CULT34857GD
Applications of Creativity and Innovation
PROF. MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA
ROLE MODEL CONSULTATION (25% of total Grade)
DUE DATE: Consult course outline
The Purpose:
· The purpose of the Role Model Consultation Assignment is for students to gain a deeper understanding of the practice of creative individuals with a view towards applying these insights to improve creative practice. Students will capture insights, learnings, and reflections in a short 4-5 page (1000 word minimum), paper, 12 point font, APA format; complete with a separate coverpage that includes a word count. Students will also include a separate bibliography with at least 2 academic sources (that are cited in body of the paper). To complete this assignment, students will arrange a 15-25 minute consultation session with a role model of their choosing. Students should structure the questions for their consultation around key points of interest (as defined by the student; aka. What do you want to learn from this person in terms of creative/innovative performance in the 21st Century? What key skills might you develop/focus upon?). While I don’t wish to tell you what to ask, here are some prompts you
may choose to focus their consultative discussions on the following:
· What, if anything, does the role model do in their practice to prepare for/entice creative insight?
· What practices or techniques does the role model believe are important for creativity and creative performance?
· What dispositions, aptitudes, or mindsets does the role model believe are important for creativity and creative performance?
· What trends does the role model feel are shaping their field/ the future of their field?
· What advice does the role model have for you in terms of improving your own creative performance and preparing for the future?
· How does these insights align with/support/ or compare with the literature we’ve covered to date on creativity and creative performance?
The Learning Outcomes:
Be the end of this assignment, students will have demonstrated the ability to:
· Identify a deliberate set of individual creative dispositions, habits, practices, and skills to be modeled.
· Appraise the relationship between creativity and innovation
Materials Required:
· An role model subject with whom to consult (do not choose your parent or family member)
Format:
1. Students may prepare their responses in one of the following formats (choose one):
a.
Written submission: A word document, inclusive of a title page (with a word count) with the responses presented in the pages that follow. Please format your document as a double-spaced, Times New Roman Font 12pnt font. I am NOT specifying a word count although student should recognize that the development a comprehensive response capable of achieving a good grade will likely require an effort that will be reflected, in part, in the quantity of the submission (in addition to its’ quality)- p.
CULT34857GDApplications of Creativity and InnovationPROF. MICH.docx
1. CULT34857GD
Applications of Creativity and Innovation
PROF. MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA
ROLE MODEL CONSULTATION (25% of total Grade)
DUE DATE: Consult course outline
The Purpose:
· The purpose of the Role Model Consultation Assignment is for
students to gain a deeper understanding of the practice of
creative individuals with a view towards applying these insights
to improve creative practice. Students will capture insights,
learnings, and reflections in a short 4-5 page (1000 word
minimum), paper, 12 point font, APA format; complete with a
separate coverpage that includes a word count. Students will
also include a separate bibliography with at least 2 academic
sources (that are cited in body of the paper). To complete this
assignment, students will arrange a 15-25 minute consultation
session with a role model of their choosing. Students should
structure the questions for their consultation around key points
of interest (as defined by the student; aka. What do you want to
learn from this person in terms of creative/innovative
performance in the 21st Century? What key skills might you
develop/focus upon?). While I don’t wish to tell you what to
ask, here are some prompts you
may choose to focus their consultative discussions on
the following:
· What, if anything, does the role model do in their practice to
prepare for/entice creative insight?
· What practices or techniques does the role model believe are
important for creativity and creative performance?
· What dispositions, aptitudes, or mindsets does the role model
2. believe are important for creativity and creative performance?
· What trends does the role model feel are shaping their field/
the future of their field?
· What advice does the role model have for you in terms of
improving your own creative performance and preparing for the
future?
· How does these insights align with/support/ or compare with
the literature we’ve covered to date on creativity and creative
performance?
The Learning Outcomes:
Be the end of this assignment, students will have demonstrated
the ability to:
· Identify a deliberate set of individual creative dispositions,
habits, practices, and skills to be modeled.
· Appraise the relationship between creativity and innovation
Materials Required:
· An role model subject with whom to consult (do not choose
your parent or family member)
Format:
1. Students may prepare their responses in one of the following
formats (choose one):
a.
Written submission: A word document, inclusive of a
title page (with a word count) with the responses presented in
the pages that follow. Please format your document as a
double-spaced, Times New Roman Font 12pnt font. I am NOT
specifying a word count although student should recognize that
the development a comprehensive response capable of achieving
a good grade will likely require an effort that will be reflected,
in part, in the quantity of the submission (in addition to its’
quality)- probably closer to 1000 words
3. b.
Video Submission: A video submission (creative entries
encouraged). Please note that I am NOT specifying a video
length requirements. Students should recognize that the
development a comprehensive response capable of achieving a
good grade will likely require an effort that will be reflected, in
part, in both the quantity and quality of the submission (not just
in its’ creativity). If video files are too large to make it into the
SLATE box… please create/submit the link so that I can view
the file. Thanks.—probably closer to 8-10 min works for length
c.
Some other creative hybrid: As discussed, I’m also open
to receiving mind-maps, open-letters, photo essays, etc… with
the caveat that whatever you submit MUST clearly demonstrate
an understanding of key course concepts and material
Whatever you choose to submit; students will find a way to
include a separate bibliography with at least 2 academic sources
(that are cited in body of the paper or the presentation).
Content for the Submission (Subheading guidelines):
While I don’t want to tell you exactly how to do this- here are
some topical subheadings that might guide your discussion:
i. Introduction to the Subject: A brief discussion of the subject
(who they are/what they do). This section might also include
the rationale for your choosing this individual; including an
explanation for why this person is deemed to be ‘creative’.
ii. Methods Section: A description of the format for the
consultation; including when/where the consultation was held;
how long the discussion lasted; and a list of the questions that
were asked during the consultation.
iii. Presentation/Discussion of the Findings: In this section,
students will present the findings from the consultation (you are
encouraged to present “block quotes” as evidence of the
4. subject’s response). Students will also follow presented
findings with a short discussion of their interpretation of that
findings (ex., how it relates to literature on creativity explored
within the course).
iv. Conclusion: A summary section of key insights taken from
the consultation.
v. Bibliography: Reference list of sources used/cited in the
paper.
Evaluation Criteria:
1-
Did not met learning needs and expectations
2-
Somewhat met learning needs and expectations
3-
Meets learning needs and expectations
4-
Strongly meets learning needs and expectations
5-
Surpasses learning needs and expectations
1
2
3
4
5
Appropriately polished formatted, grammar, spelling,
referencing
Substantive content, insights developed and reflected upon from
consultation, use of quotes, robustness of background and
5. findings
Ability to tie consultation findings with texts, theoretical
material from the course.
Overall demonstration of analytical capacity, complexity of
insights developed and portrayed
Comments:
Grade for this assignment:
Paper: /100
Total: /25%
Readings
Read the following:
6. Lesson 4
Ch. 5-7 in Sociology of Religion: Contemporary Developments
I included these files on folder
4-Pew Forum Report 2008 US Religious Landscape Survey
Social and Political Views.docx
4-Sanchez Carter 2005 AA Racial Identity Religious
Orientation.pdf
4-Woodward Gender in Soc of Religion.pdf
4-Neighbors in the Pews 2009 Schwadel.pdf
Assignment Instructions
In a reflective essay of 3-5 pages, and using the Christiano text,
Lesson 4 and online readings, your MTB exercise, and any other
credible and authoritative sources you might choose, please
address the following multi-part question in depth:
· Out of religion and politics, social class and power,
race/ethnicity, and gender (all of which you should have read
about), which concept do you see as the most relevant to the
modern world of religious belief and behavior? How does it
interrelate with at least one other of these concepts? How do
your observations apply to at least one of the religious groups
you’ve learned about?
SOC 420 Lesson 4 SEQ CHAPTER h r 1: Social Processes and
Power—
Politics, Race, Gender, and Class
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.
For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into
everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its
part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic
7. order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic
conditions of machine production which today determine the
lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism,
not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition,
with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until
the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care
for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint
like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment."
114 But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work
out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an
increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men
as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious
asceticism—whether finally, who knows?—has escaped from
the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical
foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its
laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably
fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our
lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the
fulfillment of the calling cannot directly be related to the
highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other
hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the
individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In
the field of its highest development, in the United States, the
pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning,
tends to become associated with purely mundane passions,
which often actually give it the character of sport. 115
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or
whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new
prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas
and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished
with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage
of this cultural development, it might well be truly said:
"Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity
imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before
8. achieved."
—From Max Weber,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, as
cited at
this Internet Archive copy--see pages 181-82 (PDF
screens 96 and 97).
First Things First—Politics, Social Class, Race and Gender, and
Other Fun and Games
Welcome to Lesson 4 of SOC 420! Just some notes for you all
today on the subjects we’ve been reading about, as well as a
comment or two about Max Weber’s
The Protestant Ethic. As you know, in Assignment 4,
you should be reading and writing about
religion and politics, social class and power,
race/ethnicity, and gender. (Yes, race, ethnicity, and gender
would all qualify as separate concepts.) Feel free to also
integrate any other major concepts that might impress you from
those chapters or from the alternative online readings that are
acceptable. All fair game—though, as with Assignment 3,
please remember as you write Assignment 4 to discuss the
named concepts first. Remember, no need to memorize
everything—just skim all the required readings—starting with
this lesson and the Christiano chapters—once to familiarize
yourself. Then come back to read more closely about what is of
most direct relevance to your interests and projects. Focus on
what’s most relevant first. Then show me what you’ve learned,
that you’ve processed it, and can think critically about it and
apply and interrelate the concepts. Do your research well, and
that’ll work! Here are the required readings in addition to the
text chapters.
Required Readings (see PDF copies attached on Canvas if links
9. malfunction or expire):
Religion and Politics: Pew Forum Report,
U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, 2008.
