6. • Agriculture contributes about 32% of Myanmar’s GDP
• Myanmar has a huge potential to become a credible global
food supplier
• To attain this potential, Myanmar will need to intensify its
agriculture and enhance farm productivity and
competitiveness
• This will require higher production and use of quality seeds
and the development of a competitive seed industry
7. DAR
Department of
Agricultural Research
Breeder Seeds
Foundation
Seeds
DoA
Department of
Agriculture
Registered
Seeds
Private Seed
Companies
Private Seed
Growers
Certified
Seeds and
Good Seeds
Seed
Distribution
/ Seed
Market
Farmers
Public
Sector
Private
Sector
Public/Pri
vate
Sector
• Seed
Associations?
• Seed Working
Groups?
• Seed Task Force?
• Seed
Commission?
• Seed M&E?
8. Private Sector in the Seed Industry
• Myanmar Rice Industry Association ( MRIA )
has been formed in 2007.
• MRIA has been transformed into Myanmar
Rice Federation ( MRF ) in 2011.
• Under the organization and management of
MRF, ( 57 ) Rice Specialized Companies ( MRSC
) have been formed.
• MRSCs are implementing Contract Farming
Programs.
9. Leveraging private sector investment and
fostering partnerships with private sector
and communities to increase productivity
and gain competitiveness.
Investment
• Increased private investment (both domestic and foreign) in the industry
Partnerships
• Promote Public Private Partnerships with private sector and communities
Coordination
• Between research and extension to create a demand-oriented research and
extension system
• Stronger coordination mechanisms among farmers, private sector, and
public sector (seed associations, community-based seed production and
seed banks, seed contracts, seed certification, seed information systems)
10. Low Use of Certified
Seed
Awarene
ss and
Knowled
ge
Price and
Affordabili
ty
Access to
Market
Quality
Assuranc
e
Clear
Benefits
from Use
DEMAND
Under
funded
Research
Under
funded
Extension
Infrastruct
ure
production
,
processing,
storage
Capacity
growers,
technicia
ns,
research
ers
Incentive
s for
growers
and
compani
es
SUPPLY
11. Expected growth of $170B by 2025
11
0 20 40 60 80
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Infrastructure
Energy
Tourism
Financial Services
Telecom
Real US$2010 Billion
Sector GDP Outlook
2025 2010
10%
4%
8%
5%
17%
23%
23%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Infrastructure
Energy
Tourism
Financial Services
Telecom
CompoundGrowthRate
Myanmar GDP in 2010 was $50B and by 2025 is expected
to grow 300% to $220B. This growth requires significant
development in infrastructure, financial services and
energy.
12. CSR – Training of Workforce
12
Labor productivity is low due to the lack of education and
training
provided to the workforce. Implementing a program of
training and
education will create productive and stable workforce and
in long term lower costs for companies.Education is valued within society however
education beyond primary falls as not
funded by the Government
Economic growth will lead to a skill
shortage, requiring on job training
programs
Selection of workers requires additional
screening to confirm skills
Retaining skilled workers requires
progression of job titles and pay increases
Net enrolment rate FY2010
Primary 84.6%
Lower secondary 47.2%
Upper secondary 30.0%
Completion Rate FY2009
Primary 81.2%
Lower secondary 71.7%
Upper secondary 30.8%
Transition Rate FY 2009
Primary to lower secondary 80.8%
Lower secondary to upper secondary 90.6%
Enrolment rates fall off after the
Primary Level
Source: OCED 2014
13. Myanmar restarting growth
13
Myanmar GDP is starting to grow as reforms to the
economy take hold. GDP growth, however, remains well
below benchmark countries within Asia. Based on the
benchmark countries, there’s opportunity for large growth
in GDP.
2.7%
0.1%
4.2% Asia Average
1.9% World Average
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
PercapitaGDP
compoundannualgrowthrate
14. Investment Recommendations
• Breeding program (research)
• Inspection program
• Demonstration program (extension)
• Laboratories (research and inspection)
• Processing equipment
• Seed production farms infrastructure (irrigation,
land preparation, storage, equipment)
• Promote investment by private sector through an
agreed program of initial support which gradually
will be reduced over time
15. POLICY INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS
Short
Term
(1-2
years)
a. Seed
Policy
b. Rice Policy
c. Trade
Policy
a. Seed farm
infrastructure
b. Processing
a. Membership of
UPOV
Mediu
m Term
(1-5
years)
a. Laboratories a. Seed
associations
b. Quality
assurance
Long
Term
(1-10
years)
a. Extension
b. Research
a. Coordination
mechanisms
b. Market
information
16. Policy Recommendations
Seed Policy
• Ensure implementation of Seed Law
• Provide mechanisms to support farmers growing seed,
farmers adopting seed, and companies investing in seed
• Establish targets, plans and budgets for achieving those
targets
Rice Policy
• Clarify targets, plans, and means to achieve those targets.
Trade Policy
• Review imports and exports of seed to protect IPR,
biodiversity, and plant varieties.
• Strengthen seed border control, quarantine points, and SPS
compliance.
17. RECOMMENDATIONS
POLICY INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS
a.Seed
b.Rice
c. Trade
a.Extension
b.Research
c. Seed farm
infrastructure
d.Laboratories
e.Processing
a.Coordination
mechanisms
b.Seed associations
c. Quality assurance
d.Membership UPOV
e.Market information
In the current seed formal system, DAR is responsible for research and generation of breeder and foundation seeds. DOA is responsible for the registered seeds which are distributed either to private seed growers (about 5,000 distributed around the country) and, more recently, to private seed companies under the aegis of MRF. Multiplication of foundation seeds yields certified and good seeds that are then distributed to farmers and market. Most notable in this diagram is the absence of seed associations. The diagram also lacks the presence of coordination mechanisms such as Seed Working Group or Seed Tasking Force (different from Seed Committee which is in charge only of release of new varieties).
The main opportunities related to investment, partnerships, and coordination point to the possibility of LEVERAGING public investment manifolds through incentives to investment by the private sector, the cooperative sector, and communities.
This will result in an expansion of use of good quality seeds (OPV, hybrids, and traditional varieties appropriate to certain agroecological environments), increased productivity, and increased resilience to pests, diseases, and climate change.
Need to look at constraints: In the supply side and in the demand side. Too often the demand side is dismissed
Some of this investment will be primarily public (for example in the research for OPV rice varieties). In other cases, it might be a PPP (fore example laboratories and demonstrations). In other cases will be private (for example processing equipment, private warehouses)
The urgent tasks are those related to formulation of policy and allocation of resources for implementation of plans.
Specific investments will be carried out over the first 5 years of the plan whereas institutional development will occur up to the long term.
What are some examples of support mechanisms?
For farmers: subsidies, vouchers, demonstrations, awards, matching grants
For companies: matching grants, tax exemptions, tax incentives, lines of credit
The seed policy is really an implementation plan for the See Law.
Given the important of rice in the seed industry, a rice policy is needed. This is of much bigger complexity than the seed sector. In particular, the rice policy should clearly articulate a strategy for Myanmar over the next 10 years.
Trade regulations is really about quarantine control, sharing of standards with regional partners, and compliance with SPS.
The initial emphasis on POLICY is appropriate. Unless the rules of the game are clear to the key actors, there is limited impact of investment and institutional development. Traditionally in Ministries of Agriculture all over the world there is an emphasis on investing money in public institutions. That is sometimes justified. But unless these investments are embedded in an overall strategy policy framework, there is the ever present danger that public sector investment might be inefficient, ineffective, and even counterproductive.
