Confusion Of Control And Control Of Operation Anaconda

Confusion Of Control And Control Of Operation Anaconda
Operation Anaconda was a joint operation. Even though it was a joint operation, this does not
necessarily mean cohesive. This is especially true of the air operations. Poorly executed joint
functions, primarily air operations, resulted in diminished close air support capabilities during
Operation Anaconda due to confusion of control of aviation assets, lack of proper communication
equipment, and available air coordination personnel were overwhelmed. Confusion of control of
Aviation Assets The first reason for the diminished capabilities was that there was confusion on who
had tactical control of some aviation assets. Without positive control of all available assets,
problems were inevitable. Task Force Dagger, the Special Operation Force element, was part of
Combined CJTF Mountain (CJTF), the overall command element. CJTF Mountain was not granted
Tactical Control (TACON) of TF Dagger though. This also means that TF Dagger retained control
of its aviation assets (Fleri, 2003). The aviation assets in question still assigned to TF Dagger were
the AC–130 gunships. These aircraft are one of the most capable close air support assets that is
available to the troops on the ground. This fixed wing aircraft is heavily armed. These armaments
include a 25mm Gatlin gun, 40mm Bofors cannon, and a 105mm howitzer cannon (af.mil, 2016).
This aircraft is one of the best close air support assets in the United States inventory. This also
makes this it a high demand asset in
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Operation Anaconda Command Structure
Command Structure of Operation Anaconda In the simplest of terms, command structures utilized
during combat operations are commanded by one commander with the resources and authority to
plan and execute operations. Prior to Operation Anaconda multiple dislocated command structures
oversaw operations within the same area of responsibility (AOR). During Operation Anaconda the
lack of one command structure with the authority over all assets and participants resulted in
fratricide, competition over assets, and other areas of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. Command
Structure and locations before Operation Anaconda In the infancy of Operation Enduring Freedom
the command structure was dislocated, lacked complete oversight, and had other responsibilities that
stacked the deck against them to be able to properly prepare for Operation Anaconda. General
Franks Commanded Operations in Afghanistan as the CENTCOM Commander from MacDill Air
Force Base in Florida. CENTCOM directed Operations through the Coalition Forces Air
Component Command (CFACC) via its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in the Persian
Gulf, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) which was located at Camp
Doha Kuwait (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Thomas, 2003). Furthermore, in addition to the
conventional and special operations forces (SOF) units and assets operating under CENTCON
control, other government agencies and SOF operating directly under the Secretary of Defense
(Black SOF) operated concurrently in the AOR. ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
TF Mountain, Commanded by MG Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Commanding General was
established to provide assistance to subordinate units in the (AOR) (Kugler, Baranick, &
Binnendijk,

Anaacond Unity Of Command During Operation Anaconda
Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda "Unity of command is defined as all forces operate
under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a common
purpose." (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, p. V–1). Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) Mountain only had tactical control of some of the organizations involved and due to
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) not being centrally located this caused delays in
decision making. Even though lessons learned from Operation Anaconda has help facilitate unity of
command for future operations; unity of command was a newer concept that the Armed Forces had
not fully operated under.
Leading up to Operation Anaconda Prior to the building up of forces for Operation Anaconda, the
command structure was set up that CENTCOM was working with two subordinate commands.
Those commands were Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFLCC and CFACC were both staged in the Persian
Gulf and were set to offer support to any operation in Afghanistan from there. Task Force (TF)
Dagger was the only ground force located in Afghanistan. (TF) Dagger consisted of 5th Special
Operation Forces (SOF) and Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) operations. During the build–up and
planning of Operation Anaconda, elements of the 10th Mountain Division Staff were deployed into
the CENTCOM's area of responsibility. While doing their

Tactical Assault Group
One of the biggest challenges facing modern society is in the area of security, especially as it
patterns to terrorism. The dynamics and severity of attacks on innocent citizens of different
countries around the world continues to change over the years. In Europe, the frequency of terrorist
attacks is also spreading to different countries. In fact, the 2017 Europol European Union Terrorism
Situation and Trend Report concludes that more than 142 terrorist operations were reported across
the European Union in 2016 alone. Also, the attacks caused the death of more than 140 people and
about 378 more people were injured.
Since terrorist attacks have been on the rise while taking dynamic and extreme turns, different
countries of the world have created ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The Special Reconnaissance (SR) adopts intelligence gathering and surveillance. This is the
gathering and verification of important information about potential plans or intentions of terrorist
groups and organized criminals. In addition, other relevant pieces of information such as
hydrographic, geographic and meteorological features of a location are utilized in predicting the
activities of terrorists.
Another operational technique used by the TAG unit is Precision Strike. This operation utilizes
sophisticated technology, mines, precision guided munitions, standoff weapons and other munitions
to capture or kill a target such as a criminal, hostage taker or terrorist. The operation is usually
accompanied with tactics such as raids or ambushes and are usually small in scale.
Special Recovery Operations (SRO) are also special operations utilized by the TAG units to rescue
hostages or equipment from terrorists or hostage–takers. This operation could be carried out
overseas or within the country, and they are usually high–risk

