Company ProfileWhen it comes to fast, efficient, personalized se.docx

Company Profile
When it comes to fast, efficient, personalized service, Tri-
Arrow Printing is second to none. Locally owned and operated
by Detroit natives, our team of 30 employees can help you
create professional documents, signs, banners, and specialty
products for business or personal use. With the assistance of our
full-time marketing specialist and designer, Tri-Arrow Printing
can help you produce unique advertising materials to effectively
promote yourself or your business without breaking the bank.
For clients seeking one-of-a-kind invitations, cards, calendars,
or home wall décor, Tri-Arrow Printing can help you create
distinctive designs that match your personality and style. Using
high-tech production equipment, we offer same-day delivery on
most orders.
Committed to the loyal community that has supported Tri-Arrow
Printing for two generations, we support local nonprofits and
arts organizations by designing and printing $500 worth of
promotional materials each month. In addition, we offer local
schools special pricing and packages so they can advertise and
promote school cultural events.
Products and Services
Documents
· Full-color or black-and-white printing and copying
· Full-service or self-service printing options
· Manuals, brochures, résumés, and letterhead
· Business cards and postcards
· Direct mail marketing and advertising
· Calendars
· Invitations and cards
Banners, Signs, and Speciality Products
· Posters, signs, and banners
· Magnets
· Wall and car decals
· Vinyl lettering

· Indoor and outdoor finishes
· Full-color, photo quality
· Oversize and custom shapes available
Strategic Goals
· Increase $1.2 million annual gross sales by $300,000 this year
and an additional $300,000 the following year.
· Expand into the photo printing market (mass printing such as
senior photos and high-quality art pieces).
· Invest $100,000 in after-school programs in the area.
· Develop a scholarship program for local at-risk students who
want to attend college in the areas of business or performing
arts.
§ 2:3. General Restrictions on Freedom of Speech in Schools
References
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."1 The Court
has repeatedly noted the importance of First Amendment
protection in the school context, although often at the same time
recognizing the power of school officials to control conduct in
the schools.2 The Court, in an oft-quoted statement, noted:
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of
this Court for almost 50 years … On the other hand, the Court
has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools. 3
Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that the state does not
have a monopoly on the inculcation of values or beliefs,4 the

Court also has recognized that schools have certain obligations
that make the educational environment a special environment
for purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence.5Courts and
educational policy may have to take cognizance of these
sometimes conflicting responsibilities that are given to schools.
These responsibilities at least include the development of
intellectual skills and literacy training, socialization, citizenry
preparation to ensure the effective functioning of democracy,
and the inculcation of community values. Recognition of these
varying responsibilities may affect the scope of the protection
given to freedom of expression in schools. In at least four major
decisions, the Supreme Court has delineated the general
parameters of constitutionally protected student expression in
public school.6
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Court addressed
the question of student symbolic speech.7 In that case,
students8 wore black armbands to school to express their
opposition to the Vietnam War. The principals of the schools,
having learned of the students' plan to wear the armbands,
adopted a policy which stated that any student wearing an
armband would first be asked to remove it, and upon refusal,
would be suspended until the student returned without the
armband. The students were aware of the school regulation and
chose to wear the armbands anyway. Having refused to remove
the armbands, the students were accordingly sent home and
suspended until the agreed upon time for wearing the armbands
had expired. The students, through their fathers, filed a
complaint in federal court,9 seeking both an injunction to
prevent the school authorities from disciplining the students and
nominal damages.
In an opinion by Justice Fortas, the United States Supreme
Court held that the policy violated the students' First
Amendment rights.10 The Court reasoned that the wearing of
the armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech,'" holding that
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to

