured by offering ridiculousratesofinterestonvariousRussiangovernment- issuedbonds. AsRussia’seconomycontinuedtoslideinearly1998,theRussianshad toraisetheinterestrateontheirrublebondsfrom20to50to70percent tokeepattractingtheforeigners.Thehedgefundsandforeignbankske pt buying them, figuring that even if the Russian government couldn’t pay themback,theIMFwouldstepin,bailoutRussiaandtheforeignerswo uld
  • 68. get their money back. Some hedge funds and foreign banks not only continued to put their own money into Russia, but they went out and borrowedevenmoremoney,at5percent,andthenboughtRussianT- bills withitthatpaid20or30percent.AsGrandmawouldsay,“Suchadeal!” ButasGrandmawouldalsosay,“Ifitsoundstoogoodtobetrue,itusuall y is!” Anditwas.TheAsian-triggeredslumpinoilpricesmadeitharderand harderfortheRussiangovernmenttopaytheinterestandprincipalonit s T- bills.AndwiththeIMFunderpressuretomakeloanstorescueThailand , KoreaandIndonesia, itresistedanyproposalsforputtingmorecashinto Russia—unless the Russians first fulfilled their promises to reform their economy,startingwithgetting theirbiggestbusinessesandbanks
  • 69. topay some taxes. On August 17 the Russian economic house of cards came tumbling down, dealing the markets a double whammy: Russia both devalued and unilaterally defaulted on its government bonds, without givinganywarningto itscreditorsorarranginganyworkoutagreement. Thehedgefunds,banksandinvestmentbanksthatwereinvestedinRus sia began piling up massive losses, and those that had borrowedmoney to magnifytheirbetsintheKremlincasinowerethreatenedwithbankrup tcy. Onthefaceofit,thecollapseoftheRussianeconomyshouldnothave hadmuchimpactontheglobalsystem.Russia’seconomywassmallert han thatof theNetherlands.But thesystemwasnowmoreglobal thanever, and just as crude oil prices were the transmission mechanism from SoutheastAsiatoRussia,thehedgefunds— thehugeunregulatedpoolsof
  • 70. private capital that scour the globe for the best investments— were the transmissionmechanismfromRussiatoalltheotheremergingmarker sin theworld, particularly Brazil. The hedge funds and other trading firms, havingrackeduphugelossesinRussia,someofwhichweremagnifiedf ifty timesbyusingborrowedmoney, suddenlyhad to raise cash topayback theirbankers.Theyhad to sellanything thatwas liquid.So theystarted sellingassetsinfinanciallysoundcountriestocompensatefortheirlos ses inbadones.Brazil, for instance,whichhadbeendoinga lotof theright thingsintheeyesoftheglobalmarketsandtheIMF,suddenlysawallits stocksandbondsbeingsoldbypanicky investors.Brazilhad to raise its interest rates as high as 40 percent to try to hold capital inside the country.Variationsonthisscenariowereplayedoutthroughoutthewo rld’s emerging markets, as investors fled for safety. They cashed in their
  • 71. Brazilian,Korean,Egyptian,IsraeliandMexicanbondsandstocks,an dput themoneyeitherundertheirmattressesorintothesafestU.S.bondsthe y could find. So the declines in Brazil and the other emerging markets became the transmissionmechanism that triggered a herdlike stampede intoU.S.Treasurybonds.This,inturn,sharplydroveupthevalueofU. S. T- bonds,drovedowntheinterestthattheU.S.governmenthadtoofferon themtoattractinvestorsandincreasedthespreadbetweenU.S.T- bonds andothercorporateandemergingmarketbonds. The steep drop in the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds was then the transmissionmechanismwhichcrippledmorehedgefundsandinvest ment banks. Take for instance Long-Term Capital Management, based in Greenwich, Connecticut. LTCM was the Mother of All Hedge
  • 72. Funds. Because somany hedge fundswere attracted to themarketplace in the late 1980s, the field became fiercely competitive. Everyone pounced on the same opportunities. In order to make money in such a fiercely competitiveworld,thehedgefundshadtoseekevermoreexoticbetswi th ever largerpoolsofcash.Toguidetheminplacingtherightbets,LTCM drewontheworkoftwoNobelPrize– winningbusinesseconomists,whose research argued that the basic volatility of stocks and bonds could be estimatedfromhowtheyreactedinthepast.Usingcomputermodels,a nd borrowing heavily from different banks, LTCM put $120 billion at risk bettingonthedirectionthatcertainkeybondswouldtakeinthesummer of1998.ItimplicitlybetthatthevalueofU.S.T- bondswouldgodown,and that the value of junk bonds and emerging market bonds would go up. LTCM’s computer model, however, never anticipated something
  • 73. like the globalcontagionthatwouldbesetoffinAugustbyRussia’scollapse,a nd, as a result, its bets turned out to be exactly wrong. When the whole investmentworldpanickedatonceanddecidedtorushintoU.S.T- bonds, theirvaluesoaredinsteadoffell,andthevalueofjunkbondsandemergi ng marketbondscollapsedinsteadofsoared.LTCMwaslikeawishbonet hat gotpulledapartfrombothends.Ithadtobebailedoutbyitsbankersto preventitfromengaginginafiresaleofallitsstocksandbondsthatcoul d havetriggeredaworldwidemarketmeltdown. Nowwegettomystreet.InearlyAugust1998,Ihappenedtoinvestin myfriend’snewInternetbank.Thesharesopenedat$14.50ashareand soared to$27. I felt likeagenius.But thenRussiadefaultedandsetall thesedominoesinmotion,andmyfriend’sstockwentto$8.Why?Beca use hisbankheldalotofhomemortgages,andwiththefallofinterestratesi n America,triggeredbytherushtobuyT-
  • 74. bills,themarketsfearedthatalot of peoplewould suddenlypayoff theirhomemortgages early. If a lot of people paid off their homemortgages early, my friend’s bankmight not have the income stream that it was counting on to pay depositors. The markets were actually wrong about my friend’s bank, and its stock bounced back nicely. Indeed, by early 1999 I was feeling like a genius again, as the Amazon.com Internet craze set in and drove my friend’s Internet bank stock sky high, as well as other technology shares we owned.But,onceagain,itwasn’tlongbeforetherestoftheworldcrash ed theparty.Onlythistime,insteadofRussiabreakingdownthefrontdoo r,it wasBrazil’sturntoupsetU.S.marketsandevendampen(temporarily) the Internetstockboom.
