The knock on most business leaders is that they don’t take the.docx

The knock on most business leaders is that they don’t take the
long view—that they’re fixated on achieving short-term goals
to lift their pay. So which global CEOs actually delivered solid
results over the long run? The 2013 version of the CEO
Scorecard
provides an objective answer.
by Morten T. Hansen, Herminia Ibarra, and Urs Peyer
100
The Best-Performing
CEOs in the World
hBr.Org
January–February 2013 harvard Business review 81
The BesT-Performing Ceos in The World
I
t’s no accident that chief executives so
often focus on short-term financial re-
sults at the expense of longer-term per-
formance. They have every incentive to
do so. If they don’t make their quarterly
or annual numbers, their compensa-
tion drops and their jobs are in jeopardy.
Stock analysts, shareholders, and often
their own boards judge them harshly if
they miss near-term goals. And without

equally strong pressure to manage for a future that
stretches beyond 90 or 180 days, CEOs’ behavior is
unlikely to change. Developing a simple yet rigorous
way to gauge long-term performance is crucial; after
all, in business, leaders default to managing what’s
measured.
Five years ago we launched a global project to ad-
dress that challenge. But we wanted to do more than
just devise the right metrics. Our goal was to imple-
ment a scorecard that would not only get people
talking about long-term performance but also alter
the way that boards, executives, consultants, and
management scholars thought about and assessed
CEOs. We wanted this innovation to shine a spotlight
on the CEOs worldwide who had created long-term
value for their companies, and we wanted to give ex-
ecutives around the world critical benchmarks they
could aim for.
Three years ago, in the January–February 2010 is-
sue of HBR, we introduced such a scorecard. It evalu-
ated chief executives on their entire tenure in office.
We used it to rank the performance of nearly 2,000
CEOs. This month we are publishing a new version of
that analysis. We have expanded it along two impor-
tant new dimensions—making the group of CEOs we
studied truly global, and examining which CEOs and
companies were able to do well not only financially
but also in terms of corporate social performance.
Judging Ceo Performance
For the most part, we used the same methodology
that we did three years ago. (See the sidebar “How
We Created the Scorecard,” page 92.) We wanted to
accomplish three things:

Assess the long-term performance of each
CEO, from the first day on the job to the last.
(Or for CEOs still in office, until August 31, 2012, our
last day of data collection.) To do this, we looked at
how much total shareholder returns had changed
over that time period (adjusting for country and in-
dustry effects), plus the overall increase in market
capitalization.
Reflect the global nature of business. In 2010
we drew candidates from the S&P Global 1200 and
BRIC 40 lists; this year we worked with three other
emerging-market indexes as well. The pool of CEOs
studied increased by roughly one-third, from 1,999
in 2010 to 3,143 this year.
Be objective. Other rankings use reputation
and surveys, which tap into popularity and ce-
lebrity status, to score CEOs. Instead, we use only
performance data—notably, total shareholder per-
formance. Other metrics, such as sales, profitability,
and innovation rates, are useful, too, but they differ
by industry, which makes comparisons difficult.
Granted, one downside of using truly objective
measures is that our ranking may not exclude CEOs
who have disappointed stakeholders on dimensions
where performance is more subjective. This can be
especially challenging with CEOs from emerging
markets where rules are still being established. But
even though CEOs are held accountable in areas that
shareholder performance cannot capture, it remains
the principal standard by which they are judged.

Who’s Up, Who’s down
The top 100 CEOs on our list performed exception-
ally well. On average, they delivered a total share-
holder return of 1,385% during their tenures and
increased their firms’ market value by $40.2 billion
(adjusted for inflation, dividends, share repurchases,
and share issues). The contrast between their results
and those of the bottom 100 CEOs was striking: On
average, the bottom 100 produced a total share-
holder return of -57% and presided over a loss of
$13.6 billion in market value.
It comes as no surprise that the best-performing
CEO over the past 17 years was Steve Jobs of Apple,
who was #1 on our 2010 list as well. From 1997 to
2011, Apple’s market value increased by $359 bil-
lion, and its shareholder return experienced aver-
age compound annual growth of 35%. That remark-
82 Harvard Business Review January–february 2013
1
Steve Jobs
Company
Apple
Industry
Information Technology
tEnurE
1997–2011

InsIdEr
total sharEholdEr rEturn
Country Adjusted Industry Adjusted
markEt CapItalIzatIon ChangE
($ bIllIons)
+359
mBa
unItEd statEs
6,682% 6,621%
ovErall rank
3
Yun Jong-Yong
Company
Samsung Electronics
Industry
tEnurE
1996–2008
InsIdEr

($ bIllIons)
+128
mBa
south korEa
1,559% 1,437%
ovErall rank
2
ovErall rank
Jeffrey P. Bezos
Company
Amazon.com
Industry
Online Retail
tEnurE
1996–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+111

mBa
unItEd statEs
12,431% 12,266%
Continued on PAGe 84
Jeff Bezos’s focus on consumers above share-
holders has at times vexed Wall Street. But
smart investors have stayed with his company.
In 16 years as CEO of Amazon, the online retail
giant he created, Bezos has delivered industry-
adjusted shareholder returns of 12,266%,
and the value of the company has grown by
$111 billion.
Bezos took time to speak with HBR’s editor
in chief, Adi Ignatius, last November 26—Cyber
Monday, which set an all-time record for online
sales, a category Amazon practically invented.
Edited excerpts from the interview follow.
“ You Have to Be Willing to
Be Misunderstood”
4
Roger Agnelli
Company
Vale
Industry
Materials

tEnurE
2001–2011
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+157
mBa
BrazIl
934% 1,773%
ovErall rank
BE
zO
S
Ph
O
TO
g
R
A
Ph