teachers and students."11 Noting that in this particular case the
students' expression neither disrupted schoolwork nor interfered
with the rights of other students, the Court held
that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression."12 However, the Tinker Court also stated that
behavior which "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" is not
constitutionally protected.13 School officials did not have to
wait for the disruption to actually occur before taking action as
a reasonable forecast of such disruption was sufficient.14 The
Court found it relevant that the school officials had only banned
armbands and that the school policy did not "prohibit the
wearing of all symbols of political or controversial
significance."15 The Court added that "[a] student's rights … do
not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions …"16 The
“interferes with the rights of others” prong of
the Tinkeranalysis is not as commonly used as the material and
substantial disruption prong and there is some debate in the
lower courts of its exact scope.16.50
Justice Black dissented.17 He voiced a concern that the
judiciary was improperly limiting the decision-making authority
of the school officials. He argued that greater deference should
be given to the decisions of school authorities.18 Several
members of the Supreme Court have echoed this concern to
varying degrees in subsequent decisions.19
Even when certain student actions have not yet been disruptive,
it may nevertheless be necessary to determine whether school
officials can reasonably forecast substantial disruption under
the circumstances, thus justifying censorship. In determining
whether a school could reasonably forecast a substantial
disruption, one district court has noted that the critical inquiry
is “what the school officials knew [that would project the
requisite substantial disruption], and the basis for that

knowledge, at the time they disciplined” the students and
banned the speech in question.20.10 Lower courts have found a
school's forecast of substantial and material disruption to be
reasonable in a variety of situations.20.15 One court has listed
several factors to consider in determining whether speech has
caused or is reasonably forecast to cause a substantial
disruption including: (1) “the fact that students are discussing
the speech at issue is not sufficient to create a substantial
disruption, at least where there is no evidence that classroom
activities were substantially disrupted;”20.20 (2) “[w]here a
student's speech is violent or threatening to members of the
school, several courts have found that a school can reasonably
portend substantial disruption;”20.30; (3) “whether school
administrators are pulled away from their ordinary tasks to
respond to or mitigate the effects of a student's
speech;”20.35and (4) “whether the school's decision to
discipline is based on evidence or facts indicating a foreseeable
risk of disruption, rather than undifferentiated fears or mere
disapproval of the speech.”20.40 In the post-
Columbine21 world, schools and courts may be more likely to
respond to perceived threats of violence or disruption at
school.22 Lower courts have reached varying conclusions with
regard to the creation of a disruption under Tinker when
students have posted material critical of or allegedly threatening
toward teachers or other members of the school community on
websites22.10 or in e-mails or have created graphic or textual
material that may similarly affect members of the school
community.22.20 Some courts have drawn a distinction between
student conduct that occurs on or off campus in determining
whether school officials may take action against the
student.22.30 At least one court has observed that the
ubiquitous use of social media by students may make the
distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech
increasingly meaningless.22.35 The Supreme Court's more
recent decision in Morse v. Frederick22.40 may impact some or
all of these issues. Morse may arguably support a judicial

willingness to extend school disciplinary authority over student
expression that occurs beyond actual school property, at least
when the expression involved poses a danger to students and
when facts demonstrate that the expression occurred during the
course of some kind of school sanctioned or supervised
activity.22.50It has been held that "[a] school district can
justify a policy where it can demonstrate a concrete threat of
substantial disruption that is linked to a history of past
events."23 At least one court has found that a school may be
justified in proscribing the use of a particular word with certain
sexual connotations as its use could reasonably lead to
disruption, even though the message conveyed was a positive
one.24 Another court allowed censorship of a student who
refused to stop wearing a Confederate flag patch where there
had previously been disruption caused by other displays of
confederate flags, because officials were justified in
anticipating that racial tension still existed.25 Still another
court upheld the suspension of a student who drew a confederate
flag during class in violation of school policy against racial
harassment in a school with a history of racial tension.26 It has
been noted that school officials could ban the display of the
Confederate flag based on a reasonable forecast of disruption
even where the display of that flag itself had not directly caused
the previous disruptions involving racial
tensions.26.05 Similarly, one court has held that a school did
not violate students' First Amendment rights by forcing them to
turn their shirts depicting the American flag inside out or go
home with an excused absence because the school could
reasonably forecast a substantial disruption between Mexican
and Caucasian students in light of ongoing racial tension and
gang violence at the school.26.06Tinker also permitted
restriction of speech in the school context when that speech
invades the rights of others. One circuit, in construing this
prong of the Tinker standard, stated that “[p]ublic school
students who may be injured by verbal assaults [by other
students] on the basis of a core identifying characteristic such

