The Person in the Purchase: Narcissistic Consumers Prefer Products That
Positively Distinguish Them
Seung Yun Lee
Hanyang University
Aiden P. Gregg
University of Southampton
Seong Hoon Park
Yonsei University
Narcissists, who seek keenly to self-enhance, strive to positively distinguish themselves. Might they
therefore be inclined to purchase consumer products that enable them to do so? Study 1 found that
narcissism, but not self-esteem, predicted dispositions to purchase products for the purpose of promoting
personal uniqueness. Studies 2 and 3 found that narcissism predicted greater interest in exclusive,
customizable, and personalizable products. Study 3 also found participants higher in narcissism regarded
their prized possessions as less likely to be owned by others. Finally, Studies 3 and 4 found that interest
in a hypothetical product, respectively, to be bought either for oneself or someone else, covaried with an
experimental manipulation of product exclusivity and scarcity, but principally when levels of narcissism
were high. Our findings illustrate the impact of narcissism on consumer preferences and support an
agentic interpretation of narcissistic self-enhancement.
Keywords: narcissism, distinctiveness, scarcity, consumerism, self-enhancement
I will not choose what many men desire, Because I will not jump with
common spirits And rank me with the barbarous multitude
—The Merchant of Venice, Act 2, Scene 9, Line 25
People do not always maximize their material welfare. Fleeing
a burning house, a husband may grab a wedding photo rather than
an expensive laptop. Indulging a private passion, a collector may
pay a small fortune for a rare trinket. Socializing with peers, a
teenager may wear unsightly rags rather than elegant clothes. In
such cases, goods seem to be desired, not for their physical
properties, but for their psychosocial significance. This distinction
can be marked as follows: Goods can possess both a physical and
a symbolic value (Sedikides, Gregg, Cisek, & Hart, 2007; see also
Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000).1
What symbolic values might goods possess? The short answer is
many. Just as the physical values of goods can vary widely (e.g.,
houses give shelter; cars provide transport; drinks quench thirst),
so too can the symbolic ones. For example, a wedding photo may
signify romantic love, a rare trinket some by-gone era, unsightly
rags adolescent rebellion. However, a general set of symbolic
values can be distinguished: those relevant to self or identity (Belk,
1988; Dunning, 2007; Sirgy, 1982).
Self-Related Symbolic Values
Over a century ago, William James (1890) remarked that,
it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls
mine the line is difficult to draw . . . a man’s Self is the sum total of
all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but
his clothes and his house . . . his lands and horses, and yacht and
bank-account. (p. 291)
If James is correct, then what on ...
The Person in the Purchase Narcissistic Consumers Prefer Prod.docx
1. The Person in the Purchase: Narcissistic Consumers Prefer
Products That
Positively Distinguish Them
Seung Yun Lee
Hanyang University
Aiden P. Gregg
University of Southampton
Seong Hoon Park
Yonsei University
Narcissists, who seek keenly to self-enhance, strive to
positively distinguish themselves. Might they
therefore be inclined to purchase consumer products that enable
them to do so? Study 1 found that
narcissism, but not self-esteem, predicted dispositions to
purchase products for the purpose of promoting
personal uniqueness. Studies 2 and 3 found that narcissism
predicted greater interest in exclusive,
customizable, and personalizable products. Study 3 also found
participants higher in narcissism regarded
their prized possessions as less likely to be owned by others.
Finally, Studies 3 and 4 found that interest
in a hypothetical product, respectively, to be bought either for
oneself or someone else, covaried with an
experimental manipulation of product exclusivity and scarcity,
but principally when levels of narcissism
were high. Our findings illustrate the impact of narcissism on
consumer preferences and support an
agentic interpretation of narcissistic self-enhancement.
2. Keywords: narcissism, distinctiveness, scarcity, consumerism,
self-enhancement
I will not choose what many men desire, Because I will not
jump with
common spirits And rank me with the barbarous multitude
—The Merchant of Venice, Act 2, Scene 9, Line 25
People do not always maximize their material welfare. Fleeing
a burning house, a husband may grab a wedding photo rather
than
an expensive laptop. Indulging a private passion, a collector
may
pay a small fortune for a rare trinket. Socializing with peers, a
teenager may wear unsightly rags rather than elegant clothes. In
such cases, goods seem to be desired, not for their physical
properties, but for their psychosocial significance. This
distinction
can be marked as follows: Goods can possess both a physical
and
a symbolic value (Sedikides, Gregg, Cisek, & Hart, 2007; see
also
Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000).1
What symbolic values might goods possess? The short answer is
many. Just as the physical values of goods can vary widely
(e.g.,
houses give shelter; cars provide transport; drinks quench
thirst),
so too can the symbolic ones. For example, a wedding photo
may
signify romantic love, a rare trinket some by-gone era, unsightly
rags adolescent rebellion. However, a general set of symbolic
3. values can be distinguished: those relevant to self or identity
(Belk,
1988; Dunning, 2007; Sirgy, 1982).
Self-Related Symbolic Values
Over a century ago, William James (1890) remarked that,
it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply
calls
mine the line is difficult to draw . . . a man’s Self is the sum
total of
all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic
powers, but
his clothes and his house . . . his lands and horses, and yacht
and
bank-account. (p. 291)
If James is correct, then what one has, and who one is, should
interrelate. In particular, the evaluation and acquisition of
goods
should covary with self-related motives, states, and traits.
Further-
more, given that no man is an island (Baumeister, 1998; Mead,
1934), relevant effects should manifest themselves both
intrapsy-
chically and interpersonally (Grubb & Grathwhohl, 1967;
Sivana-
than & Pettit, 2010). That is to say, the propensity to identify
with
goods psychologically (Beggan, 1992; Ikeuchi, Fujihara, &
Dohi,
1 Sedikides et al. (2007) originally used the term utilitarian
instead of
physical. Here, we have switched terms to forestall possible
4. confusion with
another distinction—that between utilitarian and hedonic goods
(Babin,
Darden, & Griffin, 1994; Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). The
former goods
mainly yield cognitive, practical, and instrumental benefits; the
latter
mainly yield emotive, sensory, and consummatory benefits. In
contrast, we
wish to emphasize how any good can provide benefits in one or
both ways:
in virtue of its concrete effects, or its semantic meaning. Thus,
USB sticks
and mobile phones are relatively utilitarian, sugar and flowers
relatively
hedonic. But whereas USB sticks and sugar are often valued
mainly for
what they can do physically (store data, sweeten taste), mobile
phones and
flowers are also valued for what they can imply symbolically (I
look cool,
I am loved).
This article was published Online First June 17, 2013.
Seung Yun Lee, College of Economics and Business
Administration,
Hanyang University, ERICA, Ansan, South Korea; Aiden P.
Gregg, Center
for Research on Self and Identity, Psychology Unit, University
of South-
ampton, Southampton, England; Seong Hoon Park, School of
Business,
Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
5. Aiden P.
Gregg, Center for Research on Self and Identity, Psychology
Unit, Uni-
versity of Southampton, England SO17 1BJ, UK. E-mail:
[email protected]
soton.ac.uk
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10. Research has identified many of the self-related symbolic
values
that goods can afford (Dittmar, 2011; Vigneron & Johnson,
1999).
These include equipping people with a sense of control and effi-
cacy (Furby, 1978), bolstering their feelings of self-continuity
over
time (Wapner, Demick, & Redondo, 1990), and cementing their
sense of interrelatedness with specific others (Dittmar, 2008).
But
two general self-related symbolic values stand out: the power of
goods to individuate—that is, to convey that one is different,
distinctive, and unique (Brewer, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin,
1980);
and the power of goods to elevate—that is, to imply that one’s
social rank is higher, better, and privileged (Frank, 1985;
Zahavi,
1975).
These values are intertwined. First, consider the definitional
question: What is social rank? For individual X to rank above
individual Y, socially or otherwise, two necessary conditions
must
be met, both of which are together sufficient: that X be
categori-
cally distinct from Y and that X be relevantly better than Y.
Thus,
the power of a good to elevate logically presumes its power to
individuate. (See Fiske, 2010, for additional discussion of
hierar-
chical differentiation.) Second, consider the empirical question:
What benefits can mere differentiation from others bring? In
particular, would one ever seek to differentiate oneself if doing
so
obliged one to evaluate oneself as markedly inferior (Gregg,
Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011)? Given the potency of the self-
11. enhancement motive, this is unlikely. Thus, social
differentiation is
intimately tied up with valence: People typically strive for
“posi-
tive distinctiveness” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). That said, if
people
can take their positivity for granted, then they may strive for
distinctiveness per se, in a bid to increase their perceptual
salience
and attract the notice of potential beneficiaries (Lynn & Snyder,
2002; McArthur, 1981).
But what empirical evidence implicates the self in purchase of
goods that afford positive distinctiveness? Sivanathan and Pettit
(2010) showed experimentally that consumer interest in “status
goods” can wax and wane in response to self-threats and self-
affirmations. Participants, told earlier they had performed
poorly
relative to peers on an ability test, indicated they would pay
more
for a photograph that was “rare, unique, and available for a
limited
time” (Study 1) and for a watch that was “exclusive and worn
only
by a select group of people” (Study 2). However, the effect was
eliminated when participants could, in the interim, repair their
self-regard by writing about how a value was important to them
(Study 2). In addition, thinking about owning a high-status good
mitigated the dismay caused by poor test performance (Study 4),
and lower levels of self-esteem among lower income
participants
mediated how much participants were willing to pay for a “lux-
ury,” “high-end” car (Study 3).