Y:
K
A
R
En
M
O
SK
O
w
IT
z
hBR.ORg
January–February 2013 harvard Business Review 83
2
Continued
Jeffrey P. Bezos
hBr: When Amazon went public, in 1997, you
wrote a letter to shareholders that said, “It’s all
about the long term.” Did you feel you were chal-
lenging orthodoxy?
Bezos: We were trying to make sure we were cor-
rectly advertising the event. Warren Buffett once

said, “You can hold a rock concert or you can hold a
ballet. Just don’t hold a rock concert and advertise it
as a ballet.” A public company has to be clear about
whether it’s holding a rock concert or a ballet, and
then investors can decide if they want to opt in.
What does it mean from the perspective of a CEO
to think long-term?
If you’re long-term oriented, customer interests
and shareholder interests are aligned. In the short
term, that’s not always the case. We have other
stakeholders, too—our employees, our vendors.
We take it as an article of faith that if we put cus-
tomers first, other stakeholders will also benefit, as
long as they’re willing to take the long-term view.
And a long-term approach is essential for invention,
because you’re going to have a lot of failures along
the way.
You’ve said that you like to plant seeds that may
take seven years to bear fruit. Doesn’t that mean
you’ll lose some battles to companies that have a
more conventional, two- or three-year outlook?
Maybe so, but if we had always needed to see sig-
nificant financial results in two or three years, then
some of the most meaningful things we’ve done
would never have been started—like Kindle, Ama-
zon Web Services, Amazon Prime.
How much do you care about your share price?
I care very much about our shareowners, so I care
very much about our long-term share price. I do
not follow the stock on a daily basis, because I don’t
think there’s any information in it. The economist
Benjamin Graham once said, “In the short term, the
stock market is a voting machine. In the long term,

it’s a weighing machine.” We try to build a company
that wants to be weighed, not voted on.
Does it make sense for Amazon to stay in the
hardware business, which is a low-margin, low-
profit area for you?
Our approach is to sell our hardware—our Kindle de-
vices—at near breakeven. Then we have an ongoing
relationship with customers who buy content from
us: digital books, music, movies, TV shows, games,
apps. We aren’t trying to make $100 every time we
sell a Kindle Fire, so we don’t have to get you on the
upgrade treadmill.
You have said that you would be interested, if you
had the right concept and approach, in creating a
physical Amazon retail experience. Why even con-
sider that?
We like to build innovative things, but only if we can
put our own unique twist on them. If we could find
something differentiated that we thought customers
would like, it would be superfun.
Would developing a phone fall into that innovative
category?
Yeah, absolutely.
Who do you fear is your biggest challenger?
We don’t get up every morning wondering, “Who are
the top three companies that are going to try to kill
us?” I know of companies that do that in their annual
planning processes, and the competitive zeal moti-
vates them. We do pay attention, but it’s not where
we get our energy from.

Disruption is a rough business. Do you have any
personal regrets about the pain your success has
caused traditional retailers?
I’m as sentimental as the next person. I have lots of
childhood memories of physical books and things
like that. But our job at Amazon is to build the best
customer experience we can and let customers
choose where they shop.
At what point will the goal change from lowering
margins and building market share to making a big-
ger profit?
Percentage margins are not something we seek to
optimize. We want to maximize the absolute-dollar
free cash flow per share. If we can do that by lowering
margins, we will. Free cash flow is something inves-
tors can spend. They can’t spend percentage margins.
Amazon has done a great job of self-cannibalizing
its revenue streams—going from Amazon Store to
able accomplishment is likely to go unbeaten for a
long time.
Jeff Bezos of Amazon.com has now climbed
to the #2 spot, up from #7 in our 2010 list. Under
his leadership, the company delivered industry-
adjusted shareholder returns of 12,266% and saw
its value increase by $111 billion. In recent years the
online retailer has expanded aggressively into new
segments such as cloud-based computing services,
while working to get the most out of the markets it

already occupies. Its revenue growth shows no signs
of slowing: Sales increased by 40% in 2011.
The highest-ranked woman on the list is Meg
Whitman, currently the CEO of beleaguered HP,
whose performance as the CEO of eBay from 1998 to
2008 earned her the #9 spot. Overall, only 1.9% of all
the CEOs we studied were women.
There was considerable turnover in the top
100—this year about half (43) of the CEOs are new
to that list since 2010. The change happened largely
because in creating the 2013 ranking, we examined
a bigger, more international sample of CEOs. To
make the top 100 in 2010, CEOs had to rank in the
top 5% of the executives in the study; this year they
had to land in the top 3.2%. The majority of new-
comers to the top 100 are from emerging markets,
not surprisingly, but eight U.S. CEOs made the cut
for the first time.
One notable new name is Lars Sørensen, the CEO
of Novo Nordisk, a company that made its name
selling insulin for diabetics. He shot up from #233 in
2010 to #20 in our current ranking. After Sørensen
took over the company, in 2000, he spent 10 years
and $500 million expanding the sales force to make
it truly global. When all his competitors were invest-
ing in diabetes pills, Sørensen shut down Novo’s pill
research and instead focused the company on its
core competency—insulin and other injected dia-
betes medications, notably prefilled insulin “pens”
that eliminate the hassle of using a vial and syringe.
His bet that sales would continue to grow in the
wake of a worldwide diabetes epidemic has clearly
paid off.

Even industries that have gone through tough
times in recent years have seen some exceptional
results. Airlines, for example, have not been do-
ing well, but Air China, under the leadership of Li
Jiaxiang (#17 on our list), bucked that trend. During
his tenure, from 2004 to 2008, the company’s to-
tal shareholder return was 1,022 percentage points
higher than the average for its industry peers, while
Amazon Marketplace, from print to e-books, and
so on. In most companies, moves like those would
be hard to execute without organizational turmoil.
How have you managed the transitions?
When things get complicated, we simplify them by
asking, “What’s best for the customer?” We believe
that if we do that, things will work out in the long
term. We can never prove that. In fact, sometimes we
do price-elasticity studies, and the answer is always
that we should raise prices. But we don’t, because we
believe that by keeping our prices very low, we earn
trust with customers, and that this will maximize
free cash flow over the long term.
What have you learned about leadership from run-
ning what has become a very big company?
If you’re inventing and pioneering, you have to be
willing to be misunderstood for long periods of time.
One early example is customer reviews. A book pub-
lisher told me, “You don’t understand your business.
You make money when you sell things. Why do you
allow negative reviews?” And I thought, “We don’t
make money when we sell things; we make money
when we help customers make purchase decisions.”
How do you institutionalize the ability to come up

