The myth is popular among education insiders who oppose high-stakes or externally mandated tests, but based on just two studies conducted without controls and employing an obscure definition of “high stakes”. Both studies actually used low-stakes tests that were administered without security protocols. Meanwhile, many controlled studies of the hypothesis have come to the opposite conclusion.
The talk will:
compare the methods and results of these studies;
describe the historical origin of the concepts in the 1980s Debra P v Turlington case in US federal courts and the “Lake Wobegon Effect” scandal; and
summarize the harms caused by belief in the myth, which include:
diverting attention from a widespread problem (at least in the US) of lax security in standardized test administration;
encouraging ineffective and detrimental test preparation procedures (e.g., excessive drilling on format, practice tests);
spawning numerous research studies using a low-stakes test score trend to “audit” a high-stakes test score trend; and
justifying the use of value-added measures, calculated from student low-stakes test score trends, to judge teacher performance.
An abundance of research reveals low-stakes test scores and trends to be unreliable. Student effort varies systematically by a number of background factors, and is easily manipulated.
Organic Name Reactions for the students and aspirants of Chemistry12th.pptx
It's a myth: High stakes cause test score inflation
1. It’s a myth:
High stakes cause test score inflation
Richard P. Phelps
researchED 2017 National Conference
7 October, 2017
Brooklyn, NY
2. Educational testing in the US: early 1980s
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
3. Student testing with stakes
reintroduced late 1970s,
early 1980s
Debra P. v. Turlington
“Truth in testing” laws
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
Educational testing in the US: 1980s
4. Residency in rural, poor Appalachia, 1980s
Surprised by claims that state and school district scored
“above average” on national tests
Investigated, all US states claimed to be “above average”
John J. Cannell, M.D.
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
5. “Welcome to Lake Wobegon, where all the women
are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all
the children are above average.”
- Garrison Keillor, A Prairie Home Companion
researchED, October High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
6. Cannell’s
suspects
• Lax security
• Outdated or invalid norms
• Deliberate educator manipulation (i.e., cheating)
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
7. US Education Establishment Responds
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
8. “While supporting Cannell’s
general finding … our
analyses lead us to
conclusions that are
different, and certainly
less sensational, than the
ones he reached.”
— Linn, Graue, Sanders ,
CRESST, 1990
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
“There are many reasons
for the Lake Wobegon
Effect, most of which are
less sinister than those
emphasized by Cannell.”
— Linn, CRESST, 2000
9. CRESST’s Lake
Wobegon suspects
Outdated or invalid norms
High stakes, that induce “teaching to the test”
(i.e., test coaching) under pressure
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
10. “We know that tests that are
used for accountability tend to
be taught to in ways that
produce inflated scores.”
— Daniel Koretz, CRESST,
1992
“Corruption of indicators is a
continuing problem where tests
are used for accountability or
other high-stakes purposes.”
— Robert Linn, CRESST,
2000
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
11. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
CRESST counters Cannell’s Lake Wobegon
study with their own, 1991
Students took test a few years. Scores rose. Then took
“competing test” district had used before. Scores fell.
12. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
CRESST 1991 “Generalization” Study
Unnamed school district
Unnamed tests
Neither replicable nor falsifiable
A conference presentation; not peer-reviewed.
13. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
CRESST 1991 “Generalization” Study
3 tests in the study
1.Annual NRT
2.Parallel form
3.A “competing” NRT
14. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
1991 CRESST “Generalization” Study
15. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
1991 CRESST “Generalization” Study
School district test was only “perceived to be high stakes.”
16. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
1991 CRESST “Generalization” Study
Study’s assumptions
1. Publication of aggregate results = “high stakes”
2. “Competing” NRTs should get same results
3. “Test coaching” improves scores
4. Low-stakes test scores are reliable and can be used
to benchmark unreliable high stakes scores
5. High-stakes cause test-score inflation?
17. Jim Popham “high stakes” definition 1987
... Such tests include the many statewide achievement
tests whose results are reported by local newspapers on a
school-by-school or district-by-district basis.”
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
1. Publication of aggregate results = high stakes?
18. Jim Popham “high stakes” definition 1992
A test “subject to legal scrutiny.”
Tests such as those used “for employment, licensure, or a
high school graduation requirement”
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
1. Publication of aggregate results = high stakes?
19. “High-stakes test. A test used to provide results that have
important, direct consequences for examinees,
programs, or institutions involved in the testing.” (p.176)
“Low-stakes test. A test used to provide results that have
only minor or indirect consequences for examinees,
programs, or institutions involved in the testing.” (p.178)
Standards for Educational and
Psychological Testing
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
1. Publication of aggregate results = high stakes?
20. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
“...tests taken to obtain
admission to an educational
program or taken during and
at the conclusion of a program
to obtain a qualification.”
