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Uk combat load
1. Seize the initiative.
DCC Load carriage – Project Payne
CEFO - Combat Equipment Fighting Order (the sort of equipment you would carry on patrol)
IBS - Infantry Battle School
HFT - Hybrid Formation Training - the equivalent of Decisive Action Training as opposed to MST.
ACMT - Annual Combat Marksmanship Test.
CEMO - Combat Equipment Marching Order
PSBC - Platoon Sergeants Battle Course.
TES - Tactical Engagement Simulation - i-MILES equivalent.
ASM - Anti Structure Munition.
FIST - Future Infantry Soldier Technology (PNVGs etc)
TAM - Tactical Aide Memoire (low level commander's handbook)
DCC - Dismounted Close Combat
PLCE - Personal Load Carrying Equipment (webbing)
CTLS: Commander's Target Locating Equipment - A laser range finder with digital magnetic compass and a night II capability
as well as day optic.
3. Seize the initiative.
“The fighting value of a soldier is in inverse
proportion to the load he carries”
Cathcart et al., (1922). “On the maximum load
to be carried by the soldier” Army Hygiene
Advisory Committee Report No. 3, 435-443.
4. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
• 58 Kg average CEFO load.
• Accepted max = 40 Kg
• Accepted ideal = 25 Kg
• The average soldier
weighs 71 Kg
5. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
• 58 Kg average CEFO load.
• Accepted max = 40 Kg
• Accepted ideal = 25 Kg
• The average soldier
weighs 71 Kg
The British Army Mule
Pamphlet 1928 states a mule
must not carry more than
25% of its body weight.
6. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
• 58 Kg average CEFO load.
• Accepted max = 40 Kg
• Accepted ideal = 25 Kg
• The average soldier
weighs 71 Kg
The British Army Mule
Pamphlet 1928 states a mule
must not carry more than
25% of its body weight.
Currently the average
Infantry soldier carries 82%
of his body weight in CEFO.
7. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
The Return to Contingency – HERRICK load in
HFT.
Impacts
Cognitive
Marksmanship
Exposure
CEMO?
10. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
Background:
3 Pl deployed to a Tac Base for no more than
24 hrs – CEFO only.
Conducted a dawn strike op on a building –
sustained 1 x stretcher and 1 x walking
wounded.
Casevac on foot by road to the PB 2 Km away.
12. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Weapons:
GPMG/LMG +
200 Rnds
Rifle + 6 Mags
60mm + 6 rnds
9 Kg 9 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg
GPMG
17 Kg
9 Kg
9 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
12 Kg 12 Kg
13 Kg 13 Kg
18
GPMG
17 Kg
9 Kg
9 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
12 Kg 12 Kg
13 Kg 13 Kg
GPMG
17 Kg
9 Kg
9 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
12 Kg 12 Kg
13 Kg 13 Kg
13. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Additional Ammo:
6 x 40mm
600 x Link
Reserve
1 Grenade per man
10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg
9
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
4
8 18
9
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
14. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
ASM
10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg
8 18
9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
10
4
9 9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
10
4
9 9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
4
10
4
9
15. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Comms:
PRC 355
PRC 354
10 Kg 10 Kg 23 Kg 9 Kg
11 183 6
9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9 9
4
GPMG
18 Kg
10 Kg
10 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
18 Kg 18 Kg
14 Kg 14 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
16. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
PPE:
Mk 7
Osprey + ECBA
Plates
17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg
11 18
9
4
3 6
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
17. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Talon
17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg
11 183 6
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
8
8
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
8
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
17
9
7
10
7
9
8
18. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Sustainability:
12 hrs rations
2 Litres water
17Kg 17 Kg 30 Kg 16 Kg
14 21
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
20
12
10
13
10
6 9
12
11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
20
12
10
13
10
12
11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
17 Kg
17 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
25 Kg 25 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
20
12
10
13
10
12
11
19. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
FIST/Comd Kit:
NVG
LLM
CWS/Maxi/FTS
TAM etc
18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg
17 239 11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
20. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
No:
Webbing
Clothing
Torches etc
Ladders/Thumpers
18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg
17 239 11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
21. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Casualties:
1 x Stretcher Case
1 x Walking
Wounded
18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg
17 239 11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
X
X
22. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Casualties:
1 x Stretcher Case
1 x Walking
Wounded
18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg
17 239 11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
X
X
78 Kg 8 Kg
23. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Casualties:
1 x Stretcher Case
1 x Walking
Wounded
18Kg 18 Kg 31 Kg 17 Kg
17 239 11
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
00
14
14
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
14
14
15
14
14
13
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
24. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Casualties:
1 x Stretcher Case
1 x Walking
Wounded
18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
14
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
27
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
25. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Men with no
additional kit
18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
27
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
26. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Men with full kit
and carrying
stretcher 18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
27
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
27. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Man with 2 x ASM
18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
27
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
28. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
Man with 2 x
Daysacs + Talon
18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
27
X
X
103 Kg 97 Kg
29. Seize the initiative.
The Current Situation
60
mm
Sig
18Kg 18 Kg 9 Kg 17 Kg
17 449 32
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
8 Kg
18 Kg
18 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
00
00
14
00
14
00
4
9
4
GPMG
25 Kg
18 Kg
26 Kg
UGL UGL
LMG LMG
26 Kg 26 Kg
21 Kg 21 Kg
21
28
28
30
14
28
13
103 Kg 97 Kg
• One man giving protection – GPMG
Gunner 3 Sec
• No change on the stretcher
• Three men with hands on weapons – Pl
Comd, Sgt and GPMG Gunner
33. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
The Battle of Long Tan – Vietnam, 18 Aug 1966
D Coy 6 RAR contacted a Reinforced Regiment of
VC and NVA.
In contact for 5 hours
Ammunition scaling for a rifleman was 3 x 20 rnd
magazines
Ammo resupply was not requested until 80
minutes after contact
The resupply took more than an hour
Despite fighting for over 2 and a half hours before
resupply ammunition did not run out
34. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
Weapons suppress or kill
Suppression:
Volume
Accuracy
KE
Types of weapon:
Area suppression
Point suppression
Assault
42. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
Belt fed weapons present a higher ammunition
burden
Belt fed weapons are heavier
Belt fed weapons are not assault weapons
44. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
Current Section Mix:
1 x GPMG – Long range area suppression; not
assault
2 x LMG – Short range area suppression; not
assault
2 x UGL – Short range area suppression and
assault
3 x Rifle - Assault
45. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
Current Section Mix:
1 x GPMG – Long range area suppression; not
assault
2 x LMG – Short range area suppression; not
assault
2 x UGL – Short range area suppression and
assault
3 x Rifle - Assault
OPTIMISED TO SUPPRESS – NOT ASSAULT
46. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
“Determined from experience, a unit of fire was
the amount of ammunition that would last, on
average, for one day of heavy fighting. A unit
of fire for the M1 rifle was 100 rounds; for the
light machine gun 1,500 rounds...”
Eugene Sledge: “With the Old Breed: At Peleliu
and Okinawa.”
47. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
“Determined from experience, a unit of fire was
the amount of ammunition that would last, on
average, for one day of heavy fighting. A unit
of fire for the M1 rifle was 100 rounds; for the
light machine gun 1,500 rounds…”
USMC Rifle Coy structure 1943/44:
3 x Rifle Pls (M1 and carbine)
Weapons Pl (3 x 0.3 MG and 3 x 60mm mor)
49. Seize the initiative.
Lethality
USMC – Pacific WW2
36 x Rfn = 3,600 Ball
1 x 0.3 MG = 1,500 link
British Army – HERRICK
15 x Rfn = 3,600
6 x LMG = 6,000 link
3 x GPMG = 3,000 link
50. Seize the initiative.
Lethality – The Solution
Return to core weapons mix
Teach the principles of suppression
Teach appropriate weapons to task
64. Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage – A lesson from history
Scalable equipment
Robust/reliable
CSS
Lean packing
Appropriate
weapon mix
65. Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage
“There seem to be two persistent notions that lead
commanders to overload their soldiers (General Burba,
Chief of [US] Infantry, 1986):
• “Be Prepared” – Some commanders feel their soldiers
must be prepared to meet every imaginable
contingency.
• “The Supply System Will Fail” – Other commanders
conclude in advance of an operation that the supply
system will fail.
66. Seize the initiative.
RESTRICTED DRAFT
1
.
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4s
4l
5
1
Kit on the man, immediate use
ammo/trauma kit in pockets.
1
No Protection.
2
3x Mags in pouches and trauma
kit. Smoke/HE gren as req.
2
Helmet Only.
3
‘Go Bag’ / Man Bag packed with
additional water / Mags / Signals.
Additional rations med kit as req. 3
Helmet + OSPREY liner worn.
4
Webbing worn with 24hours
fighting order. Daysack as
alternative to increase
manoeuvrability.
4s
/
4l
Helmet + OSPREY liner + Small Plates
(s) OR large plate (l)
Mobilitylevels
5
Webbing & Daysack worn for
longer patrols. Bergen as
required.
Protectionlevels
5
Helmet + OSPREY liner + Small plate
side.
