Topic 4 DQ 1Imagine you are serving on the board of a for-profit.docx

Topic 4 DQ 1
Imagine you are serving on the board of a for-profit educational
services company. Staff communicate to the board their
concerns about the transition from foster care to independence
for young adults who have reached the age of 18. These
individuals are no longer eligible to be in the foster care
system. Of particular concern is their self-esteem through this
transition. There is extensive quantitative research in the
scholarly literature regarding the function of self-esteem in such
a transition, but a dearth of qualitative research on the topic.
You want to assist staff in providing adequate support for this
client population by commissioning an internal qualitative study
to better understand the phenomenon and improve their
transitions. Develop a problem statement for this query using a
case study design. What would be the purpose of the study?
What research questions would you ask? Justify each response
in reference to the nature of case study design.
Topic 4 DQ 2
Having identified and developed a case study problem
statement, purpose statement, and research questions regarding
the transition to independence of emancipated foster care youth
and their self-esteem, what do you perceive are the
epistemological and methodological strengths of this design for
exploring the phenomenon of the study and answering the
research questions? What are the epistemological and
methodological limitations of the design for the same purpose?
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Discussion Article
Assessing Cultural and
Regime-Based Explanations

of Russia's Foreign Policy.
‘Authoritarian at Heart and
Expansionist by Habit’?
Andrei P. Tsygankov
Pages 695-713 | Published online: 08 May 2012
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Scholars disagree on how to interpret Russia's
assertive foreign policy. According to some
observers, Russia's authoritarian culture and

political system have historically required the
Kremlin to depend on the Western threat
image at home and to engage in revisionist
behaviour abroad. These observers
recommend that Western nations abstain
from engaging Russia as an equal contributor
to shaping the global system. This article
assesses the validity of the authoritarian
expansionism theory by comparing it to other
prominent perspectives on foreign policy,
realism and constructivism. The article argues
that, by perceiving Russia's historical and
institutional distinctness as fundamentally
threatening to the West, the theory overlooks
important sources of foreign policy
contestation at home and potentially varying
directions abroad. The article selects the
historically important cases of the Crimean

War, the Cold War and the Russia–Georgia
War to demonstrate the theory's !aws and to
highlight the role of factors other than Russia's
authoritarianism in the nation's foreign policy.
RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR CONTINUES TO
provoke lively disagreementsamong scholars
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In this article
and policy makers alike. While some view
Russia as largely accommodationist and non-
threatening to the West, others perceive the
Kremlin's objectives as expansionist and
disrespectful towards existing international
rules.1The arrival of Barak Obama to power in
the USA and his attempts to ‘reset’ relations
with Russia have yet to clarify the question of
the motives for the Kremlin's international
behaviour. Those on the sceptical side argue
that the reset advocates misread Russia's
intentions and undermine Western allies
(Kramer 2010a, 2010b; Cohen 2010; LeVine
2010). According to this line of reasoning,
Russia's authoritarian culture and political

system require the Kremlin to depend on the
Western threat image at home and to engage
in revisionist behaviour abroad (Shlapentokh
2009; Cohen & Dale 2010; Shevtsova 2010). It
leads to the conclusion that the Western
nations are better o" trying to contain or
transform Moscow, rather than engaging with
it as an equal contributor in shaping the global
system.
Behind the policy debate about Russia's
intentions are profound theoretical, historical
and ethical questions. Is a more democratic
Russia likely to act in accordance with the
United States and Europe in international
a"airs? Does an authoritarian Russia
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Abstract
The theory of
Russia's
authoritarian
expansionism
Critique
Three
illustrations
Towards a better
understanding of
Russia
Additional
information

Footnotes
necessarily present a threat to the West?
Should Russia's cultural and regime-based
di"erence serve as a su#cient basis for
excluding the nation from the list of partners
and potential allies? More generally, should a
di"erence in political system and values—
whether it concerns Russia, China, Iran or
another country—be treated by Western
nations as potentially threatening their values
and interests?
This article seeks to assess the validity of the
authoritarian or expansionist Russia approach
by comparing it to two other prominent
perspectives on foreign policy: realism and
constructivism. Instead of focusing on Russia's
domestic authoritarianism, realism and
constructivism study the foreign-policy impact

of international anarchy and norms,
respectively. I argue that as a guide to
understanding Russia's international
behaviour, the theory of authoritarian
expansionism is at best insu#cient and at
worst misleading. By emphasising Russia's
purportedly autocratic nature, it overlooks
important sources of contestation within the
nation's political system and the potentially
varying directions of its foreign policy. By
perceiving Russia's historical and institutional
distinctness as fundamentally threatening the
West, the theory of authoritarian
Vladimir Putin's
last stand: the
sources of
Russia's Ukraine
policy
Andrei
Tsygankov
Post-Soviet A"airs

Published online:
4 Feb 2015
##
In search of an
identity: Russian
foreign policy
and the end of
ideology
Margot Light
Journal of
Communist
Studies and
Transition Politics
Published online:
12 Aug 2006
##
Russian foreign
policy and
geopolitics in
the Post-Soviet
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8
expansionism also displays the tendency to
deny Russia its own interests and stakes
within the international system. As a result,
many of the theory's advocates blame
Moscow for everything that has gone wrong in
relations with Western nations and invariably
o"er policy advice that amounts to isolating or
containing Russia.