“…high-stakes decisions, such as
whether a student will move on to
the next grade level or receive a
diploma.”
1. Publication of aggregate results = high stakes?
21. A high-stakes test is a test with important consequences
for the test taker. Passing has important benefits, such as
a high school diploma, a scholarship, or a license to
practice a profession.
Wikipedia
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
1. Publication of aggregate results = high stakes?
22. 2. Research: Comparability of different tests
Scores Comparable
?
Scores Not Comparable
NRTs
Freeman, Kuhs, Porter, Floden, Schmidt, Schwille
(1983); Debra P. v. Turlington (1984); Cohen,
Spillane (1993); La Marca, Redfield, Winter, Bailey,
and Despriet (2000); Wainer (2011)
Standards
Archbald (1994); Buckendahl, Plake, Impara, Irwin
(2000); Bhola, Impara, Buckendahl (2003); Phelps
(2005)
CRTs
Massell, Kirst, Hoppe (1997); Wiley, Hembry,
Buckendahl, Forte,Towles Nebelsick-Gullett (2015)
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
23. 3. Research: Effects of test coaching
It works
Significant score
increase from learning
format tricks
Aldeman & Powers
(1980) Samson (1985)
Scruggs (1985)
Roznowski & Bassett
(1992) McMann (1994)
Holmes, Keffer (1995)
Camel & Chung (2002)
Filizola (2008)
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
24. 4. Research: Low-stakes test reliability
Reliable
“no incentive to manipulate
scores”
Kipliinger, Linn (1992)
O’Neil, Sugre, Baker (1995) *
Hout, Elliot (2011)
* 1 of 2 groups
Not reliable
student effort varies;
scores easy to manipulate
Rothe (1947); Jennings (1953); Uguroglu,
Walberg (1979); Taylor & White (1981);
Arvey, et al. (1990); Schmit, Ryan (1992);
Brown & Walberg (1993); Kim, McLean
(1995), Wolf, Smith (1995), Wolf, Smith,
DiPaulo (1996); Schiel (1996); Sundre
(1999), Sundre, Moore (2002), Sundre, Wise
(2003); DeMars (2000), Wise (2006ª,
2006b), Wise, DeMars (2005, 2005, 2006,
2010), Wise, et al., (2009); Hoyt (2001);
Eklof (2006, 2007, 2010);
….....etc.
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
25. researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
“…for consequential exams, the average score on the
motivation scale was quite high with a low standard
deviation. Essentially, most of the students were displaying
uniformly high levels of motivation (i.e., ceiling effect).
However, for the nonconsequential groups, motivation
played an important role in predicting test performance. The
overall motivation scores for the no consequence groups
were lower than the motivation for the consequential groups,
with much greater variability.”
—Cole, Bergin, Whittaker (2008), p. 612
4. Research: Low-stakes test reliability
26. 5. High stakes cause test score inflation?
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
Then, why no score
inflation with
certification and
licensure tests?
27. More left-out-
variable bias
CRESST’s Linn (2000) cites higher gains
on a federal anti-poverty program’s pre-
post testing over 9 months than over 12
as evidence of inflation
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
28. Cannell found score inflation in
elementary school tests in
dozens of states – none of
those tests had high stakes.
Cannell also found score
inflation in secondary school
tests in dozens of states –
only one had high stakes.
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
Test Score Inflation Occurs where
Security is Lax
30. Confusions from misinformation
1. Tests sample from larger domains
2. Campbell’s Law
3. “Teaching to the test” & “Narrowing the curriculum”
4. Incentives and causes
5. Educators face many incentives; “high stakes” only one
6. Today’s tests have much higher stakes than past tests
1. No one wants to be responsible for test security
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
31. 1. Tests only sample larger domains
"Tests are about making a measurement, and generally, tests
are trying to measure something huge." — Daniel Koretz
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
TRUE of many tests, e.g.,
NRTs, aptitude, IQ tests
NOT TRUE of well-done
standards-based tests
32. 2. Campbell’s Law — a truism
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
"The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it
will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor."
Social indicators can be beneficial:
- for understanding
- monitor progress
- benchmarking
- setting goals
- process improvements
33. 3. Teaching the test; Narrowing the curriculum
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
34. 4. Incentives and causes
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
Question:
Do high stakes
present an
incentive to cheat
on tests?
