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Thank you for collaborating
with your local h4¢k3r$ !
                h4¢
C:
C:>format C:Y/N _
Christian “Check your Wifi” Frenette
Michel “You’ve been H4x0r3d!” Cusin
CSE Conference – Mont-Tremblant
October 16, 2009 © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Start to think out of the box…

… and realize what hackers know that you
don't… !




Because they WILL use it to their advantage,
against you or your customers !

               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Let’s try to think out of the box…

 • How can we make 4 triangles,
   with 6 matches… ?




          © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
?
                                            ?
© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
You have to think out of the
             box, just like the hackers do…
                                                           3




                      1            2
                                                       4

                             3




You know we’re getting at… Right ?


           © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Overview of the presentation

•   Public information gathering
•   The WiFi Landscape
•   Social Networks / Social hacking / Engineering
•   Spamming, phishing & Cross-site Scripting
•   The infamous Botnets




                  © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Public information gathering
•   Whois, nslookup / dig, ARIN, RF monitoring, etc…
•   Google (Maps / Earth, Groups, Blogs, Images, etc…)
•   Wigle.net, Wireless Geographic Loggin Engine
•   Enterprise Register
•   Specialized tools (Maltego, Lazy Champ, Kismet, etc…)
•   Social Networking Sites




      • Did you know you were leaking that much..?



                     © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
The WiFi Landscape

• Use Radio frequencies
• Electromagnetic shared medium, think hub !
• Physical environment dependencies
• Users can move, Phy environment can change
• CSMA/CA instead CSMA/CD, or transmit and
  pray
• Indoor / outdoor
• Antenna pattern
• New security considerations


              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
New vector to protect from….
• Protect network from unauthorized users
  • Rogue AP, session hijacking, eavesdropping
• Protect users from unauthorized networks
  – Fake AP


    Network                                               Users




              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Don’t
• Disclose personal information in the SSID name
  of your network
• Relying on masking your SSID is useless:
  – Provide a false sense of security
  – User don’t know and reach for other
  – The stations are broadcasting the SSID they’re trying
    to reach anyway (Probe requests)
• Filtering MAC addresses is useless
  – Always transmit in clear text
  – Easy to spoof


                  © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
DOS attack require expensive equipements
• Micro-wave fork attack
• WiFi jammer

                                                                        Gighz,
                                                          Usually 2.450 Gighz,
                                                          just between Ch 8-9, in
                                                          the ISM band and 500-
                                                                           500-
                                                          1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4
                                                          watts




              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
We are protected…
• We have firewall
   – Facing Internet ! (dude!!!)
   – We provide a corporate Lan access jack
      • in the parking lot (WiFi)
• We don’t have any wireless… neither policies !
   – Neither wireless detection, ;-(
   – Laptop with WiFi card (ad-hoc mode)




        Internet




                      © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Authentication & encryption

• We use encryption
  – WEP-RC4 or TKIP-RC4, AES-CCMP
• We use authentication
  – PSK or Enterprise (Eg: Radius)
  – SSID, 802.1x, EAP-TLS, PEAP, etc, (PWD,
    Certificat)
  – EAP, Sitting on WEP/TKIP, AES ?
  – Always use strong password policy (LEAP—
    ASLEAP)


              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Working @ home

• I use WEP, WPA-PSK
  – you are acting like a rogue AP, if your home network
    is not protect
• Anayway, I use VPN to connect to the office
  – Your lucky, if it never drop when your not in front of
    your PC
  – Enforce layer 2 security even if you use VPN
• All PCs at home are safe
  – Kids PCs, Playstation, lots of treath from the inside



                  © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Rogue threats

• Good guys friendly/unaware
  – Implement by users to facilitate network
    access, always against organization policy
    (when they exist…)
• Malicious
  – To provide network backdoor
• Unintended
  – Authorized but misconfigured equipment


               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Ad-Hoc mode
• Ad-hoc mode are insecure
  – All stations control the communication no APs
  – Unencrypted or WEP
     • Look the same or very close
     • With aircrack-ng you get the WEP key and import it in Wireshark
       to decrypt on the fly.
  – User may use windows bridging utility to give access to
    wire Lan from the ad-hoc segment




                     © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Free WiFi acces
              Wonderfull Hot spot

• Hot spot controller only identifies
  authorized user by MAC+IP add
• At login, a popup logoff window is opened,
  normally block by popup-bloker
• Sessions stay active until inactivity timeout
• Excellent receipt for session Hijacking
  – Script to monitor inactivity
  – Spoof MAC and IP address (Pickupline)

               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Hot spot cont….