The article is organised in four parts. The next
section re!ects on the theory of authoritarian
expansionism's assumptions and historical
evolution. After identifying the theory's
propositions and intellectual roots, I o"er an
analysis of several biases from which it su"ers.
I then move to an empirical analysis by
selecting three cases of Russia's foreign policy
that have been important to the progression
of the theory of authoritarian expansionism.
My interpretation of these seminal cases—the
Crimean War, the Cold War and the Russia–
Georgia War—highlights the role of factors
other than Russia's authoritarianism. The
conclusion summarises the article's $ndings
and calls for a more complex and dynamic
understanding of Russia than the theory of
authoritarian expansionism-based

understanding.
The theory of Russia's authoritarian
8
expansionism
Authoritarian expansionism and other
theories of Russia's foreign policy
The central claims of the theory of
authoritarian expansionism may be
summarised in terms of two main
propositions—one of a descriptive and one of
a causal nature. The descriptive proposition
states that Russia's main foreign-policy
objectives include the preservation and
expansion of the country's imperial borders

and institutions. The causal proposition comes
in two distinct versions. Version One links
Russia's expansionism to its authoritarian
culture and propensity to impose itself onto
other nations. The latter is expressed through
the political regime's overcon$dence and
readiness to act unilaterally, rather than in the
spirit of international cooperation. Version
Two places emphasis on the leadership's low
con$dence and internal insecurity. The
regime's insecurity and preoccupation with
political survival lead to a diversionary form of
expansionism. This version assumes the public
to be generally passive and uninterested in the
state's international activities.
The two versions assume diverse types of
expansionism and have distinct policy
implications. While Version One identi$es

8
what might be called ‘expansionism from
strength’ or ‘missionary expansionism’, Version
Two describes expansionism that is driven by
weakness or desperation and seeks to divert
the internal public's attention from the
regime's lack of legitimacy and e"ectiveness.
The two versions also di"er with respect to the
perception of cooperation of Western nations
with Russia (see ). While both versions
are sceptical of the possibility of developing a
robust relationship with Russia, Version One—
by highlighting broad authoritarian support
for international expansionism—is

considerably more pessimistic than Version
Two.
The description of Russia's international
objectives and main causes of behaviour
abroad by the theory of authoritarian
expansionism contrasts with other theories of
Russia's foreign policy. In particular, the theory
of authoritarian expansionism di"ers from
realist and social constructivist theories.
Realists typically emphasise material
capabilities and the status of a great power as
Table 1
TABLE 1
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT RUSSIA'S
AUTHORITARIAN EXPANSIONISM
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state international objectives. Scholars
working in this tradition view the Russian state
as acting within the same constraints of an
international anarchical system that de$nes
the choices of other states. Although internal
factors such as ideology, nature of
government and political culture matter as
well, their role is to specify, and sometimes to
cover for but never to contradict, ‘genuine’
national interest. Realists view national
interest as a geopolitically enduring reality,
rather than something open to

interpretations, and de$ne such interest as a
preservation and enhancement of power
within the existing international system. For
instance, realists have argued that the Soviet
leaders, while employing a revolutionary
ideology and acting under a totalitarian
system of government, defended Russia's
traditional state interests.2
To social constructivists, what matters most is
not power or material capabilities objectively
de$ned but what those may mean to the Self
in terms of acquiring recognition from its
signi$cant Other. In the Russian context,
Europe and the West in general played the
role of the signi$cant Other and prominently
$gured in Russia's debates about national
identity by creating the meaningful
environment in which Russia's rulers defended

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their foreign-policy choices.3Constructivists
argue that although state behaviour is shaped
by power calculations, such behaviour can
only be understood in contexts of everyday
interactions and socio-historical development.
Even if anarchy is ‘out there somewhere’,
constructivists say, we ought to focus on
everyday interactions for understanding what
anarchy means and how social contexts of
power are being formed and unformed.
Constructivist scholars of Soviet foreign policy
therefore view such policy in terms of

signalling to the Western nations the Kremlin's
desire for equality and recognition (Nation
1992; Ringman 2002).
compares the theory of authoritarian
expansionism to other theories of Russia's
foreign policy.
Evolution of the theory of
authoritarian expansionism
The context and the long history of the theory
of Russia's expansionism may be traced to
European reactions to Nicholas's suppression
Table 2
TABLE 2
THEORIES OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN
POLIC Y
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of Polish demands for independence in 1830–
1831. Russia did not limit itself to suppressing
what was then an internal revolt, but also
played a prominent role during the nationalist
revolutions of the 1840s in Europe. In 1846,
Russia led the way in suppressing the Polish
uprising in Kraków, which was a part of the

Hapsburg state under the Vienna convention.
InJuly 1848, Nicholas suppressed revolutions
in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia—partly to assist Turkey in defeating
the Romanian nationalist movement. In 1849,
Russia provided Austria with $nancial and
diplomatic assistance to strengthen its
position in Italy and Nicholas committed
almost 200,000 troops to help the Hapsburgs
to suppress the revolt in Hungary (Riazanovsky
1959, p. 248).
By suppressing internal opposition to the
monarchical rule, Nicholas acted within the
constraints of the Holy Alliance and had no
hegemonic ambitions of his own.4Although
Russia acted in a multilateral spirit and only
did what the system expected the Tsar to do,
Nicholas was labelled the Gendarme of Europe.