In a conceptually similar set of studies, Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv
(2009) threatened aspects of participants’ self-regard by having
12. them write about a self-relevant topic with their nondominant
hand
(see Briñol & Petty, 2003). As a consequence, participants were
more likely to purchase products in keeping with their
threatened
self-aspect. For example, when participants (Study 1) wrote
about
how “exciting” they were with their nondominant hand—thereby
subtly conveying the intuitive impression that they might rank
lower than they desired on this positive trait—they responded
by
choosing more exciting brands (e.g., Apple) over more sober
ones
(e.g., IBM). Similarly, participants whose intelligence was
threat-
ened selected a fountain pen over a candy treat as a reward for
participation (Study 2). And once again, affirming values
impor-
tant to the self in advance eliminated the effects (Study 3).
Narcissism, Positive Distinctiveness, and
Purchasing Preferences
If situational manipulations of self-relevant states can shape
purchasing proclivities, might dispositional variations in self-
relevant traits do the same? In particular, might some types of
personality be more prone to purchase products that can
positively
distinguish them? We submit that the answer is yes: Narcissists
are
just such personalities.
Narcissism began life as a pathological syndrome postulated by
psychoanalysts (Ellis, 1898; Freud, 1931). The construct was
even-
13. tually codified into a personality disorder, its cardinal
symptoms
being grandiose delusions, obsessive ambition, arrogant
behavior,
and interpersonal abrasiveness (American Psychiatric
Association,
2000). However, not all putative syndromes are categorically
distinct (Meehl, 1995). Accordingly, narcissism was revamped
as
a normally distributed personally trait. In recent times, the con-
struct has often, but not always, been operationalized by higher
scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin &
Hall, 1979, 1981; see also Foster & Campbell, 2007). Yet, both
the
factor structure (Ackerman et al., 2011) and construct validity
(Rosenthal & Hooley, 2010) of the NPI continue to be debated.
Furthermore, several rival measures of narcissism exist (Pincus
et
al., 2009; Wink, 1991). However, the NPI does at least echo key
clinical criteria (Miller, Gaughan, Pryor, Kamen, & Campbell,
2009) and has spawned a rich theoretical and empirical
literature
(Campbell & Miller, 2011; Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009). If nar-
cissism has any core feature, it may be this: objectively
unjustified
conceit (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, in press;
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Foster & Reidy, 2011), implying
an
excessive motive to self-enhance (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001;
Sedikides & Gregg, 2001).
The profile of narcissists conveyed by NPI items suggests a
keenness to elevate the self.2 Items tapping subcomponents like
authority (“I see myself as a good leader”) and entitlement (“I
find
it easy to manipulate people”) convey an interest in attaining a
14. higher social rank, by fair means or foul. Items tapping subcom-
ponents like exhibitionism (“I am apt to show off if I get the
chance”) and grandiosity (“I know that I am good because
every-
one keeps telling me so”) convey a corresponding interest in
proudly broadcasting that higher social rank. Empirical findings
back up such qualitative analyses: Narcissists’ self-regard
depends
more on successfully competing than on smoothly affiliating
(Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003), and they care
more about being admired by others than about gaining their
approval (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Moreover, given
that
narcissists are more materialistic, and prone to compulsive
buying
(Rose, 2007), their keenness to elevate the self is also liable to
shape how they spend their money. Indeed, in terms of their
goals
2 For brevity, we sometimes use the word narcissist as
shorthand for
“person scoring relatively higher in narcissism.” No categorical
difference
is implied.
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19. 336 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
and aspirations, narcissists explicitly report more interest in
pur-
suing financial success and social recognition, and less interest
in
promoting affiliation or community feeling (Kasser & Ryan,
1996). They also report prioritizing economic goals, such as at-
taining a high standard of living and wealth or pursuing an
influ-
ential and prestigious career, whereas they report disdaining
social
goals, such as helping others in need or engaging in voluntary
service (Roberts & Robins, 2000). Little wonder, then, that nar-
cissists rate themselves dominant but insensitive (Bradlee &
Em-
mons, 1992; Mahadevan, Gregg, De-Waal Andrews, &
Sedikides,
2012a), and on experimental tasks denigrate others to magnify
their own performance (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, &
Gregg, 2002). An ancillary finding is also worth noting in this
connection: Priming people with reminders of money makes
them,
on the one hand, more likely to try harder and select more ambi-
tious challenges, but on the other hand, less likely to offer
assis-
tance or seek out interpersonal closeness (Vohs, Mead, &
Goode,
2008). When they have money in mind, people mimic
narcissists.
All the above can be summarized by saying that narcissistic
self-regard is rooted in agency—accomplishing goals to achieve
social status—rather than in communion—relating harmoniously
20. to ensure social inclusion (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell,
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Wiggins, 1979). This makes it
likely
that, among the self-related symbolic values that a product
could
serve for narcissists, the power to elevate will figure
prominently.
The same goes for the power to individuate the self. Narcissists
are known to enhance their distinctiveness in several ways.
First,
they report a higher need for uniqueness in general (Riketta,
2008;
see also Fromkin, 1970), uniqueness being the ultimate distinc-
tiveness. Second, narcissists are apt to use the pronoun I in de-
scriptions of themselves and their activities (Chatterjee & Ham-
brick, 2007; Raskin & Shaw, 1988), so that even their grammar
highlights the self. Third, narcissists give off definite public
signs:
For example, they present a better looking appearance
(Holtzman
& Strube, 2010), promote themselves forthrightly on Facebook
(Buffardi & Campbell, 2008), and behave overtly in line with
subjective self-reports (e.g., have an outgoing social profile;
Holtz-
man, Vazire, & Mehl, 2010). Fourth, narcissists report being
keener to buy several products that look impressive than
products
that perform better (Sedikides, Cisek, & Hart, 2011). This indi-
cates an interest in consumer products for what they show rather
than for what they do.
Thus, if narcissism is construed as a dispositional inclination
toward agency at the expense of communion (Campbell &
Foster,
2007), then there are both empirical and theoretical grounds for
21. hypothesizing that narcissists will be especially attracted by
con-
sumer products that enable them to enhance their positive
distinc-
tiveness, thereby both individuating and elevating the self. Fur-
thermore, other perspectives on narcissism arguably converge
on
the same prediction, albeit more circuitously. For example, the
dynamic self-regulatory model of narcissism (Morf &
Rhodewalt,
2001) proposes that narcissists possess positive but fragile self-
images, which they chronically attempt to shore up by
strategically
managing social feedback. One obvious way to manage such
feedback in a modern society would be to individuate and
elevate
the self by purchasing products that positively distinguish them
in
the eyes of others. Or consider an evolutionary hypothesis for
why
narcissism persists: that it serves as a frequency-dependent
variant
of behavioral dominance that promotes successful short-term
mat-
ing (Holtzman & Strube, 2011). This hypothesis is supported in
part by the finding that narcissists are reliably judged to be
more
physically attractive (Holtzman & Strube, 2010). One way of
achieving physical attractiveness, of course, is to embellish
one’s
appearance with products one can purchase.
Nonetheless, we favor deriving our hypotheses from the premise
that narcissists are hyperagentic but hypocommunal for two rea-
sons: first, because the agency– communion distinction is broad
22. enough to subsume the perspectives above (e.g., behavioral
dom-
inance is one manifestation of agency) and second, because the
agency– communion distinction is beginning to be applied else-
where in consumer psychology, for example, with respect to
perceptions of brand personality (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner,
2010;
Bennett & Hill, 2012; Kervyn, Fiske, & Malone, 2012).
Study 1
Overview
To investigate whether people higher in narcissism prefer prod-
ucts that enhance their positive distinctiveness, we began by ex-
amining the link between the standard trait measure of narcis-
sism—the NPI—and a specialized trait measure—the
Consumers’
Need for Uniqueness scale (CNFU; Tian, Bearden, & Hunter,
2001). The latter is designed to assess “the pursuit of
differentness
relative to others . . . through the acquisition, utilization, and
disposition of consumer goods for the purpose of developing
and
enhancing one’s personal and social identity” (p. 50). The
CNFU
comprises three subscales, each reflecting a related but distinct
dimension of consumer counterconformity: (a) Creative Choice
Counterconformity (CCC)—purchasing to effect a new and
unique
personal style; (b) Unpopular Choice Counterconformity
(UCC)—
purchasing to deliberately defy social norms; and (c) Avoidance
of
Similarity (AOS)—refraining from purchasing when products
de-
23. cline in distinctiveness.
We chose the CNFU in part for its psychometric merits (Tian et
al., 2001). Its threefold factor structure emerges cleanly; it pos-
sesses high reliability (Mdn �SCALE � .94; Mdn rRETEST �
.77);
it successfully identifies known groups (e.g., owners of
distinctive
“low-rider” automobiles); it correlates highly but not
redundantly
with nomologically related scales (e.g., r � .44 with the Need
for
Uniqueness scale [Snyder & Fromkin, 1977]; and r � .65 with
the
Desire for Unique Consumer Products scale [Lynn & Harris,
1997a, 1997b]); and it predicts realistic choice among more or
less
unique consumer products above and beyond these scales.