Planning Factors. General Principles IBS OSPREY configuration.
Loose items must not be stowed on
front of armour.
Cumberbund fitted
Minimum configuration is med kit and
three single kangaroo mag pouches.
• Type of Op.
• Protection levels required.
• Profile in COIN environment.
• Likelihood of digging.
• Terrain factors dictating type of emergency kit
required.
• Likely obstacles encountered.
• Likely duration of task / likelihood of retasking.
• Heat Stress Index leading to overburdening.
• Weather conditions leading to additional PPE
requirements.
1. Commander’s discretion
on the requirements for the
mission are final.
2. Load scales must be
influenced by the task rather
than personal preference.
3. Load carriage should vary
for different members of the
pl.
4. Maximise Survivability.
5. Use imagination to lighten
loads.
Profile should be minimised for max
mobility and min weight configuration.
D R O P
Decide Mobility level to
accomplish mission
Reduce unnecessary
eqmt
Organize transport means to
carry unit eqmt
Police the ranks.
Sentry Duty
Defence
Attack
Ptl route
out / in
Withdrawal
Ambush
Standing
Patrols
Harbour Routine
Adv to Con
House
Clearing
Heli / Boat
Ops
Insertion March
General
OBUA
PROTECTION
Op routine
Recce CTR
MOBILITY and PROTECTION must be
balanced to achieve optimum
SURVIVABILITY
M O B I L I T Y
D
Decide Mobility level to
accomplish mission
R
Reduce unnecessary
equipment
O
Organize means to
carry Pl/Sect equipment
P Police the ranks.
COMMANDERS!
It is your responsibility to tailor
the load of your troops.
Use the ‘DROP’ drill to maximise effectiveness.
Kit is being redesigned to
lighten the load and work
is underway to encourage
risk management to be
devolved to the junior
commander.
The threshold target
weight a soldier should
operate with is 25kg. Any
soldier, regardless of
fitness or robustness, will
see a marked drop in
performance when
carrying 40kg or more.
67. Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage
Modular:
Decided before
deployment –
tailored to
mission/task
Scalable:
Can be altered
during the
mission/task
68. Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage
Scalable Approach:
Irreducible minimum on body
Immediate sustainability
Longer term sustainability
Current issue:
Only ability to scale is with daysac
PLCE is fixed by Osprey
69. Seize the initiative.
Load Carriage – The Solution
Immediate Level 1 (I1) = Osprey
Immediate Level 2 (I2) = Belt kit
Immediate Level 3 (I3) = Daysack
Support Level 1 (S1) = Bergen
Support Level 2 (S2) = Holdall
70. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 1 (I1)
3 x Magazines
1 x Frag grenade
PRR
Immediate trauma
kit - carried on the
man or in an
additional magazine
pouch (as per Unit
SOP)
Empty smoke
grenade pouch.
On the man:
Map.
Compass.
Crib and Report
cards.
Pens.
71. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 1 (I1)
Empty smoke grenade pouch enables a smoke
grenade to be moved from I2 to I1 before
assault if required.
Immediate trauma kit:
2 x FFD
CAT
Yellow Cylume
Morphine
The above will fit in a pouch smaller than the
issue med pouch.
72. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 1 (I1): Commander’s Radio
PRC 354 carried in
hydration pouch.
This enables the
radio to be carried in
I3 or removed and
placed on the back in
I1/2.
73. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 2 (I2)
3 x Magazines.
Bayonet.
1 x Smoke Grenade
Water bottle
1 x utility pouch
with:
HMNVS.
Torch
Combi tool and
gun oil.
Additional trauma kit
74. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 2 (I2)
The soldier must be able to remove this
without removing Osprey:
No yoke.
Yoke over Osprey.
Belt attached to Osprey with fastex clips.
75. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 3 (I3)
Eye protection.
Cam cream.
Hexi/ Single mess
tin/mug/Spoon
Emergency rations.
Additional water.
Warm jacket (maximum -
softy).
Hat/headover and gloves
Waterproof jacket.
Remainder of weapon
cleaning kit.
Rations as required for the
task.
Ammunition bandolier if
required.
Aides memoire.
Pen knife/leatherman.
1 x Poncho per Fire Team.
76. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 3 (I3): Rations
Food for the duration of
the task is separate to
emergency rations.
Gas/multi fuel stove is
not carried in I3. Hexi is
light and adequate.
Emergency rations are
for when task endures
beyond planned time.
77. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Immediate Level 3 (I3)
Daysac:
Single jet pack may be appropriate for a
rifleman.
If issue 45 litre daysac is used - sides should
be zipped up. The additional capacity is for use
in extremis only.
