The Challenger Disaster
A Case-study in Engineering Ethics
• Shuttle Components
– Orbiter
– Liquid Rocket
Booster
– Solid Rocket
Booster
Shuttle Components
Chronology of the Related Events
• 1974
– NASA contracts Morton Thiokol
• 1976
– NASA accepts the design based on the Titan
missiles
– The joints are sealed by
• Two synthetic rubber O-rings,
• 177 clevis pins,
• Heat shield putty
The Cause of the Disaster
Early Problems
• 1977
– Tests at Thiokol show O-ring leakage
– Joint is made stronger by changing sizes
• 1981
– Post-launch investigation showed O-ring
erosion due to hot gages.
Early Problems
• January of 1985 launch
– First cold-weather launch
– Post-launch investigation showed joint failure
– Tests showed O-rings inability to fill the gap
due to joint rotation at lower temperatures
Early Problems
• July 1985
– Thiokol redesigns the joints w/o O-rings – The
design was not ready for Challenger launch
Political Climate
• Congress is unhappy with NASA
• Competition with Russians to be the first to
observe Halley’s comet.
• Pressure to launch before President
Reagan’s State of the Union Address
Days before Launch
• First launch attempt postponed
• The next launch date was set and was to be
attended by Vice President Bush.
• The temperature at launch: 29 degrees F.
Days Before Launch
• NASA starts an investigation of the effect
of low temperatures on the O-ring seals
• Organization involved
– NASA
– Marshall Space Flight Center
– Morton Thiokol
Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Players at NASA
– Larry Mulloy: SRB Project Manager at Marshall
• Players at Thiokol
– Roger Boisjoly: A SRB engineer
– Arnie Johnson: A SRB engineer
– Joe Kilminster: SRB engineering manager
– Alan McDonald: SRB engineering director
– Bob Lund: Vice president for engineering
– Jerald Mason: General manager
Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Boisjoly and Johnson recommend the
launch to be postponed.
• Bob Lund, the VP for engineering agrees
and makes a similar recommendation.
Investigation Before Launch
• Larry Mulloy, the NASA manager of SRB
asks Joe Kilminister, the SRB manager at
Thiokol, for his opinion.
• Kilminister agrees with other Thiokol
engineers and recommends a launch delay.
Investigation Before Launch
• After discussion with Mason
• Lund reverses his decision regarding
launch!
• Thiokol recommend the launch to proceed
The Launch in January 1986
• The overnight temperatures drop to 8 F
• The temperature of SRB at launch is 28 F
• There is an immediate blow-by of hot gas at
launch. The seal fails quickly over an arc of
70 degrees.
The Launch in January 1986
• The by-products of combustion forms a
glassy oxide that reseals the joint.
• The brittle oxide is shattered
• Hot gases quickly burn through ...
The Challenger Disaster A Case-study in Engineering Ethics.docx
1. The Challenger Disaster
A Case-study in Engineering Ethics
• Shuttle Components
– Orbiter
– Liquid Rocket
Booster
– Solid Rocket
Booster
Shuttle Components
Chronology of the Related Events
• 1974
– NASA contracts Morton Thiokol
• 1976
– NASA accepts the design based on the Titan
missiles
2. – The joints are sealed by
• Two synthetic rubber O-rings,
• 177 clevis pins,
• Heat shield putty
The Cause of the Disaster
Early Problems
• 1977
– Tests at Thiokol show O-ring leakage
– Joint is made stronger by changing sizes
• 1981
– Post-launch investigation showed O-ring
erosion due to hot gages.
Early Problems
• January of 1985 launch
3. – First cold-weather launch
– Post-launch investigation showed joint failure
– Tests showed O-rings inability to fill the gap
due to joint rotation at lower temperatures
Early Problems
• July 1985
– Thiokol redesigns the joints w/o O-rings – The
design was not ready for Challenger launch
Political Climate
• Congress is unhappy with NASA
• Competition with Russians to be the first to
observe Halley’s comet.
• Pressure to launch before President
4. Reagan’s State of the Union Address
Days before Launch
• First launch attempt postponed
• The next launch date was set and was to be
attended by Vice President Bush.
• The temperature at launch: 29 degrees F.
Days Before Launch
• NASA starts an investigation of the effect
of low temperatures on the O-ring seals
• Organization involved
– NASA
– Marshall Space Flight Center
– Morton Thiokol
5. Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Players at NASA
– Larry Mulloy: SRB Project Manager at Marshall
• Players at Thiokol
– Roger Boisjoly: A SRB engineer
– Arnie Johnson: A SRB engineer
– Joe Kilminster: SRB engineering manager
– Alan McDonald: SRB engineering director
– Bob Lund: Vice president for engineering
– Jerald Mason: General manager
Engineering Investigation Before
Launch
• Boisjoly and Johnson recommend the
launch to be postponed.
• Bob Lund, the VP for engineering agrees
6. and makes a similar recommendation.
Investigation Before Launch
• Larry Mulloy, the NASA manager of SRB
asks Joe Kilminister, the SRB manager at
Thiokol, for his opinion.
• Kilminister agrees with other Thiokol
engineers and recommends a launch delay.
Investigation Before Launch
• After discussion with Mason
• Lund reverses his decision regarding
launch!
• Thiokol recommend the launch to proceed
The Launch in January 1986
• The overnight temperatures drop to 8 F
7. • The temperature of SRB at launch is 28 F
• There is an immediate blow-by of hot gas at
launch. The seal fails quickly over an arc of
70 degrees.
The Launch in January 1986
• The by-products of combustion forms a
glassy oxide that reseals the joint.
• The brittle oxide is shattered
• Hot gases quickly burn through the liquid
rocket booster
The Aftermath
• Causes of the accident are attributed to
– Inability of the O-rings to expand and seal at
low temperatures.
8. – Heat shield putty did not perform at low
temperatures
– Fits and seating of the O-ring was affected by
low temperature.
The Aftermath
• After all the testimonials
– Biosjoly is taken off the project and subtly
harassed by Thiokol management.
Public Administration and Information
Technology
Volume 10
Series Editor
Christopher G. Reddick
San Antonio, Texas, USA
9. More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/10796
Marijn Janssen • Maria A. Wimmer
Ameneh Deljoo
Editors
Policy Practice and Digital
Science
Integrating Complex Systems, Social
Simulation and Public Administration
in Policy Research
2123
Editors
Marijn Janssen Ameneh Deljoo
Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Faculty of Technology,
Policy, and
Management Management
Delft University of Technology Delft University of Technology
Delft Delft
The Netherlands The Netherlands
Maria A. Wimmer
Institute for Information Systems Research
University of Koblenz-Landau
Koblenz
11. (www.springer.com)
Preface
The last economic and financial crisis has heavily threatened
European and other
economies around the globe. Also, the Eurozone crisis, the
energy and climate
change crises, challenges of demographic change with high
unemployment rates,
and the most recent conflicts in the Ukraine and the near East or
the Ebola virus
disease in Africa threaten the wealth of our societies in
different ways. The inability
to predict or rapidly deal with dramatic changes and negative
trends in our economies
and societies can seriously hamper the wealth and prosperity of
the European Union
and its Member States as well as the global networks. These
societal and economic
challenges demonstrate an urgent need for more effective and
efficient processes of
governance and policymaking, therewith specifically addressing
crisis management
and economic/welfare impact reduction.
Therefore, investing in the exploitation of innovative
information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) in the support of good governance
and policy modeling
has become a major effort of the European Union to position
itself and its Member
States well in the global digital economy. In this realm, the
European Union has
12. laid out clear strategic policy objectives for 2020 in the Europe
2020 strategy1: In
a changing world, we want the EU to become a smart,
sustainable, and inclusive
economy. These three mutually reinforcing priorities should
help the EU and the
Member States deliver high levels of employment, productivity,
and social cohesion.
Concretely, the Union has set five ambitious objectives—on
employment, innovation,
education, social inclusion, and climate/energy—to be reached
by 2020. Along with
this, Europe 2020 has established four priority areas—smart
growth, sustainable
growth, inclusive growth, and later added: A strong and
effective system of eco-
nomic governance—designed to help Europe emerge from the
crisis stronger and to
coordinate policy actions between the EU and national levels.
To specifically support European research in strengthening
capacities, in overcom-
ing fragmented research in the field of policymaking, and in
advancing solutions for
1 Europe 2020 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
v
vi Preface
ICT supported governance and policy modeling, the European
Commission has co-
funded an international support action called eGovPoliNet2. The
13. overall objective
of eGovPoliNet was to create an international, cross-
disciplinary community of re-
searchers working on ICT solutions for governance and policy
modeling. In turn,
the aim of this community was to advance and sustain research
and to share the
insights gleaned from experiences in Europe and globally. To
achieve this, eGovPo-
liNet established a dialogue, brought together experts from
distinct disciplines, and
collected and analyzed knowledge assets (i.e., theories,
concepts, solutions, findings,
and lessons on ICT solutions in the field) from different
research disciplines. It built
on case material accumulated by leading actors coming from
distinct disciplinary
backgrounds and brought together the innovative knowledge in
the field. Tools, meth-
ods, and cases were drawn from the academic community, the
ICT sector, specialized
policy consulting firms as well as from policymakers and
governance experts. These
results were assembled in a knowledge base and analyzed in
order to produce com-
parative analyses and descriptions of cases, tools, and scientific
approaches to enrich
a common knowledge base accessible via www.policy-
community.eu.
