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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
DOI 10.1007/s10979-006-9027-y
O R I G I N A L A RT I C L E
Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame,
and Jury Decision-Making
David A. Bright · Jane Goodman-Delahunty
Published online: 31 May 2006
C© American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the
American Psychological Association 2006
Abstract Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence
juror verdicts, but little is known
about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 ×
3 study that varied the gruesome
content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal
evidence did not influence mock

juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate.
Mock jurors who saw gruesome
photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs,
reported experiencing significantly
more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the
defendant. The conviction
rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral
photographs was included was
significantly higher than the conviction rate without
photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the
inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors
presented with gruesome photographs
were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not
view any photographs. Further
analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant
mediated the influence of the
gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory
evidence.
Keywords Gruesome evidence . Emotion . Jury decision making
In the criminal trial of Simpson (People of the State of
California v. Orenthal James Simpson,
1995), the prosecutors’ closing arguments concluded with an
audiotape of Nicole Simpson’s
911 calls to the police, whereas color photographs of the
bloodied bodies of Nicole Simpson and
Ron Goldman were displayed on a screen. The legal systems in
the United States, Australia, and
other common law countries assume that this type of gruesome
evidence can exert a prejudicial
influence on culpability determinations in criminal cases.
However, little is known about precise
ways in which gruesome evidence affects juror decision-
making. Emotional reactions to the
grisly evidentiary details may inhibit logical and rational

decision processes and impair jurors’
ability to deliver a verdict based only on the probative value of
evidence in a case. Jurors who
attribute weight to gruesome evidence in determining their
verdict separate and apart from the
probative value of the evidence, violate core assumptions of the
criminal justice system, such as
D. A. Bright (�) · J. Goodman-Delahunty
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales,
Sydney, New South Wales, 2052 Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
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184 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the jury’s role as impartial
finders of fact, and the defendant’s
right to be considered innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering the
magnitude of these issues, there are correspondingly few
references to the potential influence

of gruesome evidence on legal decision-making in the statutory
law, the common law, or in
psycholegal research.
Prejudicial and probative evidence
To ensure a fair trial for the defendant in criminal proceedings,
many common law countries
permit the exclusion of evidence that is determined to be more
prejudicial than probative. In
the United States, the rules of evidence in most states are
consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE; 2004). According to FRE 401, relevant
evidence means “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence,” (p. 3). Rule 403 on
the “exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice;
confusion or waste of time” reads,
“although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice,”(p. 4). Notes from the
Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence state that unfair prejudice means “an undue
tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one” Legal Information
Institute (n.d.).
In Australia, “probative value” is defined in the Evidence Act
(1995) as, “the extent to which
the evidence could rationally effect the assessment of the
probability of the existence of a fact
in issue” (Section 3; Part 1). “Danger of unfair prejudice” is
explained by the Australian Law

Reform Commission (1985) as follows:
By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-
finder may use the evidence to make a decision
on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, i.e., on a basis
logically unconnected with the issues in the case.
Thus, evidence that appeals to fact-finders’ sympathies, arouses
a sense of horror, provokes an instinct
to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may
cause the fact-finder to base his decision
on something other than the established propositions of the
case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence,
the fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of
probability than would otherwise be required.
(pp. 351–352)
A common theme in both the jurisdictions is the concern that
some types of evidence can
prejudicially impact juror decision-making, especially when that
evidence induces emotional
responses in jurors. The current study examines the impact of a
specific type of potentially prej-
udicial evidence on juror decision-making in criminal trials:
verbal and photographic evidence
that contain gruesome details.
Gruesome evidence and jury decision-making
In both the United States and Australia, statutory provisions
allow for a more punitive sentence
when gruesome evidence, such as a description of a postmortem
mutilation, is submitted at a
sentencing hearing. There are no statutory or common law
provisions that allow jurors to be
more punitive toward defendants in making determinations
about culpability when gruesome

evidence is presented during a trial. However, preliminary
research suggests that mock jurors
are biased toward conviction by gruesome evidence adduced at
trial.
One of the earliest studies on the influence of gruesome
evidence on juror decision-making
examined the issue in the context of a mock civil trial (Oliver &
Griffitt, 1976). Participants
read one of two cases in which the severity of the injury (no
permanent damage vs. amputation
of a limb) was varied. Half of the participants in each condition
viewed four slides depicting
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 185
the victim’s injuries and the other half were not shown any
slides. Participants who saw the
injury slides awarded a significantly greater proportion of the
requested damages than did the

participants who did not see the slides. The authors concluded
that gruesome visual evidence
influenced mock juror decisions by increasing the damages
awarded to the plaintiff-victim.
However, the observed effect may have been a methodological
artifact, as all participants awarded
damages, irrespective of the degree to which they found the
defendant negligent. Although no
measures of mock juror affective states were gathered, the
researchers attributed the biasing
effect of the photographs to emotional arousal in mock jurors
who viewed the gruesome visual
evidence.
In another examination of the impact of gruesome photographs
in the context of a civil trial,
three groups of participants read a transcript of a trial in which
parents sued a building construc-
tion company for injuries to their child who fell through a floor
of the building while trespassing
(Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). One-third of the participants were
shown a color photograph of
the boy lying face down, with his leg at an unnatural angle, and
a pool of blood nearby from cuts
to his hand and arm. One third saw a black and white version of
this photograph, and one third
did not see any photograph. In addition, the severity of the
victim’s injury (temporary injuries vs.
permanent blindness) and the blameworthiness of the defendant
(level of safety precautions exer-
cised) were varied. Participants who viewed the color
photographs awarded significantly higher
sums in damages than did the participants who viewed either
black and white or no photographs,
but only when the severity of the injury was permanent and the
defendant was portrayed as more

blameworthy. Although identical information was provided in
the color and black and white
photographs, a biasing effect was found only in response to
color photographs, and only in
the presence of other facts (permanent victim injury and greater
defendant blameworthiness).
The authors submitted that the result could not simply be
attributed to an increase in the amount
of information available in the photographs, and suggested that
the emotional arousal of mock
jurors produced this result. In an extension of these two studies,
the current study investigates the
impact of gruesome evidence in a criminal context and measures
mock juror emotional arousal.
The effects of exposing mock jurors to videotaped evidence
displaying an image of a murder
victim were investigated by Kassin and Garfield (1991).
Although no direct effects on verdict
were found, mock jurors who viewed gruesome visual evidence
and were told it depicted the
crime scene in their case applied significantly lower thresholds
of proof for conviction (76%)
compared to mock jurors in two other conditions (93%). Use of
a lower threshold of proof for
conviction can transform acquittals into convictions. The
threshold of proof used by mock jurors
in the case relevant videotaped evidence condition fell short of
the interpretation of “beyond
reasonable doubt” reported by mock jurors in the nonrelevant
and no videotaped evidence
conditions, and short of quantified thresholds of reasonable
doubt established in other empirical
research (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser,
Meek, Holt, et al., 1976; Simon
& Mahan, 1971). In other words, jurors exposed to gruesome

evidence may employ a lower
threshold in applying the legal standard “beyond reasonable
doubt,” and may convict on the
basis of less convincing evidence than mock jurors who render
verdicts in the same case absent
the visually gruesome, case-specific evidence.
The impact of visually presented gruesome evidence on mock
juror verdicts was assessed in
a study by Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff (1997). Three groups of
mock jurors read transcripts of
a murder case and viewed (1) neutral photographs and
postmortem photographs of the victim
in color; or (2) neutral photographs and postmortem
photographs of the victim in black-and-
white; or (3) neutral photographs only, presented in color.
Those who saw the photographs were
more emotionally affected (based on self-report measures), and
were significantly more likely
to render a guilty verdict, compared with jurors who did not see
the photographs. These findings
suggest that gruesome visual information arouses mock juror
emotional states, and influences
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186 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
their culpability decisions. Scores on self-report scales of
emotional distress demonstrated a
significant positive correlation with the extent to which mock
jurors believed the accused was
guilty. Interestingly, all participants indicated that the
photographs should not and did not
influence their verdicts, and claimed that they acted in a fair
and impartial manner as jurors.
Although the graphic photographs influenced verdicts, mock
jurors were unaware of or unwilling
to admit the influence of this evidence.
In a subsequent study (a replication of the study by Douglas et
al., 1997) Nemeth (2002)
used the Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1981) to measure mock
juror emotional arousal to investigate the contention that
gruesome evidence exerts its preju-
dicial effect through juror emotional arousal. Mock jurors were
presented with either weak or
strong gruesome verbal testimony plus neutral, weak, or strong
gruesome photographs. Neither
gruesome photographs nor gruesome verbal testimony
influenced dichotomous or continuous
measures of the defendant’s guilt. Emotional arousal measured
by the POMS did not vary sig-
nificantly in response to the neutral versus gruesome
photographs or verbal testimony. However,
a manipulation check revealed no difference between gruesome
and nongruesome conditions,

which may account for the null findings.
More recently, the impact of verbal gruesome evidence on mock
juror decisions was examined
in the context of a criminal case (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty,
2004). Mock jurors were
assigned to one of two evidence quality conditions (gruesome
and nongruesome), and to one of
two evidence sufficiency conditions (evidence was either
legally sufficient or legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction). When verbal gruesome evidence was
presented, mock jurors were
significantly more prone to convict the defendant compared
with those who read an equivalent
case in which no verbal gruesome evidence was submitted.
Mock jurors who read gruesome
evidence combined with weak inculpatory facts also rated the
defendant significantly more
culpable than those who had not read gruesome evidence. The
authors suggested that when
faced with gruesome evidence, mock jurors might have relied
more on their affective states than
on the probative value of the evidence in forming judgments
about the guilt of the defendant.
However, no measures of mock juror emotional states were
used, so firm conclusions were not
possible.
Together, the studies outlined earlier offer some preliminary
evidence of the potentially
prejudicial influence of gruesome evidence on juror culpability
decisions. When gruesome
evidence is presented, jurors may assess the weight of the
inculpatory evidence differently from
the assessment of its weight when no gruesome evidence is
present. The preceding studies do not

establish clear indications of the impact of gruesome evidence
(verbal or visual), nor the precise
role played by juror emotional states. The current study seeks to
fill the gap in the psychological
literature regarding affective reactions to gruesome evidence in
criminal cases.
Psychological theories to account for the prejudicial impact of
gruesome evidence
Potential explanations for any prejudicial influence of gruesome
evidence on legal decision-
making can be collected under two theoretical umbrellas: the
vividness effect and affective
influences. The current study focused on the investigation of the
influence of affect and did
not directly investigate the vividness theory. The relevant
literature on affective influences is
reviewed next.
Affective influences
When individuals are in the middle of formulating a decision,
they may use their emotional
states as a source of information. According to the “affect-as-
information” model, “rather than
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 187
computing a judgment on the basis of recalled features of the
target, individuals may . . . ask
themselves, How do I feel about it?” (Schwarz, 1990, p. 529).
In this model, affect functions as
a judgment-simplifying heuristic device. People are presumed to
consult their affective state to
infer a judgment (Clore & Parott, 1991).
Much psychological research on the role of affective states on
decision-making has focused
on mood and the differential impact of positive versus negative
moods (Forgas, 2000; Petty,
DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). However,
some investigators have argued
plausibly that distinct emotions exert differential influences on
decision-making in a way not
captured by a simple positive–negative mood dichotomy
(DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener,
& Braverman, 2004). Whether distinct emotional states exert a
differential influence on many
cognitive and motivational processes is a topic of current
research.
Discrete emotional states
In contrast to the view that negative affective states enhance
message processing more than do

positive states (Petty & Wegener, 1998; Schwarz, Bless, Strack,
Klumpp, Rittenauer-Shatka,
et al., 1991, Schwarz & Clore, 1996, Schwarz & Clore, 1996),
more recent findings suggest
that not all negative emotional states increase the processing
effort devoted to the consideration
of persuasive appeals (DeSteno et al., 2004). These processing
differences may stem from
the specific appraisal patterns attached to discrete emotions.
Discrete emotions relevant to
discussions of gruesome evidence and to attributions of blame
and responsibility include anger,
disgust, fear and anxiety, and sadness. Research on emotional
states and their specific appraisal
patterns relevant to jury decision-making are reviewed next.
Anger. Anger is of particular relevance to juror decision-making
about guilt because a critical
cognitive component of anger is assumed to be the attribution of
blame (Averill, 1982). People
who are angry are prone to blame others (Keltner, Ellsworth, &
Edwards, 1993, Lerner, Goldberg,
& Tetlock, 1998). In another formulation, anger is regarded as a
combination of reproach and
distress (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988): anger is the affective
response to holding someone
responsible for blameworthy behavior (reproach) and being
upset at the outcome (distress).
Angry individuals were more likely than were sad individuals to
attribute responsibility
for an accident to the persons involved than the circumstances
(Keltner et al., 1993). The
emotional experience of anger may focus people on seeking
someone to hold responsible for
blameworthy behavior, thus enhancing the salience of the role

of others in causing negative
events, consequently leading the angry person to attribute the
harm to human agency (Keltner
et al., 1993). Participants who were induced to feel angry were
more likely to blame the de-
fendant in subsequent accident vignettes, compared with
participants in a control condition.
Consistent with affect-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990),
participants may have misat-
tributed their angry mood to the vignettes and consulted their
mood to inform their judgments of
responsibility.
Further, research has demonstrated that angry as opposed to sad
people tend to rely more on
heuristic cues when processing social information
(Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Sheppard,
& Kramer, 1994). In one study, people who were induced to feel
angry were later asked to assess
a completely unrelated civil case. Angry people awarded more
damages to the plaintiff and
judged the defendant to be more deserving of punishment than
did people who were not angry,
even though anger was unrelated to the case in controversy
(Lerner et al., 1998). Psychological
processes similar to those reviewed above may be activated in
cases in which anger is induced
by the presentation of gruesome evidence.
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188 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
Disgust. A cluster of “other-critical moral emotions” that are
affective responses to the moral
violations of others, have been identified (Rozin, Lowery,
Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Disgust (or
socio-moral disgust) (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993) has
been shown to be triggered by a
variety of situations in which people behave without dignity or
in which people strip others of
dignity. Socio-moral disgust is often triggered by third-party
violations of others (Rozin et al.,
1999). Gruesome photographs that focus on victim harm (e.g.,
postmortem photographs) may
fit into this category. Disgust may be one possible reaction to
viewing or listening to gruesome
elements of a criminal trial.
Fear. Some research has demonstrated that when injuries to an
accident victim are more severe,
decision-makers attribute more blame and responsibility to the
person who caused the accident
(Robbennolt, 2000). One explanation for this finding is that
people make defensive attributions:
when harm is severe, people are threatened by the possibility
that similar harm will befall
them. To restore a sense of safety, people reassure themselves

that such harm does not occur
accidentally, and assign more responsibility to the actor. Fear
can be considered the affective
component of the defensive attribution reaction.
Emotions and blame
Theories of blame and responsibility are dominated by decision-
stage models (Shaver, 1985;
Weiner, 1995) that prescribe the factors a rational perceiver
should consider in assessments of
blame, but are unable to account for psychological processes
that produce deviations from rational
outcomes. Alternatively, the “culpable control” model (Alicke,
2000) offers an explanation of
the process of blame that incorporates personal expectations and
emotional reactions as central
components and that can account for biased information
processing and decision outcomes.
According to the culpable control model, affective reactions (or
“spontaneous evaluations”)
to characteristics of a harmful event or the people involved,
influence blame attributions. In
the model, affective reactions include positive and negative
attitudinal judgments about the
events and the people involved, as well as emotional responses
that moderate the strength of
the spontaneous evaluation (Alicke, 2000). The model suggests
that spontaneous emotional
reactions to the evidence activate the desire to blame the person
or persons who evoke the
most negative affect. One useful component of the model in
relation to the impact of gruesome
evidence on decision-making is that it offers three empirically
testable mechanisms for these

effects: (1) altered evidentiary standards; (2) altered
perceptions of the evidence; and (3) biased
information search.
Altered evidentiary standards. Common to cognitive
information processing models of jury
decision-making in criminal cases is the view that the task of
the juror is to listen to conflicting
evidence from multiple sources and integrate or synthesize that
information in reaching a decision
to convict or acquit the defendant (Hastie, 1993; Kerr, 1993;
Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Jurors
are presumed to arrive at a subjective estimate of guilt and then
compare that estimate with
a threshold of reasonable doubt, on the basis of a judicial
instruction. If the juror’s subjective
estimate of guilt exceeds the threshold of reasonable doubt, then
the decision is to convict
(Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978).
As discussed earlier, mock jurors who viewed a videotape of a
murder scene applied lower
conviction standards than did those who saw no video or a video
depicting an unrelated crime
scene (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). The alteration in conviction
standards may have been influ-
enced by the unfavorable responses evoked by the graphic crime
scene video (Alicke, 2000).
The culpable control model asserts that the need to restore or
preserve justice results in “unfa-
vorable” spontaneous emotional reactions to a victim’s
suffering, and a consequential lowering
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 189
of the evidential threshold in ascribing blame and
responsibility. Criminal prosecutors routinely
introduce graphic crime scene photographs or videotapes in an
apparent attempt to influence the
jury toward conviction (Alicke), as occurred in the criminal
trial of OJ Simpson.
Altered perceptions of the evidence. The model predicts that
observers who spontaneously
evaluate the actor’s behavior unfavorably will exaggerate
inculpatory evidence and de-emphasize
exculpatory evidence. For instance, negative reactions to
harmful outcomes in a civil case
led observers to skew the evidence in a way consistent with
blaming the decision-maker for
the consequences (Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994). In another
study, when verbal gruesome
evidence was submitted, mock jurors rated other (i.e., non-
gruesome) items of evidence as
more inculpatory compared with mock jurors who were not
exposed to the gruesome evidence,

suggesting that their assessments of the weight of evidence were
influenced by their reactions to
the gruesome details (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004).
Biased information search. Observers may engage in a biased
information search to support
a desired blame attribution. Results of one study (Mazocco &
Alicke, 2005) suggested that
participants who reacted more negatively to the actor who killed
innocent victims favored
information that supported a blame attribution.
The current study investigates the impact of gruesome verbal
and visual evidence on mock
jurors’ affective responses, especially anger, disgust, and
sadness, and on mock juror decision
processes, within the context of the “culpable control” model.
This study examines (1) whether
mock jurors’ evaluation of evidence is influenced by gruesome
evidence presented visually and
verbally; (2) whether gruesome evidence (verbal and/or visual)
influences mock juror affective
states; and (3) whether this affective reaction exerts a
prejudicial influence on mock juror
judgments. The gruesome evidence in this study included details
(presented verbally or visually)
of wounds inflicted on a murder victim.
The specific hypotheses tested in this study were (1) mock
jurors would render more guilty
verdicts, and report elevated subjective estimates of the factual
guilt of the defendant, elevated
ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence, elevated
confidence in their verdicts, and
less doubt about the defendant’s guilt when the evidence
includes gruesome visual and verbal

factors; (2) mock jurors who read and/or see gruesome evidence
would report higher levels of
negatively valenced affective states (specifically, anger,
sadness, fear, and disgust); (3) mock
jurors presented with gruesome evidence would rate individual
items of evidence as more
inculpatory than would mock jurors presented with non-
gruesome evidence; (4) mock jurors
presented with gruesome evidence would be more sympathetic
to the victim and more angry
toward the defendant than would mock jurors who are not
presented with gruesome evidence;
and (5) negatively valenced emotional states (in particular,
anger) would mediate the influence
of gruesome evidence on mock juror decisions.
Method
Pilot study
Seventy-eight undergraduates at the University of New South
Wales, Sydney, Australia, partic-
ipated in this study during a third year Psychology and Law
tutorial. We randomly assigned
participants to one of four groups: verbal gruesome, verbal non-
gruesome, color photographs,
and black-and-white photographs.
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
DOI 10.1007/s10979-006-9027-y
O R I G I N A L A RT I C L E
Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame,
and Jury Decision-Making
David A. Bright · Jane Goodman-Delahunty

Published online: 31 May 2006
C© American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the
American Psychological Association 2006
Abstract Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence
juror verdicts, but little is known
about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 ×
3 study that varied the gruesome
content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal
evidence did not influence mock
juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate.
Mock jurors who saw gruesome
photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs,
reported experiencing significantly
more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the
defendant. The conviction
rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral
photographs was included was
significantly higher than the conviction rate without
photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the
inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors
presented with gruesome photographs
were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not
view any photographs. Further
analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant
mediated the influence of the
gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory
evidence.
Keywords Gruesome evidence . Emotion . Jury decision making
In the criminal trial of Simpson (People of the State of
California v. Orenthal James Simpson,
1995), the prosecutors’ closing arguments concluded with an
audiotape of Nicole Simpson’s
911 calls to the police, whereas color photographs of the

bloodied bodies of Nicole Simpson and
Ron Goldman were displayed on a screen. The legal systems in
the United States, Australia, and
other common law countries assume that this type of gruesome
evidence can exert a prejudicial
influence on culpability determinations in criminal cases.
However, little is known about precise
ways in which gruesome evidence affects juror decision-
making. Emotional reactions to the
grisly evidentiary details may inhibit logical and rational
decision processes and impair jurors’
ability to deliver a verdict based only on the probative value of
evidence in a case. Jurors who
attribute weight to gruesome evidence in determining their
verdict separate and apart from the
probative value of the evidence, violate core assumptions of the
criminal justice system, such as
D. A. Bright (�) · J. Goodman-Delahunty
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales,
Sydney, New South Wales, 2052 Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
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184 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the jury’s role as impartial
finders of fact, and the defendant’s
right to be considered innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering the
magnitude of these issues, there are correspondingly few
references to the potential influence
of gruesome evidence on legal decision-making in the statutory
law, the common law, or in
psycholegal research.
Prejudicial and probative evidence
To ensure a fair trial for the defendant in criminal proceedings,
many common law countries
permit the exclusion of evidence that is determined to be more
prejudicial than probative. In
the United States, the rules of evidence in most states are
consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE; 2004). According to FRE 401, relevant
evidence means “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence,” (p. 3). Rule 403 on
the “exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice;
confusion or waste of time” reads,
“although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice,”(p. 4). Notes from the
Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence state that unfair prejudice means “an undue
tendency to suggest decision

on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one” Legal Information
Institute (n.d.).
In Australia, “probative value” is defined in the Evidence Act
(1995) as, “the extent to which
the evidence could rationally effect the assessment of the
probability of the existence of a fact
in issue” (Section 3; Part 1). “Danger of unfair prejudice” is
explained by the Australian Law
Reform Commission (1985) as follows:
By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-
finder may use the evidence to make a decision
on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, i.e., on a basis
logically unconnected with the issues in the case.
Thus, evidence that appeals to fact-finders’ sympathies, arouses
a sense of horror, provokes an instinct
to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may
cause the fact-finder to base his decision
on something other than the established propositions of the
case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence,
the fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of
probability than would otherwise be required.
(pp. 351–352)
A common theme in both the jurisdictions is the concern that
some types of evidence can
prejudicially impact juror decision-making, especially when that
evidence induces emotional
responses in jurors. The current study examines the impact of a
specific type of potentially prej-
udicial evidence on juror decision-making in criminal trials:
verbal and photographic evidence
that contain gruesome details.

Gruesome evidence and jury decision-making
In both the United States and Australia, statutory provisions
allow for a more punitive sentence
when gruesome evidence, such as a description of a postmortem
mutilation, is submitted at a
sentencing hearing. There are no statutory or common law
provisions that allow jurors to be
more punitive toward defendants in making determinations
about culpability when gruesome
evidence is presented during a trial. However, preliminary
research suggests that mock jurors
are biased toward conviction by gruesome evidence adduced at
trial.
One of the earliest studies on the influence of gruesome
evidence on juror decision-making
examined the issue in the context of a mock civil trial (Oliver &
Griffitt, 1976). Participants
read one of two cases in which the severity of the injury (no
permanent damage vs. amputation
of a limb) was varied. Half of the participants in each condition
viewed four slides depicting
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 185
the victim’s injuries and the other half were not shown any
slides. Participants who saw the
injury slides awarded a significantly greater proportion of the
requested damages than did the
participants who did not see the slides. The authors concluded
that gruesome visual evidence
influenced mock juror decisions by increasing the damages
awarded to the plaintiff-victim.
However, the observed effect may have been a methodological
artifact, as all participants awarded
damages, irrespective of the degree to which they found the
defendant negligent. Although no
measures of mock juror affective states were gathered, the
researchers attributed the biasing
effect of the photographs to emotional arousal in mock jurors
who viewed the gruesome visual
evidence.
In another examination of the impact of gruesome photographs
in the context of a civil trial,
three groups of participants read a transcript of a trial in which
parents sued a building construc-
tion company for injuries to their child who fell through a floor
of the building while trespassing
(Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). One-third of the participants were
shown a color photograph of
the boy lying face down, with his leg at an unnatural angle, and
a pool of blood nearby from cuts
to his hand and arm. One third saw a black and white version of
this photograph, and one third

did not see any photograph. In addition, the severity of the
victim’s injury (temporary injuries vs.
permanent blindness) and the blameworthiness of the defendant
(level of safety precautions exer-
cised) were varied. Participants who viewed the color
photographs awarded significantly higher
sums in damages than did the participants who viewed either
black and white or no photographs,
but only when the severity of the injury was permanent and the
defendant was portrayed as more
blameworthy. Although identical information was provided in
the color and black and white
photographs, a biasing effect was found only in response to
color photographs, and only in
the presence of other facts (permanent victim injury and greater
defendant blameworthiness).
The authors submitted that the result could not simply be
attributed to an increase in the amount
of information available in the photographs, and suggested that
the emotional arousal of mock
jurors produced this result. In an extension of these two studies,
the current study investigates the
impact of gruesome evidence in a criminal context and measures
mock juror emotional arousal.
The effects of exposing mock jurors to videotaped evidence
displaying an image of a murder
victim were investigated by Kassin and Garfield (1991).
Although no direct effects on verdict
were found, mock jurors who viewed gruesome visual evidence
and were told it depicted the
crime scene in their case applied significantly lower thresholds
of proof for conviction (76%)
compared to mock jurors in two other conditions (93%). Use of
a lower threshold of proof for
conviction can transform acquittals into convictions. The

threshold of proof used by mock jurors
in the case relevant videotaped evidence condition fell short of
the interpretation of “beyond
reasonable doubt” reported by mock jurors in the nonrelevant
and no videotaped evidence
conditions, and short of quantified thresholds of reasonable
doubt established in other empirical
research (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser,
Meek, Holt, et al., 1976; Simon
& Mahan, 1971). In other words, jurors exposed to gruesome
evidence may employ a lower
threshold in applying the legal standard “beyond reasonable
doubt,” and may convict on the
basis of less convincing evidence than mock jurors who render
verdicts in the same case absent
the visually gruesome, case-specific evidence.
The impact of visually presented gruesome evidence on mock
juror verdicts was assessed in
a study by Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff (1997). Three groups of
mock jurors read transcripts of
a murder case and viewed (1) neutral photographs and
postmortem photographs of the victim
in color; or (2) neutral photographs and postmortem
photographs of the victim in black-and-
white; or (3) neutral photographs only, presented in color.
Those who saw the photographs were
more emotionally affected (based on self-report measures), and
were significantly more likely
to render a guilty verdict, compared with jurors who did not see
the photographs. These findings
suggest that gruesome visual information arouses mock juror
emotional states, and influences
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186 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
their culpability decisions. Scores on self-report scales of
emotional distress demonstrated a
significant positive correlation with the extent to which mock
jurors believed the accused was
guilty. Interestingly, all participants indicated that the
photographs should not and did not
influence their verdicts, and claimed that they acted in a fair
and impartial manner as jurors.
Although the graphic photographs influenced verdicts, mock
jurors were unaware of or unwilling
to admit the influence of this evidence.
In a subsequent study (a replication of the study by Douglas et
al., 1997) Nemeth (2002)
used the Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1981) to measure mock
juror emotional arousal to investigate the contention that
gruesome evidence exerts its preju-
dicial effect through juror emotional arousal. Mock jurors were
presented with either weak or

strong gruesome verbal testimony plus neutral, weak, or strong
gruesome photographs. Neither
gruesome photographs nor gruesome verbal testimony
influenced dichotomous or continuous
measures of the defendant’s guilt. Emotional arousal measured
by the POMS did not vary sig-
nificantly in response to the neutral versus gruesome
photographs or verbal testimony. However,
a manipulation check revealed no difference between gruesome
and nongruesome conditions,
which may account for the null findings.
More recently, the impact of verbal gruesome evidence on mock
juror decisions was examined
in the context of a criminal case (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty,
2004). Mock jurors were
assigned to one of two evidence quality conditions (gruesome
and nongruesome), and to one of
two evidence sufficiency conditions (evidence was either
legally sufficient or legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction). When verbal gruesome evidence was
presented, mock jurors were
significantly more prone to convict the defendant compared
with those who read an equivalent
case in which no verbal gruesome evidence was submitted.
Mock jurors who read gruesome
evidence combined with weak inculpatory facts also rated the
defendant significantly more
culpable than those who had not read gruesome evidence. The
authors suggested that when
faced with gruesome evidence, mock jurors might have relied
more on their affective states than
on the probative value of the evidence in forming judgments
about the guilt of the defendant.
However, no measures of mock juror emotional states were
used, so firm conclusions were not

possible.
Together, the studies outlined earlier offer some preliminary
evidence of the potentially
prejudicial influence of gruesome evidence on juror culpability
decisions. When gruesome
evidence is presented, jurors may assess the weight of the
inculpatory evidence differently from
the assessment of its weight when no gruesome evidence is
present. The preceding studies do not
establish clear indications of the impact of gruesome evidence
(verbal or visual), nor the precise
role played by juror emotional states. The current study seeks to
fill the gap in the psychological
literature regarding affective reactions to gruesome evidence in
criminal cases.
Psychological theories to account for the prejudicial impact of
gruesome evidence
Potential explanations for any prejudicial influence of gruesome
evidence on legal decision-
making can be collected under two theoretical umbrellas: the
vividness effect and affective
influences. The current study focused on the investigation of the
influence of affect and did
not directly investigate the vividness theory. The relevant
literature on affective influences is
reviewed next.
Affective influences
When individuals are in the middle of formulating a decision,
they may use their emotional
states as a source of information. According to the “affect-as-
information” model, “rather than

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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 187
computing a judgment on the basis of recalled features of the
target, individuals may . . . ask
themselves, How do I feel about it?” (Schwarz, 1990, p. 529).
In this model, affect functions as
a judgment-simplifying heuristic device. People are presumed to
consult their affective state to
infer a judgment (Clore & Parott, 1991).
Much psychological research on the role of affective states on
decision-making has focused
on mood and the differential impact of positive versus negative
moods (Forgas, 2000; Petty,
DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). However,
some investigators have argued
plausibly that distinct emotions exert differential influences on
decision-making in a way not
captured by a simple positive–negative mood dichotomy

(DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener,
& Braverman, 2004). Whether distinct emotional states exert a
differential influence on many
cognitive and motivational processes is a topic of current
research.
Discrete emotional states
In contrast to the view that negative affective states enhance
message processing more than do
positive states (Petty & Wegener, 1998; Schwarz, Bless, Strack,
Klumpp, Rittenauer-Shatka,
et al., 1991, Schwarz & Clore, 1996, Schwarz & Clore, 1996),
more recent findings suggest
that not all negative emotional states increase the processing
effort devoted to the consideration
of persuasive appeals (DeSteno et al., 2004). These processing
differences may stem from
the specific appraisal patterns attached to discrete emotions.
Discrete emotions relevant to
discussions of gruesome evidence and to attributions of blame
and responsibility include anger,
disgust, fear and anxiety, and sadness. Research on emotional
states and their specific appraisal
patterns relevant to jury decision-making are reviewed next.
Anger. Anger is of particular relevance to juror decision-making
about guilt because a critical
cognitive component of anger is assumed to be the attribution of
blame (Averill, 1982). People
who are angry are prone to blame others (Keltner, Ellsworth, &
Edwards, 1993, Lerner, Goldberg,
& Tetlock, 1998). In another formulation, anger is regarded as a
combination of reproach and
distress (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988): anger is the affective
response to holding someone

responsible for blameworthy behavior (reproach) and being
upset at the outcome (distress).
Angry individuals were more likely than were sad individuals to
attribute responsibility
for an accident to the persons involved than the circumstances
(Keltner et al., 1993). The
emotional experience of anger may focus people on seeking
someone to hold responsible for
blameworthy behavior, thus enhancing the salience of the role
of others in causing negative
events, consequently leading the angry person to attribute the
harm to human agency (Keltner
et al., 1993). Participants who were induced to feel angry were
more likely to blame the de-
fendant in subsequent accident vignettes, compared with
participants in a control condition.
Consistent with affect-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990),
participants may have misat-
tributed their angry mood to the vignettes and consulted their
mood to inform their judgments of
responsibility.
Further, research has demonstrated that angry as opposed to sad
people tend to rely more on
heuristic cues when processing social information
(Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Sheppard,
& Kramer, 1994). In one study, people who were induced to feel
angry were later asked to assess
a completely unrelated civil case. Angry people awarded more
damages to the plaintiff and
judged the defendant to be more deserving of punishment than
did people who were not angry,
even though anger was unrelated to the case in controversy
(Lerner et al., 1998). Psychological
processes similar to those reviewed above may be activated in

cases in which anger is induced
by the presentation of gruesome evidence.
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188 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202
Disgust. A cluster of “other-critical moral emotions” that are
affective responses to the moral
violations of others, have been identified (Rozin, Lowery,
Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Disgust (or
socio-moral disgust) (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993) has
been shown to be triggered by a
variety of situations in which people behave without dignity or
in which people strip others of
dignity. Socio-moral disgust is often triggered by third-party
violations of others (Rozin et al.,
1999). Gruesome photographs that focus on victim harm (e.g.,
postmortem photographs) may
fit into this category. Disgust may be one possible reaction to
viewing or listening to gruesome
elements of a criminal trial.

Fear. Some research has demonstrated that when injuries to an
accident victim are more severe,
decision-makers attribute more blame and responsibility to the
person who caused the accident
(Robbennolt, 2000). One explanation for this finding is that
people make defensive attributions:
when harm is severe, people are threatened by the possibility
that similar harm will befall
them. To restore a sense of safety, people reassure themselves
that such harm does not occur
accidentally, and assign more responsibility to the actor. Fear
can be considered the affective
component of the defensive attribution reaction.
Emotions and blame
Theories of blame and responsibility are dominated by decision-
stage models (Shaver, 1985;
Weiner, 1995) that prescribe the factors a rational perceiver
should consider in assessments of
blame, but are unable to account for psychological processes
that produce deviations from rational
outcomes. Alternatively, the “culpable control” model (Alicke,
2000) offers an explanation of
the process of blame that incorporates personal expectations and
emotional reactions as central
components and that can account for biased information
processing and decision outcomes.
According to the culpable control model, affective reactions (or
“spontaneous evaluations”)
to characteristics of a harmful event or the people involved,
influence blame attributions. In
the model, affective reactions include positive and negative
attitudinal judgments about the

events and the people involved, as well as emotional responses
that moderate the strength of
the spontaneous evaluation (Alicke, 2000). The model suggests
that spontaneous emotional
reactions to the evidence activate the desire to blame the person
or persons who evoke the
most negative affect. One useful component of the model in
relation to the impact of gruesome
evidence on decision-making is that it offers three empirically
testable mechanisms for these
effects: (1) altered evidentiary standards; (2) altered
perceptions of the evidence; and (3) biased
information search.
Altered evidentiary standards. Common to cognitive
information processing models of jury
decision-making in criminal cases is the view that the task of
the juror is to listen to conflicting
evidence from multiple sources and integrate or synthesize that
information in reaching a decision
to convict or acquit the defendant (Hastie, 1993; Kerr, 1993;
Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Jurors
are presumed to arrive at a subjective estimate of guilt and then
compare that estimate with
a threshold of reasonable doubt, on the basis of a judicial
instruction. If the juror’s subjective
estimate of guilt exceeds the threshold of reasonable doubt, then
the decision is to convict
(Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978).
As discussed earlier, mock jurors who viewed a videotape of a
murder scene applied lower
conviction standards than did those who saw no video or a video
depicting an unrelated crime
scene (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). The alteration in conviction
standards may have been influ-

enced by the unfavorable responses evoked by the graphic crime
scene video (Alicke, 2000).
The culpable control model asserts that the need to restore or
preserve justice results in “unfa-
vorable” spontaneous emotional reactions to a victim’s
suffering, and a consequential lowering
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 189
of the evidential threshold in ascribing blame and
responsibility. Criminal prosecutors routinely
introduce graphic crime scene photographs or videotapes in an
apparent attempt to influence the
jury toward conviction (Alicke), as occurred in the criminal
trial of OJ Simpson.
Altered perceptions of the evidence. The model predicts that
observers who spontaneously
evaluate the actor’s behavior unfavorably will exaggerate
inculpatory evidence and de-emphasize

exculpatory evidence. For instance, negative reactions to
harmful outcomes in a civil case
led observers to skew the evidence in a way consistent with
blaming the decision-maker for
the consequences (Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994). In another
study, when verbal gruesome
evidence was submitted, mock jurors rated other (i.e., non-
gruesome) items of evidence as
more inculpatory compared with mock jurors who were not
exposed to the gruesome evidence,
suggesting that their assessments of the weight of evidence were
influenced by their reactions to
the gruesome details (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004).
Biased information search. Observers may engage in a biased
information search to support
a desired blame attribution. Results of one study (Mazocco &
Alicke, 2005) suggested that
participants who reacted more negatively to the actor who killed
innocent victims favored
information that supported a blame attribution.
The current study investigates the impact of gruesome verbal
and visual evidence on mock
jurors’ affective responses, especially anger, disgust, and
sadness, and on mock juror decision
processes, within the context of the “culpable control” model.
This study examines (1) whether
mock jurors’ evaluation of evidence is influenced by gruesome
evidence presented visually and
verbally; (2) whether gruesome evidence (verbal and/or visual)
influences mock juror affective
states; and (3) whether this affective reaction exerts a
prejudicial influence on mock juror
judgments. The gruesome evidence in this study included details
(presented verbally or visually)

of wounds inflicted on a murder victim.
The specific hypotheses tested in this study were (1) mock
jurors would render more guilty
verdicts, and report elevated subjective estimates of the factual
guilt of the defendant, elevated
ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence, elevated
confidence in their verdicts, and
less doubt about the defendant’s guilt when the evidence
includes gruesome visual and verbal
factors; (2) mock jurors who read and/or see gruesome evidence
would report higher levels of
negatively valenced affective states (specifically, anger,
sadness, fear, and disgust); (3) mock
jurors presented with gruesome evidence would rate individual
items of evidence as more
inculpatory than would mock jurors presented with non-
gruesome evidence; (4) mock jurors
presented with gruesome evidence would be more sympathetic
to the victim and more angry
toward the defendant than would mock jurors who are not
presented with gruesome evidence;
and (5) negatively valenced emotional states (in particular,
anger) would mediate the influence
of gruesome evidence on mock juror decisions.
Method
Pilot study
Seventy-eight undergraduates at the University of New South
Wales, Sydney, Australia, partic-
ipated in this study during a third year Psychology and Law
tutorial. We randomly assigned
participants to one of four groups: verbal gruesome, verbal non-
gruesome, color photographs,

and black-and-white photographs.
Springer
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Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 5, 1997
The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence
on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial:
Probative or Prejudicial?
Kevin S. Douglas,1 David R. Lyon,1 and James R. P. Ogloff1'2
Although courts in the United States and Canada regularly
admit graphic photographs
into evidence, little research exists on whether such evidence
prejudices the decisions

of jurors. Mock jurors (N = 720) read a detailed trial transcript
of a murder trial, and
were either presented with color, black and white, or no
photographs of an actual
murder victim. The proportion of guilty verdicts in the color
and the black and white
photograph conditions was approximately double that in the
control condition. Both
groups were more likely than the control condition to report
emotional distress and
physical reactions in response to viewing the photographs. By
contrast, there were few
differences between groups concerning the extent to which
participants felt that the
photographs influenced verdicts. Participants in all conditions
equally felt that they had
acted fairly. Implications surrounding the admissibility of
graphic photographic
evidence, and the seeming inability of participants to recognize
that their judgments
were biased, are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
I quite realize that to those of us who have been accustomed
over many years to see and
examine similar photographs, it may well be that we are not so
easily disturbed or shocked,
but these photographs when marked as exhibits, will be part of
the evidence, and it will
not only be the right but the duty of the jury to look at and
examine them to such an
extent as may assist in arriving at a true verdict (Boyd McBride,
J., in Regina v. Sim, 1954,
p. 383).

As the passage above suggests, there are occasions when juries
are confronted
with extremely shocking and gruesome photographic evidence
of a victim at a crime
1Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby,
British Columbia, Canada.
2To whom correspondence should be addressed, at the
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser
University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6 (e-
mail: [email protected]).
485
0147-7307/97/1000-0485$12.50/1 © 1997 American
Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American
Psychological Association
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scene or autopsy. To the prosecution, such pictures may
constitute a vital piece of
evidence pointing to an accused's guilt; yet, to the defense the
same pictures may

represent inflammatory and highly prejudicial information
which threatens the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial. The purpose of this study was to
investigate the possible
prejudicial effect of graphic autopsy photographs on the
perceptions and verdicts
of mock jurors.
photographic evidence has been utilized in a large variety of
criminal cases.
However, there appears to be a limited number of grounds on
which this evidence
traditionally has been admitted at trial. The following six
grounds for admitting pho-
tographic evidence in Canada were summarized in R. v.
Schaefler (1993): (1) to permit
the jury to view the facts and follow the step-by-step process
which forms the basis
for an expert witness' testimony; (2) to exhibit details, such as
the nature and extent
of wounds, described in testimony; (3) to assist the jury in
assessing the accuracy of
testimony put before them and the weight which should be
ascribed to it; (4) to link
the murder weapon to the injuries inflicted upon the victim; (5)
to shed light on the
possible intent involved in the offense; and (6) to help the jury
assess the validity of
theories offered in court. Similar grounds for admitting
photographic evidence to court
exist in American case law (see Jacobs v. Singletary, 1992;
United States v. Goseyun,
1986; United States v. Soundingsides, 1987). Furthermore,
evidence of this nature also
has been accepted into American courts for the purpose of
showing the identity and

condition of the deceased (Kuntzelman v. Black, 1985).
While any of the grounds reviewed may serve as a basis for
admitting pho-
tographic evidence, the mere presence of one or more of these
grounds does not
necessarily ensure that photographs will be admissible.
Although there are several dif-
ferences between the evidentiary rules governing admissibility
in Canada and the
United States, the underlying principles are very similar in both
countries. The first
consideration to be made before any evidence, including
photographic evidence, is
admitted, is whether the evidence is relevant (Ogloff, 1990,
1995). Without ventur-
ing into the intricacies of evidence law, suffice it to say that
evidence is considered
to be relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable
than it would be without the evidence" (Federal Rules of
Evidence 401,1986). The
rules of relevancy are intentionally broad, leaving trial courts
with considerable dis-
cretion to determine whether evidence is relevant (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, 1993).
Once a court has determined that the evidence is relevant, the
judge next turns
to the pivotal question of whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact. Thus, in ruling on the admissibility of
contentious photographic

evidence, a trial court judge must balance the potential
importance of such evidence
against any negative impact it may have on the fairness and
impartiality of the
proceedings. Therefore, if the photographic evidence in
question was particularly
shocking or gruesome, and the benefit to the jury of seeing the
evidence was mini-
mal, a judge would be compelled to rule the evidence
inadmissible. Given the com-
plexity of the many factors that a judge must weigh when
deciding whether to admit
photographic evidence into testimony, it would be useful for
judges to know what
impact such evidence might have on jurors.
Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff486
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Once a trial court judge has rendered a decision regarding
admissibility, appeal
courts on both sides of the border have demonstrated a
reluctance to interfere with

the ruling (in Canada see Draper v. Jacklyn, 1969; and in the
United States see Daubert
v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; Futch v. Dugger, 1989;
Nettles v. Wainwright, 1982;
United States v. Goseyun, 1986; United States v, Whitfield,
1983). This situation is par-
ticularly apparent in the United States, where a number of
rulings have held that even
in cases where photographs were erroneously admitted, the
accused is only deprived
of a fair trial if the photographs were crucial, critical, and
highly significant in the
accused's conviction (Futch v. Dugger, 1989; Nettles v.
Wainwright, 1982). In Futch v.
Dugger (1989), the llth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
introduction of photo-
graphic evidence rarely renders the proceedings fundamentally
unfair.
Despite the legal system's assumption that jurors will not be
unduly prejudiced
by graphic photographs, there are several cognitive psychology
principles which
might lead one to suspect otherwise. First, there is some limited
research that vivid
information may act in a more persuasive manner to impact
people's decisions than
pallid information (Bell & Loftus, 1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980;
Shedler & Manis,
1986; Thornton, Kirchner, & Jacobs, 1991). A second
possibility is that viewing
gruesome photographic evidence could induce a dysphoric mood
in jurors which
influences their subsequent perceptions and judgments. It is
well documented that
mood-congruent information receives more attention and is

recalled better than
mood-incongruent information (Bower, 1991; Branscombe &
Cohen, 1991; Forgas
& Bower, 1987). Finally, it may be that such photographs
generate a sense of moral
outrage that demands someone be found responsible and held
accountable. Al-
though there are several mechanisms which could potentially
cause graphic eviden-
tiary photographs to influence the perceptions and decision of
jurors, the purpose
of this study was only to investigate whether such bias might
result.
Only a few studies have investigated the possibility that
photographic evidence
could lead to bias in legal decision-makers. Oliver and Griffitt
(1976) examined the
impact of graphic visual evidence on the monetary awards of
mock jurors in a per-
sonal injury case. Participants read a fictitious case summary of
an employee who
had injured his hand on a piece of farm equipment that had been
poorly maintained
by the owner. Half the participants also were shown four color
slides depicting a
severely lacerated hand before and after medical treatment.
While no differences
were found in the degree of responsibility assigned to either
party in the case, par-
ticipants exposed to the color slides were found to award a
significantly greater
proportion of the damages requested than were the participants
unexposed to the
slides.

In a similar study, Whalen and Blanchard (1982) used a
personal injury case
to compare the relative effects of color, black and white, or no
photographs on the
monetary awards of female mock jurors. The case involved a
boy who suffered
injuries after entering an abandoned building. In addition to the
photographs, the
defendant's culpability (high, medium, or low) and the severity
of the boy's injuries
(high or low) also were manipulated. The authors found that
presenting color pho-
tographs of the injured boy resulted in significantly larger
monetary awards than
either the black and white or the no-photograph conditions, but
only if the defen-
dant was highly culpable and the victim's injuries were severe.
487The Impact of Graphic Evidence
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The only published study using a criminal case investigated the
effects of vide-

otaped crime scenes on the verdicts of mock jurors (Kassin &
Garfield, 1991). Par-
ticipants viewed a crime scene video, read a trial transcript of a
murder case, and
then rendered a verdict. Participants in the relevant-videotape
condition were in-
formed that the video had been recorded by the police shortly
after the murder
had occurred, whereas those in the nonrelevant-video condition
were told that the
video and trial transcript related to separate incidents in two
different cities. The
participants in the control condition did not view the videotape.
All three groups
rated the crime as equally violent, but those groups which
viewed the videotapes
rated the crime details as significantly more graphic than the
control group. It also
was found that participants watching the relevant videotape set
significantly lower
standards of proof for conviction. However, this did not result
in any statistical
differences among the verdicts of the three study conditions.
The authors suggested
that the failure to detect differences in verdicts may be
attributable to the lack of
evidence against the defendant and the low base rate of guilty
verdicts that occurred
across all conditions.
Previous research on pretrial publicity highlights another
subject of impor-
tance for the current study. Studies of pretrial publicity have
found that jurors fre-
quently are not cognizant of their biases, or, alternatively,
remain convinced of their

ability to be fair and impartial. For example, Sue, Smith, and
Pedroza (1975) com-
pared the verdicts of mock jurors exposed to damaging pretrial
publicity and neutral
pretrial publicity. Even after eliminating those jurors who
admitted having been
prejudiced by pretrial publicity in either condition, those
participants in the dam-
aging-pretrial-publicity condition voted guilty significantly
more often than the neu-
tral-publicity controls. Thus, many of the participants exposed
to the damaging
pretrial publicity appeared unaware of the extent to which this
information had
influenced their verdicts.
Similarly, Ogloff and Vidmar (1994) found that mock jurors
exposed to emo-
tional pretrial publicity were significantly more likely to
believe that the defendant
was guilty than were unexposed jurors; yet, exposed jurors were
just as likely to
report they could be fair in the case. These results have notable
implications for
the legal system because objectivity and impartiality are the
very foundations upon
which it is built. Unfortunately, no study has examined the
extent to which jurors
exposed to gruesome evidentiary photographs perceive
themselves to be fair and
impartial fact finders.
To summarize, the legal system assumes that jurors likely will
not be preju-
diced by graphic evidentiary photographs, but there is very little
empirical data to

either support or refute this presumption. Judges must make
decisions regarding
admissibility without knowing what the potentially biasing
effects of the evidence
may be. Unfortunately, virtually all the research that has been
conducted is limited
to civil law cases and therefore it may tell us very little about
criminal law cases,
where the burden of proof is much higher and the rules of
evidence are different.
The only study using a simulated criminal trial was hampered
by a low base rate
of guilty verdicts, making it difficult to draw any conclusions.
The purpose of the
present study was to examine the impact of graphic evidentiary
photographs on the
verdicts, other decisions, and perceptions of mock jurors in a
criminal trial.
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Hypothesis 1: Viewing autopsy photographs will be more

arousing and emotion-
ally distressing than merely reading testimony describing the
state of the victim's body.
Several studies have found that the presentation of negative-
affective visual stimuli is
associated with greater self-reported arousal, behavioral
reactions, and physiological
responses (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Livesay
& Porter, 1994). Fur-
thermore, because the impact of blood likely is much more
striking in color, it was
predicted there would be greater emotional reaction to the color
autopsy photographs
relative to the black and white autopsy photographs.
Hypothesis 2: Viewing color autopsy photographs will result in
a higher guilty
rate than viewing black and white autopsy photographs, which
in turn will result in
more guilty verdicts than viewing no autopsy photographs. As
the literature reviewed
suggests, there is evidence that emotionally arousing
photographs can influence sub-
sequent decisions. To the extent that color creates more vivid,
emotionally charged,
or dysphoria-inducing visual images, it should also exert a
stronger biasing effect on
juror verdicts than black and white photographs.
Hypothesis 3: There will be no differences between participants'
reported abil-
ity to be fair and impartial jurors, irrespective of whether or not
they were exposed
to the autopsy photographs. Should viewing the autopsy
photographs bias study
participants as hypothesized, the extent to which participants

are cognizant of their
bias will also be examined. As previous research reminds us,
people often are unable
to recognize their biases and the impact it may have on
subsequent decision-making
tasks (Ogloff & Vidmar, 1994; Sue et al., 1975).
METHOD
Participants
Study participants comprised 120 students registered in first-
and second-year
psychology courses. All participants received research credit
toward partial fulfill-
ment of their course requirements. Due to the nature of the
study, participants
were warned that they would view graphic autopsy photographs
prior to signing up
for the study and again at the beginning of the study when the
informed consent
process was completed.
Materials
Each participant was presented with a fictional trial transcript
and a series of
photographic exhibits. The trial involved a man accused of first-
degree murder in the
stabbing death of his ex-girlfriend. Testimony on behalf of the
prosecution suggested
that the accused's failure to accept the victim's desire to end the
relationship may
have been the motivation behind the murder. The evidence of
several witnesses and
exhibits provided circumstantial evidence indicating the

accused may have committed
the murder. In his defense, the accused claimed to have been
sick in bed all day and
there was testimony from a number of witnesses corroborating
several portions of his
4S9The Impact of Graphic Evidence
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story. Nothing entered into evidence either conclusively placed
the accused at the
scene of the murder or eliminated the possibility he could have
been there, ensuring
ambiguity with respect to guilt. Altogether, the transcript
included the testimony of
10 witnesses and opening and closing statements by prosecution
and defense counsel.
Judicial instructions, based on pattern instructions used in
Canada, informed partici-
pants of their roles as jurors, various rules of law (e.g., they are
the fact finders), and
definitions of key concepts (e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt;
burden of proof; the

role of expert witnesses; and the elements of each charge in the
case). The trial tran-
script was 30 single-spaced pages in Times 12-point font.
Participants also were given a series of 8 by 10 in. photographs
placed in
envelopes and marked as exhibits A, B, C, and D. Exhibits A, B,
and C contained
photographs of the victim's apartment building, the door to her
apartment which
showed no signs of forced entry, a knife similar to one
purchased by the accused
some time before the murder, and a graduation photograph of
the victim. These
photographs were primarily included as 'decoys' to conceal the
true purpose of the
study. Exhibit D held the stimulus materials, which comprised
three explicit pho-
tographs of an actual homicide victim taken from different
angles. The photographs
included two closeup views of the victim's face and shoulder
area which had been
stabbed, and as a consequence was severely lacerated and
bloody. A third photo-
graph was of the victim's upper body, which also had received
stab wounds. The
photographs were chosen in part because they did not implicate
the accused in the
murder per se, but rather demonstrated the state of the victim
after death. This
characteristic of the photographs was considered important with
respect to mini-
mizing the probative nature of the photographs. Depending upon
the study condi-
tion, the photographs in this exhibit were either black and white
or color.

Procedure
The size of each experimental session ranged from 1 to 6
participants. Al-
though several participants took part at one time, they were
separated by large
dividers which blocked their view of the other participants and
their respective study
materials. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
study conditions. In
condition one (Color), participants viewed color photographs of
the victim in exhibit
D. Condition two (B & W) participants viewed black and white
photographs of the
victim in exhibit D. Participants in the third condition (Control)
were not given
Exhibit D and therefore did not view any autopsy photographs
of the victim. These
participants only read the graphic description of the victim's
body which was de-
tailed in the testimony of the medical examiner contained in the
transcript of all
three study conditions. Thus, the only difference across the
three study conditions
was in the presentation of exhibit D.
Following the informed consent procedure, participants were
informed to read
the transcript and examine the exhibits carefully because these
would be collected
before they rendered a verdict in the case, participants were
further instructed to
examine the exhibits only when specifically directed to do so in
the transcript and
to place them back in the envelopes once they had finished. It

took approximately
45 min. to read the transcript and view all the evidence.
Douglas, Lyon, and Ogtoff490
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Once all the study materials had been examined and collected,
participants were
requested to complete a verdict questionnaire. Possible verdicts
in the case included
a finding of not guilty, guilty of first-degree murder, guilty of
second-degree murder,
or guilty of manslaughter. Second-degree murder and
manslaughter are two lesser
and included offenses of first-degree murder indictments in
Canada. Unfortunately,
the verdict of guilty or not guilty is a relatively gross measure
of mock juror bias.
Therefore, participants also were asked to indicate on a 10-point
scale the extent to
which they believed the accused was guilty. To obtain more
information about their
attitudes regarding the case, participants also were polled as to

the sentence length
and period of parole ineligibility they would recommend for the
accused. Although
jurors do not consider these issues in most jurisdictions, the
importance of including
measures with potentially greater variability and sensitivity
outweighed their lack of
legal realism. The final queries on the verdict questionnaire
related to the verdict or
conditions pertaining to the accused's disposition (e.g., certainty
of the verdict). Par-
ticipants also completed two additional postverdict
questionnaires. These question-
naires focused on participants' emotional reactions upon
viewing the photographs of
the victim, their perceptions of their ability to be fair and
impartial jurors in the case,
and their opinions regarding the importance and impact of this
type of photographic
evidence. The total testing time lasted between 60 and 75 min.
At the end of the study, all participants were individually
debriefed and time
was provided to answer any questions or discuss the study in
greater detail with
any participant who expressed the desire to do so. All
participants were treated in
accordance with the ethical principles of the Canadian
Psychological Association
(1991) and the American Psychological Association (1992).
RESULTS
Demographic Information
The mean age of participants was 21.07 years (SD = 4.28; range

= 17-40).
Eighty-two (67.8%) were female and 38 (32.8%) were male.
Five people (4.2%)
indicated that they had been charged in the past with a criminal
offense, and 29
(24.4%) responded that they had been victimized by an offense.
There were no
differences in verdicts across experimental groups as a function
of these demo-
graphic variables.
Emotional Impact of Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors
To test whether the presentation of graphic photographic
evidence had its ex-
pected impact on mock jurors' emotional reactions, a
multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was performed to determine whether, in general,
self-reported emo-
tional reactions differed across the three conditions. Because
the MANOVA indicated
that emotional reactions, in fact, did differ across conditions,
Wilks F(2, 114) = 1.99,
p < .01, the results of the univariate analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) for each self-
491The Impact of Graphic Evidence
T
hi
s
do
cu
m

ly
.
reported emotional reaction are reported in Table 1. Given the
somewhat large num-
ber of tests employed, alpha was set at .01 for these analyses.
Tukey B posthoc com-
parisons were used to test for significance between specific
conditions.
As is apparent from the results displayed in Table 1, people
exposed to
autopsy photographs, whether they were color or black and
white, were more likely
to report feeling anxious, anguished, disturbed, and shocked
compared to those
participants who did not view the autopsy photographs. The
total score for self-re-
ported emotion scales also differed significantly across groups
— both conditions
receiving autopsy photographs had higher scores than the
control condition. There
were, in general, few differences between people exposed to
black and white versus
color autopsy photographs.
Participants also answered, on a 10-point scale, "how did the
photographs of
the victim affect you emotionally?" A score of 1 was labeled
"not affected at all,"
a score of 10 "extremely affected," and scores of 5 to 6
indicated being "moderately
affected." Those in the control condition indicated being

significantly less severely
affected (M = 2.82, SD = 2.34) than those in either the black
and white
(M = 5.37, SD = 2.60) or color (M = 5.08, SD = 2.84)
conditions, F(2,
117) = 11.34, p < .0001. Tukey post-hoc comparisons confirmed
that both groups
receiving the autopsy photographs differed from the control
group, but not from
one another.
Participants were asked whether the photographs of the victim
helped to dem-
onstrate the severity of the act committed. Of 40 participants in
the color photo
condition, 35 (87.5%) indicated that they did. In the black and
white condition, 36
of 41 (87.8%) responded that they did. In the control condition,
in which the only
photograph of the victim was a graduation photograph, only 6 of
39 (15.4%) indi-
cated that the photographs of the victim helped to demonstrate
the severity of the
crime, X2(2, N = 120) = 59.80, p < .000001.
As the final test of whether the autopsy photographs affected
mock jurors,
participants indicated whether they experienced any physical
reactions (e.g., nervous
stomach, sweaty palms, difficulty concentrating) upon viewing
the photos. Half of
the 40 participants in the color condition responded
affirmatively to this question,
11 of 41 (26.8%) participants in the black and white group did
so, and only 4 of
39 (10.3%) in the control condition did so, x2(2, N = 120) =

15.26, p < .001.
Factors Affecting Verdicts and Verdict-Related Opinions
The ultimate test of this experiment was whether exposure to
graphic autopsy
photgraphs would influence determinations of guilt. Those
participants who were
exposed to the autopsy photographs were almost twice as likely
to find the accused
guilty than participants in the control condition, x2(2, N. = 120)
= 7.88, p = .02.
Of the 40 people in the color condition, 23 (57.5%) voted
guilty. Exactly half of
the 40 people who made a determination of guilt in the black
and white condition
voted guilty. Only 11 of 40 (27.5%) people in the control
condition voted guilty.
The two photograph conditions did not differ from one another,
though both dif-
fered from the control condition.
T
hi
s
do
cu
m
en
t i

s
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss

oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic

le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o
f t
he
in
di

vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.

The Impact of Graphic Evidence 493
T
hi
s
do
cu
m
en
t i
s
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic

ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.
To test whether emotional reactions to the photographs affected
tendency to
vote guilty, a multiple regression analysis was conducted using
the 10 emotional
self-report variables shown in Table 1 as predictor variables,
and the continuous
variable …
CJA 2220 CJ research methods & statistics
Statistical autopsy instructions
Background: Extant peer-review literature is the place where
researchers, practitioners, students and others publish what they
know about phenomena. Reading and understanding the peer-
review literature is a vital part of starting any research project
or implementing any good criminal justice policy. This project
is designed to allow students to explore and analyze peer-review

literature on a topic of relevance and interest to them,
academically or professionally. Though it is a separate grading
item, this project works iteratively with and is coterminous to
the student research briefing.
The project attends to all of the course goals and is a major
work product of this course.
Instructions: There are several parts of this assignment. These
are all discussed below, along with their individual point
values. I will not accept any submissions that do not follow
these instructions.
Where these instructions require written submission, all
submissions are to be APA formatted, typed into a Microsoft
Word document, and then submitted via the appropriate D2L
Dropbox. Where these instructions require class presentation,
all presentations must include an appropriate audio/visual aid.
Students who do not make an acceptable submission of all
previous steps must complete any missing step before I will
accept any new submissions from those students. Except where
I have already approved an absence documentation and assigned
a new due date/time, I will enforce all due dates and times,
regardless of missing any previous submissions.
Each autopsy is worth up to 15 points, (30 points total, 30% of
grade).
(1) Selection of articles and identification of authors’ research
hypotheses (3 points each article/6 points total). Students will
locate two peer-review research articles on their research
briefing topic of interest. One of the peer-review articles must
be quantitative and the second must be qualitative. Students

will submit three documents to the D2L Dropbox; A Word
document with the proper APA formatted citations for each of
the two articles, and APA formatted text that clearly identifies
the research hypothesis, IV, DV, and DOE for each of the
articles; and PDF versions of each of their peer-review research
articles. All submissions are due no later than Friday,
September 28, 2018.
(2) Assessment of research methodology (4 points per article/8
points total). For each article you will assess whether the
author(s) used appropriate research methodology. In assessing
methodology, you will specifically consider: (i) appropriateness
of the research design, (ii) appropriateness of the sampling
frame and final sample, (iii) any spurious variables that could
explain the influence of the IV on the DV or the association
between the IV and DV. You will present your assessments to
the class during Module 4 and then use classmates’ feedback to
finalize your assessments. You will submit written final
assessments to me no later than 8:00 pm, Friday, October 19,
2018.
(3) Reliability and validity of research (4 points per article/8
points total). For your two peer-review articles you will assess
any threats to reliability and validity of the potential findings.
You will present your ideas to the class during module 5. You
will then use classmates’ feedback to refine your assessments
and submit them in written form to me no later than 8:00 pm,
Friday, November 2, 2018.
(4)Assessment of findings (combined knowledge from both
articles, 8 points total). Using your newfound knowledge of
research methods/statistics and information from the two
articles you have now thoroughly autopsied you will discuss
what you think are the most important findings of each of your
articles for your research topic. In doing so, you are to directly
discuss how the research findings help us to understand, predict,

and control your topic of interest. Very simply, tell the class,
in an informed manner, what you found out about your research
topic and why it matters. You will present your assessment of
findings to the class during module 6.
Notes:
Students may request my permission to compete this project in
pairs. When asking such permission, each student of the pair
acknowledges that s/he will be graded based on the overall
demonstration of learning within the pair. Thus, each student is
responsible for knowing, understanding, applying and analyzing
the material of this project as if s/he was completing the project
alone. To insure each student is fully invested in the pair’s
project, I will choose which project questions to ask each
member of the pair during class presentations. Once I ask the
question, the student to whom I posed the question must answer
it correctly.
CJA 2220 CJ research methods & statistics
Statistical autopsy instructions
Background: Extant peer-review literature is the place where
researchers, practitioners, students and others publish what they
know about phenomena. Reading and understanding the peer-
review literature is a vital part of starting any research project
or implementing any good criminal justice policy. This project
is designed to allow students to explore and analyze peer-review
literature on a topic of relevance and interest to them,
academically or professionally. Though it is a separate grading
item, this project works iteratively with and is coterminous to
the student research briefing.
The project attends to all of the course goals and is a major

work product of this course.
Instructions: There are several parts of this assignment. These
are all discussed below, along with their individual point
values. I will not accept any submissions that do not follow
these instructions.
Where these instructions require written submission, all
submissions are to be APA formatted, typed into a Microsoft
Word document, and then submitted via the appropriate D2L
Dropbox. Where these instructions require class presentation,
all presentations must include an appropriate audio/visual aid.
Students who do not make an acceptable submission of all
previous steps must complete any missing step before I will
accept any new submissions from those students. Except where
I have already approved an absence documentation and assigned
a new due date/time, I will enforce all due dates and times,
regardless of missing any previous submissions.
Each autopsy is worth up to 15 points, (30 points total, 30% of
grade).
(1) Selection of articles and identification of authors’ research
hypotheses (3 points each article/6 points total). Students will
locate two peer-review research articles on their research
briefing topic of interest. One of the peer-review articles must
be quantitative and the second must be qualitative. Students
will submit three documents to the D2L Dropbox; A Word
document with the proper APA formatted citations for each of
the two articles, and APA formatted text that clearly identifies
the research hypothesis, IV, DV, and DOE for each of the
articles; and PDF versions of each of their peer-review research
articles. All submissions are due no later than Friday,

September 28, 2018.
(2) Assessment of research methodology (4 points per article/8
points total). For each article you will assess whether the
author(s) used appropriate research methodology. In assessing
methodology, you will specifically consider: (i) appropriateness
of the research design, (ii) appropriateness of the sampling
frame and final sample, (iii) any spurious variables that could
explain the influence of the IV on the DV or the association
between the IV and DV. You will present your assessments to
the class during Module 4 and then use classmates’ feedback to
finalize your assessments. You will submit written final
assessments to me no later than 8:00 pm, Friday, October 19,
2018.
(3) Reliability and validity of research (4 points per article/8
points total). For your two peer-review articles you will assess
any threats to reliability and validity of the potential findings.
You will present your ideas to the class during module 5. You
will then use classmates’ feedback to refine your assessments
and submit them in written form to me no later than 8:00 pm,
Friday, November 2, 2018.
(4)Assessment of findings (combined knowledge from both
articles, 8 points total). Using your newfound knowledge of
research methods/statistics and information from the two
articles you have now thoroughly autopsied you will discuss
what you think are the most important findings of each of your
articles for your research topic. In doing so, you are to directly
discuss how the research findings help us to understand, predict,
and control your topic of interest. Very simply, tell the class,
in an informed manner, what you found out about your research
topic and why it matters. You will present your assessment of
findings to the class during module 6.

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