  • 75. AsIwatchedallthisplayout,allIcouldthinkofwasthatittooknine monthsfortheeventsonAsokeStreettoaffectmystreet,andittookone week for events on the Brazilian Amazon (Amazon.country) to affect Amazon.com.USATodayaptlysummeduptheglobalmarketplaceat the end of 1998: “The trouble spread to one continent after another like a virus,”thepapernoted.“U.S.marketsreactedinstantaneously....Peo ple inbarbershopsactuallytalkedabouttheThaibaht.” If nothing else, the cycle from Asoke Street to my street and from Amazon.country to Amazon.com served to educateme andmany others aboutthestateoftheworldtoday.Theslow,stable,chopped- upColdWar systemthathaddominatedinternationalaffairssince1945hadbeenfir mly replaced by a new, very greased, interconnected system called globalization.We are all one river. If we didn’t fully understand that in 1989,when theBerlinWallcamedown,wesureunderstood itadecade
  • 76. later. . . . From themid-1800s to the late 1920s theworld experienced a similar era of globalization. If you compared the volumes of trade and capitalflowsacrossborders,relativetoGNPs,andtheflowoflaboracr oss borders, relative to populations, the period of globalization preceding WorldWarIwasquitesimilartotheonewearelivingthroughtoday.Gr eat Britain,whichwasthenthedominantglobalpower,wasahugeinvesto rin emerging markets, and fat cats in England, Europe and America were oftenbuffetedbyfinancialcrises,triggeredbysomethingthathappen edin Argentine railroad bonds, Latvian government bonds or German governmentbonds.Therewerenocurrencycontrols,sonosoonerwast he transatlanticcableconnectedin1866thanbankingandfinancialcrise sin NewYorkwerequicklybeingtransmittedtoLondonorParis.Iwasona panel once with John Monks, the head of the British Trades
  • 77. Union Congress,theAFL- CIOofBritain,whoremarkedthattheagendaforthe TUC’s firstCongress inManchester, England, in 1868, listed among the itemsthatneededtobediscussed:“Theneedtodealwithcompetitionfr om theAsiancolonies”and“Theneed tomatch theeducationaland training standardsof theUnitedStatesandGermany.” In thosedays,peoplealso migratedmorethanweremember,and,otherthaninwartime,countrie s didnotrequirepassportsfortravelbefore1914.Allthoseimmigrants who floodedAmerica’s shores camewithout visas.When you put all of these factors together, along with the inventions of the steamship, telegraph, railroad and eventually telephone, it is safe to say that this first era of globalizationbeforeWorldWarIshranktheworldfromasize“large”t
  • 78. oa size“medium.” Thisfirsteraofglobalizationandglobalfinancecapitalismwasbroke n apart by the successive hammer blows of World War I, the Russian Revolution and the Great Depression, which combined to fracture the world both physically and ideologically. The formally divided world that emergedafterWorldWarIIwasthenfrozeninplacebytheColdWar.Th e ColdWarwasalsoaninternationalsystem.Itlastedroughlyfrom1945 to 1989,when,with the fall of theBerlinWall, itwas replacedby another system:theneweraofglobalizationwearenowin.Callit“Globalizatio n RoundII.”Itturnsoutthattheroughlyseventy-five- yearperiodfromthe startofWorldWarItotheendoftheColdWarwasjusta longtime-out betweenoneeraofglobalizationandanother. Whiletherearealotofsimilaritiesinkindbetweenthepreviouseraof
  • 79. globalizationandtheonewearenowin,whatisnewtodayisthedegree and intensity with which the world is being tied together into a single globalizedmarketplace.What isalsonew is thesheernumberofpeople and countries able topartakeof thisprocess andbeaffectedby it. The pre- 1914eraofglobalizationmayhavebeenintense,butmanydeveloping countriesinthaterawereleftoutofit.Thepre-1914eramayhavebeen largeinscalerelativeto itstime,but itwasminuscule inabsoluteterms comparedtotoday.Dailyforeignexchangetradingin1900wasmeasur ed inthemillionsofdollars.In1992,itwas$820billionaday,accordingto theNewYorkFederalReserve,andbyApril1998itwasupto$1.5trillio n aday,andstillrising.Inthelastdecadealonetotalcross- borderlendingby banksaround theworldhasdoubled.Around1900,privatecapital flows from developed countries to developing ones could be measured in the hundredsofmillionsofdollarsandrelativelyfewcountrieswereinvol ved.
  • 80. According to the IMF, in 1997 alone, private capital flows from the developedworld to all emergingmarkets totaled $215 billion. This new era of globalization, compared to the one before World War I, is turbocharged. Buttoday’seraofglobalizationisnotonlydifferentindegree;insome very importantways it is also different in kind. AsThe Economist once noted, the previous era of globalization was built around falling transportationcosts.Thankstotheinventionoftherailroad,thesteams hip and the automobile, people could get to a lot more places faster and cheaperandtheycouldtradewitha lotmoreplaces fasterandcheaper. Today’s era of globalization is built around falling telecommunications costs— thankstomicrochips,satellites,fiberopticsandtheInternet.These newtechnologiesareabletoweavetheworldtogethereventighter.The se
  • 81. technologiesmeanthatdevelopingcountriesdon’tjusthavetotradeth eir rawmaterialstotheWestandgetfinishedproductsinreturn;theymean thatdevelopingcountries canbecomebig- timeproducersaswell.These technologies also allow companies to locate different parts of their production,researchandmarketingindifferentcountries,butstilltiet hem togetherthroughcomputersandteleconferencingasthoughtheywere in one place. Also, thanks to the combination of computers and cheap telecommunications, people can now offer and trade services globally— from medical advice to software writing to data processing— that could neverreallybetradedbefore.Andwhynot?AccordingtoTheEconomi st, athree- minutecall(in1996dollars)betweenNewYorkandLondoncost $300in1930.TodayitisalmostfreethroughtheInternet. Butwhatalsomakesthiseraofglobalizationuniqueisnotjustthefact thatthesetechnologiesaremakingitpossiblefortraditionalnation-
  • 82. states andcorporationstoreachfarther,faster,cheaperanddeeperaroundth e worldthaneverbefore.Itisthefactthatitisallowingindividualstodos o. Iwasremindedofthispointonedayinthesummerof1998whenmythen seventy-nine-year-old mother, Margaret Friedman, who lives in Minneapolis, called me sounding very upset. “What’s wrong, Mom?” I asked. “Well,” she said, “I’ve been playing bridge on the Internet with threeFrenchmenandtheykeepspeakingFrenchtoeachotherandIcan’ t understandthem.”WhenIchuckledatthethoughtofmycard- sharkmom playingbridgewiththreeFrenchmenontheNet,shetookalittleumbra ge. “Don’tlaugh,”shesaid,“IwasplayingbridgewithsomeoneinSiberiat he otherday.” Toall thosewhosaythatthiseraofglobalization isnodifferent from thepreviousone,Iwouldsimplyask:Wasyourgreat- grandmotherplaying bridgewithFrenchmenontheInternetin1900?Idon’tthinkso.Therea
  • 83. re some things about this era of globalization that we’ve seen before, and somethingsthatwe’veneverseenbeforeandsomethingsthataresone w wedon’tevenunderstandthemyet.Forallthesereasons,Iwouldsumu p thedifferencesbetweenthetwoerasofglobalizationthisway:Ifthefir st era of globalization shrank the world from a size “large” to a size “medium,” this era of globalization is shrinking the world from a size “medium”toasize“small.” . . . This newera of globalizationbecame thedominant international systemattheendofthetwentiethcentury— replacingtheColdWarsystem —and . . . it now shapes virtually everyone’s domestic politics and internationalrelations.Thebodyofliteraturethathasbeenattempting to definethepost–ColdWarworld[includes] fourbooks:PaulM.Kennedy’s
  • 84. TheRise and Fall of theGreat Powers: Economic Change andMilitary Conflictfrom1500to2000,FrancisFukuyama’sTheEndofHistoryan d the Last Man, the various essays and books of Robert D. Kaplan and Samuel P. Huntington’sThe Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of WorldOrder. While all of these works contained important truths, I think none of themreallycapturedthepost– ColdWarworldinanyholisticway.Kaplan’s reportingwasvividandhonest,buthe took thegrimmestcornersof the globeandovergeneralizedfromthemtothefateoftherestoftheworld. Huntington saw cultural conflicts around theworld andwildly expanded that into an enduring, sharply defined clash of civilizations, even proclaimingthatthenextworldwar,ifthereisone,“willbeawarbetwe
  • 85. en civilizations.”IbelievebothKaplanandHuntingtonvastlyunderesti mated how the power of states, the lure of global markets, the diffusion of technology, the rise of networks and the spread of global norms could trumptheirblack-and-white(mostlyblack)projections. BothKennedyandHuntingtontriedtodivinethefuturetoomuchfrom thepastandthepastalone.Kennedytraced(quitebrilliantly)thedeclin e oftheSpanish,FrenchandBritishempires,butheconcludedbysugges ting that the American empire would be the next to fall because of its own imperialoverreaching.HisimplicitmessagewasthattheendoftheCol d WarnotonlymeanttheendoftheSovietUnionbutwouldalsoheraldthe declineoftheUnitedStates.IbelieveKennedydidnotappreciateenou gh that therelativedeclineof theUnitedStates in the1980s,whenhewas writing,waspartofAmerica’spreparingitselfforandadjustingtothen ew
  • 86. globalizationsystem— aprocessthatmuchoftherestoftheworldisgoing throughonlynow.Kennedydidnotanticipate thatunder thepressureof globalization America would slash its defense budget, shrink its government,andshiftmoreandmorepowerstothefreemarketinways thatwouldprolongitsstatusasaGreatPower,notdiminishit. Huntington’sviewwasthat,withtheColdWarover,wewon’thavethe Sovietstokickaroundanymore,sowewillnaturallygobacktokickingt he Hindus and Muslims around and them kicking us around. He implicitly ruled out the rise of some new international system that could shape eventsdifferently.ForHuntington,onlytribalismcouldfollowtheCo ldWar, notanythingnew. Fukuyama’s pathbreaking book contained the most accurate insight aboutwhatwasnew—thetriumphofliberalismandfree- marketcapitalism as themosteffectiveway toorganizeasociety—buthis title (more than
  • 87. thebookitself)impliedafinalitytothistriumphthatdoesnotjibewitht he worldasIfindit. Inaway,eachoftheseworksbecameprominentbecausetheytriedto captureinasinglecatchythought“TheOneBigThing,”thecentralmov ing part, the underlying motor, that would drive international affairs in the post–ColdWarworld— eithertheclashofcivilizations,chaos,thedeclineof empiresorthetriumphofliberalism. . . . Ibelievethat ifyouwanttounderstandthepost–ColdWarworld you have to start by understanding that a new international system has succeeded it—globalization. That is “The One Big Thing” people should focuson.Globalizationisnottheonlythinginfluencingeventsinthew orld today,buttotheextentthatthereisaNorthStarandaworldwideshapin g force, it is this system.What is new is the system;what is old is
  • 88. power politics,chaos,clashingcivilizationsandliberalism.Andwhatisthed rama ofthepost– ColdWarworldistheinteractionbetweenthisnewsystemand these old passions. It is a complex drama, with the final act still not written. That is why under the globalization system you will find both clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations, both environmental disasters and amazing environmental rescues, both the triumphof liberal, free-marketcapitalismandabacklashagainst it,both thedurabilityofnation- statesandtheriseofenormouslypowerfulnonstate actors. ...Thepublisher...JonathanGalassicalledmeonedayandsaid,“I was telling some friends of mine that you’re writing a book about globalization and they said, ‘Oh,Friedman, he loves globalization.’What wouldyousaytothat?”IansweredJonathanthatIfeelaboutglobalizati
  • 89. on alotlikeIfeelaboutthedawn.Generallyspeaking,Ithinkit’sagoodthi ng thatthesuncomesupeverymorning.Itdoesmoregoodthanharm.But evenifIdidn’tmuchcareforthedawnthereisn’tmuchIcoulddoaboutit . Ididn’tstartglobalization,Ican’tstopit— exceptatahugecosttohuman development—andI’mnotgoingtowaste timetrying.All Iwant to think about ishow I canget thebestoutof thisnewsystem,andcushion the worst,forthemostpeople. APPROACHESTOGLOBALIZATION PaulJames There are many different approaches to the study of globalization, testifying to the diversity and vitality of the field of global studies. The diversityof theseapproaches isnoteasy tocategorize,however, inpart because of the intellectual climate in which most of the studies of
  • 90. globalizationhaveemerged. Studies of globalization and,moregenerally, studies in thebroadand loosely defined field of global studies did not become conscious of themselvesassuchuntilthe1990s;andbythenthedirect- linelineagesof classic social theory had either been broken or segmented. The social sciencesandhumanitieswereinthemidstofaretreatfromgrandtheory . Therewas a growing suspicion, in part influenced by a poststructuralist turn,ofanygeneralizingtheoreticalexplanationsofparticularpheno mena. This suspicion was paralleled by a claim made by some that the postmodern condition could be characterized by the end of grand narratives of all kinds: nationalism, socialism, liberalism, and by implication,globalism.Althoughinthepast,approachestoanytheore
  • 91. tical field could be comfortably organized according to three foundational considerations—theoretical lineage, scholarly discipline, and normative orientation— thiswaschanging.Bytheendofthe20thandintotheearly 21st century, those kinds of considerations remained useful by way of backgroundorientation,butthepatternofapproacheswasbecomingl ess obviousandwithmorecrossovers. There is an irony in this retreat from generalizing theory that is importanttonote.Itconcernsaparadoxthatisyettobeexplained.Atthe sametimethatgeneralizingtheorylostitshold,ageneralizingcategor yof social relations gripped the imagination of both academic analysts and journalistic commentators—this, of course, was the category of “the global.” In this emerging imaginary, globalization was understood as a process of social interconnection, a process that was in different ways
  • 92. connecting people across planet Earth. Globalization as a practice and subjectivityconnectingthe(global)socialwholethusbecamethestan dout object of critical enquiry. In other words, globalization demanded generalizingattentionattheverymomentthatresidual ideasthatanall- embracing theory might be found to explain such a phenomenon was effectively dashed. This has profound consequences for the nature of globalizationtheoryandhowwemightunderstanddifferentapproach es... . EARLYAPPROACHESTOGLOBALIZATION Although there were some isolated articles across the 1960s to 1980s directlyreferringtoglobalization— withthemostprominentofthesebeing by Theodore Levitt on the globalization of markets in 1983— more elaborateacademicapproachestoglobalizationlaggedbyadecadeors
