HIPAAThe day after the medication error, B. Moore’s mother signs.docx

HIPAA
The day after the medication error, B. Moore’s mother signs in
at the front desk to get her visitation pass. As she is standing at
the front desk, she overhears an inappropriate conversation
between Ida Feeney, the unit secretary, and a nurse from a
different unit of the hospital.
Ida Feeney and Brenda Turner
Ida Feeney: Did you hear about the Moore kid? It’s a good thing
they caught that right away. She’s small for her age, and that
insulin could have really done a number on her.
Brenda Turner: Jeez, how much did they give her?
Ida Feeney: Well, she wasn’t supposed to have any. But I forget
the actual dose. I’ll look in the EHR later, but I think it was
pretty high.
Brenda Turner: Wait, is it Belinda Moore?
Ida Feeney: Yes, why?
Brenda Turner: I think she’s in a gymnastics class with my
daughters!
Now that you have observed this inappropriate conversation,
answer the following questions about HIPAA regulations.
Question 1: Which regulatory agency is responsible for
overseeing the HIPAA privacy and security rule?
Your response:
This question has not been answered yet.
Incorrect.
Correct Answer: U.S Department of Health and Human
Services.
The Joint Commission is an independent regulatory agency. It is
not part of the U.S. government, and it does not have the
authority or responsibility to enforce privacy and security rules.
Incorrect.
Services.
While the DEA is a U.S. government regulatory agency, its

purpose is not to oversee the HIPAA privacy and security rules.
Its primary responsibility is to enforce controlled substances
laws.
Correct!
The U.S Department of Health and Human Services Office of
Civil Rights is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA privacy and
security rules.
Incorrect.
Services.
While CLIA is a U.S. government regulatory body, its purpose
is not to enforce the HIPAA privacy and security rules. CLIA’s
purpose is to ensure laboratory testing quality.
Question 2: How would the health care organization’s privacy
officer determine whether others who were not involved in the
patient’s care had viewed her medical record?
Your response:
Expert Response: Health care experts on the HIPAA privacy and
security rules indicate the best way to determine whether a
patient’s medical record was accessed inappropriately is to
conduct file audits. These audits may include, but are not
limited to:
· Random file reviews to determine who has recently accessed a
patient’s medical record and if this access was warranted.
· Reviews of business associate contracts.
· Audits of disclosures in accordance with the privacy notice,
along with the organization’s adherence to confidential
communications protocols.
Question 3: Health care experts on the HIPAA privacy and
security rules indicate the following as the most appropriate
sequence to follow in addressing the potential HIPAA violation.
1. Meet with B. Moore’s mother to document the details of her
complaint.
2. Inform risk manager of the potential violation.
3. Audit B. Moore’s medical record to determine who has

accessed it during her stay.
4. Interview involved employees.
5. Determine whether any discipline is warranted.
6. Educate staff about the HIPAA rule.
Your response:
Correct!
Investigations collect as much information as possible.
Information and data collected in the investigation will help the
privacy officer to determine whether an actual breach occurred,
ensure that all aspects of the complaint have been examined,
and minimize risks to the organization and the patient.
Incorrect.
Correct Answer: True
Investigations collect as much information as possible.
Information and data collected in the investigation will help the
privacy officer to determine whether an actual breach occurred,
ensure that all aspects of the complaint have been examined,
and minimize risks to the organization and the patient.
Question 4: Identify the most common penalties employees may
face if they are found in violation of HIPAA.
Your response:
security rules indicate that failure to comply with HIPAA may
result in civil and criminal penalties. Violations of the law
include those that are unknowing, reasonable cause, or willful
neglect — both corrected and uncorrected. The most common
penalties employees face when they are found to have violated
HIPAA rules include:
· Monetary penalties ranging from $100 to $1.5 million.
· Prison sentences up to 10 years.
· Disciplinary action, up to and including termination.
Question 5: How would a privacy officer determine whether this
is an isolated event or a trending issue? Why is this an
important part of the investigation?

Your response:
security rules recommended these best practices to determine
whether potential HIPAA violations are isolated events or
trending issues:
· Conduct random audits to determine whether this employee or
others have been accessing the medical records of patients who
are not under their care.
· Perform reviews of patient and family complaints.
Determining whether HIPAA violations are isolated events or
trending issues is an important part of this investigation,
because this information will reveal whether the health care
organization needs to implement tighter security procedures.
Likewise, it may need to do more to educate staff about HIPAA
security rules. If the organization fails to take action to reduce
the number of these events that occur, it could be subject to
fines and penalties.
Question 6: Health care organizations may disclose patients’
medical information without their permission in all of following
situations EXCEPT:
Your response:
Incorrect.
Correct Answer: In facility directories.
A health care facility may disclose patient medical information
directly to the patient once it has confirmed the patient’s
identity.
Correct!
A health care facility must obtain the patient’s permission to
publish his or her information in its directory.
Incorrect.
In certain circumstances, health care organizations are not
required to obtain patient permission to disclose medical
information. Reporting communicable diseases is one such

circumstance. The reason for this is to protect the public health.
Incorrect.
A health care facility may disclose patient information for the
purposes of payment, treatment, and operations. For example,
the facility may submit claims for payment to insurance
companies without the patient’s permission.
Question 7: Identify three covered entities that are subject to
HIPAA compliance.
Your response:
Expert Responses: Health care experts on the HIPAA privacy
and security rules indicate the following as covered entities
subject to HIPAA compliance:
· Health plans.
· Health providers.
· Business associates.
· Health care clearinghouse
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© Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 September 2015 623
The Urban Political Ecology
of the 2011 Floods in Bangkok:
The Creation of Uneven
Vulnerabilities

Danny Marks
Abstract
This paper uses an urban political ecology analysis to question
the discourses
used by Thai government leaders regarding the causes of the
2011 floods
in Bangkok and the solutions that they have proposed in
response. In
contrast to their argument that the main causes of the floods in
Bangkok
were climate change and nature, I argue that the causes of the
2011 floods
are compound. They are a result of human-nature interactions:
while
Thailand did receive heavy rainfall that year, a number of
human activities
interacted with this heavy rainfall to create the floods. During
the past few
decades, local political elite have risen to power and profited
the most from
Bangkok’s urbanization activities while changes to the physical
environment
of Bangkok have made those living there more vulnerable to
floods. These
activities include massive land use change and concretization
which have
drastically increased run-off, over-pumping of groundwater, and
the filling
of canals. Further, both the local and national government’s
overreliance
on antiquated and poorly maintained infrastructure made the
city more
vulnerable to the 2011 floods.

In 2011, human decisions, particularly by politicians, about
where
to direct and block water heavily influenced which groups were
most
vulnerable. As a result, the inner city was protected at the
expense of those
living in the city’s peripheral areas. Analyses of disasters in
urban areas
therefore need to consider how discourses, socio-political
relations, and
ecological conditions shape governance practices of disasters.
Keywords: 2011 Thailand floods, urban political ecology,
disaster
governance, social vulnerability, Bangkok urbanization, Thai
flood
management
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2015883623
____________________
Danny Marks is a PhD candidate in human geography at the
University of Sydney.
Email: [email protected]
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Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 – September 2015
“It seems like we’re fighting against the forces of nature.” 1
“They build their estates in low-lying areas that are supposed to
be
reservoirs and they throw up a dam or a dike, and they block the
flow
where the water is supposed to go in the rainy season.” 2
Introduction
In the second half of 2011, Bangkok experienced its worst
flooding in many decades. Overall in Thailand, the floods killed
over 800 people, affected millions and cost the economy at least
US$45 billion.3 Much of
this devastation occurred in Bangkok and its environs. The
destruction
wrought by the floods was certainly partially a result of heavy
rainfall—
significantly more rain fell in 2011 than average (43 percent
more than the
average rainfall from May to October, 1982 to 2002).4
However, there have
been years where it rained more and the country faced more
tropical cyclones
than it did in 2011, but the magnitude of flooding was less
severe in those
years than it was in 2011.5 Further, the city’s western and
northern outskirts
were heavily flooded for many weeks but the inner part
remained dry despite
the areas lying at similar elevations. These phenomena suggest
that this
disaster was not natural but a compound disaster: a result of
both natural

and social processes, the latter of which occurred not only in
2011 but also
beforehand, during the disaster’s incubation period. These
social processes
arose largely due to the poor governance of flooding in the
urban transition
of Thailand’s Central Plains. They include mismanagement and
the failure
of infrastructure, uncoordinated land use change, land
subsidence, and the
filling in of canals.
The prime minister, her Cabinet members, and some senior
bureaucrats,6
however, blamed the external forces of nature and climate
change for the
____________________
1 Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra during the height of
the 2011 floods. Seth Mydans,
“Floods Lapping at Heart of Thailand’s Capital,” Seattle Times,
31 October 2011, http://www.
seattletimes.com/nation-world/floods-lapping-at-heart-of-
thailands-capital/, accessed 29 April 2015.
2 Smith Dharmasaroja, former director general of the Thai
Meteorological Department. Seth
Mydans, “As Thailand Floods Spread, Experts Blame Officials,
Not Rains,” New York Times, 13 October
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/world/asia/a-natural-
disaster-in-thailand-guided-by
-human-hand.html?_r=0, accessed 29 April 2015.
3 Voice of America, “Thailand Moves to Avoid Repeat of 2011
Flood Catastrophe,” 11 April 2012,

http://www.voanews.com/content/thailand-budgets-12-billion-
to-avoid-repeat-of-2011-flood
-catastrophe-147139575/179378.html, accessed 19 May 2014.
4 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on
International Economy and Trade 2012
(Tokyo, 2012)
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gWT2012fe.html,
accessed 19 May 2014.
5 2011 Thailand Floods Event Recap Report—Impact
Forecasting March 2012 (Chicago: Impact
Forecasting, 2012)
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20120314
_impact_
forecasting_thailand_flood_event_recap.pdf, accessed 19 May
2014.
6 For example, in an interview with the author in October 2014,
a senior Royal Irrigation
Development official declared, “I think the main cause of the
floods was climate change or climate
http://www
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/world/asia/a-natural-
disaster-in-thailand-guided-by
to-avoid-repeat-of-2011-flood-catastrophe-
147139575/179378.html
to-avoid-repeat-of-2011-flood-catastrophe-
147139575/179378.html
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gWT2012fe.html
_impact_forecasting_thailand_flood_event_recap.pdf