In addition, to test whether effects were specific to narcissistic
self-regard, rather than a function of ordinary self-worth, we
included a standard of self-esteem so that patterns of correlation
could be compared and contrasted.
Method
Participants and procedure. One hundred nineteen stu-
dents—a mix of undergraduates and postgraduates enrolled
either
at McGill University in Canada or Yonsei University in South
Korea—participated. All were recruited via advertisements
posted
locally for a “15-minute marketing survey.” Upon expressing
interest by e-mail, prospective participants were sent a reply
con-
taining a relevant link for completing the study online (hosted
28. em
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337NARCISSISTIC CONSUMERISM
iSurvey, University of Southampton, 2011). After completing
the
study, and being debriefed online, participants were sent an
elec-
tronic $5 (CAD) voucher for a Starbucks coffee.
Preliminary screening led to the exclusion of data from 17
participants: Three did not complete all measures; six
completed
them with atypical haste (i.e., in under 4 min, where median
completion time exceeded 15 min); five exhibited zero or
almost-
zero variance in their ratings (suggesting noncompliance); and
five
more rated their English-speaking ability below the scale
midpoint
(see below). Of the 102 retained participants, most were in their
20s (M � 26.96; SD � 5.46). The sample was almost equally
split
29. by gender (52% female, 48% male) and university attended
(52%
McGill, 48% Yonsei).
Measures. After indicating their informed consent online,
participants reported their gender, age, university, and English-
speaking ability (5 � Perfect; 1 � Poor). They then completed
the
four key measures, described below, in randomized order.
The CNFU (Tian et al., 2001) featured 31 items (� � .98) in
all,
11 assessing CCC (� � .95), 11 assessing UCC (� � .95), and
nine assessing AOS (� � .97). Respective sample items include
the following: “Often when buying merchandise, an important
goal
is to find something that communicates my uniqueness”; “I
enjoy
challenging the prevailing taste of people I know by buying
something they wouldn’t seem to accept”; “I often try to avoid
products or brands that I know are bought by the general
popula-
tion.”
To assess narcissism, we then administered a continuously
scaled version of the original 40-item NPI (Raskin & Terry,
1988).
This served to maximize the internal consistency of the total
scale
score (� � .96) as well as that of its subcomponents
(considered
individually in the later section Subcomponents of narcissism:
Reanalysis of Studies 1– 4). The pronarcissism option from each
of
the original dichotomous items was rated on a continuous 7-
point
30. scale (1 � Strongly Disagree; 7 � Strongly Agree), as done in
some prior research (e.g., Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-
Browne, & Correll, 2003). Sample items include “I really like to
be
the center of attention”; “I am an extraordinary person.”
Finally, we assessed self-esteem using the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), a 10-item questionnaire
(� � .84) balanced for positively and negatively worded items.
Participants rated each item on a 7-point scale (1 � Strongly
Disagree; 7 � Strongly Agree). Sample items include “I feel
that
I have a number of good qualities” and “At times, I feel no good
at all” (reverse coded).
Results
Replicating past research (e.g., Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Ku-
mashiro, & Rusbult, 2004), the NPI and RSES intercorrelated
modestly (see Table 1). This is to be expected: Both are
measures
of self-regard. Also replicating past research (Tian et al., 2001),
the
three subscales of the CNFU intercorrelated substantially, but
not
redundantly. Most importantly, and supporting our hypothesis,
the
NPI correlated substantially with the CNFU and with each of its
subscales. In contrast, the RSES exhibited no such correlations.
In
other words, participants higher in narcissism reported being
more
inclined to purchase consumer products to satisfy their need for
uniqueness—to cultivate a personal style, defy established con-
ventions, and avoid looking like others—whereas participants
31. higher in self-esteem did not. Thus, this pattern of correlations
supports our hypothesis that it is narcissistic self-regard in
partic-
ular that prompts the purchase of products that enhance distinc-
tiveness.
Our findings generalized well across culture and gender. Re-
garding mean differences, males did not differ significantly
from
females on the NPI (5.32 vs. 5.30, p � .90), the RSES (5.32 vs.
5.30, p � .70), or the CNFU (5.63 vs. 5.86, p � .33). In
addition,
Canadians did not differ significantly from Koreans on the NPI
(4.71 vs. 4.51, p � .29) or the CNFU (3.90 vs. 3.56, p � .16),
but
they did on the RSES (5.61 vs. 4.99, p � .0005). Crucially,
however, the links between key constructs remained consistent.
For example, NPI and CNFU correlated at r(53) � .70, p �
.0005,
in Canada, and at r(49) � .54, p � .0005, in Korea, with
location
not significantly moderating the link (� � .07), t(98) � 0.86, p
�
.39.3 The NPI and CNFU also correlated at r(48) � .61, p �
.0005,
for men, and at r(53) � .71, p � .0005, for women, with gender
not significantly moderating the link (� � .04), t(98) � 0.55, p
�
.58. One curiosity was that, whereas self-esteem and narcissism
correlated at r(53) � .43, p � .0005, in Canada, they did so only
at r(49) � .06, ns, in Korea; yet, moderation by location was
still
not significant (� � .11), t(98) � 1.12, p � .27. Hence, our
findings harmonize with research showing that links to self-
regard
hold up well cross-culturally, even when levels of self-regard
32. differ (Schmitt & Allik, 2005).
Study 2
Overview
Our overall hypothesis is that narcissists prefer products that
enhance their positive distinctiveness. The sizable correlations
observed in the previous study— between trait narcissism and
the
disposition to purchase products in order to express particular
3 The beta-weight here refers to the interaction term in a
hierarchical
regression equation, the product of one centered independent
variable
(either gender or culture: the putative moderator) and another
centered
independent variable (one variable in the correlational link). In
keeping
with standard practice (Aiken & West, 1991), the dependent
variable (the
other variable in the correlational link) was regressed on both
independent
variables before being regressed on the interaction term.
Table 1
Intercorrelations Between Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and
Consumer Need for Uniqueness Indices
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. NPI —
2. RSES .27� —
3. CNFU .65�� .08 —
4. CCC .65�� .10 .94�� —
33. 5. UCC .57�� .07 .90�� .77�� —
6. AOS .57�� .06 .90�� .78�� .68�� —
Note. N � 102. NPI � Narcissistic Personality Inventory; RSES
�
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; CNFU � Consumer Need for
Uniqueness
scale; CCC � Creative Choice Counterconformity subscale;
UCC �
Unpopular Choice Counterconformity subscale; AOS �
Avoidance of
Similarity subscale.
� p � .01. �� p � .0005.
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338 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
types of uniqueness—supported it. However, demonstrating
links
between trait narcissism and interest in actual consumer
products
would provide even stronger evidence. Hence, we sought to
show
in Study 2 that narcissists, when given the free choice between
38. two
otherwise equally desirable products, would incline toward the
product more capable of conferring positive distinctiveness.
Method
Participants and procedure. Seventy-five undergraduate
students enrolled at McGill University in Canada participated in
this study. The sample (63% female, 37% male) consisted of
people in their early 20s (no individual age data were collected,
but
the experimenter noted no exceptions). All participants were re-
cruited via advertisements posted locally for a “20-minute
market-
ing survey.” Upon replying, participants were directed to a re-
search room in the business department building, where they
proceeded to complete the survey individually. Following a de-
briefing, all were paid $10 CAD.
As part of the cover story, participants were led to believe that
a marketing survey was being conducted. Its alleged purpose
was
to “better understand consumer opinions about a new product . .
.
launched in the market.” Participants were reminded that there
were no right or wrong answers and that their anonymity would
be
ensured. They were given a booklet to guide them through the
task
and provide space for recording their responses. To reinforce
the
cover story, each page of this booklet featured the McGill
Univer-
sity and Desautels Faculty of Management logos as a header.
Participants were asked to imagine that the current MP3 player
39. they owned (whether they owned one in reality or not) no longer
worked and that they had decided to buy a replacement: the
featured product, an Apple iPod Touch. Participants were
further
asked to imagine buying the product by accessing the website of
an
apparently real, but actually fictitious, online electronics store
(“Digital World”). They then inspected a realistic color printout
of
the alleged online story (see Figure 1). This printout
prominently
featured an image of the product and was accompanied by the
description “Apple iPod Touch 4th Generation 32GB Black Por-
table Media Player.”
Crucially, the product came with one of two supplementary
“bonus options.” Participants had to imagine choosing either
one
or the other. One option was designed to help enhance product
distinctiveness, whereas the other was not. The option that
partic-
ipants chose constituted the dependent variable.
The high-distinctiveness option was an “ultra-slim genuine
leather case.” It was described as being part of a “limited
edition”
and as offering the possibility of “personal name engraving.” In
contrast, the low-distinctiveness option was an “iTunes gift
card.”
