2. 2
Terror has adopted the global business model
“Traditional” terrorists pursued limited irredentists aims
Al-Qaeda, recruits around the globe, and seeks failed states to house
it’s own, self-sufficient infrastructure
Failed states draw terrorist, where breakdown of authority gives ability
to conduct operations without risk of interference.
o Weak states cannot impede groups freedom of action but has
veneer of sovereignty, which prevents stronger states from
countermeasures
Terrorist networks need failed states:
To acquire territory on a larger scale than a collection of safe houses
Acquire de facto control
Allows groups to develop business interests and generate income
Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?
State Sponsored Terrorism
3. 3
Failed states retain the outward signs of sovereignty
Failed states have weak or nonexistent law enforcement capabilities
Provide legitimate passports and other documents or templates to forge
Military - under international law can legitimately purchase weaponry
Afghanistan Questions: Stopgap or Solution?
Terrorist rely on two developments in Afghanistan.
o Long term occupation/reconstructing won’t follow military action
o US: No stomach for pursuing terrorists in inaccessible locations
Afghan operations unique:
o Existence of anti-Taliban resistance on the ground
o Absence of international recognition of Taliban as legitimate Gov
o General consensus that decapitation of Taliban served
international order and stability
Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?
State Sponsored Terrorism
4. 4
Continuing weakness of other states also will prove to be a
major liability in the war against terrorism
Governments will play a game-appeasing Washington by cooperating
to some extent while striking bargains with terrorists to prevent
further destabilization
Pakistan:
1990’s mired in ethnic tension, sectarian violence and absence of
cohesive rule
Utilized AQ fanaticism to strategic advantage
Guerrilla fighters into Kashmir while providing “plausible deniability”
(40% came from Pakistan)
“Any actions, including the use of force, by states and international
organization must be based on the norms and principles of international law
and be appropriate for the threat.” ~ Sergei Ivanov
Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?
State Sponsored Terrorism
5. 5
Nation building
Bad reputation
Bush administration: War against terrorism implies a war against
political chaos in favor of strengthening legitimate states…..states remain
the key actors in the international arena
1. Rehabilitating failed states is not holding elections but assisting in
swift reconstruction of basic infrastructure; Health care system, police,
and so forth-followed by longer-term investment
2. Effective military and security assistance
3. Culture of lawlessness, abetted by failed states has taken root
4. Terrorism will be problematic as long as people are disaffected
Best means for emasculating international terrorist networks are for effective
regimes to police their borders and exercising supervision over their territory.
Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?
State Sponsored Terrorism
6. 6
"State Sponsored" Terrorism: Active and often clandestine
support, encouragement, and assistance provided by a foreign
government to a terrorist groups. ~ Hoffman
Countries determined by Secretary of State to repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws:
1. Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
2. Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
3. Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act
Categories of sanctions resulting from designation include:
1. Restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance
2. Ban on defense exports and sales
3. Certain controls over exports of dual use items
4. Miscellaneous financial and other restrictions
Countries identified as “State Sponsors of Terrorism”:
Cuba (1982), Iran (1984), Syria (1979), and Sudan (1993).
State Sponsor of Terrorism
State Sponsored Terrorism
7. 7
To sponsor terrorism within the borders of another state,
the response to that are political in nature.
Sponsoring state - Own interests to disrupt internal politics targeted
state
Main theories: Realism (Bismark: Realpolitik), and Idealism (Wilsonian)
Realist: States act in rational manner in their conduct vis-a-vis other states
1. Politics, governed by objective laws have their roots in human nature
2. Interest is defined in terms of power
3. A state’s interests varies depending on political and cultural context,
which foreign policy is made
4. There is a moral significance to political action. Tension between
morality and requirements of successful political action
5. Identifying a state’s aspirations with moral laws that govern the
universe is an exercise in futility
6. IR: Political sphere is separate from morality. Only relevant question
is: Does a particular policy affect power and interest of nation?”
State Sponsor of Terrorism
State Sponsored Terrorism
8. 8
Idealism: Like realism, has as an ideology
President Woodrow Wilson: Referred to as
“Wilsonianism” or “Wilsonian Idealism.”
o Restructured international relations in wake of WWI
State’s foreign policy should reflect its internal policies and practices
Liberal idealists believe in value of international institutions based on
rule of international law and regulated intercourse between states
United Nations, NATO, and international legal and economic treaties
were intended to balance power, regulate commerce and cooperation
Neo-conservative idealists also believe in a world as it “should be.”
Like liberal idealists, they believe in promotion of "universal values.”
(democracy, human rights, and free trade.)
o Neo-conservatives distrust international institutions and treaties
State Sponsor of Terrorism
State Sponsored Terrorism
9. 9
President George W. Bush: Aggressive policies that sought to
undermine or replace disruptive regimes (“regime change”)
Willing to pursue issues they hold “morally worthy”
Prosecution can include use or threat of military force, unilaterally
and even preemptively, if necessary, to pursue their objectives.
Tension between realism and idealism in international relations:
o Realism holds that only a state’s interests should govern conduct
of its foreign policy
o Idealism holds states should seek to create a world based upon
a set of principles
Realism deals with the world as it is, while idealism holds that states
should pursue a world as it should be (whose morals?)
State Sponsor of Terrorism
State Sponsored Terrorism
10. 10
States often engage in efforts, motivated by Realism or
Idealism, to influence, affect, or undermine the policies of other states
Before a state can engage in a sponsorship of terrorism, it must have
the means to project its will inside the borders of another state
Advantage: Unless the targeted victim-state were to develop
intelligence leading back to the sponsor-state, it allows the sponsor to
retain a level of deniability in regards to the violence it has caused
WWI: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, (a.k.a Lenin), into Czarist Russia
Is it inherently wrong to sponsor a proxy war inside another state?