_impact_forecasting_thailand_flood_event_recap.pdf
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Political Ecology of Bangkok Floods
floods. Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop
Surasawadi stated that
Thais “must continue living with the flood for now” and “would
have to
accept that climate change is occurring.”7 In another instance,
Deputy Prime
Minister Kittiratt Na-Ranong declared that the flooding “has to
be the result
of climate change and global warming.”8 Blaming nature or
climate change,
rather than governance failures, as the main cause of floods not
only absolves
the government of any responsibility for causing or worsening
the extent of
the flooding but also leads to the belief that floods should be
controlled and
managed mainly by implementing structural measures to control
water and
protect populations from water.
The practice of governance, however, forms an essential
component of
compound disasters, not just natural forces and technical

failures. While a
vast literature exists on disaster management, there is little
written so far on
disaster governance. Based on the World Bank’s definition of
governance,
good disaster governance would be exercising power to
successfully and fairly
reduce vulnerabilities and exposures to disasters. However,
throughout much
of Asia, disaster governance by the state, which in many cases
has a low
institutional capacity and has been mostly captured by the elite,
causes
disasters to be more damaging and their effects unequal, hurting
the poor
disproportionately. The most marginalized members of society
have become
the most vulnerable while the elite suffer the least. Therefore,
analyses of
disasters in Asia need to include studies of power relations and
contestations.
Further, the discourses used to govern disasters are also
essential for
understanding the causes of escalating failures before and
during disasters.
The discourse used by Thai national leaders depoliticizes
disasters. By stating
that unlucky victims happened to be in the “wrong place at the
wrong time,”
this discourse “conceal[s] the socio-economic processes that
place vulnerable
populations at risk and consequently, such processes are not
regarded as
policy issues because ‘natural’ hazards become the policy
problem to solve.”9

This misplaced analysis can lead policy makers to propose
engineering and
structural solutions which often do not address underlying
vulnerabilities
and can have a number of negative repercussions. For example,
engineering
designs and operational planning norms are normally based on
historically
expected flood returns, but climate change and other factors
may cause
these estimations to be too low. Further, depending on flood-
control
____________________
variability.” In another interview in December 2013, a
permanent secretary of a ministry said, “The
major cause of the floods was excessive water – it was natural.”
7 Bangkok Post, “Plodprasop: Accept the Reality,” 3 November
2011.
8 NBC News, “As the Floods Recede, Bangkok Blame Game
Begins,” 22 November 2011, http://
worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/11/22/8956474-as-the-
floods-recede-bangkok-blame-game
-begins, accessed 19 May 2014.
9 Fernando J. Aragón-Durand, “Unpacking the Social
Construction of Natural Disaster through
Policy Discourses and Institutional Responses in Mexico: The
Case of Chalco Valley’s Floods, State of
Mexico” (PhD dissertation, University College London, 2009),
21.

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infrastructure creates a false sense of security which suggests
that changing
the built environment through land use planning and ecosystem
protection
and improving flood-response capacity are not needed. This can
lead to
increased losses in urban areas when events exceed the projects’
design
capacity of engineering projects.
In response to the problems arising from using the
aforementioned
approach, this paper proposes that we use an urban political
ecology (UPE)
approach, which rejects this separation of environment and
urban. Instead,
it views disasters as compound events that have cascading
consequences with
feedbacks to the local and wider political economy10 and the
urban as a “site
where ecology, economy, and society collapse on another and
must be
untangled.”11 Such an analysis can help reveal why high and
unequal levels
of devastation are experienced in disasters in urban areas

throughout Asia
as well as which types of responses are needed to reduce future
vulnerabilities
to disasters.
The 2011 floods in Bangkok provide a useful case study of the
governance
of disasters in Asia’s urban transition. A UPE analysis of the
period before,
during, and after the floods reveals how the exercising of power
by the city’s
elite through state and market institutions has not only changed
the
environment of the Bangkok metropolitan area so that those
living there
have become more vulnerable to floods, but also has created a
spatial pattern
of urban development which has led to uneven exposure to
floods. Further,
the case study shows how governance failures of water and land
management
made flooding worse in Bangkok, particularly to the city’s most
vulnerable
communities. Overall, poor governance elevated the floods in
2011 from
being a minor disaster to a major one.
To make this argument, the paper will first summarize the
theory of UPE
and how it relates to urban flood governance. Second, it will
describe the
political economy of Bangkok’s urbanization processes and the
city’s flood
governance during the last few decades, the effects urbanization
has had on
the physical environment, and the pre-2011 flood conditions

these processes
created. Third, it will link Bangkok’s urbanization and water
management
schemes to the 2011 floods, arguing that actions and policy
decisions by the
country’s elite subjected those in the outer city to more
extensive flooding
to ensure that the inner city stayed dry. Last, it will briefly
conclude with a
discussion of the governments’ response after the floods. The
paper uses
a mixture of primary and secondary sources, drawing from
interviews
conducted with Thai government officials, academics, NGO
activists,
____________________
10 Michael Douglass, “The Urban Transition of Environmental
Disaster Governance in Asia,”
(working paper 210, Asia Research Institute, Singapore, 2013).
11 Saskia Sassen and Natan Dotan, “Delegating, Not Returning,
to the Biosphere: How to Use
the Multi-scalar and Ecological Properties of Cities,” Global
Environmental Change 21, no. 3 (2011): 825.
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community leaders, and community members from December
2013 to
October 2014.12
Urban Political Ecology and Its Relationship to Flooding
The field of urban political ecology provides a useful
framework for thinking
about the creation and shape of disasters, particularly in an
urban context.
This field could be called a subfield of political ecology, which
combines
“concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political
economy”13 and asserts
that environmental change and ecological conditions are the
outcomes of
political processes. Prior to the development of this field of
political ecology,
both academics and policy makers mistakenly often sought to
address
environmental problems with technical or management solutions
that did
not tackle the political economy dimensions of these problems.
Blaikie pioneered the argument that environmental problems
cannot be
solved unless these dimensions are addressed.14 In The
Political Economy of
Soil Erosion in Developing Countries, he argues that soil
erosion is a socio-
political problem because of the involvement of a number of
key stakeholders
who live outside the affected areas, and of the state, which is

never a neutral
actor. Together with Bloomfield, Blaikie continued to analyze
environmental
problems through a political economy lens in Land Degradation
and Society,15
arguing that not only was the state not neutral but also that it
often bestows
its power to the dominant group and classes while marginalizing
the least
powerful. Influenced by Marxism, political ecology focuses on
unequal power
relations and examines control over access to natural and social
environments
and to natural resources, thereby making conflict and
contestation over
resources central to most analyses.
Only in the last fifteen years have studies in UPE taken off.
Before, most
political ecology studies were conducted in rural areas. With a
strong Marxist
leaning, UPE developed from the work of Harvey (and
Lefebvre). In his
seminal work, Social Justice and the City, Harvey begins with
the position that
the city is a tangible, built environment but also a social
product.16 Cities
are built for the purpose of circulating capital, including human,
commodities or finance. Using this Marxist framework, he
argues that “cities
are founded upon the exploitation of the many by the few”17
and posits that
____________________
12 The identities of some of the interviewees have been

concealed to protect confidentiality
agreements.
13 Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, Land Degradation and
Society (London: Methuen, 1987),
17.
14 Piers Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in
Developing Countries (London: Longman,
1985).
15 Blaikie and Brookfield, Land Degradation.
16 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward
Arnold, 1973).
17 Harvey, Social Justice, 314.
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the roots of urban inequality are the scarcity and high value of
land in good
locations.
Urban political ecologists expand upon Harvey’s theory of the
city,
perceiving landscapes and urban infrastructures of cities as
hybrids and