with these good, misunderstood ideas?
First, there are stories we tell ourselves internally
about persistence and patience, long-term think-
ing, staying focused on the customer. Second, we
select people who, when they wake up in the morn-
ing, are thinking about how to invent on behalf of the
customer. If you like a more competitively focused
culture, you might find us dull. We find our culture
intensely fun. We have an explorer mentality, not a
conqueror mentality.
You’ve generated a lot of attention recently. Is all
the publicity good for you and for Amazon?
I have to be choosy—I do very little. But I do inter-
views because I want customers to understand what
makes us tick, how we operate, what our principles
are. I think customers want to know who they’re do-
ing business with.
And if you don’t talk, how in the world can we mis-
understand you?
Oh, believe me, that wouldn’t stop it.
hbr.org
January–February 2013 harvard business review 85
THE BEST-PERFORMING CEOS IN THE WORLD
A truly stringent standard of excellence takes into account
not only what results CEOs deliver over the long term but
whether they’ve positioned their companies to succeed after
they’ve left the helm. Here are the CEOs whose companies
did very well over their entire tenure (in the top 10% of

our 3,143 CEOs) and also during the three years after their
departure. Many CEOs are not eligible for this list, of course,
because they are still in offi ce or because three years haven’t
passed since they left.
At the top of this ranking we fi nd Tim Koogle, who was the
CEO of Yahoo from 1995 to 2001. His successor, Terry Semel,
increased the company’s market value by $24 billion from
2001 to 2004.
The Legacy Litmus Test
its market capitalization rose by $37 billion. With
his guidance, Air China obtained a 50% share of the
market in major Beijing airports and joined the larg-
est airline alliance in the world.
The World of CEOs Is Not Flat
With a truly global sample to study, we can do a bet-
ter job of comparing countries and regions. This is
a signi� cant advance; for decades most analysis of
CEO performance has been U.S.-centric. Now we’re
able to examine data country by country—and we
� nd real di� erences when we do.
China has been the growth miracle of the past de-
cade, so you might expect CEOs there to have done
very well. We � nd that the opposite is true: Among
the 3,143 CEOs we analyzed, the average rank of
Chinese executives was 176 places lower than the
average rank of U.S. executives. Only three Chinese
companies’ CEOs made the top 100, though 17%
of all the executives studied were from China. The
Chinese leaders we asked about this discrepancy
theorized that as the country’s companies become
more innovation-focused, their performance will

improve.
Likewise, the average rank of Japanese CEOs was
562 places lower than that of their U.S. counterparts,
although this is not a big surprise, since Japan’s econ-
omy has struggled for many years. On the whole, U.S.
CEOs did not shine either, despite holding six of
the top 10 slots. Their average rank was 215 places
lower than Latin American CEOs’, 140 places lower
than Indian CEOs’, and 137 places lower than British
CEOs’. Continental European and U.S. CEOs ranked
about the same. U.S. CEOs have not been as competi-
tive on a global scale as one might think.
One bright spot is Brazil, whose CEOs make up
only 4.5% of the total sample but 9% of the top 100.
They include Roger Agnelli of Vale (#4) and Em-
braer’s Maurício Botelho (#11). Botelho took over
the state-owned company in 1995, when it was
reporting losses of around $300 million a year, and
over the next 12 years, built it into a world-class
competitor. (Interestingly, Brazil is also overrepre-
sented in the bottom 100, suggesting that compa-
nies from that country play a high-risk, high-reward
game.) Another standout is Mexico, whose aver-
age CEO ranked 108 places higher than the average
U.S. CEO.
The national and regional differences get even
more interesting as we turn to the question of why
some CEOs got better results than others.
1 TIM KOOGLE
COMPANY Yahoo
United States
INDUSTRY Information Technology

TENURE 1995–2001
COUNTRY-ADJUSTED TSR
TENURE 566% POST-TENURE 1,041%
INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED TSR
MARKET CAP CHANGE
TENURE +14B POST-TENURE +24B
2 V.S. JAIN
COMPANY Steel Authority of India
India
INDUSTRY Materials
TENURE 2002–2006
MARKET CAP CHANGE
3 PANGAL JAYENDRA NAYAK
COMPANY Axis Bank
India
INDUSTRY Financial Services
TENURE 2000–2009
TENURE 2,149% POST-TENURE 3,217%
MARKET CAP CHANGE
4 JOSÉ EDUARDO
DE BARROS DUTRA
COMPANY Petrobras
Brazil

INDUSTRY Energy
TENURE 2003–2005
TENURE 58% POST-TENURE 243%
MARKET CAP CHANGE
5 MÁRCIO ARTUR
LAURELLI CYPRIANO
COMPANY Bradesco
Brazil
INDUSTRY Financial Services
TENURE 1999–2009
MARKET CAP CHANGE
6 YUN JONG-YONG
COMPANY Samsung Electronics
South Korea
INDUSTRY Information Technology
TENURE 1996–2008
TENURE 1,559% POST-TENURE 471%
TENURE 1,437% POST-TENURE 380%
MARKET CAP CHANGE
7 DAVID THOMPSON
COMPANY Teck Cominco

Canada
INDUSTRY Materials
TENURE 2001–2005
MARKET CAP CHANGE
8 CHEE ONN LIM
COMPANY Keppel Corporation
Singapore
INDUSTRY Industrials
TENURE 2000–2008
MARKET CAP CHANGE
9 JOSÉ SIDNEI
COLOMBO MARTINI
COMPANY CTEEP
Brazil
INDUSTRY Utilities
TENURE 1999–2009
MARKET CAP CHANGE
10 SUBIR RAHA

COMPANY Oil & Natural Gas
India
INDUSTRY Energy
TENURE 2001–2006
MARKET CAP CHANGE
86 Harvard Business Review January–February 2013
6
Chung Mong-Koo
Company
Hyundai Motor Company
Industry
Automobile
tEnurE
1999–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)

+48
mBa
south korEa
2,024% 2,548%
ovErall rank
7
Y.C. Deveshwar
Company
ITC
Industry
Consumer Goods
tEnurE
1996–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+45
mBa
IndIa

3,308% 1,574%
ovErall rank
mBa
11
Maurício Novis
Botelho
Company
Embraer
Industry
Industrials
tEnurE
1995–2007
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+23
BrazIl
5,881% 2,895%
ovErall rank

12
William J. Doyle
Company
PotashCorp
Industry
Materials
tEnurE
1999–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+38
mBa
Canada
862% 1,343%
ovErall rank
16
Graham Mackay
Company