Chapter 2, "Social and Political Views."
(Optional but recommended: Feel free to read the
Entire Report, starting at Section 1. The report is a little
dated but still largely valid.)
Religion and Social Class: Schwadel 2009, “Neighbors in the
Pews.” Digital Commons, University of Nebraska.
Religion and Race/Ethnicity: Sanchez and Carter 2005,
“Religion and African American Racial Identity,”
Journal of College Student Development (46/3)
.
Religion and Gender: Woodward 2013 on Religion Gender and
Meaning. (Excellent overview and information, though feel free
to think critically. (
Optional Readings and Resources:
Religion and Politics:Georgetown University's Berkley Center
for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, a wonderful resource on
this topic, as well as The PBS Frontline series
God in America.)
Religion and Class/Economic Factors: Lincoln et. al., 2008,
"Religious Giving."(See especially pages 19-34.)
Religion and Race/Ethnicity:Pew Forum articles on US religious
demographics, many relevant to race and ethnicity. See also
The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion.
Religion and Gender: The online journal
Religion and Ge+nder and the
10. Center for Religion and the Professions at the
University of Missouri.
Again, in line with the encouragement in Lesson 3, as you
write, show your insights, analyze the named concepts (you can
add what you’d like about other material after that), make
connections with the course material, and explore what you’re
learning in depth!
So now that we’ve introduced those, just a few notes here and
there about religion and politics. First, as not only Christiano
but Johnstone, Putnam and Campbell, and many others point
out, religion has become a major player in the American
political system, particularly since the 1980s and the foundation
of “The Moral Majority.” Morally charged debates about
various issues ranging from theological (prayer in schools) to
academic (evolution) and to life itself (abortion, euthanasia,
capital punishment, etc.) have raged for the past few decades,
more recently joined by gay rights and same-sex marriage
debates and legal action. The June 2015
Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision on gay
marriage in particular seemed intended to settle the question, as
it has among some segments of society, though others have
since expressed misgivings on moral grounds. So the debate
continues, though the playing field has shifted substantially. In
any case, it is abundantly clear that many Americans—
conservative AND liberal alike—have over the decades used
their religious views to justify their political perspectives and
approaches. What’s the explanation? Here are just a few
thoughts on that.
First, both politics and religion involve deeply seated beliefs.
Interestingly, many religious believers in America today (even
including some members of my own faith) deeply value their
political beliefs, more than a few quite frankly even to the point
of appearing to believe more deeply in their politics than their
11. religion. Of course, that’s probably beside the point. Or, on
second thought, is it really? Especially with Edward Bailey’s
concept of “implicit religion” in mind? (See Christiano, pp. 50-
52, or
Edward Bailey's chapter in the Oxford Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion.) The two have become so intertwined in
our modern American political consciousness that it’s hardly
surprising to see, at least in practice (though not in name or
literal organization, as in the concept of
implicit religion—simply explained, the idea that
religious thinking and behavior is present in many different
areas of society, including sports, academics, science, and of
course politics), the Church of Political Correctness or the
Church of Health Care emerge, or perhaps the Church of Lower
Taxes, the Church of the Free Constitutional Republic, the
Church of Immigration Law, the Church of Anti-Vaccination,
the Church of Masks Don’t Work, and so forth, all depending on
what variety of deeply held political-religious beliefs one holds.
No, these actual “churches” don’t exist, of course—but
far too many people act as if they do and as if they have become
fully committed members. That’s implicit religion at work, in
this case in politics.
For better or worse, we also saw in the 2016 presidential race
the emergence of the (apparent) Church of Donald Trump, as
loyal followers flocked around a hero who seemingly could do
no wrong in their eyes while others gazed on, horrified. As we
know from the fervent loyalty of this group despite the various
crises and problems the Trump Administration encountered, that
“church” certainly seems to be sticking around—even after the
election of Joe Biden. Perhaps
especially after Biden’s win, disputed by Trump and an
increasingly smaller but still fervent core of his followers that
insists he actually won. This will remain an issue to watch as
Biden—
who appealed to religious sentiment during his own
12. presidential campaign— continues to govern in 2022, even as
numerous dates predicted for Trump’s re-ascendance to the
presidency have passed by without incident. It also remains to
be seen after several attempts to hold Trump accountable for the
Jan. 6 riots and other apparent misbehavior, most recently the
August 2022 FBI raid on Mar-a-Lago, apparently to recapture
sensitive nuclear documents.
Neither is the conflation of politics and religion fully
hyperbole. Some observers have pointed out that various
conspiracy theories rampant in American politics today—most
notably those connected with the shady, mysterious alt-right
figure QAnon, or more often simply “Q”—have distinctly
religious overtones and implications. As this piece in
The Atlantic explains,
much of Q (as with conspiracy theory in general) eerily
resembles religious belief, complete with the apparent ability to
convince followers that particular “prophecies” are true, if not
fulfill them outright.
Relevant outlines
the appeal of Q for American Christians, particularly
the less religious, while
Christianity Today explores the ultimate evangelical
question:
Can Christians consider Q Biblical?
For various reasons, possibly also related to the legal troubles
of InfoWars head Alex Jones (on trial for falsely characterizing
the Sandy Hook shootings of innocent schoolchildren as some
sort of government “false flag” operation), Q doesn’t seem to be
as active or influential during the Biden presidency—though
please note that this conspiracy theory is neither gone nor
forgotten, especially on the ultra-far-right. Moreover, the fact
remains that Q helped throw open the doors to conspiratorial
thought and helped undermine political legitimacy through
means that distinctly echoed religious processes, playing a key
role in the tumultuous events of January 6, 2021. I should be
13. clear that there’s no known connection between Q and Alex
Jones, but it is certainly intriguing that Q is much less active as
Jones has been embroiled in legal issues. In any case, it’s
ultimately undeniable that politics and religion are profoundly
interlinked in modern American culture and life.
That said, keep in mind one of the core ironies of American
society: According to our longstanding legal practice, there’s
supposed to be some sort of separation between politics and
religion, publicly and privately. However, we definitely have a
great deal of trouble doing precisely that, and we’ve only
scratched the surface. Questions arise: How complete is that
separation? How complete should it be? Might extreme
separation actually marginalize religion?
For more on the interrelationship of politics and religion in the
modern American Christian context, see
this insightful previously recommended video from Phil
Vischer (AKA “Bob the Tomato,” for those who grew up on
VeggieTales). As before, note that I haven’t fact-checked all the
details, so feel free to verify anything that seems off (I’m TBH
not sure about all the “Scopes Monkey Trial” details in
particular). But it’s generally true of the overall discourse of
modern Christian thought. Also note that just as it discusses
fundamentalism really quite well, some parts are also relevant
to our upcoming discussion of race later in this chapter as well
as religion and the media in Lesson 5.
Second, the interlinkage of politics and religion means that they
seem like the same thing, and can even
feel the same.
Sociologist Emile Durkheim suggested one possible
reason for this in his classic treatise on the elementary forms of
religious life, as he concluded that the “collective
effervescence” that in his framework drives religion actually
originates from the energy of the group itself. (
The full explanation from the Internet Encyclopedia of
14. Philosophy is here.) So in the Durkheimian framework, the
reason for such intense political and religious association would
be the commonality of collective effervescence (or social
energy) at work in both processes. In all fairness, not many
sociologists today truly “buy into” Durkheim’s notion of
collective effervescence as a theoretical construct. It doesn’t
have legs as a valid comprehensive social theory along the same
lines as functionalism or symbolic interaction. Still, the logical
train of thought seems instructive, particularly when examining
Trump’s highly energetic political following. Durkheim’s idea
of collective effervescence at very least suggests that the energy
of social activity helps underscore ideas that emerge from such
settings. So in this framework, a worship service and a political
convention (or even a Trump rally) would produce similar
feelings and experiences. Simply put, the “rush” people get
from the energy of such gatherings could certainly push a lot of
the behavior that follows.
The “collective effervescence” explanation seems true in some
respects, although qualitative differences between those settings
also seems relevant. I’m also not entirely sure this fully
accounts for the individual or social psychology of each
process, which probably also helps explain why few sociologists
cite the Durkheimian concept of “collective effervescence” as a
concrete explanation. ( Explaining the curiously still-enduring
Trump popularity phenomenon, for instance, requires examining
the multi-variate historical and socio-political context that
includes fears over illegal immigration and terrorism, an
ongoing refugee crisis, talk radio and anti-liberal sentiment,
distrust of established mass media (and a willingness to point a
finger at “fake news,” however defined), a backlash against the
advocates of political correctness and liberalism, the continued
unpopularity of Obama and Hillary Clinton among many
conservatives, the attempt to de-legitimize the election of Joe
Biden (STILL, nearly two years later), the rise of nationalism
15. and pro-traditional-Christian favoritism along with conspiracy
theory, the prospect of foreign interference in US affairs, and so
forth. But at minimum, Durkheim explains group religious
phenomena via the collective effervescence hypothesis, and
there may well also be various socio-political applications.
For that matter,
Berger’s
Sacred Canopy argument
about the legitimation of the socially constructed
and established
nomos may have found a political equivalent. If the
nomos is considered no longer divine, but a political
figure or celebrity, it could be legitimated in a very similar
way. Is this happening right before our eyes? Possibly.
Although some GOP loyalists voted for Trump simply because
they didn’t want to see Hillary Clinton or Joe Biden (or in the
far-right-conspiratorial line of thought, Kamala Harris) in the
Oval Office, other fervent Trump supporters have legitimized
their candidate as The Only One who could “make America
great again”—in doing so, also rejecting counterarguments and
evidence against their candidate while vilifying Hillary Clinton
and Joe Biden. (For various reasons, Clinton has historically
been easier to demonize, though Biden’s son Hunter has
certainly been pulled into the fray.) In all fairness, Democrats
and some independent sources and supporters have also vilified
Trump and other GOP figures in return. Moreover, much of the
media coverage of Trump and his administration has been
sharply negative, deserved or not. No matter where we sit
politically, our politics and political news coverage alike have
become indisputably toxic.