“historical products of human-nature interaction.”18 Thinking
of the city as
a socio-spatial hybrid enables us to see how the “social
production of urban
space unevenly spreads the vulnerability to hazards, exposure to
risk and
ecological breakdown.”19 For example, they argue that the
spaces of
environmental degradation and high exposure to hazards as well
as those
of protection to hazard threats are unevenly distributed over the
topography
of the city. One other important contribution they make is their
conceptualization of the city as an ever-changing landscape of
power.
Swyngedouw argues that urbanization is a contested political-
economic
process of exclusion and marginalization, creating new
landscapes of power,
rather than manifestations of existing ones.20 Therefore, they
focus on power
relations and social actors who carry them out21 because these
two factors
largely determine who can access and mobilize scarce resources
or other
components of the environment and who is marginalized by
being forced
to live in spaces of high vulnerability.
Specifically in the case of urban flooding, uneven
vulnerabilities
experienced by different individuals during floods are largely
due to the
state and market institutions protecting the lives and the
interests of the elite
while failing to protect marginalized groups or making them

more vulnerable.
Normally the state, rather than the private sector, has
undertaken investments
in flood risk reduction, such as flood protection structures,
designation of
public floodways and land-use controls and therefore plays a
key role in
determining how vulnerable people are to floods. Hence, the
state is a crucial
arena of contestation over flood protection. In this
contemporary landscape,
the elites often have been able to use the state to accumulate
social surpluses
in areas where they live and work at the expense of other
groups.22 However,
the structures of power governing floods and their effects are
not static.
Rather, by opening political space, floods can act as catalysts or
tipping points
shaping “the future political trajectory towards an accelerated
status quo or
____________________
18 Roger Keil, “Urban Political Ecology,” Urban Geography 24,
no. 8 (2003): 724.
19 Martin J. Murray, “Fire and Ice: Unnatural Disasters and the
Disposable Urban Poor in Post-
Apartheid Johannesburg,” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 33, no. 1 (2009): 171.
20 Erik Swyngedouw, “Power, Nature, and the City. The
Conquest of Water and the Political
Ecology of Urbanization in Guayaquil, Ecuador: 1880–1990,”
Environment and Planning A 29, no. 2

(1997): 311–332.
21 Erik Swyngedouw, Social Power and the Urbanization of
Water: Flows of Power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
22 Timothy W. Collins, “Marginalization, Facilitation, and the
Production of Unequal Risk: The
2006 Paso del Norte Floods,” Antipode 42, no. 2 (2010): 258–
288.
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/external-
references?article=0066-4812(2010)42:2L.258[aid=10639746]
references?article=0308-518x(1997)29:2L.311[aid=3695132]
references?article=0308-518x(1997)29:2L.311[aid=3695132]
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a critical juncture.”23 Consequently, as Pelling argues, while
floods are physical
occurrences, their form, magnitude, and location, and the people
they affect
are the outcome of ongoing and past socio-economic and
political processes.24
Thus we must study these processes in order to fully understand

floods.
Before 2011: The Flood’s Incubation Period
Many people suffered in Bangkok during the floods of 2011 at
vastly different
levels—some remained safe and dry at the expense of others.
Given the key
role of state and market institutions in determining this
vulnerability, our
analysis should focus on the governance processes that created,
distributed,
and reduced these vulnerabilities. Further, disasters do not
simply occur
because of a one-off phenomenon, such as a heavy rainfall
event, but also
because of “environmental unsustainable development projects
over time.”25
Or, as Douglass argues, before each urban disaster’s onset,
there is an
incubation period when causal factors contributing to a disaster
accumulate,
interact in an unnoticed manner, and compound vulnerability.26
Therefore,
analyzing the 2011 flood incubation period in Bangkok can shed
light into
this process. This section describes the political economy of
Bangkok’s
urbanization and the effects this had on the environment and on
the creation
of uneven vulnerabilities to flooding.
Founded in 1782 in the low-lying floodplain of the Chao Phraya
Delta
(see figure 1, next page), Bangkok is located in an area which
has always

been prone to flooding. However, during the initial period of
the city’s
establishment (1782–1890), flood damage was not a major
problem and
“excess water was a part of life and considered as benevolent
nourishment.”27
Life revolved around an aquatic network of natural or dug
canals (khlongs)
and residents lived in amphibious dwellings. Further, plantation
irrigation
ditches and low-lying rice paddies served as drainage and water
catchments,
thereby reducing serious flooding.28
In the 1890s, the city began to change from a floating city to a
land-based
one. Over 135 roads and 41 bridges were constructed between
1890 and
____________________
23 Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill, “Disaster Politics: Tipping
Points for Change in the Adaptation
of Sociopolitical Regimes,” Progress in Human Geography 34,
no. 1 (2010): 29.
24 Mark Pelling, “A Political Ecology of Urban Flood Hazard
and Social Vulnerability in Guyana”
(PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1997), 3.
25 Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, eds.,
Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters,
Development, and People (London: Earthscan, 2004), 3.
26 Douglass, “The Urban Transition.”
27 Danai Thaitakoo and Brian McGrath, “Bangkok Liquid

Perception: Waterscape Urbanism in
the Chao Phraya River Delta and Implications to Climate
Change Adaptation,” in Water Communities,
eds. Rajib Shaw and Danai Thaitakoo, (Bingley: Emerald,
2010), 41.
28 Sidh Sintusingha, “Bangkok’s Urban Evolution: Challenges
and Opportunities for Urban
Sustainability,” in Megacities: Urban Form, Governance, and
Sustainability, eds. Andre Sorensen and
Junichiro Okata (Tokyo: Springer, 2011), 133–161.
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1935.29 Shop houses and mansions replaced their aquatic
counterparts. In
addition, the government allowed land tenure for the first time,
which
stimulated land-based settlements, on either side of the
khlongs.30
____________________
29 Porphant Ouyyanont, “Physical and Economic Change in
Bangkok, 1851–1925,” Southeast

Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (1999): 456.
30 Sintusingha, “Bangkok’s Urban Evolution,” 141.
Figure 1
The Chao Phraya Delta
Source: Kreeta Sroikeeree and Rattana Bannatham, “Flood
and Flood Management in Bangkok, Thailand,” in Water-
Related Risk Management in Urban Agglomerations, ed. Ulrike
Kastrup (Bonn: UNU-EHS, 2006), 8.
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The city’s land-based urbanization and population expanded
rapidly after
World War II as the country transformed from an agriculture-
based to an
export-led manufacturing and service economy. This
transformation
accelerated from the 1960s onwards when the government
successfully wooed
foreign direct investment (FDI) in export-oriented
manufacturing. During
the 1980s, facing rising manufacturing costs domestically and
an increased

value of the yen especially after the 1985 Plaza Accords,
Japanese companies
significantly invested in manufacturing.31 Much of this
investment occurred
in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), consisting of the
metropolis
of Bangkok and the five surrounding provinces. To attract
investment,
the government concentrated transportation and
telecommunications
infrastructure in this area, giving it a competitive advantage
over the rest of
the country.32 The expansion of roads into former agricultural
areas around
Bangkok plus the high cost of land in the city centre spurred
rapid urban
and industrial expansion into Bangkok’s hinterlands. 33 The
majority of
multinational companies decided to locate their industries here
given its
infrastructure advantages, the lower cost of land and labour, and
the weaker
enforcement of regulations.34
The newfound opportunities to accumulate wealth,
infrastructure
expansion, the massive wave of migrants to the BMR,35 and the
lower cost of
land contributed significantly to a real estate boom in the peri-
urban areas
of Bangkok, particularly in the form of townhouses and
detached housing.
The real estate market exploded during this period and
eventually overheated.
As an example of this massive land change, in peri-urban
Pathum Thani

Province, a province above Bangkok, non-agriculture land use
burgeoned
from 25 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 1990 and 39 percent in
2000. This
trend has continued until the present. To build these new roads
and estates,
developers filled in paddy fields and many of the khlongs or
reduced them
to drainage ditches and open sewers.36 Overall, the built-up
area of the BMR
ballooned from 67 km2 in the 1950s to 683 km2 by 2007.37
____________________
31 The Japanese constituted 44% of the total investment in
manufacturing in Thailand from
1960–1992. Michael J. G. Parnwell and Luxmon
Wongsuphasawat, “Between the Global and the Local:
Extended Metropolitanisation and Industrial Location Decision
Making in Thailand,” Third World
Planning Review 19, no. 2 (1997): 127.
32 Gavin Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership:
Growth, Power and Politics in Thailand’s
Eastern Seaboard,” International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 28, no. 1 (2004): 11–26.
33 Suwanna Rongwinriyaphanich, “Effects of Land Policy on
Hybrid Rural-urban Development
Patterns and Resilience: A Case Study of the Territorial
Development in the Bangkok Metropolitan
Region,” (paper presented at Regional Studies Association
European Conference, Delft, Netherlands,
15 May 2012).
34 Parnwell and Wongsuphasawat, “Between the Global,” 119–
138.