It was described as permitting the free download of various
enter-
tainment media (songs, movies, apps, etc.) up to a certain total
value. Thus, the high-distinctiveness option (the leather case)
was,
relative to the low-distinctiveness option (the gift card),
40. appearance-related as opposed to practically useful, in short
supply
as opposed to in plentiful supply, and particular to the self as
opposed to generic.
Two precautions were taken to ensure that, apart from the
difference in distinctiveness, the options were otherwise equiva-
lent. First, an identical cash value of $50 was ascribed to each
option. Second, in a pilot study, 38 undergraduates from the
same
university rated these two bonus options. They emerged as
equiv-
alently desirable (Ms � 5.15 vs. 5.24), t(37) � �0.89, p � .38,
as
assessed on a two-item scale (1 � dislike a lot, 9 � like a lot; 1
�
not at all attractive, 9 � very attractive) but as significantly
Figure 1. Advertisement for iPod “options” used in Study 2.
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.0001, in terms of a one-item scale (1 � not at all distinctive, 9
�
very distinctive).
After inspecting the printout of the website, individuals an-
swered the question: “If you decided to buy the iPod Touch
shown
on the webpage, which bonus option would you choose?” After-
wards, they filled out the same 40-item narcissism questionnaire
(� � .91) as in Study 1. Finally, they were debriefed, compen-
sated, thanked, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Option choice (leather case vs. gift coupon) was logistically
regressed on mean narcissism scores. Relative to a null model,
the
overall model was significant, �2(1) � 6.32, p � .012, yielding
a
Nagelkerke’s R2 of .11. Moreover, the effect lay in the
predicted
direction: Participants higher in narcissism were more likely to
opt
for the leather case than for the gift coupon, Wald �2(1) �
5.57,
p � .019. Predictive success reached 62.7%. Thus, in keeping
with
our overall hypothesis, more narcissistic respondents showed
greater interest in a consumer product that could enhance their
positive distinctiveness than in one that could not.
Study 3
Overview
46. In Study 3, we tested our overall hypothesis in three further
ways.
First, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, narcis-
sists would display relatively greater interest in a product
whose
selling point was its capacity to individuate. This time, we
asked
participants to evaluate on continuous scales an item of cloth-
ing—a dress shirt—that they could customize and personalize so
as to visibly mark themselves out from the crowd.
Second, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, nar-
cissists would be either (a) more likely to already possess
distinc-
tive products or (b) more likely to perceive that the products
they
already possessed were more distinctive. Regardless, we
predicted
that, if asked to nominate a prized personal possession, and then
to
guess how many other people owned it too, narcissists would
provide lower estimates. Accordingly, we had participants list
up
to three appearance-relevant possessions and then estimate what
percentage of consumers like them also owned each of these
possessions.
Third, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, the
same
product would hold greater or lesser appeal for narcissists, as
opposed to nonnarcissists, depending on whether it did or did
not
exhibit a specific feature implying that it could confer
distinctive-
ness. Accordingly, we manipulated whether a product was— by
47. being part of an exclusive limited edition or not—in either short
or
plentiful supply, on the grounds that greater product scarcity
would
signify greater potential for enhancing positive distinctiveness.
In
other words, we predicted an interaction between continuous
levels
of dispositional narcissism and the dichotomous manipulation of
product supply.
Method
Participants and procedure. One hundred twenty undergrad-
uate students enrolled at McGill University in Canada
participated.
Most of the gender-mixed sample (45% female, 55% male) were
in their early 20s (M � 23.29; SD � 1.80). They were recruited
and run as in the previous study. All received in compensation
an
organic cookie worth $5 (CAD).
The booklet’s introduction claimed that a marketing survey was
being conducted, whose alleged purpose was to “better
understand
consumer opinions about new products being launched in the
market.” To reinforce this cover story, each page featured
McGill/
Desautels Faculty of Management logo as a header. Participants
were reminded that there were no right or wrong answers and
that
participation was anonymous.
Stimuli, measures, and manipulation. The following mate-
rials were administered in a fixed order via the booklet.
48. Product 1: Individuation potential. Participants learned about
a fictitious company called Just for You. This company sold “a
full
line of clothing and accessories for both men and women.” It
was
said to have recently launched “a new line of custom dress
shirts,”
available for sale online via the website http://www.justforyou
.com.4 Participants were asked to inspect a printed screenshot
of
this website, designed to look classy and professional (see
Figure
2). It featured images of sharply attired models of both genders,
and buzzwords connoting contemporary stylishness. Most
images
depicted the website’s unique selling proposition: the capacity
to
tailor shirts in accord with one’s personal preferences. In
particu-
lar, online shoppers could select their shirts by fabric, color,
style,
and size. Furthermore, they could append a customized label to
each shirt—an option flagged by the onscreen button
“individual-
ize.” The capacity to create such a desirably distinctive shirt of
one’s own was emphasized by the following accompanying
blurb:
Just for You is empowering you to be your own dress shirt
designer.
Forget about shopping at your local retail stores to buy a dress
shirt
ten thousand other people can get. Design your own custom
dress shirt
to fit your style, personality, and body. Customize the collar,
49. cuff,
placket, pockets, shoulders, buttons and more on your dress
shirt.
Individualize it with a personalized monogram or a custom
label.
To verify that the custom shirt had the capacity to make its
wearers distinctive, we asked 34 undergraduates from the same
university the following question: “How would wearing such a
shirt make a person appear in a crowd?” They answered by
providing a rating on a 9-point scale (1 � not at all distinctive,
9 �
very distinctive). The mean rating (M � 7.15) was significantly
above the midpoint of the scale, t(33) � 11.33, p � .0005.
Having inspected the screenshot, participants were prompted for
their reactions. In particular, they were asked about their
intention
to purchase one of the products depicted (e.g., “How likely
would
you be to purchase the custom dress shirt?”; 1 � not at all
likely,
9 � very likely), their willingness to pay for it (e.g., “How
much
would you be willing to pay for the custom dress shirt?”;
$____),
and their overall attitude toward it (“In your opinion, the
custom
dress shirt is: 1 � dislikeable, 9 � likeable; 1 � bad, 9 � good;
1 � undesirable, 9 � desirable; � � .89).
Product 2: Prized possessions. Participants were asked to
“think of up to three things that you own that are extremely
4 This website actually existed at the time—it advertised
“Wonderful
50. Vacation Rentals” in the United States. However, all
participants were
unaware of this. It now advertises “The Amazing Stanley,” a
Baltimore-
based magician.
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340 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
http://www.justforyou.com
http://www.justforyou.com
important to you.” Given that publicly observable goods are a
potent source of distinctiveness, we provided the following
further
guidance: “We are talking about the things which we can wear
on
our body—such as clothing and accessories for both men and
women, including jewelry, formal wear, casual clothes, watches,
shoes, sunglasses, handbags, ties, and etc.” Participants were
ad-
ditionally advised to give “precise names and details, NOT just
saying the type of thing it is,” so that exemplars, and not merely
categories, would be described. For each prized possession they
reported, participants were asked to write down their “own esti-
55. mate of what percentage of other people— of about your age
and
gender—. . . also own each of these things.”
Product 3: Manipulated supply. Finally, participants were
asked to imagine that they needed to buy a new watch, and had
seen a relevant advertisement for one displayed in a department
store. A realistic-looking advertisement was shown on the
follow-
ing page of the booklet (see Figure 3), which participants were
told
to inspect. It depicted a brand of watch called Equinoxe. Images
of
several flagship versions, presented at different angles and mag-
nifications, were shown. The accompanying text read, “The
Equi-
noxe watch was introduced at the iF Design Conference 2009.
Add
an accent to your business ensemble with the Equinoxe
automatic
chronometer.”
Critically, the advertisement came in two subtly different ver-
sions. One version featured the tagline: “Exclusive limited
edition:
Hurry, stocks limited!” The other featured the tagline “New
addi-
tion: Many items in stock!” This constituted the experimental
manipulation of distinctiveness: It was implied that the product
was, respectively, either in short supply or in plentiful supply.
Half
the participants received each version of the advertisement.
To verify that manipulating the supply of the Equinoxe watch
rendered it more or less distinctive, we took 40 undergraduates
from the same university and had half rate one version of the
56. advertisement, half the other, on a 9-point scale (1 � not at all
distinctive, 9 � very distinctive). The Equinoxe watch in plen-
tiful supply (M � 6.15) was rated as significantly more distinc-
tive than the watch in short supply (M � 2.55), t(38) � 9.42,
p � .0005.
Having inspected the screenshot, participants again indicated, as
they had for the dress shirt, their overall attitude (� � .83)
toward,
intention to purchase, and willingness to pay for a typical
Equinoxe
watch. Thereafter, participants completed a two-item
manipulation
check (r � .51). The items, respectively, read, “According to
the
ad for Equinoxe, how many watches were available for sale?” (1
�
few, 9 � many) and “According to the ad for Equinoxe, what
was
the availability of Equinoxe watches?” (1 � low availability, 9
�
high availability).
Finally, participants completed the same version of the NPI
(� � .87) as before.
Results and Discussion
Product 1. As hypothesized, narcissism predicted consumer
interest in a product liable to enhance positive distinctiveness—
a
dress shirt that could be customized and personalized.
