The Communication Contractand Its Ten Ground Clauses Birgi.docx

The Communication Contract
and Its Ten Ground Clauses Birgitta Dresp-Langley
ABSTRACT. Global society issues are putting increasing
pressure on both small and large organizations to com-
municate ethically at all levels. Achieving this requires
social skills beyond the choice of language or vocabulary
and relies above all on individual social responsibility.
Arguments from social contract philosophy and speech act
theory lead to consider a communication contract that
identifies the necessary individual skills for ethical com-
munication on the basis of a limited number of explicit
clauses. These latter are pragmatically binding for all
partners involved and help to ensure that the ground rules
of cooperative communication are observed within a
group or an organization. Beyond promoting ethical
communication, the communication contract clarifies

how individual discursive behaviour can be constructively
and ethically monitored by group leaders in business
meetings. A case study which shows what may happen
when ground clauses of ethical communication are vio-
lated is presented. The conclusions of the study highlights
why attempting to respect the communication contract is
in the best interest of all partners at all levels within any
group or organization.
KEY WORDS: philosophical foundations of business
ethics, social contract theory, speech act theory, ethical
communication, communication contract
Purpose
Extensive data published by Huang (2004) in this
journal have shown some of the advantages of socially
responsible, cooperative, and symmetrical, in short,
ethical, communication for public relations, mar-
keting, and the economic development of large
organizations. Apart from being politically correct,

ethical communication may, indeed, prove a sound
business strategy, because it may allow securing long-
term benefits that are more valuable to an organiza-
tion compared with short-term profits obtained
through communication strategies which do not take
into account ethical core values.
Social responsibility is claimed to define one of
the general ground conditions of ethical communi-
cation in the corporate world (see the review article
by Reinsch, 1990). The present article is concerned
with the essential role of individual social responsi-
bility in the sense of ‘‘individual moral agency’’ as in
Reid’s essays on the active powers of the human
mind (1843), or ‘‘personal agency’’ as in Bandura’s
social cognitive theory (2001). The special need for
individual respect of a limited number of ground
rules of ethical communication at the interpersonal
level is discussed, with particular emphasis on busi-

ness meetings. The arguments presented defend the
idea that communicating ethically with our nearest
neighbours or partners is the conditio sine qua non
to give an institution, corporation, or a small
group such as a family a chance to ensure that ethical
core values may eventually be adhered to at a larger
scale.
To provide the theoretical concepts for this
exercise, some relevant links between the philo-
sophical foundations of social contract theory,
speech act theory, and the hypothesis of a commu-
nication contract are introduced. Ten pragmatic
ground clauses, derived from Reid’s essays on moral
agency in communication (1843) and Austin’s
felicity conditions for speech acts (1962), are defined
and discussed. It is argued that these clauses define
universal ground rules of ethical communication
between socially responsible individuals. A case

study example is discussed to show what may happen
when ethical ground clauses are violated by indi-
viduals in a business meeting, and how such
behaviour can be ethically monitored by leaders to
limit clause violations and their potentially destruc-
tive consequences.
Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 87:415–436 � Springer 2008
DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9929-3
From social contract to communication
contract
Without society, we would live in a state of nature
without positive rights and unlimited natural free-
dom, where anyone can do what they like, for
themselves and to anyone else. To avoid such a state
of ‘‘bellum omnium contra omnes’’ (Hobbes, 1651),
we agree as individuals within society to adhere to
an implicit contract, a so-called social contract.
Through this social contract, we gain rights by

giving up unlimited freedom and by accepting to
respect and defend the rights of others. The idea that
all rational beings would inevitably consent to such a
social contract because it is in their own best interest
was first introduced in theoretical essays by philos-
ophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, as
in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and Rousseau’s Du
Contrat Social (1762). This philosophical framework
is now referred to as social contract theory or
‘‘contractarianism’’ (e.g. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy). In more recent years, social contract
theory has enjoyed renewed success (see Ankerl,
1980), in particular in the business ethics literature.
Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994, 1995, 1999) inte-
grative social contract theory has substantially con-
tributed to this success by providing a fresh
conceptual framework with a new look on con-
tractarian thinking for ethical business management

and modern economics. The term ‘‘integrative’’
places emphasis on the general, all-encompassing
nature of the social contract as a basic commitment
with binding obligations, which imply adhering to
certain ethical core values and respecting certain
rules of due process.
Ethical core values
Social contract theory recognizes a general, collec-
tive need for adhering to certain ethical core values.
Such core values are, in principle, collectively
acknowledged though not always explicitly formu-
lated. They are derived from philosophical, political
and economic norms which can be considered
universal in the sense that they are detached from
specific cults, religions or beliefs. Ethical core values
are seen as beneficial to society in general, and to any
individual who is part of it in particular. Ethical core
values are non-negotiable. They are the foundations

of ethical standards in society, and of an organiza-
tion’s commitment to corporate responsibility. Core
values explicitly listed in modern codes of business
ethics almost invariably include: responsibility,
integrity, honesty, respect, trust, openness, fairness
and transparency. Translating ethical core values into
action requires an explicit system of ethical ground
rules and principles of due process to ensure that
these rules are respected.
Ethical communication as a contract
Communication between individuals is the most
essential medium for translating ethical core values
into action. According to speech act theory (Austin,
1962; Reid, 1843; Searle, 1969), an utterance in itself
is an act, a so-called illocutionary act, with its impli-
cations and with its consequences. Like a hand
bringing down a hammer to close a deal at an auction
or to kill, the spoken word may have an impact with

similar, more or less dramatic, consequences. The
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, one of the
founders of the School of Common Sense Philoso-
phy, was the first to explicitly state the nature of
particular speech acts which involve individual moral
responsibility (moral agency). In his essays on the
active powers of the human mind, Reid points out
that a speaker enters into a social contract, which he is
expected to respect, whenever a speech act consists of:
• asking;
• testifying;
• commanding and
• making a promise.
Reid’s philosophy clarifies why the notion of a
communication contract, which will be defended
here, follows directly from that of a social contract.
Society and any group or organization that is part
of it can, indeed, be defined as a community of
communicating individuals who agree to adhere to

an implicit communication contract (cf. Ghiglione,
1997). Through such a communication contract,
individuals gain rights by giving up unlimited free-
dom of expression or speech and by accepting to
respect the needs, freedom and rights of expression
and speech of others. In the global corporate
world, the growing trans-national embedding and
416 Birgitta Dresp-Langley
interdependence of complex issues such as life
quality, environmental challenges, economic devel-
opment and sustainability have increased the need
for individual social responsibility. To address these
issues, contemporary sociological theory (see Ban-
dura, 2001) has taken up Reid’s original concept of
individual moral agency by placing human agency at
the centre of any future capacity of control over the
nature and quality of all forms of human existence

within society, from families to corporations.
Responsible communication between individuals
has undeniably become one of the most urgent of all
current social needs, worldwide.
Austin’s (1962) speech act theory not only offers a
conceptual approach to the problem of interpersonal
communication but also leads the way towards an
explicit definition of ethical core values and princi-
ples. Subsequent speech act theories (e.g. Searle,
1969) have failed to develop this aspect of Austin’s
work. Communication theories in general have not
expressed much concern for the question of ethics,
and the fundamental link that exists between Aus-
tin’s original speech act theory and the philosophy of
ethics needs, indeed, to be re-established. To this
end, the concept of a speech situation and the associ-
ated felicity conditions will be re-discussed here to
clarify that, beyond offering an analysis of unsuc-

cessful speech acts, Austin’s theory addresses ground
conditions of ethical communication.
Austin’s felicity conditions and
the psychological speech situation
Austin’s felicity conditions define critical and inter-
dependent conditions for a speech situation that are
supposed to cause a given speech act to succeed
when the conditions are fulfilled, and to fail when
the conditions are not fulfilled. The felicity condi-
tions are as follows:
(A.1) There must be an accepted conventional
procedure that has a certain conventional
effect and includes the uttering of certain
words by certain persons under certain
circumstances
(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances
must be appropriate for the particular pro-
cedure invoked