SABMiller
Industry
Consumer Goods
tEnurE
1997–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+70
mBa
unItEd kIngdom
758% 626%
ovErall rank
top 5
FEmalE
CEos
1
margarEt C.
WhItman
Company eBay
United States
Industry

tEnurE 1998–2008
Country Adjusted 1,434%
Industry Adjusted 1,368%
markEt CapItalIzatIon
ChangE +40B
2
dong mIngzhu
Company
Gree Electric Appliances
China
Industry
Consumer Goods
tEnurE 2001–
Country Adjusted 975%
ChangE +8B
3
Carol mEyroWItz
Company TJX
United States
Industry
Retail
tEnurE 2007–
Industry Adjusted 204%
ChangE +24B
4
zou lIhua

Company Xinhu Zhongbao
China
Industry
Financial Services
tEnurE 2006–2009
ChangE +7B
5
hElIanE CanEpa
Company Nobel Biocare
Switzerland
Industry
Health Care
tEnurE 2001–2007
ChangE +8B
13
ovErall rank
Mikhail Prokhorov
Company
Norilsk Nickel
Industry
Materials
tEnurE

2001–2007
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+48
mBa
russIa
657% 1,250%
*tIE
5
John C. Martin
Company
Gilead Sciences
Industry
Health Care
tEnurE
1996–
InsIdEr

($ bIllIons)
+51
mBa
unItEd statEs
2,552% 2,474%
ovErall rank
10
John T. Chambers
Company
Cisco Systems
Industry
tEnurE
1995–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)

+143
mBa
unItEd statEs
564% 873%
ovErall rank
9
Margaret C.
Whitman
Company
eBay
Industry
tEnurE
1998–2008
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+40
mBa
unItEd statEs

1,434% 1,368%
ovErall rank
8
David Simon
Company
Simon Property Group
Industry
Financial Services
tEnurE
1995–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+47
mBa
unItEd statEs
1,199% 1,410%
ovErall rank
13

Subir Raha
Company
Oil & Natural Gas
Industry
Energy
tEnurE
2001–2006
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+57
mBa
IndIa
729% 915%
ovErall rank
*tIE
15
José Antonio
Fernández
Company

FEMSA
Industry
Consumer Goods
tEnurE
1995–
InsIdEr
($ bIllIons)
+26
mBa
mExICo
2,788% 1,183%
ovErall rank
HBR.ORG
January–February 2013 Harvard Business Review 87
What Accounts for success?
Our 2010 article looked at several factors that might

be relevant to good performance (whether CEOs
were hired from inside the company, had an MBA,
and so on). We tracked those factors again, and our
global comparison revealed some insights into dif-
ferences across the world.
The insider-CEO story. Management thinkers
have long debated whether it is better to appoint an
insider as CEO or get someone from the outside to
run the company. But most studies have focused on
U.S. corporations.
In our full sample of 3,143 CEOs, 74% were insid-
ers. India had the lowest proportion (63%) and Japan
the highest (90%). Overall, insiders did better than
outsiders; the insiders’ average rank was 154 places
higher than the outsiders’. This is similar to what we
found in the 2010 global ranking. It didn’t hold true,
however, in major parts of the world. Insiders got
better results in the United States, the United King-
dom, and Latin America, but there was no difference
between insiders and outsiders in continental Eu-
rope, China, and India.
What about the idea that outsiders are prefer-
able when a company is in trouble? We find that
boards—especially in the United States and Europe—
do have a slightly greater tendency than normal to
hire outsiders when the company is underperform-
ing (measured as having an industry-adjusted total
shareholder return of -24% or worse for the two
years before the CEO started). But the results those
outsiders produced varied by region. In the United
States they didn’t get better performance from strug-
gling companies than insiders did. In Europe outsid-
ers did better; the average rank of those who took

over subpar performers was 370 places higher than
the average rank of their insider counterparts.
In Latin America, however, the picture was dif-
ferent: The average rank of insiders who had taken
the helm of poor performers was 750 places higher
than that of outsiders who had. Regional factors help
explain this disparity. A large number of Central and
South American firms are family controlled; another
large segment is government controlled. Business
families—and, in some cases, governments—exer-
cise a strong influence on long-term strategies and
investment decisions, which makes it more difficult
for a CEO who is new to a company to operate.
The upshot: In the United States, outsider CEOs
usually do not deliver the goods, whether the
company is underperforming or not. But this find-
ing can’t be generalized to other parts of the world.
Boards need to keep regional success factors firmly
in mind when selecting CEOs.
The curse of great prior performance. If you
want to create a lot of shareholder value, it pays to
take over a company that hasn’t been doing well—at
least if you’re in the United States, China, India, or
the United Kingdom. In those countries a poorly
performing predecessor is often followed by a high-
performing one. But there is no such effect in conti-
nental Europe, Japan, and Latin America.
The greater continuity in company performance
in Latin America is probably a reflection of the long-
term control exercised by business families, investor
syndicates, and governments, whose visions don’t

change even as CEOs come and go. In Latin America
those parties generally make the important bet-the-
company decisions and policies, while CEOs are
mainly responsible for execution.
An MBA degree. In the wake of the financial
crisis, MBAs were accused of being value destroy-
ers. We supplied the debate with some contrary data
in 2010, showing that the average MBA ranked 40
places higher in the study sample than the average
non-MBA. We saw similar results in this year’s list.
In this case, we did not discover that CEOs of cer-
tain nationalities benefited more from an MBA than
others.
Industry. In general, industry differences count
for very little in our analysis, explaining only about
5% of the variation in CEO performance. That said,
the high-tech industry is overrepresented in the top
10, with five CEOs, including Amazon.com’s. CEOs
from the energy industry, who make up only 5% of
the group studied, are overrepresented in the top
100, where they occupy 15% of the slots.
doing Well and doing good
Many management thinkers argue that it is no longer
enough to do well financially; companies also need
to improve the well-being of (or at least not harm)
the communities in which they operate, the environ-
ment, and their employees. (See, for example, “Cre-
ating Shared Value,” by Michael E. Porter and Mark R.
Kramer, HBR January–February 2011.) That’s the
good news. The bad news is that stellar performance
on both dimensions is no common or easy feat.
This year we examined the correlation between

the financial performance of leaders on our list and
their social and environmental performance as mea-
sured by MSCI, a highly reputable firm that rates
Top 5
Ceos
IndIa
1
Y.C. deVesHWaR
CompanY ITC
IndusTRY Consumer Goods
TenuRe 1996–
ToTal sHaReHoldeR ReTuRn
maRkeT CapITalIzaTIon
CHange +45B
2
suBIR RaHa
CompanY Oil & Natural Gas
IndusTRY Energy
TenuRe 2001–2006
CHange +57B
3
mukesH dHIRuBHaI
amBanI
CompanY
Reliance Industries
IndusTRY Energy
TenuRe 2002–