Anaconda Command Structure
Command Structure Operation Anaconda
Introduction
The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or
outside the country. The Department of Defense is responsible for overseeing the establishment of
command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed
from the highest–ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or
pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The principles that establish the command
structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the
various missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in
mission deficiencies are organizational structure, decision–making, and collaboration. Operation
Anaconda The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) aimed at destroying terror groups
Taliban and al–Qaeda carried out operation Anaconda. The operation was executed in March 2002
outside the valley of Shahi–Kot in Zormat area, Afghanistan (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, Searle, 2003).
The task included forces that required direct command and instruction from their Commanders. The
mission was in direct link with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office and CENTCOM with
the General Tommy R. Franks as the officer in charge that received, analyzed and provided real–
time intelligence. Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, of the 10th

The Challenges Of Command Structure In Operation Anaconda
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces
assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by
General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command
(CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a
conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign
the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical
commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck's command authority, CENTCOM named his
headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control
authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck
would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure
were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation
Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces.
These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command
relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and
positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation
Anaconda.
Multiple

Causes Of Operation Anaaconda
Lack of Planning during Operation Anaconda
It has been 16 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
which resulted in thousands dead, thousands injured and millions affected across the globe. In the
wake of these terrorist attacks, the Nation had been rocked at its core, as symbols of our freedom lay
in rubble and ash. These acts of terrorism aimed to tear the country apart but much to the terrorists'
surprise, their acts brought the Nation together with one common goal in mind. As Americans, there
was no choice but to expeditiously act with force and make clear statement that America will not
bow, surrender or cower to terrorists. Zimmerman (2012) On March 2, 2002 Operation Anaconda,
the largest battle in Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan was executed. Operation Anaconda
was designed from its inception with one objective in mind, destruction of Taliban and Al Qaeda
terrorist networks that had created a strong hold in the Shah–i–Kot Valley in the Paktia province,
Afghanistan. Overall, Operation Anaconda was a success, General Tommy Franks, the commander
of CENTCOM in 2002 said that the operation's plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy."
Although Operation Anaconda was successful, with its rapid planning, lack of a unified command
with an established joint force command structure over the prepositioning of air assets, ground
assets, and SOF assets early in the fight it led to an ill–prepared wartime fighting

The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report
Leading the Way
Vision 2016: People working together as a global enterprise for aerospace leadership
The Boeing Company
Boeing is the world's leading aerospace company and the largest manufacturer of commercial
jetliners and military aircraft combined, providing products and tailored services to airlines and U.S.
and allied armed forces around the world. Our capabilities include rotorcraft, electronic and defense
systems, missiles, satellites, launch systems and advanced
information and communication systems. Our reach extends to customers in more than 90 countries
around the world, and we are a leading U.S. exporter in terms of sales. With corporate ... Show more
content on Helpwriting.net ...
On that foundation, we are pursuing one big, overarching goal. We aim to be the world's strongest,
best and best–integrated aerospace company – for today and tomorrow. Measured against that goal,
2007 stands out as a year of significant – and accelerating – progress. We achieved record financial
performance, which reflects the potent combination of good top–line growth and strong gains in
productivity. Total revenues rose to an all–time high of $66.4 billion. For the first time ever, both of
our core businesses – Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Boeing Integrated Defense Systems –
simultaneously achieved double–digit operating margins. Gains in productivity and performance in
existing programs contributed significantly to earnings and helped offset additional investment in
key growth programs. Our cash flow went from strong to even stronger – increasing from $7.5
billion in 2006 to $9.6 billion in 2007.
We also had our best year ever in capturing new business and adding to a backlog that now totals
almost one third of a trillion dollars – or just about five times our total revenues in 2007. Boeing
Commercial Airplanes had spectacular success in landing 1,423 airplane orders during 2007,
reaching more than 1,000 orders for an unprecedented

Operation Anaconda Research Paper
OPERATION ANACONDAAND THE ARMY PROFESSION
USAACE
NCOA
SSG Casey J. Vauthier
15PSLC
15–00
SFC ANDERSON
Operation Anaconda was a major U.S. and Afghan combined offensive that took place in March of
2002. Named after the snake that would coil around its victim and squeeze the life out of them
before devouring them, this was the intent of the offensive. This offensive would lead us into further
development as a fighting force that would need to adjust, so that our decisions bring our Soldiers
home. The Army Profession adamantly displayed itself throughout the battle and this paper will
explain a few of these instances. Major combat operations began for Operation Enduring Freedom
on October 7, 2001. After initial combat and air strikes, the CIA began to learn that the Taliban and
al Qaeda forces were beginning to regroup in the White Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan. Large
numbers had been assembling in the Tora Bora region and the CIA ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
The battle plan consisted of many moving parts and based itself on the "Hammer and Anvil"
approach, and the CIA estimated the enemy to be about 200 strong. On March 2, they executed the
plan. The friendly Afghans, led by US SOF and known as TF Hammer, moved into place by a
mixture of light trucks and vehicles that were not a formidable adversary for the Taliban. CH–47
helicopters were the mode of transportation for the 10th Mountain Division soldiers along with help
from the Rakkasans of the 101st Airborne Division. The CH–47s would drop the troops and make
multiple turns for resupply. Six US AH–64 Apaches were to begin patrols into the valley at around
0530 that morning and once troops were on the ground, provide air support. Finally, the Air Force
was to support with bombings prior to the offensive and air support with AC–130 gunships. The
plan seemed well thought out and was ready to