This book, entitled “Policy Practice and Digital Science—
Integrating Complex
Systems, Social Simulation, and Public Administration in Policy
Research,” is one
of the exciting results of the activities of eGovPoliNet—fusing
community building
14. activities and activities of knowledge analysis. It documents
findings of comparative
analyses and brings in experiences of experts from academia
and from case descrip-
tions from all over the globe. Specifically, it demonstrates how
the explosive growth
in data, computational power, and social media creates new
opportunities for policy-
making and research. The book provides a first comprehensive
look on how to take
advantage of the development in the digital world with new
approaches, concepts,
instruments, and methods to deal with societal and
computational complexity. This
requires the knowledge traditionally found in different
disciplines including public
administration, policy analyses, information systems, complex
systems, and com-
puter science to work together in a multidisciplinary fashion
and to share approaches.
This book provides the foundation for strongly multidisciplinary
research, in which
the various developments and disciplines work together from a
comprehensive and
holistic policymaking perspective. A wide range of aspects for
social and professional
networking and multidisciplinary constituency building along
the axes of technol-
ogy, participative processes, governance, policy modeling,
social simulation, and
visualization are tackled in the 19 papers.
With this book, the project makes an effective contribution to
the overall objec-
tives of the Europe 2020 strategy by providing a better
understanding of different
15. approaches to ICT enabled governance and policy modeling, and
by overcoming the
fragmented research of the past. This book provides impressive
insights into various
theories, concepts, and solutions of ICT supported policy
modeling and how stake-
holders can be more actively engaged in public policymaking. It
draws conclusions
2 eGovPoliNet is cofunded under FP 7, Call identifier FP7-ICT-
2011-7, URL: www.policy-
community.eu
Preface vii
of how joint multidisciplinary research can bring more effective
and resilient find-
ings for better predicting dramatic changes and negative trends
in our economies and
societies.
It is my great pleasure to provide the preface to the book
resulting from the
eGovPoliNet project. This book presents stimulating research by
researchers coming
from all over Europe and beyond. Congratulations to the project
partners and to the
authors!—Enjoy reading!
Thanassis Chrissafis
Project officer of eGovPoliNet
European Commission
DG CNECT, Excellence in Science, Digital Science
16. Contents
1 Introduction to Policy-Making in the Digital Age . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 1
Marijn Janssen and Maria A. Wimmer
2 Educating Public Managers and Policy Analysts
in an Era of Informatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 15
Christopher Koliba and Asim Zia
3 The Quality of Social Simulation: An Example from Research
Policy Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Petra Ahrweiler and Nigel Gilbert
4 Policy Making and Modelling in a Complex World . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 57
Wander Jager and Bruce Edmonds
5 From Building a Model to Adaptive Robust Decision Making
Using Systems Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 75
Erik Pruyt
6 Features and Added Value of Simulation Models Using
Different
Modelling Approaches Supporting Policy-Making: A
Comparative
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Dragana Majstorovic, Maria A.Wimmer, Roy Lay-Yee, Peter
Davis
and Petra Ahrweiler
17. 7 A Comparative Analysis of Tools and Technologies
for Policy Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 125
Eleni Kamateri, Eleni Panopoulou, Efthimios Tambouris,
Konstantinos Tarabanis, Adegboyega Ojo, Deirdre Lee
and David Price
8 Value Sensitive Design of Complex Product Systems . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 157
Andreas Ligtvoet, Geerten van de Kaa, Theo Fens, Cees van
Beers,
Paulier Herder and Jeroen van den Hoven
ix
x Contents
9 Stakeholder Engagement in Policy Development: Observations
and Lessons from International Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 177
Natalie Helbig, Sharon Dawes, Zamira Dzhusupova, Bram
Klievink
and Catherine Gerald Mkude
10 Values in Computational Models Revalued . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 205
Rebecca Moody and Lasse Gerrits
11 The Psychological Drivers of Bureaucracy: Protecting
the Societal Goals of an Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 221
Tjeerd C. Andringa
18. 12 Active and Passive Crowdsourcing in Government . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 261
Euripidis Loukis and Yannis Charalabidis
13 Management of Complex Systems: Toward Agent-Based
Gaming for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Wander Jager and Gerben van der Vegt
14 The Role of Microsimulation in the Development of Public
Policy . . . 305
Roy Lay-Yee and Gerry Cotterell
15 Visual Decision Support for Policy Making: Advancing
Policy
Analysis with Visualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 321
Tobias Ruppert, Jens Dambruch, Michel Krämer, Tina Balke,
Marco
Gavanelli, Stefano Bragaglia, Federico Chesani, Michela
Milano
and Jörn Kohlhammer
16 Analysis of Five Policy Cases in the Field of Energy Policy .
. . . . . . . . 355
Dominik Bär, Maria A.Wimmer, Jozef Glova, Anastasia
Papazafeiropoulou and Laurence Brooks
17 Challenges to Policy-Making in Developing Countries
and the Roles of Emerging Tools, Methods and Instruments:
Experiences from Saint Petersburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 379
Dmitrii Trutnev, Lyudmila Vidyasova and Andrei Chugunov
18 Sustainable Urban Development, Governance and Policy:
A Comparative Overview of EU Policies and Projects . . . . . . . .
19. . . . . . 393
Diego Navarra and Simona Milio
19 eParticipation, Simulation Exercise and Leadership Training
in Nigeria: Bridging the Digital Divide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 417
Tanko Ahmed
Contributors
Tanko Ahmed National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
(NIPSS), Jos,
Nigeria
Petra Ahrweiler EA European Academy of Technology and
Innovation Assess-
ment GmbH, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany
Tjeerd C. Andringa University College Groningen, Institute of
Artificial In-
telligence and Cognitive Engineering (ALICE), University of
Groningen, AB,
Groningen, the Netherlands
Tina Balke University of Surrey, Surrey, UK
Dominik Bär University of Koblenz-Landau, Koblenz, Germany
Cees van Beers Faculty of Technology, Policy, and
Management, Delft University
of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Stefano Bragaglia University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
20. Laurence Brooks Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK
Yannis Charalabidis University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece
Federico Chesani University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Andrei Chugunov ITMO University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Gerry Cotterell Centre of Methods and Policy Application in the
Social Sciences
(COMPASS Research Centre), University of Auckland,
Auckland, New Zealand
Jens Dambruch Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics
Research, Darmstadt,
Germany
Peter Davis Centre of Methods and Policy Application in the
Social Sciences
(COMPASS Research Centre), University of Auckland,
Auckland, New Zealand
Sharon Dawes Center for Technology in Government,
University at Albany,
Albany, New York, USA
xi
xii Contributors
Zamira Dzhusupova Department of Public Administration and
Development Man-
agement, United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs (UNDESA),
21. NewYork, USA
Bruce Edmonds Manchester Metropolitan University,
Manchester, UK
Theo Fens Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management,
Delft University of
Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Marco Gavanelli University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
Lasse Gerrits Department of Public Administration, Erasmus
University
Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Nigel Gilbert University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jozef Glova Technical University Kosice, Kosice, Slovakia
Natalie Helbig Center for Technology in Government,
University at Albany,
Albany, New York, USA
Paulier Herder Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management,
Delft University
of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Jeroen van den Hoven Faculty of Technology, Policy, and
Management, Delft
University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Wander Jager Groningen Center of Social Complexity Studies,
University of
Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
Marijn Janssen Faculty of Technology, Policy, and
22. Management, Delft University
of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Geerten van de Kaa Faculty of Technology, Policy, and
Management, Delft
University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Eleni Kamateri Information Technologies Institute, Centre for
Research &
Technology—Hellas, Thessaloniki, Greece
Bram Klievink Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management,
Delft University
of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Jörn Kohlhammer GRIS, TU Darmstadt & Fraunhofer IGD,
Darmstadt, Germany
Christopher Koliba University of Vermont, Burlington, VT,
USA
Michel Krämer Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics
Research, Darmstadt,
Germany
Roy Lay-Yee Centre of Methods and Policy Application in the
Social Sciences
(COMPASS Research Centre), University of Auckland,
Auckland, New Zealand
Deirdre Lee INSIGHT Centre for Data Analytics, NUIG,
Galway, Ireland
Contributors xiii
23. Andreas Ligtvoet Faculty of Technology, Policy, and
Management, Delft Univer-
sity of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Euripidis Loukis University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece
Dragana Majstorovic University of Koblenz-Landau, Koblenz,
Germany
Michela Milano University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Simona Milio London School of Economics, Houghton Street,
London, UK
Catherine Gerald Mkude Institute for IS Research, University of
Koblenz-Landau,
Koblenz, Germany
Rebecca Moody Department of Public Administration, Erasmus
University
Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Diego Navarra Studio Navarra, London, UK
Adegboyega Ojo INSIGHT Centre for Data Analytics, NUIG,
Galway, Ireland
Eleni Panopoulou Information Technologies Institute, Centre
for Research &
Technology—Hellas, Thessaloniki, Greece
Anastasia Papazafeiropoulou Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK
David Price Thoughtgraph Ltd, Somerset, UK
24. Erik Pruyt Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management,
Delft University of
Technology, Delft, The Netherlands; Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Study,
Wassenaar, The Netherlands
Tobias Ruppert Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics
Research, Darmstadt,
Germany
Efthimios Tambouris Information Technologies Institute, Centre
for Research &
Technology—Hellas, Thessaloniki, Greece; University of
Macedonia, Thessaloniki,
Greece
Konstantinos Tarabanis Information Technologies Institute,
Centre for Research
& Technology—Hellas, Thessaloniki, Greece; University of
Macedonia, Thessa-
loniki, Greece
Dmitrii Trutnev ITMO University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Gerben van der Vegt Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Groningen,
Groningen, The Netherlands
Lyudmila Vidyasova ITMO University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Maria A. Wimmer University of Koblenz-Landau, Koblenz,
Germany
Asim Zia University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA
25. Chapter 1
Introduction to Policy-Making in the Digital Age
Marijn Janssen and Maria A. Wimmer
We are running the 21st century using 20th century systems on
top of 19th century political structures. . . .