(B.1) The accepted conventional procedure
must be followed by all participants, both
correctly and
(B.2) completely
(s. 1) When the accepted conventional proce-
dure invoked is designed for persons with
certain thoughts or feelings or for the
inauguration of certain consequential
conduct on the part of any participant,
then any person participating in the pro-
cedure must indeed have those thoughts
or feelings or indeed intend to conduct
herself/himself accordingly and
(s. 2) actually conduct herself/himself accord-
ingly as a consequence.
The felicity conditions thus prescribe that, whenever
we enter a speech situation, we implicitly agree to
follow certain conventions regarding what is said by
whom and when at a first, strictly procedural level

(conventionality), to act in a way that ensures that
these conventions are actualized as part of the reality
of the speech situation (actuality), and at a deeper
level, which is particularly important to the question
of ethics, to formulate sincere intentions according
to expectations, and to act subsequently in a manner
that respects the intentions expressed (intentionality).
Austin pointed out the difference in nature between
the felicity conditions indicated by roman letters A
and B and the felicity conditions indicated by the
Greek letter s: non-fulfilment of the procedural
conventionality conditions stated in A and B would
reflect what he called misexecution of the felicity
conditions, whereas non-fulfilment of the inten-
tionality conditions in s would reflect abuse of the
felicity conditions.
From misexecution to abuse: the thin line between
ethical and unethical speech acts
Misexecution of the felicity conditions is frequent in

the real world of today. A typical case of misexe-
cution would be incorrectly assuming shared pro-
cedural conventions with regard to who is supposed
to say what and when (conditions stated in A) when,
in reality, all participants do not share these con-
ventions. Deliberately (mischievously, provoca-
tively, etc.) not acting according to actually shared
The Communication Contract and Its Ten Ground Clauses 417
procedural conventions (conditions stated in B) has
also become frequent in contemporary society,
where speaking up when one is not supposed to may
be a deliberate strategic means to a specific end.
Austin’s notion of abuse originally referred to
insincerely expressed intentions, or to a sincere
intention that is not followed by the professed act.
There can be no doubt that a promise uttered
without the intention of keeping it, or an intention

deliberately followed by non-action or an action that
is incompatible with the intention expressed, is a
case of abuse. On the other hand, a sincere intention
that is not followed by the professed act may be the
consequence of factors that are beyond the control
of the speaker. In this case, what is potentially abuse
becomes a case of incidental non-performance due
to facts that could not be anticipated. Conversely, an
apparent misexecution of an accepted convention at
the procedural level might reflect motivated strategic
abuse. In such a case, the abuser would be aware of
the accepted convention, knows what he/she is
supposed to say or not and when, but deliberately
violates the convention to an end only he/she may
be aware of. TV footages of G. W. Bush’s address to
the public on Independence Day 2008 feature sev-
eral such examples, where members of the public
deliberately interrupt the speaker, thereby violating

the convention to keep quiet while being addressed.
In the light of these considerations, it becomes clear
why speech situations, especially in the modern
world, refer to a complex psychological space. This
psychological space exists only through the motiva-
tions and intentions which underlie the utterances
made. Thus, when I speak to you, I am performing a
speech act with underlying psychological motiva-
tions and intentions. These motivations or intentions
are not necessarily made clear through the speech
act. Whether or not felicity conditions are fulfilled,
accidentally misexecuted, or deliberately abused in a
given speech situation requires more than an analysis
of the logical structure of speech acts.
In his book on existentialism, the French philos-
opher Sartre (1945) proposed the psychological
concept of bonne foi (good faith) as opposed to that of
mauvaise foi (bad faith) to provide a universal defi-

nition for fundamentally ethical human acts, partic-
ularly speech acts, as opposed to fundamentally
unethical ones: whenever we pretend in speech or
direct action to be what we are not, to think or feel
what we do not, we are acting in bad faith and
therefore unethically. Conversely, when our speech
or action is true to what we genuinely are, think,
and feel, we are acting in good faith and therefore
ethically.
Misexecution of a felicity condition in speech acts
may be accidental, in which case it does not involve
bad faith. Accidental misexecution may cause a
speech act to fail its purpose, but is not unethical.
Misexecution of a felicity condition may be delib-
erate, such as deliberately provoking a speaker in a
manner that violates an accepted convention.
Deliberate misexecution is not necessarily unethical,
especially when caused in good faith. When, for

example, a hearer interrupts a speaker against an
accepted convention because he/she perceives the
speaker’s utterances as unacceptable, the hearer
misexecutes the accepted convention, but does so in
good faith. While such behaviour has a disruptive
effect, it is not by definition unethical. On the other
hand, any deliberate misexecution that involves bad
faith, such as for example interrupting a speaker
against the accepted convention with the sole intent
to cause trouble is, by definition, unethical.
Abuse of a felicity condition in Austin’s sense
involves bad faith by definition. It is therefore by
definition unethical. In the light of these consider-
ations, we propose the following general definition
of an unethical speech act: ‘‘any utterance motivated
by psychological forces that involve bad faith and
lead to misexecution and/or abuse of at least one of
Austin’s felicity conditions’’.

The psychological speech situation
How can we know for sure whether people we
interact with are communicating in good or bad
faith? Grice (1975, 1981), among others, described
devious speech scenarios where a hearer may act in
bad faith, by taking for granted that a speaker re-
spects the felicity conditions, to gain the warrant to
interpret the speaker’s utterances accordingly. A
speaker may act in bad faith by strategically abusing
the felicity conditions to all kinds of ends. This leads
to contaminated speech situations where commu-
nication may appear ethical at the surface, but is in
reality devious, the felicity conditions being delib-
erately abused at all levels. This explains why trying
to identify the intentions that motivate utterances or
speech acts by analysing the logical structure of

speech sequences is, as Haberland and Mey (2002)
put it, looking for traces in a petrified product. Any
simple sequence of seemingly straightforward speech
acts may reflect a psychologically complex speech
situation, the true nature of which may remain un-
known to the outsider listening in. This can be
shown through the following scenario, originally
given in Clark and Brennan (1991) as an example to
explain that common semantic ground needs to be
built and updated in a conversation:
Alan: now, – um, do you and your husband
have a – car?
Barbara: – have a car?
Alan: yeah
Barbara: no
Clark and Brennan (1991) argued that it is obvi-
ous from this sequence of utterances that Alan did
not effectively manage to ask Barbara whether she