An Analysis of the Current Business Environment in Thailand
An Analysis of the Current Business Environment in Thailand
Executive Summary Trade relations between Thailand and Australia have steadily increased over
the years, and the two countries recently celebrated 60 years of bilateral trade. The strong ties that
exist between Australia and Thailand have been further strengthened in recent years through a series
of free trade initiatives, reduced or eliminated tariffs and, prior to 2003, through the provision of
Australian economic development advisors to Thailand. Despite the positive trends in commerce,
Thailand has been rocked by political turmoil from time to time over the years, and student
uprisings in Bangkok in particular have threatened the political stability of the country's ruling
parties in ways that had short–term implications for Australians doing business in Thailand.
Moreover, because it has become increasingly integrated into the global economy, Thailand has not
been immune from the Great Recession of 2008. Nevertheless, the business climate in Thailand
remains highly favorable in general and especially favorable for Australian companies of all types
and sizes as described further below.
Profile of Thailand As the only country in Southeast Asia to avoid being colonized by Western
powers, the Thai people do not have any particular chip on their national shoulders concerning
doing business with foreigners, especially Australians. In fact, Australia and Thailand have long
enjoyed excellent diplomatic and trade

One Significant Change That Has Occurred in the World...
E SSAYS ON TWENTIETH–C ENTURY H ISTORY In the series Critical Perspectives on the
Past, edited by Susan Porter Benson, Stephen Brier, and Roy Rosenzweig Also in this series: Paula
Hamilton and Linda Shopes, eds., Oral History and Public Memories Tiffany Ruby Patterson, Zora
Neale Hurston and a History of Southern Life Lisa M. Fine, The Story of Reo Joe: Work, Kin, and
Community in Autotown, U.S.A. Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds., The World the Sixties Made:
Politics and Culture in Recent America Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th John
McMillian and Paul Buhle, eds., The New Left Revisited David M. Scobey, Empire City: The
Making and Meaning of the New York City Landscape Gerda Lerner, Fireweed: A ... Show more
The beginnings and ends of what we choose to call centuries are almost invariably years of little
significance. But there is little agreement over when the twentieth century c.e. arrived, and there
were several points both before the year 2000 (the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of
Germany, the surge of globalization from the mid–1990s) and afterward (9/11, or the global
recession of 2008) when one could quite plausibly argue that a new era had begun. A compelling
case can be made for viewing the decades of the global scramble for colonies after 1870 as a
predictable culmination of the long nineteenth century, which was ushered in by the industrial and
political revolutions of the late 1700s. But at the same time, without serious attention to the
processes and misguided policies that led to decades of agrarian and industrial depression from the
late 1860s to the 1890s, as well as the social tensions and political rivalries that generated and were
in turn fed by imperialist expansionism, one cannot begin to comprehend the causes and
consequences of the Great War that began in 1914. That conflict determined the contours of the
twentieth century in myriad ways. On the one hand, the war set in motion transformative processes
that were clearly major departures from those that defined the nineteenth–century world order. On
the other, it perversely unleashed forces

Structure Of Operation Anaconda
Command Structure
Command structure is the organizational hierarchy through which administrative leadership or
operational authority is exercised (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2017). The
United States' armed forces and other coalition forces encountered an estimated 1,000 enemy troops
and killed hundreds during Operation Anaconda. However, defeating these enemy forces required
commanders and staff members to scramble to coordinate and rush reinforcements into battle after
the shooting begun. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain headquarters failure to
establish and maintain tactical control, operational control, or situational awareness (SA) of special
operations forces and other inter–agencies led to unity of command confusion during the execution
of Operation Anaconda.
Command Structure before Operation Anaconda
The United States and its allies responded against Al Qaida members and their Taliban sponsors in
Afghanistan after their 11 September 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11) attack on New York City
and Washington D.C. The initial crisis action planning, developed with limited intelligence and
without a well–defined end state, had a significant impact on the overall mission and the concept of
operations in Afghanistan and the region, specifically U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command
(MARCENT) was located in Hawaii and maintained small support staffs in Tampa and Bahrain. The
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) did not have a standing

One Hundred Victories by Linda Robinson
In the book, the author makes it clear that executing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult
task for Special Forces operators. She explains that the commanding officers knew these operations
would be a challenging feat. For instance, the author details Major General Scott Miller's efforts to
expand the Afghan Local Police initiative to the rural areas of Afghanistan. Major General Miller
felt that the same approach that was taken in the cities would not work in the rural areas. In other
words, the "Afghan local policemen by themselves were not sufficient to bring peace to rural
Afghanistan, and the country had to be stabilized from the village up" (Robinson 2013, 26). In this
instance, the book demonstrates the Generals knowledge and awareness of the situation in the
region. That is to say, "the only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement in much of the
country consist of village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of
Sharia" (Rubin 2007, 76). Both the author and the general realized the importance villages have in
securing peace in Afghanistan. These rural operations of the Afghan Local Police are known as
Village Stability Operations. These operations were not intended to be a quick fix, rather a long–
term investment. The author asks the question, are the village stability operations a success?
Perhaps, the answer can be found in the results of the operations. Although stability in Afghanistan
has proved to be an