Such a presentation of Russia was partly a
product of the continent's power struggle.
Britain and France were not satis$ed with the
Vienna system and each sought to challenge
Russia's rise as a great power competitor
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(Taylor 1954, p. 61). No less signi$cant,
however, was Russia's and Europe's growing
divergence in values. European liberals now
associated Poland, and other nations that
challenged monarchies, with progressive

values, and Russia with imperialism and
repression. Russia was now deemed too
‘barbaric’ and ‘autocratic’ (Malia 1999, p. 99).
Today, scholars such as John LeDonne
continue to argue that during the 1830s and
1840s the Russians were ‘dangerously close to
the establishment of their hegemony in the
Heartland’, and that Russia's ‘expansionist
urge’ remained ‘unabated until 1917’ (LeDonne
1997, pp. 314, 348).
Such was the political context for the
emergence of the theory of authoritarian
expansionism in the liberal West. The Polish
question did not go away, and the Polish elite
led another uprising in 1863, during which the
European powers, again, opposed Russia's
e"ort to manage the issue and preserve
existing territorial boundaries.5Intellectually,

the view of Russia as a barbaric expansionist
power was supported by foreign travellers,
such as the Marquis de Custine, who began to
promote this view even before the Polish
uprising. The United States had begun to
develop negative perceptions of Russia after
the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, as
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immigrant groups (especially Jewish ones)
engaged in anti-Russian lobbying in the United
States to ‘liberate’ Russia from autocracy and
anti-Semitism.6The perception of Russia as a
dangerous autocratic power grew stronger as
Alexander III and Nicholas II sought to
preserve their in!uence in the Balkans. As
theories of authoritarian Panslavism began to
develop in the early twentieth
century,7scholars became convinced of the
primacy of ‘Panslavist imperialism’ in the Tsar's
outlook (Geyer 1987; Tuminez 2000).
The social revolution in Russia in October 1917
provided another powerful impetus for
developing the perception of the country as an
expansionist autocracy. The Soviet Union
diverged from the West in terms of internal
institutions and it challenged the West's sense

of military security. The Bolsheviks' dissolution
of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918,
its doctrine of world revolution, and the
establishment of the Communist International
(Comintern) in 1919 in order to spread
communist ideas and set up new communist
parties abroad, all contributed to the
perception of Soviet Russia as perpetuating—
in the most dangerous way—the mode of
authoritarian expansionism. Even after the
Bolsheviks had renounced the idea of world
revolution and dissolved the Comintern, the
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majority of the West's politicians and scholars
could not change their mind about the Soviet
system. Scholars became convinced that the
idea of peaceful coexistence was a Soviet
cover for an ideological expansion or an
o"ensive war on the West. A classic statement
of this position can be found in George
Kennan's (1961, p. 179) condemnation of ‘a
regime, the attitude of which towards Western
governments, psychologically and politically,
was equivalent to that which would prevail
toward an enemy in time of war’. Many
observers rejected the position that the Soviet

leaders' attitudes re!ected a defensive
response to the equally hostile Western
governments, citing the Soviet Union's
authoritarian ideology as the reason for their
distrust. For Kennan, Western governments
came to hate the Soviet leaders ‘for what they
did’, whereas the Bolsheviks hated the
Western states ‘for what they were, regardless
of what they did’ (Kennan 1961, p. 181,
emphasis in original). This distinction has
become common in Western scholarship of
Soviet foreign policy since the Cold War.8
Despite the end of the Cold War, many
observers have continued to interpret Russia
as an authoritarian state with expansionist
instincts, and not as a normal state or one
abiding by acceptable rules of international

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behaviour. Conservative representations of
the Russia-threat argument tend to focus on
the nation's political culture (Pipes 1997;
Odom 2001; Cohen 2007), while more liberal
interpretations place responsibility for Russia's
‘anti-Western’ policies on the Kremlin's
leadership (Council on Foreign Relations 2006;
Lapidus 2007; Legvold 2007, p. 98; Wallander
2008). Conservative perception was especially
visible in justi$cations of expanding NATO to

the east by incorporating former parts of
Russia's sphere of in!uence. For example, the
New York Times columnist William Sa$re (1994)
pursued the ‘window of opportunity’ argument
by insisting on the need to extend alliance
membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, the Baltic states and ultimately
Ukraine, because ‘Russia is authoritarian at
heart and expansionist by habit’. It had to be
done promptly, he added, ‘while Russia is
weak and preoccupied with its own revival,
and not later, when such a move would be an
insu"erable provocation to a superpower’
(Sa$re 1994). Richard Pipes provided the
perspective of an academic and historian. He
reminded his readers about Russia's ‘heavy
burden of history’ and failure to make ‘a clean
break with its Soviet past’ (Pipes 1997, p. 67).

To Pipes, Russians are yet to ‘overcome not
only the communist legacy but also that of the
czars and their partner, the Orthodox Church,
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which for centuries collaborated in instilling in
their subjects disrespect for law, submission to
strong and wilful authority, and hostility to the
West’ (Pipes 1997, p. 70). He then cautioned
against viewing the country as a potential ally,
as Russia might still return as an enemy ‘if
those who guide its destiny, exploiting the
political inexperience and deep-seated
prejudices of its people, once again aspire to a
glory to which they are not yet entitled’ (Pipes
1997, p. 78).
The Kremlin's international assertiveness in
the wake of the coloured revolutions in the

former Soviet region has instilled additional
fears in both conservative and liberal Western
analysts. Russia has been frequently viewed as
reviving the lost empire, ‘back-pedalling’ on
democracy and challenging the West's vital
interests in the world (Brzezinski 2004; Council
on Foreign Relations 2006; Cheney 2006;
Satter 2007; Lucas 2009; Bugajski 2009).
Russia's intervention in Georgia in August
2008 provided a fresh pretext for resorting to
the theory of authoritarian expansionism.
Although Russia has legitimate interests in the
Caucasus, many scholars and commentators
explained the Kremlin's intervention either in
terms of Russia's expansionist determination
to secure full control over Georgia's territory
and resources (Asmus 2010; Blank 2009;

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Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8; Sherr 2009), or the
Kremlin's perceived insecurity in response to
the coloured revolutions and its search for
internal legitimacy (Cohen 2007; Lapidus 2007;
Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2009; Filippov 2009).
As a result, both conservative and liberal
perspectives were sceptical about Moscow
entering cooperative arrangements with
Western nations voluntarily. As an
authoritarian revisionist state, it was expected
instead that Russia would use available
opportunities to upset American plans to
remain the dominant world power. If this
reasoning iscorrect, it is suggested, American
policy makers would be wise to abandon any
search for partnership with post-Soviet Russia
and stay $rm in resisting its power aspirations.