as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a right to be free
from such attacks while on school campuses.”26.10 The circuit
court upheld the right of school officials to prohibit a student
from wearing a T-shirt at school that bore a message of
religious condemnation of
homosexuality.26.20 Quoting Tinker's statement that students
have the right to “be secure and to be let alone,” the circuit
court stated that such security “involves not only freedom from
physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause
young people to question their self-worth and their rightful
place in society.”26.30 However, this opinion was vacated by
the Supreme Court as moot.26.40 Subsequently, a different
circuit held that students had the right to wear clothing with the
phase “Be Happy, Not Gay,” noting that while “[s]chool
authorities are entitled to exercise discretion in determining
when student speech crosses the line between hurt feelings and
substantial disruption of the educational mission, because they
have the relevant knowledge of and responsibility for the
consequences.” The attempted ban here was merely based on a
speculative forecast of disruption and thus could not be
upheld.26.41 Courts have also held that school athletic coaches
must maintain discipline and thus student athlete's speech that
undermines or challenges the coaches' authority may be deemed
to be insubordinate and disruptive under the Tinker disruption
standard.26.42 It is not clear whether Tinker and its progeny
apply to the elementary school context.27 Even if they do
apply, it has been recognized that a "school's authority to
control student speech in an elementary school setting is
undoubtedly greater than in a high school setting."28 Some
recent lower courts have interpreted Tinker to apply only to
content or viewpoint-based restrictions on student
speech.28.50Lower courts have also cited language in
the Tinker opinion itself to conclude that Tinker also does not
apply when something other than pure speech or something akin
to pure speech is involved.28.75These many uncertainties and
varied conclusions have led to criticism of Tinker.28.80

Tinker remained the primary authority governing the scope of
free expression in the schools until 1986 when the Supreme
Court decided Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser.29 In Fraser, the Supreme Court retreated somewhat from
its speech protective position in Tinker. The case involved a
student who, on behalf of another student who was running for
student office, gave a campaign speech during a school
assembly that relied on sexual innuendo. Although his teachers
had advised him against making this particular speech, the
student delivered the speech during a school-sponsored
educational program in self-government. Students were allowed
to choose between attending the assembly or attending study
hall.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger, upheld the disciplinary action taken against the student
reasoning that, unlike Tinker, the action taken was unrelated to
the student's political viewpoint.30 The Court held that while
students have constitutional rights in the school, those rights
"are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings."31 Accordingly, the Court upheld the authority
of school officials to prohibit the speech because the form or
manner of delivery of that speech was deemed inappropriate for
the age of the particular school audience by the school
authorities, even though the underlying message was
permissible. The material in question was sexually explicit but
neither obscene nor defamatory.32 The Court stated that "[t]he
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech … would
undermine the school's basic educational mission."33 The Court
concluded that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests with the school board."34 The school could "disassociate
itself" from the speech in a manner that would show others that
such vulgarity was "wholly inconsistent with the fundamental
values of public school education."35
The reasonableness of such regulation of speech should be

examined in light of the age and maturity of the students.36 The
Court recognized "that the constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings."37 Lower courts have held that what
is reasonably appropriate for college students may not be so for
secondary school students.38 The determination of what
constitutes lewdness or vulgarity is within the role of the school
board rather than the courts.39 Thus, applying Fraser, lower
courts have held that school officials may prohibit wearing t-
shirts displaying non-disruptive, vulgar messages, even if the
messages were political, or the substance of the message
conveyed was one supported by the school.40 Other courts have
upheld school prohibitions of wearing t-shirts that may negate a
teacher as a role model or compromise the school's ability to
teach substance abuse,41 prohibitions against uttering vulgar
language directed at a teacher,41.50 and uttering vulgar
language directed at another student.42 It is not completely
clear whether Fraser applies to off-campus student
speech.42.50 It has been held that Fraser may only apply to on-
campus speech.42.60
Two years after Fraser, in Hazelwood Independent School
District v. Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of
First Amendment protection for school-sponsored
speech.43 The HazelwoodCourt distinguished the personal
student speech involved in Tinker from that upon which the
school places its imprimatur. In Hazelwood, the high school
principal unilaterally eliminated two stories from the official
high school newspaper that was published by a journalism class
under the supervision of a faculty advisor. The principal
maintained that one story might invade the privacy of the two
pregnant students interviewed and the other story, containing a
student's negative comments about his father without giving the
father an opportunity to respond, did not meet the standards of
"journalistic fairness and balance."44
The Supreme Court held that school authorities may exercise
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in