Introduction Of The First World War
Introduction to the First World War
In the context of the First World War, we need to consider the question: 'Are we as a nation so
transfixed by the Gallipoli campaign that we have failed to look at what was happening elsewhere
during the First World War?
There is a strong case to be made that Gallipoli has over the past hundred years, overshadowed the
real stage on which the war was fought – the Western Front. This does a great injustice to the many
thousands of Australians who fought and died there. It is time to set the record straight – not to
diminish Gallipoli – but to raise the Western Front campaign to the same degree of significance in
the Australian psyche and its historic records.
Many Australians today would point to the 1915 Gallipoli campaign as the single most defining
moment in Australia 's history.
Before 1915 at the outbreak of the First World War Australia was widely considered as just a colony
of the British Empire. The heroism, courage and 'mateship' portrayed by the ANZACS at Gallipoli
has since become a symbol of nationhood of Australia. From this time other countries respected
Australian soldiers as a 'force to be reckoned with'/ Politicians have frequently referred to what it
means to be Australian was 'written in blood' at ANZAC Cove. Every year special remembrance
services are held at ANZAC Cove to remember the soldiers who gave their lives there.
The War on the Western Front.
In France and Belgium on the Western

Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda
The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi–headed and lacked unity due to the U.S.
military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected
the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by
CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component
Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was
led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where
they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th
Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan.
MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the
theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley,
based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF)
Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF
Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski
based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord.
TF–K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed
by CPT Robert H
Operation

Operation Anaconda Joint Planning Failure
Joint Planning Failures of Operation Anaconda In January 2002, intelligence began reporting on a
heavy concentration of Taliban and al Qaeda forces in and around the Shahikot Valley area of
Afghanistan. With the intelligence available and experience to date, the U.S. Coalition Forces began
planning Operation Anaconda. The end state of U.S. officials was to drive all enemy forces out of
their strongholds within the valley, allowing coalition forces to capture or kill the enemy (2003).
Even though the original plan of three–days stretched into a seventeen–day battle and resistance was
much greater than expected, military officials hailed Operation Anaconda as a success (Andres,
2007). Although the overall mission hailed as a success an examination of the Army's joint planning
process exposed multiple shortfalls in the areas ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Generals Franks and Mikolashek made the decision to deploy the staff of the Army's 10th Mountain
Division under the command of MG Hagenbeck to Bagram Air Base (2007). In an attempt to fix,
joint planning problems CENTOM designated the 10th Mountain as Coalition and Joint Task Force
(CJTF) Mountain; CJTF Mountain took command of a large portion of the ground forces. However,
CJTF Mountain did not receive tactical control (TACON) over supporting U.S elements or Afghan
forces to be involved in the operation. Aviation elements supporting the area of operation remained
under control of CFACC and special operations forces remained under the command of COL
Mulholland at Task Force Dagger. Further complicating the Special Forces chain of command, Delta
Force, the Navy Seals, Air Force special operations aircraft, and supporting personnel took direction
from Air Force BG Trebon at Task Force 11, located at Joint Special Operations Command in Fort
Bragg North Carolina

Operation Anaconda Afghanistan
Michael A. Difuntorum
25W Class: 502
Abstract
Operation Anaconda was fought in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan in March of 2002 and lasted
17 days, thought it was initially planned as a 3 day battle. During the months leading up to
Operation Anaconda there were many drawbacks, including lack of accurate and reliable
intelligence. Due to the lack of intelligence regarding the enemy and their weapons there was not a
unity of command and instead it was multi headed by General Hagenbeck and Task Force Mountain
headquarters but did not include command of the air forces or the friendly Afghan units that were to
be used as the main axis of attack in the battle plan. Though the battle was not carried out as planned
... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
General Hagenbeck receives his Intel from the U.S Official. Reports stated that enemy forces
including Al Qaeda were assembling in Shahikot Valley. U.S Official did not have a good
intelligence on how many enemy forces there where and what types of equipment they have. Before
the battle of operation anaconda Genera Hagenbeck and his forces underestimated the enemy forces
and defense. U.S forces lack the man power and fire power to and air support to complete the
mission due to Afghanistan forces withdrawing and requesting air support from another commander
thus General Hegenbeck and his forces did not accept the prudent risk with the