CHange +41B
4
a.m. naIk
CompanY
Larsen & Toubro
IndusTRY Industrials
TenuRe 1999–2012
CHange +16B
5
a.k. puRI
CompanY
Bharat Heavy Electricals
IndusTRY Industrials
TenuRe 2004–2008
CHange +30B
23

Paolo Rocca
Company
Tenaris
Industry
Energy
tEnurE
2002–
InsIdEr
($ billions)
+26
mBa
argEntIna
816% 1,138%
ovErall rank
24
Renato Alves Vale
Company
CCR
Industry
industrials

tEnurE
1999–
InsIdErmBa
BrazIl
1,933% 2,658%
ovErall rank
21
lew Frankfort
Company
Coach
Industry
Consumer Goods
tEnurE
1995–
InsIdErmBa
unItEd statEs
2,260% 2,073%
ovErall rank
19
Mark G. Papa

Company
EoG Resources
Industry
Energy
tEnurE
1998–
InsIdErmBa
unItEd statEs
1,428% 1,201%
ovErall rank
CounTRy AdjusTEd indusTRy AdjusTEd
ovErall rank
22
Hugh Grant
Company
Monsanto
Industry
Materials
tEnurE

2003–
InsIdEr
($ billions)
+45
mBa
unItEd statEs
781% 632%
ovErall rank
17
li jiaxiang
Company
Air China
Industry
Transportation

tEnurE
2004–2008
InsIdErmBa
ChIna
731% 1,022%
ovErall rank
($ billions)
+37
18
daniel Hajj
Aboumrad
Company
América Móvil
Industry
Telecommunication
tEnurE
2000–
InsIdErmBa
mExICo

506% 684%
ovErall rank
($ billions)
+87
20
lars Rebien
sØrensen
Company
novo nordisk
Industry
Health Care
tEnurE
2000–
InsIdErmBa
dEnmark
470% 804%
ovErall rank

($ billions)
+64
($ billions)
+20
($ billions)
+25
25
Paul Chisholm
Company
ColT Telecom Group
Industry
Telecommunication
tEnurE
1996–2001
InsIdErmBa
unItEd kIngdom
1,905% 1,761%
ovErall rank

($ billions)
+20
26
david E.i. Pyott
Company
Allergan
Industry
Health Care
tEnurE
1998–
InsIdErmBa
unItEd statEs
949% 956%
ovErall rank
*tIE
($ billions)

+25
26
djalma bastos
de Morais
Company
Companhia Energética
de Minas Gerais (CEMiG)
Industry
utilities
tEnurE
1999–
InsIdErmBa
BrazIl
939% 1,649%
ovErall rank
*tIE
($ billions)
+22
ovErall rank

28
Mukesh dhirubhai
Ambani
Company
Reliance industries
Industry
Energy
tEnurE
2002–
InsIdErmBa
IndIa
565% 745%
($ billions)
+41
($ billions)
+19
HbR.oRG
January–February 2013 Harvard business Review 89
top 5

CEos
EuropE
1
graham maCkay
Company SABMiller
United Kingdom
Industry Consumer Goods
tEnurE 1997–
ChangE +70B
2
lars rEBIEn
sØrEnsEn
Company Novo Nordisk
Denmark
Industry Health Care
tEnurE 2000–
ChangE +64B
3
paul ChIsholm
Company
COLT Telecom Group
United Kingdom
Industry Telecommunication
tEnurE 1996–2001

ChangE +20B
4
garEth davIs
Company Imperial Tobacco
United Kingdom
tEnurE 1996–2010
ChangE +27B
5
mIkaEl lIlIus
Company Fortum
Finland
Industry Utilities
tEnurE 2000–2009
ChangE +22B
ADIDAS
HERBERT HAINER
INDITEX
PABLO ISLA ÁLVAREZ

DE TEJERA
HERMÈS
PATRICK THOMAS
EATON
ALEXANDER
CUTLER
2010 RANKING
DANONE
FRANCK RIBOUD
NATURA
ALESSANDRO
CARLUCCI
major companies. Despite all the rhetoric, we discov-
ered that the correlation between the two sets of data
is, well, zero. You can see this clearly in the exhibit
“Does Doing Good Help CEOs Do Well?” Companies
are scattered all over this chart. Though many articles
suggest that responsible corporate behavior—say, in
sustainability—will automatically improve your bot-
tom line, clearly it’s not as simple as that. Some com-
panies probably aren’t managing with such issues in
mind. Some may not have attractive social or envi-
ronmental strategies; some may have misalignment
between those strategies and the overall corporate
strategy; and some may have incomplete measures
of social or environmental practices.

But the chart did reveal outliers. Five percent of
the CEOs for which we had su� cient data fell into
the box at the top right; they delivered great � nancial
performance year over year and performed strongly
on social and environmental dimensions. It is a rare
achievement, indeed, but it is possible.
These trendsetting CEOs are the new role models
for leaders pursuing the paradigm of creating shared
value. One example: Franck Riboud of Danone, a
French multinational with $27 billion in annual sales.
Danone’s excellent financial performance earned
Does Doing Good Help CEOs Do Well?
SOURCE BEST-PERFORMING CEOS SCORECARD DATA,
2013; MSCI ESG INTANGIBLE VALUE ASSESSMENTS,
2006–2010
This chart maps the long-term fi nancial performance of some
1,100 CEOs against their companies’ social and environmental
performance for their last two years in offi ce. As the rela-
tively even scattering of points across the chart shows, there
is no overall correlation between fi nancial results and social
responsibility. However, the chart does reveal numerous role
models, who excelled in both areas.
WORST BESTSHAREHOLDER PERFORMANCE RANK
W
O
R
ST

B
ES
TIDEALISTSIDEALISTS
LAGGARDSLAGGARDSLAGGARDS
EXPLOITERSEXPLOITERSEXPLOITERS
TRENDSETTERSTRENDSETTERSTRENDSETTERS
SO
C
IA
L
&
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
EN
TA
L
P
ER