ETH - threat dependant.
Lightweight stretcher – one per fire team.
78. Seize the initiative.
Immediate Levels – Concept of Use
Immediate kit (I1, I2 and I3) is carried on the man.
It can be shed as the situation requires, e.g:
"Assaulting troops will drop off I3 in the FUP. At
the entry point to the building assaulting troops will
drop off I2. Once the building is secure the link
man will bring in I2. On reorg I3 will be collected
from the FUP."
For certain tasks troops may operate in reduced scales,
e.g:
"All movement around the FOB/harbour will be in
I1."
"The clearance patrol will be conducted in I2."
I3 may contain night vision, but only if the operation
will span dark hours.
79. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Support Level 1 (S1)
Bergen:
24/48 hrs rations.
Sleeping bag.
Bivi Bag.
Poncho.
ETH if not in I3.
Night vision equipment.
1 x set combats.
3 x pairs socks.
Additional warm kit (if warm kit in I3 is light).
Gas stove/multi fuel stove - optional.
Wash kit.
Waterproof trousers.
Housewife.
Boot cleaning kit.
80. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Support Level 1 (S1)
Night vision may be moved to I3 as required.
If IDF threat will require digging on every
halt/reorg and not just in harbours then the
ETH will be moved to I3.
If S1 is to be used as CEMO for a short period
spare clothes, wash kit etc can be moved to
S2. Sleeping bag may be swapped for jungle
sleeping bag if temperature/duration/distance
balance is considered appropriate.
81. Seize the initiative.
Scalable Load Carriage –
Support Level 2 (S2)
1 x Black holdall per Fire Team (contents per
man):
Additional spare clothes.
Spare boots.
Light/soft foot wear (trainers/sandals).
Jungle sleeping bag.
82. Seize the initiative.
Soft Bags
Soft bag:
One labelled Bergen liner per fire team.
One labelled side pocket liner per individual.
Soft Bags will be used to bring forward limited loads. Individuals' small soft
bags will be put in Fire Team or Section soft bags. Example use:
"Put lunch in your I3 and the balance of your 24 hrs rations in your soft
bags. Centralise the soft bags before leaving this location and they will
be brought forward on the CSM's quad for evening meal.“
"Put night vision in soft bags. It will be brought forward before last
light, when you can either fit it or put it in I3.“
“At first light, soft bag your night vision. The CSM will come forward to
collect it.”
"Put dry clothes in soft bags. Once the crossing is secure these will be
brought forward and wet cloths will be taken back."
"Commanders - put spare radio batteries in soft bags and I will bring
these forward within 10 hrs."
83. Seize the initiative.
Support Levels – Concept of Use
Support kit will not routinely be carried.
In extremis S1 may be carried, but equipment
which will not be required will be moved to S2.
The fire team shares 1 x black holdall.
Soft Bags will be used to bring forward or back
load limited loads.
84. Seize the initiative.
General Principles
In general terms any kit movement should be up, not down
the chain.
Ammo from I3 to S1.
If S1 has to be carried as much of it as possible should be
moved to S2.
In hot weather warm kit may be moved from I3 to S1.
The support chain must be robust and reliable. It must be
considered a task which requires resourcing during planning.
I1 is for assault - assault does not require a stove, model kit,
TAM etc.
I2 is for immediate support - ammo for F Sp, to reload I1 with
ammo before the next assault, to have a drink.
I3 keeps the individual functioning between access to Support
kit - there should be no "just in case" except true emergency
rations.
85. Seize the initiative.
Specialist Equipment
The Talon stretcher is on the CSM’s quad.
Light weight stretchers carried in I3.
HMNVS in I2 will cover unplanned night
deployments. Bringing forward night vision
will need to be planned for operations
spanning dusk. Similarly, back loading night
vision should be considered for operations
spanning dawn.
86. Seize the initiative.
Conclusion
We carry too much “just in case”
We carry it in the wrong place
We often carry the wrong weapons
We carry too much ammunition
The above quote summarises the issue well: it is difficult to soldier well with a heavy burden.
It also shows that this is not a new issue and the presentation will use historical examples of how this issue has been addressed in the past.
This shows the load average load on Op HERRICK, averaged across the multiple.
Survivability is 25% of the burden; not inconsiderable, but not the largest. However, it tends to be where we focus when looking at the burden.
CIED – ECM, VALLON etc – is only 11% of the average burden. Even if removed (in another theatre with a different IED threat for example) the base load remains above 50kg.
It has long been accepted, following significant scientific study, that over 25 kg performance begins to more rapidly decline. Over 40 kg it declines exponentially. Therefore it is accepted that the ideal load is 25kg or less and that it should never be over 40kg.