Sensitive Items
It is very important to secure all your sensitive equipment and items, and maintain accountability.
The reason simply is to keep very important high cost valued items and equipment accounted for so
people all around you do not have to deal with the consequences of the lost item or equipment. Also
every sensitve item or equipment is high dollar valued so if you lose it you will be hurting money
wise by losing a grand or more easily right on the spot. And after that you can possibly do jail time
from six months to a year and sure their will be rank taken away or something along those lines.
You might even get an article fifteen after all that or maybe when you have to pay for the lost
sensitive equipment or item so these should be a ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
While this makes it a candidate for non–infantry troops (vehicle crews, clerks and staff officers), it
also makes it ideal for close quarters combat (CQC), and airborne and special operations. It has been
adopted by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is the preferred weapon
of the U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs. M4's have also been fielded by the Australian
Special Air Service Regiment. Malaysia purchased M4 Carbine service rifles to replace the Steyr
AUG service rifles in its armed forces in 2006 and will be manufactured in Malaysia under license
by SME Ordnance Sdn Bhd.[3] It is expected that these weapons will not only be used by MAF, but
also will attract other users such as Police, Coast Guard and other enforcement agencies.[4] The M4
was developed and produced for the United States government by Colt Firearms, which has an
exclusive contract to produce the M4 family of weapons through 2009; however, a number of other
manufacturers offer M4–like firearms. The M4A1, along with the M16A4, has mostly replaced the
M16A2 ; the U.S. Air Force, for example, plans to transition completely to the M4 Carbine. The M4
is similar to much earlier compact M16 versions, such as the 1960s–era XM177 family. The United
States Marine Corps has ordered its officers (up to the rank of lieutenant colonel) and (senior) Staff
Non–commissioned officers to carry the M4A1 carbine instead of the M9

Anaconda Joint Command Structure
U.S. intelligence underestimated the enemy threat, including its size, location, and brutality. They
also overestimated the reliability of friendly Afghanistan forces no full joint command structure in
the Afghanistan area of responsibility and joint coalition operations had no plan to guide force
operations. In Afghanistan, there was confusion about who was in charge with unity of command.
The Army Task force 10th Mountain was the lead organization during planning and execution of
Anaconda, but it did not yet have full Combined Joint Task Force authority to plan a joint battle
Many of its integrated assets were deployed in different other countries. It had a recently established
a combined Air liaison cell but no fully developed air support ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
The Army had only two infantry companies in tactical reserve in a fluid battle where the withdrawal
of friendly Afghan forces compromised the situation. The air component was not involved in joint
planning far enough to be aware of the Army's branch plans and therefore did not develop unique
branch plans of its own. Essentially, on–call airstrikes against targets of opportunity were Task
Force Mountain's branch plans for the air component. Targets developed by the Task Force daily
targeting board to Combined Force Air Component Commander for consideration and inclusion in
the air tasking order. The air component did not develop a more detailed understanding of the battle
on its own initiative, thus resulting in the Task Force Mountain plan becoming the in fact air
campaign plan. In addition, of being assign to the upcoming operation and coordinated with the
different ground Units per standard doctrine. Time was short, and Task Force Mountain steadily
focused on integrating the complex actions of ground units from the 10th and 101st Divisions,
friendly Afghanistan forces, and Special Forces, including other allied units that were to help block
exit routes along the outer circles of the battlefield. During the battle, Special Operation Forces from
Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, and Norway were expected to help

Operation Anaconda Command Structure Many Americans make a choice to serve in the military,
knowing they could have to make the ultimate sacrifice for our country. During Operation
Anaconda, many great Soldiers paid this ultimate sacrifice. Further review many experts have
deemed this as an unnecessary loss of life due to a multitude of factors we will explore. This
Operation has been viewed as a great success in times of uncertainty and challenges. Ultimately, the
enemy was defeated but what could have been done differently? The higher headquarters command
structure for Operation Anaconda faced challenges planning, making timely decisions, and
communicating which lead to mission gaps while developing lessons learned for future joint
operations. ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) did not align under
CENTCOM and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Initially, JFSOCC was detached
from the theater command structure. JFSOCC operated on specific mission for the theater
Commander, rather than included in the Command Structure. JFSOCC's delay caused issues in the
development of the command structure. Furthermore, the mission requirements changed by the time
the CFLCC and JFSOCC took control of their respected requirements, unity of command was still
developing. External to the JFOCC structure, additional SOF units were operating across
Afghanistan conducting their own individual missions with no JFOCC over sight. When SOF units
request air support, it was send directly to CFACC and then forwarded to the CAOC dislocated from
the ground force headquarters. Command Structure during Operation Anaconda As stated earlier,
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was subordinate to CFLCC. The CJTF was the senior
Commander for Operation Anaconda and the Shahikot Valley Area of Operations (AO). The senior
command, CFTF had critical gaps. CJTF only had one infantry battalion, and half of the normal
division