FO
R
M
A
N
C
E
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
CEOS ON THE RISE
Four CEOs whose fi rms received high ratings for
social responsibility moved into the top 15% of
fi nancial performers in the 2013 study, joining role
models from Natura and Danone.
DETAIL
him a spot in the top 10% of this year’s sample (a
truly amazing achievement for a consumer goods
company); at the same time, the company received
extremely high ratings from MSCI. Another outlier
is Natura’s Alessandro Carlucci (who made the top
6% for � nancial performance), a leader among CEOs
who believe that alleviating poverty and inequality
and protecting the environment are intimately tied
to their business agendas. Carlucci and Riboud have
both confronted the key social or environmental is-
sue in their industry (in Danone’s case, obesity and
unhealthful food consumption; in Natura’s, defores-
tation and poverty) and redirected their company’s
strategy to tackle it.
We also looked at CEOs whose companies had

high social and environmental performance in 2010
but whose � nancial performance kept them out of
the top 15% of the group studied that year. Since do-
ing both well and good can be a long-term strategy,
we wanted to see whether any of those CEOs had
then moved into the top 15% of the current � nancial
ranking. We found four: the leaders of Adidas, Indi-
tex, Hermès International, and Eaton.
At Adidas, CEO Herbert Hainer oversaw the im-
plementation of a triple-bottom-line philosophy, a
2013 RANKING
Top 5
Ceos
China
1
Li Jiaxiang
Company Air China
indusTry Transportation
Tenure 2004–2008
ToTaL sharehoLder reTurn
markeT CapiTaLizaTion
Change +37B
2
Wang dongming
Company Citic Securities
indusTry Financial Services

Tenure 2002–
Change +12B
3
dong mingzhu
Company
indusTry Consumer Goods
Tenure 2001–
Change +8B
4
Li Jianhong
Company
China International
Marine Containers
indusTry Industrials
Tenure 1995–2007
Change +5B
5
Che shuChun
Company
Shanxi Xishan Coal and

Electricity Power
indusTry Energy
Tenure 2007–2010
Change +9B
29
Manoel Arlindo
Zaroni Torres
Company
Tractebel Energia
indusTry
Utilities
Tenure
1999–
insidermBa
BraziL
3,171% 2,585%
overaLL rank
CoUnTry AdjUsTEd IndUsTry AdjUsTEd
30
Mark donegan

Company
Precision Castparts
indusTry
Industrials
Tenure
2002–
insidermBa
uniTed sTaTes
1,237% 1,190%
overaLL rank
31
William E. Greehey
Company
Valero Energy
indusTry
Energy
Tenure
1997–2005
insidermBa

uniTed sTaTes
721% 629%
overaLL rank
32
A.M. naik
Company
Larsen & Toubro
indusTry
Industrials
Tenure
1999–2012
insidermBa
india
3,154% 2,728%
overaLL rank
34
Mikael Lilius

Company
Fortum
indusTry
Utilities
Tenure
2000–2009
insidermBa
FinLand
768% 1,014%
overaLL rank
37
david C. novak
Company
yum Brands
indusTry
Consumer Goods
Tenure
2000–
insidermBa

uniTed sTaTes
658% 567%
overaLL rank
38
A.K. Puri
Company
Bharat Heavy Electricals
indusTry
Industrials
Tenure
2004–2008
insidermBa
india
471% 664%
overaLL rank
39
Fu Chengyu

Company
CnooC
indusTry
Energy
Tenure
2003–2011
insidermBa
hong kong
448% 395%
overaLL rank
40
john rowe
Company
Aetna
indusTry
Health Care
Tenure
2000–2006
insidermBa

uniTed sTaTes
679% 566%
overaLL rank
markeT CapiTaLizaTion Change
($ BILLIons)
+18
($ BILLIons)
+21
($ BILLIons)
+36
($ BILLIons)
+16
33
Gareth davis
Company
Imperial Tobacco
indusTry
Consumer Goods

Tenure
1996–2010
insidermBa
uniTed kingdom
977% 579%
overaLL rank
($ BILLIons)
+27
($ BILLIons)
+22
35
Eric E. schmidt
Company
Google
indusTry
Tenure
2001–2011

insidermBa
uniTed sTaTes
448% 401%
overaLL rank
($ BILLIons)
+143
36
Masahiro sakane
Company
Komatsu
indusTry
Industrials
Tenure
2003–2007
insidermBa
Japan
652% 493%
overaLL rank

($ BILLIons)
+40
($ BILLIons)
+31
($ BILLIons)
+30
($ BILLIons)
+83
($ BILLIons)
+27
HBr.orG
January–February 2013 Harvard Business review 91
massive push to slash the company’s carbon foot-
print, and the increased use of recycled polyester as

well as sustainably farmed cotton in products. One
of Adidas’s latest sustainable innovations is DryDye
technology, which removes the need for water in
the dyeing process. At Eaton, Alexander Cutler has
embedded sustainability into the company’s culture
and practices. The diversi� ed power management
company develops innovative products and pro-
cesses, such as hybrid electric and hydraulic power
trains and electric power control systems, that help
customers and consumers conserve resources and
reduce their carbon footprint.
This new breed of leaders not only rejects the
idea that � nancial market demands are more impor-
tant than stakeholders’ needs but also demonstrates
that companies can excel at meeting both. These
CEOs have shown the way, and others can learn
from them.
We don’t foresee a time in the near future when
measures of social performance will be as objective
as the measure of long-term � nancial performance
we’ve developed. That said, we will continue to
track how CEOs are doing in the two areas, with the
aim of encouraging leaders to shine in both.
EVERYONE IN the business world seems to agree that
executives should be less obsessed with quarterly
earnings and more focused on the long term—every-
one, that is, except the decision makers who hire and
� re executives and the people who buy and sell com-
pany stock. The short-term emphasis won’t change
until a new paradigm for evaluating performance
emerges. Talk alone won’t bring about that change;
we also need a whole new method of evaluating
CEOs. Here, we’re proposing two key improvements:

a robust, objective measure of leaders’ performance
over their full terms in o� ce, benchmarking all chief
executives of major global companies; and an assess-
ment of the correlation between a � rm’s � nancial re-
sults and its environmental and social practices. We
hope that boards of directors, pension funds, hedge
funds, and other shareholder activists will use these
measures to better evaluate CEOs and to guide the
selection of tomorrow’s leaders.
HBR Reprint R1301F
Metrics. We pulled fi nancial data
from Datastream and Worldscope
and calculated daily company
returns for the entire length of each
CEO’s tenure (or until August 31,
2012, if the CEO was still in of-
fi ce). We calculated three sets of
numbers:
Country-adjusted company
returns. We computed a company’s
total shareholder return (including
dividends reinvested) for the CEO’s
tenure. We then computed the aver-
age return for other fi rms from the
same country over the same period
and subtracted that fi gure from the
company’s return. This measure
thus excludes any increase in stock
return that is merely attributable to
an improvement in the general stock
market of a country.
Industry-adjusted company