and her husband have a car because Barbara indicates
by her question ‘‘– have a car?’’ that she has not
understood Alan. The authors consider this sequence
of utterances as an example for ineffective commu-
nication (Clark and Schaefer, 1987; Sacks et al.,
1974; Schegloff, 1982; Schegloff et al., 1977);
however, without any insight into the psychological
context in which the utterances were produced,
such as the kind of relationship between Alan and
Barbara and what may have motivated their
respective utterances, one cannot explain why Alan’s
speech act was unsuccessful.
Now, let us consider the same sequence of
utterances in the light of the following (fictive)
psychological speech situation. Alan and Barbara are
colleagues who work on the same floor. Barbara
loves her garden and flowers and spends a lot of time
taking care of them. Alan is aware of Barbara’s

passion for gardening. His car broke down this
morning and he wants to find someone to give him a
lift into town. When leaving the office, he bumps
into Barbara who is having a cup of coffee and is
reading a gardening magazine in the lobby. Alan
starts a brief conversation with her about how her
garden is doing and whether she has planted any new
flowers yet. After a few exchanges on the gardening
matter, he suddenly utters:
Alan: now, – um, do you and your husband
have a – car?
Barbara: – have a car?
Alan: yeah
Barbara: no
This psychological speech situation sheds, indeed,
a completely new light on the utterances made and,
more importantly, on the motivations behind them.
It is now obvious that Alan’s primary motivation to

talk to Barbara was to find someone with a car to give
him a lift. To gain Barbara’s attention, Alan used his
knowledge of Barbara’s passion for gardening and
involved her in a conversation about flowers. Then,
without any reason that could possibly have been
clear to Barbara in the context given, he abruptly asks
her whether she and her husband have a car. Barbara
delays responding to Alan by asking him to confirm
his question: ‘‘– have a car?’’ In the fictive context
considered, it is most likely that she does so not be-
cause she has not understood Alan, but because she is
surprised and may be even quite shocked about the
nature of Alan’s question, or the abrupt manner in
which he brought it up. In fact, what Barbara does
not understand is not Alan’s question or the meaning
of his utterance. What she does not understand is the
motivation behind the question. In fact, Alan has not
communicated as ethically as he could have. In the

context given, his incongruous utterance about
Barbara and her husband having a car is unrelated to
the initial topic of their conversation. Also, it fails to
make clear to Barbara why the utterance should be
relevant at all, to either her or himself. Moreover,
Alan has not been entirely sincere with Barbara by
pretending to be interested in her garden and her
flowers while the first thing on his mind was, in
reality, to find out whether she and her husband have
car and could maybe give him a lift into town. Alan
has, indeed, spoken in bad faith. He has deliberately
and in bad faith misexecuted Austin’s first felicity
condition relative to actuality and abused the first
felicity condition relative to intentionality. Expressed
in terms of the model that will now be introduced, he
has violated three ground clauses of his implicit
communication contract with Barbara: the continu-
ity clause, the relevance clause and, to some extent,

the sincerity clause.
The communication contract model with ten
binding ground clauses as stipulated is schematized in
Figure 1. These clauses encompass and extend
Austin’s original felicity conditions by adapting them
to the communication needs of modern society
with, however, the major aim of exercising control
over any severe form of misexecution and/or abuse
of any of the original felicity conditions. It is argued
that ensuring that respecting these ten simple ground
conditions ensures ethical communication at the
interpersonal level, in particular in business meet-
ings, where a moderator may be designed to monitor
the speech situation.
The ten ground clauses
of the communication contract

The ten ground clauses of the communication
contract proposed here to ensure ethical communi-
cation are as follows:
Sincerity clause
The sincerity clause stipulates that all partners are
to honestly communicate according to the best of
their knowledge, without deliberately omitting,
hiding or falsifying knowledge or intentions that
are relevant to the issue of their interaction. It is
the conditio sine qua non for all of Austin’s felicity
conditions relating to intentionality. In his book
‘L’homme communiquant’ (1997), the French phi-
losopher, psychologist and linguist Ghiglione
described the psychological problem space
addressed by the sincerity clause in terms of a
complex domain between inadequate facts and
straightforward lies. Violations of the sincerity
clause can engender a heavy cost in communica-

tion. They may lead to a total breakdown of
constructive information exchange and thereby
severely jeopardize the outcome of any relationship
between people in the shorter or longer term.
Identifying and preventing violations of the sin-
cerity clause in the discursive behaviour of com-
municating partners is generally difficult, often
impossible. Human beings omit communicating, or
lie about, facts or intentions for many different
reasons and in many different, often subtle, devious
ways. They may sometimes not even be conscious
of doing so. The goal here is neither to address the
reasons why people may be insincere nor to make
judgemental statements about liars or suggest
measures that would allow sorting out who tells
the truth and who does not. The goal of an ex-
plicit sincerity clause is to make individuals aware
that it is in their own best interest to be sincere

and honest when they communicate. As our fictive
example above shows, by not being sincere with
Barbara about his true motivations, Alan created an
immediate grounding problem (Clark and Brennan,
1991) in their conversation. Furthermore, Barbara’s
delaying her reply to Alan may even indicate that
she has become mistrustful of his intentions, in
which case Alan’s lack of sincerity has achieved the
opposite of what he initially wanted: win Barbara’s
trust and cooperation to get a lift into town. Only
by communicating sincerely can partners ever hope
to create and reinforce the climate of mutual trust
that is necessary for building lasting and truly
effective relationships, in organizational and in
private life.
THE COMMUNICATION CONTRACT
Partners and expectations at outset
Ethical Ground Clauses

sincerity
relevance
continuity
clarity
prudence
tolerance
openness
prompt resolution
balanced speech times
optimal timing
Violation of clauses Respect of clauses
Decision making quality
Satisfaction of partners at outcome
Figure 1. The communication contract model is based
on ten ground clauses that are pragmatically binding for
all communicating beings. They encompass and extend
Austin’s (1962) felicity conditions, as explained in the
text. It is stipulated that non-respect or deliberate viola-
tion of any of these clauses incurs an intangible cost.
The weight of the latter can be assessed indirectly on
the basis of the level of satisfaction of communicating
partners at the end of a conversation or a meeting (see
the case study presented here).

Relevance clause
The relevance clause stipulates that utterances have
to be relevant to the goals, topics and objectives of a
conversation or a meeting. It pragmatically ensures
to a large extent Austin’s felicity conditions relative
to conventionality and actuality, which is especially
important in business meetings. It helps a group or a
team focus on goals and contributes to ensure that
relevant issues will not get drowned in, or obscured
by, irrelevant individual utterances. This involves
respecting a given agenda. Meetings where some
partners make others waste their time are costly and
therefore counterproductive. In conversation or
discourse in general, partners have to make sure that
others understand why what they say is relevant and
to whom, as illustrated by the Alan–Barbara example

above. In text designed to be informative, the author
has to ensure that what he/she writes is relevant to
his/her potential audience, the topic addressed, and
the context in which the text is to be published.
Continuity clause
The continuity clause stipulates that communication
is to ensure continuity in contents. This clause is
particularly important in interpersonal communica-
tion and to a lesser extent in written text, where the
reader has the possibility to stop, reflect, and go back
to previous lines to get a coherent representation of
contents. The continuity clause is to ensure that
communicating partners ‘‘get connected’’ and de-
velop a cohesive discourse that effectively takes into
account the other partners’ propositions and argu-
ments. Like the relevance clause, it defines one of
the pragmatic key modalities to ensure felicity con-
ditions relative to conventionality and actuality.