Modern History.Hsc.2012 Essay
MODERN HISTORY
–2012
Topic one – USA 1919–1941
Topic two – conflict in the pacific
Topic three – Douglas MacArthur
Topic Four – World War I
TOPIC ONE – USA 1919–1941
USA 1920'S * the radio age * felt like istory had turned a corner and never going back * stock
market * black Thursday November 24 1929 * the jazz age * a speakeasyyyyyyy
How significant were the Republican policies in causing the great depression?
The significance of the republic policies were great, they brought a lot of growth in the 20's
allowing the market to strive over lots of trading and the purchase of shares, but was also an
unstable market, as the government had no control over what it did and was left up to the ... Show
more content on Helpwriting.net ...
more detail needed; but probably enough to write a paragraph or two in an essay on industrialisation
between 1919 and 1941...
The nature of industrialisation in the 1930s
The nature of industrialisation changed in the 1930s. In the 1920s industrialisation had occurred
because of free enterprise and big business. But with the onset of the Depression, industrial output
fell dramatically. (statistics needed). To combat this, the federal government adopted a role of
directly stimulating industrial growth. The Public Works Administration (PWA) instituted in began
many large industrial projects with the aim of spurring the economy and providing many jobs. The
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was a federal project to energise the economy through a massive
industrial scheme sponsored by the federal government. Twenty five dams were built to reshape the
land and generate hydro–electricity, which could further contribute to industrial growth. Another
example of government leadership of industry was the National Recovery Administration (NRA),
which attempted to foster industrial growth through the creation of 'codes' for each industry. These
federal programs fundamentally changed the nature of industrialisation. In the 1930s, the
government's approach to industrialisation was more akin to socialist–state–style industrialisation
than it was to the American capitalism–style industrialisation of the 1920s. Further, the federal
government's

Operation Anaconda Battle Analysis
John Doe
Colonel Mustard
MIL Battle Analysis
March 2010
Operation Anaconda Battle Analysis In the mountainous Shah–i–Khot region south of the city of
Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation
Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17–day
battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success
due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters,
which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah–i–Khot Valley. Originally intended to be
a three–day battle with light resistance, a seven–day battle ensued with intense fighting and was
finally ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication
between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped.
TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and
mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and
Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre–registered mortar fire on
known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a
successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but
unfortunately for a non–unified command, the reverse effect holds true. Another principle of war
that was violated several times was the element of surprise. This had to do, however, with a direct
correlation to communication and unity of command. In the late hours of 3 March 2002, the SEAL
team, MAKO 30 was picked up by a MH–47 heading east of the peak of Takur Ghar, which is the
tallest point in the Shah–i–Khot region. A problem was encountered with the MH–47 and the team
had to change aircraft. This placed them off of their suspected timeline and did not allow MAKO 30
with enough time to reach the

Operation Anaconda Failures
The Failures of Operation Anaconda The United States Army (USA) is known for having a superb
command structure and it has been in use for over 240 years. The Army exercises command at three
levels, strategic, operational, and tactical. This determines who is in charge of any given operation at
any given time; whether an Army or joint operation. It also establishes a chain of command in order
for information and order to reach the intended target. However, that did not happen during the first
day of Operation Anaconda as everything that should have gone well, did not. And while the
operation did achieve its goal, there were failures due to the lack of command and control,
relationships, and trust. These are all necessary for a successful ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
The absence of command and control was clear from the beginning as the commander did not even
have boots on the ground and was "commanding" from afar. Not having command and control of
their organizations led the CENTCOM commander to clearly communicate and establish
relationships with those involved in the operation. Additionally, while the operation did achieve its
goal, there were failures due to the lack of command and control, relationships, and trust. All
necessary ingredients for a successful and effective command structure to fight and win in joint
combat

Operation Anaconda was a battle that occurred in Shahi Khot Valley, Afghanistan in early March
2002. It was the first major battle and the largest operation in Afghanistan that began after the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Baran, 2015). The
operation was led by Major General F.L Hagenbeck, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division
based out of Fort Drum, New York, and the mission was to remove the remaining Taliban fighters in
Shahi Khot Valley. In his memoirs, American Soldier, former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda, as an "absolute
and unqualified success," but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive the
first contact with the enemy." (Kelly et al, 2014) Operation Anaconda offered many lessons learned
from the operation's successes and failures through the planning process. Anaconda's "unqualified
success" was due to the force's adaptability to the operational environment, joint forces support and
overcoming lack of unity of command.
Operation Anaconda O.E. Adaptability The original day for Operation Anaconda was set for 28
February. There was a final weather decision that needed to be made by 26 February to allow the
special reconnaissance (SR) teams ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
However, with the coming of the air force and eventually, the differences were ironed out making
the operation to be operated smoothly. This lack of unity was also largely contributed by the effect
of terrain and mountainous region making it difficult for effective communication to take place
between among the soldiers (Kayes, Allen, & Self,

Operation Anaconda By Reviewing The Setting
Important battles in a war are the ones that not only define the campaign but also the men who take
part in them. An important battle often shapes the conditions for the rest of the war and enables
future success. The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough battle analysis of Operation
Anaconda by reviewing the setting, describing the actions of friendly and enemy forces, and then
assessing the significance of those actions. Additionally, this paper will identify an alternate ending
based on the use of available intelligence assets. Had military intelligence effectively employed
measures and signatures intelligence assets and correctly analyzed the information those assets
provided before the start of Operation Anaconda, estimates of enemy composition, disposition,
capabilities, and intentions would have been known and could have drastically reduced the amount
of casualties Coalition Forces incurred. Second and third order effects of realizing this intelligence
would have shattered the enemy's ability to conduct major combat operations and set the conditions
for stability operations to take place.
Operation Anaconda was a joint effort between elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 101st
Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces from multiple nations, and local Afghan fighters to
drive out al–Qaeda and Taliban fighters from the Shahikot Valley in order to set the conditions for
successful stability operations in Afghanistan. The battle took place in late February