  • 93. o. Theburgeoninganddominant journalisticandbusinessdiscoursesof the firstwaveofintenseattentionintothe1980stendedtobethinonanalysi s and thick on hyperbole. Most suggested that globalization was a completely newphenomenon symbolized by the triumph of the capitalist market.Levitt’swritingsignaledtheriseoftheglobalcorporationcarr ied byaworldwidecommunicationsrevolution. It took a sociologist of religion and a couple of anthropologists and socialtheoristsinthe1990s— scholarssuchasRolandRobertson,Jonathan Friedman,ArjunAppadurai,andMikeFeatherstone—towriteoredit the firstmajorexplorationsofglobalization-as- such,contributionsthatmoved beyondhyperboleorthindescription.JournalssuchasTheory,Cultur eand
  • 94. Societywere in thevanguardof thenewthinkingof thissecondwaveof attention. Earlier work, such as that of Immanuel Wallerstein and the world-systems theorists, or Andre Gunder Frank and the dependency theorists,hadsignaledashiftawayfromclassicimperialismstudiesas the major carrier of work on globalizing relations. However, in relation to understanding globalization itself, this did not lead to significant developmentsintheory,exceptintherecognitionthatglobalizationw asa centuries-oldprocess. The work of Wallerstein in the discipline of international political economycanherebeusedasan indicationof thedifficultyof coming to termswithissuesofglobalization.Insteadofexploringtheconsequen cesof processes of globalization—economic, ecological, cultural, and political— forunderstandingthecomplexitiesofcapitalism,Wallersteinrework
  • 95. edthe verities of a world system’s understanding: namely, that capitalism had gone through twomajor overlapping cycles of development: from 1450, andfrom1945tothepresent,suggestingthatcapitalismwasnowenteri ng atransitionphaseofterminalcrisis.Whatotherscalledglobalization, he said,wasjusttheepiphenomenonofthetransition.Herethesophistica ted criticofmainstreammodernizationtheorythusreducedglobalization toa reflection of the phases of capital. He limited its consequences to the domainofeconomicsorthenexusbetweencapitalandeverythingelse. Alternativelyandmoreproductively,theworkofRolandRobertsonto ok aculturalturn.Likethecriticalpoliticaleconomists,Robertsonrecog nized the long-termand changinghistory of globalization.However, unlike the dominanttrendthatforatimedefinedglobalizationintermsofthedemi se
  • 96. ofthenation- state,perhapsmostprominentlysurfacinginthewritingsof Arjun Appadurai and Ulrich Beck, Robertson recognized the complex intersection and layering of nationally and globally constituted social relations.One of hismajor contributionswas to show how globalization across its long uneven history contributed to a relativization of social meaningandsocialpractice,includingthenotionofa“worldsystem.” His workstillstandsuptoscrutinytoday,andhecontinuestobeamajorfigu re inthefield. Another key figure of this time, Arjun Appadurai, also followed the cultural turn, but instead of taking a critical modernist position on the changing order of things as Robertson did, he headed down the postmodernpathtoemphasizefluidity.Thekeycontributionforwhic
  • 97. hheis known is the notion of global “scapes,” unstructured formationswith no boundariesor regularities.Hedistinguisheddifferent formationsofwhat he called ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes.Thisapproachwasavidlyused foraperiodbefore it lost its standing as differentwriters realized that, apart from the categories of ethnoscapes and perhaps ideoscapes, his global landscape focused too narrowlyontheculturalpresentandtherecentpast.Broadercategorie s of analysis were needed to understand the unevenness of social continuitiesanddiscontinuities. APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEDOMAINOFE NQUIRY Athirdwaveofattentionemergedacrosstheturnofthecenturyintothe present. Journals such as Globalizations, Global Society, and Global Governanceemergedas thenumberofpublicationsexploded
  • 98. innumber. Oneofthemostimportantbroaderrenderingsofglobalizationcamefr om ajointlywrittenbookcalledGlobalTransformations(1999)byDavid Held, a political philosopher; Anthony McGrew, an international relations theorist;DavidGoldblatt,atheoristofenvironmentalpolitics;andJon athan Perraton,aneconomist. Interdisciplinarystudieshadbecomethekey.As signaledinthesubtitleofthebook,Politics,EconomicsandCulture,an d extendedinthechapterstructureto includea focusonglobalizationand environment,thisapproachworkedacrossthebroaddomainsofecono my, ecology,politics,andculture.Similarly JanAartScholteworkedacrossa broad series of domains. In his case, the domains were production, governance, identity, and knowledge. And, when Chamsy el- Ojeili and PatrickHaydencametowritetheirbookCriticalTheoriesofGlobaliza tion
  • 99. (2006),lookingbackonmorethanadecadeofdevelopingapproachest o globalization they returned to the useful categorization of economics, politics,andculture.Inallofthesecases,however,therewasnoattemp t to develop a theory of globalization as such. Rather these and other relatedwriters— writersasdiverseasJamesMittleman,GeorgeRitzer,Ulf Hannerz, and Heikki Patomaki—sought to explore the complexity of globalizationacrossdifferentdomains. In the domain of culture, for example, a penetrating critique of the dominantideologyofglobalizationbyManfredStegerjoinedwithoth ersin introducingthenotionof“globalism.”Initsmidrangeuse,globalismc anbe defined as the ideologies and/or subjectivities associated with different historicallydominantformationsofglobalextension.Steger