school-sponsored activities, or speech that "members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school"45 as long as the school restrictions are "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."46 Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion in Morseseems to suggest that something short
of the Tinker disruption showing may be sufficient when the
very serious issue of illegal drug use is involved.46.50 Justice
White, writing for the Court, reasoned that "a school must be
able to set high standards for the student speech that is
disseminated under its auspices."47 He recognized the school's
right to disassociate itself from speech it deems "poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."48
The Hazelwood Court expressly distinguished Tinker, reasoning
that Tinker only applies to behavior or speech that does not
involve activities carrying the school's imprimatur.49 Because
the wearing of armbands in Tinker did not implicate such an
imprimatur, the school authorities in Tinker had less latitude to
restrict this speech than did the school officials
in Hazelwood with regard to articles in the official school
newspaper. The Hazelwood Court reasoned that the message
conveyed by wearing armbands in Tinker was the students'
personal expression.50 In contrast, the articles published in the
school newspaper in Hazelwood were officially sanctioned by
the school, were given school course credit, and were produced
under the supervision of a school faculty member.
The Hazelwood Court also held that the particular student
newspaper in question did not constitute a public forum for
expression.51 The Supreme Court has allowed varying degrees
of restriction on speech based on the type of forum
involved.52 Nonpublic forums provide the regulating officials
with greater authority to restrict speech than do public
forums.53 "Accordingly, school officials were entitled to
regulate the contents of [the newspaper] in any reasonable
manner."54
Subsequently, lower courts, embracing the Hazelwood court's

restrictive view of Tinker, have often given a rather broad
interpretation to what constitutes school-sponsored
speech.55 There is some controversy whether school-sponsored
speech must be viewpoint neutral.55.50 Lower courts have also
given wide latitude to school officials' determination of what
constitutes a "legitimate pedagogical concern,"56 finding the
existence of such concerns in many different situations.57 At
least one court, however, has stated that a school board's
motives in removing books from the curriculum should be
examined before accepting the proffered pedagogical
justification.58 A few states have also passed legislation
granting editorial control of school-sponsored newspapers to
student editors, thus granting students greater free speech rights
than those set forth in the Hazelwood decision.59
Although after Hazelwood the speech in Fraser may be seen as
"school-sponsored" speech, the Fraser standard may
nevertheless prohibit vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech
that is not school-sponsored.60 Thus, courts have generally
applied the Hazelwood standard to all school-sponsored speech,
leaving Fraser and Tinker to determine when private student
speech may be restricted.61Lower courts have accordingly held
that school authorities could restrict vulgar student personal
speech either because the manner of expression was
inappropriate62 or because disruption could be reasonably
forecast given the manner or content, including sexual
connotations, of the expression.63It is also important to note
that both the Hazelwood and Fraser standards will generally
allow school officials to restrict vulgar, lewd, or plainly
offensive speech.64 Also, a distinction should be made between
school-sponsored speech and the speech of the school itself.65
The Supreme Court's most recent decision involving the scope
of student speech in the K-12 public school context was issued
on June 25, 2007 in Frederick v. Morse.65.01 While the
decision was an immediate victory for school administrators, its
full implications remains to be seen.65.015 Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,