In particular, narcissism correlated positively with overall atti-
tude toward that dress shirt, r(122) � .24, p � .01; intention to
purchase it, r(122) � .39, p � .0005; and willingness to pay for
57. it,
r(122) � .53, p � .0005. The last variable, though expressed in
Figure 2. Advertisement for dress shirt used in Study 3.
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341NARCISSISTIC CONSUMERISM
dollar amounts, was nonetheless relatively symmetrically
distrib-
uted (skew � �.25), so the original metric was kept.5
In addition, the three indices of consumer interest were them-
selves interrelated: Overall attitude toward the dress shirt corre-
lated with intention to purchase it, r(122) � .56, p � .0005, and
intention to purchase it correlated with willingness to pay for it,
r(122) � .39, p � .0005. However, overall attitude toward the
dress shirt did not correlate significantly with willingness to
pay
for it, r(122) � .11, p � .20.
Thus, these new findings complement those of Study 2. There,
more narcissistic participants were more likely to choose a
distinctiveness-enhancing product over nonenhancing
62. alternative.
Here, more narcissistic participants expressed greater interest in
a
distinctiveness-enhancing product.
Product 2. As hypothesized, narcissism predicted partici-
pants’ perceptions of the distinctiveness of their prized
possessions
in terms of their estimated ownership prevalence.
The possessions that participants listed met the criteria we
requested: They were liable to be both highly prized and
publicly
displayed. Typical items included designer jewelry (e.g., a
Bulgari
ring), fashion accessories (e.g., a Hermes handbag), haute
couture
(e.g., an Armani suit), portable gadgets (e.g., an iPad), and
flam-
boyant vehicles (e.g., a Hyundai sports car). Unexpectedly,
how-
ever, only a few participants (24%) reported more than a single
prized possession. Hence, we confined our correlational
analyses
solely to estimates of the percentage of other people who owned
the first possession listed. These estimates emerged as
positively
skewed (�2.71), so we nonlinearly transformed them using
natural
logarithms. The transformed scores then emerged as negatively
skewed (�1.88). Accordingly, we analyzed both sets of scores.
Results converged for both: More narcissistic participants
reported
that a smaller percentage of other people also owned the
personal
63. possessions they prized, rRAW(122) � �.39, p � .0005;
rLN(122) � �.45, p � .0005.
For exploratory purposes, we also conducted a follow-up
analysis
afforded by the unexpected variation in the number of
possessions
that participants reported. We reasoned that if narcissists used
these
possessions to distinguish themselves, then they should have
listed
more of them (on a scale from 1 to 3). They did, r(122) � .42, p
�
.0005. Moreover, listing more possessions correlated negatively
with
estimates of the percentage of people who owned the first
possession
listed, rRAW(122) � �.23, p � .02; rLN (122) � �.22, p �
.02.
As pointed out earlier, these findings could reflect perceptions
or reality. It could be that narcissists actually buy products that
are
more distinctive in that fewer people are liable to buy them, or
it
could be that narcissists regard whatever products they buy as
more distinctive, or it could be both. To help settle the matter,
we
had five postgraduates, all blind to participants’ narcissism
scores,
independently rate the distinctiveness of each of the possessions
that participants listed first (1 � not at all distinctive; 9 � very
distinctive). We then averaged those ratings to create an
objective
index of possession distinctiveness. We also took and averaged
complementary ratings of the desirability (1 � not at all desir-
64. 5 Following transformation of willingness-to-pay scores by a
natural
logarithm, the correlation decreases slightly, r(124) � .48, p �
.0005,
likely reflecting the induced skew of �1.51.
Figure 3. Advertisement for Equinoxe watch used in Studies 3
and 4.
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342 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
ability; 9 � very desirable) and value (1 � not at all valuable; 9
�
very valuable) of each of the possessions.
As hypothesized, narcissistic participants reported owning pos-
sessions that were objectively rated as more distinctive, r(122)
�
.28, p � .002. However, participants’ estimates of the
percentage
of people who owned those possessions did not covary with this
objectively rated distinctiveness, rRAW(122) � �.17, p � .06;
69. rLN(122) � �.09, p � .33: The two dependent variables were
independent. Moreover, the link between narcissism and partici-
pants’ estimates of the percentage of people who owned those
possessions persisted after partialing for the objectively rated
dis-
tinctiveness of those possessions, rRAW(121) � �.34, p �
.0005;
rLN(121) � �.44, p � .0005, with the same being true when the
target and partialed variables were reversed, rRAW(121) � .24,
p �
.01; rLN(121) � .27, p � .002. Thus, the data are consistent
with
narcissists distinguishing themselves in terms of consumer
prod-
ucts both by actually buying more objectively distinctive
products
and by regarding whatever products they buy as being more
distinctive, with the two effects being independent.
Finally, our findings showed an interesting specificity. As re-
gards objective ratings of participants’ possessions, correlations
unsurprisingly emerged between distinctiveness and likability,
r(122) � .49, p � .0005; likeability and value, r(122) � .28, p
�
.0005; and value and distinctiveness, r(122) � .78, p � .0005.
However, although the possessions of more narcissistic partici-
pants were objectively rated as more distinctive (see above),
they
were not objectively rated as either more desirable, r(122) �
�.06,
p � .50, or as more valuable, r(122) � .14, p � .12. Indeed, the
correlation between narcissism and objectively rated
distinctive-
ness remained almost unchanged after simultaneously
controlling
for both objectively rated likeability and objectively rated
70. value,
r(120) � .27, p � .005. Thus, more narcissistic participants
seemed to own, in the eyes of others, more purely distinctive
possessions. Only in their own eyes may their possessions have
been prized as positive.
Products 1 and 2: Combined analysis. If interest in Product
1, and estimates of ownership of Product 2, both reflected a
desire
for positive distinctiveness, then these variables should have
cor-
related. Our results partly supported this prediction. On the one
hand, neither intention to purchase the dress shirt nor overall
attitude toward it correlated significantly with ownership
estimates
of prized possessions (�.03 � r[122] � �.13; .77 � p � .14).
On
the other hand, willingness to pay for the customizable dress
shirt
did correlate negatively with ownership estimates of prized pos-
sessions, rRAW(122) � �.29, p � .001; rLN(122) � �.27, p �
.005. Moreover, the same pattern (in the opposite direction) was
also observed when number of prized possessions listed
replaced
ownership estimates: No correlation emerged with intention to
purchase the dress shirt, or with overall attitude toward it (.02
�
r[122] � .06; .87 � p � .53), but one did emerge with
willingness
to pay for it, rRAW(122) � .27, p � .002; rLN(122) � .26, p �
.005. Given that narcissism had earlier shown the highest
correla-
tion with willingness to pay for the dress shirt, this may have
been
the most sensitive index to capture such a relation.
71. Furthermore, if narcissism lay behind the quest for positive
distinctiveness, then it should also have largely accounted for
the
link between, on the one hand, willingness to pay for the dress
shirt
and, on the other hand, ownership estimates of prized
possessions
and the number of prized possessions listed. This turned out to
be the
case. After partialing for narcissism, the link between
willingness to
pay for the dress shirt and ownership estimates of prized
possessions
fell substantially and became insignificant, rRAW(121) � �.11,
p �
.21; rLN(121) � �.05, p � .61. So did the corresponding link to
the number of prized possessions listed, r(121) � .06, p � .51.
Product 3. As hypothesized, the same product held greater
appeal for more narcissistic participants when it was portrayed
as
being exclusive and in short supply.
First, the scarcity manipulation worked: Together, fewer Equi-
noxe watches were deemed available in the scarce condition (M
�
3.65) than in the plentiful condition (M � 6.82), t(122) � 9.94,
p � .001. Moreover, the scarcity manipulation check was signif-
icantly below the scale midpoint (5) in the scarce condition,
t(61) � 7.17, p � .0005, and significantly above it in the
plentiful
condition, t(61) � 7.00, p � .0005. Nonetheless, if ratings on
the
“correct” side of the scale midpoint are taken as the criterion of
success, then the manipulation “worked” in only 77% of cases—
72. most, but hardly all. Hence, we report results both (a) across all
participants and (b) across those participants whose ratings of
scarcity were above or below the scale midpoint in the intended
direction (i.e., for whom it “worked”). Whereas results for (a)
maximized power via sample size, results for (b) maximized
power
via true variance.
Given that the Equinoxe watch, whether in short or plentiful
supply, was still arguably a reasonably exclusive product per se,
it
would not have been surprising had narcissism simply predicted
consumer interest in it. On two out of three indices, it did. In
particular, although narcissism did not predict overall attitude
toward a typical Equinoxe watch, r(122) � �.13, p � .14
(scarcity
subset: r[93] � �.14, p � .18), it did predict both intention to
purchase it, r(122) � .21, p � .02 (scarcity subset: r[93] � .19,
p � .06), and willingness to pay for it, r(122) � .46, p �. 0005
(scarcity subset: r[93] � .44, p � .0005). (Note: willingness-to-
pay scores, being positively skewed [�1.01], were transformed
via
natural logarithm, thereby normalizing their distribution
[�.04].)