Respecting the continuity clause is avoiding dis-
cursive behaviours where individuals express what-
ever comes to their minds at a given moment
without taking into account what was said by the
partner who spoke before them. Monitoring the
continuity clause regulates self-centred discursive
behaviours and thereby facilitates genuine team
communication. It enables a group to evolve to-
wards cohesive group thinking and effective infor-
mation sharing. Disconnected egotistical discourse,
as illustrated by the non-communication scenarios in
Harold Pinter’s theatre plays, is detrimental to
interpersonal information sharing and, at a deeper
psychological level, prevents people from sharing
certain thoughts and feelings to better understand
each other’s viewpoints.
Clarity clause
The clarity clause states that communicating beings

or partners should be as precise and explicit as pos-
sible. It adds a new dimension to Austin’s felicity
conditions insofar as lack of clarity in interpersonal
communication can make speech acts fail even
though all the felicity conditions relating to con-
ventionality, actuality and intentionality may be
fulfilled. Jargon deserves particular attention here,
especially in business or team communication,
where different jargons are used by professionals
with different expertise, knowledge, age, or social
status. When using jargon in a communication
process, one must be aware that some partners may
not be familiar with it. Jargon abuse, like abuse of
innuendo or lack of general clarity in statements,
needs to be monitored constructively in goal-di-
rected communication. Younger or less experienced
partners should be encouraged to ask questions and
to interrupt whenever they do not understand what

is being said. Putting communication partners in a
position where they have to read between the lines
or spend additional time searching for information
not provided in due course is detrimental to meet-
ings with tight agendas and deadlines that have to be
met. The clarity clause, in short, is to prevent mis-
understandings and their consequences by promot-
ing attention to the information needs of all
communication partners involved.
Prudence clause
As explained above, words, like actions, have their
consequences. Thinking about the possible conse-
quences of what one does, writes, or says is not only
an important key to ethical speech acts, but also a
key to their success or effectiveness (Baron, 1990).
The prudence clause extends the felicity conditions
by encouraging communication partners to deal
with information sincerely but, at the same time,

carefully. Careless handling of information can lead
to the rapid propagation of false data such as hearsay,
rumours, or incomplete facts in human communi-
cation networks and thereby seriously compromise
relationships and projects. Whenever dubious or
false information circulates in groups or teams, vio-
lation of the sincerity clause, where certain indi-
viduals deliberately try to manipulate members of
the group or the whole group as such, may be sus-
pected. The psychological argument for a prudence
clause relates to the fact that sincere communication
partners share an interest in relating only information
from reliable sources that can be verified by all
partners at any time if necessary.
Tolerance clause
The tolerance clause stipulates that communicating

beings must not dismiss any sincere and potentially
constructive comment of a partner, even if it may
appear non-conventional or naı̈ ve. This clause
encourages handling the felicity conditions relating
to conventionality in an open, tolerant and flexible
manner, which is important in modern multicultural
societies. Unconventional suggestions often help
clarify complex issues. Younger, less experienced
partners and individuals from different domains of
expertise cannot necessarily deal with complexity
with the same ease and insight as some of their more
experienced partners. In groups, naı̈ ve questions,
suggestions or comments should be taken into ac-
count within the limits of the felicity conditions
relating to conventionality. Non-conventional
questions also should, if possible, be discussed in a
constructive manner. Monitoring conventionality
conditions with tolerance and flexibility can open

doors to new ideas or ways of conceiving or doing
and can produce unsuspected breakthroughs. Such
potential must not be wasted. Unfortunately, this is
only too often the case. Senior team partners with an
assumedly wider experience often have a tendency
to dismiss or ignore critical statements from juniors
or partners with different or less expertise. In the
senior versus junior scenario, such intolerance may be
due to the fact that, implicitly and sometimes
unwillingly, the junior’s statement or comment is
deemed ‘‘inadequate’’. In the case of the expert versus
non-expert scenario, it may be due to the fact that an
expert may, consciously or unconsciously, consider
that he/she has nothing to learn from someone
outside his/her field of expertise. This kind of psy-
chological problem reaches well beyond a problem
of communication grounding. Pragmatic clauses are
needed to regulate the use of discursive behaviour as

a means of dominating other partners. The tolerance
clause directly aims at situations where relevant re-
marks of team members with inferior hierarchical
position or less experience are overruled by
authority statements from team members with
higher status. Interrupting partners or speaking up
for them without having been asked to do so are
examples of violations of the tolerance clause. Such
behaviour, which can readily be quantified in dis-
course analysis, is considered an indicator of so-
called ‘‘conversational dominance’’ (e.g. Itakura,
2001) in every day and institutional conversation.
Openness clause
The openness clause complements the tolerance
clause by stipulating that all communicating beings
should be as open as possible to suggestions or
arguments of other partners. The function of this
clause is to create a communication climate where

partners are able, when differences in opinion exist,
to accept these differences gracefully. A conversation
or meeting must not become a discursive battlefield
where arguments are used like weapons and where
persuasion strategies replace open and constructive
exchange. Such situations have a potentially
destructive effect on both personal and professional
relationships between individuals and may compro-
mise collective goals and decision making.
Prompt resolution clause
The status of conflict in modern communication has
become an important issue, and extends far beyond
the initial preoccupations of Austin’s felicity condi-
tions. In modern business communication, however,
it is critical to deal with interpersonal conflict ethi-
cally and promptly. The function of the resolution
clause here is to increase the awareness of individual
partners and team leaders that it is in their best

interest to deal with conflicts and misunderstandings
promptly, openly, self-critically, and constructively
(see other clauses here above). The prompt resolu-
tion clause may be difficult to monitor given that
negative feelings or resentments caused by specific
utterances may be kept tacit and interpersonal con-
flicts may therefore not be immediately detectable.
The monitoring of such speech situations by a psy-
chologically skilled consultant seems an appropriate
way of keeping them under control.
Balanced speech time clause
Fulfilling the felicity conditions in the domain of
interpersonal communication relies on a certain
balance of the times taken by different partners in a
conversation or a business meeting to ‘‘have their
say’’. Situations where some protagonists take sig-

nificantly more speech time than others, or where a
particular partner notoriously monopolizes speech
time, can be costly, especially when such behaviour
leads to important issues being neglected and/or
affects sound decision making. Like violations of the
tolerance clause, violations of the balanced speech
time clause are quantifiable indicators of conversa-
tional dominance patterns (Edelsky, 1981; Itakura,
2001), where partners who do not get their ‘‘fair
share’’ of verbal expression are being dominated by
others. Such scenarios can engender a heavy cost, in
organizations and in families. Recent psychological
insight into the causal relation between conversa-
tional dominance, power discrepancies (victimiza-
tion) and domestic violence (Babcock et al., 1993)
highlights the potential importance of this particular
clause.
Optimal timing clause