John Pollock, contributing editor MIT technology review
Abstract The explosive growth in data, computational power,
and social media
creates new opportunities for innovating governance and policy-
making. These in-
formation and communications technology (ICT) developments
affect all parts of
the policy-making cycle and result in drastic changes in the way
policies are devel-
oped. To take advantage of these developments in the digital
world, new approaches,
concepts, instruments, and methods are needed, which are able
to deal with so-
cietal complexity and uncertainty. This field of research is
sometimes depicted
as e-government policy, e-policy, policy informatics, or data
science. Advancing
our knowledge demands that different scientific communities
collaborate to create
practice-driven knowledge. For policy-making in the digital age
disciplines such as
complex systems, social simulation, and public administration
need to be combined.
1.1 Introduction
Policy-making and its subsequent implementation is necessary
27. which is traditionally
found in different disciplines, including (but not limited to)
public administration,
policy analyses, information systems, complex systems, and
computer science. All
these knowledge areas are needed for policy-making in the
digital age. The aim of
this book is to provide a foundation for this new
interdisciplinary field in which
various traditional disciplines are blended.
Both policy-makers and those in charge of policy
implementations acknowledge
that ICT is becoming more and more important and is changing
the policy-making
process, resulting in a next generation policy-making based on
ICT support. The field
of policy-making is changing driven by developments such as
open data, computa-
tional methods for processing data, opinion mining, simulation,
and visualization of
rich data sets, all combined with public engagement, social
media, and participatory
tools. In this respect Web 2.0 and even Web 3.0 point to the
specific applications of
social networks and semantically enriched and linked data
which are important for
policy-making. In policy-making vast amount of data are used
for making predictions
and forecasts. This should result in improving the outcomes of
policy-making.
Policy-making is confronted with an increasing complexity and
uncertainty of the
outcomes which results in a need for developing policy models
that are able to deal
28. with this. To improve the validity of the models policy-makers
are harvesting data to
generate evidence. Furthermore, they are improving their
models to capture complex
phenomena and dealing with uncertainty and limited and
incomplete information.
Despite all these efforts, there remains often uncertainty
concerning the outcomes of
policy interventions. Given the uncertainty, often multiple
scenarios are developed
to show alternative outcomes and impact. A condition for this is
the visualization of
policy alternatives and its impact. Visualization can ensure
involvement of nonexpert
and to communicate alternatives. Furthermore, games can be
used to let people gain
insight in what can happen, given a certain scenario. Games
allow persons to interact
and to experience what happens in the future based on their
interventions.
Policy-makers are often faced with conflicting solutions to
complex problems,
thus making it necessary for them to test out their assumptions,
interventions, and
resolutions. For this reason policy-making organizations
introduce platforms facili-
tating policy-making and citizens engagements and enabling the
processing of large
volumes of data. There are various participative platforms
developed by government
agencies (e.g., De Reuver et al. 2013; Slaviero et al. 2010;
Welch 2012). Platforms
can be viewed as a kind of regulated environment that enable
developers, users, and
others to interact with each other, share data, services, and
29. applications, enable gov-
ernments to more easily monitor what is happening and
facilitate the development
of innovative solutions (Janssen and Estevez 2013). Platforms
should provide not
only support for complex policy deliberations with citizens but
should also bring to-
gether policy-modelers, developers, policy-makers, and other
stakeholders involved
in policy-making. In this way platforms provide an information-
rich, interactive
1 Introduction to Policy-Making in the Digital Age 3
environment that brings together relevant stakeholders and in
which complex phe-
nomena can be modeled, simulated, visualized, discussed, and
even the playing of
games can be facilitated.
1.2 Complexity and Uncertainty in Policy-Making
Policy-making is driven by the need to solve societal problems
and should result in
interventions to solve these societal problems. Examples of
societal problems are
unemployment, pollution, water quality, safety, criminality,
well-being, health, and
immigration. Policy-making is an ongoing process in which
issues are recognized
as a problem, alternative courses of actions are formulated,
policies are affected,
implemented, executed, and evaluated (Stewart et al. 2007).
Figure 1.1 shows the
30. typical stages of policy formulation, implementation, execution,
enforcement, and
evaluation. This process should not be viewed as linear as many
interactions are
necessary as well as interactions with all kind of stakeholders.
In policy-making
processes a vast amount of stakeholders are always involved,
which makes policy-
making complex.
Once a societal need is identified, a policy has to be formulated.
Politicians,
members of parliament, executive branches, courts, and interest
groups may be
involved in these formulations. Often contradictory proposals
are made, and the
impact of a proposal is difficult to determine as data is missing,
models cannot
citizen
s
Policy formulation
Policy
implementation
Policy
execution
Policy
enforcement and
evaluation
politicians
31. Policy-
makers
Administrative
organizations
b
u
sin
esses
Inspection and
enforcement agencies
experts
Fig. 1.1 Overview of policy cycle and stakeholders
4 M. Janssen and M. A. Wimmer
capture the complexity, and the results of policy models are
difficult to interpret and
even might be interpreted in an opposing way. This is further
complicated as some
proposals might be good but cannot be implemented or are too
costly to implement.
There is a large uncertainty concerning the outcomes.
Policy implementation is done by organizations other than those
that formulated
the policy. They often have to interpret the policy and have to
make implemen-
32. tation decisions. Sometimes IT can block quick implementation
as systems have
to be changed. Although policy-making is the domain of the
government, private
organizations can be involved to some extent, in particular in
the execution of policies.
Once all things are ready and decisions are made, policies need
to be executed.
During the execution small changes are typically made to fine
tune the policy formu-
lation, implementation decisions might be more difficult to
realize, policies might
bring other benefits than intended, execution costs might be
higher and so on. Typ-
ically, execution is continually changing. Evaluation is part of
the policy-making
process as it is necessary to ensure that the policy-execution
solved the initial so-
cietal problem. Policies might become obsolete, might not work,
have unintended
affects (like creating bureaucracy) or might lose its support
among elected officials,
or other alternatives might pop up that are better.
Policy-making is a complex process in which many stakeholders
play a role. In
the various phases of policy-making different actors are
dominant and play a role.
Figure 1.1 shows only some actors that might be involved, and
many of them are not
included in this figure. The involvement of so many actors
results in fragmentation
and often actors are even not aware of the decisions made by
other actors. This makes
it difficult to manage a policy-making process as each actor has
33. other goals and might
be self-interested.
Public values (PVs) are a way to try to manage complexity and
give some guidance.
Most policies are made to adhere to certain values. Public value
management (PVM)
represents the paradigm of achieving PVs as being the primary
objective (Stoker
2006). PVM refers to the continuous assessment of the actions
performed by public
officials to ensure that these actions result in the creation of PV
(Moore 1995). Public
servants are not only responsible for following the right
procedure, but they also have
to ensure that PVs are realized. For example, civil servants
should ensure that garbage
is collected. The procedure that one a week garbage is collected
is secondary. If it is
necessary to collect garbage more (or less) frequently to ensure
a healthy environment
then this should be done. The role of managers is not only to
ensure that procedures
are followed but they should be custodians of public assets and
maximize a PV.
There exist a wide variety of PVs (Jørgensen and Bozeman
2007). PVs can be
long-lasting or might be driven by contemporary politics. For
example, equal access
is a typical long-lasting value, whereas providing support for
students at universities
is contemporary, as politicians might give more, less, or no
support to students. PVs
differ over times, but also the emphasis on values is different in
the policy-making
34. cycle as shown in Fig. 1.2. In this figure some of the values
presented by Jørgensen
and Bozeman (2007) are mapped onto the four policy-making
stages. Dependent on
the problem at hand other values might play a role that is not
included in this figure.
1 Introduction to Policy-Making in the Digital Age 5
Policy
formulation
Policy
implementation
Policy
execution
Policy
enforcement
and evaluation
efficiency
efficiency
accountability
transparancy
responsiveness
public interest
35. will of the people
listening
citizen involvement
evidence-based
protection of
individual rights
accountability
transparancy
evidence-based
equal access
balancing of interests
robust
honesty
fair
timelessness
reliable
flexible
fair
Fig. 1.2 Public values in the policy cycle
36. Policy is often formulated by politicians in consultation with
experts. In the PVM
paradigm, public administrations aim at creating PVs for society
and citizens. This
suggests a shift from talking about what citizens expect in
creating a PV. In this view
public officials should focus on collaborating and creating a
dialogue with citizens
in order to determine what constitutes a PV.