The key question, nonetheless, was whether narcissism would
interact with the manipulation of product scarcity to predict
con-
sumer interest. To answer this question, we hierarchically re-
gressed each of the three consumer interest indices— overall
atti-
tude toward a typical Equinoxe watch, intention to purchase it,
and
willingness to pay for it— on the same three predictor
variables—
narcissism, the experimental manipulation, and their statistical
73. interaction. In keeping with standard practice (Aiken & West,
1991), we first centered scores for narcissism and the
experimental
manipulation, and the computed interaction term as their
multipli-
cative product. Next, we regressed each consumer interest vari-
able, at Step 1, on both narcissism and the experimental
manipu-
lation, and at Step 2, on their interaction. A significant
interaction
term—such that the experimental manipulation of scarcity led to
greater consumer interest when narcissism scores were higher—
would have confirmed our prediction.
Indeed, for all three consumer interest variables, this significant
interaction emerged. In particular, for overall attitude toward a
typical Equinoxe watch, it was t(1, 120) � 3.70, p � .0005; for
intention to purchase it, t(1, 120) � 4.80, p � .0005; and for
willingness to pay for it, t(1, 120) � 2.49, p � .02. The pattern
of
interaction in each case suggested that a difference in consumer
interest among more narcissistic participants was the key driver.
Simple effects analyses confirmed this: The links between the
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78. scarcity manipulation and the consumer interest indices were
con-
sistently significant and substantial when narcissism was plotted
at �1 SD (.42 � � � .67; 3.77 � t[120] � 5.92; all ps �
.0005),
but consistently significant and negligible when narcissism was
plotted at �1 SD (�.10 � � � .04; �.89 � t[120] � .32; all
ps � .38).
Finally, those participants among whom the scarcity manipula-
tion “worked” showed almost identical results. In particular, the
corresponding values for the three interaction terms were,
respec-
tively, t(1, 91) � 3.16, p � .002; t(1, 91) � 3.92, p � .0005;
and
t(1, 91) � 1.98, p � .05. Also, the corresponding ranges of
values
when plotting narcissism at �1 SD were (.38 � � � .65; 2.77 �
t[91] � 4.86; all ps � .004), and when plotting it at �1 SD were
(�.13 � � � .05; �.94 � t[91] � .36; all ps � .35). To
illustrate
these interactions, Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively, plot the ex-
trapolated means for each dependent variable (overall attitude
toward the Equinoxe watch; intention to purchase it; and
willing-
ness to pay for it) at each level of the scarcity manipulation, for
levels of narcissism at 1 SD.
Study 4
Overview
All findings so far have pertained to how narcissism predicts
79. interest in consumer products intended for the buyer. But we
wondered whether these findings would generalize across
product
recipient. In particular, we wondered whether narcissists would
show a preference for products that enhance positive
distinctive-
ness, not only when spending their own money on themselves
but
also when spending their own money on close others. (When it
comes to consumer products, particularly those that might be
expensive, we assumed that the most common recipients would
be
close others.)
One line of argument suggests that the product preference
would
not persist. Narcissists are more interested in personal
achievement
than in intimate relationships (Foster & Campbel, 2007).
Indeed,
they are often prepared to sacrifice close others to satisfy their
thirst for competitive glory (Sedikides et al., 2002). Hence,
when
buying gifts for others, narcissists might conceivably refrain
from
purchasing products that would enhance the distinctiveness of
close others, lest it obscure their own distinctiveness.
On the other hand, narcissists may often assimilate themselves
to, rather than contrast themselves against, genuinely close
others
(Tesser, 1988). Otherwise put, narcissists may habitually
include
close others in their own self-concept (Aron et al., 2004). If so,
then close others may be proxy targets for achieving positive
80. distinctiveness. If so, spending on close others might be psycho-
Figure 4. Extrapolated means representing consumer attitudes
toward the
Equinoxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated
level of supply
(scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of
narcissism (low, high).
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around estimated
intercepts (i.e.,
the means shown), based on standard errors computed from four
derivative
regression equations where levels of narcissism were
orthogonally coded at
�1 SD or –1SD, and levels of supply as 0 or 1.
Figure 5. Extrapolated means representing intention to purchase
the Equi-
noxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated level
of supply
(scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of
narcissism (low, high).
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around estimated
intercepts (i.e.,
the means shown), based on standard errors computed from four
derivative
regression equations where levels of narcissism were
orthogonally coded at
�1 SD or –1SD, and levels of supply as 0 or 1.
Figure 6. Extrapolated means representing willingness to pay
for the
Equinoxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated
level of
supply (scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of
narcissism
81. (low, high). Units are expressed in the natural logarithm (ln) of
the dollar
amounts reported. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals
around
estimated intercepts (i.e., the means shown), based on standard
errors
computed from four derivative regression equations where
levels of nar-
cissism were orthogonally coded at �1 SD or –1SD, and levels
of supply
as 0 or 1.
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344 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
logically similar to spending on oneself, and prior findings
should
generalize to buying for close others.
Given that gift-giving constitutes a noncompetitive activity, and
narcissists can become communally inclined given the right
cues
(Finkel, Campbell, Buffardi, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2009), we
favored the latter reasoning.
86. Method
Participants and procedure. One hundred undergraduate
students, enrolled at McGill University in Canada, participated
in
return for $5 (CAD). The gender split of the sample was roughly
equal (56% female, 44% male). Most participants were in their
early 20s (no individual age data were collected). All were re-
cruited and run as in previous studies. Each was paid $5 (CAD)
for
taking part. The cover story for the booklet, and its
presentational
format, were identical to those in Study 3.
Stimuli, measures, and manipulation. The booklet came in
two versions. Each featured a version of the advertisement for
Equinoxe watches previously featured in Study 3 (i.e., implying
it
was in short or plentiful supply). However, the framing of the
advertisements differed. This time, participants were asked to
imagine that they had “a gift certificate for a department store”
and
that they could use to “buy a wrist watch as a gift for someone
very
close to you on his or her birthday.”
Having inspected the screenshot, participants indicated their
overall attitude toward a typical Equinoxe watch (r � .83) and
willingness to pay for it.6 They then completed the same manip-
ulation check (r � .81) as in Study 3, as well as the same
version
of the NPI (� � .93).
Results and Discussion
87. The evidence was broadly consistent with our hypothesis. Nar-
cissists showed, or tended to show, more interest in a consumer
product when it was portrayed as exclusive and in short supply,
even when it took the form of a gift for close others.
As before, the scarcity manipulation worked: Together, fewer
Equinoxe watches were deemed available in the scarce
condition
(M � 3.88) than in the plentiful condition (M � 8.36), t(98) �
12.69, p � .0005. Moreover, the scarcity manipulation check
was
significantly below the scale midpoint (5) in the scarce
condition,
t(49) � �3.62, p � .001, and significantly above it in the
plentiful
condition, t(49) � 19.81, p � .0005. Taking ratings on the
correct
side of the scale midpoint as the criterion of success, the manip-
ulation “worked” in 82% of cases. For the sake of completeness,
and to be consistent with Study 3, we again report results both
across all participants and across that subset for whom the
scarcity
manipulation “worked.”
This time, however, narcissism predicted neither overall attitude
toward a typical Equinoxe watch, r(98) � .13, p � .20 (scarcity
subset: r[80] � .09, p � .43), nor willingness to pay for it, r(98)
�
.07, p � .49 (scarcity subset: r[80] � �.01, p � .92). (As in
Study
3, willingness-to-pay scores, being positively skewed [�2.93],
were transformed via a natural logarithm, thereby normalizing
their distribution [�.20].) That is, either because the recipient
of
the product, or the tastes of the sample, differed, the watch per
se
88. itself held no greater appeal for narcissists than for
nonnarcissists.
Next, we tested the critical Narcissism
Scarcity interactions
just as in Study 3. Once again, the interaction was significant
for
willingness to pay for a typical Equinoxe watch, t(1, 96) �
3.47,
p � .001, although not for overall attitude toward it, t(1, 96) �
1.58, p � .12. However, among those participants for whom the
manipulation “worked,” the interaction was significant both for
the willingness-to-pay index, t(1, 78) � 3.26, p � .002, and for
the
overall attitude index, t(1, 78) � 1.96, p � .05.
Follow-up simple effects analyses were conducted on this sam-
ple subset to help interpret the pattern of interaction. As in
Study
3, the link between the scarcity manipulation and the
willingness-
to-pay index was significant and substantial when narcissism
was
plotted at �1 SD (� � .50), t(78) � 3.34, p � .001, but not
when
narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (� � .19), t(78) � �1.25, p �
.22. However, although the link between the overall attitude
was
also insignificant when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (� �
�.16), t(78) � �1.05, p � .30, it was only marginally
significant
when plotted at �1 SD (� � .27), t(78) � 1.70, p � .09. Yet,
the
interaction can be alternatively decomposed as follows:
Whereas
89. participants higher in narcissism did not evaluate the Equinoxe
watch significantly more positively than those lower in
narcissism
when it was portrayed as being in plentiful supply (� � �.13),
t(78) � �0.82, p � .41, they did evaluate it significantly more
positively when it was portrayed as being in short supply (� �
.30), t(78) � 1.96, p � .05.
Subcomponents of narcissism: Reanalysis of Studies 1– 4.