Finally, nowadays more than ever, time is precious.
Wasting time through bad planning is unsound, not
only in business but in general. Wasting time
deliberately by letting ‘‘things ride’’ is abusive and,
therefore, unethical. Thus, a communication con-
tract adapted to modern society must include a
clause which stipulates that there is an optimal fre-
quency with which communicating beings have to
interact to keep their relationships and projects
going. An optimal timing clause is therefore
proposed to encourage communicating partners to
combine their efforts in working out a schedule for
meetings which ensures that goals are pursued in due
course and time is not wasted.
Case study: speech act analysis
of a business meeting with
conversational dominance
In institutional interpersonal communication, as-

signed roles and tasks often produce asymmetries in
participatory weights and the distribution of verbal
interactions (Ten Have, 1991). Such asymmetries are
characteristic of conversational dominance (e.g.
Itakura, 2001) and can be identified on the basis of
quantitative data patterns relative to questioning,
topic control, interruptions, and amount of speech.
Communication scenarios where conversational
dominance patterns are present may lead to victim-
ization and domestic violence (Babcock et al.,
1993). As explained above, the presence of con-
versational dominance patterns in interpersonal
communication implies that ground clauses of the
communication contract are being violated.
To illustrate how clause violations and their
possible consequences may affect a business meeting,
the pragmatic analysis of the speech act sequences
from a meeting with traces of conversational dom-

inance in a ‘senior-versus-junior’ scenario is pre-
sented. We randomly selected one of the meetings of
a small team of senior partners and junior members
in a large organization, the identity of which will
remain anonymous. The meeting was called at very
short notice by the team leader. The last team
meeting had taken place 3 months earlier although
the team was supposed to meet at least once a month
to keep track of ongoing projects.
Context and background information
The projects of some of the juniors were not pro-
gressing well. At least seven of the thirteen team
partners were aware of the problem and had
expressed their concern informally at various mo-
ments (coffee breaks, corridor talk, etc.). The team
leader communicated the time and place of the

meeting to all team members by e-mail the evening
before. The following agenda was given:
– departmental elections;
– budgets;
– summary of previous directors’ committee and
– junior research projects.
Four senior team members were unable to attend the
meeting and sent e-mails to the team leader, stating
‘‘too short notice’’ or ‘‘have other important busi-
ness to see to’’ as reasons for their absence. The
meeting was attended by five junior members (three
female, two male) and four seniors (three male, one
female), among whom were the former department
director (male) and the team leader himself (male).
Before the meeting, the team was asked whether any
of them had any objection against the meeting being
recorded by means of a digital device and their
utterances being analysed for study purposes. None

of the protagonists objected and all agreed to fill out
questionnaires anonymously, before and after the
meeting. None of them was aware of the goal or the
theory underlying the study.
Data collection and coding scheme
A pre-meeting questionnaire was used to collect
information relative to the expectations of partners
and their previous experience with a given partner
or team. Two post-meeting questionnaires were
given to establish whether partners were immedi-
ately satisfied with the way things went in the
meeting, and how effectively the different topics and
contents were recalled 3 days later. Information
regarding the general context, objective, and agenda
of the meeting was taken into account. The hier-
archical status and gender of partners, whose identity
remains anonymous, were determined. The re-
corded material was analysed using the following

coding scheme, which permits identification of
clause violations on the basis of quantitative and
qualitative criteria.
– In order to detect violations of the balanced speech
time clause, speech sequences are timed and
numbered; quantitative indicators, such as the
speech times of the different partners as a func-
tion of their status and gender, are computed.
– Whenever the content of an utterance bears
no relationship with the content of the pre-
ceding one, violation of the continuity clause is
noted.
– When an utterance suggests that a partner does
not understand why what has been said in a pre-
vious utterance should matter, violation of the
relevance clause is noted.
– Respect of the sincerity clause is questioned
whenever an utterance, or the context in which

it is produced, indicates that a partner is suspi-
cious of what has been said by another. An
example of a sequence of utterances indicating
violations of the continuity, relevance and sincerity
clauses is given and explained in the fictive
Alan–Barbara scenario above.
– Violation of the tolerance clause is noted when-
ever team partners interrupt others or speak for
them without having been invited to do so, as
in classic conversational dominance patterns (e.g.
Itakura, 2001).
– When an utterance is obviously or repeatedly
misunderstood in a sequence, violation of the
clarity clause is noted, as in the following example:
Peter: a different modus operandi was adopted this
time
Paul: a modus – what?
Peter: well, there was pressure from higher up

to do things differently this time
Paul: – pressure from higher up?
– Whenever an utterance contains apparent facts
or figures for which there is no clear evidence,
or is obviously based on hearsay, violation of the
prudence clause is noted, as for example in:
Peter: Mary says they do not feed these cats
properly
Paul: well, the neighbour told me there’s always
food in a bowl in the garden
– Violation of the openness clause is noted when an
argument is dismissed without justification or
when a partner maintains his/her argument with-
out considering a counter-argument presented by
the partner who has spoken before, as in:
Peter: I think they should take these cats away
from them

Paul: but they cannot do that just because Mary
says these things, can they?
Peter: I think they should take them away
– Whenever an argument leads to a dead end, vio-
lation of the prompt resolution clause is noted, as
for example at the end of the following se-
quence of utterances:
Paul: you must not say things like that, these
people are my friends
Peter: better be more careful choosing your
friends then, right?
Paul: don’t you speak to me like that!
Peter: have to go now – some of us are work-
ing, you know?
– Violation of the optimal timing clause may be
inferred on the basis of answers given in the pre-
and post-meeting questionnaires, as the discussion

of the results of this study will show.
Results and discussion
The pre-meeting questionnaire featured four ques-
tions the different team members had to answer: (1)
‘‘Please state in a few words what you expect from
this meeting’’, (2) ‘‘Do you think your expectations
will be satisfied by the meeting?’’, with five possible
answers to choose from, (3) ‘‘How would you
qualify your experiences from previous meetings
with the team and their outcomes?’’, with four
possible answers to choose from and (4) ‘‘How
would you assess your status within the team?’’, with
five possible answers to choose from. The data from
the analysis of the pre-meeting questionnaires are
summarized in Table I. From these data, we can
conclude that three of the five junior team members
expected exchanges beyond retrieving general
information relative to topics listed in the meeting

agenda. Six of the nine team members, including all
the five juniors, expected the meeting to be con-
cerned with team projects. We further note that
none of the team partners thought that his/her
expectations would be satisfied by the meeting
without difficulty. The five juniors considered that
their expectations would be satisfied either with
difficulty (four replies) or not at all (one reply). Eight
of the nine team members reported having had
reasonably good experiences from the previous team
meetings, with more or less positive outcomes. One
junior team member reported having had poor
experiences from previous meetings, with poor
outcomes or none. None of the participants identi-
fied themselves as the team leader despite the fact
that the team has an officially declared leader and a
clear hierarchical structure. One senior participant
stated that he considered all people in the team to