1.3 Developments
There is an infusion of technology that changes policy processes
at both the individual
and group level. There are a number of developments that
influence the traditional
way of policy-making, including social media as a means to
interact with the public
(Bertot et al. …
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Additional Praise for
Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
37. “Educators the world over seeking to make the management of
risk an integral part
of management degrees have had great difficulties in providing
their students with
a definitive ERM text for their course. The Standards and
associated Handbooks
helped, but until the arrival of Implementing Enterprise Risk
Management: Case Stud-
ies and Best Practices, there has been no text to enlighten
students on the application
of an effective program to manage risk across an enterprise so
that objectives are
maximized and threats minimized. Fraser, Simkins, and Narvaez
have combined
with a group of contributors that represent the cream of risk
practitioners, to pro-
vide the reader with a clear and concise journey through the
management of risk
within a wide range of organizations and industries. The
knowledge, skills, and
experience in the management of risk contained within the
covers of this book are
second to none. It will provide a much needed resource to
students and practition-
ers for many years to come and should become a well-used
reference on the desk
of every manager of risk.”
—Kevin W. Knight AM, chairman, ISO/TC 262—Risk
Management
“The authors—Fraser, Simkins, and Narvaez—have done an
invaluable service to
advance the science of enterprise risk management by collecting
an extensive num-
ber of wonderful case studies that describe innovative risk
38. management practices
in a diverse set of companies around the world. This book
should be an extremely
valuable source of knowledge for anyone interested in the
emerging and evolving
field of risk management.”
—Robert S. Kaplan, senior fellow, Marvin Bower Professor of
Leadership
Development, emeritus, Harvard University
“Lessons learned from case studies and best practices represent
an efficient way
to gain practical insights on the implementation of ERM.
Implementing Enterprise
Risk Management provides such insights from a robust
collection of ERM pro-
grams across public companies and private organizations. I
commend the editors
and contributors for making a significant contribution to ERM
by sharing their
experiences.”
—James Lam, president, James Lam & Associates; director and
Risk Oversight
Committee chairman, E∗ TRADE Financial Corporation;
author, Enterprise Risk Management—From Incentives to
Controls
“For those who still think that enterprise risk management is
just a fad, the varied
examples of practical value-generating uses contained in this
book should dispel
any doubt that the discipline is here to stay! The broad
collection of practices is
39. insightful for students, academics, and executives, as well as
seasoned risk man-
agement professionals.”
—Carol Fox, ARM, director of Strategic and Enterprise Risk
Practice, RIMS
“Managing risk across the enterprise is the new frontier of
business management.
Doing so effectively, in my view, will be the single most
important differentiating
factor for many enterprises in the twenty-first century.
Implementing Enterprise Risk
Management: Case Studies and Best Practices is an innovative
and important addition
to the literature and contains a wealth of insight in this critical
area. This book’s
integration of theory with hands-on, real-world lessons in
managing enterprise
risk provides an opportunity for its readers to gain insight and
understanding that
could otherwise be acquired only through many years of hard-
earned experience.
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I highly recommend this book for use by executives, line
managers, risk managers,
and business students alike.”
—Douglas F. Prawitt, professor of Accounting at Brigham
Young University,
and Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)
40. Executive Board member
“The real beauty of and value in this book is its case study
focus and the wide
variety of firms profiled and writers’ perspectives shared. This
will provide readers
with a wealth of details and views that will help them chart an
ERM journey of their
own that is more likely to fit the specific and typically
customized ERM needs of
the firms for whom they toil.”
—Chris Mandel, senior vice president, Strategic
Solution
s for Sedgwick;
former president of the Risk Management Society
and the 2004 Risk Manager of the Year
“Implementing Enterprise Risk Management looks at many
industries through excel-
lent case studies, providing a real-world base for its
recommendations and an
important reminder that ERM is valuable in many industries. I
highly recommend
this text.”
41. —Russell Walker, Clinical associate professor, Kellogg School
of Management;
author of Winning with Risk Management
“The body of knowledge in Implementing Enterprise Risk
Management continues to
develop as business educators and leaders confront a complex
and rapidly chang-
ing environment. This book provides a valuable resource for
academics and prac-
titioners in this dynamic area.”
—Mark L. Frigo, director, Strategic Risk Management Lab,
Kellstadt Graduate School of Business, DePaul University
“The management of enterprise risk is one of the most vexatious
problems con-
fronting boards and executives worldwide. This is why this
latest book by Fraser,
Simkins, and Narvaez is a much needed and highly refreshing
approach to the sub-
ject. The editors have managed to assemble an impressive list of
contributors who,
through a series of fascinating real-life case studies, adroitly
42. help educate readers
to better understand and deal with the myriad of risks that can
assault, seriously
maim, and/or kill an organization. This is a ‘how to’ book
written with the ‘risk
management problem solver’ in mind. It provides the link that
has been missing
for effectively teaching ERM at the university and executive
education levels and
it is an exceptional achievement by true risk management
advocates.”
—Dr. Chris Bart, FCPA, founder and lead faculty,
The Directors College of Canada
“The Institute of Risk Management welcomes the publication of
this highly practi-
cal text which should be of great interest to our students and
members around the
world. Implementing Enterprise Risk Management brings
together a fine collection of
detailed case studies from organizations of varying sizes and
working in differ-
ent sectors, all seeking to enhance their business performance
by managing their
43. risks more effectively, from the boardroom to the shop floor.
This book makes a
valuable contribution to the body of knowledge of what works
that will benefit the
development of the risk profession.”
—Carolyn Williams, technical director, Institute of Risk
Management
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IMPLEMENTING
ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT
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The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance provides a
comprehensive view of the field
44. of finance in all of its variety and complexity. The series is
projected to include
approximately 65 volumes covering all major topics and
specializations in finance,
ranging from investments, to corporate finance, to financial
institutions. Each vol-
ume in the Kolb Series in Finance consists of new articles
especially written for
the volume.
Each volume is edited by a specialist in a particular area of
finance, who develops
the volume outline and commissions articles by the world’s
experts in that partic-
ular field of finance. Each volume includes an editor’s
introduction and approx-
imately thirty articles to fully describe the current state of
financial research and
practice in a particular area of finance.
The essays in each volume are intended for practicing finance
professionals, grad-
uate students, and advanced undergraduate students. The goal of
each volume is
to encapsulate the current state of knowledge in a particular
45. area of finance so that
the reader can quickly achieve a mastery of that special area of
finance.
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IMPLEMENTING
ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT
Case Studies and Best Practices
Editors
John R.S. Fraser
Betty J. Simkins
Kristina Narvaez
The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance
www.it-ebooks.info
47. 646-8600, or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to
the Publisher for permission
should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 111 River
Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-
6008, or online at
http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher
and author have used their
best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations
or warranties with
respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this
book and specifically
disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness
for a particular purpose. No
warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or
written sales materials.
The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable
for your situation. You
should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither
the publisher nor author
shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial
damages, including but not
limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
48. For general information on our other products and services or
for technical support, please
contact our Customer Care Department within the United States
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Wiley publishes in a variety of print and electronic formats and
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not included in the version you purchased, you may download
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
ISBN 978-1-118-69196-0 (Hardcover)
ISBN 978-1-118-74576-2 (ePDF)
ISBN 978-1-118-74618-9 (ePub)
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To Wendy, my wonderful wife and my inspiration, and to my
parents who instilled in me a lifelong thirst for learning.
—John Fraser
To my husband (Russell) and our family: sons and daughters-
in-law (Luke & Stephanie and Walt & Lauren), daughter and
son-in-law (Susan & Jason), and our youngest daughter (April).
Thank you for your love, support, and encouragement!
—Betty Simkins
I would like to thank my husband and four children for support-
50. ing me on my journey of writing two chapters and co-editing
this
book. I would also like to thank the Risk and Insurance Manage-
ment Society for supporting me during my educational years
and providing great workshops and conferences on enterprise
risk management.
—Kristina Narvaez
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Contents
Foreword xiii
1 Enterprise Risk Management Case Studies:
An Introduction and Overview 1
51. John R.S. Fraser, Betty J. Simkins, and Kristina Narvaez
PART I Overview and Insights for Teaching ERM 17
2 An Innovative Method to Teaching Enterprise Risk
Management: A Learner-Centered Teaching Approach 19
David R. Lange and Betty J. Simkins
PART II ERM Implementation at Leading Organizations 37
3 ERM at Mars, Incorporated: ERM for Strategy
and Operations 39
Larry Warner
4 Value and Risk: Enterprise Risk Management at Statoil 59
Alf Alviniussen and Håkan Jankensgård
5 ERM in Practice at the University of California
Health System 75
Grace Crickette
6 Strategic Risk Management at the LEGO Group:
Integrating Strategy and Risk Management 93
Mark L. Frigo and Hans Læssøe
52. 7 Turning the Organizational Pyramid Upside Down:
Ten Years of Evolution in Enterprise Risk Management
at United Grain Growers 107
John Bugalla
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x Contents
8 Housing Association Case Study of ERM in a
Changing Marketplace 119
John Hargreaves
9 Lessons from the Academy: ERM Implementation in
the University Setting 143
Anne E. Lundquist
10 Developing Accountability in Risk Management: The
British Columbia Lottery Corporation Case Study 179
Jacquetta C. M. Goy
53. 11 Starting from Scratch: The Evolution of ERM at the
Workers’ Compensation Fund 207
Dan M. Hair
12 Measuring Performance at Intuit: A Value-Added
Component in ERM Programs 227
Janet Nasburg
13 TD Bank’s Approach to an Enterprise Risk
Management Program 241
Paul Cunha and Kristina Narvaez
PART III Linking ERM to Strategy and Strategic
Risk Management 251
14 A Strategic Approach to Enterprise Risk Management
at Zurich Insurance Group 253
Linda Conrad and Kristina Narvaez
15 Embedding ERM into Strategic Planning at the City
of Edmonton 281
Ken Baker
16 Leveraging ERM to Practice Strategic Risk Management 305
54. John Bugalla and James Kallman
PART IV Specialized Aspects of Risk Management 319
17 Developing a Strategic Risk Plan for the Hope City
Police Service 321
Andrew Graham
18 Blue Wood Chocolates 335
Stephen McPhie and Rick Nason
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CONTENTS xi
19 Kilgore Custom Milling 363
Rick Nason and Stephen McPhie
20 Implementing Risk Management within Middle
Eastern Oil and Gas Companies 377
Alexander Larsen
55. 21 The Role of Root Cause Analysis in Public Safety
ERM Programs 397
Andrew Bent
22 JAA Inc.—A Case Study in Creating Value from
Uncertainty: Best Practices in Managing Risk 427
Julian du Plessis, Arnold Schanfield, and Alpaslan Menevse
23 Control Complacency: Rogue Trading
at Société Générale 461
Steve Lindo
24 The Role of VaR in Enterprise Risk Management:
Calculating Value at Risk for Portfolios Held by the
Vane Mallory Investment Bank 489
Allissa A. Lee and Betty J. Simkins
25 Uses of Efficient Frontier Analysis in Strategic Risk
Management: A Technical Examination 501
Ward Ching and Loren Nickel
PART V Mini-Cases on ERM and Risk 523
26 Bim Consultants Inc. 525
John R.S. Fraser
56. 27 Nerds Galore 529
Rob Quail
28 The Reluctant General Counsel 535
Norman D. Marks
29 Transforming Risk Management at Akawini Copper 539
Grant Purdy
30 Alleged Corruption at Chessfield: Corporate
Governance and the Risk Oversight Role of the Board
of Directors 547
Richard Leblanc
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xii Contents
31 Operational Risk Management Case Study:
Bon Boulangerie 555
Diana Del Bel Belluz
57. PART VI Other Case Studies 559
32 Constructive Dialogue and ERM: Lessons from the
Financial Crisis 561
Thomas H. Stanton
33 Challenges and Obstacles of ERM Implementation
in Poland 577
Zbigniew Krysiak and Sl̄ awomir Pijanowski
34 Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Building an ERM
Program at General Motors 607
Marc S. Robinson, Lisa M. Smith, and Brian D. Thelen
35 ERM at Malaysia’s Media Company Astro: Quickly
Implementing ERM and Using It to Assess the
Risk-Adjusted Performance of a Portfolio of Acquired
Foreign Companies 623
Patrick Adam K. Abdullah and Ghislain Giroux Dufort
About the Editors 649
Index 651
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Foreword
E
nterprise Risk Management is an evolving discipline focused on
a com-
plex and still imperfectly-understood subject. In such a
situation, science is
advanced best by collecting data from multiple, independent
sites. A rich
set of observations educates the field’s scholars and
practitioners and provides the
foundation for them to develop descriptive and normative
theories as well as cod-
ified best practices about the subject.
The authors—Fraser, Simkins, and Narvaez—have done an
invaluable service
to advance the science of enterprise risk management by
collecting an extensive
59. number of wonderful case studies that describe innovative risk
management prac-
tices in a diverse set of companies around the world. This book
should be an
extremely valuable source of knowledge for anyone interested
in the emerging
and evolving field of risk management. We should be grateful to
the editors and
to each chapter author for expanding the body of knowledge for
risk management
professionals and academics.
Robert S. Kaplan
Senior Fellow, Marvin Bower Professor
of Leadership Development, Emeritus
Harvard University
xiii
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CHAPTER 1
Enterprise Risk Management
Case Studies
An Introduction and Overview
JOHN R.S. FRASER
Senior Vice President, Internal Audit, and former Chief Risk
Officer, Hydro One
Networks Inc.
BETTY J. SIMKINS
Williams Companies Chair of Business and Professor of
Finance, Oklahoma State
University
KRISTINA NARVAEZ
President and Owner of ERM Strategies, LLC
Businesses, business schools, regulators, and the public are now
61. scrambling to
catch up with the emerging field of enterprise risk management.
—Robert Kaplan (quote from Foreword in Fraser and Simkins,
2010)
Most executives with MBA degrees were not taught ERM. In
fact, there are only
a few universities that teach ERM. So some business school
graduates are strong
in finance, marketing, and management theory, but they are
limited in terms of
critical thinking, business acumen, and risk analysis skills.
—Paul Walker1
THE EVOLUTION OF ENTERPRISE
RISK MANAGEMENT
Over the past two decades enterprise risk management (ERM)
has evolved
from concepts and visions of how risks should be addressed to a
method-
ology that is becoming entrenched in modern management and
is now
increasingly expected by those in oversight roles (e.g.,
62. governing bodies and
regulators). As Felix Kloman describes in his chapter “A Brief
History of Risk Man-
agement,” published in Fraser and Simkins (2010), many of the
concepts go back
a very long time and many of the so-called newly discovered
techniques can be
1
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2 Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
referenced to the earlier writings and practices described by
Kloman. However,
it is only from around the mid-1990s that the concept of giving
a name to manag-
ing risks in a holistic way across the many operating silos of an
enterprise started
to take hold. In the 1990s, terms such as integrated risk
management and enterprise-
63. wide risk management were also used. Many thought leaders,
for example, those
who created ISO 31000,2 believe that the term risk management
is all that is needed
to describe good risk management; however, many others
believe that the latter
term is often used to describe risk management at the lower
levels of the organiza-
tion and does not necessarily capture the concepts of enterprise-
level approaches
to risk. As a result, the term ERM is used throughout this book.
As ERM continues to evolve there is still much discussion and
confusion over
exactly what it is and how it should be achieved. It is important
to realize that
it is still evolving and may take many more years before it is
fully codified and
practiced in a consistent way. In fact, there is a grave danger
now of believing
that there is only one way of doing ERM. This is probably a
mistake by regula-
tors who have too eagerly seized some of these concepts and are
trying to impose
them when the methods are not fully understood, and in some
64. cases the require-
ments are unlikely to produce the desired results. As Fraser and
Simkins (2010)
noted in their first book on ERM: “While regulatory interest can
force ERM into
companies, if not done well, it can become another box-ticking
exercise that adds
little value.”3
The leading and most commonly agreed4 guideline to holistic
risk manage-
ment is ISO 31000. However, it should be mentioned that in the
United States
the COSO 2004 Enterprise Risk Management–Integrated
Framework has been the
dominant framework used to date. Many organizations are
currently adopting
one or the other of these frameworks and then customizing them
to their own
context.
WHY THE NEED FOR A BOOK WITH ERM
CASE STUDIES?
Following the success of the earlier Enterprise Risk
Management: Today’s Leading
65. Research and Best Practices for Tomorrow’s Executives by
Fraser and Simkins (2010),
we found through our own teaching experiences, and by talking
to others, that
there was an urgent need for a university-level textbook of ERM
case studies to
help educate executives, risk practitioners, academics, and
students alike about
the evolving methodology. As a result, Fraser and Simkins,
together with Kristina
Narvaez, approached many of the leading ERM specialists to
write case studies for
this book.
Surveys have also shown that there is a dire need for more case
studies on ERM
(see Fraser, Schoening-Thiessen, and Simkins 2008).
Additionally, surveys of risk
executives report that business risk is increasing due to new
technologies, faster
rate of change, increases in regulatory risk, and more (PWC
2014). As Paul Walker
of St. John’s University points out in the opening quote of the
2014 American Pro-
ductivity & Quality Center (APQC) report on ERM, “Most
66. executives with MBA
degrees were not taught ERM. In fact, there are only a few
universities that teach
ERM. So some business school graduates are strong in finance,
marketing, and
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ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES 3
management theory, but they are limited in terms of critical
thinking, business acu-
men, and risk analysis skills.” Learning Centered Teaching
(LCT), as discussed in
Chapter 2, is an ideal way to achieve this. Using LCT and the
case study approach,
students actively participate in the learning process through
constructive reflective
reasoning, critical thinking and analysis, and discussion of key
issues. This is the
first book to provide such a broad coverage of case studies on
ERM.
67. The case studies that follow are from some of the leading
academics and prac-
titioners of enterprise risk management. While many of the
cases are about real-life
situations, there are also those that, while based on real-life
experiences, have had
names changed to maintain confidentiality or are composites of
several situations.
We are deeply indebted to the authors and to the organizations
that agreed so
kindly to share their stories to help benefit future generations of
ERM practition-
ers. In addition, we have added several chapters where we feel
the fundamentals
of these specialized techniques (e.g., VaR) deserve to be
understood by ERM stu-
dents and practitioners. Each case study provides opportunities
for executives, risk
practitioners, and students to explore what went well, what
could have been done
differently, and what lessons are to be learned.
Teachers of ERM will find a wealth of material to use in
demonstrating ERM
68. principles to students. These can be used for term papers or
class discussions, and
the approaches can be contrasted to emphasize different
contexts that may require
customized approaches. This book introduces the reader to a
wide range of con-
cepts and techniques for managing risks in a holistic way, by
correctly identifying
risks and prioritizing the appropriate responses. It offers a
broad overview of the
various types of ERM techniques, the role of the board of
directors, risk tolerances,
profiles, workshops, and allocation of resources, while focusing
on the principles
that determine business success.
Practitioners interested in implementing ERM, enhancing their
knowledge on
the subject, or wishing to mature their ERM program, will find
this book an abso-
lute must resource to have. Case studies are one of the best
ways to learn more on
this topic.
This book is a companion to Enterprise Risk Management:
69. Today’s Leading
Research and Best Practices for Tomorrow’s Executives (Fraser
and Simkins 2010).
Together, these two books can create a curriculum of study for
business students
and risk practitioners who desire to have a better understanding
of the world of
enterprise risk management and where it is heading in the
future. Boards and
senior leadership teams in progressive organizations are now
engaging in building
ERM into their scenario-planning and decision-making
processes. These forward-
looking organizations are also integrating ERM into the
business-planning pro-
cess with resource allocation and investment decisions. At the
business unit
level, ERM is being used to measure the performance of risk-
taking activities of
employees.
As these case studies demonstrate, ERM is a continuous
improvement process
and takes time to evolve. As can be gleaned from these case
studies, most firms that
70. have taken the ERM journey started with a basic ERM language,
risk identification,
and risk-assessment process and then moved down the road to
broaden their pro-
grams to include risk treatments, monitoring, and reporting
processes. The ulti-
mate goal of ERM is to have it embedded into the risk culture of
the organization
and drive the decision-making process to make more sound
business decisions.
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4 Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
SUMMARY OF THE BOOK CHAPTERS
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this book is to provide
case studies on ERM
in order to educate executives, risk practitioners, academics,
and students alike
about this evolving methodology. To achieve this goal, the book
is organized into
71. the following sections:
Part I: Overview and Insights for Teaching ERM
Part II: ERM Implementation at Leading Organizations
Part III: Linking ERM to Strategy and Strategic Risk
Management
Part IV: Specialized Aspects of Risk Management
Part V: Mini-Cases on ERM and Risk
Part VI: Other Case Studies
Brief descriptions of the contributors and the chapters are
provided next.
PART I: OVERVIEW AND INSIGHTS FOR
TEACHING ERM
The first two chapters provide an overview of ERM and
guidance on ERM educa-
tion. As we have pointed out, education on ERM is crucial and
more universities
need to offer courses in this area. Our conversations with many
ERM educators
and consultants highlight how extremely challenging it is to
achieve excellence in
ERM education.
72. Chapter 2, “An Innovative Method to Teaching Enterprise Risk
Manage-
ment: A Learner-Centered Teaching Approach,” offers insights
and suggestions
on teaching ERM. This chapter covers the concept of flipping
the classroom with
learner-centered teaching (LCT), distinguishes it from
traditional lectures, and
describes how it can be used in teaching ERM. The LCT
approach emphasizes
active student participation and collaboration on in-class
activities such as case
studies versus the traditional lecture approach. This chapter
provides several
examples as to how LCT can be applied in teaching ERM,
utilizing Fraser and
Simkins’ (2010) book. David R. Lange and Betty J. Simkins,
both experienced ERM
educators, team together to write this chapter. David Lange,
DBA, is an Auburn
University Montgomery (AUM) Distinguished Research and
Teaching Professor of
Finance. He has received many prestigious awards for both
research and teaching
from the University and from several academic associations. He
73. has taught many
courses in the area of risk management and has consulted in a
significant num-
ber of individual and class insurance–related cases in both state
and federal court.
Betty Simkins, PhD, the Williams Companies Chair of Business
and Professor of
Finance at Oklahoma State University, is coeditor of this book.
PART II: ERM IMPLEMENTATION AT
LEADING ORGANIZATIONS
Part II is a collection of ERM case studies that give examples of
how ERM was
developed and applied in major organizations around the world.
Note that there
is no perfect ERM case study and the objective is for readers to
assess what they
believe was successful or not so successful about these ERM
programs.
www.it-ebooks.info
http://www.it-ebooks.info/
74. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES 5
The first case study in this book describes ERM at Mars, Inc.
Larry Warner, who
is the former corporate risk manager at Mars, Inc. and now is
president of Warner
Risk Group, describes the ERM program at the company in
Chapter 3. Mars is
a global food company and one of the largest privately held
corporations in the
United States. It has more than 72,000 associates and annual net
sales in excess
of $33 billion across six business segments—Petcare,
Chocolate, Wrigley, …
Engineering Ethics Case Study:
The Challenger Disaster
Course No: LE3-001
Credit: 3 PDH
75. Mark Rossow, PhD, PE, Retired
Continuing Education and Development, Inc.
9 Greyridge Farm Court
Stony Point, NY 10980
P: (877) 322-5800
F: (877) 322-4774
[email protected]
Engineering Ethics Case Study: The
78. passengers aboard the vehicle were killed. A presidential
commission was formed to investigate
the cause of the accident and found that the O-ring seals had
failed, and, furthermore, that the
seals had been recognized as a potential hazard for several years
prior to the disaster. The
commission’s report, Report to the President by the Presidential
Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident, stated that because managers and
engineers had known in advance
of the O-ring danger, the accident was principally caused by a
lack of communication between
engineers and management and by poor management practices.
This became the standard
interpretation of the cause of the Challenger disaster and
routinely appears in popular articles and
books about engineering, management, and ethical issues.
79. But the interpretation ignores much of the history of how NASA
and the contractor’s engineers
had actually recognized and dealt with the O-ring problems in
advance of the disaster. When
this history is considered in more detail, the conclusions of the
Report to the President become
far less convincing. Two excellent publications that give a
much more complete account of
events leading up to the disaster are The Challenger Launch
Decision by Diane Vaughan, and
Power To Explore -- History of Marshall Space Flight Center
1960-1990 by Andrew Dunar and
Stephen Waring. As Dunar and Waring put it—I would apply
their remarks to Vaughan’s work
as well— “Allowing Marshall engineers and managers to tell
their story, based on pre-accident
documents and on post-accident testimony and interviews, leads
80. to a more realistic account of
the events leading up to the accident than that found in the
previous studies.” I would strongly
encourage anyone with the time and interest to read both of
these publications, which are
outstanding works of scholarship. For those persons lacking the
time—the Vaughan book is
over 550 pages—I have written the present condensed
description of the Challenger incident. I
have drawn the material for Sections 1-8 and 10 from multiple
sources but primarily from
Vaughan, the Report to the President, and Dunnar and Waring.
Of course, any errors introduced
during the process of fitting their descriptions and ideas into my
narrative are mine and not the
fault of these authors. Sections 9, 11, and 12 are original
contributions of my own. All figures
81. have been taken from Report to the President.
Mark Rossow
4
Introduction
Course Content
This course provides instruction in engineering ethics through a
case study of the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster. The course begins by presenting the
minimum technical details needed to
82. understand the physical cause of the Shuttle failure. The
disaster itself is chronicled through
NASA photographs. Next the decision-making process—
especially the discussions occurring
during the teleconference held on the evening before the
launch—is described. Direct quotations
from engineers interviewed after the disaster are frequently
used to illustrate the ambiguities of
the data and the pressures that the decision-makers faced in the
period preceding the launch. The
course culminates in an extended treatment of six ethical issues
raised by Challenger.
Purpose of Case Studies
Principles of engineering ethics are easy to formulate but
sometimes hard to apply. Suppose, for
83. example, that an engineering team has made design choice X,
rather than Y, and X leads to a bad
consequence—someone was injured. To determine if the
engineers acted ethically, we have to
answer the question of whether they chose X rather than Y
because 1) X appeared to be the
better technical choice, or 2) X promoted some other end (for
example, financial) in the
organization. Abstract ethics principles alone cannot answer
this question; we must delve into
the technical details surrounding the decision. The purpose of
case studies in general is to
provide us with the context—the technical details—of an
engineering decision in which an
ethical principle may have been violated.
Case Study of Challenger Disaster
84. On January 28, 1986, the NASA space Shuttle Challenger burst
into a ball of flame 73 seconds
after take-off, leading to the death of the seven people on board.
Some months later, a
commission appointed by the President to investigate the causes
of the disaster determined that
the cause of the disaster was the failure of a seal in one of the
solid rocket boosters (Report to the
President 1986, vol. 1, p. 40). Furthermore, Morton Thiokol, the
contractor responsible for the
seal design, had initiated a teleconference with NASA on the
evening before the launch and had,
at the beginning of the teleconference, recommended against
launching because of concerns
about the performance of the seal. This recommendation was
reversed during the teleconference,
85. with fatal consequences.
To understand the decisions that led to the Challenger disaster,
you must first understand what
the technical problems were. Accordingly, this course begins
by presenting the minimum
technical details you will need to understand the physical cause
of the seal failure. After laying
this groundwork, we examine what occurred in the
teleconference. You will probably find, as
you learn more and more about the Challenger project, that
issues that had appeared simple
initially are actually far more complex; pinpointing
responsibility and assigning blame are not
nearly as easy as many popular accounts have made them. The
purpose of the present course is
1) to consider some of the issues and show by example how
86. difficult it can be to distinguish
unethical behavior from technical mistakes (with severe
consequences), and 2) to equip you to
think critically and act appropriately when confronted with
ethical decisions in your own
professional work.
5
The course is divided into the following topics:
1. Two Common Errors of Interpretation
2. Configuration of Shuttle
3. Function of O-rings
4. History of Problems with Joint Seals
5. Teleconference
6. Accident
7. Ethical issue: Did NASA take extra risks because of pressure
87. to maintain Congressional
funding?
8. Ethical issue: Did Thiokol take extra risks because of fear of
losing its contract with
NASA?
9. Ethical issue: Was the Principle of Informed Consent
violated?
10. Ethical issue: What role did whistle blowing have in the
Challenger story?
11. Ethical issue: Who had the right to Thiokol documents
relating to the Challenger
disaster?
12. Ethical issue: Why are some engineering disasters
considered ethical issues and others
are not?
13. Summary
1. Two Common Errors of Interpretation
88. Persons studying the history of an engineering disaster must be
alert to the danger of committing
one of the following common errors: 1) the myth of perfect
engineering practice, and 2) the
retrospective fallacy.
The Myth of Perfect Engineering Practice
The sociologist, Diane Vaughan, who has written one of the
most thorough books on Challenger,
has pointed out that the mere act of investigating an accident
can cause us to view, as ominous,
facts and events that we otherwise would consider normal:
“When technical systems fail, …
outside investigators consistently find an engineering world
characterized by ambiguity,
disagreement, deviation from design specifications and
89. operating standards, and ad hoc rule
making. This messy situation, when revealed to the public,
automatically becomes an
explanation for the failure, for after all, the engineers and
managers did not follow the rules. …
[On the other hand,] the engineering process behind a
‘nonaccident’ is never publicly examined.
If nonaccidents were investigated, the public would discover
that the messy interior of
engineering practice, which after an accident investigation
looks like ‘an accident waiting to
happen,’ is nothing more or less than ‘normal technology.”
(Vaughan 1996, p. 200) Thus as you
read the description of the Challenger disaster on the pages to
follow, keep in mind that just
because some of the engineering practices described are not
neat and tidy processes in which
90. consensus is always achieved and decisions are always based on
undisputed and unambiguous
data, that fact alone may not explain the disaster; such practices
may simply be part of normal
technology—that usually results in a nonaccident.
The Retrospective Fallacy
Engineering projects sometimes fail. If the failure involves
enough money or injuries to
innocent people, then investigators may be brought in to
determine the causes of the failure and
6
identify wrongdoers. The investigators then weave a story
explaining how decision-makers
91. failed to assess risks properly, failed to heed warning signs,
used out-of-date information,
ignored quality-control, took large risks for personal gain, etc.
But there is a danger here: the
story is constructed by selectively focusing on those events that
are known to be important in
retrospect, that is, after the failure has occurred and observers
look back at them. At the time
that the engineers were working on the project, these events
may not have stood out from dozens
or even hundreds of other events. “Important” events do not
come labeled “PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT: PAY ATTENTION”; they may appear important
only in retrospect. To the
extent that we retrospectively identify events as particularly
important—even though they may
92. not have been thought particularly important by diligent and
competent people working at the
time—we are committing the “retrospective fallacy.” (Vaughan
1996, p. 68-70)
In any discussion of the Challenger disaster, the tendency to
commit the retrospective fallacy
exists, because we all know the horrendous results of the
decisions that were made—and our first
reaction is to say, “How could they have ignored this?” or,
“Why didn’t they study that more
carefully?” But to understand what happened, it is crucial to
put yourself in the place of the
engineers and to focus on what they knew and what they
thought to be important at the time. For
example, NASA classified 745 components on the Shuttle as
“Criticality 1”, meaning failure of
93. the component would cause the loss of the crew, mission, and
vehicle (NASA’s Response to the
Committee’s Investigation of the “Challenger” Accident 1987).
With the advantage of 20-20
hindsight, we now know that the engineers made a tragic error
in judging the possibility of
failure of a particular one of those 745 components—the seals—
an “acceptable risk.” But at the
time, another issue—problems with the Shuttle main engines—
attracted more concern
(McDonald 2009, pp. 64-65). Similarly, probably most of the
decisions made by the Shuttle
engineers and managers were influenced to some extent by
considerations of cost. As a result,
after the disaster it was a straightforward matter to pick out
specific decisions and claim that the
decision-makers had sacrificed safety for budgetary reasons.
94. But our 20-20 hindsight was not
available to the people involved in the Challenger project, and
as we read the history we should
continually ask questions such as “What did they know at the
time?,” “Is it reasonable to expect
that they should have seen the significance of this or that fact?,”
and “If I were in their position
and knew only what they knew, what would I have done?” Only
through such questions can we
hope to understand why the Challenger disaster occurred and to
evaluate its ethical dimensions.
2. Configuration of Shuttle.
NASA had enjoyed widespread public support and generous
funding for the Apollo program to
put a man on the moon. But as Apollo neared completion and
concerns about the cost of the
95. Vietnam War arose, continued congressional appropriations for
NASA were in jeopardy. A new
mission for NASA was needed, and so the Space Shuttle
program was proposed. The idea was
to development an inexpensive (compared to Apollo) system for
placing human beings and
hardware in orbit. The expected users of the system would be
commercial and academic
experimenters, the military, and NASA itself. On January 5,
1972, President Nixon announced
the government’s approval of the Shuttle program.
7
Fig. 1 Configuration of the Shuttle
96. Because a prime goal was to keep costs down, reusable space
vehicles were to be developed.
After many design proposals and compromises—for example,
the Air Force agreed not to
develop any launch vehicles of its own, provided that the
Shuttle was designed to accommodate
military needs—NASA came up with the piggyback design
shown in Figure 1. The airplane-like
craft (with the tail fin) shown in side view on the right side of
the figure is the “Orbiter.” The
Orbiter contains the flight crew and a 60 feet long and 15 feet
wide payload bay designed to hold
cargo such as communications satellites to be launched into
orbit, an autonomous Spacelab to be
used for experiments in space, or satellites already orbiting that
have been retrieved for repairs.
97. Before launch, the Orbiter is attached to the large (154 feet long
and 27 1/2 feet in diameter)
External Tank—the middle cylinder with the sharp-pointed end
shown in the figure; the External
8
Tank contains 143,000 gallons of liquid oxygen and 383,000
gallons of liquid hydrogen for the
Orbiter's engines.
The two smaller cylinders on the sides of the External Tank are
the Solid Rocket Boosters
(SRBs). The SRBs play a key role in the Challenger accident
and accordingly will be described
98. here in some detail.
The SRBs contain solid fuel, rather than the liquid fuel
contained by the External Tank.
The SRBs provide about 80 percent of the total thrust at liftoff;
the remainder of the thrust is
provided by the Orbiter's three main engines. Morton-Thiokol
Inc. held the contract for the
development of the SRBs.
The SRBs fire for about two minutes after liftoff, and then,
their fuel exhausted, are separated
from the External Tank. A key goal of the Shuttle design was
to save costs by re-using the SRBs
and the Orbiter. The conical ends of the SRBs contain
parachutes that are deployed, after the
SRBs have been separated from the External Tank, and allow
99. the SRBs to descend slowly to the
ocean below. The SRBs are then picked out of the water by
recovery ships and taken to repair
facilities, where preparations are made for the next flight. After
the SRBs are detached, the
Orbiter’s main engines continue firing until it achieves low
earth orbit. Then the External Tank
is jettisoned towards earth where it burns up in the
atmosphere—the External Tank is not re-
used. Once the crew has completed its mission in orbit, the
Orbiter returns to earth where it
glides (No propulsion is used.) to a landing on a conventional
airstrip. The Orbiter can then be
refurbished for its next launch.
More Details about the SRBs
100. Fig. 2 Solid Rocket Booster with Exploded View Showing
Segments and Joints
9
Figure 2 shows the subassemblies that make up the SRB.
Because the total length of the SRB
was almost 150 feet, it was too large to ship as a single unit by
rail from Thiokol’s
manufacturing facility in Utah to the Kennedy Space Center
launch site in Florida. Furthermore,
shipping the SRB as a single unit would mean that a large
amount of rocket fuel would be
concentrated in a single container—creating the potential for an
101. enormous explosion. For these
reasons, Thiokol manufactured the SRB from individual
cylindrical segments each
approximately 12 feet in diameter. At Thiokol’s plant in Utah,
individual segments were welded
together to form four “casting” segments, into which propellant
was poured (cast). The welded
joints within a casting segment were called “factory joints.”
The four casting segments were
then shipped individually by rail to Kennedy, where they were
assembled—by stacking, not
welding—to form the solid rocket motor (SRM) of the SRB.
The joints created by the assembly
process at Kennedy were called “field joints.” The sealing
problem that led to the Challenger’s
destruction occurred in the field joint at the right end of the
AFT MID SEGMENT in Figure 2.
102. Hot combustion gases from the SRM leaked through the joint
and either weakened or burned a
hole in the External Tank, igniting the contents of the Tank and
producing a catastrophic fireball.
3. Function of O-rings
The cutaway view of the SRB in Figure 3 shows the aft field
joint location in the assembled
SRB.
Fig. 3. Location of the Problematic Aft Field Joint
10
103. Fig. 4. Cross Section of Field Joint
Figure 4 shows how the upper SRM segment in a field joint is
connected to the lower segment by
a pin passing through the “tang” (the tongue on the upper
segment) and the “clevis” (the U-
shaped receptacle cut in the lower segment); 177 such steel pins
are inserted around the
circumference of each joint. When the propellant is burning
and generating hot combustion
gases under the enormous pressure necessary to accelerate the
SRB, the joint must be sealed to
prevent the gases from leaking and possibly damaging exterior
parts of the Shuttle. This sealing
is accomplished by a primary O-ring backed up by a secondary
O-ring (O-rings are widely used
104. in machine design and, when functioning properly, can seal
pressures in the range of thousands
of psi). An SRM O-ring has been compared to “a huge length of
licorice—same color, same
diameter (only 0.28”)—joined at the ends so it forms a circle
12’ across” (Vaughan 1996, p. 40).
SRM O-rings were made of a rubberlike synthetic material
called Viton. To prevent the hot
combustion gases from contacting and thus degrading the Viton
when the propellant was ignited,
zinc chromate putty was applied in the region shown in Figure 4
prior to assembly of the SRM
segments.
105. 11
Fig. 5. Effect of Compression of the O-ring in Inhibiting
Pressure Actuation
Pressure Actuation of the O-ring Seal
Besides protecting the O-rings from the corrosive effects of the
hot combustion gases, the putty
is intended to be pushed outward from the combustion chamber
during ignition, compress the air
ahead of the primary O-ring, and thus force the O-ring into the
tang-clevis gap, thereby sealing
the gap. This process is referred to as “pressure-actuated
sealing.” Experiments show that
pressure actuation is most effective when the high-pressure air
acts over the largest possible
106. portion of the high-pressure side of the O-ring. In the leftmost
sketch in Figure 5, for example,
the high-pressure side extends from the “Response Node” at the
top to the point of tangency at
the bottom of the groove. If, however, the O-ring is initially
compressed during assembly, then
the O-ring may deform sufficiently to cause contact with the
left-hand side of the groove, as
shown in the rightmost sketch in Figure 5. In that case, the
high-pressure air acts over only the
surface of the upper left-hand side of the O-ring, and pressure
actuation of the seal is impaired.
This problem is lessened if, upon ignition, the joint gap opens,
and the O-ring is able to spring
back elastically and lose contact with sides of the groove, as in
the middle sketch in Figure 5.
107. However, when the temperature is low, the O-ring loses much of
its elasticity and as a result may
retain its compressed shape, as in the right-hand sketch of
Figure 5. This retention of the
compressed shape has three unfortunate consequences: 1)
pressure actuation is delayed or
impaired because the high-pressure air cannot get to the lower
left-hand side of the O-ring,
2) pressure actuation is delayed or impaired because the O-ring
does not seal the opened gap, and
the actuation pressure on the O-ring decreases as the fluid is
able to pass by the O-ring, and
3) because of the lack of sealing, compressed air, putty, and
then hot combustion gas may blow
by through the gap, and in the process, damage or even destroy
the O-ring.
In general, pressure actuation was also affected negatively by
108. several other factors, such as the
behavior of the putty and the increase in gap size caused by re-
use of the SRM. From
consideration of all these factors and from observation of the
explosion, the Presidential
Commission concluded ”that the cause of the Challenger
accident was the failure of the pressure
seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor
[Italics in the original]. The failure was
due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of
factors. These factors were the
12
effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of
materials, the effects of reusability,
109. processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.”
(Report to the President 1986, vol.
1, p. 69)
4. History of Problems with Joint Seals
From the very beginning, in 1973, of Thiokol’s contract to
develop the SRM, problems arose
with the joints. The Thiokol design for the SRM was based on
the Air Force’s Titan III, one of
the most reliable solid-fuel rockets produced up to that time.
But Thiokol engineers could not
simply copy the Titan design—the SRM was larger than the
Titan’s motor and had to be
designed for refurbishment and repeated use. One particular
area in which the two motors
differed was the field joints, and Thiokol’s initial design for the
SRM field joints worried
110. engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center, who were
responsible for monitoring Thiokol’s
contract. Many modifications and reviews of the design ensued,
and Thiokol and Marshall
finally began various load tests in 1976. Early tests were
successful and gave engineers
confidence. In an important test in 1977, however, the joint
seals surprised the engineers by
exhibiting “joint rotation,” illustrated in Fig. 6. Of particular
concern is the loss of redundancy
in the design because not just the primary but also the
secondary O-ring is rendered ineffective if
the gap opens sufficiently. (It is important to realize the scale
of the events being described: the
gap between the tang and clevis in the unpressurized joint is
tiny: 0.004”, in the pressurized joint
111. the gap was estimated to lie between 0.042” and 0.06,”—caused
by a joint rotation that occurs in
the first 0.6 seconds of ignition.)
13
Fig. 6 Joint Rotation
Other sealing problems—some but not all related to joint
rotation—such as blow-by, ring
charring, ring erosion, loss of resilience of the O-ring material
at low temperature, and
performance of the putty were observed later in various static
112. tests and launches. Engineers both
at Thiokol and at the Marshall were aware of these problems.
On July 31, 1985, Roger Boisjoly,
a Thiokol engineer specializing in O-rings, wrote a memo to
Thiokol vice president Robert Lund
with the subject line, "O-ring Erosion/Potential Failure
Criticality", after nozzle joint erosion was
detected in an SRB:
“This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware
of the seriousness of the
current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an
engineering standpoint. “
"The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to
fly without fear of failure
and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately
lead to a solution or at
113. least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This
position is now changed as a
result of the [51-B] nozzle joint erosion which eroded a
secondary O-ring with the
primary O-ring never sealing. If the same scenario should occur
in a field joint (and it
could), then it is a jump ball whether as to the success or failure
of the joint because the
secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and
may not be capable of
pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest
order-loss of human
life…
14
114. Boisjoly urged that a team be set up to work on the O-ring
problem, and ended by saying
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take
immediate action to dedicate a
team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the
number one priority, then we
stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad
facilities." [quoted in
Vaughan 1996, p. 447]
Boisjoly later charged that Thiokol management failed to
provide adequate follow-up and
support to correct the problem described in his memo.
Readers tempted to commit the retrospective fallacy after
115. reading Boisjoly’s memo should note
that the memo does not mention temperature effects on the seal.
The years of concern about the sealing problems eventually led
to a briefing at NASA
Headquarters in Washington on August 19
th
, 1985, by Marshall and Thiokol, in which they
presented both an engineering evaluation and a redesign plan.
They noted that only 5 of 111
primary O-rings in field joints and 12 of 47 primary O-rings in
nozzle joints had shown erosion
in various tests and flights. Thiokol argued that various
experimental and flight data verified the
safety of the design. They said, however, that the field joint was
the “highest concern” and
116. presented plans for improving the joints both with short-term
fixes and longer-term fixes that
would take over two years to implement. Data from studies by
Arnie Thompson (Boisjoly’s
boss) of the effect of temperature on ring resiliency were
presented, but imposing a temperature
launch constraint was not mentioned. The review judged that
leak checks and careful assembly
made it “safe to continue flying [the] existing design.”
Nevertheless NASA needed “to continue
at an accelerated pace to eliminate SRM seal erosion.” In the
meantime, the risks were
considered acceptable. [Dunnar and Waring, p. 363].
5. Teleconference
After several delays, the Challenger launch was scheduled for
January 28, 1986, at 9:38 AM
117. EST. At about 1 PM on the 27
th
, however, NASA personnel became concerned about the
unusually low temperatures—in the low 20’s—predicted for
early morning of the next day. A
Marshall manager asked Thiokol engineers to review the effect
the low temperatures might have
on the SRM. Accordingly, a meeting was held at Thiokol’s
Utah facility. Engineers there stated
their concern that the extreme cold would greatly reduce O-ring
resiliency and ability to seal the
joints. A teleconference among Thiokol, Marshall, and
Kennedy personnel was set for 5:45 PM
EST to discuss the situation.
At the teleconference, Thiokol engineers made no official
118. recommendation about delaying the
launch. The discussion centered on their concerns about the
effect of the low temperatures on
the O-rings. However, some of the teleconference participants
were unable to hear well, because
of a poor telephone connection, and some key personnel had not
been located in time to be
included in the teleconference, so the teleconference was ended,
and a second one scheduled for
8:15 PM EST. In the interim, Thiokol engineers had time to
organize their data in charts and fax
them to Marshall and Kennedy.
15
119. A total of thirty-four managers and engineers from Thiokol,
Marshall, and Kennedy took part in
the second teleconference. Thiokol engineers began the
teleconference by discussing the charts
that they had faxed to the other teleconference participants.
The Thiokol position was that
because significant O-ring blow-by and damage had been
observed in the coldest previous
launch—53°F—the O-ring material would lose much of its
resilience and the joint could fail,
were the launch to be conducted at a temperature in the 20’s or
low 30’s. When directly asked
by Larry Mulloy, Manager of the SRB project at Marshall,
Thiokol Vice President Joe
Kilminster …