Critique
The theory of authoritarian expansionism
su"ers from biases of essentialism, cultural
ethnocentrism and political hypocrisy.
Essentialism
The $rst problem concerns the theory of
authoritarian expansionism's presentation of
Russia as a never changing entity that is
constantly preoccupied with imperialist plans
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to subjugate and occupy other nations. This
tendency to essentialise Russia and its foreign
policy downplays the role of factors others
than the nation's political culture or the
regime's strategic design. As a result, little
serious consideration is given to the possibility
that Russia's international assertiveness may
be designed as a response to actions by the
West and to seek relatively limited objectives.
For example, despite frequent claims that St
Petersburg's nineteenth-century policy sought

to topple the Ottoman Empire and conquer
Constantinople,9Russia's eastern goals were
far less ambitious. These objectives included
protection of the Orthodox Christians in the
Balkans and the right to have a secure
passage of Russian vessels through the Black
Sea. Although inside Russia there had been
supporters of the drive to Constantinople
within intellectual and foreign-policy circles, it
would be a mistake to view Russia's foreign
policy as driven by their views. Even after
defeat in the Crimean War, the government
did not turn away from Europe as Russia's
hard-liners had hoped. As Chancellor
Alexander Gorchakov's activities
demonstrated, St Petersburg wanted
recognition of its interests in the Black Sea,
which Russia was prepared to defend even at

the cost of German uni$cation.
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Even Soviet international policy had more
limited goals than many Western scholars and
politicians believed. With the exception of the
brief period of the drive for world revolution,
the Kremlin mainly sought to establish the
Soviet Union as a great power and recognised
member of the international community, not
to expand the Soviet geopolitical boundaries.
The Cold War, including the Soviet occupation
of Eastern Europe, the Cuban missile crisis in
1962 and the military intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979, also cannot be
adequately understood without considering
actions by the Western nations. Western
suspicion and mistrust toward the Soviet
Union served to strengthen its determination
to act assertively. From the willingness to work
with Russia before and during the meeting at
Yalta, Great Britain and the United States soon
moved to unilateral and potentially
confrontational behaviour. Ideological
di"erences notwithstanding, Stalin and his
entourage did not abandon their attempts to
mend fences with the West until Truman had
made public his doctrine of globally containing
communism on 12 March 1947 and the
Marshall Plan had been proclaimed in June of
the same year.
It is equally problematic to present Russia's

more recent assertiveness as a part of a plan
8
by the Kremlin to restore the empire and
dominate its neighbours, even at the price of
confrontation with the West. Those accusing
Russia of reviving the lost empire, back-
pedalling on democracy and challenging the
West's vital interests in the world oversimplify
the extremely complex process of Russia's
transformation and its relations with Western
nations. In particular, much of Russia's
assertiveness was a product of the United
States' regime-change policy, e"orts to
achieve nuclear superiority and the West's

post-Cold War advancement into what Russia
perceived as the sphere of its geopolitical
interests.10It is misleading to ignore the
interactive nature of Russia–West relations,
presenting Russia as an essentialist entity with
once-and-forever formed values and
behavioural patterns.
Ethnocentrism
The above-noted essentialist presentation of
Russia's foreign policy in part results from the
theory of authoritarian expansionism's
cultural ethnocentrism. Rather than viewing
other cultural communities as a source of
learning, ethnocentric theories tend to
perceive them as a potential threat precisely
because of their di"erence from the self.
Ethnocentrism precludes the theory of

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authoritarian expansionism from being able to
appreciate Russia's historical, geopolitical and
institutional distinctness because ethnocentric
ideas assume the superiority of their own
culture and the inferiority of others.
A good example of a Western ethnocentric
theory is that of democratic peace, according
to which democracies do not go to war with
each other.11Critics of the democratic peace
theory pointed out that it re!ects American
values of what is ‘democratic’ and that those
values themselves have been shaped by the

United States' perception of external threats
(Oren 1995, 2002). Upon closer inspection, the
theory of democratic peace is a mirror image
of the authoritarian expansionism theory.
Simply put, the two theories say that by not
$ghting each other Western-style democracies
tend to act peacefully and cooperatively
abroad, whereas the non-Western
authoritarian systems, such as Russia, are
bullish and expansionist exactly because they
are non-democracies. Yet social structures and
internal conditions are far more complex than
the two theories present. For example, in the
post-communist context, democratisation is
not infrequently accompanied by state
weakness, thereby allowing the re-emergence
and the rise of a previously dormant militant
ethnic nationalism. As a result, not only do