Larger than Survivability is Sustainability; food, water, clothes etc.
Larger still is lethality; weapons and ammunition combined makes up 33% of the burden.
Lethality and sustainability are areas we can influence without EP driven change.
The British Army mule pamphlet stated that a mule cannot carry more that 25% of its body weigh. Current accepted practice is that a mule cannot carry more that 20% of its body weight and that for long periods it should carry no more than 10% of body weight.
We currently expect our young soldiers to carry 82% of their body weight – in CEFO. They are expected to fight with this load.
At the IBS we do not conduct MST, we conduct HFT and we are therefore well placed to see what happens when this load – which has developed in theatre – comes into contact with HFT. In OBUA ladders bend or snap, men cannot climb into lofts without ladders, they cannot climb through windows, cross fences, safely cross country in the dark etc etc.
The impact is not just sore shoulders.. There has been much scientific work into the impact of the burden on performance.
USMC research has shown that cognitive ability – the ability to think, remember, make decisions, notice thing around you – is significantly degraded as the weight of the load climbs. Partly this is physical; as the load rises the head cants more; the individual looks at the ground, not around them. Also, as the core temperature rises our speed of thought drops. Discomfort also fills more and more of the individuals thoughts.
Marksmanship standards fall as the burden climbs. A DSTL study had 8 men fire an ACMT. 6 passed, those that failed both only failed one of the five elements of the test and one of them only failed by one round. They were then given the current theatre load. They did not move anywhere, simply put on the load and returned to the firing point. Only one soldier passed the ACMT; the rest failed all 5 elements. During field firing those carrying 30kg hit 75% of targets, those carrying 50kg and more hit only 50%.
Recent work has also shown that exposure times – the time you are up and moving – during contact increase exponentially with weight. At loads similar to our current theatre burden exposure time was almost doubled from baseline. Equally, under heavy loads maximum speeds were never reached.
Ultimately, this means that by overloading our soldiers we not only cause them physical discomfort, we make them worse soldiers less likely to succeed.
All of this deals with CEFO only. What of CEMO?
This is a student on PSBC carrying CEMO. It has almost become unrealistic, with some soldiers carrying more than their own body weight.
The following vignette illustrates how the burden issue can impact on realistic infantry tasks.
A Pl during battle camp on PSBC deployed with CEFO only and conducted a dawn strike op onto a building. During the contact TES showed that they had received two casualties, one walking and one a stretcher case.
These casualties were recovered by stretcher to the Coy PB 2 km away. The move was solely on roads.
The Pl was down to 7 man sections. This is entirely normal.
Large lozenges show individuals, The smaller lozenge next to it is their daysac.
First we add weapons and ready ammunition. Rifles have 6 x mags. In theatre some units have been carrying up to 11 mags per man
Then we add UGL rounds, additional link (routinely 1,000 rounds link are carried per belt fed weapon – here we just have 800). Pl Sgt and Sec 2ICS are given an ammo reserve. Each man has an HE grenade.
Each section carries an ASM.
Radios are added.
The soldiers were wearing helmets and Osprey BUT THE OSPREY ONLY HAD SMALL ECBA PLATES NOT LARGE PLATES OR SIDE PLATES.
Each section had a Talon stretcher.
Add 12 hrs rations (not a 24 hr ration pack) and 2 x litres water (less than a full camelback).
FIST kit and command kit (TAM, model kits etc) are added.
This is still not the full load a man would have. The weight of his load carriage equipment, his warm and water proof clothing, torches, stoves etc is not included.
None of the strike equipment – ladders etc – are included.
The average load is around 40kg.
The GPMG gunner in 1 Sec became a stretcher case. A UGL gunner in 2 Sec was walking wounded.
Two Talon stretchers (8 kg each) were deployed. The GPMG gunner (for illustrative purposes weighing 70kg) was put on one.
The GPMG gunners personal kit was put on the stretcher with him.
The personal equipment of the UGL gunner was put on the second stretcher, as was the 60mm mortar.
Where possible, those carrying stretchers gave their daysacs to anyone not carrying a stretcher.
This left only the Pl Comd, Pl Sgt and 1 x GPMG gunner without additional equipment.
6 men were carrying stretchers, but had no one to give their daysac to, so they carried both.
One man had two ASMs.
One man had 2 x daysacs and a folded Talon stretcher.
This left one man giving protection – 3 Sec GPMG gunner.
This is a photograph from this serial.
This man has his own rifle, an LMG, a section of ladder attached to his Osprey with a plasticuff, a thumper (a heavy item) on his shoulder and a daysac with radio.