  • 100. inhisearlier writingsfromtheearly1990sfocusedonglobalismasneoliberalism,b ut as his analysis developed, he came to distinguish different kinds of globalism, including justice globalisms, imperial globalisms, and religious globalisms.Hehelpedus tounderstandthatglobalism is thereforemuch morethantheideologyassociatedwiththecontemporarydominantva riant ofglobalism—marketglobalismandideasofaborderlessworld. APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFNORMATIVEORIE NTATION Other ways to differentiate approaches to globalization include their normativeorethicalorientationandtheirpoliticaldescriptivestance. The mostcitedcategorizationofdifferentkindsofapproachestoglobaliza tion, which comes from Global Transformations, a book mentioned earlier, combines both of these categorizations and posits what it calls
  • 101. “three broad schools of thought”: the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and the transformationalists.Theyarenotactuallyschoolsatallbutorientatio ns. ThehyperglobalizersincludewriterssuchasKenichiOhmae(aneolib eral) and Martin Albrow (a critical theorist) who argue that a wave of globalization is changing the world fundamentally and supplanting older national sovereignties. The sceptics include Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompsonwhoarguethatwithcontemporaryso- calledglobalizationwhat we are witnessing is just another wave of internationalization. The transformationalists, including James Rosenau and Saskia Sassen, who suggestthatwhileintensifyingglobalizationischangingthenatureof world politics,culture,andeconomy,theprocessisuneven. APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFSCHOLARLYDISC IPLINE
  • 102. With the realization in the 1990s that “the global” required direct attention, the taken-for-granted assumptions of fields of study such as internationalrelations,politics,andsociologycameunderdirectchal lenge. In international relations, the realist emphasisonnation- statesasblack- boxentitiesinpoliticalinter- relationcameunderconsiderablepressure,as didtheemphasesofitscriticalcounterparts,includingevenMarxisma nd rationalism that had long recognized the long reach of both material processes and ideas across the world. International relations as a discipline had profoundproblemsdealingwith globalization, but into the newcentury,booksstartedtocomeoutbywriterscrossingtheboundari es of thediscipline, including international critical theorist JanAartScholte
  • 103. andinternationalpoliticaleconomistMarkRupert. Onedisciplinethatsawaseachangeinitsapproachwasanthropology. Itmaintaineditsclassicalemphasisonethnographicdepth,butitshifte dits orientation from internally focused microstudies of remote locales to attempting to understand communities, whether they be remote or metropolitan,intermsoftheirplaceinaglobalizingworld.Newsubfie lds ofhistorydeveloped,including“bighistory”and“worldhistory.”The field ofglobal studies itselfemergedduring thisperiodasan interdisciplinary approach tounderstanding therelationbetween the localand theglobal acrossthedomainsofsociallife. APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEORETICALLI NEAGE Adevelopingaversiontograndtheorydidnotmeanthattheoldtheoreti cal lineages became completely irrelevant, although it did mean
  • 104. that approaches associated with the classical social theories of Karl Marx, ÉmileDurkheim,andMaxWeber tendedeither todrawmore looselyon thosepastwritingsortoworkacrossthemsynthetically.Outofacritica l reading of the Durkheimian–Weberian tradition came the work of such writersasRolandRobertsonandAmerican sociologist ofglobal religion, MarkJuergensmeyer— althoughitshouldbesaidthatRobertsonwasalso influencedbyanopenversionofneo- Marxisthistoricalmaterialism.Outof theneo- MarxistlineagecamethevariedworkofPaulHirst,MarkRupert, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Tony McGrew, and via Karl Polanyi, Ronnie Munck.Third,severalwritersexplicitlysetouttoformulateapostclas sical synthesis. The most prominent of these writers was British sociologist AnthonyGiddens.Hehadbeenworkingacrossthe1980sand1990sona grandtheoreticalapproachtothesocialcalledstructurationism;howe
  • 105. ver, by the time that he wrote in an elaborated way on globalization, his approachhadbecomelesstheoretically integratedandmoredescriptive. Hismajorpointbecamethatglobalizationiscomplex,shapesthewayt hat welive,andislinkedtotheexpansivedynamicoflatemodernity. Marxistwriter JustinRosenberg immediatelytookGiddenstotaskfor theoreticalincoherence.Inparticular,hecriticizedatendencyinGidd ens’s writing(andinmanyotherwritersonglobalization)totreatglobalizati on and the extension of social relations across world space as both the explanationandtheoutcomeofaprocessofchange.Thatis,heaskedho w ifglobalization involves spatialextensioncan itbeexplainedby invoking the claim that space isnowglobal.Theexplanationand the thing-
  • 106. being- explained,he rightly says, are thus reduced intoa self- confirmingcircle. Takingintoaccounthiscritique,it isstill legitimatetotreatglobalization as a descriptive category referring to a process of extension across a historically constituted world-space as we have been doing across this entry, but it is problematic to posit globalization as the simple cause of otherphenomena,muchlessofitself. CONCLUSION Now,afterthreedecadesofwritingonglobalization,wehavemadeso me extraordinarygainsinunderstanding.Thehistoricallychangingandu neven nature of globalization is now generally understood. In the various scholarlyapproaches,muchofthehyperbolehastendedtodropawaya nd the normative assessment of globalization has become more sober and