Nonetheless, the sense of legitimation of Trump was real in
2016, as a number of prominent conservative Christian leaders
endorsed and backed Trump despite his apparent lack of
religiosity. This support has largely continued, even despite the
armed revolt at the US Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021 and the
16. sentencing of many who openly participated in the unrest. Some
continue the unfailing support, blaming the FBI for supposedly
persecuting Trump by raiding Mar-a-Lago in August 2022,
despite the documentable fact that Trump had highly sensitive
confidential documents in his possession that he was legally
supposed to leave in place. In any case, the historic
unpopularity of both Trump and Hillary Clinton was
unparalleled in modern politics, resulting in a great deal of
politics-of-opposition as well as cynicism. A lingering sense of
malaise continued in the 2018 mid-term elections, producing the
116th Congress that expanded its religious diversity, including
the first two Muslim women ever elected to the House
of Representatives. Something of a “blue wave” in 2018 put the
House in Democrat control, leading to Trump’s first
impeachment, though retaining the GOP Senate majority was
the primary factor in his acquittal.
The 2020 election saw much less independent political activity
than 2016, with Libertarian Jo Jorgenson largely carrying the
banner for independents, unless one counts Kanye West, who
some believe entered the race to take votes from Democrat Joe
Biden, though if that was the ploy, it apparently didn’t work
well if at all. Meanwhile, with Joe Biden winning the
presidency from Trump in 2020, Biden has publicly reaffirmed
his Catholic faith,
though some Catholic bishops remain incensed at
Biden's political positions, which they see as at odds with
Catholic beliefs—most notably abortion. The Jan. 6 revolt then
led to Trump’s second impeachment, which most Republican
senators dismissed. However, seven senators, notably including
Utah’s Mitt Romney (citing conscience), voted to convict. In
short: The relationship between politics and religion in the US
has become much more complicated since 2016. Time will tell
what the 2022 election cycle will bring.
Third, religion and politics tend to mimic each other in terms of
17. social structure. For a more satisfactory and complete analysis,
please see Robert Bellah’s treatise on civil religion in the
American context. (
Bellah’s full essay is here.) The long and short of it:
Bellah argues that in America, we have infused our political
sphere with religious significance. Therefore, the American
political realm has acquired a religious dimension, which is
something of the flip side of the argument that many religions
have conversely acquired political overtones. Not only do
American political leaders—probably more true in the past than
the present, but still more commonplace at present than many
seem to believe—routinely invoke God, but the very American
political structure appears to have near-religious significance.
As Bailey’s “implicit religion” concept helps explain, politics
operate very much like religion. Again, given the overt
Sacred Canopy process of legitimation of the
intersubjective as actually having Objective significance, it is
hardly difficult to imagine Berger agreeing here.
As Bellah put it: In America, our “
sacred documents”—The Constitution, Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights, and by extension, the resulting
legal codes— generally guide our political decisions. We have “
sacred sites”: The Lincoln Memorial, Washington
Monument, the White House and the rest of the Capitol
complex, Gettysburg, and so forth. We have “
saints”: Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Lincoln, FDR,
and JFK, to name a mere few of the most prominent. We have
hymns and devotional music: The National Anthem,
“Stars and Stripes Forever,” “America the Beautiful,” and so
forth—and last but far from least, “God Bless America.” We
have national “
holy days” (holidays): Independence Day, President’s
Day, Flag Day, Memorial Day, Veteran’s Day, etc. We have
religious
symbols and relics:
18. Our country’s flag, Presidential Seal, eagle, and the
Liberty Bell among them. We allow our president to be
inaugurated with an oath on the Bible or other sacred texts. We
debate the religious views of our presidential candidates, and
even if some among us know a candidate isn’t at all religious,
the candidate’s most fervent partisans infuse the race with
politico-religious significance anyway.
Those of you who read the required Pew Forum research article
and/or watched the Frontline series have seen just now
interlinked American politics and religion really are. When we
speak of the separation of church and state, we are often
discussing an analytical distinction. As previously noted, we
still have a very difficult time doing so in actual practice. It’s
interesting to observe the conclusions the authors of
American Grace (who are political scientists, after all!)
drew about the 2008 presidential election. Notably, they
underscored the role of religion in the political process, noting
how profoundly the candidates’ religious affiliations mattered.
Was Barack Obama a true Christian? A number of detractors
even today, including more than a few Trump supporters,
continue to insist—falsely and a shade absurdly—that he is
actually a Muslim pretending to be a Christian. (
For the record: Yes, Obama’s father was nominally
Muslim. But Obama himself was raised in a spiritual-though-
not-overtly-religious environment and converted to Christianity
while living in Chicago shortly after attending college. The
conversion came without undue complications or
repercussions.) How much did religion matter to Republican
candidate John McCain in 2008? For many American religious
ultraconservatives, not enough. McCain was not “their kind of
religious,” as it were. Yet a scant eight years later, overt
religiosity and adherence to “family values” seems not to matter
at all for a fair number of the same believers—though
championing and advocating for religion and religious interests
certainly still matters.
19. Putnam and Campbell were no doubt riveted by the 2012
election as well, as Republican presidential hopeful Mitt
Romney—defeated in the 2008 primaries, partly over concerns
about his religious beliefs—not only gained his party’s
nomination but gained unprecedented support from conservative
Christians across America despite their historical antagonism
towards the beliefs of the church to which Romney belonged.
True, the majority of conservative evangelical voters seemingly
opposed re-electing President Obama more than they opposed
Romney’s religion. Significantly and ironically, however,
negative views of Romney’s religion mattered much more than
his politics to many top Republicans, especially to several ultra-
conservative pastors and religious opinion leaders. As with
McCain, to a substantial group, he wasn’t “their kind of
religious” either. As a result, evangelical support for Romney in
2012 was far from universal; neither was it whole-hearted nor
long-lasting. With Romney’s loss, many previous religious
relationships seem to have reverted, including the traditional
theological divide with traditional Christian faith groups. Still,
the 2012 election indicated that at least some Christian (and
specifically evangelical) voters would support a presidential
candidate from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
under a particular set of conditions. Whether this sort of support
would ever occur again, especially after the dynamics observed
in 2016, remains to be seen.
It seems to be the case, in fact, that the previously mentioned
traditional Christian religious leaders were so desperate for
“winning” after the 2012 loss despite squeaky-clean Romney
that they were willing to put aside the “squeaky clean” factor in
favor of a highly flawed but seemingly strong charismatic
candidate who still promised “winning.” Interestingly, many
ultraconservative voters with previous reservations about “not
my kind of religious” candidates turned to a political figure who
was barely religious at all. The unwavering support for Donald
Trump from some religious quarters has continued despite
20. numerous controversies, most notably the December 2019
passage of articles of impeachment against Trump in the House
of Representatives, accusations throughout 2020 that Trump
mismanaged the US response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and
even the aftermath of the 2020 election—including the January
6 armed revolt and subsequent second impeachment. Here,
official state certifications, virtually all qualified observers, and
the state/federal courts alike jointly attest that Joe Biden won
the election. However, Trump’s refusal to concede and
insistence that he actually won (thanks to vaguely given and
generally unsupported claims of Democrat election-rigging)
have only assured that his place as an American opinion leader
remains unwavering for the most devoted of his support base,
and survives even despite his ban from Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media outlets.
The Intersection of Religion with Race, Ethnicity, and Culture
Another interesting idea somewhat related to religion and
politics is the malleability of religion. Religion, as we
remember from Lesson 2, stems from our subjective perception
and intersubjective construction of the Reality we understand as
Objective. Keep in mind, again—in this class, we are not
approaching this issue from a believer’s perspective. The
Objective Truth of any particular religious perspective is
beyond our assessment. But we are taking a close look at
religion’s intersubjective dimension, in which religion acts as a
socially constructed entity. As such, religion as currently
practiced by many groups in our world today is malleable.
Because it is socially constructed, as with Berger’s
Sacred Canopy argument, it can be shaped, changed,
interpreted, and re-interpreted in order to fit the demands of the
group or society that uses it. Many political beliefs have shaped
religion over the years, such as the ordination of women and
acceptance of homosexuality in many Christian denominations.
Since religion has been practiced in a highly malleable way, it
has been used for particular ends. Considered in its dimension
of a social creation—or, by some motivated individuals, even
21. subjective experience—malleable religion can be used to
enlighten or oppress, teach or reduce to ignorance, bind or make
free, or to build or destroy.
According to Ronald L. Johnstone (in the text that was formerly
required for this class), religion—though not exclusively to
blame—certainly played a distinct role in the deculturation of
many slaves. Some of those brought over were already
Christian, but many others were not. Some were Muslims;
others held various African tribal-religious views. Still, most
slaves were Christianized. Johnstone presents a pre-segregation
scenario in the South, likely during the 18th and early 19th
centuries, where slaves and their owning families went to
church together. In a curious and highly ironic social inversion,
the masters occupied the lower level and the slaves were
relegated to the upper concourse of the church. Strange and
counterintuitive to physically place the slaves above the
masters, right? Not really when we think about it: On the upper
level, with only windows as exits, the slaves were right where
the masters could keep an eye on them and where they couldn’t
safely escape. These slaves “learned their place” in society
through the practice of religion. Later on, slaves and masters
attended church separately, with resulting differences in
religious practice and experience between black and white
churches in the South.
Here, questions of power present themselves, as the more
powerful white owners clearly justified their own actions via
the Christian religious tradition, both as they understood it and
as they used it. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the slave
owners used various principles of Christianity to rationalize
their actions and social position. In return, our own 21st century
perspective on religion as well as public philosophy, which are
both much different than theirs, contributes to a sense of shock
22. and horror as we consider the social outcomes. A great deal of
literature on race and religion is devoted to the Black diaspora,
slavery, and post-slavery periods.