Across various dependent variables in four studies, we obtained
consistent evidence that more narcissistic participants prefer
con-
sumer products that enhance their positive distinctiveness.
How-
ever, narcissism is not a unifactorial construct. As recurring in-
vestigations have highlighted, narcissism comprises several
subcomponents that may be psychometrically and predictively
distinguished (Kubarych, Deary, & Austin, 2004; Raskin &
Terry,
1988), even if the optimal derivation remains debated
(Ackerman
et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Hooley 2010). Accordingly, by exam-
ining how such subcomponents predict preferences for
consumer
products that enhance positive distinctiveness, more nuanced in-
sight may be gained into why narcissism prompts purchasing.
Here, we follow Ackerman et al. (2011) by splitting full-scale
narcissism (mean � � .92 across all studies) into three subcom-
ponents that are, respectively, associated with higher,
intermediate,
and lower psychosocial adaptiveness: Leadership-Authority
(mean
� � .77), reflecting assertiveness and social potency;
Grandiosity-
Exhibitionism (mean � � .79), reflecting vanity and showiness;
and Entitlement-Exploitativeness (mean � � .61), reflecting
90. felt
desert and antisocial scheming.
A plausible case can be made— especially for the first two
subcomponents—that each should predict interest in achieving
positive distinctiveness via consumer products. First, people
higher in Leadership-Authority should chronically seek to
elevate
themselves by pursuing more high-status positions. Here,
display-
ing distinctive products as a way of expressing their aspirations,
or
of communicating their rising social rank, would help them
achieve this goal. Second, people higher in Grandiosity-
Exhibitionism should chronically seek to individuate themselves
by standing out from the crowd. Displaying products that are
personalizable and customizable would help them achieve this
6 Due to a printing error, the intention-to-purchase index was
omitted
from this study.
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95. goal. Finally, people higher in Entitlement-Exploitativeness—
who
are keen to manipulate others to their own advantage, so as to
secure what they regard as their due—may use the positive dis-
tinctiveness that consumer products afford to exploit other
people
strategically.
Tables 2 and 3 list the links in various studies between the key
dependent variables and the three subcomponents of narcissism.
Table 3 displays links for dependent variables pertaining to the
Equinoxe watch (Studies 3 and 4), and Table 2 for other
dependent
variables (Studies 1, 2, and 3). For convenience, the leftmost
column in both tables reproduces links with overall narcissism.
To
their right, independent links with each subcomponent of narcis-
sism are displayed. Next, links with each subcomponent after
adjusting for both other subcomponents are displayed. Finally,
the
rightmost column indicates associated sample sizes.
Overall, all three subcomponents of narcissism always or nearly
always showed zero-order correlations with the key dependent
variables. Furthermore, adjusting for the other subcomponents,
each subcomponent uniquely predicted at least one key
dependent
variable. However, the pattern of unique prediction varied.
In Study 1, only Grandiosity-Exhibitionism continued to predict
scores on the CNFU and on each of its subscales after adjusting
for
both other subcomponents. (Interestingly, self-esteem correlated
only with Leadership-Authority, the most adaptive component
of
96. narcissism.) Such specificity is perhaps unsurprising, given that
many of the items of the CNFU explicitly refer to individuation
(e.g., CCC: “I actively seek to develop my personal uniqueness
by
buying special products or brands”; UCC: “When I dress differ-
ently, I’m often aware that others think I’m peculiar, but I don’t
care”; AOS: “I give up wearing fashions I’ve purchased once
they
become popular among the general public”). By the same token,
it
makes sense that, in Study 3, Grandiosity-Exhibitionism proved
to
be the main predictor of consumer interest in a product designed
to individuate: the “Just for You” dress shirt that could be
tailored
to participants’ taste. Grandiosity-Exhibitionism also uniquely
pre-
dicted participants’ estimates of the number of people who also
owned the possessions that they prized. Again, this makes
sense:
Whether these estimates reflected reality or fancy, the sense of
owning what others do not conveys the impression of being a
distinctive individual.
In other cases, Leadership-Authority emerged as the primary
or unique predictor: of the number of prized possessions par-
ticipants owned (Study 3); of the amount they were willing to
pay for distinctive clothes (Study 3); and of their preferences
for a special-edition product as opposed to a commonplace one
(Study 2). It also uniquely predicted greater interest in a
product
(for personal use) that was portrayed as being in short supply
(Study 3).
Although multiple explanations for this last pattern exist, we
97. suggest two possibilities. First, two of the dependent variables
have a “bottom-line” character to them (i.e., number of posses-
sions; willingness to pay). People higher in Leadership-
Authority should want to actually get ahead, as opposed to
merely being regarded as standing out. Of course, both goals
are mutually reinforcing, but one can still be prioritized over
the
other. If so, higher correlations with more objective indices of
Table 2
Studies 1, 2, and 3: Links Between Narcissism, Narcissism
Subcomponents, and Key Dependent Variables Not Involving
the
Equinoxe Watch
Simple
coefficients
Regression
coefficients
Variable
Overall
narcissism
Leadership/
Authority
Grandiosity/
Exhibitionism
Entitlement/
Exploitativeness
Leadership/
Authority
99. Number listed .42��� .38��� .36��� .31��� .21� �.01
.13 124
Note. Overall narcissism was operationalized as the full-scale
score on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Subcomponents
of narcissism were
operationalized as partial scale scores derived from the item
subsets identified by Ackerman et al. (2011). Simple
coefficients are Pearson’s rs. Regression
coefficients are beta weights derived from multiple regressions
featuring all three subcomponents of narcissism as simultaneous
predictors of each
dependent variable. CNFU � Consumer Need for Uniqueness
scale; CCC � Creative Choice Counterconformity subscale;
UCC � Unpopular Choice
Counterconformity subscale; AOS � Avoidance of Similarity
subscale.
† p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.
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104. status. Second, products that convey exclusivity might be par-
ticularly sought by people higher in Leadership-Authority. The
status they seek is necessarily zero-sum: People must divide
into those who have it (the haves, or have-mores) and those who
do not (the have-nots, or have-lesses). Similarly, the ownership
of exclusive products is necessarily zero-sum: People must
divide into those who own them and those who do not. (In
contrast, run-of-the-mill products are for hoi polloi.) Thus, the
keenness of people higher in Leadership-Authority to own
exclusive products— both the leather case in Study 2 and the
watch in Study 3 having been described as “limited edition”—
may reflect their keenness to attain status. To them, owning
exclusive products may serve either as a coveted symbol of
status or as a self-presentational means of attaining it.
In only one case did Entitlement-Exploitativeness emerge as
the primary or unique predictor: Study 4. Here, only partici-
pants who were higher in Entitlement-Exploitativeness were
prepared to spend more on a product for someone else, when
that product was portrayed as being in short supply (Study 4).
One implication is that our earlier theorizing about why nar-
cissists purchase distinctive products for close others may re-
quire revision. Narcissists’ goal here may not be as much ego
related—that is, to elevate or individuate themselves vicari-
ously by elevating or individuating a close other—as much as it
is pragmatic—that is, to bribe a close other into doing some-
thing for them that they believe they deserve. There is certainly
a precedent for narcissists treating even close others as means
rather than ends (Sedikides et al., 2002) and for having Machi-
avellian inclinations (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Narcissists
may, in particular, pursue gift-giving as a tactical mating strat-
egy (Holtzman & Strube, 2011; Saad & Gill, 2003).
General Discussion
Summary of Findings
105. We hypothesized that narcissists would prefer consumer prod-
ucts that enhance their positive distinctiveness. Across four
studies
and various operationalizations, we found consistent support for
this hypothesis.
First, we found (Study 1) that participants higher in narcissism
reported, on a well-validated inventory, a greater inclination to
purchase products to satisfy their need for uniqueness
(uniqueness
being the logical limit of distinctiveness). In particular, such
par-
ticipants reported purchasing products to cultivate a personal
style,
to defy established conventions, and to avoid looking like
others.
Importantly, participants merely higher in self-esteem did not
show the same inclination. This suggests that narcissistic self-
regard, not generic self-worth, lay behind the effects.
Second, we found that more narcissistic participants also
showed greater interest in consumer products liable to confer
positive distinctiveness. In particular (Study 3), more
narcissistic
participants rated a shirt that they could customize and
personalize
(thereby permitting them to distinguish themselves from
wearers
of regular shirts) more favorably than did less narcissistic
partic-
ipants. They also indicated they were more likely to buy it and
would be willingly to pay a higher price for it. Furthermore
(Study
2), more narcissistic participants, given a choice of free
accesso-
106. ries, were more likely to opt for a leather case over a gift
coupon,
where the latter belonged to a limited edition (its scarcity
thereby
permitting them, by joining a select class of owners, to
distinguish
themselves from nonowners), and could be engraved with their
name (again, offering them the opportunity for distinctiveness
via
personalization).