  • 107. qualified. Scholarly approaches have tended to move away from essentializing the phenomenon as necessarily good or bad. Similarly, at leastinthescholarlyarena,therehasbeenasignificantmovebeyondth e reductive tendency to treat globalization only in terms of economic domain. Ontheothersideoftheledger,ourcentralweaknessofunderstanding goesbacktothecentralparadoxofglobalizationstudies— theemergence ofanaversiontogeneralizingtheoryatatimewhentheimportanceofa generalizing category of relations came to the fore. Globalization may simply be the name given to a matrix of processes that extend social relations across world-space, but the way in which people live those relationsisincrediblycomplex,changing,anddifficulttoexplain.Th us,we remain in search of generalizing methodologies (not a singular grand theory)thatcansensitizeustothoseempiricalcomplexitieswhileena bling
  • 108. ustoabstractpatternsofchangeandcontinuity. HOWGLOBALIZATIONWENTBAD StevenWeber Theworldtodayismoredangerousandlessorderlythanitwassuppose d tobe.Tenor15yearsago,thenaiveexpectationswerethatthe“endof history”wasnear.Therealityhasbeentheopposite.Theworldhasmor e internationalterrorismandmorenuclearproliferationtodaythanitdi din 1990. International institutions are weaker. The threats of pandemic disease and climate change are stronger. Cleavages of religious and cultural ideology are more intense. The global financial system is more unbalancedandprecarious.Itwasn’tsupposedtobelikethis.Theendo f theColdWarwassupposedtomakeglobalpoliticsandeconomicseasi
  • 109. erto manage,notharder. What went wrong? The bad news of the 21st century is that globalization has a significant dark side. The container ships that carry manufactured Chinese goods to and from the United States also carry drugs. The airplanes that fly passengers nonstop from New York to Singaporealsotransportinfectiousdiseases.AndtheInternethasprov ed just as adept at spreading deadly, extremist ideologies as it has e- commerce.Theconventionalbeliefisthatthesinglegreatestchalleng eof geopoliticstodayismanagingthisdarksideofglobalization,chipping away at the illegitimate co-travelers that exploit openness, mobility, and freedom, without putting too much sand in the gears. The current U.S. strategyistopushformoretrade,moreconnectivity,moremarkets,an d more openness. America does so for a good reason—it benefits
  • 110. from globalizationmorethananyothercountryintheworld.TheUnitedStat es acknowledges globalization’s dark side but attributes it merely to exploitative behavior by criminals, religious extremists, and other anachronistic elements that can be eliminated. The dark side of globalization,Americasays,withvery littlesubtlety,canbemitigatedby the expansion ofAmericanpower, sometimesunilaterally and sometimes throughmultilateralinstitutions,dependingonhowtheUnitedStatesl ikes it. In other words, America is aiming for a “flat,” globalized world coordinatedbyasinglesuperpower. That’sniceworkifyoucangetit.ButtheUnitedStatesalmostcertainly cannot.Notonlybecauseothercountrieswon’tletit,but,moreprofoun dly, because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of American powerhasmanybenefits,butthemanagementofglobalizationisnoton e
  • 111. of them. Themobility of ideas, capital, technology, and people is hardly new.Buttherapidadvanceofglobalization’sevilsis.Mostofthatadva nce hastakenplacesince1990.Why?Becausewhatchangedprofoundlyin the 1990swas thepolarity of the international system.For the first time in modernhistory,globalizationwassuperimposedontoaworldwithasi ngle superpower.Whatwehavediscoveredinthepast15yearsisthatit isa dangerousmixture. The negative effects of globalization since 1990 are not the resultofglobalization itself.Theyare thedark sideofAmerican predominance. THEDANGERSOFUNIPOLARITY Astraightforwardpieceoflogicfrommarketeconomicshelpsexplain why unipolarity and globalization don’t mix. Monopolies, regardless of who
  • 112. holdsthem,arealmostalwaysbadforboththemarketandthemonopoli st. Weproposethreesimpleaxiomsof“globalizationunderunipolarity” that revealthesedangers. Axiom1: Aboveacertainthresholdofpower,therateatwhichnewglobal problems are generatedwill exceed the rate atwhich old problems are fixed. Power does two things in international politics: It enhances the capabilityofastatetodothings,butitalsoincreasesthenumberofthing s that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts to overtaketheformer.It’sthefamiliarlawofdiminishingreturns.Becau se powerful states have large spheres of influence and their security and economicintereststoucheveryregionoftheworld,theyarethreatened by theriskofthingsgoingwrong— anywhere.Thatisparticularlytrueforthe UnitedStates,whichleveragesitsabilitytogoanywhereanddoanythi
  • 113. ng throughmassivedebt.Nooneknowsexactlywhenthelawofdiminishi ng returnswillkickin.But,historically,itstartstohappenlongbeforeasi ngle greatpowerdominatestheentireglobe,whichiswhylargeempiresfro m ByzantiumtoRomehavealwaysreachedapointofunsustainability.T hat may already be happening to theUnitedStates today, on issues ranging from oil dependency and nuclear proliferation to pandemics and global warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not the answer;it’sactuallypartoftheproblem.Amultipolarworldwouldalm ost certainly manage the globe’s pressing problems more effectively. The larger thenumberofgreatpowers in theglobalsystem, thegreater the chancethatatleastoneofthemwouldexercisesomecontroloveragive n combinationofspace,otheractors,andproblems.Suchreasoningdoe sn’t
  • 114. rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together. They mightdoso.Buteven if theydon’t, the result isdistributedgovernance, where some great power is interested in most every part of the world throughproductivecompetition. Axiom2: Inanincreasinglynetworkedworld,placesthatfallbetweenthe networksareverydangerousplaces— andtherewillbemoreungoverned zones when there is only one network to join. The second axiom acknowledgesthathighlyconnectednetworkscanbeefficient,robust ,and resilient to shocks. But in a highly connectedworld, the pieces that fall between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity.Theseproblemsfesterintheformoffailedstates,mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in
  • 115. subterranean networks such as al Qaeda. The truly dangerous places are the points wherethesubterraneannetworkstouchthemainstreamofglobalpoliti cs and economics.Whatmade Afghanistan so dangerous under the Taliban wasnot that itwasa failedstate. Itwasn’t. Itwasapartially failedand partially connected state that worked the interstices of globalization through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism. Can any single superpowermonitoralltheseamsandbackalleysofglobalization?Ha rdly. In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these problems, becausemorepressing issuesarehappeningelsewhere, inplaceswhere tradeand technologyaregrowing.Bycontrast,aworldof severalgreat powersisamoreinterest- richenvironmentinwhichnationsmustlookin lessobviousplacestofindnewsourcesofadvantage.Insuchasystem,i t’s
  • 116. harder for troublemakerstospringup,becausethecracksandseamsof globalizationareheldtogetherbystrongerties. Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a superpower,opponentswilltrytoneutralizepower,bygoingundergro und, going nuclear, or going “bad.” Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategiesof theweak. It’s abasic insightof international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. Butwhat if there is no viable group to join? In today’sunipolarworld, everynation fromVenezuela to NorthKoreaislookingforawaytoconstrainAmericanpower.Butinth e unipolarworld, it’sharder forstates to join together todo that.So they turn to othermeans. Theyplay a different game.Hamas, Iran,Somalia, NorthKorea,andVenezuelaarenotgoingtobecomealliesanytimesoo n.
  • 117. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another.Raisinguncertaintyaboutoilsuppliesisperhapsthemostobv ious methodofall.Here’stheimportantdownsideofunipolarglobalizatio n.Ina world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence.Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomesthemosteffectivemeansofconstrainingAmericanpower. SHARINGGLOBALIZATION’SBURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United
  • 118. States is bearingmost of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There’seffectivelyamarketoutthereforproliferation,withitsownsu pply (stateswillingtosharenucleartechnology)anddemand(statesthatba dly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchetsupboththesupplyanddemand,tothedetrimentofU.S.nationa l security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysisisoverblown.TheUnitedStatesmaynotbeabletostabilizean d rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang,andmanyothercapitals, includingBeijing, thebottom line is simple:TheU.S.militarycould,withconventionalforce,endthosereg imes
  • 119. tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challengingU.S.conventionalmilitarypower.Buttheycancertainly hope todeterAmericafromusingit.Andthebestdeterrentyetinventedisthe threatofnuclearretaliation.Before1989,states that felt threatenedby theUnited States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclearweaponusedtobealuxury.Today,itisfastbecominganecessit y. NorthKorea is theclearestexample.Fewcountrieshad itworseduring the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear- armed communistneighbors, itwasofficially atwarwith its southernneighbor, anditstaredcontinuouslyattensofthousandsofU.S.troopsonitsbord er. But,for40years,NorthKoreadidn’tseeknuclearweapons.Itdidn’tne ed to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.Within five years of the
  • 120. Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanshippaidoff.TodayNorthKorea is likely anuclearpower, and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein’sgreatstrategicblunderwasthathetooktoolongtogettothe sameplace. Howwouldthingsbedifferentinamultipolarworld?Forstarters,great powerscouldsplitthejobofpolicingproliferation,andevencollabora teon someparticularlyhardcases.It’softenforgottennowthat,duringtheC old War,theonlystatewithatoughernonproliferationpolicythantheUnit ed States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a
  • 121. formal alliancewithMoscoweverbecameanuclearpower.TheEasternblocw as full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non- superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannotoutsmartdisease,becauseitjustevolvestooquickly.Bacteriac
  • 122. an reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decadestocomeupwithanewgenerationofantibiotics.