He has no hands on a weapon.
He is looking at the ground ahead of him.
He cannot fight and has no situational awareness; he is purely moving a heavy load from A to B.
The bullets here explain the situation at Long Tan.
The Australians, albeit with significant artillery support (which is not cheating) fought a hugely more numerous enemy for over 2.5 hrs with 60 rnds per rifle and did not run out of ammunition. They also had 1 x M60 MG per Pl, with 500rnds link.
Weapons suppress of kill. Suppression is physiological incapacitation; it is a substitute for physical incapacitation – killing or injuring the enemy.
Suppression is made up of volume of fire, accuracy and the KE of the round – how big the round is. If there is less volume this can be compensated for with accuracy or size of round etc.
Within the DCC Pl we have three types of direct fire weapons; area suppression (characterised by throwing down a beaten zone), point suppression weapons capable of accurate aimed fire and assault weapons which can easily be carried during the assault (jumping fences, crawling, entering buildings etc).
The GPMG is a long range area suppression weapon.
The LMG a short range area suppression weapon.
The sharpshooter (a UOR weapon) gives point suppression.
The LSW gives long range point suppression.
The 40mm UGL gives short range area suppression.
The rifle gives short range point suppression, but is also a true assault weapon.
We have a propensity of belt fed weapons in the rifle Pl.
The current section weapon mix – informed by theatre experience and used at the IBS – is as above.
The current weapon mix is optimised for suppression, not assault.
This is a product of theatre experience, where we rarely assault, but hold enemy at arms length and either extract or call in joint fires.
Equally, frustrations with locating the enemy have driven us to use high volumes of area suppression fire.
Few men in this Section can go through a window or crawl up to a bunker.
Eugene Sledge fought with the USMC in the pacific in WW2.
He states that they considered the ammunition required by a rifleman for a day of heavy fighting was 100 rounds. For a .30 MG it was 1,500 rounds.
This was fighting the Imperial Japanese Army, who had similar equipment capabilities and were fanatical. They required significant suppression and always required an assault to clear their position.
The USMC Rifle Coy of the time has 3 x Rifle Pls with rifles only and a Support Pl with 3 x 0.30 MGs and 3 x 60mm Mortars.
If the MGs and Mortars are given to the Rifle Pls we end up with something not dissimilar to the current British Rifle Pl.
In 1944 the USMC were fighting a determined near peer enemy in high intensity, heavily contested close combat.
In Afghanistan were are conducting influence Ops and demonstrating courageous restraint.
The USMC Pl had 3 x 12 man Sections. With 100 rnds per man this is 3,600 ball.
The Current British Pl has 15 men with magazine fed weapons (Rifle and UGL Rifle) in the Sections. If each carries 8 mags (remember – in theatre up to 11 mags have been carried) and there is no Pl Sgt’s or Sec 2ICs’ reserve then these men have 3,600 rounds of ball. THIS IS THE SAME AS MORE THAN TWICE THE NUMBER OF USMC RIFLEMEN.
The single MG in the USMC Pl (one from the Support Weapons Pl) has 1,500 link.
Routinely an MG Gunner in the current British Rifle Pl will carry 1,000 rnds link. There are 6 x LMG and 3 x GPMG in the Pl, so the Pl has 9,000 rnds link. THE MODERN BRITISH RIFLE PL CONDUCTING COUNTER INSURGENCY CARRIES 6 TIMES MORE LINK THAN A USMC PL FIGHTING THE JAPANESE.
At Brecon we will:
Return to the core weapon mix, with 1 x GPMG per Pl and with the LSW back in the fire team.
Teach the principles of suppression – how people are suppressed and how much of what type of fire it takes – so that more effective use can be made of ammunition and informed fire control (not just “get some fucking rounds down”) can be conducted.
Teach what weapons are suitable for what task. There is not often a need to manoeuvre a GPMG to 100 m of the objective. A lone rifleman can be suppressed with deliberate fire from one rifle etc. This will include assessing fire effect on the enemy and managing the fire accordingly.
This will counter the following situation occurring again:
During a pl attack with TES a Pl on PSBC grouped their 3 x GPMG as a fire support group. The first objective was an open fire pit with 2 x enemy in it. At H Hr the GPMGs began to engage at a rapid rate, The first Section then launched. It dropped off a Fire Team (with an LMG) as a point of fire. It then dropped off another pair (with an LMG) as a point of fire. The final pair then assaulted. This meant that at one point there were 9 men, with 5 belt fed weapons, engaging the enemy position. When the TES data was interrogated it showed that the first two rounds fired on H Hr had hit and killed the two enemy. The enemy had then neither moved nor fired for the rest of the attack. Therefore for approx 5 mins the Pl had fired several thousand rounds at two dead bodies.