35 A daily average of 30,000 from 1985 to 1990.
36 Edsel E. Sajor and Rutmanee Ongsakul, “Mixed Land Use
and Equity in Water Governance
in Peri-Urban Bangkok,” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 31, no. 4 (2007): 782–801.
37 Shlomo Angel, Jason Parent, and Daniel Civco, “Urban
Sprawl Metrics: An Analysis of Global
Urban Expansion Using GIS,” (paper presented at ASPRS 2007
Annual Conference, Tampa, Florida,
7–11 May 2007).
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However, the BMR developed in a haphazard and sprawling
fashion. It
grew outwards in a ribbon-like fashion along the three major
transportation
routes leading out of the urban core with these corridors
becoming heavily
congested while underutilized land remained between the

corridors.38 The
expansion resulted in a situation in which all types of urban
land uses,
including individual houses, housing estates, and commercial
and industrial
buildings were located beside each other. Development was
“influenced as
much by ‘who owns land where’ as by any sound urban planning
principles.”39
This pattern of unregulated and sprawled-out urban
development has
had a number of negative effects on the physical environment
and has
increased the city’s overall vulnerability to flooding. Previously
agricultural
lands had contributed to flood retention by holding up surplus
water during
times of heavy rain.40 The widespread paving of the surface for
roads or
residential, commercial, and industrial buildings decreased
water infiltration,
has increased run-off and hastened it into channels.41 On land
with natural
ground cover, 50 percent of precipitation infiltrates into the
ground whereas
in a surface that is 75 to 100 percent impervious, only 15
percent infiltrates
the ground.42 In particular, the illegal construction of houses
and factories
in floodways and green zones (discussed below) has harmfully
encroached
onto natural drainage channels and flood storage areas. Further,
the filling
and degradation of khlongs which previously played a major
role draining

storm run-off water has also shrunk the city’s capacity to cope
with rainfall.
A number of illegal settlements encroaching upon the remaining
khlongs has
limited their drainage capacity and made it more difficult to
dredge them.43
Another damaging effect has been the city’s heavy land
subsidence, which
began in the 1970s. The city’s ground has already sunk more
than one metre
since then. This has occurred mainly because of excessive
groundwater
pumping, particularly by industries. The state has failed to
manage expanding
water demand, which rose as a result of the city’s expansion.
Demand for
____________________
38 Charles A. Setchell, “The Growing Environmental Crisis in
the World’s Mega Cities: The Case
of Bangkok,” Third World Planning Review 17, no. 1 (1995): 1–
18.
39 Craig Plumb, “Bangkok,” in Cities in the Pacific Rim,
Planning Systems and Property Markets, eds.
Jim Berry and Stanley McGreal (London: E. & F. N. Spon,
1999), 154.
40 Vudipong Davivongs, Makoto Yokohari, and Yuji Hara,
“Neglected Canals: Deterioration of
Indigenous Irrigation System by Urbanization in the West Peri-
Urban Area of Bangkok Metropolitan
Region,” Water 4, no. 1 (2012): 12–27.

41 Judith A. Rees, Urban Water and Sanitation Services; An
IWRM Approach (Stockholm: Global
Water Partnership, 2006),
http://www.gwp.org/Global/ToolBox/Publications/Background%
20
papers/11%20Urban%20Water%20and%20Sanitation%20Ser
vices;%20An%20IWRM%20
Approach%20%282006%29%20English.pdf, accessed 20 May
2014.
42 Joachim Tourbier and Iain White, “Sustainable Measures for
Flood Attenuation: Sustainable
Drainage and Conveyance Systems SUDACS,” in Advances in
Urban Flood Management, eds. Richard
Ashley et al. (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 14.
43 Thongchai Roachanakanan, “Floodways and Flood
Prevention in Thailand,” (paper presented
at the World Flood Protection, Response, Recovery and
Drawing up of Flood Risk Management
Conference, Bangkok, 12–13 September 2012).
20papers/11%20Urban%20Water%20and%20Sanitation%20Serv
ices;%20An%20IWRM%20Approach%20%282006%29%20Engl
ish.pdf
ish.pdf
ish.pdf

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groundwater surpassed the threshold of the city’s aquifer system
and
consequently over-extraction occurred. This problem was
exacerbated by
the lack of a proper city plan to manage the city’s land usage
and infrastructure
development. While the government did succeed in curbing the
pumping
rate during the early 1990s, it rose again in the late 1990s due
to the city’s
expansion into new outer areas where no surface water supply
was available
(see figure 2 above). Until the early 2000s, the Federation of
Thai industries
had succeeded in limiting a tax increase of well-pumping
charges.44 The
subsidence has debilitated the city’s flood protection. Flood
walls and dikes
subside steadily as the ground sinks and the city therefore needs
to make
greater efforts to pump and drain potential floodwater through
khlongs and
tunnels.45 The World Bank estimates that 70 percent of the
increase in

Bangkok’s flooding costs in 2050 will be due to land
subsidence.46
____________________
44 François Molle, “Scales and Power in River Basin
Management: The Chao Phraya River in
Thailand,” The Geographical Journal 173, no. 4 (2007): 35–73.
45 N. Phien-Wej, P.H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya, “Land Subsidence
in Bangkok, Thailand,” Engineering
Geology 82, no. 4 (2006): 187–201.
46 World Bank, Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal
Megacities: A Synthesis Report
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/
Resources/226300-
1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf, accessed 20
May 2014.
Figure 2
Groundwater Pumping Rate in the Bangkok Plain
from 1955–2004
Source: N. Phien-Wej, P.H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya, “Land
Subsidence in Bangkok,
Thailand,” Engineering Geology 82, no. 4 (2006): 191.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Re
sources/226300-
1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Re
sources/226300-
1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf

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An underlying driver of this ineffective planning system and
subsequent
degrading urbanization is a change in the country’s political
economy
beginning in the second half of the 1970s, which reshaped the
urban political
ecological landscape. Up until this period, Thailand’s political
system had
been described as a bureaucratic polity: bureaucrats and the
military
dominated the political process and monopolized power at the
local level
through almighty central government ministries, particularly the
Ministry
of Interior. During this period, three changes occurred that led
to the decline
of the power of the bureaucratic polity and the rise of local
politicians-
cum-businessmen who gained enormous wealth and power. 47
First, after the
middle class agitated for change and launched large-scale street
protests,
the national government devolved power to the local level,
including

significantly increasing the budgets of the elected Provincial
Administration
Organizations (PAO) which were created in the 1950s. PAOs
soon began to
be dominated by local businessmen since they were given the
responsibility
to allocate state funding for local infrastructure projects, which
became more
important as the country rapidly invested in infrastructure
during this period.
Second, democratization occurred from this period onwards as
the power
of Parliament grew. This change enabled provincial elites to run
for national
office or exert informal power by financially backing
parliamentary
candidates. Third, the aforementioned industrial transformation
provided
new opportunities for provincial elites to accumulate wealth,
particularly in
the construction, transportation, and real estate sectors, and
translate this
wealth into political power.48 Largely due to the concentrated
economic
boom in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region, a number of these
local elite
operated in this area.49
The rise of the local political elite has had a strong influence
on the
haphazard form of Bangkok’s urbanization and the city’s
increased
vulnerability to flooding. First, they often either acted as
brokers for outside
investors wanting to buy a big piece of land or invested in a
number of

housing and industrial projects.50 They would consolidate land
for these
projects either through legal purchases or graft and
intimidation. Their
excessive pursuit of property development, however,
contributed to
overbuilding in the BMR, including in the green zones, and in
floodways,
such as industrial estates in Ayutthaya. Second, members of
Parliament have
protected illegal communities encroaching upon khlongs in
order to gain
their votes. According to a local government officer in Don
Muang, one of
____________________
47 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership,” 11–26.
48 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local Leadership,” 11–26.
49 Of a list of the seven most influential local strongmen
compiled by the military, five operated
in the BMR.
50 Sombat Chantornvong, “Local Godfathers in Thai
Politics,” in Money and Power in Provincial
Thailand, ed. Ruth T. McVey (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2000),
53–73.
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Bangkok’s northernmost districts, this is why a number of
communities still
are allowed to encroach upon a major canal, Khlong Prem
Prachakorn.51
Third, local elected politicians in Bangkok and surrounding
areas often have
responded to the electorate’s desire to adopt road-led
development by giving
higher priority to infrastructure development and income-
generation
projects over long-term conservation. Last, in public hearings
and meetings
between government officials and business interest groups,
landowners and
developers have pressured government officials to change land-
use plans
from green zones to other areas so that they can build in these
areas.52
Besides the rise of the local elite, another, albeit interrelated,
underlying
driver of the city’s lack of planning is the limited power and
interest of the
state institutions governing Bangkok’s urbanization. As Askew
argues, city
planning “remained a highly symbolic modernistic ritual for
sections of the
western-educated municipal and state-level bureaucracy, but it
is effectively
impotent as policy.”53 Until 1992, Bangkok was probably the
largest city in

the world without an official development plan. The first
Bangkok General
Plan was delayed numerous times and was in draft status for
fifteen years
until it was officially adopted. However, even after its passage,
there was “no
actual commitment to the plan.”54 The lengthy delay in
adopting the plan
and lack of enforcement after its implementation occurred
because of not
only strong resistance from powerful local elites but also the
persistently
fragmented and feeble government institutions governing
urbanization.
Government regulations curbing degrading forms of land use
have been
weak. Until the creation of the city’s 2006 Comprehensive Plan,
the plans
themselves have been vague without any detailed or quantifiable
goals, such
as set floor area and open space ratios, and the plans have not
been linked
with wider policy goals.55 For example, the 1992 plan merely
has an objective
that the plan should “be used as a guide to the development of
the city.”56
While the 2006 Bangkok Comprehensive Plan positively
provides a clearer
framework, including spatial ratios and plot sizes,57 it will be
difficult to
modify previous infringements. Legal and tax provisions also do
not
encourage environmentally sound land usage. Legally real estate
developers
who purchased land are entitled to take any action on their land,