Answer:
Of course they do
35. 5. Educators face many incentives
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
Incentives of
test “stakes”
is just one
36. 6. Today’s tests have higher stakes
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
Exactly the
opposite is true.
Koretz: States in
1980s and 1990s were
“chicken feed”
compared to today’s
tests.
37. 7. No one inside education wishes to be
responsible for test security
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
… including test
development firms.
38. Large-scale test, tight security
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
39. Large-scale test, lax security
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
40. Harms of disinformation
1. Acceptance of low standard for research as valid
2. Unfairly discredits useful evaluation tool
3. Test security (in U.S.) remains shoddy
4. Teachers given mixed messages
5. Now spreading worldwide
6. Corruption of Test Standards barely averted
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
41. 1. Acceptance of very low quality standard
for popular research results
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
CRESST studies:
- no controls
- secret test
- secret
location
- secret
definitions
Non-replicable,
Non-falsifiable
42. 2. Uniquely useful evalution tool is
discredited
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
…and, in the US, the
only objective measure
available to the public
(i.e., not under the
control of insiders).
43. 3. Test security (in U.S.) remains shoddy
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
ACT, SAT, PARCC, SBAC
now administered statewide
by schools, on varying
dates. Tests save money,
hassle, gain customers by
outsourcing (or, ignoring)
test security.
44. 4. Teachers given mixed messages
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
“Teaching to the test” is
unethical; Don’t do it! Teach
content beyond the
standards.
“Teaching to the test works!
You and your students will
be better off if you do it!
45. 5. Standards corruption barely averted
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
46. 6. Disinformation spreading worldwide
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
47. • Motive alone is not sufficient
if test security is tight.
• Means and opportunity exist
only in the absence of
security measures and form
and item rotation.
Artificial test score gains (score inflation) are
caused by lax security; they require means
and opportunity.
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
48. Test Security in
South Carolina:
“Unlike their other two tests,
… teachers are allowed to look at test booklets,
… teachers may obtain test booklets before the day of testing,
… booklets are not sealed, and
… testing is not routinely monitored by state officials.
… Outside test proctors are not used,
… test questions have not been rotated every year, and
… answer sheets have not been scanned for suspicious erasures or
analyzed for cluster variance.
… There are no state regulations that govern test security and test
administration for norm-referenced testing done independently
in the local school districts.”
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October,
2017
Cannel’s score-inflated test
49. Test Security in
South Carolina:
“South Carolina also administers a graduation exam and a criterion
referenced test, both of which have significant security
measures.
… Teachers are not allowed to look at either of these two test
booklets,
… teachers may not obtain booklets before the day of testing,
… the graduation test booklets are sealed,
… testing is routinely monitored by state officials,
… special education students are generally included in all tests,
… outside test proctors administer the graduation exam, and
… most test questions are rotated every year on the criterion
referenced test.”
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
Tests not in Cannell’s study
50. Lessons Learned
If terms can be defined arbitrarily, and not specified, any
research result is possible.
Cleverly-disguised falsehoods and obfuscation can be well-
rewarded in US education schools (e.g., with endowed
professorships at Harvard and Stanford).
researchED, Brooklyn High stakes & test score inflation 7 October, 2017
US education: Research quality
standards extremely low for
popular results; impossibly high
for unpopular results
State / Local determination of ...curricula, textbooks, courses, sequencing of courses …constitutionally, states determine education laws
Tests develooped by commercial firms. Most test developers also textbook publishers
Tests purchased “off the shelf” based on generalized curricula. Norm-referenced tests used national norms. School personnel administered tests.
Student testing with stakes reintroduced after perhaps too-liberal 1960s
Debra P v. Turlington and move to standards-based tests
“Truth in testing” laws
From Flat Top, West Virginia, Dr. Cannell formed an organization of friends and relatives called “Friends for Education” and investigated. They surveyed 50 state education departments, and many school districts. Also, they “stung” testing firms pretending to be local educators and discovered test salespersons were very willing to help them artificially boost their scores.
Lake Wobegon is a fictional town in the state of Minnesota in a radio comedy show.
…where all the children are above average. Cannell’s findings were called the “Lake Wobegon Effect”
Showing test items to teachers beforehand
Keeping test forms around for years
Misleading reporting, etc.
Much of the “cheating” was unintentional. One test publisher even recommended that teachers examine the test booklets beforehand.