The British Army in Normandy in 1944 saw some of the heaviest fighting of the second world war.
This was a very capable Army. Several Division had fought in North Africa and Sicily before landing on D Day. Other Divisions had trained hard for years and by the final break-out most had been in heavy contact for 6 weeks. These were experienced soldiers.
The British faced 2 x Waffen SS Corps around Caen. Several enemy divisions were fresh from the Eastern front. These Divisions were the best equipped the Germans had, they received the best recruits and they were fanatical. This was a capable near peer (and at times more than near peer) enemy.
The human body in 1944 was the same as today, it still got cold, hungry, needed hydration etc. Equally it still took the same suppression; because most men had bolt action rifles this didn’t mean that both sides agreed to be more readily suppressed.
This is Fusilier Tom Payne in the fighting order of 1944.
(Tom Payne was a regular soldier before the war. Here he is 33. He survived the war.)
On his belt is a respirator. This was not routinely carried in Normandy, so the pouch was removed; it wasn’t filled with other stuff.
He also had a 2 pint water bottle.
In his 37 pack he carried the items above.
Note – he has no food other than emergency rations and chocolate. He would routinely expect food to be brought forward to him.
His gas cape is waterproofs, warm kit (ish) and shelter all in one.
He has no sleeping kit; this would be brought forward to him when there was the opportunity for sleep.
The 37 pack has an 8 litre capacity. The current issue daysac is 45l. The issue grab bag is 8 litres.
These are British Army emergency rations from WW2. They have a block of chocolate, matches and sugar and instant tea. It was for use in emergencies only.
Now we tend to talk of “24 hrs emergency ration” and this is interpreted as a 24 hr ration pack. No British soldier has starved to death in recent history. In an emergency hydration, energy and warmth are critical. A few energy bars and a packet of hot chocolate will do this.
This is his med kit.
In his ETH pouch he has equipment as above.
This is the only personal equipment he had.
Recently we found a student of PSBC with an iPad on battle camp.
Here we see a Section in Normandy carrying the kit as modelled by Fus Payne. Note they are from a different Division, but still have the same load configuration.
(Note that they have 1 x automatic weapon in the Section – the Bren Gun. This was an accurate magazine fed weapon - more akin to the LSW or Sharpshooter than an LMG or GPMG.)
Here we see Infantry in the FUP ready for an attack during Op Charnwood – the break in to Caen.
Note that they have stripped their webbing down to ammunition pouches and a bayonet only.
(Also note how calm the Pl Sgt looks!)
Here we see troops fighting through one of the villages in the approach to Caen. Between the two men they have 1 x ammunition bandolier. These men are engaged in high intensity fighting against a capable and fanatical near peer enemy.
In the next slide we see a PSBC student:
He is on a Platoon clearance patrol from a Coy tactical base that was planned to last an hour.
The patrol deployed at 1000 hrs; night vision would not be required.
He had eaten breakfast and was fully hydrated.
The patrol was going no more than 500m from the tactical base.
The enemy was operating in no more than fire team size and would engage and then withdraw.
This is him trying to run in contact.
In WW2 the British Infantry had scalable equipment – they could tailor their load to match the situation.
They trusted their CSS to get forward what they require when they required it.
During the fighting around Hill 112 the 43rd Wessex Div took 40% casualties. Their history describes the fighting as so intense that “the CSgts couldn’t get forward with hot food until after last light.”
They packed lean – Tom Payne was willing to be cold and wet for periods of time.
For all the fighting in Normandy was over Jun, Jul and Aug the weather was atypically bad. The Mulberry harbours were damaged in a storm and close air support was often unavailable due to the weather. For much of the time it was cold and wet.
They had appropriate weapons in the Pl. They had considerable indirect fire support and direct fire support from MG Bns (which could attach Coys – much like modern FSGs – to Units or Bdes). This allowed the Pl weapon mix to be optimised for the assault.
This summarises well how we have gone off the rails.
Some QMs may still remember going on recce patrols in Army daps, a soft hat and a magazine in the pocket. No-one would consider this now for a recce patrol.
These are aide memoirs currently used at Brecon to drive risk management with what is carried.
There are two approaches to load carriage.
The modular approach allows the load to be altered before deploying – deciding what to take, stripping webbing etc.
The scalable approach allows the load to be managed during deployment. This is of more utility to us as it allows the troops to flex to task without returning to a base.
The scalable approach sees:
An irreducible minimum on the body.
Immediate sustainability.