• Hotspot are identified only by SSID
• Station reach for the highest signal
• High power soft-AP may be use to capture
  clients


               Hotspot AP




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Hot spot…Sidejacking.

• Common for popular sites to do authentication
  over HTTPS (Gmail)
  – and reverts to HTTP after authentication
• Raison they can support HTTPS for all users
  – HTTPS is an option you have to select
• The attack consist to retrieve the session cookie,
  no need of your credentials
  – Attacker can impersonate the user
  – Doesn’t affect the active session


                 © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Hot spot injections Airpw

•   begin page_html
•   match ^(GET|POST)
•   ignore ^GET [^ ?]+.(jpg|jpeg|gif|png|tif|tiff)
•   response content/page_html
•   -----------------------------------------------------------------

•   HTTP/1.1 200 OK                                                             HTTP req
•   Connection: close                                                           sniff
•   Content-Type: text/html                                                                HTTP
                                                                                           response
•   <html><head><title>HELLO CSE!</title>
•   </head><body>
•   <blink><font size=+5 color=red>
•   Hello CSE! I'm watching you !
•   </font>
•   </blink>
•   <p>

                                                                  HTTP req
                             Internet


                                          © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Hot spot recommendations

• Lack of layer 2 security require stronger
  upper-layer defences
• Personal firewall, HIPS, AV is a must and
  – Patch, patch, patch
• Restrict permitted SSID
• Use VPN tunnelled traffic at hotspots
• Security awareness for Hot spot utilisation


               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Black Berry

• They are secure, but users are not always
• Social engineering vulnerability
  – Malware download, turn de BB into a remote
    cam or microphone or redirect mail




              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
6 things to consider

•   Security policy
•   Strong authentication
•   Strong encryption
•   Monitoring
•   Auditing
•   Security awareness



                © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Social Engineering

 What is social engineering?




 Is there any social engineers in the room ?

              © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Social Networks and Social Engineering




               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Social Engineering + Social Networks =



• Some people post their life
   – (Kids, vacations, etc..)
• Security relies on a username/password
   – Could be easy to get in
• ID spoofing
   – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts
• Koobface
   – Worm – Infected 2.9M machines just in the US (Soc. Eng.)
       • Install a Web Server and fake antivirus, send fake messages,
       • Foils CAPTCHA, Steal Data,
       • Hijack Web sessions, Change Domain Name System (DNS)



                        © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Social Networks and Social Engineering



• Microblog (Max 140 characters -> SMS)
• Security relies on a username/password
    – Could be easy to get in
• ID spoofing
    – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts
• New way of spamming
• Are used to control Botnets
• All kind of information could be posted on it (same as forums, BB)
    – Corporate
    – Sensitive
    – Etc..




                          © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Spam

• What is it ?
  Did you know that 86.4% of all e-mail in Sep 09 was spam ?

• Who ?

• Why ?

• When ?

• How ?


                   © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Phishing

• What is it ?
  Did you know that 1 in 437 e-mails comprised a phishing attack?

• Who ?

• Why ?

• When ?

• How ?

• Here’s some examples…
                    © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Example of Phishing




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Example of Phishing




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
XSS example                         Web Site
                                  (very popular)




User
                                     Web Site
                                (vulnerable to XSS)
         © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
XSS example                         Web Site
                                  (very popular)




User
                                     Web Site
                                (vulnerable to XSS)
         © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Another Example <Metasploit>




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Spamming + phishing = Lo$$ & Profit$


                           Lo$$ & Profit$




                                                           ng
             Ph




                                                           mi
                is




                                                         am
                   hi
                      ng




                                                       Sp




               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
The infamous botnet


                 Relay
                 Japan


  Relay
  Russia

               IRC Servers
               (Internet Relay Chat)

Relay
China



  IRC client
  Cuba



               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Methodes of propagation




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
X                        OK




© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Peer to peer botnet




            © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Fast flux botnet




             © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Botnet controled via Twitter




            © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Botnet controled via Google Groups




            © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Security in surface…




                     Intrusion Detection


                                            Antivirus
            Firewall




            © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Security in depth



                                        Intrusion Detection
                                                                           Communications and
                                                                            Communications and
       Security Policy
        Security Policy                                                    Operations Management
                                                                            Operations Management
                                                               Antivirus
                               Firewall
  Organizational Security
   Organizational Security                                                 Access Control
                                                                            Access Control



Information Classification
 Information Classification                                                Systems Development and
                                                                            Systems Development and
                                                                           Maintenance
                                                                            Maintenance

Personnel Security
 Personnel Security                                                        Business Continuity
                                                                            Business Continuity
                                                                           Management
                                                                            Management

Physical and Environmental
 Physical and Environmental                                                Compliance
                                                                            Compliance
Security
 Security


                              * 10 domains of security - ISO 17799
                               © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Information security sometimes
require solutions, that may not be in
              “a box”…




          © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
Questions ?




© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés

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Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

  • 1. Thank you for collaborating with your local h4¢k3r$ ! h4¢ C: C:>format C:Y/N _ Christian “Check your Wifi” Frenette Michel “You’ve been H4x0r3d!” Cusin CSE Conference – Mont-Tremblant October 16, 2009 © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 2. Start to think out of the box… … and realize what hackers know that you don't… ! Because they WILL use it to their advantage, against you or your customers ! © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 3. Let’s try to think out of the box… • How can we make 4 triangles, with 6 matches… ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 4. ? ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 5. You have to think out of the box, just like the hackers do… 3 1 2 4 3 You know we’re getting at… Right ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 6. Overview of the presentation • Public information gathering • The WiFi Landscape • Social Networks / Social hacking / Engineering • Spamming, phishing & Cross-site Scripting • The infamous Botnets © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 7. Public information gathering • Whois, nslookup / dig, ARIN, RF monitoring, etc… • Google (Maps / Earth, Groups, Blogs, Images, etc…) • Wigle.net, Wireless Geographic Loggin Engine • Enterprise Register • Specialized tools (Maltego, Lazy Champ, Kismet, etc…) • Social Networking Sites • Did you know you were leaking that much..? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 8. The WiFi Landscape • Use Radio frequencies • Electromagnetic shared medium, think hub ! • Physical environment dependencies • Users can move, Phy environment can change • CSMA/CA instead CSMA/CD, or transmit and pray • Indoor / outdoor • Antenna pattern • New security considerations © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 9. New vector to protect from…. • Protect network from unauthorized users • Rogue AP, session hijacking, eavesdropping • Protect users from unauthorized networks – Fake AP Network Users © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 10. Don’t • Disclose personal information in the SSID name of your network • Relying on masking your SSID is useless: – Provide a false sense of security – User don’t know and reach for other – The stations are broadcasting the SSID they’re trying to reach anyway (Probe requests) • Filtering MAC addresses is useless – Always transmit in clear text – Easy to spoof © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 11. © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 12. © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 13. © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 14. DOS attack require expensive equipements • Micro-wave fork attack • WiFi jammer Gighz, Usually 2.450 Gighz, just between Ch 8-9, in the ISM band and 500- 500- 1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4 watts © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 15. We are protected… • We have firewall – Facing Internet ! (dude!!!) – We provide a corporate Lan access jack • in the parking lot (WiFi) • We don’t have any wireless… neither policies ! – Neither wireless detection, ;-( – Laptop with WiFi card (ad-hoc mode) Internet © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 16. Authentication & encryption • We use encryption – WEP-RC4 or TKIP-RC4, AES-CCMP • We use authentication – PSK or Enterprise (Eg: Radius) – SSID, 802.1x, EAP-TLS, PEAP, etc, (PWD, Certificat) – EAP, Sitting on WEP/TKIP, AES ? – Always use strong password policy (LEAP— ASLEAP) © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 17. Working @ home • I use WEP, WPA-PSK – you are acting like a rogue AP, if your home network is not protect • Anayway, I use VPN to connect to the office – Your lucky, if it never drop when your not in front of your PC – Enforce layer 2 security even if you use VPN • All PCs at home are safe – Kids PCs, Playstation, lots of treath from the inside © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 18. Rogue threats • Good guys friendly/unaware – Implement by users to facilitate network access, always against organization policy (when they exist…) • Malicious – To provide network backdoor • Unintended – Authorized but misconfigured equipment © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 19. Ad-Hoc mode • Ad-hoc mode are insecure – All stations control the communication no APs – Unencrypted or WEP • Look the same or very close • With aircrack-ng you get the WEP key and import it in Wireshark to decrypt on the fly. – User may use windows bridging utility to give access to wire Lan from the ad-hoc segment © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 20. Free WiFi acces Wonderfull Hot spot • Hot spot controller only identifies authorized user by MAC+IP add • At login, a popup logoff window is opened, normally block by popup-bloker • Sessions stay active until inactivity timeout • Excellent receipt for session Hijacking – Script to monitor inactivity – Spoof MAC and IP address (Pickupline) © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 21. Hot spot cont…. • Hotspot are identified only by SSID • Station reach for the highest signal • High power soft-AP may be use to capture clients Hotspot AP © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 22. Hot spot…Sidejacking. • Common for popular sites to do authentication over HTTPS (Gmail) – and reverts to HTTP after authentication • Raison they can support HTTPS for all users – HTTPS is an option you have to select • The attack consist to retrieve the session cookie, no need of your credentials – Attacker can impersonate the user – Doesn’t affect the active session © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 23. Hot spot injections Airpw • begin page_html • match ^(GET|POST) • ignore ^GET [^ ?]