Operation Anaconda Analysis
A Battle Analysis of Operation Anaconda Operation Anaconda, which was part of Operation
Enduring Freedom, was a combat operation that took place in the Shahikot Valley of Eastern
Afghanistan during March 2002. Months earlier, a large number of Taliban and al Qaeda forces fled
into the valley after the U.S. failed to achieve its objectives at Tora Bora. An operation similar in
scope and intent, success at Tora Bora would have negated the need to conduct Operation Anaconda
and potentially could have had profound impacts on the enduring conflict in Afghanistan. Early on
in the war, coalition forces saw victories quickly and often. Most combat operations were carried
out by U.S. SOF, air strikes, and an organized Afghanistan militia called ... Show more content on
Helpwriting.net ...
Operation Anaconda was comprised of three smaller, interrelated operations. U.S. and coalition
SOF, along with Afghan Soldiers, were to take up blocking positions surrounding the Shahikot
Valley. In theory they would prevent an impenetrable coil, like a constricting snake, around the
enemy forces to prevent exfiltration. The Eastern Alliance, led by a local warlord named Zia Lodin,
and some U.S. SOF would be the driving force, or "hammer", during the operation. TF Hammer
would then enter the valley at its southwestern opening. They had orders to engage and destroy or
capture any opposition within the valley and drive the enemy towards the opening on the other side.
TF Rakkasans, comprised of 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division Soldiers, would
be there waiting and acting as the "anvil". In order for this operation to succeed the hammer and
anvil had to be executed exactly as planned. Any deviation could result in the enemy escaping or
increased risk of friendly fire. Air support was never seen as having a major role during any part of
the operation. The Air Force was responsible for conducting strikes on 13 preplanned targets before
TF Hammer entered the valley. Outside of that, they had planned to have enough aircraft to facilitate
on–call CAS, but only for the planned three day mission. The CFACC and the CAOC were never
involved in the

Personal Narrative: A Career As An Immigrant
It all started on one sunny day on the month of July, I was done with my service to protect my
country the United States of America. Man it was nice to experience the smell of freedom once
again. Due to my deployments in many countries I never had the opportunity to step forth in the
land of the free, my home, it felt nostalgic to experience it all again. During my time in the military
I was twenty–one and was first a designated marksman or Scout Sniper in the Marine Corp for a
year or two, then I decided to join a special operations team and joined the 75th Ranger Regiment
and continued my role as a sniper. Then finally through months of hard work and combat
deployments my skills as a sniper was finally recognized. I was hand selected to ... Show more
Makarov was held up in an abandoned weapons factory in Ukraine. The place was heavily guarded
with only two exits and from what I heard there is a scammer in the area so I would not be able to
be rely on any help. I armed myself with a suppressed MP5, one M1911, a helmet–mounted
AN/AVS–6 vision goggle, standard issue parachute, C4 plastic explosives, frag grenades, a coil of
rope, and a Blackhawk Tatang knife. I decided to go at the drop of night from a AC–130 and
paradrop on top of the factory. It was a cold night, but I knew I had no time to waste and jumped
out. There was a bombardement of air as I was crashing down and I had to admit the view never got
old. I could see for miles and saw the stars shining above me and the darkness of the night. As I
approach the ground I pulled my chute and landed peacefully. While I descended onto the ground I
quietly took of my parachute and killed a soldier on the roof. I attached the rope to the railing up
there and and attached the other end to my harness. I descended down and I pulled out my MP5 and
set the C4 explosives on the wall. I detonate the explosive and jumped in and while I situated myself
I could hear the sound of confused men around me and then a alarm went off. None of these things
bothered me as I searched for the control room since I knew that would be where he was. As I
battled my way to their I quickly double tapped anyone who got in my way by shooting them twice
in the chest and one in the head or I left them in pain as I walked over them. When I got to the
entrance to the control room there lay one last enemy eyeballing me ready to fire. I wasted no time
and fired, it was a perfect headshot. I could see a gush of mercury–red blood spew from his head as
echoes of men wailing and screaming went on around me. As I slammed the door open I could see
Makarov in his chair