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some of the newly established democracies go
to war against each other, but they may also
do so in part as a result of their moving away
from authoritarianism (Mans$eld & Snyder
2007). Similarly, authoritarian regimes that
lack popular legitimacy may be cautious
enough and abstain from assertive foreign
policy if they perceive such policy as
potentially destabilising. Just as authoritarian

regimes may be compatible with building an
inclusive national identity and an e#cient
economy,12such regimes may be compatible
with a moderate international behaviour.
The highly simplistic treatment of Russia's
political system becomes especially
problematic in the post-Soviet context. Indeed,
if judged by the degree of public support,
rather than by institutionalisation of e"ective
checks and balances, Russia's political system
can hardly be called undemocratic.13Yet
Russia's system is still emerging, and can
hardly be labelled either as an established
democracy or as pure authoritarianism. More
nuanced categories and theories need to be
developed if we are to match Russia's
domestic conditions to its foreign policy. Even
within the West, meanings of democracy

change over time,14and it makes little sense
to analyse the Russian post-communist
‘democracy’ by comparing it to the model of
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Western societies (McFaul 2001; Fish 2005;
Baker & Glasser 2005), rather than to Russia's
own history.
Hypocrisy

The essentialism and ethnocentrism of the
authoritarian expansionism theory also feed
into questionable policy recommendations.
Presenting Russia as an autocratic power that
invariably threatens the outside world leaves
other countries with few options regarding
engaging Russia. If Russia—especially in
presentation of Version One of the theory of
authoritarian expansionism—was, is and will
remain an autocratic and anti-Western
imperialist state, then the West must either
contain or confront it. Such recommendations
do not only tend to perpetuate the tense state
of West–Russia relations; they are also
politically hypocritical because they deny
Russia interests and stakes that the Western
nations themselves view as fundamental to
their own existence. Russia's interests and

values are not only perceived as incompatible
with those of the West; they are also viewed as
illegitimate and not worthy of recognition.
An example of these kinds of
recommendations for Western governments
might be the calls by many advocates of the
theory of authoritarian expansionism to
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punish and contain the Kremlin following its

assertive post-9/11 policy. Disappointed by
Russia's unwillingness to follow the United
States' international agenda, analysts and
members of the American political class, such
as Senator John McCain and Vice President
Dick Cheney, issued multiple statements
indicating their concerns with Russia's new
‘imperialism’ and energy ‘blackmail’.15Steps
were proposed, such as revoking Russia's
membership in the G8, severing its ties with
other Western institutions, banning private
investments and recognising the
independence of secessionist territories (in the
case of Chechnya) (McCain 2003; Frum & Perle
2003, p. 263; Pipes 2004; Edwards & Kemp
2006; Council on Foreign Relations 2006).
These would amount to a policy of containing
Russia or returning to where the two nations

were during the Cold War.
Blaming Russia alone for the breakup of the
post-9/11 international coalition is insu#cient
at best and misleading at worst; and
recommendations to contain or punish
Moscow are counter-productive. Denying
Russia its political and energy interests and
the right to set an independent foreign policy
is sure to come with large political and
economic costs. Such an approach is not likely
to discipline a Russia that continues to be in a
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position not to yield to external pressures.
Continuous treatment of Russia as a potential
threat, rather than a legitimate member of
international society, may indeed bring to
power in Moscow those who are interested in
exacerbating relations with the West.
Politically, it may generate a prolonged cycle of
hostilities shaped by Russia and the West's
clashing perceptions of each other's
intentions. NATO expansion, as well as military
interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, has already

done its share of damage in this respect. Hard-
line nationalists in Russia will only be grateful
to hawkish pundits and politicians for assisting
them in constructing an image of the West as
a threat.
Three illustrations
This section reviews several cases of Russia's
assertiveness in order to highlight empirical
problems with employing the theory of
authoritarian expansionism for interpreting
Russia's behaviour. I have selected cases
across historical eras—the Crimean War, the
Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War—which
have been critically important to the theory's
establishment and progression.
Crimean War

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The advocates of the theory of authoritarian
expansionism have advanced two
assumptions regarding the decision by Russia
to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. First,
they have argued that the Tsar's ultimatum to
the Sultan over the rights of Orthodox
Christians was predetermined by Russia's
traditional desire to conquer
Constantinople.16Second, they have assumed
that the autocratic nature of St Petersburg's
decision making precluded any serious
opposition to the Tsar's plan. Evidence for
these assumptions is far from conclusive.
Nicholas did not seek to topple the Sultan. The
Tsar's objectives were more limited and

included the defence of the rights of Russia's
co-religionists residing within the Ottoman
Empire, preservation of the prestige of a
European power, and the right to maintain a
!eet in the Black Sea. More than a third of the
Ottoman Empire's population—approximately
13 million people—was Orthodox Christian,
and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardzhi provided
Russia with special rights to protect Orthodox
Christians within the Ottoman Empire.
Although these rights were not clearly de$ned,
Article 7 obligated the Porte to ‘give the
Christian faith and its churches $rm
protection’, and it granted ‘the Ministries of
the Russian Imperial Court [the right] to
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protect all interests of the church built in
Constantinople’.17As a member of the Holy
Alliance, Russia also viewed its commitment to
the rights of Orthodox Christians as consistent
with its European obligations. In Nicholas's
perception, he was challenging the Sultan on
the issue of the Holy Places to return the
Ottoman principalities to the European
Concert.18Finally, the Tsar sought to con$rm
Russia's control over the Straits of the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which was
vital to Russia's economic ties to Europe. The
Crimean War resulted less from Russia's
expansionism and more from the West and
Russia's incorrect perceptions of each other's

