I made this presentation at the 4th International Symposium of the Association of Old Crows, in Adelaide in February 2004. The presentation represented a high level overview of my original conception for my Ph.D., as I had worked on at the Queensland University of Technology from 1997 to 1999. The presentation proposes a conceptual model for understanding the information component of national power (ICNP), being the integration of: intelligence; counterintelligence and security; protection of the national information infrastructure (NII); strategic perception management; and military information operations (IO) in the pursuit of national security outcomes. Whilst the paper is now somewhat dated, it did anticipate some aspects of the formation of a National Security Chief Information Officer (NSCIO) within the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) in the later portion of the first decade of the 21st century.

1. The Information Component
of National Power and
Australian National Security
Policy
Captain Jeff Malone
2003 CDF Fellow – Australian Defence
Studies Centre - ADFA
4th AOC International Symposium
Adelaide 17th February 2004

2. Caveat
 Paper is UNCLASSIFIED and has been
cleared for public release
 Paper reflects personal views of author

3. Scope of Presentation
 Global security in the contemporary era
 Operationalising the Information
Component of National Power (ICNP)
 The Australian National Security System
 The ICNP in Australia
 Enhancing the ICNP in Australia

4. Global Security in the
Contemporary Era
 Broadened security agenda
 Increased significance of non-state
actors
 Decline in ability of states to control
information flows
 Relative power of non-state actors
versus states has increased

5. Operationalising the ICNP
NIIP
INT CI
National
ICNP Security
Policy
PM IO
National
Information
Policy

6. The Australian National
Security System
NSC
SCNS
SPCG
Departments Inter-Departmental
and Agencies and Inter-Government
Arrangements
DPMC AIC
AGD Inter-Departmental
Arrangements
DFAT Inter-Government
Arrangements
DOD
OGD

7. The ICNP in Australia (1)
 Not formally recognised as a whole, but
individual components are present
 Long standing arrangements for
intelligence, CI, and (to a lesser extent)
PM
 Evolving arrangements for NII
protection and IO

8. The ICNP in Australia (2)
 Intelligence
– Impact of electronic media cycle
 CI
– lack of attention to information held in the
private sector
 NII protection
– poorly integrated and resourced
– poor engagement of private sector

9. The ICNP in Australia (3)
 PM
– No coordination mechanisms
– poorly prioritised and resourced
 IO
– poorly prioritised and resourced
– OK at tactical/operational level, poor at
strategic level

10. What’s Wrong?
 No formally articulated national security
policy
 No formal consideration of the ICNP
 Weak state of integrating mechanisms
in national security system
 Poor understanding of the ICNP

11. Enhancing the ICNP in
Australia (1)
 Improving overall national security
arrangements
– Formally articulated national security policy
– Recognise the ICNP within national security
policy
– Improve integrative mechanisms in the
national security system

12. Enhancing the ICNP in
Australia (2)
 Specific Improvements
– Intelligence
 Increased professionalism
– Counterintelligence
 Consider the national security implications of
data held in the private sector
– NII Protection
 Consolidate present arrangements
 Incentives for private sector action

13. Enhancing the ICNP in
Australia (3)
 Specific Improvements
– Perception Management
 Establish coordination mechanisms
 Reform funding/governance arrangements for
external broadcasting
– Information Operations
 Enhance ADF IO capabilities
 Enhance strategic coordination

14. Conclusion

15. Questions?