including
filling khlongs. Consequently, of the filled khlongs, 97 percent
of them have
____________________
51 Don Muang District deputy governor, interview by Danny
Marks, Bangkok, 16 July 2014.
52 BMA city planning official, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 4 April 2014.
53 Marc Askew, Bangkok: Place, Practice and Representation
(London: Routledge, 2002), 63.
54 W. Konisranukul, “Successful Urban Design: The Case of
Bangkok” (PhD dissertation,
University College London, 2006), 106.
55 Plumb, “Bangkok,” 129–156.
56 Comprehensive Plan for the Bangkok Metropolis (Bangkok:
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration,
1992), Clause 4. URL no longer available.
57 Cassidy Johnson et al., “Private Sector Investment Decisions
in Building and Construction:
Increasing, Managing and Transferring Risks,” in Global
Assessment Report 2013 on Disaster Risk Reduction,
UNISDR, 33 (Geneva: UNISDR, 2013).
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been filled on privately owned land.58 However, despite the
clear influence
of ownership on khlong degradation, this policy remains
unchanged. Further,
taxes on residential properties fail to control land use because
the tax rates
are too low and the tax base excludes unutilized property. This
system has
encouraged speculative land holding.59
Also, the state’s fragmented institutions have a limited capacity
to enforce
land-use regulations. The numerous Thai government ministries
responsible
for urban governance operate like small kingdoms, with
fragmented and
competing jurisdictions. They rarely coordinate with each other.
Additionally,
the long-winded approval process and rigid review procedures
mean that
the city plan’s drafting and implementation process is
constantly slowed
down—evident by the 17-year period it took Bangkok to pass its
first city plan
after the initial draft.60 Further, provincial governments of the
BMR have not
coordinated land-use plans. For example, the Bangkok
Metropolitan
Administration (BMA) has designated a water catchment area
(green and
grey areas) to be undeveloped in northwestern Bangkok, but
north of this

area, the Nonthaburi provincial government has allowed
extensive
development (yellow, orange, and red zones), thereby rendering
this
catchment area ineffective.
A strong example of the state’s limited capacity to enforce land-
use
regulation is the illegal development in designated swathes of
eastern and
western Bangkok. The BMA has set these areas as green zones
in order to
keep these as drainage areas which would reduce the city’s risk
of flooding.
Under this designation, the BMA has prohibited nearly twenty
uses of the
land, including housing estates. However, an investigation
found developers
have built housing estates on both sides of roads and
disregarded spacing
regulations.61 Another study counted over 28,000 houses
constructed in the
eastern floodway.62 According to the head of a major real
estate company,
in previous decades, a number of developers paid bribes to
government
agencies in order to obtain housing permits in these areas,
although this
practice has mostly ceased during the past few years.63 During
the floods in
2011, water diverted to these green zones not only severely
damaged these
houses but also was blocked by all of these buildings from
flowing south into
____________________

58 Davivongs, Yokohari, and Hara, “Neglected Canals,” 20.
59 Orapan Srisawalak-Nabangchang and Warin Wonghanchao,
“Evolution of Land-use in Urban-
Rural Fringe Area: The Case of Pathum Thani Province,” in The
Chao Phraya Delta: Historical Development,
Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand’s Rice Bowl: Proceedings
of the International Conference (Bangkok:
Kasetsart University, 2000), 8–9.
60 Plumb, “Bangkok,” 137.
61 Charles Mehl and Banasopit Mekvichai, “Contemporary
Issues in Urban Land Management
in Thailand,” (paper presented at the International Symposium
on Emergent Cities in Southeast Asia,
Vientiane, Laos, 26–28 November 2013).
62 Sutat Weesakul, “Thailand Flood in 2011 and Mitigation
Strategies,” (lecture, Asia Institute
of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand, 16 September 2013).
63 Real estate developer, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok,
27 August 2014.
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the Gulf of Thailand.64 Thus, these practices by developers who
profited
handsomely from building these estates contributed to those
residents in
northern Bangkok being exposed to the floodwater longer.
While these powerful politicians and businessmen who have
profited the
most from the BMR’s rapid growth often live in the better
protected inner
city of Bangkok (as discussed below) or in the outskirts in
houses with high
floodwalls, the rest of the population in the BMR, which has
risen rapidly
during the past few decades to at least 15 million (as of 2010),
has become
more exposed to floods due to these land-use practices. Further,
those most
vulnerable to floods are low-income slum communities. They
have a low
level of capacity to cope with floods due to their community’s
limited
infrastructure, poorer quality of housing, low level of financial
resources,
lack of access to decision makers, and in the majority of cases
land tenure
insecurity.65 The geographic pattern of slum settlement has
made them
highly vulnerable to floods too. While the number of slums has
shrunk in
the city core, new slums have emerged in suburban areas,
particularly near
industrial areas in the east and north, areas which have less
flood protection

infrastructure than the core does.66 The majority of slums are in
low-lying,
unfilled land which often floods during the rainy season. It is a
common
practice for real-estate developers to fill the land of new
housing estates
before they build them, thereby making low-lying communities
more exposed
to floods.67 Many slum settlements can be found in the strips
along either
railway lines or khlong banks. The latter is particularly the case
in Pathum
Thani, which has many public irrigation khlongs. This is
because the squatters
do not have to pay rent in this publicly owned land and cannot
afford to
move to less exposed areas.68
The slum communities along canals in the peripheral areas of
the BMR
are the ones that are most exposed to the overflowing of
khlongs due to
heavy rainfall or pluvial flooding69 and, due to their lack of
assets, their coping
capacity is also the lowest. Thus, the urbanization pattern of
Bangkok has
created vast inequalities in vulnerability to environmental
harms, particularly
floods. The next section argues that it has also created
inequalities in access
to environmental goods, such as flood protection infrastructure.
____________________
64 Mehl and Mekvichai, “Contemporary Issues.”
65 Norio Saito, “Challenges for Adapting Bangkok’s Flood

Management Systems to Climate
Change,” Urban Climate 9 (2014): 89–100.
66 Utis Kaothien and Douglas Webster, “The Bangkok Region,”
in Global City Regions: Their
Emerging Forms, eds. Roger Simmonds and Gary Hack (New
York: E. & F.N. Spon, 2000), 23–37.
67 Real estate developer, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok,
27 August 2014.
68 Kioe Sheng Yap and Koen De Wandeler, “Self-help Housing
in Bangkok,” Habitat International
34, no. 3 (2010): 332–341.
69 Shaikh M.M. Ahsan, “Resilient Cities for the Poor or by the
Poor? A Case Study from Bangkok,”
(master’s thesis, Technology University of Berlin, 2013),
http://www.urbanmanagement.tu-berlin.de/
fileadmin/f6_urbanmanagement/Study_Course/student_work/Th
esis_Ahsan_Resilient_Cities_for_
the_Poor_or_by_the_Poor.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
http://www.urbanmanagement.tu-
berlin.de/fileadmin/f6_urbanmanagement/Study_Course/student
_work/Thesis_Ahsan_Resilient_Cities_for_the_Poor_or_by_the
_Poor.pdf
_Poor.pdf
_Poor.pdf

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Bangkok’s Flood Management
Because Bangkok is prone to flooding and has faced heavy
flooding since
its inception, in recent decades both the national government
and the BMA
have mostly sought to reduce the exposure of the population of
Bangkok
and surrounding areas to floods by putting in place structural
measures such
as dams, dikes, and flood tunnels. Unlike a number of
governments of
Western cities, such as those in the US, the UK, and Canada,
they have mostly
overlooked nonstructural measures, such as prohibiting
development in
high-hazard areas, acquiring and relocating buildings in high-
hazard areas,
and restoring natural habitations such as wetlands. When they
have
implemented such measures, such as the gam ling (King’s
monkey cheek)
scheme of building retention ponds to hold water, they have not
been
expanded sufficiently. However, this over-reliance on

infrastructural measures
without building the population’s coping capacity can have
devastating
impacts if the infrastructure fails, as it did in 2011. Governance
failures
further weaken the government’s flood management. Moreover,
the spatial
pattern of this infrastructure development is uneven, protecting
the inner
city, the location of the palace, shopping malls, and government
buildings,
at the expense of the outer city.
One major strategy the government has used to protect Bangkok
from
floods is by constructing dams upstream, particularly the
massive Bhumibol
and Sirikit dams, which were built in 1964 and 1972
respectively. However,
the multi-purpose nature of the dams, providing irrigation and
energy
primarily and flood protection secondarily, can cause this
strategy to backfire.
This occurred both in 2006, when the dams were already full
and could not
retain any more water, and more recently in 2011. As the dams
began to fill
by August due to heavy rainfall, the Thai Meteorology
Department informed
the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the
managers of
the dams, that more heavy rain would likely come. The dam
manager said in
an interview that he wanted to release water in order stop the
dams from
overfilling. However, the Agriculture Minister Theera