concluded that school officials could discipline a student for
unfurling a banner with the message “BONG HITS 4 JESUS.”
The Chief Justice held that the student's speech in question,
despite its at least arguable ambiguity,65.02 could reasonably
be construed by the principal to be a message that promoted
illegal drugs in violation of school policy. The student
maintained that the banner did not send such a message and that
he had used the phrase simply to get media attention. The Court
dismissed the student's explanation as merely “a description of
his motive for displaying the banner … [and] not an
interpretation of what the banner says.”65.03 The speech
occurred during a school-sanctioned activity that was
supervised by faculty and administrators. The event occurred
during normal school hours and the school district's rules
expressly applied to such “school approved social events and
class trips.”65.04 The Court held that the school had authority
to restrict the message in this context without violating the free
speech guarantee of the First Amendment. The student had
refused to take the banner down. The banner was confiscated by
the principal who later suspended the student.
Despite its reaffirmation that “students do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,”65.05 the Court, citing its previous decision
in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,65.06 also stressed that
such speech rights were not the same as the rights of adults
exercised elsewhere.65.07 The Morse Court reiterated its
previous holding “that the rights of students ‘must be “applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.”’65.08
The Court noted that in Tinker “[t]he students sought to engage
in political speech.”65.09 The Court stated that not even the
student in Morse argued that the banner conveyed any political
or religious message.65.10 The Morse Court characterized the
speech in Tinker as “a silent passive expression of opinion,
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.”65.11
The Court also acknowledged that “[t]he mode of analysis

employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”65.12 Thus, the Court
indicated that its Fraser decision seems to be aware of both the
content and the manner of the speech at issue. The Court
concluded, however, that it was not necessary to “resolve this
debate to decide”65.13 the case now before it in Morse as “it is
enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles,”65.14 First,
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings”65.15 and second, “the mode of analysis set forth
in Tinker is not absolute” as Fraser did not use Tinker's
substantial disruption analysis.65.16 The Court also stated that
the Court's most recent major student speech case before Morse,
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, did not control
the Morse case because no one would think that the student's
banner in the Morse case “bore the school's imprimatur,” but
like Fraser, Hazelwood also confirmed these same two
principles.65.17
The Morse Court observed that it had “draw[n] on the principles
applied in our student speech cases” in holding in the Fourth
Amendment context that “‘the school setting requires some
easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities
are ordinarily subject.’”65.18 The Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions involving the student drug problem “recognize that
deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important-indeed,
perhaps compelling’ interest.”65.19 Thus, “the government
interest in stopping student drug abuse-reflected in the policies
of Congress and myriad school boards … allow schools to
restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use.”65.20
The Court also reaffirmed the principle that a school may not
prohibit student speech solely because the speech is
“offensive.” The Court stated that this would
“stretch[] Fraser too far” as “[t]he concern here is not that …
[the student's] speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”65.21
Two factors seem to dominate the Chief Justice's reasoning.

First, even though such speech occurs off campus, it could be
viewed in the same way as speech that actually occurs on
campus as long as students are viewed as within the control and
supervision of school authorities. Second, while acknowledging
the existence of some speech rights at school, the Court seems
to be willing to give great deference to school administrators'
construction of the meaning of the student's message, at least
when that message involves such dangerous activities as the
promotion of illegal drugs. Whether the extent of such
deference in determining the meaning or significance of an
arguably ambiguous student message will extend beyond the
drug context remains to be seen.65.22
The Morse Court also seemed to indicate that some viewpoint
discrimination could be permissible in the special context of the
school. Noting that Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the
Court's opinion for “authorizing ‘viewpoint
discrimination,’”65.23 Justice Roberts stated that even “the
dissent concludes that ‘it might well be appropriate to tolerate
some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique
setting.’”65.24 Moreover, the Court noted that it did not think
that the dissent would require schools “to tolerate student
advocacy of illegal drug use at school events, even if that
advocacy falls short of inviting ‘imminent’ lawless action,” thus
indicating that the “‘rigid imminence requirement” may
possibly have “to be relaxed at schools.’”65.25 The dissent,
however, argued that while restriction on speech that advocates
drug use may be permissible, it is not permissible “to prohibit
an obscure message with a drug theme that a third party
subjectively—and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to
express advocacy.”65.26
Finally, the Court concluded that “the issues here are close
enough” that even the dissent would find that the principal
should be given qualified immunity.65.27 The Court saw the
difference between it and the dissent as based not on First
Amendment principles, but simply on whether the student's
“banner constitutes promotion of illegal drug use” and that