Yet it should surprise none of us that there exist substantial
Black and white differences in religious perception and
praxis, as Dr. Michael Emerson further attests.
Those of you who read the Sanchez and Carter article have also
seen that the Black experience with religion has some
substantive differences with the Caucasian experience,
including a tendency to more closely integrate worship with
community and political concerns than generally occurs with
Caucasian believers. There is much less church-state separation
in the Black church. For yet another perspective supporting this
thesis, feel free as well to consult
Dr. Sandra Barnes’ reflections on W.E.B. DuBois’
Souls of Black Folk.
In any case, we speak of the Black church for a reason. Black
Christians, faced at first with worship under the watchful eyes
of their masters, and then afterwards with segregated worship,
truly did perceive and use the church differently than their
white counterparts. The Black church in America became not
only more energetic and enthusiastic, but also more community-
centered, more applied in terms of service and mutual assistance
(i.e., “let’s take care of each other”), and last though anything
but least, more explicitly political than worship tended to be in
the white congregations. Because the Black worshippers were
less culturally and politically powerful, their churches became
their cultural
and political centers where they put what they believed
into practice and sought ways to empower themselves.
Just a couple more notes about race. First, in my own religious
background, race and my faith tradition have had something of a
23. checkered history and have featured a fair amount of
misunderstanding—even among my fellow church members
themselves. I won’t dwell on this at length because I want to
devote time and space to other concepts in other contexts, but
let’s leave it at this: I take a personal interest in this issue
because of my two years spent living among and teaching
religion to a largely Black population in the Caribbean, where
this issue became real and human to me. My personal belief—
for whatever it’s worth—is that all races and ethnic categories
are, in the words of the Book of Mormon itself (if the truth be
known) ( “alike unto God.” (See
2 Nephi 26:33.) However, we human beings have
always had trouble looking past the historical biases and even
prejudices that we have inherited and/or socially constructed for
ourselves.
In any case, if you want more information on the church and
Blacks from a sociological perspective, click on
this intriguing explanation by the late sociologist
Armand Mauss, who was also LDS. Please note, though, that
IMHO Dr. Mauss has overlooked and oversimplified no small
amount of historical complexity by strongly implying that
Brigham Young was a racist. Considering some of the nuances
of that argument, yes, indisputably, some of Young’s opinions
are best described as racist by today’s standards—though such
views were also common in mid-19th century American society.
In that light, it’s valuable to examine
the nuanced perspective of Black activist Heather
McGhee on racism:
“There’s a false mythology that in the days of
segregation, the majority of white people were bad, evil people
and no one today could hold that position if they were fed the
same images and stories of why black people deserved it. …
Where did Southerners get the belief that there was something
so wrong with black children that they shouldn’t drink from the
same water fountain? It wasn’t inner malevolence; it was
24. images and messages that justified black people’s lower
position in society.”
In other words, racism is and has been so pervasive throughout
history that even decent people who thought they were doing the
right thing fell prey to it—a tendency which still continues
today in many other contexts. Many revered historical figures
still had racially dubious viewpoints and made racially charged
statements. Consider also that racism is NOT merely something
people either are or aren’t—
it’s a spectrum rather than a category. This means that
despite our best intentions and beliefs to the contrary, each of
us may be a little bit racist in our own ways—the important
thing is to recognize and counteract it as best we can. Brigham
Young had that problem, too, without the modern
conceptualization of racism-on-a-spectrum so that he could
recognize and correct it.
By acknowledging his racism, we need not conclude that Young
stalked the nighttime streets of Salt Lake City in white sheets
burning crosses in less-than-white people’s front yards. THAT
most certainly didn’t happen, either. As a matter of fact, his
views on Blacks aside, he actually advocated empathy and
service towards the Native Americans in the Western territory
of America, advising church members to feed rather than fight
them. He sent missionaries to various Asian and South Pacific
countries and welcomed members from those areas. He even
indicated that the day would someday come when Black
members would enjoy full privileges in the church despite the
restrictions he had announced and enacted.
In sum, his racism was essentially limited to banning the
church’s privileges to those of African descent and some fairly
harsh and shocking words about “the seed of Cain” in various
speeches. Let’s be clear: That’s still bad. Young was
indisputably racist in terms of Africans, which is typical of
others of his time, and unfortunate and ugly all at once. Still, as
discussed previously, Young leaves a lot of other boxes
25. unchecked if we want to consider him an actual white
supremacist. Moreover, interestingly, Young was also an
abolitionist and advocate for women’s education, being in those
respects a 19th-century
progressive. Since cultures also change over time,
resulting in different “time cultures,” studying history requires
that we try to step out of the lenses of the present and assess the
true complexity of the people we examine by the standards of
their time. So by all means, let’s do that. (
Second, though examining the Black experience is critical for
understanding the American context of race and religion, if we
only consider the Black experience as relevant, we
unfortunately overlook the role that religion has played and
continues to play in other racial and ethnic contexts. Ethnicity,
BTW, is a better or at least more realistic conceptualization to
adopt overall than “race,” which generally adopts mere skin
color as the sole marker of difference and becomes something of
a reified social construct when considered globally. Ethnicity,
too, is a social fact, though we can learn a great deal from the
cultures around us.
For instance, many Native American belief systems are virtually
synonymous with their cultures and also provide a rich
worldview. Consider, to only begin to scratch the surface, the
sheer profundity and depth of
the Navajo concept of
hozho, a complex quality and state of being that
includes multiple aspects such as joy, order, beauty, harmony,
health, balance, peace and completeness—all of which are
interconnected and interdependent—that native Navajo
believers see as an end objective. Trying to comprehend the
complex beauty of this concept will definitely expand the mind!
And that’s only one concept from one Native American
tradition; the beliefs of the Cherokee, Iroquois, Hopi, Zuni,
26. Apache, and many others are well worth examining and learning
from—though these complex cultures take a lot of effort to
understand.
Unfortunately, it’s also possible to regrettably skim past the
rich heritage and cultural contribution of Catholicism to
Latino/Latina ethnicity—which, unfortunately and ironically, I
may have to do, leaving you primarily with
this resource detailing the influence of spirituality and
religion in Latino culture. Since the alternative could be a 50-
page lesson, � let’s largely recommend this resource for your
optional reading and intellectual enrichment. The linked article
generally does an excellent job of discussing the development
of Latino spirituality in the context of a genesis of European
colonialism, the melding of a variety of cultural perspectives in
a Catholic worldview, and the key influence of the
Our Lady of Guadalupe religious experience. This
combination—and let’s not overlook the value of a “sign from
God” as a contributing factor—helped native cultures accept
Catholicism as an extension (not necessarily a replacement!) of
their existing lifeworlds.
Likewise, one only begins to understand Asian cultures with an
analysis of Buddhism and, in the case of Japan, Shinto as well;
much the same applies to the Eastern India region and
Hinduism. Eastern religion and culture alike are highly
intertwined. This is also true of the culture and religious
traditions of the Pacific Islands and the Australian aborigines.
Speaking of which, if you want to really and truly blow your
own mind from a sociology-of-religion standpoint, even beyond
hozho, try to wrap your minds around the mystical
aboriginal concept of
The Dreamtime. (And Emile Durkheim thought the
aborigines were
primitive. Hah! () The native religions of the Pacific
27. Islanders, though not as prevalent as they used to be, are
likewise interconnected with their governance and lifestyle. The
tribes simply did what they thought would satisfy the gods, in
their political and religious life alike.
In short, though we in America tend to embrace a pluralistic
model of religion (which the religious identity of Christianity
tends to dominate, nonetheless), race and ethnicity are clearly
linked to systems of belief and culture in the global perspective.
We likewise in our social context shouldn’t be ignorant of the
pervasive influence of Christian religious concepts in our
nation’s cultural fabric. We tend to shun the overt symbols in
our public space—see numerous court battles over Ten
Commandments monuments and Nativity scenes—but find it
difficult to escape more subtle influences, such as laws that
reflect and to some degree still enforce our religious beliefs.
Likewise for other races, ethnicities, and cultures, religion often
plays a key role in shaping and maintaining the associated
collective identity, whether this happens directly (as in Shinto,
for only one example) or indirectly (as in the complex
interrelationship of Catholicism in several Latinx cultures).
Gender and Sexuality
Religion also clearly shapes the discourse of gender and
sexuality. One preliminary note about the Woodward essay that
is listed as a required reading: I do NOT agree in any way with
her assertion early in her essay that the sociology of religion
has neglected gender issues. Ummm… really? Seriously? Not to
go on a rant about this or anything, but anyone who has read
and considered at length the work of Susan Starr Sered, Lynn
Davidman, Marie Cornwall, and many others on women in
religion just can’t reasonably make that argument with a
straight face! However, Woodward’s point may be valid if
somewhat restated: The sociology of religion has traditionally
adhered to a more static than dynamic conceptualization of
gender, in contrast to other sociological fields. Woodward
clearly prefers the dynamic version of that conceptualization,
28. which has not been as common in the literature on religion and
gender. So that’s what I think she
really means by that statement. OK, now that I have that
off my chest, I feel better. I think. (
In any case, when considering the interaction between religion
and gender, let’s consider this: In our modern Western world,
many of our religious systems have historically been male-
centric—and for that matter, also heteronormative and
cisgender—especially in the Judeo-Christian context. In the
Genesis account, the core founding narrative to all Judeo-
Christian believers, the serpent deceives the woman Eve and
convinces her to eat the forbidden fruit first, but the man Adam
makes up his own mind. God then appoints Adam as the ruler
over the woman. Hence, in the Judeo-Christian context, the man
has historically “ruled” over the woman (in many of the various
senses of the term), and historically, both Judaism and the
various Christian denominations have featured almost
exclusively male leadership. Islam also relies on this narrative
in general, though with a somewhat different understanding and
perspective, both overall and dependent on the collective
interpretation of the Islamic group in question. Still, the
outcome in terms of gender is more or less the same,
particularly for conservative forms of Islam. Buddhism in
general has likewise been historically patriarchal, though of
course for much different reasons than the Adam-Eve gender
narrative, and features substantial variation according to local
culture,
as discussed by this informed observer.