Battle Analysis Paper Takur Ghar
Mission Command Analysis
The Battle of Takur Ghar
"Roberts Ridge"
Operation Anaconda, 03 – 04 March 2002
CPT Michael A. Broussard PA–C
SG 11, CCC
30 October 2014
1
Abstract
In the late evening of March 3rd 2002, through to the evening of March 4th 2002, Special
Operation Forces were engaged in an intense fire fight with al Qaeda forces on a mountain top
known as Takur Ghar. This battle was the product of a botched reconnaissance insertion and
ultimately resulted in a 24 hour fire fight and the deaths of 7 U.S. service members and over 200 al
Qaeda fighters. Navy SEAL, Neil C. Roberts is believed to be the first U.S. casualty of this battle
and thus, the battle also became unofficially known as "Roberts Ridge" (1).
This paper will give ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The ramp gunner was tethered to the aircraft and was retrieved back inside by the remaining
passengers. Roberts fell from the aircraft and was believed to still be alive as the aircraft was only
10 feet off of the ground at the time it came under fire.
The helicopter was forced to crash land in the valley and now was 7 kilometers away from the
mountain top. Roberts was now completely alone amongst an overwhelming enemy force and it is
believed that he fought in place until he was eventually over run by the enemy (3).
The downed SEALs were picked up by RAZOR 04 and at 0500, again attempted to reinsert at
Roberts' last known position. Now they were only a team of 5 with the addition of Air
Force CCT Chapman. The aircraft was able to insert the team but again came under heavy fire and
was also rendered mission incapable and had to fly back to its origin due to the damage that it
sustained. The team moved to the high ground of the mountain engaging and killing 2 combatants,
they then realized that they were standing in the middle of multiple bunkers as they came under
heavy cross fire from only 20 meters away. Acoording to the official report,
Chapman was fatally wounded almost immediately and 2 others would also become wounded as

they attempted to break contact. An AC–130 was able to provide covering fire and enabled the
SEALS to disengage. Wounded and

Operation Anaconda Essay
Operation Anaconda: Questionable Joint Planning Success Operation Anaconda, although a win for
the US and Coalition Forces, was seen by many as a joint planning nightmare. Throughout history,
the military has closely examined engagements through case studies to improve the planning
process. Operation Anaconda's case studies displayed mistakes, power struggles, and lack of
credible Intel while planning the execution of Operation Anaconda causing question about the
success of the operation. Mistakes during planning Once 911 happened and the US started gathering
intel from the Middle East, the proper authorities inside Washington saw the potential for military
action; this initiated the planning step. In 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM) ... Show more
Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and,
therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a
plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key
components necessary when planning such as "task organization, mission statement, commander's
intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions and control
measures" (ADRP 5–0, para 2–69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became
apparent. In the case study there are missing elements "Initially Task Force Mountain was not
designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems" (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003).
Some commands were not communicating with other commands they should have been
communicating with, while some commands were leaving commands out of the communication;
therefore, information was not going up or coming back down the proper channels, which led to
confusion and a struggle for

Running head: OPERATION ANACONDA JOINT PLANNING 1 OPERATION ANACONDA
JOINT PLANNING 7 Operation Anaconda Joint Planning SFC Durham, Joshua B. Master Leader
Course Operation Anaconda Joint Planning Enemy combatants, in familiar terrain, chose to stand
and fight from fortified positions; forcing commanders to improvise and adapt quickly to unforeseen
circumstances. Support elements received the operational order within just one week of the expected
execution date. Staff elements created analysis and plans on poor intelligence estimates and recent
experience. Strategic planners also failed to establish command and control of the assault force.
Lack of forethought for an integrated joint operation, although ultimately successful, led to the death
of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables
requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support
elements, and failed to establish effective command and control. Enemy Initial planning to execute
Operation Anaconda was to employ the ?hammer and anvil? technique. This technique uses a
primary assault force, ... Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
Commanders assigned U.S. Special Forces, the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Airborne
Division, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and Afghan military forces as significant contributors to the
overall mission accomplishment. With the amount of subordinate units, information must be
detailed and specific for those involved. In early February, intelligence identified large
concentrations of enemy forces in the target area. However, preparation for the mission did not
include allied forces personnel. Planning for Operation Anaconda finalized 13 February without the
Combined Forces Air Component Commander, LTG Mosley. LTG Mosley finally learned of plans
on 23 February, five days before the intended start date of 28

Operation Anaconda Case Study
Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
SFC Albert G. Davis
MLC 02–18
MSG Gina R. Aceves Task Organization during Operation Anaconda
The war in the Middle East was in full effect and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM)
already had forces in the Afghanistan area of responsibility (AOR). These pre–positioned troops
were the result of intelligence reports that showed the Taliban and al Qaeda were hiding out in the
Shahi–Khot valley in Afghanistan. CENTCOM'S poor task organization for the multiple coalition
forces on the ground and air contributed to the breakdown of Task Force Mountain's battle plan.
Available Assets Task organization is creating an operating force, support staff, or sustainment
package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (Department of the ...
Show more content on Helpwriting.net ...
The lack of tactical control (TACON) with the amount of different forces engaged in the operation
made command authority an issue. (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2013)
The Joint Task Force (JTF) did not have the TACON it should have had with the SOF. Prior to the
start of the JTF Mountain, the SOF operated under the control of the Joint Special Operations Task
Force and bypassed the Joint Commander. SOF groups needed to be inserted at a time when the air
support was not bombing the valley.
Task force command and control (C2) was a major issue when key staff elements were not present.
The continuing air support need for the attack on the valley required more air controllers than
CENTCOM would allow the JTF to have in the AOR. Without enough air liaisons for each group
they began to us the air control elements of the Airforce.

Confusion Of Control And Control Of Operation Anaconda

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