Since 1980, CRESST has been the only federally funded research center focused on education standards and student testing. A West Virginia country doctor embarrassed them.
They have been the best funded, most highly visible US testing researchers for decades. They have assumed control of the testing research function in other high profile organizations – e.g., the National Research Council, the National Academy of Education.
CRESST has a HUGE amount of power and influence. Few are willing to confront them. Those few that do pay a price.
Cannell was portrayed as as crank sensationalist who accidentally stumbled onto something he didn’t understand. Given he was not a testing expert, it was now time for the professionals to investigate things. Meanwhile Cannell needed to complete his medical degree, and moved on.
Cannell’s findings implied widespread and casual corruption in US education administration. The obvious solution was external control of educational testing.
CRESST successfully spun a threat to the status quo into an argument for maintaining education establishment control.
No ifs, ands, or buts according to CRESST for the past 30 years. Dan Koretz has just published another book reiterating the same themes.
High stakes cause test score inflation. We “know” this.
Teaching to the test caused by high stakes must have caused artificial test score gains that do not generalize to a “similar” test.
What about curricular alignment? …or test security? No controls for either.
To this day, Koretz claims the identity of the school district must be protected. From what is unknown.
To demonstrate that teachers were teaching to a familiar test form, logical course of action would have been to administer a parallel form and compare results.
In fact, they did that and found no difference in results. But, they identified this comparison as a control for the effect of motivation, not a test of the score inflation hypothesis. The comparison that allegedly reveals test score inflation was made between the current test and a “competing test” – i.e., some other firm’s NRT.
Read the study casually and it seems to be a careful, highly technical, scientific study. It employs the tone and language one would expect. Read it in detail, and it makes little sense.
Perhaps it has been so successful because it is so convoluted.
Koretz later revealed that the only “stakes” were… … publication of the aggregate results.
Jim Popham wrote that there were 2 types of high-stakes tests. His first type would be familiar to us all.
Absolutely nothing official or consensual about this definition. Jim Popham is just one guy, and this definition was just one guy’s idea at that one time.
But, Popham’s 1987 definition was untenable. With “truth in testing” laws, aggregate results for all systemwide tests were now reported. According to his 1987 definition, all systemwide tests were high stakes, so the definition was meaningless.
By 1992, five years later, it would seem that he had changed his mind.
At least in the US, the most official definition is that of the Standards published jointly by the American Psychological Association, American Educational Research Association, and the National Council for Measurement in Education.
Like most definitions of the term, includes 2 notions: substantial and direct effect
Two more relatively official renderings of the definition.
Even Wikipedia defines the term the way most of us would.
The second assumption of the 1991 CRESST generalization study.
Here are citations to research comparing tests on the same general topic, but developed by different organizations. I could find none claiming comparability.
Even Common Core tests no longer comparable …up to 30% difference in test content where states have the same standards but separately create and revise frameworks, blueprints, and test items.
“If you want to measure change you should not change the measure”
The third assumption of the 1991 CRESST generalization study.
Test coaching research is more mixed. Most studies find some small effect.
Some coaching is good: students need to be familiar with the format, for example, particularly if it is new and familiar.
And, some test prep is more subject matter learning than it is drill on format and old items.
The fourth assumption of the 1991 CRESST generalization study; one can use low-stakes tests as reliable benchmarks because “there is no incentive to manipulate scores”.
The experiments finding low-stakes tests to be NOT reliable found moderate to high effect sizes by varying test incentives (i.e., stakes). The mean in one meta-analysis was 0.59, a fairly large effect.
The 3 studies on the “reliable” side were all conducted by CRESST or CRESST affiliates
Indeed, high-stakes scores more reliable than low-stakes scores. This simply reflects common sense. Students, particularly teenagers, are reticent to put much effort into a test that doesn’t count.
This is a quote from one study.
One more CRESST study
The 9 month interval would be taught by the same teacher who, supposedly, had an incentive to inflate scores. 2 different teachers involved in 12 month interval (ergo, no incentive to raise test scores).
Difference of 1 month’s achievement. Does not consider 3 months of forgetting. Harris Cooper’s meta-analysis of summer learning loss studies averaged 1 month of loss.
Mean test scores by district were required to be reported
That’s all, there were no stakes
Cannell surveyed all the US states, and many school districts. He asked about all their systemwide tests. In state after state, district after district, the NRTs – the score-inflated tests – had no stakes and lax security. Rather, standards-based tests, not comparable across states, were the tests with stakes.
Of the hundreds of tests, the “Lake Wobegon” tests – the score inflated tests -- the NRTs -- had the lowest stakes.
A few year later, I conducted a study for the US Congress that surveyed all US states and over 600 school districts about all their systemwide testing.
Testing environment was the same as Cannell found in that almost all NRTs were administered without stakes. By contrast, almost all standards based tests had stakes.
Confustions from the Lake Wobegon Effect misinformation spread by CRESST.
In standards-based tests I have helped to develop myself, at least one test item was written to each standard, and rather literally.
If standard read “Students should be able to add two digit numbers.” There was at least one test item in which students were asked to add two digit numbers,
…and so on. Every standard is tested. The test is NOT a sample of a much larger domain. it is a census of a well-circumscribed domain.
Last week, Koretz stated that a 12th-grade test of mathematics covered 12 years of math with just 42 test items. This is misleading. Certainly, this test did not include 1st-grade test items, 2nd-grade test items, and so on. The tests containing those items were already taken long ago. The 12th-grade tests covers 12th-grade standards.
Testing opponents frequently cite Campbell’s Law to justify complete elimination of high-stakes or external testing. By the same logic, should we not eliminate all occupational testing? How about eliminating the criminal code? …the police?
Besides, Campbell’s Law applies as well to all other evaluation methods, including those of the teacher and the school. There is simply no escaping it.
J.J. Cannell’s work shows it is as true for no stakes tests as for high stakes tests.
Not necessarily related.
Can have one without the other.
Asked why do you rob banks, bank robber Willy Sutton replied, “Because that’s where the money is.”
Banks present an incentive to rob them, simply by having a lot of money inside. But, most banks are never robbed.
Tight security is expensive and time-consuming. Lax test security is convenient and inexpensive.
Increasing test score trends help education administrators politically and professionally.
Koretz “chicken feed” statement.
Most states in the 1980s and 1990s had high-stakes graduation exams or grade promotion exams, or both. As does most of the world.
With No Child Left Behind, many of those tests have disappered. Current federally-required tests have NO stakes for students.
a thankless responsibility, fraught with risks and complaints and, in the United States, lawsuits.
Like being a referee, only worse, because fewer understand the work involved.
So long as there is no external control, any control is internal.
Here is a photograph of Indian Army proctors administering a test to new recruits. Notice that the test-takers are allowed few places to hide cheating materials, and are separated by a distance unfavorable to reading others’ test answers.
One often finds very high levels of test security for professional selection tests – those already in the profession want to work with the best job candidates.
Here is another photograph from India, this time of a school. The reporter posting this photo tells us that the people climbing the walls are family members helping students inside the building with answers on a test.
CRESST studies treat test security as an irrelevant factor in their studies. The contrast of these 2 photos illustrates how relevant a factor test security is.
The “high stakes cause test score inflation” myth is not just an innocent pet theory. It carries harmful consequences.
I’m told that when Koretz is pressed on the issue, he admits that there could be other explanations for the test score inflation in the 1991 CRESST study. When not pressed, however, he declares high-stakes to be the definite cause.
Contrary evidence suppressed, sometimes even declared nonexistent, and wistleblowers discredited.
CRESST asserts that test scores from high-stakes tests are unreliable, untrustworthy – ambiguous at best, possibly meaningless. When, in fact, they are more reliable than the low-stakes tests that CRESST promotes.
With the exception of just a few states, US has no inspectorate system.
30 years after Cannell showed security was lax for all school tests but the ACT and SAT, which were administered securely by ACT and SAT themselves…
Now the ACT, SAT, PARCC, & SBAC are being administered internally by schools, too.
Security guidelines that testing firms give to school personnel typically a few dozen pages long; impossible that untrained educators will follow them consistently.
Pity the poor teachers, ethically obligated to teach the legally-mandated standards. They may feel pressure from administrators for improper teaching to the test (e.g., drilling on fromat, old test items). Meanwhile, Koretz wants them to teach “to a larger domain”
Many test develpers adhere to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing religiously. Court judges use them for reference. They are the equivalent of construction codes for home builders or ethics codes for professionals.
To my knowledge, only one person in the world objected to draft standards that included all the CRESST disinformation about test policies. He was successful, …for the moment.
OECD recently conducted a completely one-sided study on testing.
World Bank: 30 years has told only one side of story; testing office run by professional colleagues of CRESST.
Popularity of International tests grows, with strong incentives to cheat in some countries.
When investigating crimes, police detectives look for means, motive, and opportunity. High stakes may provide a motive. But, it does not provide means or opportunity. And, you need all three.