“[t]he dissent's contrary view on that relatively narrow question
hardly justifies sounding the First Amendment bugle.”65.28
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, stated that he joined
the Court's opinion because he saw it as “erod[ing] Tinker's
hold in the realm of student speech” by “adding to the
patchwork of exceptions to
the Tinker standard.”65.29 However, he would have rather
“dispens[d] with Tinker altogether.”65.30Justice Thomas'
historical view of education from the colonial era to the
development of public schools and in particular the
development of the concept of in loco parentis, led him to
conclude that the First Amendment does not eliminate the
control that public schools had traditionally retained over the
student conduct. If parents do not like the rules so imposed by
the schools, they can seek change through the political
process. Tinker erroneously “substituted judicial oversight of
the day-to-day affairs of public schools” and “made little
attempt to ground its holding in the history of education or in
the original understanding of the First
Amendment.”65.31 Justice Thomas argued that “the history of
public education suggests that the First Amendment, as
originally understood, does not protect student speech in public
schools.”65.32
Justice Alito's concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy
joined, emphasized the narrowness of the Court's decision. He
thus characterized the Court's decision as holding no more than
that “a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use” and
that that the decision does not restrict “speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
social issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of
the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use.’”65.33 He did not read the Court's opinion as authorizing
any more control over student speech than the Court's previous
opinions had allowed. He therefore made clear that he joined
the Court's opinion “on the understanding that the opinion does

not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools
necessarily justify any other speech restrictions.”65.34 This
reasoning has prompted some to argue that the Morse decision
may not preclude constitutional protection for other forms of
student speech, like student religious speech. At least one lower
federal circuit court has stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in Morse, specifically Justice Alito's concurring
opinion in that case, allows school officials greater authority to
intervene before student speech leads to violence than would
generally be permitted by Tinker under other
circumstances.65.35 Such latitude for intervention by school
officials would only be permissible in those limited
circumstances where “the heightened vulnerability of students
arising from the lack of parental protection and the close
proximity of students with one another make schools places of
“special danger” to the physical safety of the student.”65.36
Justice Alito also rejected the argument made by the school that
“the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor
any student speech that interferes with a school's ‘educational
mission’” as that “would give public school authorities a license
to suppress speech on political and social issues based on
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.”65.37 Justice Alito
also rejected the argument that public school officials should be
treated “as if they were private, nongovernmental actors
standing in loco parentis.”65.38 In contrast to Justice Thomas,
Justice Alito reasoned that “[i]t is a dangerous fiction to pretend
that parents simply delegate their authority—including their
authority to determine what their children may say and hear—to
public school authorities.65.39 Thus, Justice Alito maintained
that “any argument for altering the usual free speech rules in the
public schools cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must
instead be based on some special characteristic of the school
setting.”65.40
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, would have held that the principal was
entitled to qualified immunity and that the First Amendment

issue therefore need not have been decided.65.41 The Chief
Justice argued that Justice Breyer's approach would not be
sufficient as the student had sought injunctive and declaratory
relief as well as damages. Thus, holding that the principal was
immune would not resolve these other claims for
relief.65.42 The Chief Justice noted that Justice Breyer had
countered this concern by noting that the student could have
been punished on non-speech-related grounds.65.43 The Chief
Justice responded to this argument by stating that none of the
parties had made such an argument below, that none of the
lower courts had considered this argument, and that the record
did not support such a conclusion.65.44
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, would agree that the principal should not be held
liable for taking down the student's banner, but would not allow
the school to discipline the student for his “oblique reference to
drugs,” which should be protected by the First
Amendment. That Amendment's free speech guarantee “protects
student speech if the message itself neither violates a
permissible rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal
and harmful to students,” and “[t]his nonsense banner does
neither.”65.45
The precise scope and meaning of Morse remains to be worked
out. Morse raises several questions. Is the Court articulating a
new test or merely an adaptation of Tinker for certain dangerous
situations? Put more simply, does Morse leave Tinker wholly
intact and if not, how much of Tinker is eroded?65.46 The
answer to such questions may well depend upon which Justice is
asked. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in Morse seems to suggest
that something short of the Tinker disruption showing may be
sufficient when the very serious issue of illegal drug use is
involved. Justice Thomas saw the Court's decision as
“erod[ing] Tinker's hold in the realm of student speech … by
adding to the patchwork of exceptions to
the Tinker standard.”65.47 Will this concept of danger be
expanded to circumstances beyond illegal drug use?65.48 At

least two Justices who joined the Court's opinion only after
emphasizing their understanding of the narrowness of the
Court's holding, exhibited a degree of nervousness about any
such extension.65.49 Arguably, Morse does not affect Tinker's
level of protection for other kinds of student speech, including,
but not limited to, speech involving religion. Justice Stevens,
dissenting, seems worried about Tinker's health. Additionally,
there is some question as to the extent to which Morse supports
the argument that viewpoint neutrality may not always be
required in the school context, even when the speech in question
is not school-sponsored. Some district courts have
construed Morse to allow school officials to restrict any student
speech that “promotes unlawful behavior.”65.50
Subsequent to Morse, a lower court “address[ed] those societal
concerns articulated” by the Supreme Court in Morse to uphold
the validity of a school's anti-drug policy that required parents
to give their written consent to the enforcement of the school's
drug policy as a predicate to their child being allowed to
participate on a school sports team.65.51 The court stated that
the school did not violate the First Amendment when it denied
the right of a child to participate on a team when her father
signed an unaltered consent form, but accompanied the form
with a letter that stated that the form was signed “under duress.”
The court noted that the school's interest here not only involved
prohibiting speech that advocated illegal activity as in Morse,
but involved its interest in prohibiting the student's actual
participation in illegal drug or alcohol use.65.52 The court
stated that the school was not censoring the father's speech, but
was seeking an affirmation that the student's conduct would
comply with the anti-drug use policy.65.53 The court denied the
father's motion for a preliminary injunction as he failed to show
that the school's “insistence on full parental consent to the
Policy's disciplinary and remedial scheme is not rationally
related to the paramount goal of deterring underage drug and
alcohol consumption.”65.54
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment of the district court stating that requiring the father to
sign the Student Activities Permission Form did not constitute
compelled speech and “[p]redicating student participation in
extracurricular activities on a parent's unconditional consent to
such a form does not infringe a parent's First Amendment
rights.”65.55 The Third Circuit also emphasized that there was
no evidence that the father's ability to criticize the policy had in
any way been inhibited.65.56
In summary, the Supreme Court quartet of Tinker, Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Morse now governs the scope of
constitutionally protected student free expression in the school
context.66 It has also been held that the right to receive
information is a “corollary” to the guarantee of free speech and
such right has particular importance for students.66.10 States
and schools retain legislative authority and state constitutional
authority to expand the protection for student expression
beyond that mandated by the federal Constitution.67 Courts may
differ in deciding whether or to what extent free speech
protection extends to elementary school
students.67.50 The Tinker Court stated that teachers and
students retain their constitutional right to freedom of
expression inside the schoolhouse gates. The TinkerCourt also
noted the “special circumstances” of the school environment,
indicating, as Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse all subsequently
illustrate, that the scope of federal constitutional protection of
student free speech rights is more limited in the school context
than outside of it.68 The Fraserdecision also demonstrates that
limits may be placed upon the speech that is deemed to be lewd
or contrary to notions of decency or civility.
Under Morse, school officials are given great deference in
construing the meaning of student speech to determine whether
it poses a danger to students, although presumably under fairly
limited circumstances, and then given significant latitude in
disciplining the student speaker. Whether Morsetruly sets forth
a new analytical framework for certain types of student speech
or whether it will end up being something more like a special

subset of Tinker, to be used only under certain particular
circumstances, is not yet really clear.68.5 remains to be seen.
Finally, under Hazelwood, school officials have significant
authority to regulate the content of school-sponsored speech. In
light of these decisions, school officials may constitutionally
suppress or limit student speech that may otherwise be protected
under the First Amendment where: (1) officials reasonably
forecast that such speech will cause a material disruption of, or
a substantial interference with, the operation of the school, or
will interfere with the rights of others, although mere
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of such disruption is
insufficient to warrant restriction of students' right to freedom
of expression; (2) the student speech is lewd, indecent, or
plainly offensive considering the age and maturity of the
students; or (3) the speech may be reasonably be construed by
school officials to advocate illegal drug use or pose a danger to
students (4) the student speech may reasonably be perceived to
bear the imprimatur of the school and its suppression is
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The
distinction between speech bearing the school's imprimatur and
nonschool-sponsored speech has become an essential criterion
for determining the scope of constitutionally permissible
limitations on student expression.
§ 301. Generally
Topic Summary | Correlation Table | References
West's Key Number Digest
· West's Key Number Digest, Schools 170.1, 171, 173
A.L.R. Library
· First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs and Bloggers,
35 A.L.R.6th 407
· What oral statement of student is sufficiently disruptive so as
to fall beyond protection of First Amendment, 76 A.L.R. Fed.
599
The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution1 protects the free-speech rights of students in

school.2 Students do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and freedom of expression at the schoolhouse
door.3 However, public schools have an interest of
constitutional dignity in being allowed to manage their affairs
and shape their destiny free of minute supervision by federal
judges and juries.4
Thus, high school students may be more strictly curtailed in the
mode of their expression than college students or adults,5 and
the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.6 Instead, the constitutional rights of students in public
school must be applied in a manner consistent with the special
characteristics of the school environment.7 Put another way,
schools may regulate some speech even though the government
could not censor similar speech outside the school.8
A state statute protecting student expression may provide
greater free-speech protection to students than that provided by
the First Amendment.9 However, such a state statute may be
construed to apply only to written publications.10
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
The First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings, and must be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1. Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. School Dist.,
2012 WL 954063 (2d Cir. 2012).
A public school has the power to regulate speech to prevent
problems before they occur, and the school is not limited to
prohibiting and punishing conduct only after it has caused a
disturbance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. Hardwick ex rel.
Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2013).
School's prohibition of "sexually oriented" electronic messages
was not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due
process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. S.N.B. v. Pearland
Independent School Dist., 120 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D. Tex.

2014).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
NOW, learning what you have GENERALLY learned from the
above, in 250 words or less, what do you think might happen in
OUR case? Do you believe that the student correctly wore the
protesting shirt and acted properly at the school assembly?
Would these forms of speech be protected under the First
Amendment in a public school setting? OR would her speech be
properly regulated by the school?
The answer, especially at this point, is unclear. However, you
are expected to explain what our facts are and why, on those
facts, and while describing the law to me and citing your
sources, it is unclear whether the student’s discipline was legal.
Use the SPACE BELOW for this purpose, and fill it in:
“It is unclear whether the school’s discipline of a student’s
expression of anti-war sentiments on her shirt and during a
school assembly violate the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
“According to the legal encyclopedia I found [ADD YOUR
OWN TEXT HERE…].
Use the SPACE BELOW for this purpose, and fill it in.
Citations have already been provided for you!!
“It is unclear whether the school’s discipline of a student’s
expression of anti-war sentiments on her shirt and during a
school assembly violate the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
“According to the Tinker case, I found [add your own words
here….]…. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969).
“This relates to the t-shirt Sarah wore because [add your own

words here….] …..
“According to the Bethel case, I ALSO found [add your own
words here….] …. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986).
“This relates to the vulgar act Sarah performed by wiping blood
on herself during the school assembly because [add your own
words here….] ….
“Therefore, it is unclear whether the school’s discipline of a
student’s expression of anti-war sentiments on her shirt and
during a school assembly violate the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
“According to the treatise I found [ADD YOUR OWN TEXT
HERE…].
“Here [add some OF OUR crucial facts]…..
“Therefore it is unclear whether the school’s discipline of a
student’s expression of anti-war sentiments on her shirt and
during a school assembly violate the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
END.

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