returns. We also deducted the
average return for the industry, to
exclude any increases that were
the result of rising fortunes for the
overall industry.
Market capitalization change.
We measured the change in the
company’s equity market capitaliza-
tion over the CEO’s tenure. We ad-
justed this fi gure for infl ation in each
country and translated values into
U.S. dollars, using 2011 exchange
rates. We added to this number
the infl ation-adjusted value of the
dividends and shares repurchased,
and subtracted the adjusted value of
shares issued.
We then ranked all CEOs for
each metric—from 1 (best) to 3,143
(worst)—and calculated the average
of the three rankings for every CEO
to create the fi nal overall ranking.
Using three metrics is a balanced
and robust approach: While the fi rst
two metrics risk being skewed to-
ward smaller companies (it’s easier
to get large returns if you start from
a small base), the third is skewed
toward larger companies.
Analysis. We performed regres-
sion analysis on the data set of 3,143
CEOs. This allowed us to “control”

for some factors and isolate the ef-
fect that one factor (such as having
an MBA) had on a CEO’s standing in
the ranking. Signifi cant eff ects are
reported in this article.
How We Created the Scorecard
We selected the CEOs we tracked from the following indexes:
• S&P Global 1200, 1997–2010
• S&P CNX 500, 1998–2010 (for India)
• Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 1998–2010
• MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index and
AméricaEconomía 500, 2002–2010
• S&P BRIC 40, 1997–2010
To make sure we had reliable and suffi cient data, we
excluded CEOs who had assumed their role before 1995 or
after August 31, 2010. (For example, Tim Cook of Apple is
not eligible because he became CEO in 2011.) And we in-
cluded only those whose tenure lasted more than two years.
All told, we ended up with 3,143 CEOs from 1,862 companies,
of whom 1,007 were still in offi ce on the date we stopped
measuring performance. The entire group represented 64
nationalities and came from companies based in 37 countries.
Nana von Bernuth, project manager,
led the eff ort to create and analyze the
ranking.
Morten T. Hansen is a management professor at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Information,
and at Insead, in Fontainebleau, France. Herminia Ibarra is
the Cora Chaired Professor of Leadership and Learning and
a professor of organizational behavior at Insead. Urs Peyer
is an associate professor of fi nance at Insead.

Top 5
Ceos
LaTin
ameriCa
45
Oscar González
Rocha
Company
Southern Copper
indusTry
Materials
Tenure
2004–
insider
($ billions)
+39
mBa
mexiCo
411% 530%

overaLL rank
1
roger agneLLi
Company Vale
Brazil
indusTry Materials
Tenure 2001–2011
Change +157B
2
maurÍCio novis
BoTeLho
Company Embraer
Brazil
indusTry Industrials
Tenure 1995–2007
Change +23B
3
JosÉ anTonio
FernÁndez
Company FEMSA
Mexico
indusTry Consumer Goods
Tenure 1995–

Change +26B
4
danieL haJJ
aBoumrad
Company América Móvil
Mexico
indusTry Telecommunication
Tenure 2000–
Change +87B
o
5
paoLo roCCa
Company Tenaris
Argentina
indusTry Energy
Tenure 2002–
Change +26B
816 1,138 26
26278.10368
For more
on The Ceos
go To

hBr.org
46
Bart Becht
Company
Reckitt Benckiser
indusTry
Consumer Goods
Tenure
1999–2011
insider
($ billions)
+44
mBa
uniTed kingdom
467% 420%
overaLL rank
41
John W. Thompson
Company
Symantec

indusTry
Tenure
1999–2009
insider
($ billions)
+21
mBa
uniTed sTaTes
838% 851%
overaLL rank
COunTRy AdJuSTed InduSTRy AdJuSTed
42
Pietro Franco Tali
Company
Saipem
indusTry
energy
Tenure

2000–
insider
($ billions)
+21
mBa
iTaLy
706% 924%
overaLL rank
43
Company
express Scripts
indusTry
Health Care
Tenure
2005–
insider
($ billions)

+48
mBa
uniTed sTaTes
448% 442%
overaLL rank
George Paz
44
Robert L. Tillman
Tenure
1996–2005
insidermBa
uniTed sTaTes
overaLL rank
Company
Lowe’s
indusTry
Retail
($ billions)

+44
459% 456%
47
david B. Snow Jr.
Company
Medco Health
Solution
s
indusTry
Health Care
Tenure
2003–2012
insider

($ billions)
+33
mBa
uniTed sTaTes
515% 455%
overaLL rank
48
James d. Taiclet Jr.
Company
American Tower
indusTry

Telecommunication
Tenure
2003–
insider
($ billions)
+29
mBa
uniTed sTaTes
554% 485%
overaLL rank
49

Tomeo Kanbayashi
Company
nTT data
indusTry
Tenure
1995–1999
insider
($ billions)
+30
mBa
Japan
658% 406%
overaLL rank

50
Shafagat Fakhrazo-
vich Takhautdinov
Company
Tatneft
indusTry
energy
Tenure
1999–
insider
($ billions)
+14
mBa

russia
983% 1,285%
overaLL rank
HBR.ORG
51
Tim SolSo
Company Cummins
United States
induSTry Industrials
Tenure 2000–2011
mBa Yes

inSider Yes
ToTal Shareholder reTurn
markeT CapiTalizaTion
Change +16B
52
paBlo iSla
Álvarez de Tejera
Company Inditex
Spain
induSTry Retail
Tenure 2005–
mBa No
inSider No
Change +61B
53
mark C. pigoTT
Company PACCAR

United States
Tenure 1997–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +17B
54
Frank Chapman
Company BG Group
United Kingdom
induSTry Energy
Tenure 2000–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +58B

55
marShall o. larSen
Company Goodrich
United States
Tenure 2003–2012
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +15B
56
philip g. Cox
Company International Power
United Kingdom
induSTry Utilities
Tenure 2003–
mBa No
inSider Yes