Wongsamut overruled
him, ordering him to delay releasing water so that farmers in the
central plains
would have sufficient time to harvest a second crop of rice.70
However, this
strategy backfired due to heavy rainfall in August and
September which forced
the managers to release 7,000 million cubic metres of water
from the dams
in October to stop them from breaking. This outpour of the
dams’ water
combined with the heavier than usual tropical rainstorms in the
second half
of 2011 caused a huge amount of water to flow into the Chao
Phraya Basin.71
____________________
70 EGAT and Thai Meteorology Department senior officials,
interviews by Danny Marks,
September and October 2014.
71 Suluck Lamubol, “Thailand: Floods Expose System Failures:
Academics,” University World News,
4 November 2011,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=201111
04093419380,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=201111
04093419380
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The city has also sought to prevent water from flowing outside
into the
city or in some cases to temporarily divert the water elsewhere.
Recently
Bangkok endured large floods in 1983, 1995, and 2006. After
each of these
floods, the city administration constructed more infrastructure
to protect
the city. In response to the 1983 floods, a polder system was
built, including
a major dyke running from the east bank of the Chao Phraya
from Pathum
Thani to major areas of Bangkok and the King’s Dyke at the
northern and
eastern boundaries of Bangkok.72 In 1995, the BMA used
central government
funding to build a 77 kilometre barrier along the Chao Phraya
River, which
was completed in 2010. In 2006, after extensive flooding, the
BMA built a
series of additional flood barriers along the main khlongs and
pumping
stations.73 Most of the flood protection infrastructure is
concentrated in the
central core of Bangkok, which is where the majority of the
city’s upper-
income segments live, work, and shop.
However, this strategy has multiple drawbacks. While those

inside the
dykes are better protected, conditions are worse for those
outside. Starting
in the 1980s, urbanization occurred beyond the King’s Dyke in
the form of
housing estates and industries. But without the construction of
additional
dykes and pumping stations in these areas, they became
unevenly exposed
to pluvial and fluvial floods.74 For example, in 2006, areas
outside the King’s
Dyke in eastern Bangkok, such as Minburi and Nong Chok,
suffered heavy
flooding. In Pathum Thani, a local NGO leader said that the
area “was being
drowned to protect Bangkok.”75 With water being diverted
from the protected
zone, the outer zone was transformed into a retention area to
store the
region’s excessive water.76 Also, Suvarnabhumi Airport has
polders blocking
major khlongs which could have been used to drain flood-prone
areas, as
was the case in 2011.77 The importance placed on keeping the
airport dry
causes areas outside the polder system, particularly those closer
to the
airport,78 to become more flooded.
____________________
72 Louis Lebel et al., “The Promise of Flood Protection: Dykes
and Dams, Drains and Diversions,”
in Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower,
Livelihoods and Governance, eds. François
Molle, Tira Foran, and Mira Käkönen (London: Earthscan,

2009), 283–306.
73 Archana M. Patankar et al., Enhancing Adaptation to Climate
Change by Integrating Climate Risk
into Long-Term Development Plans and Disaster Management,
(Kobe: Asia-Pacific Network for Global
Change Research, 2012), 80, http://www.apn-
gcr.org/resources/files/original/06516ed9ac5850386
cdd0d5d73f7033f.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014.
74 Hiroyasu Ohtsu, “Construction and Development of Social
Infrastructure” in Challenges for
Human Security Engineering, eds. Yuzuru Matsuoka and
Mamoru Yoshida (Tokyo: Springer Japan,
2014), 61–78.
75 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 287.
76 N. Preyawanit, “Planning in the Sprawling Zone of an Asian
Mega-urban Region: The Case
Study of Bang Kachao, Bangkok Metropolitan Region” (PhD
dissertation, University College London,
2007), 107–108.
77 Jon Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System,” Bangkok Post,
1 November 2011, http://www.
bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-
news/264228/bangkok-drainage-system, accessed 20 May
2014.
78 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 283-306.
http://www.apn-
gcr.org/resources/files/original/06516ed9ac5850386cdd0d5d73f
7033f.pdf
http://www.apn-

gcr.org/resources/files/original/06516ed9ac5850386cdd0d5d73f
7033f.pdf
http://www
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Additionally, as seen in 2011, the existing system insufficiently
protects
large areas of Bangkok from major flows of water. For example,
the King’s
Dyke (mapped in figure 3 above) is designed primarily to
address low-level
flooding rather than infrequent but high-level flooding events79
and
subsequently was breached in two places in 2011.80 Also,
achieving artificial
drainage through water gates, khlongs, and pumps in flat-lying
Bangkok is
not only expensive but also “complex and full of agents that
respond to
problems in their own areas of jurisdiction,”81 which means
that the drainage
system is less than optimal. The number and size of the
retention ponds were
____________________

79 Patankar et al., “Enhancing Adaptation,” 81.
80 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official, interview by
Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18 July 2014.
81 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 289.
Figure 3
Flood Protection Infrastructure in Eastern Bangkok
Source: Jon Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System,” Bangkok
Post, 1 November 2011.
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too small to hold the floodwaters in 2011 and they are less
effective than
they could have been because they are not connected to a
network of other
ponds and khlongs.82
Further, in 2011, infrastructure failed along the Chao Phraya
River
upstream of Bangkok. At least thirteen dykes and water gates
broke because
local government agencies had not adequately maintained these
ageing
structures. The breaking of this infrastructure, especially of the

Bang Chom
Sri water gate in Singburi, caused flood protection
embankments along the
river to be breached.83 For a number of weeks afterwards, over
300 million
cubic metres of water flowed daily through these breaches on
the eastern
bank of the river, causing large parts of Lopburi and Ayutthaya
to be
inundated and making it much more difficult to control the
water.84 In
addition, the government had neglected to dredge many
irrigation canals
for a while and remove weeds from them, causing them to have
less than
maximum flow capacity in 2011.85
Similar to the situation of land management in Bangkok, poor
governance
further enfeebles flood management. At the national level, there
is no single
regulatory framework for water management in place; at least
eight different
agencies—none of which coordinate with each other—are
responsible for
regulating water policies. Technical weaknesses, such as
inaccurate methods
of measuring rainfall and river flows, also hinder the
government’s ability
to manage water.86 Likewise, within the BMA, there exists no
systematic
coordination between departments, who instead work
independently in
“silos.”87 Moreover, national-level and provincial-level
agencies often have
fundamentally different objectives. For example, the

Department of Water
Drainage of the BMA aims to achieve zero flooding within
Bangkok, but this
makes it more difficult for the Royal Irrigation Department
(RID) to manage
in surrounding provinces. The city administration has so far had
little interest
in aligning dyke infrastructure inside its boundaries with those
outside of
it.88 As seen in 2011, the two agencies are often at loggerheads
and rarely
cooperate with each other. Last, prior to the 2011 floods,
neither the national
government nor the BMA had a flood emergency plan.
____________________
82 Thongchai Roachanakanan, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 16 December 2013.
83 Nipon Poapongsakorn and Pitsom Meethom, “Impact of the
2011 Floods, and Flood
Management in Thailand,” in Economic and Welfare Impacts of
Disasters in East Asia and Policy Responses,
eds. Yasuyuki Sawada and Sothea Oum ( Jakarta: ERIA, 2012),
247–310, http://www.eria.org/
publications/research_project_reports/FY2011/No.8.html,
accessed 22 April 2015.
84 Bangkok Post, “Up to 50,000 May Have to Quit Sing Buri,”
3 October 2011.
85 Pithaya Pookaman, Mungman Tam Ngaan Borehan Jat Gan
Nam Phua Prachachon [Commitment
to Work on Water Management for the People] (Bangkok: The
Office of National Water and Flood

Management Policy, 2013), 12.
86 Danny Marks, “Climate Change and Thailand: Impact and
Response,” Contemporary Southeast
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 2
(2011): 229–258.
87 Saito, “Challenges for Adapting Bangkok’s Flood,” 89–100.
88 Lebel et al., “The Promise,” 283–306.
http://www.eria.org/publications/research_project_reports/FY20
11/No.8.html
http://www.eria.org/publications/research_project_reports/FY20
11/No.8.html
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There are a number of reasons why the government prefers
structural
solutions rather than non-structural ones. First, citizens’
incomplete
information affects the type of disaster policies governments
undertake and
reduces political awards for them to pursue prevention policies.
It is difficult
for citizens to observe the implementation and effects of
improving building

codes, early warning systems, land-use planning, and floodplain
management.
Second, because voters tend to reward politicians for strong
relief efforts
which they can evaluate more easily, politicians tend to
prioritize relief over
prevention. Third, incentives drive politicians to favour
infrastructure
solutions even if they are not the best policy. Infrastructure is
easy for
beneficiaries to observe and can be located in areas of favoured
constituencies.
Further, many local Thai politicians, such as PAO council
members, have
their own construction companies and so addressing flooding
through
infrastructure projects aligns with their business interests. PAO
councils have
been nicknamed sapha phu rap mao, or contractors’ councils.89
Infrastructure
projects are also a lucrative source of rents: politicians can dole
out contracts
for infrastructure projects to their key supporters or earn money
from bribes
and infrastructure can increase the value of flood-protected land
to owners.90
In 2008, Nishimatsu Construction confessed that it gave a bribe
of more than
US$4 million to senior BMA officials in order to win the right
to build a
drainage tunnel in Bangkok.91 Thus, disaster governance is
particularly subject
to perverse political incentives which have driven BMR
politicians to favour
structural projects over non-structural measures.