Historically, outside these traditions, the role and view of
women have been different, especially in polytheistic faith
traditions. Hinduism has sent some fairly
mixed messages about gender equality, so that in some
times and places, women were more equal to men than in others.
29. In Egyptian mythology, as with the corresponding society,
men and women were seen as equals, though differences
clearly existed in society according to social class. With a few
notable exceptions such as Nefertiri and the much later
Cleopatra, men were almost always given the ruling power as
Pharaohs and later equivalent titles.
Later, in
the Greek pantheon as well as its
Roman counterpart, the male deities seemed to hold
more power than the females, and the same tendency carried
over into the corresponding societies. However, we with our
21st century eyes tend to see women in ancient Greek society as
more powerful than Roman women, and then extend this belief
to their goddesses—but let’s not get too hasty. Yes, Hera,
Aphrodite and Athena were more involved and active outside
the domestic sphere than their Roman counterparts Juno, Venus,
and Minerva, relatively speaking. BUT—let’s be completely
clear about this!—
none of the Roman goddesses were exactly 1950s
suburban housewives! Not even Vesta, both the goddess of the
hearth and a fierce protector! The Greek and Roman goddesses
alike were strong women. No “Stepford Wives” here! In any
case, it is much more correct to see Roman religion as a whole
as more favorable than its Greek counterpart to the social
stability of the state; the Romans likewise gave more value to
home and family as the foundation of the state’s stability.
As a result, Roman society generally saw the true power of
women as that of nurturers of the rising generations, who would
perpetuate the Roman Empire. This domestic role went well
beyond the “June Cleaver mommy” stereotype. Mothers who
actively raised noble Roman sons capable of exercising wisdom
and sound judgment in the power they held were particularly
respected. So what constituted a “powerful woman” in Rome
30. was the wisdom, capacity, and resources she was able to pass on
to her own children—especially to her sons—and the wiser and
stronger she could be, the better.
Again, as the Romans saw it, motherhood was a
position of power. This view of mothers as domestically
powerful, however, is alien to the current constructs of
mainstream Western feminism. (See the “Mommy wars” online
for more information about that.) ( Moreover, since the so-
called female “cult of domesticity” prevalent in post-war
America superficially resembled the Roman ideal—but is far
from parallel, on a more in-depth examination—the concept
actually produces a fair amount of debate.
Still, in other cases, there is more gender-role divergence in the
pantheon of other religions. Shinto in Japan, for instance, not
only sees men and women as equal partners in the world, but as
potentially divine equal partners in creation as well,
since both men and women participated in creating the world. In
addition, in a number of localized tribal religions—
Hopi and
Navajo, for instance, in the American context—there is
a great degree of prominence given to women, where female
deities such as Spider Woman are seen as the actual powerful
creators, and women are given respect accordingly. Likewise,
though the basic beliefs are rather different
in Wicca, the social outcome for women is much the
same, and the concept of “Goddess worship” in Wicca and the
various traditions associated with paganism speaks to a sense of
women’s religious and spiritual empowerment in those
traditions. The women of these traditions certainly give birth to
and raise children, but this makes them powerful creators in
their own right rather than domestic servants of men.
The prevalence of these pro-feminist religious groups, along
with the more recent political and social campaigns for gender
31. equality, has resulted in more modern iterations of even the
major American religious traditions opening the door more to
women and female leadership. Many of the more liberal-minded
Protestant denominations have ordained female clergy and
leadership, where women make valued contributions, though a
number of more conservative-oriented congregations continue to
hold with the male-led leadership model. However, the Roman
Catholic Church has resisted ordaining women to its priesthood,
though some dissident groups have caused a stir by staging a
number of female ordinations anyway.
In the religious context popularly known as “Mormon” (larger
than the mainstream Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints), the “splinter group” Community of Christ (formerly the
Reorganized LDS Church) ordains women to its priesthood,
though many other splinter groups, including the Apostolic
United Brethren and the FLDS sect, do not. As some of you
probably know, the 16-million-plus mainstream church also
doesn’t ordain women, though it offers them leadership roles
within its Relief Society, arguably the world’s largest women’s
organization, as well as the church’s Primary and Young
Women groups as well as in mission leadership. Women in the
mainstream organization also teach in many church contexts,
and a new advisory position was recently created for women to
counsel with the faith’s core leadership.
So, perhaps in part because of this, some additional theological
considerations, and at least anecdotal evidence from many
women in the church I know who say they see no need to take
on even more work than they’re already doing, � this does not
exactly translate into a powerful groundswell of interest in
female ordination. In fact, the authors of
American Grace as well as polls by the Pew Research
Center indicated around 2010 that the vast majority of LDS
women—several studies claim around 90 percent—actually do
not wish to be ordained. It’s unclear if and how much
that number has changed since then.
32. Roughly mirroring this pattern, there’s a split in church
feminists on this issue. Some have openly advocated ordaining
women, including lawyer-activist Kate Kelly, who was
excommunicated in the summer of 2014 for “conduct contrary to
the laws and order of the Church,” according to the letter sent to
her informing her of the decision. Presumably, the decision
stemmed not only from her advocacy of women’s ordination but
of her role in: a) planning and organizing a protest on Temple
Square during the church’s April 2014 General Conference,
though the actual protest was rather small and gained only scant
media attention, and b) various efforts her local church leaders
saw as deliberate attempts to lead others away from the church.
However, other church feminists, including Dr. Valerie Hudson-
Cassler, point out the core irony of feminists asking men for
power. They instead advocate that female church members
explore the ways in which they already hold systemic and
spiritual power, and then work to broaden their influence
through those means. Dr. Hudson-Cassler has furthermore
argued that the ordination issue is superfluous, since to her,
women already have their own innate spiritual power
that needs no male approval—it merely awaits discovery.
(Please be aware that her article, which I find highly intriguing,
still may require a fair amount of knowledge of the church’s
belief, ceremony, and history to be properly understood.) In any
case, the issue of women’s ordination remains complex and
rather divisive in the church’s culture.
All in all, the relationship between women and religion is
profound and multi-dimensional. For those interested in
exploring the issue further, see the
Religion and Gender online journal, which appears
promising, especially in terms of exploring and interrelating the
many dimensions involved in this issue. The journal sometimes
publishes special editions focusing on various aspects of
religion and gender.
33. American Grace discusses a long-standing relationship of
tension between religion and sexuality; near the other side of
the ideological spectrum, Michel Foucault argues in
The History of Sexuality that religion has always had a
vested interest in regulating sexual behavior. In any case, a
close look at the historical record clearly shows that religion
has often had a great deal to say about how adherents should
practice sexuality. It is little secret that religious rules have
long existed that proscribe particular types of sexual behavior,
particularly in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic contexts, though
virtually all major world religions have had codes of sexual
morality.
For instance, the religious law of the ancient Hebrews,
reflecting practices seen today in modern conservative and
orthodox forms of Judaism (and later in Christianity), reserved
sexuality for the marital relationship between man and woman,
where sex was seen as sacred. Their law also forbade
homosexuality and other forms of sexual expression outside
male-female married relationships. This soon put them at odds
with their neighbors. The Old Testament chronicles a long
struggle between the early Hebrews and other native
“Canaanite” tribes over religious and political matters,
including substantial differences in sexual practice—notably
sexual behavior that was not only condoned but actually
featured in the native tribes’ religious worship. This was
generally denounced by the Hebrew leaders as offensive to God
as part of a blanket condemnation of “idolatry,” though
according to the biblical record, a fair number of Hebrews
indulged in these practices from time to time despite their
religious laws and accordingly received retribution.
This tension between sexuality and belief has remained constant
over time in many world religions, though the actual substance
of the rules has often varied according to time and context. For
34. instance, Islam, like ancient Hebrew culture, reserves sex for
male-female married relationships, thereby forbidding
homosexuality and other practices seen as deviant. Incidentally,
there are reports of localized pedophiliac practices in some
areas of the Middle East, including the rape of young boys in
Taliban-dominated areas. There is no known rationale under
shari’a law for this. To complicate the issue, a few
clerics do believe Muhammad married a child in his old age and
have likewise argued that
shari’a (in their view) may permit “child brides”—
though many other Muslims, of course, disagree. In any case,
Islam remains a complicated, diverse identity sphere with many
conflicting and some debated elements.
In other religious contexts, ancient Hinduism saw sexuality in
terms of quasi-religious devotion, as embodied in the
Kamasutra, though heterosexuality was clearly the
established norm; homosexuality, however, was not religiously
proscribed in Hinduism. Even more intriguingly, the story of
sexuality within Buddhism is highly complex and sometimes
varied by time period and cultural context, leading to a fair
amount of modern disagreement. But in general, Buddhism
established rules against illicit sexual behavior for men and
women alike and discouraged licentiousness in any form. Most
major world religions have various rules governing sexual
behavior in any case.
In terms of the Western world, the ancient Greeks were rather
sexually open; not only was Aphrodite the goddess of “love” in
essentially
all the socially constructed senses of the term, but Zeus
and other gods had a long history of sexual dalliances with
mortals, as fans of Rick Riordan’s
Percy Jackson novels and subsequent series know well.
( The Greeks also rather famously embraced homosexuality,
whether between lesbians—the word itself is derived from the
35. Greek island of Lesbos—or between adult men and even at
various times between adult men and younger boys. However,
even within this context, uncontrolled
eros or expression of sexuality was still frowned upon.