Change +33B
57
john C.S. lau
Company Husky Energy
Canada
induSTry Energy
Tenure 2000–2010
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +23B
58
STanley Fink
Company Man Group
United Kingdom
induSTry Financial Services
Tenure 2000–2007
mBa No
inSider Yes

Change +17B
59
a.j. SCheepBouwer
Company Royal KPN
Netherlands
induSTry Telecommunication
Tenure 2001–2011
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +40B
60
ChriSTopher m.
Connor
Company Sherwin-Williams
United States

induSTry Retail
Tenure 1999–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +16B
61
Benjamin
STeinBruCh
Company CSN
Brazil
induSTry Materials
Tenure 2002–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +14B

62
william a. oSBorn
Company Northern Trust
United States
Tenure 1995–2008
mBa Yes
inSider Yes
Change +19B
63
miguel gomeS
pereira SarmienTo
guTierrez
Company Lojas Americanas
Brazil
induSTry Retail
Tenure 2001–
mBa Yes
inSider Yes

Change +9B
64
kong Qingping
Company China Overseas
Land and Investment
Hong Kong
Tenure 2001–2007
mBa Yes
inSider Yes
Change +11B
65 *Tie
Sunil BharTi miTTal
Company Bharti Airtel
India
induSTry Telecommunication

Tenure 1995–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +16B
65 *Tie
peTer marrone
Company Yamana Gold
Canada
induSTry Materials
Tenure 2003–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +12B
67
ronald l.

havner jr.
Company Public Storage
United States
induSTry Other
Tenure 2002–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +24B
68 *Tie
Sidney Toledano
Company Christian Dior
France
induSTry Consumer Goods
Tenure 1998–
mBa No
inSider Yes

Change +31B
68 *Tie
paTriCk darold
daniel
Company Enbridge
Canada
induSTry Energy
Tenure 2001–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +24B
70
71
r. david yoST
Company AmerisourceBergen
United States
induSTry Health Care
Tenure 1997–2011

mBa Yes
inSider Yes
Change +16B
72
paTriCk ThomaS
Company
Hermès International
France
Tenure 2003–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +28B
73
manFred wennemer

Company Continental
Germany
induSTry Automobile
Tenure 2001–2008
mBa Yes
inSider Yes
Change +14B
74
C. john wilder
Company TXU
United States
induSTry Utilities
Tenure 2004–2007
mBa Yes
inSider No
Change +33B

75
pedro
wongTSChowSki
Company Ultrapar
Brazil
induSTry Energy
Tenure 2007–
mBa No
inSider Yes
Change +19B
joÃo mauriCio
giFFoni de CaSTro
neveS
Company Ambev
Brazil
Tenure 2009–
mBa Yes
inSider Yes

Change +99B
76
Kenneth W.
Freeman
Company Quest Diagnostics
United States
tenure 1996–2004
mBa Yes
InsIder Yes
total shareholder return
marKet CapItalIzatIon
Change +11B

77
thomas p. maC
mahon
Company Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings
United States
tenure 1997–2006
mBa Yes
InsIder No
Change +11B
78
phIlIp K.r. pasCall
Company
First Quantum Minerals
Canada
Industry Materials
tenure 1996–
mBa Yes
InsIder No

Change +9B
79
terry leahy
Company Tesco
United Kingdom
Industry Retail
tenure 1997–2011
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +49B
80
BlaKe W.
nordstrom
Company Nordstrom
United States

Industry Retail
tenure 2000–
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +14B
81 *tIe
tIm Koogle
Company Yahoo
United States
Industry
tenure 1995–2001
mBa No
InsIder N0
Change +14B

81 *tIe
roy gardner
Company Centrica
United Kingdom
Industry Utilities
tenure 1997–2006
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +20B
83 *tIe
Wang dongmIng
Company Citic Securities
China
Industry Financial Services
tenure 2002–
mBa No
InsIder Yes

Change +12B
83 *tIe
mIng-KaI tsaI
Company MediaTek
Taiwan
Industry Information
Technology
tenure 1997–
mBa No
InsIder No
Change +15B
85
marCelo aWad
Company Antofagasta
Chile
Industry Materials
tenure 2004–2012
mBa No

InsIder Yes
Change +19B
96
paul Walsh
Company Diageo
United Kingdom
tenure 2000–
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +61B
97
John mCadam
Company
Imperial Chemical Industries

United Kingdom
Industry Materials
tenure 2003–2008
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +13B
98
dong mIngzhu
Company
China
tenure 2001–
mBa Yes
InsIder Yes
Change +8B

99
Jon FredrIK
BaKsaas
Company Telenor
Norway
tenure 2002–
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +27B
100
noBuo Katsumata
Company Marubeni
Japan
Industry Industrials
tenure 2003–2008
mBa No
InsIder Yes

Change +14B
91
merrIll a.
mIller Jr.
Company
National Oilwell Varco
United States
Industry Energy
tenure 2001–
mBa Yes
InsIder Yes
Change +30B
92 *tIe
ronald alVIn
Brenneman
Company Petro-Canada

Canada
Industry Energy
tenure 2000–2009
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +21B
92 *tIe
phIlIppe VarIn
Company Corus
United Kingdom
Industry Materials
tenure 2003–2009
mBa No
InsIder No
Change +10B

94
harry roels
Company RWE
Germany
Industry Utilities
tenure 2003–2007
mBa No
InsIder No
Change +62B
95
gÉrard mestrallet
Company Suez
France
Industry Utilities
tenure 1995–2008
mBa No
InsIder Yes

Change +70B
86
Wang JIanzhou
Company China Mobile
Hong Kong
tenure 2004–2010
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +189B
87
naVeen JIndal
Company Jindal Steel & Power
India
Industry Materials
tenure 1998–
mBa Yes
InsIder Yes

Change +7B
88
grant alFred KIng
Company Origin Energy
Australia
Industry Energy
tenure 2000–
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +8B
89
V.s. JaIn
Company
Steel Authority of India
India

Industry Materials
tenure 2002–2006
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +10B
90
mattheW K. rose
Company
Burlington Northern Santa Fe
United States
Industry Industrials
tenure 2000–
mBa No
InsIder Yes
Change +31B

HBR.ORG
Harvard Business Review Notice of Use Restrictions, May 2009
Harvard Business Review and Harvard Business Publishing
Newsletter content on EBSCOhost is licensed for
the private individual use of authorized EBSCOhost users. It is
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