Longer term sustainability
Currently we can only scale our load by dropping the daysac. If we are wearing PLCE with a yoke this is fixed to us by our Osprey.
I have witnessed on PSBC men in the final bounds of an assault with belt kit with 5 utility pouches containing an jetboil, TAM, model kit and 3 x boil in the bag meals. Are these really required when assaulting a bunker?
The proposed solution sees kit broken down as stated here.
This is the I1 load. This is what is required in the final assault – the final bounds, entering a building etc.
It has an empty pouch to allow an additional item to be carried in the assault.
It has a stripped down, immediate trauma kit.
If the commander’s radio is in his daysac he cannot drop the pack and reduce to I1.
If it is in his belt kit it means he cannot drop his I2.
By putting it in a hydration pack pouch he can wear the radio when he is in I1. When he is carrying his daysac the radio in its pouch goes in the daysac.
(As an aside – this makes it much easier to access and insert/remove the radio.)
This is the belt kit – I2.
The rifle cleaning kit is stripped to a combi tool and oil – enough to keep the weapon working.
The soldier must be able to drop his belt order without removing Osprey. Several solutions have been trialled:
Not using a yoke works for some, but the belt can slip.
A yoke over the Osprey is not comfortable.
With the Osprey CES come four T bars with fastex (trident) clips. If these are used to attach the belt to the Osprey then the Osprey acts as the yoke, but with a few quick clips the belt can be dropped.
The daysac has what is required, not “what might be required”. Warm kit is as dictated by the weather – no softy in the Summer etc.
This is where the TAM etc belongs if it is to be carried.
Emergency rations are true emergency rations – not 24hrs worth of boil in the bag.
Hexi is light and compact. Gas or multi fuel stoves don’t belong in the daysac.
Normal rations are carried as dictated by the duration of the task. This may just be biscuits and sweets. It may be 1 x boil in the bag.
With this load a single jetpack will suffice for a rifleman
A commander can use a 45 l pack, but the sides should be routinely zipped up.
The ETH is carried as directed by the IDF threat. If high, it may go on I2. If low it may go in S1 (the bergen). If intermediate it will go in I3.
This is the bergen. Note:
Routinely the individual would not expect to carry the bergen. He will see it when it is required.
Night vision when not required by the individual is kept in S1.
This is where additional warm kit is, to mitigate the risk of carrying less in I3; by the time you are in a harbour you will have a softy/down jacket.
If the individual wants a gas stove, this is where it should be for use in a tactical base.
The last bullet is critical here. If a soldier must carry his S1, then it should be pared down to bare minimum weight, with the remainder going into S2. Spare clothes, wash kit, house wife, boot cleaning kit etc is not required for one night. If it not too cold the jungle sleeping bag can be taken, with the large sleeping back put in S2.
This is for additional equipment not required every night.
Soldiers should expect to see this at least once every 3 days.
The jungle sleeping bag is to swap with the large sleeping bag if S1 is to be carried.
Soft bags allow some equipment to be moved backwards and forwards in small capacity lift as required. The prime example would be night vision, brought forward for last light and collected again after first light.
The aim should always be to move kit, where possible, up the chain, i.e. I2 to I3, I3 to S1, S1 to S2.
Plans must be put in place to support these efforts. If a Coy HQ accepts that a pl is deploying without night vision it must bear this in mind. If they need to re-task this Pl to stay out after last light they must accept that they can only use NVGs, accept that they must get their soft bags with night vision forward to them or replace them with a suitably equipped Pl. To leave the risk with them alone and then grip them if they cannot stay out will mean that next time they deploy they will carry night vision as a rule and the load will grow.
If a Pl Comd decides that he does not want to take, for example, night vision, Coy HQ should work to support this. This may mean getting a veh forward to them to collect soft bags of night vision and then having someone in Coy HQ (signaller?) stag on the serial numbered items.
Without this support and acceptance of risk from Coy and BG HQ then this system will fail and people will revert to carrying everything all the time.
Finally, we should avoid “surprise overnighters” where we tell troops they will see their bergens but then they don’t see them for days. This will undermine confidence in the system and lead to soldiers once more packing for every eventuality. No-one needs to practice being cold that often; when required to do so you will have no choice anyway.
At the very core of this is a mindset. Whether the system can be put in place etc does not impact upon the basic principle: we should carry no more than we require (be it clothing, ammunition, weapons etc) and we should carry it in the right place (no jetboils in the assault).
On the left is a patrol in Normandy in 1944, looking for Waffen SS.
On the right is a PSBC student wearing Osprey with pouches, belt order, a grab bag and a daysac.
We have clearly drifted.