have equal status. Two of the four seniors identified
themselves with an important status in the team and
the five juniors considered their status in the team
‘not very high’.
Analysis of the recorded discourse material
allowed a reconstruction of the chronological
sequences of speech production (see Table II),
revealing that 54 min of the 64 min of overall
meeting duration were taken by two of the nine
team partners: the team leader (A) and the former
department director (B). The other two senior
partners (C and D) each spoke a few minutes at the
meeting. Of the junior partners, only the two male
juniors spoke. This result indicates a considerable
imbalance in speech time characteristic of a con-
versational dominance pattern, where the two male
seniors with the highest status in the team ‘take the
floor’ (cf. Edelsky, 1981). This is achieved here

through massive violation of the balanced speech
time clause. Further sequence-by-sequence analysis
of the verbal exchanges revealed other clause viola-
tions. Table II may be consulted for localising these
clause violations, which are described here in the
order in which they occurred in the meeting.
Violations of the tolerance clause and the open-
ness clause by B were detected in exchanges with
the female senior team partner C in the first 8 min
of the meeting. These clause violations occurred in
a context where A requested to be informed about
the status of a specific project submission. Senior
partner C, being the coordinator of that project,
should have been the one expected to reply to A’s
question:
A: …will this project be re-submitted?
B (replying for C): yes, yes, we will re-submit
C: – well, we
B (interrupting C): we’ll consider the reports,

revise, and then re-submit
C: these reports said nothing helpful about the
quality of our products, they…
B (dismissive): well, we will consider these re-
ports and re-submit
C: they were quite clear in saying that they
wanted us to include X in this project and that
B (interrupting C): I don’t remember – we’ll
have to see and then make a decision…
Three further violations of the tolerance clause by B
were detected in exchanges with A, the team leader.
One of these consisted of a double clause violation
where B interrupted A, violating both the tolerance
and the clarity clauses:
A: …several new people joined the department
recently – there is
B (interrupting A): X got Y in this year

A: beg your pardon?
B: Y is with us this year, X got him in
A: ah – yes…
Another tolerance clause violation by B towards A
was detected subsequently in:
D (asking A): is it really urgent to put this into
practice?
B (replying for A): it is not urgent, but the new
department director wants to put it into practice
as quickly as possible and…
A: well, some changes are bound to be immi-
nent, then – now, …
Then, after about 15 min of exchanges between the
four seniors without clause violations, B violates the
continuity and the relevance clauses by interrupting
A. This double clause violation leads to a sequence
of violations of the clarity clause and the openness
clause (see also Table II):

A: …I guess we have dealt with the internships
– there also
B (interrupting A): it occurs to me that mem-
bers of … have the same status as members of
… – which means X will also be able to take
over projects in the new department
D: so do members of …, no?
B (dismissive): no – that’s not the same thing
A: what are we talking about here? –
T
A
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5
TABLE II
The chronological sequence of speech production in the meeting
Protagonist speaking Status/gender Time Topics covered
Clauses violated
A T-Leader/male 3 min 1 0
B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance!
C Senior/female 1 s 1 0
B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 1 Tolerance! Openness!

C Senior/female 20 s 1, 2 0
A T-Leader/male 20 s 2 0
B Ex-Dir/male 10 s 2 0
B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 2 Tolerance! Clarity!
A T-Leader 20 s 2 0
A T-Leader 3 min 3, 4 0
D Senior/male 10 s 4 0
A T-Leader 1 min:30 s 5, 6, 7 0
B Ex-Dir/male 3 min 7 0
A T-Leader 1 min 7 0

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 7 Tolerance!
A T-Leader 25 s 7 0
A T-Leader 10 s 7 0
D Senior/male 1 min 7 0

TABLE II
continued
Clauses violated
B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 7 0
A T-Leader 50 s 8 0
A T-Leader/male 50 s 8, 9 0

E Junior/male 5 s 9 0
B Ex-Dir/male 10 s ? Continuity! Relevance!
D Senior/male 4 s ? Openness! Clarity!

B Ex-Dir/male 2 s ? Clarity!
A T-Leader/male 2 s ? 0
B Ex-Dir/male 5 s ? Clarity!
A T-Leader/male 3 s ? 0
B Ex-Dir/male 4 s ? Clarity! Openness!
Silence 6 s – –
A T-Leader/male 2 min:10 s 10 0
A T-Leader, male 6 s 11 Clarity!
B Ex-Dir/male 2 s 11 Clarity!

TABLE II
continued
Clauses violated
C Senior/Female 3 s 11 0
A T-Leader/male 1 min:30 s 12 0

F Junior/male 6 s 12 0
A T-Leader/male 1 min:30 s 12, 13 0

B: well, there are new equivalences between
certain kinds of qualifications

A: including …?
B (dismissive): no, no, no – that is not at all the
same thing
In the following sequence, A violates the clarity
clause, which is followed by a question from C to A.
Then B, without having been invited to do so,
answers this question for A, violating the tolerance
clause once and the clarity clause twice:
A: different weights are to be applied to the dif-
ferent posts in regard to training and research
C (asking A): different weights? What would my
weight be, for example?
B: yours would be more
C: more?
TABLE II
continued
Clauses violated

D Senior/male 1 s 14? Relevance!
C Senior/female 10 s – 0
B Ex-Dir/male 35 s 15, 16 0
B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:30 s 17, 18 0
A T-Leader/male 10 s 18, 19 0
D Senior/male 15 s 19? Relevance! Prudence!

B Ex-Dir/male 1 min:15 s ? Continuity! Relevance! Tolerance!
B Ex-Dir/male 1 s ? Openness!
A T-Leader/male 1 s ? Relevance!
B Ex-Dir/male 1 min – 0
A T-Leader/male 4 s ? Relevance!
B Ex-Dir/male 2 s – 0
D Senior/male 3 s ? Relevance!
End of meeting
The different protagonists are indicated by letters of the
alphabet, reproducing the order in which they have first spoken
up in the meeting. Their status and gender, the times taken to
speak, the topics covered (indicated by numbers repro-
ducing the order in which they were brought up), and the
clauses violated in a given sequence are shown.

B: yes, more – more for research
C: well, this is not all too clear…
Later in the meeting, when elections to the new
department council are discussed, B further violates
the tolerance and clarity clauses. The revealing se-
quence started when A asked junior member F
whether he was elected or designated member of last
term’s council:
A (asking F): you were elected into the last
council, weren’t you?
F: no, I was designated to replace P, who had
left after his
B (interrupting): yes, but this is like being
elected
F: is it ? – I thought it was more like being
nominated – we were discussing among us who
B (interrupting): well, for junior members it is

different
A: ok, whatever – this year there are three dif-
ferent groups to be represented and we have to
know who would like to stand for election
F: yes, and I have a question: those of us juniors
who were designated to replace outgoing mem-
bers in the middle of the last council mandate,
will they be able to
B (interrupting): that is not the way it works –
with new elections, all counters are back to zero
F: – like, uh, starting from scratch?
B: yep
A: ok – I might stand for election to represent
the senior partners…
Later on, another senior team member (D) violates
the relevance clause twice. The first violation is
followed by an objection from the female senior
(C):

A: …it says applications will be reviewed under
the sole criterion of excellence
D: they’re looking for individualistic shit stirrers,
right?
C: oh come on – I hope there are some young
and bright individuals around who don’t fall
into one of your categories
Then, violations of the relevance and prudence
clauses are noted:
B: …we have not yet had such committees
here, but it might come
D: I heard they’ve already had one like that at
… – appears the guy was sacked on the spot
B: well – I believe this is for the moment not
the way things are done, at least not here…
After about 60 min, the team leader (A) asked the
group whether anyone wanted to discuss other is-
sues, such as the ongoing team projects. These were,
according to the background information given, not
progressing well and clearly demanded some dis-

cussion. The former department director (B), as if
ignoring A’s question, starts a longish personal
comment on a different and irrelevant matter, pre-
venting other team members from considering A’s
invitation. In doing so, it is considered that B has
violated the tolerance, continuity and relevance
clauses at the same time. This triple clause violation
engendered more clause violations and the rapid
termination of the meeting, in an apparently relaxed
atmosphere:
A: …any other urgent business – maybe the
current projects?
B: I really regret having missed that exhibition
last week – they say it was fantastic. That guy
really is a fabulous artist – presented all his new-
est constructions … such an exciting project
C: what’s the name of the project?
B: the name of the artist is X
A (asking B): can we maybe have some more

information on that prize we seemed to have
won?
B: well, they are treating it discretely at the mo-
ment, but there might be some publicity in the
next weeks or so
A: there should also be G at the celebration – is
she still around?
B: oh yes, still going strong
D: she still going? – my oh my – been hanging
in there for a while now, the old bat [laughs]
C: old bat – listen to that – old bat yourself
[laughs]
The distribution of clause violations by the dif-
ferent members of the team as a function of their
status and gender are given in Table III. The dif-
ferent topics addressed in the meeting are listed in

Table IV, respecting the order in which they were
brought up and with the times dedicated to each
topic. About 39 min, more than half of the total
time (64 min), were dedicated to topics 1, 7, 11 and
12. The remaining 25 min were dedicated to various
topics, either featuring or not on the agenda. There
was a brief mention of an urgent need to plan and
coordinate team projects for the year (topic 17),
followed by a non-specific remark from senior team
partner B to the juniors reminding them that their
projects are not progressing as well as they should
(topic 18) and that there have been discussions about
forming a supervisors’ committee (19). An exchange
of ideas relating to their projects or any of the other
team projects was not produced.
Analyses of the post-meeting questionnaires are
shown in Table V. Seven of the nine team partners,
including the four seniors, were ‘‘reasonably satisfied

with the meeting and its outcome’’. One junior
stated to be ‘‘not too satisfied’’ and another junior
was ‘‘not satisfied at all’’. None of the team partners
reported being entirely satisfied with the meeting
and its outcome.
By applying a ‘satisfaction coefficient’ to each of
the four possible answers, with a coefficient of 1 for
‘‘entirely satisfied’’, coefficients of 0.75 for ‘‘rea-
sonably satisfied’’, 0.25 for ‘‘not too satisfied’’ and 0
for ‘‘not satisfied at all’’, we are able to compute a
quantitative indicator of the ‘terms of closure’ of the
communication contract after a meeting or a con-
versation. Here, for a meeting with nine participants,
TABLE III
Speech times of the different protagonists and number of clause
violations
Protagonist Status/gender Total time spoken Clause violations
A Team Leader/male 30 min:51 s 3
a

B Ex-Dept. Director/male 23 min:48 s 26
a
C Senior Partner/female 04 min:26 s 0
D Senior Partner/male 03 min:23 s 6
E Junior Member/male 00 min:17 s 0
F Junior Member/male 01 min:26 s 0
G Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0
H Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0
I Junior Member/female 00 min:00 s 0
Total time of speech 64 min:11 s
a
Balanced speech times clause.
TABLE IV
Topics in the order in which they were brought up in
the meeting, time dedicated to a given topic and whe-
ther it featured (yes/no) on the provisional agenda
communicated to team partners by the team leader
before the meeting
Topic

covered
Time dedicated
to topic
Corresponds to a topic
on agenda given
1 08 min:40 s Yes
2 02 min:40 s No
3 01 min:50 s No
4 01 min:20 s No
5 01 min:10 s Yes
6 00 min:15 s Yes
7 17 min:55 s Yes
8 01 min:30 s No
9 02 min:13 s No
10 01 min:58 s Yes
11 05 min:40 s Yes
12 06 min:10 s Yes
13 01 min:36 s No

14 02 min:28 s Yes
15 00 min:15 s No
16 00 min:25 s No
17 00 min:54 s No
18 01 min:20 s No
19 02 min:09 s No
20 00 min:04 s Yes
60 min:32 s
the optimal satisfaction rate indicating ‘closure under
the best possible conditions’ of the communication
contract would be 9/9. As it is, we obtain an overall
satisfaction rate of 5.5/9, which is only about 60% of
the optimal rate. When computing satisfaction rates
as a function of the status of the team partners, we
obtain a rate of 3/4 (75%) for the seniors, and a rate
of 2.5/5 (50%) for the juniors. This result suggests

that the juniors were far less happy with the
way things went at the meeting than the seniors.
Generally, we may expect that clause violators
would, indeed, suffer less from the consequences of
the deficient communication scenarios they create
than those who have to suffer the violations.
Seven of the nine team partners considered that
the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of communication within the
team ‘‘needs to improve’’, one junior judged com-
munication ‘‘ineffective’’, but stated that she ‘‘could
not say why’’ and another junior deemed that ‘‘time
is wasted on irrelevant matters’’. None of the nine
team partners thought that the team communicates
very effectively. When asked whether they had and
took every opportunity to speak up in the meeting,
three seniors of the nine team partners stated that
they did, three juniors stated that they did not speak
because they considered it ‘‘not worth it’’, two ju-

niors pointed out the fact that ‘‘others in the team
speak more often’’ and one senior team partner
declared that ‘‘I had hardly any chance to speak and
it bothered me a lot’’.
Four of the nine protagonists thought that the
‘‘team should meet more often’’ while four, of
whom three seniors, deemed that the ‘‘team meets
often enough’’. One junior team partner stated that
there were ‘‘far too many meetings’’ and that ‘‘a lot
of time is wasted’’ in them. When asked to make
suggestions on how the effectiveness of communi-
cation within the team could be improved, three
senior team partners stated to ‘‘have no idea’’, while
two juniors suggested to ‘‘involve the junior team
members more’’. Two others, one junior and one
senior, suggested to ‘‘plan and target the meetings
better’’ and to ‘‘meet more regularly’’.
Analyses of the second post-meeting question-

naire given 3 days after the meeting (results sum-
marized in Table VI) revealed that the items or
topics they most recalled, correctly and in great
detail, were, in the team partners’ own words:
‘‘a need to define and plan projects for the year’’
T
A
B
L
E
V
R
e
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
th
e
p
o
st
-m
e
e

ti
n
g
q
u
e
st
io
n
n
ai
re
w
it
h
ab
b
re
v
ia
te
d
v
e
rs
io
n
s
o
f
q
u
e
st
io

n
s
as
k
e
d
an
d
an
sw
e
rs
g
iv
e
n
S
at
is
fi
e
d
w
it
h
m
e
e
ti
n
g
an
d

o
u
tc
o
m
e
T
e
am
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
in
g
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
H
ad
e
v

e
ry
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
to
sp
e
ak
T
e
am
m
e
e
ti
n
g
o
ft
e
n
e
n
o

u
g
h
S
u
g
g
e
st
io
n
s
to
im
p
ro
v
e
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
E
n
ti
re

ly
sa
ti
sfi
e
d
:
0
R
e
as
o
n
ab
ly
sa
ti
sfi
e
d
:
7
N
o
t
to
o
sa
ti
sfi
e
d

:
1
N
o
t
at
al
l:
1
V
e
ry
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
:
0
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
n
e

ss
n
e
e
d
s
to
im
p
ro
v
e
:
7
In
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
,
b
u
t
I
d
o
n
’t
u

n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
w
h
y
:
1
T
im
e
is
w
as
te
d
o
n
ir
re
le
v
an
t
m
at
te
rs
:

1
H
ad
an
d
to
o
k
e
v
e
ry
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
:
3
N
o
t
w
o
rt
h
it
:

3
O
th
e
rs
sp
e
ak
m
o
re
o
ft
e
n
:
2
I
h
ar
d
ly
h
ad
an
y
c
h
an
c
e

to
sp
e
ak
,
an
d
it
b
o
th
e
rs
m
e
a
lo
t:
1
O
ft
e
n
e
n
o
u
g
h
:
4
S

h
o
u
ld
m
e
e
t
m
o
re
o
ft
e
n
:
4
F
ar
to
o
m
an
y
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s,

w
as
te
o
f
ti
m
e
:
1
N
o
id
e
a:
3
Im
p
li
c
at
e
ju
n
io
rs
m
o
re
:
2
P

la
n
an
d
ta
rg
e
t
th
e
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
b
e
tt
e
r:
2
D
e
v
o
te
m
o
re
ti

m
e
to
te
am
p
ro
je
c
ts
:
2
M
e
e
t
m
o
re
re
g
u
la
rl
y
:
5

(recalled correctly and in great detail by six out of
nine, including the four juniors), ‘‘the juniors need
to report about their progress more regularly’’ and
the related ‘‘project charter’’ (recalled correctly and
in great detail by five out of nine including the four
juniors; recalled by one senior with considerable
deformation in contents). Hardly more than 2 min
of the meeting were actually devoted to these two
topics. Eight out of the nine team members globally
recalled topic 7, but without any of the details that
were discussed at the meeting. The total time de-
voted to topic 7 at the meeting was 18 min.
Conclusions
The results from the study case presented here
highlight some of the implications of the ground
clauses for ethical communication by bringing to the
fore some typical clause violations characteristic of
conversational dominance patterns (e.g. Itakura,

2001). In the example shown here, one of the two
most senior members of the group is found to detain
the power over ‘‘what is said when and by whom’’.
Such power or conversational dominance is
achieved and sustained here by monopolizing speech
time and/or by frequently interrupting other team
partners. These violations of the ‘balanced speech
time’ and ‘tolerance’ clauses often go hand in hand
with violation of other clauses, such as the ‘conti-
nuity’, ‘openness’, ‘clarity’, or ‘relevance’ clauses, as
illustrated by B’s discursive behaviour. The disrup-
tive effect of clause violations in the sequences in
which they occur here is brought to the fore. Not
only are such violations detrimental to successful
communication as defined previously by others (e.g.
Clark and Schaefer, 1987; Schegloff, 1982), but they
also affect interpersonal relationships at a deeper
psychological level by reducing or abolishing mutual

trust and by altering individual levels of confidence.
In families, such communication patterns were
found to lead to victimization and domestic violence
(Babcock et al., 1993). In the present case scenario,
those who appear to lose out are the junior members
of the group, for whom not a single clause violation
could be noted because they were simply not given,
or did not take, the chance to speak. The same ap-
plies to the discursive behaviour of the female senior
of the group (C). Apart from being unethical, sce-
narios where multiple clause violations by a few are
more or less tacitly suffered by others jeopardize
collaborative team projects (those of the juniors in
our case here) and the evolution and progress of a
group in a larger and more general sense. In the
meeting studied here, the clause violations contrib-
ute to reinforcing existing hierarchical patterns.
TABLE VI

Topics in the order in which they were brought up in
the meeting, time dedicated to a given topic, and whe-
ther the topics were recalled 3 days after the meeting by
the different protagonists
Topic Time dedicated
to topic in meeting
Recalled 3 days
later or not
1 08 min:40 s
p
1
s 3
2 02 min:40 s s 5
3 01 min:50 s Not recalled
6 00 min:15 s s 4
1
v 1

7 17 min:55 s s 8
1
8 01 min:30 s
p
1
9 02 min:13 s
p
1
s 1
11 05 min:40 s s 1
12 06 min:10 s s 5
1
v 1
15 00 min:15 s
p
2

s 3
1
16 00 min:25 s
p
4
17 00 min:54 s
p
6
18 01 min:20 s
p
5
v 1
p
Correctly and in great detail.
s Correctly but without detail.
Slightly deformed in content.
v Considerably deformed in content.

At the same time, they prevent certain important
topics from being discussed openly and effectively
and, as a consequence, the meeting is not getting
anywhere. The group was given feedback about this
analysis several weeks later, and the outcome has
triggered a collective reflection. The seniors both
claimed to be unaware of the conversational strate-
gies and were impressed with the data and the pat-
terns revealed (Tables II–VI). Senior member B,
twice divorced, stated that he was ‘‘surprised to be
such a bully in the meeting room’’. Most of the
other group members then spontaneously claimed
that they had a strong impression that there was a
serious problem with this meeting, but would not
have been able to identify the problem as clearly and
objectively as the data presented to them.
The primary purpose of the communication con-

tract model is to provide practical guidance for ethical
and interpersonal communication in smaller and lar-
ger organizations. Whatever the psychological forces
that lead to clause violations and unethical commu-
nication, by explaining the importance of the ten
ground clauses to individuals and by making them
aware of what may happen when they are violated,
we may hope to strengthen their sense of individual
responsibility. What can be made explicit can be
traced and analysed, as demonstrated here above.
What can be analysed can, in principle, be improved,
especially in the organizational world where it is
possible to monitor speech situations professionally.
People who know each other very well, like
lovers or good friends, may grant each other certain
degrees of freedom in handling their communication
contracts, and so may business partners who have
been working together for a long time, who enjoy

equivalent hierarchical status and decisional power,
and who are equally aware of what they are doing
and why they are doing it. Ultimately, the notion of
a communication contract invites us all to step back
and ask ourselves whether our own discursive
behaviours are as ethical as they could be. In addi-
tion, the pragmatic approach presented here pro-
vides some diagnostic criteria that could help people
in smaller or larger organizations find out where they
could try harder to communicate more humanly and
more ethically. This could allow them to secure
long-term gains which may ultimately be more
desirable and beneficial than short-term benefits
achieved through unethical strategies.
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LMGC, UMR 5508 CNRS,
Université Montpellier,
Montpellier Cedex 5, France
E-mail: [email protected]

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