Despite the somewhat “do your own thing” reputation of ancient
Greece, it was never acceptable to simply act upon unrestrained
sexual impulse or exercise sexual violence upon another fellow
Greek.
The Romans, like many other cultures, were more sexually
restrained by comparison to the Greeks. Of course, however,
sexuality was certainly also far from unknown in Rome. It was
simply more channeled and structured. As Venus was—
relatively—more domestic and matronly than Aphrodite, so was
Roman society more structurally friendly to a more organized
form of family life, a more or less traditional form led by the
paterfamilias, the oldest living male. The
paterfamilias was firmly in charge of the Roman family
structure, leading out on matters ranging from child discipline
to arranged marriages. Homosexuality—though not unknown
and presumably not punished in Rome—was less prevalent and
celebrated relative to Greek culture. Furthermore, as
Christianity became more prevalent in the later Roman era,
especially as the two cultures intermingled three centuries after
the death of Jesus Christ, Roman culture gradually took on the
religious values of Hellenized Christianity before that culture
came preeminent in the Western world.
In any case, sexuality and religion’s role in governing its
expression is clearly relevant to our modern discourse. Not only
has there been a fair amount of controversy about sexuality in
the American context itself, most notably including the
previously mentioned Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints religious practice of plural marriage in the mid-to-late
36. 1800s and its ongoing continuation by splinter groups, but
sexual controversy has been ongoing ever since. There had been
something of a preliminary “Sexual Revolution” in the 1920s
and ‘30s with the advent of “flappers,” American film that
included fare from Mae West innuendo to outright pornography
(generally produced and shown in secret before “The Sixties”),
and other changes in popular culture.
Beyond that—and the authors of
American Grace cover this in the excerpt on Canvas—
we saw an outright “Sexual Revolution” in the late 1960s and
early ‘70s, in which premarital sexual behavior became more
widely accepted in society as a whole. Though far from
everyone in America participated in the anti-war protests,
counter-cultural celebrations, and so forth, the results rippled
outwards and gradually influenced all of American society. The
core issue of the “Sexual Revolution” was not necessarily the
presence of premarital sex. This has been present all
through our known history, not only among the Puritans
themselves but even (as our current nostalgia suggests) in the
supposedly squeaky-clean post-war America of the 1940s and
‘50s. However, “The Sixties” gave us the widespread
acceptance of premarital sex as a social norm.
Moreover, currently, we may well be undergoing a second
Sexual Revolution in terms of homosexuality, which was seen
by most people throughout most of the 20th century as deviant
but is now becoming normalized along with the issue of gay
marriage. See the June 2015
Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision affirming
gay marriage for more details. Yet, despite the ruling (which
was vehemently disputed in several justices’ dissenting
opinions), religion’s role in this issue remains debated. But the
battlefields remain somewhat disjointed, as traditionalists
continue to argue against homosexuality and gay marriage on
religious grounds while its proponents claim legal and
philosophical grounds of equality and anti-discrimination.
37. Regardless, the issue seems far from settled, to say the least.
Also, the even more recent rise of the discourse of transgender
rights and the variation of gender are opening up the discourse
of sexuality and variation to even wider levels. See the marriage
and family Lesson 6 subtopic for more discussion of these
complex issues.
Despite individuals’ stances on these issues—or perhaps better
said,
because of them—sexuality and its regulation remains
highly controversial, whether in the field of religion or secular
philosophy. Hence, religion’s role in this process of sexual
regulation and the resulting conflict is well worth examining.
Some resources on this issue for further reading and information
include
"Sexuality and Fertility" from the Hartford Seminary,
this 2008 study at Santa Clara University involving how
directly faith informs sexual attitudes and behaviors among a
group of religious university students, and resources located at
The Claremont School of Theology's Center for
Sexuality, Gender, and Religion.
Social Class and the Economy
To begin to wrap it all up, just a few words about the
relationship of social class and the economy to religion. As we
read up front in the quote at the top of the lesson, Max Weber’s
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism analyzed
this longstanding relationship more than a century ago. Weber’s
main findings in that study, partially quoted at the top, noted
that capitalism, especially in early America, depended on a sort
of ethos that was derived from Protestantism. Think in terms of
Benjamin Franklin’s
Poor Richard’s Almanac, if you will:
·
A penny saved is a penny earned,
38. ·
A stitch in time saves nine,
·
If you'd be wealthy, think of saving more than of
getting:
The Indies have not made Spain rich, because her Outgoes equal
her Incomes.
·
Up, sluggard, and waste not life; in the grave will be
sleep enough.
·
Genius without Education is like Silver in the Mine.
·
The thrifty maxim of the wary Dutch / Is to save all the
money they can touch.
·
Haste makes Waste.
·
Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy,
wealthy, and wise.
Underlying those maxims, and many more, from the somewhat
ironically named Poor Richard is an underlying ethos of
economy and judicious management practice. Weber contends
that this ethos is derived from America’s early Protestant
history, which encouraged saving and thrift—as opposed to
more modern consumer spending—as well as the wise use of
time and resources. In the Protestant view, according to Weber,
wealth was seen as a “blessing” or gift from God that could be
used to do good, and so it needed to be treated with respect and
39. used conscientiously and with the utmost care. Some Judeo-
Christian religious groups have historically feared wealth
itself—that is, before Andrew Carnegie’s
Gospel of Wealth in 1889, and the even more recent
advent of “
The Prosperity Gospel”—which, importantly, should
NOT be seen as the same thing!—but many others have seen
value in having the resources and avoiding “greed,” or love of
the resources rather than God.
Not only this, but work itself was seen as a divine principle—
the believer’s way of helping God do God’s work. God created
the believers for a particular purpose, including one’s skills,
abilities, and ultimately life’s work. In the
Protestant Ethic perspective, God gave people gifts and
resources to both work and to help others, so if a believer could
be wealthy, this would develop his (or her) generosity to help
others—life’s ultimate purpose. Hence, to find that purpose and
life’s work was to participate in harmony with God. So work, to
the believer, was not only a job or profession, but an actual
“calling” from God.
Thus, believers would work at their life’s callings, saving
money and amassing wealth for the glory of God, allowing a
tremendous amount of capital and business to be built up.
Weber thereby established a clear link between religion and
economic considerations, one that has been confirmed by
numerous observations since then. The optional Lincoln reading
is merely one of those, in which religious believers feel the
need to use their surplus means to take care of others, or simply
just donate resources they feel they don’t need to charity.
Moreover, as particular religious believers gained sufficient
wealth, social class and status became core considerations in
religious life as well. However, as pointed out in the Schwadel
reading, it’s important not to make too much of this
observation; his conclusion is that contemporary Christian
40. congregations tend to be more diverse in terms of social status
than they are in terms of race. This is partly because religious
congregations are still spatially located in particular areas,
within which is a variety of socio-economic strata.
But back to a key point about the
Protestant Ethic. Significantly, these ideals and
expectations, which Weber saw among the Puritans and
Separatists (among others), did not remain exclusively
religious, but passed into the secular culture as well, where it
took root. As a result, even when these sects died out, the
overall ethos of the Protestant Ethic remained entrenched in the
capitalist culture of North America. Though many of the
secularized American capitalists were no longer working for the
glory of God, they still saved money, used their resources
wisely, and remained devoted to their careers, whether or not
they realized where the ethos came from. Although our modern
version of capitalism has gradually drifted to a form of
consumerism, many of the same impulses remain: To save, to
use resources wisely, and to devote extensive amounts of time
and energy to one’s work.
It is in this light that we can consider the contemporary
American relationship between religion, economy, and social
class. Often, religion suggests our relationship to the material
world around us. Most religions oppose materialism
per se, or at least the greed associated with it, although
they diverge on exactly how to recognize and deal with
materialism. Some mistrust wealth in all forms, seeing money
and resources as necessary evils; others see wealth as a blessing
from God. Yet others see wealth not necessarily as a divine gift
but more of a divine trust that allows them to be able to help the
less fortunate. (This was the main idea behind Carnegie’s
Gospel of Wealth.) These encourage gaining wealth in
order to do good for others and allow and encourage the
believer to be generous. As part of their teachings about
materialism and their recommended approach, they address the
41. issues of social class, which virtually by definition is
inequitable.
History has seen a handful of attempts to directly address that
inequity, such as in various attempts to pool and share resources
among a community of believers. Despite current political
rhetoric from some quarters, capitalism isn’t necessarily
divinely ordained; the religious world has at various times
explored a number of alternatives in order to try to resolve the
chronic problem of poverty. For instance, according to the New
Testament Book of Acts (4:32), the early Christian community
“had all things common.” This experiment was echoed in the
19th century American Transcendental communal social
experiment of
George Ripley’s Brook Farm as well as the early
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ practice of the
United Order. (Which technically took the form of
multiple “orders,” as people in various communities tended to
pool resources together by their location rather than routing
those resources through a centralized clearinghouse and so
forth.) These two efforts and others in early Transcendental
America attempted to practice a different and more equitable
economic model than capitalism. So within religion, there have
been efforts to reform the actual economic structure.
More common in post-Civil-War America, however, was the
view of wealth as a divine trust. The Social Gospel was a key
part of the context. Emerging from the preaching of
Walter Rauschenbusch and others featured on this link,
this movement came about as pastors in the Northern states
became horrified by conditions that new immigrants were forced
to endure, particularly in New York City and Chicago. It was
also a reaction against the
Social Darwinism of the Gilded Age, or (in brief) the
idea that the richest and most successful men were the most fit
to run society. The Social Gospel encouraged sharing wealth to
42. do good for others instead of merely building wealth for
power’s sake, inspiring a wave of humanitarian efforts that
prospered alongside the Robber Barons, such as Jane Addams
and Hull House in Chicago. By 1890, as previously referenced,
Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth came on board.
Though not strictly a devotee of the Social Gospel
per se, Carnegie (at one point the richest man in
America) took capitalism for granted and simply affirmed that
those who amassed vast quantities of wealth in turn faced a
divine obligation to share it.
Over the years that have followed, this Social Gospel/Gospel of
Wealth ethos has since been secularized as philanthropy.
Modern magnates such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and others
who have signed on to “The Giving Pledge” (a modern
secular echo of The Gospel of Wealth) have donated sums from
vast fortunes—most not necessarily out of divine conviction,
but in pursuit of tax deductions or for more directly practical
reasons. Buffett, for instance, simply didn’t believe he would do
his descendants any favors, to say the least, by handing down
his entire fortune to them. Even more intriguingly, there is
the curious case of Chuck Feeney, a somewhat reclusive
American-born billionaire who quickly amassed a fortune in
Japan’s economic boom of the 1960s. For reasons that remain
unclear, he vowed to give every cent of it away to quality
causes well before he died and spent much of his time
researching where his donations would do the most good. Citing
only a vague notion that “people who have money have an
obligation [to do good with it],” Feeney’s actions also parallel a
more secular Carnegie approach. In September 2020, reports
broke that
Feeney had accomplished his goal of, well, being broke.
Also as previously mentioned, in more recent years the
Prosperity Gospel has taken root, with those subscribing to it
proclaiming that riches are a blessing to God’s faithful and thus
a sign of God’s favor. (
43. An interesting take on the Prosperity Gospel from NPR
here.) Through church income, publishing royalties, speaking
fees, and other sources of revenue, pastors such as Joel Osteen,
Paula White, and Kenneth Copeland have made literal millions
from their preaching and other products. This development also
made it possible to argue that Donald Trump was chosen by God
because of his riches, and many Christian believers have
accepted that argument.
In any case, in the modern American context, the capitalist
economic structure is considered firmly established, and despite
some remnants of the Social Gospel, religions today generally
don’t seek to challenge this social norm. Accordingly, most
modern American and even world religions, like Carnegie, take
the issue of social class for granted and seek to resolve the
inequities of capitalism on the ground, as in the case of
Mother Teresa and others, or seek wealth as a sign of
God’s favor, as in the Prosperity Gospel. Regardless, capitalism
resonates in the current political and religious marketplace
largely because it is associated with the rhetoric of freedom.
The free North American political marketplace has also allowed
for the amassing of copious amounts of wealth, to extents
unheard of even in the Gilded Age.
Still, however, difficulties persist, as religions grapple not only
with the historic problem of poverty but with the corresponding
prevalence of greed, materialism, and power. The dedication to
capitalism gives rise to a curiously ironic inversion of the
Golden Rule—those who have the gold make the rules—as well
as the normalization of a consumer culture that risks additional
problems for religious belief and practice. Questions abound
involving alternative economic forms—particularly socialism,
long the bugbear of capitalism. For instance, some ask, is
unbridled capitalism (sometimes referred to as capitalism
without a soul), as Ayn Rand depicts in her novels
44. The Fountainhead and
Atlas Shrugged, still really any better than socialism?
Does our American experience with the late 19th century
“robber barons” (AKA “captains of industry”) have any
relevance to that question? But in any case, religion, economic
factors, and social class are all interlinked, particularly in the
North American cultural context, and religion seems to be
surviving despite the challenges.
And with all that, let’s end! I look forward to reading your
comments in Assignment 4!
America’s Hero or Dangerous Don? For better or worse, 2016
saw the election of Donald Trump, who polarized American
politics and gathered a loyal throng of devotees who supported
him, er, religiously. Curiously, Trump won then and continued
to persist despite defying many of the traditional “rules” of
American political discourse. He also openly appealed to some
historical sympathies of Christian religious voters despite not
being religious himself, and showed little support for other
religious identities—even proposing an immigration ban on
Muslims coming to America during his campaign. The ongoing
relationship of religion and politics and the paradoxes presented
during the presidency were hallmarks of the Trump
administration. All culminated in Trump’s loss to Joe Biden in
2020 despite continual protests from Trump that he had actually
won and devout near-religious belief by some Trump enthusiasts
that their hero would ultimately be proven the winner and retain
the Oval Office. Image from people.com.
The Election of 2016 spawned a great many social media memes
reflecting profound political cynicism, including this image
credited to kkwalker.
45. Past U.S. presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
Theodore Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln are memorialized on
Mt. Rushmore. What is the significance of this in terms of
Robert Bellah’s concept of an American “civil religion”? Image
from � HYPERLINK
"http://www.religionlink.com/tip_090204.php"
�www.religionlink.com�.
French painter François-Auguste Biard depicted the slave trade
in the early 1830s. Image from Wikimedia Commons.
A pictorial representation of hozho that clearly represents the
sense of interconnected balance and harmony. Image from
rootsandwingsfoundation.blogspot.com.
One representation of the traditional Christian origin myth of
Adam, Eve, and the Serpent/Devil, along with the expulsion
from the Garden of Eden. Image from � HYPERLINK
"https://perswww.kuleuven.be/~u0010542/theory/sin.html" t
"_blank" �perswww.kuleuven.be�.
A depiction of the Shinto creation story, as male and female
deities work together to create the Earth. Image from �
HYPERLINK "http://www.makethelist.net/the-top-10-deities-in-
shinto-mythology/" �www.makethelist.net�.
46. A Navajo artist’s tribute to the creator goddess Spider Woman,
who also taught her people to farm and to weave cloth. She is
sometimes shown as agelessly young and other times as old and
wise. Image from the Jesse Lee Project.
“The Sixties”—actually from about 1966-75—was a time of
counter-culture protest against the Vietnam War, consumerism,
and various existing norms of American life, including many
relevant to sexuality. Image from bizpacreview.com.
Jane Addams, humanitarian founder of Chicago’s Hull House in
the late 19th century. Image from iipdigital.usembassy.gov.
17
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Gender Differences in Religious Practice and Significance
Linda Woodhead
For reasons which merit separate analysis, the Sociology of
Religion has lagged
behind many other fields in taking gender seriously. Whilst
small-scale, ethnographic
studies have been most likely to recognise the significance of
gender, dominant
theoretical frameworks within the Sociology of Religion often
remain gender-blind.
Although there has been some debate about why women, in the
West at least, are
more religious than men,
1
this has largely taken place in isolation from what are still
considered to be the „big‟ issues in the sociological analysis of
religion, most notably
issues concerning the growth and decline of religion in modern
societies.
48. This inattention to gender contrasts with the liveliness of
gender studies within the
academy in recent decades. There have been a number of
significant advances in
theorising gender, most notably in three related areas. First, the
idea that a distinction
can be drawn between a biologically-given „sex‟ and a socially-
constructed „gender‟
has been widely discredited. Historical studies like Laqueur
(1990) demonstrate that
sex is historically and culturally variable, with the modern idea
of two separate sexes
representing a shift away from the longer-established western
view that there is a
single male sex, of which the female is an inferior
manifestation. The „sex and
gender‟ model has also been undermined by a model of
sex/gender as produced in and
by social processes and performances (Butler, 1999), or as a
form of „social
embodiment‟ (Connell, 2002). The latter view stresses the
mutual constitution of
bodies and social processes, such that it is impossible to prise
them apart, whilst the
49. former tends to reduce the bodily to the social. Second,
rejection of the „sex and
gender‟ model is bound up with a rejection of the idea that
there are „two spheres‟ of
masculinity and femininity or male and female. Psychological
research on sex
difference has failed to find any large or universal differences
between men and
women (for a summary see Kimmel, 2000), and there is a
growing awareness that in
different cultural contexts gender can be viewed as one or as
many, rather than as
binary. Finally, these developments have rendered talk about
„sex roles‟ – a term
which implies a sex and gender model – problematic. The idea
that individuals are
socialised into sex roles in childhood has been supplemented by
the idea that
sex/gender differences are continually negotiated throughout the
life-course, in a
process which is active as well as passive. Thus investigation
into „femininities‟ and
„masculinities‟ is replacing study of „sex roles‟, one
consequence of which is to move
50. the research agenda away from a concentration on „women‟
alone.
Cumulatively, these developments have led to a shift away from
the so-called
„essentialism‟ of the 1970s and early 1980s which set „women‟
against „men‟,
towards a view which prefers to stress the multiple
„differences‟ which go to make up
identities. This shift has rendered talk of talk „patriarchy‟
suspect, since the idea that
men systematically dominate, oppress and exploit women is
challenged by the view
that society is structured by a complex set of differences
(ethnic, racial, gendered,
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51. class-based), and that both men and women occupy and
negotiate a range of different
positions within this complex matrix. Under the towering
influence of Michel
Foucault many writers dismiss the idea of power as a possession
which is unequally
distributed in society, above all between men and women, in
favour of a picture of
power as constantly negotiated in the small, ceaseless, real-time
interactions between
individuals. There is, however, a countervailing move by others
who believe that the
stress on „capillary‟ rather than „arterial‟ power has gone too
far (for example, Sayer
2004; Skeggs, 1997, 2004), and that talk of „differences‟ must
not be allowed to mask
the massive and consolidated inequalities of power which still
structure contemporary
societies – including, pre-eminently, that between men and
women.
This, then, is the lively tradition of debate with which the
Sociology of Religion has
thus far entered into only limited dialogue. As I will illustrate
52. in this chapter, there
have been a number of significant sociological contributions to
the study of religion
and gender in recent decades, which have nevertheless failed to
make a significant
impact upon the wider field of gender studies.
2
Even within the Sociology of Religion
itself, those who engage with gender issues have failed to
convince many of their
colleagues that such a move is not an optional extra or an
interesting specialisation,
but an essential corrective to the gender-blindness which has,
until now, restricted the
discipline‟s field of vision. The argument still has to be won
that removal of these
blinkers has consequences for the entire discipline – its
methods, its theories, its
critical tools and concepts, its focus, its areas of concentration,
its specialisations, its
hierarchies, its institutional forms and material practices.
One consequence of this patchy and partial interaction is that
there is as yet no agreed
53. „syllabus‟ in the sociological study of religion and gender, no
tried and tested way of
approaching the subject, no theory or theories of religion and
gender. Of necessity
then, this chapter cannot simply summarise the „state of the art‟
and suggest how it
can or should develop in the future – it must also try to fill in
some of the gaps. It will
approach this task, first, by sketching a theoretical framework
for understanding
religion and gender, and then by substantiating the theory by
reference to some key
studies of aspects of religion and gender. Next, the significance
of gender for the
sociological study of religion will be illustrated in relation to
classic theories of
secularization. The chapter will end with a brief sketch of
additional areas in which
attention to gender has the potential to disrupt and reform
agendas in the sociological
study of religion.
Starting points for a theory of gender and religion
54. To take gender seriously in the study of religion means taking
power seriously as
well. Although the theme of power has been neglected in recent
sociological thinking
about religion (Beckford, 1983), classical Sociology
investigated relations between
religion and economic power (for example, Weber, 1992 [orig.
1904-1905]), religion
and class (for example Halévy, 1949), and religion and political
power (still a topic of
interest – see the work of Martin, 1977, 2005 and Norris and
Inglehart, 2004, for
example). Religion and gender – and arguably religion and
ethnicity – is the missing
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55. element in this programme. A theoretical account of the
relations between religion
and gender requires an acknowledgement that both serve to
represent, embody and
distribute power within society, plus an account of how these
two systems of
distribution may relate to one another.
i. Gender and power
Attention to gender demands attention to power because gender
is inseparably bound
up with the unequal distribution of power in society. Recent
developments in gender
theory have, if anything, reinforced awareness of the
significance of the unequal
distribution of power between the sexes by seeing it as
constitutive of sex/gender
itself. By denying that the construction of sex/gender has a
material basis in
biologically-given bodies (at least over and above basic
reproductive differences),
gender theory has shifted the focus onto systematic structural
inequalities between
men and women as the basis of sex/gender difference. It is
56. social inequality which
creates the idea that there are two opposed sexes, male and
female, characterised by
the different characteristics we label „masculine‟ and
„feminine‟, and not the other
way round. To imagine that inherent differences between men
and women result in
the gender division of labour and other inequalities is the exact
inverse of what is
really the case. As MacInnes (1998) argues, inequality creates
masculinity and
femininity as ideologies which serve to mask and legitimate
social inequality.
This is not to deny that gender is experienced and constructed
differently in different
social and geographical locations, with ethnic, racial and class
identifications serving
to modify its influence. Although acknowledgement of such
differences undermines
the idea of patriarchy as a single system of oppression of all
women by all men, it is
compatible with a recognition that the workplace, the home, the
political arena, the
57. legal system, and mass culture are organised in mutually-
reinforcing ways which,
though various and ever-changing, nevertheless result in women
being disadvantaged
and disempowered relative to men across the globe (Connell,
2002: 97-114). Clearly
different theorists have different ways of explaining how
gender-based patterns of
inequality are generated and sustained, and different authors
may assign priority to
different factors. The widespread cultural turn in gender studies
in recent decades has
seen some shift of concentration from material factors such as
gender difference in the
workplace to cultural factors such as the influence of film,
television and other
popular cultural representations of masculinity and femininity
(Evans, 2003). Yet
there is still widespread agreement about the interconnection of
a wide range of
processes in the production and reproduction of gender
difference, and wherever they
choose to concentrate their attentions, feminist theorists tend to
agree that such
58. processes reflect and reproduce not just „difference‟, but the
unequal distribution of
power on the basis of gender (Walby 1990, 1997).
ii. Religion and power
If gender is a complex and interlocking set of power relations
constituted in the
historical process (Bourdieu, 2001), then it is possible to speak
of the „gender order‟
of a society, despite the impossibility of ever disentangling the
full complexities of
this order. Religion not only takes its place within this order, it
is a constitutive part of
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it, though it may play a range of different roles and occupy a
59. number of different
positions.
Religion‟s constitutive contribution to power relations within
society is best
understood by viewing religion itself as a system of power. As I
have argued in
relation to Christianity (Woodhead, 2004), religion is the social
expression of
engagement with a source of power which is unique to religion
(„sacred power‟), but
religion also involves interaction with „secular‟ sources of
power, both social
(cultural, political, economic, military) and socio-personal
(emotional, physical,
intellectual, aesthetic). Although it can have independent force,
the potency of sacred
power is enhanced through alignment with secular power (e.g.
there is a close
historical relationship between the power of the Christian God
and the wealth and
political influence of the church, or between the success of
„holistic‟ therapies and
their ability to enhance emotional wellbeing). There are many
60. possible permutations
of sacred and secular power, many different ways in which they
can reinforce or
repudiate one another. To view religion simply as a benign
„sacred canopy‟ over
society (Berger, 1967) is to ignore the ways in which religion(s)
can and do play
active roles in: reinforcing and legitimating dominant power
interests; generating
resistance to dominant power; resourcing groups with little
social power; resourcing
reconfigurations of power. A group which has a great deal of
social power may call
on sacred power to enhance, extend, legitimate and normalise
that power (for
example, the Frankish dynasty in medieval Europe, or George
W. Bush‟s Republican
Party in the USA). Conversely, a group which has little social
power can draw on
sacred power to improve its access to secular power in a way
which would not
otherwise be possible (for example, early Christian communities
in the second and
third centuries, women-dominated holistic self-spiritualities
61. today, see Heelas and
Woodhead, 2005).
Theorising religion and gender
Once power is highlighted, it is easy to see how religion and
gender can and do
interact. By way of symbolic and material practices religion can
reinforce existing
gendered distributions of power or try to change them. At any
one time a religion will
exist in a particular structural relation to the gender order of the
society of which it is
part. But the existing relationship is only a snapshot in an on-
going dynamic that is
shaped by many factors, including the religion‟s own gender
strategy. Given that
gendered distributions of power are integral to the wider
inequalities of social power
which define all known societies, this gives us two main
variables to consider. One,
the way in which religion is situated in relation to existing
distributions of secular
power: religion‟s situation in relation to gender. Two, the way
62. in which religion is
mobilized in relation to existing distributions of secular power:
religion‟s strategy in
relation to gender.
Expressing this diagrammatically, we can draw a vertical axis
which runs from
„mainstream‟ to „marginal‟ religion and a horizontal axis which
starts with religion as
„confirmatory‟ and moves to religion as „challenging‟.
„Mainstream‟ religion is
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integral to the existing distribution of power in society and
socially respectable.
„Marginal‟ religion sits at more of an angle to the social and
63. gender order, and will
therefore be treated as socially deviant by those who accept the
dominant distribution
of power. „Confirmatory‟ religion seeks to legitimate,
reinforce, and sacralise the
existing distribution of power in society, particularly the
existing gender order, whilst
„challenging‟ religion seeks to ameliorate, resist or change this
order. The two axes
give us four „cells‟, which represent the four main ways in
which religion (as a
distribution of power) may relate to gender (as a distribution of
power) – and hence
four main „types‟ of religion in relation to gender.
First, religion can be integral to the existing gender order, and
can serve to reproduce
and legitimate gender inequality for those who practice the
religion and those who fall
within its penumbra („consolidating‟). Second, religion can be
integral to the existing
gender order, but can be used to give access to power from
„inside‟ and use it in ways
which may be subversive of the existing gender order
64. („tactical‟). Third, religion may
be marginal to the existing gendered distribution of power, but
used as a means of
access to that power from the outside, without necessarily
intending to disrupt the
distribution of that power („questing‟). Finally, religion may
be situated in a marginal
relation to the gendered distribution of power, and may be used
to try to contest,
disrupt and redistribute that distribution („counter-cultural‟).
MAINSTREAM
Consolidating Tactical
CONFIRMATORY CHALLENGING
______________________________________________
Questing Counter-cultural
MARGINAL
65. Fig. 1 Religion‟s positioning in relation to gender
This typology does not assume that there is necessarily a static
single „gender order‟
in a society, for the unit of analysis may vary from a nation-
state to a region or ethnic
group. It is, however, assumed that within such a unit there will
at any one time be a
prevailing distribution of power between genders which can be
labelled „mainstream‟,
and alternatives to it which are currently „marginal‟. In most
known societies the
mainstream distribution has been one which has favoured men
over women.
However, the nature of that unequal distribution varies
considerably over time and
place, and in some societies – as, for example, in many
contemporary western
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ISSN: 2305-8285 Vol.13 January
2013
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societies – gender relations may be in a state of considerable
flux, such that
mainstream position(s) are relatively precarious. Neither does
this typology assume
that there is necessarily a dominant religious order within a
society, or that all
members of a religion will assume identical positions in relation
to gender. Thus, for
example, within a single Christian congregation or
denomination the religious
activities of some members may „consolidate‟ the existing
gender order (those who do
not question the „sanctified‟ version of masculine domination
which is presented in
official church teachings, institutional arrangements and
liturgical practice, for
example), whilst the religious activities of others may fall into
the „tactical‟ category
(for example, women who ignore a good deal of official church
67. teaching, create
groups in church for women‟s mutual support, and use these
groups to claim both
sacred and political power, see Winter, Lummis and Stokes,
1995), whilst still others
may be „questing‟ (for example, those who use churches
sporadically, and sometimes
enter them simply to enjoy the sacred space and use it for their
own personal and
spiritual purposes which do not, however, disrupt the status
quo).
This typology directs attention not only to gender orders in
society, but also to the
gender order(s) inherent in a religion or religious group. In
order to investigate the
latter it is necessary to pay attention not only to cultural
factors, such as teachings and
visual representations, but to the entire inner landscape of a
religion. Early feminist
explorations of religion, from Cady Stanton to Mary Daly,
focused almost exclusively
on the explicit and implicit teachings about men and women,
masculinity and