+.(jpg|jpeg|gif|png|tif|tiff) • response content/page_html • ----------------------------------------------------------------- • HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP req • Connection: close sniff • Content-Type: text/html HTTP response • <html><head><title>HELLO CSE!</title> • </head><body> • <blink><font size=+5 color=red> • Hello CSE! I'm watching you ! • </font> • </blink> • <p> HTTP req Internet © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 24. Hot spot recommendations • Lack of layer 2 security require stronger upper-layer defences • Personal firewall, HIPS, AV is a must and – Patch, patch, patch • Restrict permitted SSID • Use VPN tunnelled traffic at hotspots • Security awareness for Hot spot utilisation © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 25. Black Berry • They are secure, but users are not always • Social engineering vulnerability – Malware download, turn de BB into a remote cam or microphone or redirect mail © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 26. 6 things to consider • Security policy • Strong authentication • Strong encryption • Monitoring • Auditing • Security awareness © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 27. Social Engineering What is social engineering? Is there any social engineers in the room ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 28. Social Networks and Social Engineering © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 29. Social Engineering + Social Networks = • Some people post their life – (Kids, vacations, etc..) • Security relies on a username/password – Could be easy to get in • ID spoofing – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts • Koobface – Worm – Infected 2.9M machines just in the US (Soc. Eng.) • Install a Web Server and fake antivirus, send fake messages, • Foils CAPTCHA, Steal Data, • Hijack Web sessions, Change Domain Name System (DNS) © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 30. Social Networks and Social Engineering • Microblog (Max 140 characters -> SMS) • Security relies on a username/password – Could be easy to get in • ID spoofing – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts • New way of spamming • Are used to control Botnets • All kind of information could be posted on it (same as forums, BB) – Corporate – Sensitive – Etc.. © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 31. Spam • What is it ? Did you know that 86.4% of all e-mail in Sep 09 was spam ? • Who ? • Why ? • When ? • How ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 32. Phishing • What is it ? Did you know that 1 in 437 e-mails comprised a phishing attack? • Who ? • Why ? • When ? • How ? • Here’s some examples… © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 33. Example of Phishing © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 34. Example of Phishing © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 35. XSS example Web Site (very popular) User Web Site (vulnerable to XSS) © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 36. XSS example Web Site (very popular) User Web Site (vulnerable to XSS) © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 37. Another Example <Metasploit> © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 38. Spamming + phishing = Lo$$ & Profit$ Lo$$ & Profit$ ng Ph mi is am hi ng Sp © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 39. The infamous botnet Relay Japan Relay Russia IRC Servers (Internet Relay Chat) Relay China IRC client Cuba © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 40. Methodes of propagation © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 41. X OK © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 42. © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 43. Peer to peer botnet © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 44. Fast flux botnet © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 45. Botnet controled via Twitter © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 46. Botnet controled via Google Groups © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 47. Security in surface… Intrusion Detection Antivirus Firewall © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 48. Security in depth Intrusion Detection Communications and Communications and Security Policy Security Policy Operations Management Operations Management Antivirus Firewall Organizational Security Organizational Security Access Control Access Control Information Classification Information Classification Systems Development and Systems Development and Maintenance Maintenance Personnel Security Personnel Security Business Continuity Business Continuity Management Management Physical and Environmental Physical and Environmental Compliance Compliance Security Security * 10 domains of security - ISO 17799 © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 49. Information security sometimes require solutions, that may not be in “a box”… © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés
  • 50. Questions ? © Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés