A C A D E M I C P A P E RReforming policy roles in the Jor.docx

A C A D E M I C P A P E R
Reforming policy roles in the Jordanian policy‐making process
Rami Tbaishat1 | Ali Rawabdeh1 | Khaled Qassem Hailat2 |
Shaker A Aladwan1 |
Samir Al Balas1 | Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlouny3
1 Department of Public Administration, Faculty
of Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan
2 Department of Marketing, Faculty of
Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan
3 Department of Business Administration,
Faculty of Business, Al‐zaytoonah University
of Jordan, Irbid, Jordan
Correspondence
Rami Tbaishat, Department of Public
Administration, Faculty of Economics and

Administrative Sciences, Yarmouk University,
Irbid 21163, Jordan.
Email: [email protected]
The aim of this diagnostic analysis is to identify the weaknesses
in the process of
reforming policy in Jordan. This study will first present a
diagnostic analysis of the
characteristics of administrative reform in Jordan. Following
this, weaknesses will be
identified with a focus on policy roles in the policy‐making
process. Administrative
reform has long been an area of interest and development in
Jordan since the early
1980s. Conferences were held, political and technical
committees formed, and exper-
tise and resources invested. The outcomes of these programs
have been below
expectations, with inadequate impact. This investigation paid
attention on how
Jordan can best invest its resources to maximize efficiency in
the public sector, spe-
cifically the process of reforming policy. This study concludes
that the primary factor
impacting efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness is the

degree of authority at
both national and organizational level. Recent efforts in Jordan
to tackle these issues
could create more conflicts that threaten the Jordanian
government's stability. Other
resources have been dedicated to reviewing the rules and values
that govern the rela-
tionship between state and society.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The bureaucratic ethos that emphasizes the importance
of centrally controlled rationality considers one of the
most important characteristics of the political regime
which Jordan has experienced during the last decades
(UNDP Report, 2015). In this context, economic
performance in most cases proved to be less than
adequate for either ensuring self‐sustained development
or, at a minimum, being able to meet the basic
requirements of the populace. In Jordan, the movement
away from the authoritarian past is characterized by
the efforts to maintain or improve the neoliberal

foundations of the economy while opening the political
arena to ensure the participation of a traditionally
marginalized citizenry that demands an equitable and
prompt share of the benefits of economic growth.
Despite the official political structure, it is so clear that the
domination
of the executive branch over the judicial and legislative branch
of
government is eminent. The extreme centralization of
managerial
decision‐making surrounded by the executive branch challenges
the
power of attempts at change and, more notably, to retard efforts
to
tackle the problems of the government bureaucracy, like that of
inef-
ficiency and corruption. Consequently, ministers and Prime
ministers
continue their involvement in routine matters at the expense of
stra-
tegic issues and are reluctant to send meaningful powers
downward.

Researchers noticed that a significant number of senior
administrators
have received their jobs through patronage rather than on merit.
Their
longevity has conferred on them too much discretionary power
and
rendered them ill prepared to handle the responsibilities
associated
with decentralization (Amster, 2012).
The shift from government to governance, which involves the
focus of administrative practice, is moving from the
bureaucratic
direct governmental form of services to third‐party government
as it
has been called lately (Duflo, 2012).
Explicitly, the way we govern is shifting outside governmental
boundaries—the long‐established procedures and institutions of
gov-
ernment are developing into less concerned with less centralized
to,
which we administrate ourselves (Jacobsen, 2006).
The irresistible challenges in political environment recently,
yet,

have created new passageway to self‐searching among
practitioners
and thinkers in this field. This rethinking went alongside the
subse-
quent lines: Can the old official procedure of government cope
with
Received: 19 September 2018 Accepted: 13 October 2018
DOI: 10.1002/pa.1886
J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1886.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1 of 10
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727
mailto:[email protected]
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa
economic, political, and social transform? Is it pressed to
nationwide
improvement, which is basically the loud spoken objective of
all
former and current governments? Should not the focal point be
turned from mere repair maintenance system to active and

dynamic
improvement? Should not more concentration be given to the
dynamic development and innovative portion of governmental
deci-
sion making‐administrations?
2 | RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study focused on a diagnosis of reforming the Jordanian
policy‐
making process to recognize the difficulties and weaknesses
that
accompanied it. In this comparative procedure, the study
scrutinize
the individuality of rival's explanation reform of policy‐making.
Pattern‐matching is a famous method that goes with this kind of
stud-
ies, where quite a lot of situations are well known in having
confident
results, and the analysis concentrated on answering the
investigated
issues of how and why, which leads to this conclusion turn out
in
every situation. A regular problem in policy‐making is to be
aware of

the surroundings under which research and development can be
formalized in a constructive way to the community.
Hence, this analysis is valuable in elucidation and
understanding
the methods and drivers of modern governmental reforms,
which
has been carried out and modernized. Also, this form presents
theoret-
ical frameworks for investigation of organizational of and
public
administration and modernized governance.
To solve the previous matter, this study focused on the situation
under which structural government works efficiently, and how
Jordan
can manage material capital and human in the direction of
efficient
and effective governmental services.
3 | PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to analyze the career public servant
roles in
the policy process and, more generally, how should government
seek

to influence the policy‐making process. These questions involve
a vari-
ety of difficult issues about the procedures through which
government
should make its decisions as well as the content of those
decisions
(Kugler & Kugler, 2009). Too often, those two issues are
conflated,
with the assumption that certain actors (civil servants) will
produce
certain types of policies (interventionist). Therefore, more
market‐
based instruments (e.g., vouchers) that keep the bureaucrats out
are
preferable.
In some ways, the questions about the public sector problems
are
basically a reformation of the old questions regarding
“governance.”
How should government administrations function? How should
we
decide what government administrations will and can do? How
should

tasks be divided among career civil servants and political
executive's
administrators? To what degree should one branch is to have the
power to check the other?
However, the economic and financial difficulties forced the
gov-
ernment to initiate a reform process. This reform was more
urgent
due to the financial crises in 2008 and globalization. This
study's main
purpose is to scientifically analyze policy roles to recognize its
and
effectiveness and pitfalls. The expectation of this research study
also
is to present to government administrators with the chance to
identify
any variation that could be adjusted within an appropriate
method.
4 | STUDY SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this study depends on both hypothetical and
prac-
tical forms. On the hypothetical side, investigating the policy
making

process development in Jordan and identifies its consequences
and
pitfalls. It is the first study of its kind based on the knowledge
of the
researchers. Hence, this study was projected to develop and
study
prior literatures in the policy‐making field in particular and
public
administration in general.
Alternatively, this study has practical importance and its
outcome
will offer to the policy and decision makers to recognize some
of the
outcomes of the managerial transformation in Jordan and be
attentive
of some of the pitfalls of the transformation process. Moreover,
the
significance of this kind of study is to attain the anticipated
purpose
of the transformation plan.
Understanding policy‐making in Jordan requires an
understanding
of policy roles and the nature of its institutional arrangements.
There-

fore, the importance of this study stems from its analytical
framework
to review and assess the policy‐making process in the Jordanian
bureaucracy with special emphasis on policy roles played by
different
participants and command and control mechanisms as
evaluation
criteria.
5 | RESEARCH PROBLEM
Transform programs that have come about at the political and
socio‐eco-
nomical levels in Jordan for the last decade, have focused on
the
question of the legitimacy of traditionally detained visions. It
concerns
the role and function of mutually the state, and those with most
important roles in the policy‐making processes (Blackden &
Hallward‐
Driemeier, 2013).
Efforts to transition toward democracy have focused on either
reform of the constitution at a systematic level or roles played
by or

assigned by conventional institutions with influential power
such as
legislatures, executives, political parties, or external
influencers.
Less consideration is given to the potential positive influencers
in
the development of changes processes and improvement in the
pro-
cess of policy making by the public sector.
Good governance should be able to control the incompatible
goals
of economic efficiency in a rational manner. Along this, there
ought to
be a force toward legality based on extensive involvement in the
pro-
cess of public policy‐making and fairness in the sharing of
services
offered by the government to the public (Adrian, 1994).
The difficulty here is in achieving an equilibrium between the
demands for enhancement in the operations of a neoliberal,
capitalist,
free market, and the call to restore and develop conventional
govern-

ment and formulate a process forms that connected with a free
bene-
fit state (World Bank Ministerial Seminar, 2001).
The state has been instrumental in addressing a variety of
challenges ranging from regulations and promotion of
economical
2 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.
and social activities to ensure equality and integrations among
the
public. These have all been addressed through changes to
economic
policies on a national level, in response to urbanization.
Characteristically, the state develops on an institutional level
with
long‐enduring outcomes for public administration services.
First, on an
organizational level, the state expands its functional scope to
include
commercial, industrial, financial, economic, social security,
public
health, education, and welfare activities.

Second, the disorderly development of the governmental public
sectors turns out to be an obstacle in attempting at answering
the
question of how to develop from a practical viewpoint.
Governmental
procedures and programs are built to respond to hesitant
legality, and
considerable differentiation in capital accessibility was
established
without congruence. There was minimal preparation,
synchronization,
and controlling power by policy administrators.
The growth outline in the governmental public sectors is a
cumu-
lative based on a combination of an incremental aggregation. No
incorporated well‐studied master plan was created before the
initiat-
ing of determined improvement of public strategy and agendas.
Neither was expansion in the compass of the government
function,
cost, size, nor relative influences and authorities which is based
on

intellectuality planning.
In response to these issues, this analysis focuses on how the
reform model can clarify how legislators, political executives,
and
career civil servants can share responsibility for policy‐making
and
implementation.
6 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Within an article entitled “Globalization and public
administration” by
Karamack (Kamaraack, 2001), it was noted that there are four
key
driving forces behind the waves of reform to public
administration
across the world, that is, democratization, the deficit in
performance,
the revolution in information technology and global economic
compe-
tition. The modern type of administrative state can shape
society and
guide it, through regulations and control of social and economic
devel-
opment. Doubts with regard to the capacity of the state to

govern do
not just have a basis in concern over limited capacity in
financial
terms; there are also deep‐rooted disputes over ideology and
percep-
tions of what the nature of a state ought to be and what its
purposes
are, and balances of opinion shift with regard to what people
feel a
state ought and ought not to do. Within his argument related to
strat-
egies for reform, Cheng (2005) explained that many factors in
combi-
nation influence the reform of public administration such as
traditions
of national administrations, political evolution as a result of
decoloni-
zation, nation‐building and democratization and global trends
with
regard to the reinvention of government and administrative
reform.
Angranof and Yildis (2006) articulated a dichotomy between
administration and politics; they sought answers to issues
stemming

from politics being related to policies and expressions of the
will of
the state, whereas administration is concerned with how such
policies
are to be executed. Political decisions over public policy are
made by
political leaders, and then it is simply a case of career officials
figuring
out what is the most effective and efficient manner in which
those
policies are to be implemented. It is conceptually appealing to
cleanly
split between labor for administration and labor for politics;
however,
in realty, there is a complete disconnect. The perspective of
gover-
nance offers another kind of solution to the issue. As Wachhaus
(2012) noted, governing structure patterns are experiencing
change
in what is considered a shift from government to forms of
governance.
Such a shift involves the movement of managerial practices
focus

beyond government boundaries of bureaucratic states and the
provi-
sion of services directly from government to what is called
“third
party” kinds of government. Expressed another way, the manner
in
which people govern is going beyond the boundaries of
government
and is less involved with traditional institutions and
mechanisms.
The reforms that have been disseminated and inspired by the
‘new public management’ new reforms have been implemented
within many countries and, as Schick (2002) argued, there has
been
an increase in the horizontal specialization witnessed in the
function-
ing of administrations, which has often been coupled with more
clear
separation between administrative and political function. The
aim has
been to have sharper structural task separation in relation to
policy
advice, control, and regulation. Another way of looking at the
shift is

to consider that reform rhetoric and theories in relation to
normative
practice thus give the suggestion that actors in administration,
such
as agencies operating at arm's length, ought to focus upon the
implementation of policy instead of being involved with
processes of
decision‐making around policy.
Talbot (2004), meanwhile, pointed out that “Next Steps” has the
aim of a more precise description of the respective roles of civil
servants and ministers, with the former being responsible for
making
policy intentions happen with the autonomy to do so, and the
latter
being responsible for the setting of policy in the first instance.
Reformers within the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have
frequently argued that specialization of functions of public
services
into agencies would lead to better forms of management and
better
delivery of services. Also, the distancing of public services into
agen-

cies was thought likely to lead to more professional forms of
manage-
ment with greater levels of transparency through the bringing of
services closer to citizens and through making, and allowing,
managers
to manage (Kettl, 1996). It was emphasized within an appraisal
of gov-
ernment reform (“Inside the Reinvention Machine”) that a need
still
exists for centralized coordination and control; although policy
may
lead to devolved activity, as long as there is an involvement of
public
funds, government still remains responsible for how such
funding is
used. A need to ensure that there is value for money leads to
encour-
agement for early detection and policy conflict resolution and
the
elimination of duplication. There is, therefore, a call for further
informal procedures and suitable communication between them,
in
addition to change in behavior and attitudes on both parts. It

was
claimed by Lawson (2006) that there is a need for good
governance
to rest upon the ability of a system to manage conflicting goals
related
to rationality and efficiency in economic terms along with goals
for
legitimacy based upon wide participation in the processes of
public
policy‐making along with equity in access to, and distribution
of, public
services. Stolk and Wergrich (2008) have indicated that reforms
search
continuously for improved linkages that can reconcile the goals
of
budget and policy and serve to ensure that they have a mutually
TBAISHAT ET AL. 3 of 10
reinforcing nature. One development with promise is that with
regard
to evolving roles within budget ministries. There is a move
away from
traditional roles with budget ministers being perceived as

“naysayers”
to a culture wherein expertise is developed for identification of
efficiency and cost‐cutting measures; as such, they are better
placed
to offer ministries advice in relation to how administrative costs
can
be cut without there being a need to reduce programs.
7 | FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Politically, Jordan is a constitutional system that differentiates
the
powers of each of the three branches of government. The
Jordanian
governmental system is parliamentary with an inherited
monarchy.
The Mulgi government is the 84th since the founding of the
Jordanian
State some 95 years ago, giving the government an average life
span
of 11 months (www.gov.jo/byFormationdate).
Over the years, the centralization aspect has reinforced and per-
petuated a status quo judged as inappropriate by researchers and
practitioners. The king appoints the Council of Ministers, which

is
responsible for the daily operations of the domestic government,
the
president, and the members of the Senate. He approves and
promul-
gates laws. The king has the power to declare war and sign
peace
treaties, although treaties must be signed by the National
Assembly
(Jordan Constitution, article 35).
Policy‐making cannot adequately be studied apart from the
environment or context in which it operates. Therefore, it is
necessary
to review and focus on the important actors in the
policy‐making
process.
7.1 | The Palace and the Cabinet
In the absence of democracy, decisions have been those of the
king,
often in conjunction with several key advisers. On issues of
foreign
policy and military, the king, the Prime Minister, and the Chief
of the

Royal Court are the decisions‐making circle. The cabinet, as a
body,
is not involved, although its members may be consulted for their
reac-
tions or comments.
Brand also argued that in foreign policy, the major goal was to
secure aid for the budget and to finance the military. In the case
of
the budget, the king's highest concern has been paying the
salaries
of the army and the security apparatus, whose members have
tradi-
tionally been largely recruited from the kingdom's tribes and
who have
long been regarded as the bedrock of support for the monarchy.
The Prime Minister has generally handled the “how” questions
related to the economy and bureaucracy. The role of the Prime
Minis-
ter was also described as key, but his input varies depending
upon the
political or economic conditions at any given time (Brand,
1994).

Beyond these two figures—the king and the Prime Minister—
the
economic decision‐making group differs from the foreign policy
group.
The king has certain advisers and confidants both within and
outside
government whose friendship and proximity give them access
and,
hence, the opportunity to lobby for certain policies. The king is
described as an arbiter by nature, preferring not to interfere in
policy
details. However, if a complaint is voiced frequently enough
either
by officials or by nonofficial confidants, he will likely come to
view it
as a general problem. He may then draw the cabinet's attention
to it
and, if it is not solved, may replace the relevant minister.
However,
for domestic economic matters to have an influence on upper
level
decision‐making, they must be of real consequence—large
loans, the
devaluation of the dinar, and the like (Kernaghan, 2010).

7.2 | The Economic Security Committee
One key factor that affected the development of the economy
and the
process of economic decision‐making in the kingdom was the
pres-
ence of a martial law regime during most of the 1957–1990
periods.
Symptomatic of the conditions that existed under martial law
were
the establishment, development, and activities of what was
called
the Economic Security Committee (ESC; Alfanik, 2016). This
body
was originally founded in 1967 to address the economic
problems cre-
ated by the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. With martial
law
already in place giving the state sweeping powers, adding such
a com-
mittee seemed like a natural step. Composed of the Minister of
Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of
Transport,
and the Governor of the Central Bank, and standing in effect

above or
outside the law, the committee initially served to help solve
problems
faced especially by the government and some of the public
companies
and institutions (UNDP, 2015).
Gradually, however, the committee's “mandate” broadened. It
began to act as a kind of extraordinary legislative council. The
commit-
tee was permitted to make decisions that overturned existing
laws;
even those that had been passed after the occupation and that
had
taken the post‐June 1967 reality into account. In this way, the
com-
mittee came to be used to bypass existing laws when it was
problem-
atic or inconvenient from the point of view of the
decision‐makers or
their confidants (Brand, 1994). For example, if the Prime
Minister
requested something to be done quickly or something done that
was