During the 2011 Floods: Creation of Uneven Vulnerabilities
These urban inequalities and governance failures once again
starkly
manifested themselves during the government’s response to the
floods. It
was clear—to the chagrin of local residents in the outer parts—
that the
government sought to protect the inner city at all costs. Further,
conflicts
and miscommunication arose between government agencies,
particularly
between the BMA and the RID, which undermined the state’s
response.
The large amount of water that flowed into Bangkok and its
surrounding
areas would have been much less without political interference.
Numerous
academics and NGOs believe that Banharn Silapa-archa, a well-
connected
former prime minister and veteran politician, used his
connections within
the Royal Irrigation Department and commanded them not to
open the
____________________
89 Shatkin, “Globalization and Local,” 11–26.
90 Philip Keefer, Disastrous Consequences: The Political
Economy of Disaster Risk Reduction, special
paper commissioned by the Joint World Bank Report – UN
Project on the Economics of Disaster Risk
Reduction, 24 January 2009,
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/Keefer_Disastrous_Conse

quences.
pdf, accessed 22 April 2015.
91 Weerawong Wongpreedee, “BMA Asks Japan to Aid Bribery
Probe,” Bangkok Post, 9 July 2008.
http://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/Keefer_Disastrous_Conse
quences
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water gates to Suphanburi, his home province and often referred
to as
“Banharn Buri,” in order to allow farmers there enough time to
harvest their
crops.92 Statistics of the amount of water flow suggest that the
RID did not
open the three water gates in the western side of the Chao
Phraya to their
maximum capacity until the beginning of October.93 Not fully
opening these
gates caused more water to flow downstream.
Following months of heavy rain and the release of water from
Bhumibol
and Sirikit dams, a massive run-off slowly swept towards the
capital in October.

In response, the BMA erected huge sandbag barriers, closed
water gates,
and diverted water to the west to protect the city’s central
districts. For
example, in mid-October, after a big sandbag wall had been
placed near an
air force base at the boundary between Pathum Thani and the
city of
Bangkok, the level of water was almost one metre lower on the
BMA side.94
While this scheme kept the centre dry, those outside of the
centre heavily
bore this cost: these walls and water gates held up the
floodwaters in the
northern and western areas, submerging these areas for
weeks.95
This decision generated significant discontent among local
residents in
these areas, who had seen on the news that the inner city was
still dry but
their area had been flooded for weeks.96 One elderly woman in
a low-income
community in Don Muang believed that the “the government
unfairly divided
people. People in the inner city are big people and big rich
companies but
they did not protect the small people.”97 One middle-class
resident of Don
Muang complained, “The government was only concerned about
impacts
to the economy. It did not think about how much people outside
the inner
city are suffering. And the assistance provided was not
enough.”98

In response, throughout October and November, these residents
frequently
expressed their anger through petitions and protests and
attempted to
destroy the sandbags or open water gates. For example, in early
November,
after enduring protracted inundation, hundreds of residents of a
housing
estate in Western Bangkok blocked a major road, insisting upon
the removal
of a sandbag barrier and only dispersed after the police agreed
to remove
____________________
92 Kasetsart University professor, Rangsit University professor,
Chulalongkorn University professor,
and two local NGO leaders, interviews by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, January-March, 2014.
93 Poapongsakorn and Meethom, “Impact of the 2011 Floods,”
258.
94 INN News, “Jao Naa Ti Waang Bik Bak Yack Sah Por Au
Fang Pathum” [FROC Officials Place
Big Bags at the Pathum Thani Side], 11 October 2011.
95 Damon Wake, “Misery Lingers for Bangkok’s ‘Forgotten’
Flood Victims,” ABS-CBN News, 27
November 2011, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-
filipino/world/11/27/11/misery-lingers
-bangkoks-forgotten-flood-victims, accessed 22 April 2015.
96 Chatnarong Wisitku, “Jat Gaan Banhaa Namtuam Yaang Mai
Ben Thaam … Saang
Kwamdtackdtang Nai Sangkhom” [Managing the flood Problem

is Not Just … Creates a Rift in Society],
Krungthep Turakij, 22 November 2011.
97 Phrom Samrit community member, interview by Danny
Marks, Bangkok, 5 October 2014.
98 Yu Chareon community member, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 16 August 2014.
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-
filipino/world/11/27/11/misery-lingers
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____________________
99 Bangkok Post, “Govt Apologises to Flood Victims,” 12
November 2011.
100 Krungthep Turakij, “Chao Lum Luk Ka Ruu Nao Gan Nam
Tuam Khet Sai Mai” [Lam Luk Ka
People Removes the Water Barrier. Floods in Sai Mai District],
17 November 2011.
101 Yu Chareon community leader, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 12 March 2014.
102 Nation, “Bang Khae Residents Block Expressway,” 25
November 2011, http://www.

nationmultimedia.com/national/Bang-Khae-residents-block-
expressway-30170601.html, accessed 20
May 2014.
103 Sasin Chalermlarp, interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18
July 2014.
104 Terry Fredrickson, “Flood Management Controversy,”
Bangkok Post, 25 November 2011.
105 They were 67% of the total number of protests (126) in the
country. Former FROC member,
interview by Danny Marks, Bangkok, 17 July 2014.
106 Bangkok Post, “Inner City Spared from Floods, Says
Yingluck,” 20 November 2011.
107 Terry Fredrickson, “Saturday Flood News,” Bangkok Post,
5 November 2011.
the barrier.99 In mid-November, over 200 residents in Pathum
Thani removed
the sandbags by Khlong Hok Wa as well as demanded a nearby
water gate to
be opened by 20 cm.100 In late November, almost a thousand
residents in
Don Muang demolished a sandbag dyke after the government
reneged on
its promise to lower the level of the dyke.101 And on 24
November, in the
western area of Bang Khae, residents blocked a section of the
Western Outer
Ring Road, demanding that the government explain its unfair
flood
mitigation measures. They said that they had to endure chest-
high putrid
floodwater for over five weeks without any explanations or
response from
the government.102 Further examples abound. The last example

suggests
that an additional problem was that the government did not
communicate
clearly its plans with communities. It neither articulated its
method to drain
the water in flooded areas, the duration these areas would be
flooded, and
the location of where it would place sandbags. Nor did it give
strong rationales
for its mitigation measures.103 This lack of clear information
frustrated
residents because they did not know how much longer their
areas would stay
flooded and why their area had remained flooded while others
remained
dry.104 Overall, eighty-five flood-related protests occurred in
the BMR.105
The government’s priority of protecting the inner city at all
costs was also
reflected in Prime Minister Yingluck’s statement in mid-
November 2011 at
the ASEAN Summit in Indonesia. She said, “it’s certain the
inner zone of
Bangkok will be safe from floods, as the measures to hold
floodwaters have
been successful.”106 She declared success even when those in
the peripheries
of the city were still suffering from the floods and residents of
these areas
who had evacuated had still not returned.
At the same time, conflict and lack of cooperation between
different
agencies in the national and local government hampered the
government’s

response.107 The national government, the BMA, and
provincial governments
had differing objectives and strategies to address the floods and
often did
not collaborate, especially at the beginning. For example, some
khlongs
which pass through Bangkok are under the responsibility of the
RID, yet
BMA officials were reluctant to ask the RID to help divert
water from the
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Bang-Khae-
residents-block-expressway-30170601.html
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Bang-Khae-
residents-block-expressway-30170601.html
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city.108 In other instances, the Flood Relief Operation Center
(FROC), created
by the national government to respond to the floods, ordered the
city
administration to open water gates at the northern border of the
city to ease
flooding in Pathum Thani, such as at Khlong Sam Wa, but the
BMA resisted,
saying that they were afraid of further rainfall, and did not open

them for
a week.109
The BMA and the FROC also disseminated contradicting
information.
For example, during the height of the flooding, the national
government
spokesperson told the public in Bangkok’s Taling Chan and
Laksi districts
to go to work while the Bangkok governor, Sukhumbhand
Paribatra,
announced that people in these districts should evacuate and
said that people
should listen to him only.110 A large source of the conflict is
that Sukhumbhand
hails from the opposition Democrat Party whereas Yingluck was
the head of
the ruling Pheu Thai Party and these two leaders bickered
frequently. Deep-
seated polarization between the two parties exists and each
sought to blame
the other for the heavy flooding in the BMR. Conflicts,
however, did not only
occur between the Democrats and Pheu Thai but between local
politicians
who all sought to protect their own turf. They led their
constituents to destroy
flood protection dykes or open water gates so that water would
be diverted
to other areas. In many instances, local Pheu Thai leaders
disobeyed the
commands of the relief centre. Their actions undermined the
overall
management of the flooding.111
The flood relief centre also worsened the losses incurred by

flooded
communities in Bangkok when it proclaimed it could handle the
floods
(ao yu) and that they would not be flooded. For example,
satellite imagery
in late October showed that some parts of Bangkok faced
severe, lengthy
flooding but the centre still incorrectly announced that the level
of the water
would decrease by the middle of November.112 A number of
these residents,
such as those in Don Muang, trusted the government’s
announcement and
consequently did not protect their houses and possessions as
much as they
would have if they had been warned earlier that their
communities would
be flooded.113
The uneven vulnerability of Bangkok residents to the flood is
suggested
in a study conducted by the National Housing Authority after
the floods.
The study found that while 21 percent of the total population
living in the
____________________
108 Fernquest, “Bangkok’s Drainage System.”
109 Former FROC member, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 17 July 2014.
110 Wang Lin, “Grassroots Innovation in Disaster Crisis
Communication: A Case Study of 2011
Thailand Floods” (master’s thesis, Asian Institute of
Technology, 2013), 43.