motives, as well as from Nicholas's
overcon$dence.
It would be equally wrong to assume that
Nicholas's assertiveness met no opposition at
home. Advocates of a more restrained policy
within the political class included Nicholas's
most in!uential advisors, such as Count
Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow, who urged
him to be cautious in negotiations with the
Ottomans and consultations with Austria and
Prussia. On the other side of the political
spectrum, Slavophiles proclaimed the Crimean
War to serve the ‘holy’ purpose of reviving
Russia's Christian mission and pressured the
Tsar to extend military support for the Balkan
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Slavs—advice that Nicholas never accepted.19
Cold War
The early Cold War provides another seminal
case of the theory of authoritarian
expansionism which places emphasis on the
Soviet expansionist ideology and totalitarian
structure of Josef Stalin's decision making
(Kennan 1961; Kissinger 1994). Again, the
reality is far too complex to be adequately
expressed by supporters of the theory of
authoritarian expansionism.
The historical record shows that Soviet
international objectives after World War II

were limited and shaped by the state's
perception of strategic interests, rather than
communist ideology.20Before the end of 1945,
Stalin acted with restraint and generally in the
spirit of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements as
he interpreted them. He was willing to tolerate
Poland's independence, although not outside
the Soviet area of in!uence (Suny 1998, p.
344). He also planned no communist
takeovers in Europe and advised the leaders
of communist parties in Italy, France, Hungary
and Bulgaria to cooperate with national
governments and not to expect to assume
power within the foreseeable future (Roberts
1999, p. 19; LaFeber 1997, p. 20)—partly
because he wanted to prevent the
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strengthening of independent communist
centres (Daniels 1985, p. 220). In addition—
and consistent with the agreement on the
division of in!uence he had devised with

Churchill—Stalin refused to interfere in Greece
(Pikhoya 2007, p. 146). He further abstained
from interfering in Finland, which he viewed as
maintaining a generally ‘friendly’ international
posture (Alperovitz 1971, p. 22). Outside
Europe, Stalin advised Chinese communists to
enter into a coalition with their enemies, the
nationalists (Roberts 1999, p. 19). He also
refused to defy the United States by
intervening in Japan and landing in Hokkaido,
as some of his advisers encouraged him to do
after Truman had dropped two nuclear bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945
(Suny 1998, p. 345).
The really radical turn in the Soviet attitude
toward the West did not take place until the
Marshall Plan was o#cially proclaimed in June
1947. ‘There is little evidence’, wrote Vladislav

Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, ‘that before
the Marshall Plan Stalin had any master plan
for immediate expansion’ (Zubok & Pleshakov
1996, p. 130). Even after Truman had
proclaimed his new doctrine in March 1947,
Stalin was hoping to continue political ties and
negotiations with the United States and Great
Britain. In April, during a long meeting with
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State Secretary George Marshall, Stalin argued
for a possible compromise on ‘all the main
questions’ and insisted that ‘it was necessary
to have patience and not become pessimistic’
(Kissinger 1994, p. 444). Marshall, however,
was of a di"erent opinion, and in his radio
address on 28 April he indicated that the
United States was no longer in a mood to
deliberate and was planning to take decisive
actions (Kissinger 1994, p. 445). On 5 June he
delivered his Marshall Plan speech, in which
he pledged $nancial assistance for the post-
war reconstruction of the European continent.
In response, Stalin and Molotov articulated

their alternative to Western policy by creating
a separate bloc with the Eastern European
states and suppressing any opposition to their
policy within the region. At home, the new
course meant a return to the pre-war system
of mass mobilisation and repressions.
In addition, the Soviet power structure, as
highly centralised as it was, did allow for
opposition to the policy of assertiveness.
Immediately following the war, Stalin's most
impatient comrades wanted him to cross the
Elbe and occupy some parts of the Western
European nations—advice that he rejected as
impractical.21From the other side of the
political spectrum, a former Foreign Minister
Maxim Litvinov and the ambassador to the
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United States Andrei Gromyko defended the
‘liberal’ approach that included more respect
for the choices of Eastern European states and
more extensive negotiations with the Western
ones (Zubok & Pleshakov 1996, pp. 29–30;
Pikhoya 2007, pp. 106–8). What exacerbated
the situation, making it ever more di#cult to
prevent a full-!edged political confrontation,
was the two sides' international ambitions and
mistrust of each other's intentions. Stalin's
geopolitically limited ‘socialist imperialism’ was

met with the West's global ‘democratic
imperialism’.22Had the West been be less
revisionist and fearful of the Kremlin's
preparedness to penetrate the Western
nations,23there was a possibility that Stalin
would have continued with post-war
cooperative security arrangements.
The Russia–Georgia War
Similar problems exist with the claims of the
theory of authoritarian expansionism that an
autocratic Moscow was seeking to establish
imperial control over Tbilisi and that the war
with Georgia was part of a broader geopolitical
plan to revive Russia's hegemony in the
former Soviet region and to challenge the
West globally (Asmus 2010, pp. 9, 14, 217–18;
Blank 2009, p. 104; Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8;
Sherr 2009, p. 224).24

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Russia's relationship with its Caucasian
neighbour has evolved through several
increasingly unhappy stages and Moscow's
objectives have been defensive, aiming mainly
to prevent NATO expansion and the inclusion
of Georgia and potentially Ukraine into the
alliance. Just as Tbilisi was angry with
Moscow's unwillingness to honour Georgia's
independence and the right to choose a
foreign-policy orientation, Russia was
frustrated with the lack of recognition by the
United States and NATO. While it is plausible
to assume the Kremlin's intention was to gain
full control over Georgia, it is at least as
plausible to interpret Russia's motives as
driven by defence and security considerations.
The interests of Russia's security are at least as

helpful in determining its behaviour and
explaining why it limited itself to recognising
Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence,
but abstained from pursuing the more
expansionist objectives of removing
Saakashvili from power and establishing a pro-
Kremlin regime in Tbilisi. The theory of
authoritarian expansionism lacks nuance and
a sense of proportion and, by presenting
Russia as inherently imperialist and anti-
Western, this theory is less inclined to consider
seriously the impact of contemporary
developments and international interactions
on Russia's behaviour.