officially against the law, he could refer it to the committee.
The
committee also made decisions about liquidating companies,
borrow-
ing to the ceiling of the Central Bank, and then legalizing more
borrowing, allowing the Central Bank to deposit with other
banks to
support the currency, issuing more currency than had been
allowed,
expelling people from commercial organization, and consenting
to
someone who would or else have been banned, to be part of the
board of directors of a corporation. In the days of escalating
political
repression in 1988, its decisions also dissolved the boards of a
number
of public shareholding companies including those of the major
daily
newspapers.
Many of the rulings the committee made are open to criticism,
not
only on legal grounds but also on economic and financial ones.
Some

of its decisions were intended to benefit a particular person,
company,
or bank, to enable them to undertake an activity that was against
the
law or to avoid procedures dictated by the law (Alfanik, 2016).
More-
over, only a few of the ESC's decisions were ever published in
the
Official Gazette, the newspaper in which all legislation is
supposed
to appear. Most were confidential, and for specific purposes,
they
were usually not general edicts.
4 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.
http://www.gov.jo/byFormationdate
Comprising only a handful of cabinet members who were chosen
by the Prime Minister in consultation with the king, the ESC
appears
to have been the institutionalized form of an inner circle for
economic
policy. Their power derived from both the cabinet positions
they held

and their closeness to the king and the Prime Minister at the
time, to
which they owed their appointment.
7.3 | The role of the ministers
The type of regime that produces and perpetuates an institution
such
as the ESC is clearly one that is uninterested in or incapable of
decentralizing decision‐making. And, indeed, even for what
would
appear to be relatively minor matters, economic
decision‐making is
highly centralized in the kingdom. Most decisions—whether
important
or relatively minor—are made at the cabinet level or even
above, not
even at the level of individual ministers.
Part of the reason for the lack of ministerial involvement is that
ministerial appointments in Jordan generally owe to
considerations
of domestic political balancing along ethnic and regional lines.
All cab-
inet members must meet certain unofficial but well‐known
formulae.

As a result, most ministers are appointed because of ethnicity,
tribal/
family background, or regional considerations, not because of
exper-
tise in the field of their appointment, although there are
certainly
numerous notable exceptions. In such a system, where a
minister's
background in his or her field has generally been only a
secondary
consideration, a minister's power derives from a number of
sources.
The first is the degree of support he or she enjoys from the
Prime
Minister. They therefore have no automatic political base in the
Parliament or outside, as would be the case in a normal
parliamentary
system. Beyond his or her ties with the decision‐making group,
a min-
ister's power is often determined by such factors as the degree
to
which he or she has developed ties in the bureaucracy (both
within

his or her own ministry and elsewhere) and his or her own
energy
and involvement. Another source of power lies in the ministry
itself.
For example, the Ministry of Finance is potentially very
powerful,
because it includes the customs bureau, the income and sales tax
department, the budget, and the land and surveys bureau—all
the
departments responsible for domestic revenue.
At least part of the problem with ensuring implementation
below
the cabinet level is that many individual ministers prefer not to
take
responsibility, opting to leave certain issues to the cabinet. If
that is
the case at the level of minister, one can imagine what happens
(or does not happen) at lower levels. As is the case for
bureaucrats
everywhere, there is no incentive (and in this case, also no
authority)
to make decisions without prior approval from above, even on
very minor matters. If the relevant minister does not take an

interest in solving a problem, no action will be taken. In
general, then,
because of the lack of authority to make decisions, there is little
or no
follow‐up.
In addition to the issue of authority and responsibility is the
problem of the lack of a guiding program or policy. In more
general
terms, however, one reason for the lack of a coherent policy is
that
there have not been political parties steering the government.
The
appointment of the Prime Minister has always been the king's
prerogative, not a response to election results, even since the
political
liberalization of 1989.
Although some studies agreed that ministerial changes are
disrup-
tive, given the lack of a program, it is not necessarily the case
that a
change in minister will mean a complete change in the ministry
(Kernaghan, 2010). After all, the other mid‐level and lower

level
bureaucrats remain in place. Instead, the change of ministers
will often
mean that projects in which the former minister was involved
may
simply be set aside as the new minister begins to establish his
own pri-
orities (Brand, 1994).
7.4 | The Parliament
Legislative authority resides with the King and Parliament that
is a
bicameral national assembly consisting of the upper house (the
Sen-
ate) and the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies). The
constitution
provides that the Senate, indulging the Speaker, shall consist of
not
more than one‐half of the number of members of the Chamber of
Deputies (Senate 65 members, Chamber …

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