111 Poapongsakorn and Meethom, “Impact of the 2011
Floods,” 247–310.
112 Samchai Sirisan, “Kwam Pitplaat Khong Rathabaan Nai
Gaan Jat Gaan Wikkrit Nam Tuam:
Mum Mawng Taang Sangkhom Wittaya” [The Failure of the
Government to Deal with the Flood Crisis:
a Sociological Perspective], Prachathai¸ 30 October 2011.
113 Don Muang district officer, interview by Danny Marks,
Bangkok, 30 June 2014.
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city of Bangkok were affected by the floods (this number is
higher in three
other provinces of the BMR: Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and
Nakhon
Pathom), 73 percent of Bangkok’s low-income population were
affected.114
One statistic which supports this finding is that the nine
districts in Bangkok
which have the highest number of slum communities (and are all
in
northwestern, northern, or northeastern Bangkok) were all
flooded, some

very heavily, such as Don Muang, Sai Mai, and Nong Khaem
districts.115
While certainly middle-class and upper-class housing estates
were badly
flooded as well as factories in the northern and western parts of
the BMR,
these owners could easily evacuate to other cities or could
better cope with
losses because of possessing higher assets. In these mixed
communities,
where the rich and middle-class live near the poor, slum
communities were
the worst affected. A Don Muang district official and a slum
community
leader agreed that Don Muang slum communities living along a
canal faced
the highest amount of water and for the longest period.116 This
is because
these communities do not have floodwalls to protect their
houses, their land
is the lowest-lying, and they have the fewest assets. Further,
their vulnerability
was compounded by two other factors. First, there was the issue
of
unemployment, because many of them work as day labourers
and could not
work for a few months because they could not access their
workplaces or
their workplaces became inundated and subsequently closed.
Second, there
was the problem of theft: in one slum community in Don Muang
about half
of the community’s houses were robbed by outsiders who
arrived on boats
at night and broke into their houses.117 In addition, for the
majority, the

compensation they received after the floods was inadequate to
cover the
costs of renovating their houses and buying new furniture and
other
possessions. Some had to use all or most of their limited
savings.118
In sum, socio-economic conditions prior to the 2011 floods,
especially
uneven power and economic relations and governance
weaknesses, can
largely help explain the flood’s effects, which unequally hurt
the poor the
____________________
114 UN ESCAP, “The Thailand Floods of 2011: While
Businesses Lost Millions, the Urban Poor
Lost Out Most from the Floods,” Working Paper (Bangkok: UN
ESCAP Sustainable Urban Development
Section, 2012).
115 The number of slum communities by districts is found in:
The Statistical Profile of Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration 2011 (Bangkok: Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration, 2011) http://
office.bangkok.go.th/pipd/05_Stat/08Stat(En)/Stat(En)54/pdf%2
0(not%20edit)/stat_eng2011%20
(not%20edit).pdf, accessed 28 October 2014. The flooding of
those districts is based on BMA’s flood
alert map on 1 November 2011 and the news article: Bangkok
Post, “470 Spots Under 80cm of Water,”
7 November 2011.
116 Don Muang district official and Phrom Samrit community
leader, interviews by Danny Marks,

Bangkok, 30 June and 29 August 2014.
117 Phrom Samrit community leader, interview by Danny
Marks, Bangkok, 29 August 2014.
118 In the slum community in Lamlukka, surveys (n=25)
conducted by the author from June to
August 2014 revealed that losses ranged from 50,000 to 200,000
baht while none received more than
25,000 baht from the government and some less than this
amount. The majority in the community
receive the minimum daily wage of 300 baht per day.
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____________________
119 Peter Janseen, “Two Years after Deluge, Thailand Braces
for More Floods,” Oman Observer, 29
September 2013, http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=17234,
120 Ron Corben, “Thai Flood Prevention Dam Draws
Criticism,” Voice of America, 26 September
2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/thai-flood-prevention-
dam-draws-criticism/1757489.html,

121 Cleanbiz.Asia, “Strong Whiff of Corruption from
Thailand’s Water Mega-project,” 21 February
2013, http://www.cleanbiz.asia/news/strong-whiff-corruption-
thailand%E2%80%99s-water-mega
-project#.U3rrutKSy-0, accessed 20 May 2014.
122 Ploenpote Atthakor, “Samut Songkhram Pressures Govt
over Water Project,” Bangkok Post, 25
November 2013,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/381525/samut-
songkhram-pressures
-govt-over-water-project, accessed 20 May 2014.
most. In particular, these conditions help reveal why various
government
agencies rarely cooperated and even clashed with each other and
why the
government committed to protecting the inner city, which meant
that those
in the peripheral areas suffered more. Rising political tensions
and anger
against the government during the last few years once again
flared during
the floods as numerous local communities protested and sought
to destroy
flood barriers and water gates.
After the Floods: Has Anything Changed?
However, despite this widespread anger and devastation and
high number
of deaths, after the floods subsided, the Yingluck government
did not
significantly alter its strategy to prevent floods. It continued to

view structural
measures as the best way to protect populations and industries
from floods.
It built higher flood walls around previously flooded industrial
estates. It
also proposed a massive US$11.3 billion water infrastructure
improvement
plan to increase protection, with almost 90 percent of the budget
allocated
to manage water in the Chao Phraya River basin. Included in the
plan’s
nine modules were 20 new dams and two 300-km diversion
khlongs to divert
water from the north to the west and east and then to the sea,
the conversion
of land into water retention areas, and the cleaning up of
khlongs and
waterways.119
The plan, however, was met with fierce criticism from civil
society,
academics, and local communities and resistance from the
judiciary. Civic
engineering groups lambasted the plan for being too expensive
and poorly
conceived, focusing too much on improving irrigation rather
than preventing
floods.120 A water specialist of the Japan International Co-
operation Agency
asserted that from an integrated water management perspective
neither the
new dams nor the floodways are necessary. Civil society
advocates charged
that the government has not sought adequate public input on the
plans.121
In Samut Songkhram and Nakhon Pathom provinces, thousands

protested
against the western flood diversion channel, declaring that the
water from
the floodway would hurt their fishing and agricultural
activities.122 Backed
by these communities, a local NGO, Stop Global Warming
Association of
http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=17234,accessed
http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=17234,accessed
http://www.voanews.com/content/thai-flood-prevention-dam-
draws-criticism/1757489.html
http://www.cleanbiz.asia/news/strong-whiff-corruption-
thailand%E2%80%99s-water-mega
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/381525/samut-
songkhram-pressures
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____________________
123 Janseen, “Two Years after Deluge.”
124 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official and RID
official, interviews by Danny Marks,
June–August, 2014.
125 Patsara Jikkham and Apinya Wipatayotin, “Flood Projects

Run Aground,” Bangkok Post, 20
October 2014,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/environment/438532/flood-
projects-run
-aground, accessed 28 October 2014.
126 Santi Nindang and Teigan Allen, “Ahead of Flood Season,
Thailand’s Communities Demand
Greater Preparedness,” In Asia, 8 August 2012,
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2012/08/08/
ahead-of-flood-season-thailands-communities-demand-greater-
preparedness, accessed 20 May 2014.
127 Hydro and Agro Informatics Institute official, interview by
Danny Marks, Bangkok, 18 July
2014.
128 In the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx), Thailand fell from 54 (out of 100) in 2005 to
43 in 2007. In Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index
(http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview),
the country dropped dramatically from ranking 59th worldwide
in 2005 to 84th in 2007.
Thailand, filed a lawsuit in Thailand’s Administrative Court,
claiming that
the bidding procedures for the megaproject violated Thailand’s
constitution
because the government had not adequately included local
communities in
the decision-making process and failed to carry out mandatory
environmental
and health impact assessments. In late 2013, in agreement with

the lawsuit,
the Administrative Court ruled that the plan must be put on hold
until public
hearings and environmental and health impact assessments are
conducted.123
The scheme was suspended after the military coup in May 2014.
In June,
the new prime minister, Prayut Chan-o-cha, ordered agencies to
draft a new
national water management plan. However, senior government
officials
revealed that several of the modules of the previous projects are
likely to
be included in the new plan.124 While the military government
released
11 billion baht (US$338 million) in late June to repair water
management
infrastructure such as floodwalls, water gates, and pumping
stations, it has
yet to release any money for non-structural measures. “We don’t
have new
tools for water management, despite the fact three years have
passed since
the flood disaster,’’ said Suwatana Chittaladakorn, an adviser to
the Water
Management and Policy Committee.125
The new government’s response raises the question of why its
approach
to flood protection remains unchanged. One reason is that
political leaders
continue to see rehabilitation to floods as a political opportunity
and a
source of rents. The previous government’s reconstruction
efforts were

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