Third, we found that, if the same brand of watch were described
as belonging to an exclusive limited edition, as opposed to
being
Table 3
Studies 3 and 4: Links Between Scarcity
Narcissism Interactions, Scarcity
Narcissism-Subcomponent Interactions, and
Dependent Variables Involving the Equinoxe Watch
Independent
coefficients
Mutually
adjusted
coefficients
Variable
Full-scale
NPI
Leadership/
Authority
107. Grandiosity/
Exhibitionism
Entitlement/
Exploitativeness
Leadership/
Authority
Grandiosity/
Exhibitionism
Entitlement/
Exploitativeness N
Study 3
Watch for self
Attitude .29�� .38��� .24� .15 .41��� .09 �.11 95
Purchase intent .36��� .35��� .25�� .23� .30�� .08 .04
95
Willingness to pay .17� .23�� .05 .13 .20† �.10 .08 95
Study 4
Watch for other
Attitude .22� .14 .11 .25� �.02 �.03 .27† 82
Willingness to pay .35�� .29�� .27�� .43��� .05 .02
.41�� 82
Note. Overall narcissism was operationalized as the full-scale
score on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI).
Subcomponents of narcissism were
operationalized as partial scale scores derived from the item
clusters identified by Ackerman et al. (2011). Independent
coefficients are regression beta
108. weights representing the statistical interaction between the
scarcity manipulation and either narcissism or a subcomponent
of narcissism, after first
controlling for the main effects of both. Mutually adjusted
coefficients are regression beta weights representing the
statistical interaction between the
scarcity manipulation and one subcomponent of narcissism,
after first controlling for (a) the main effects of both and (b) the
interactive effects of the other
two subcomponents of narcissism. All analyses conducted on
subsets of participants for whom the scarcity manipulations
worked.
† p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.
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113. for a close other (Study 4).
Fourth, we found (Study 3) that more narcissistic participants
estimated that the personal possessions they prized were owned
by
a smaller percentage of other people and that, independently of
this, those possessions were also objectively more distinctive,
as
judged by independent raters. In addition, more narcissistic par-
ticipants listed a greater number of prized personal possessions.
Finally, narcissism explained the link between estimates of rela-
tively exclusive ownership and willingness to pay for the
customi-
zable shirt referred to above. This strongly implicates
narcissism as
the driver of these effects.
Finally, in a reanalysis of all the above findings, we found that
two subcomponents of narcissism, namely, Grandiosity-Exhibi-
tionism—reflecting a striving for social individuation—and
Lead-
ership-Authority—reflecting a striving for social elevation—
inde-
pendently predicted, on different occasions, interest in
consumer
products intended for oneself (Studies 1, 2, and 3). A third sub-
component, Entitlement-Exploitativeness, independently
predicted
interest in consumer products only when they were intended for
others (Study 4), consistent with manipulative intent.
Thus, we found consistent evidence that personality—specifi-
cally, narcissism or some subcomponent thereof— could
intelligi-
bly and powerfully predict interest in a consumer product on the
basis of its power to satisfy one of two self-related symbolic
114. values—social individuation and social elevation—and thereby
enhance the positive distinctiveness of the purchaser. Moreover,
there is good reason to believe, based on the cognate research
findings (e.g., Gao et al., 2009), that such “agentic” purchasing
proclivities ultimately reflect an attempt on the part of
narcissists
to strategically regulate their self-regard (Morf & Rhodewalt,
2001), either via self-enhancement (Sedikides & Gregg, 2001)
or
via self-protection (Horvath & Morf, 2009).
We close by considering some implications of our findings, both
practical and theoretical.
Practical Implications
First, not only did predicted effects emerge consistently across
our four studies, but their magnitude was often noteworthy. In
Study 1, the NPI and CNFU shared over 40% of their variance
in common. In Study 2, the NPI predicted 25% of the variance
in
money participants would spend on a product with high individ-
uation potential. In Studies 3 and 4, the level of manipulated
product supply predicted 25% of the variance in willingness to
pay
for it among high NPI scorers. If such results generalize, then
knowledge of consumers’ narcissism, either at an individual or
group level, could markedly augment the ability of market re-
searchers to predict the purchase of branded or status goods
(Berger & Heath, 2007; Sedikides et al., 2011). This is
especially
so given the availability of briefer assessment instruments
(Ames,
Rose, & Anderson, 2006), which might even be abbreviated
even
further, as has been done for self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, &
115. Trzesniewski, 2001). Moreover, the fact that narcissism seems
to
be on the rise (Twenge & Foster, 2008) increases its relevance
as
a basis for purchase predictions.
Second, our findings help to clarify on whom contrasting types
of persuasive appeal might work better. Cialdini and Trost
(1998),
in a comprehensive review, noted that people could be swayed,
among other things, by an appeal to social proof—that many
other
people are doing something (e.g., buying a product)— or by an
appeal to scarcity—that not a lot of something is available (e.g.,
an
unusual product).
The concept of social proof has been variously addressed under
such headings as bandwagon effects (Leibenstein, 1950) and
multiple-source effects (Harkins & Petty, 1981). What most
people
desire most of the time is likely to be what one will desire
oneself,
both because human nature is shared (Pinker, 2002) and because
the high demand for a good reflected in mass behavior is a
signal
that the good is objectively beneficial. In contrast, the concept
of
scarcity derives originally from economics (e.g., Reisman,
1996),
where it designates a property of all goods where demand
outstrips
supply. As a rule of thumb, scarcity is also a signal that a good
is
objectively beneficial; indeed, it must be, as high demand is
built
116. into its very definition. Much empirical evidence also confirms
the
subjective allure of scarce goods (Brock, 1968; Eisend, 2008;
Inman, Peter, & Raghubir, 1997; Lynn, 1989; Verhallen & Rob-
ben, 1994).
Note, however, that it is often the physical properties of a good
that are understood as being demanded. For example, swayed by
a
social proof appeal, someone might infer that, if everyone is
buying Acme widgets, then they are in high demand, and do
their
job. Similarly, swayed by a scarcity appeal, someone might
infer
that if Acme widgets are hard to come by, they are again in high
demand, and also do their job. Either way, someone would do
well
to acquire that good. But consider now the supply element in
the
question, which is relevant to the symbolic value of these
goods. If
everyone is buying Acme widgets, and supply is keeping pace
with
demand, then everyone can get them; however, if demand is
outpacing supply, then only a select few people can get them.
Crucially, it is only in the latter case that Acme widgets can
enhance the positive distinctiveness of their owners; in the
former
case, indeed, Acme widgets might actually have the opposite
effect. Thus, narcissists, relative to nonnarcissists, should be
par-
ticularly susceptible to scarcity appeals, because the physical
and
symbolic values of the goods demanded would complement one
another. In contrast, narcissists, relative to nonnarcissists,
should
117. be less susceptible to social proof appeals, because the physical
and symbolic values of the goods demanded would contradict
one
another.
Theoretical Implications
Our findings underscore the agentic basis of narcissistic self-
regard (Campbell & Foster, 2007). That narcissists’ interest in
consumer products is strongly driven by the power of those
prod-
ucts to positively distinguish them illustrates their acute
concern
with social rank. Presumably, narcissists feel better about them-
selves to the extent that they succeed in individuating or
elevating
themselves.
But if so, then narcissistic self-regard operates at odds with
regular self-esteem. For, according to the original version of so-
ciometer theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), the
function of self-esteem is to track levels of social inclusion. In
particular, if inclusion levels fall below a critical minimum,
then
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122. 348 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK
an aversive signal—a drop in self-esteem— ensues, prompting
people to redouble their efforts to integrate oneself into society.
This self-regulatory system is alleged to have evolved as an
adaptation because membership of cooperative groups greatly
fa-
cilitated the survival and reproduction of ancestral humans. On
this
view, self-esteem clearly serves a communal function—the pro-
motion of greater belonging. Yet, the habit of individuating and
elevating oneself, on which narcissistic self-esteem depends,
hardly seems a sure-fire recipe for inclusion. Indeed, habitually
and visibly indicating how different one is from one’s peers or
how
superior one is to one’s peers—including via one’s purchases—
is
liable to jeopardize the likelihood of social acceptance. Little
wonder, then, that, although narcissists win over group members
initially, they end up alienating them (Paulhus, 1998).
Narcissistic
self-regard thus seems to serve a function contrary to nonnarcis-
sistic self-esteem: It apparently tracks social status, not social
inclusion.
This paradox can be resolved by an updated version of sociom-
eter theory (e.g., Leary, 2010; see also Kirkpatrick & Ellis,
2001),
which postulates that self-esteem tracks any form of social
value.
As such, the social value in question might sometimes be
commu-
nal, and more mediated by regular self-esteem, and sometimes
agentic, and more mediated by narcissistic self-regard. Nonethe-
123. less, the distinction between these broad bases of self-regard is
worth drawing. Recent correlational and experimental research
suggest that there is not only a sociometer tracking how well
people are fitting in and getting along but also a “dominometer”
tracking how well people are standing out and getting ahead:
Not
only do status and inclusion equivalently predict self-esteem,
but
status predicts narcissism better than inclusion does
(Mahadevan et
al., 2012a; Mahadevan, Gregg, De-Waal Andrews, & Sedikides,
2012b; see also Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, &
Abele, 2011). The results of our four studies here, then,
underscore
the hyperagentic nature of narcissistic self-regard: Buying prod-
ucts that enhance positive distinctiveness pushes the needle on
the
“dominometer” dial upwards.
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