8
Western nations and Georgia too bear
responsibility for Russia's increasingly
assertive behaviour in the Caucasus. By
assisting Tbilisi with its political transition after
the Rose Revolution and not interfering with
its e"orts to restore control over Adjara, the
Kremlin expected Georgia to honour its
interests in the Caucasus by not pressing for
immediate military withdrawals, excluding the
use of force from dealings with South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, and consulting Russia on vital
security issues such as membership in NATO.
Soon, however, Tbilisi adopted a strategy of
solving territorial disputes without assistance
from Russia and by relying on support from
the United States. By 2004 Washington had
provided $1.2 billion in aid in the previous

decade, and deployed military advisors in
Georgia. The United States was determined to
secure its access to Caspian oil and strengthen
its geostrategic presence in the Caucasus,
which the Kremlin saw as evidence of
America's bias and lack of recognition of
Russia's role in the region. The United States
did little to restrain Georgia's militarisation
and ambitions to reign in its autonomous
regions by force.25While Russia was
increasing its support for Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, NATO and US o#cials did not hide
their backing of Tbilisi, and rarely criticised
Georgia's actions in public. For example, less
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than a month before the war, the US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice travelled to Europe.
She found no time to visit Moscow, but on 9
July she went to Tbilisi to demonstrate support
for Georgia's territorial integrity and NATO
aspirations.
It is also unrealistic to assume that the
Kremlin's decision-making system was
autocratic enough to exclude a serious debate
within the ruling circles. According to Gleb
Pavlovski, one faction within the Kremlin
wanted to march on Tbilisi in order to
challenge the West and fully revive Russia's
domination in the Caucasus (Felgenhauer
2009, pp. 178–79). Another faction had more
modest objectives, but did consider a decision

to remove Saakashvili. Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov both indicated that they wanted the
Georgian President ‘to go’ and at $rst
considered this a condition for a cease$re
(Asmus 2010, pp. 199, 220). Still another
faction seems to have been satis$ed with
achieving a military victory over Georgia and
recognition of its rebellious provinces.26The
ruling structure was far from uniform or
consolidated.
Towards a better understanding of
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Russia
The analysis in this article suggests the theory
of authoritarian expansionism has a rather
limited ability to understand Russia and its
foreign policy. Not only does the theory tend
to misrepresent the direction and scope of
Russia's international actions, but it is
potentially misleading regarding the sources
of such actions. Because of its emphasis on
the role of domestic ‘authoritarianism’ in
determining foreign policy, the theory of
authoritarian expansionism tends to miss
other important sources of state international
behaviour, such as security conditions and

actions by outside powers towards Russia. It is
not that the theory of authoritarian
expansionism is necessarily wrong, but it is
biased and incomplete and therefore
potentially wrong. To apply the late Martin
Malia's (1999, p. 9) diagnosis, ‘the West is not
necessarily most alarmed when Russia is in
reality most alarming, nor most reassured
when Russia is in fact most reassuring’. The
theory's tendency to essentialise Russia's
internal conditions and exaggerate its
international ambitions should therefore
make analysts pause before adopting the
theory of authoritarian expansionism
framework and policy recommendations.
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A better approach to Russia would be to
devise a more complex classi$cation of
Russia's foreign policy. The historical record
will show that since its emergence as an
independent centralised state, Russia has
followed not one but several distinct
trajectories in relations with the West
(Tsygankov 2012). From opening a permanent
mission in Rome in the early seventeenth
century to the collective security policy before
World War II, Russia frequently sided with a
coalition of Western states against those
whom it viewed as challenging Russian values
of security. The second distinct trajectory of
Russia's relations with the West has been that

of defensiveness or balancing through
domestic revival and !exible international
alliances. It included Russia's periods of
recovery after the Time of Troubles, the war
with Sweden, the Crimean War, the
Communist Revolution and the Soviet
disintegration. Finally, historically Russia has
resorted to assertiveness in relations with the
West, as exempli$ed by the cases considered
above of the Crimean War, Cold War and the
Russia–Georgia war of August 2008. The
theory of authoritarian expansionism is
applicable only to the third trajectory of
Russia's foreign policy and to a limited degree.
A better approach to Russia would be one free
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from crude biases and hypocritical
recommendations. Such approaches should
be eclectic and draw from various theoretical
traditions by incorporating ideas of domestic
institutions, considerations of national security
and international recognition as sources of the
nation's foreign policy.27The $rst task ought
to be to establish a meaningful context in
which Russia acts and seeks to achieve its
goals. Scholarly responsibility demands that
we should establish it by studying the relevant
historical, social, psychological and political
contexts behind what ostensibly are
‘autocratic’ decisions. Proceeding from the

200-year-old vision of Russia by the Marquis
de Custine as an essentially aggressive nation,
or engaging in reconstruction of the Kremlin's
motives without su#cient evidence at hand, is
unlikely to facilitate a better understanding of
the country or produce sound policy
recommendations. How the Russians
themselves describe their system of
commitments to relevant social communities
should give us a better clue as to what the
purpose, legitimacy and scope of their actions
might be. The second task should be to
analyse the level of power and con$dence that
provides the state with the required platform
for acting, and it incorporates power
capabilities, institutional capacity and the
leadership's perceptions of actions necessary

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for implementing the vision. Even if the
domestic belief system supports assertive
international behaviour, Russia may lack the
resources to act on it. Finally, a scholar of
foreign policy must carefully monitor the
actions of the Western states toward Russia.
As constructivism teaches us, such external
actions may serve the purpose of external
legitimisation of Russia's behaviour on the
international scene. By providing various
forms of support the outside world may have
the power to encourage Russia not to resort to
revisionist behaviour. Only such an eclectic

approach, sensitive to local systems of
perceiving the outside world, national security
interests and the behaviour of outsiders, may
bring us closer to a better understanding of an
enormously complex country, such as Russia.
Related Research Data
The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of
Russian Foreign Policy
Source: Informa UK Limited
Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources
of Russia's Ukraine policy
Source: Informa UK Limited
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dx.doi.org%2F10.1080%2F10758216.2018.1468270&type=Scho
lix
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dx.doi.org%2F10.1080%2F1060586x.2015.1005903&type=Scho
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Linking provided by
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Andrei P. Tsygankov
The author thanks the editors of Europe-
Asia Studies and two anonymous
reviewers for their comments and
suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
For examples of scholarship on Russia's
foreign policy, see Trenin (2009), Manko"
(2009), Tsygankov (2010), Lucas (2009),
Bugajski (2009) and Kanet (2009).
For realist studies of Soviet foreign policy, see,
for example, Ulam (1968), Wohlforth (1993)

and Donaldson and Nogee (1998).
For a development of this argument, see
Neumann (1996), English (2000), Hopf (2002),
Clunan (2009) and Larson and Shevchenko
(2010).
While Prussia wanted to help Austria in
exchange for dominating Germany, Russia had
no such conditions and was assisting Austria
http://www.scholix.org/
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out of Holy Alliance obligations (Taylor 1954, p.

30).
For example, in April 1863, Britain, France and
Austria each sent similar notes to the Russian
government asking for Poland to be given
independence and for its borders to include
Lithuania and Ruthenia (Seton-Watson 1967,
p. 435).
In 1911 the American government even
abrogated the commercial treaty with Russia
(Foglesong 2007, pp. 43–44).
For overviews of Panslavist theories, see Kohn
(1953), Petrovich (1956), Duncan (2000) and
Tuminez (2000).
For important exceptions, see revisionist
scholarship on the West–Soviet relations
(Holloway 1984; Garto" 1985; Cohen 1985;
Kolko 1994). For analysis of Western
scholarship as re!ective of an enemy's

perception, see Oren (2002) and Foglesong
(2007). For a recent study of Sovietologists, see
Engerman (2010).
For such claims, see, for example, Kissinger
(1994, pp. 140–44), Geyer (1987, p. 65) and
MacKenzie (1993, p. 220).
For development of this argument, see
Tsygankov (2010, ch. 6).
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For a summary of the debate, see Brown et al.
(1996). For other works critical of Western
ethnocentrism in analysing Russia, see Malia
(1999), Cohen (2001) and Brown (2010).
For an argument against universality of
economic and political openness for advancing
economic growth, see Bremmer (2006).
Public support for President Putin was
consistently high, ranging from 70% to 80%
during the 2000s. In addition, some polls
showed that almost half (47%) of Russians
thought that the country needed a distinct
kind of democracy that would correspond to
Russia's national traditions and speci$c

qualities, and only 17% were against a
democratic form of government (Interfax, 18
December 2007).
On contested meanings of democracy in the
United States, see Foner (1998) and Oren
(2002).
For analysis of anti-Russian currents within the
American political class and media circles, see
Tsygankov (2009) and English and Svyatets
(2010).
See for example, Kissinger (1994, pp. 140–44),
Geyer (1987, p. 65) and MacKenzie (1993, p.
220).
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For the text of the agreement, see Dmytryshyn
(1974, pp. 97–107).
The Tsar's stated objectives were that ‘all the
Christian parts of Turkey must necessarily
become independent, must become again
what they [formerly] were, principalities,
Christian states, as such re-enter the family of
the Christian states of Europe’ (Vinogradov
1993, p. 170).
Part of it was that Nicholas was wary of the
Slavophiles' insistence on abolition of
serfdom. Domestic censorship for the
Slavophiles remained tight, and the war
objectives were kept as limited and status-quo
oriented. Disappointed in Nicholas and the
course of the war, the Slavophiles soon began
to withdraw their support (for details, see
Curtiss 1979, pp. 557–60). The Tsar also

rejected plans from his own court to attack
Constantinople (Fuller 1992, pp. 235–36).
This is not to say that ideology was
unimportant. Yet, it was more important as
‘the internal lens through which the state
viewed the very legitimacy of its actions’
(Gaddis 1997, p. 290) than as a justi$cation for
hard-line actions toward the West.
For example, General Semyon Budennyi
advocated such intervention. Stalin reportedly
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responded to Budennyi by posing the
rhetorical questions ‘how are we to feed
them?’ (Akstyutin 1995).
The terms of ‘socialist’ and ‘democratic’
imperialism come from Zubok and Gaddis,
respectively (Zubok 2009, ch. 2; Gaddis 1997,
pp. 284, 289).
See, for example, CIA (1948, pp. 4–7) and NSC
(1948, pp. 1–2). For analysis of the United
States' in!ated assessments of the Soviet
threat after the war, see Evangelista (1982).
Other scholars argued that the war assisted
the Kremlin with its internal legitimacy (Allison
2008, p. 1169; Filippov 2009).

According to the former Defence Minister
Irakli Okruashvili (2007), Georgia planned a
military invasion of South Ossetia in 2006.
This objective seems to have been favoured by
President Medvedev (2008).
For a recent attempt to o"er a more
sophisticated analysis of relationships
between authoritarianism and foreign policy,
see Chambers (2010).
References
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