U.S. DOD has a term: “Irregular warfare = A violent struggle among state and
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”
State Sponsor of Terrorism
State Sponsored Terrorism
12. 12
State Sponsored Terrorism
Iran is the World’s Preeminent State
Sponsor 0f Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
Iran considered terrorism a legitimate tool of foreign policy
Wages undeclared war through asymmetrical strategies and terrorism
o Often through proxies such as Hizballah, HAMAS, al Qaeda, et al
Only country in Middle East that exists as a state for thousands of years
Iranian Shi‘a Islam is steeped in the ancient religion of Persia
Zoroastrianism, which centers on a precept of duality of good and evil
Iran today considers itself a global power
Goals include hegemony over Middle East and its oil
Near-term objective: Driving out colonialist, occupying powers, leaving
Iran in a position to defeat what it has viewed as corrupt governments of
Sunni states, and establish itself as leader and protector of all Islam
Considers itself to be the ―Ommol-ghora— heart of the Islamic world
and the homeland of Islam
13. 13
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
Primary mission: Establishment of an Islamic state
worldwide and conversion of all people to its Islamic ideology
Executive power in Iran is held by the Supreme leader
Supreme Leader‘s authority emanates not only from the Iranian
Constitution, but also from the Islamic Revolution itself
Earthly representative of legendary twelfth imam, (hidden Imam) -
who will return at End of Days
o Supreme Leader has authority to make any decision – religious or
Political
o He holds power to dismiss the president, overrule Parliament
and the courts, and overturn any secular law
Supreme Leaders during the entirety of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
1. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
2. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
14. 14
Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)
Answers only to Supreme Leader
Owns hundreds of companies and commercial interests
Special division, known as the Qods (or Quds, meaning―Jerusalem)
Terrorism training provided to Hizballah, HAMAS, and al-Qaeda by IRGC
is part of official policy of the Iranian government
Iran: Provided Hizballah with $100 - $300 million in support annually
9/23/ 2001: U.S. DOT designated IRGC-Qods Force as terrorist organization
6/28/2005: U.S. DOS designated IRGC as a F.T.O
MOIS (Farsi, VEVAK) Iran‘s intelligence agency.
30,000 employees: Largest intelligence agency in Middle East.
Annual budget is somewhere between $100 million and $400 million.
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
15. 15
Entire apparatus of Iranian state - government, private
individuals, and even charities are at service of Supreme Leader,
IRGC, and MOIS when it comes to support of terrorism
Iran: Uses terrorist proxies to wage asymmetrical warfare against the
U.S. and Israel while maintaining plausible deniability
Iran’s terrorist partners includes:
Hizballah and the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO)
o Hizballah: Shi‘a organization, but an Arab group, has stature in
Arab community and can better bridge Shi‘a-Sunni divide because
not suspect due to difference in ethnicity
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
16. 16
Bombings:
U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, 4/18/1983, (63 KIA)
o Imad Mughniyah: Carried out on direct orders from Iran
10/23/1983: U.S. Marines barracks at Beirut Airport, and outpost
French baracks killing 241 American and 58 French soldiers
o Imad Mughniyah: videotaped suicide truck into USMC barracks
Kidnappings and Murders:
David Dodge, American University of Beirut president on 7/19/1982
o After Dodge - Iran changed tactics, employing proxies to kidnap
more Americans, in order to give Iran―plausible denial
Imad Mughniyah, Hizballah, and the IJO, acting as proxies for Iran and
supervised by the IRGC and MOIS, kidnapped dozens more
o CIA‘s station chief, William Buckley (kidnapped 1984, died 1985)
o USMC Lt. Col. William Higgins (kidnapped 1988, died 1990)
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
17. 17
Hijackings: Iran‘s proxies carried out waves hijackings;
1984 Kuwait Airlines flight, two USAID officials murdered
1985 TWA Flight 847, U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem murdered
o Mughniyah’s fingerprints in TWA 847‘s lavatory
Assassinations:
End of Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic regime assassinated scores of
Iranian dissidents inside Iran and on foreign soil
Massacre of four Kurdish leaders in Berlin‘s Mykonos Restaurant in
September 1992, which led to a diplomatic crisis between the European
Union countries and Iran
Every attack, carried out by Hizballah, the IJO, and PFLP-GC, was
approved by IRGC and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, or
Ayatollah Khamenei
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
18. 18
Iran and al-Qaeda can be ruthlessly pragmatic, cutting deals with
potential future adversaries to advance their cause in the short-term
Religious differences are trumped by leaders‘ desire to confront and
oppose common enemies, particularly U.S. and Israel
“ Iran‘s hard-line leaders have no real tie to Islam, and they don‘t care about
Islam, they only care about power. . . . [They only use Islam as a rationale] in
order to appear more legitimate.”
~Former Iranian President Banisadr
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
19. 19
1991-92: The Sudanese Connection:
1991, UBL fled Saudi Arabia accepting an offer by
Hassan al Turabi, to move himself and Mujaheddin fighters to Sudan
Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, also found refuge in Sudan during this time
Hassan al Turabi hosted first Popular Arab and Islamic Congress
Al-Turabi and Iran‘s political leadership and intelligence agencies
proceeded to establish close ties for a united Sunni-Shiite front against
the U.S. and West
al Zawahiri went to Iran to ask for help to overthrow Egyptian government
Imad Mughniyah, convinced him the power of suicide bombings
o A significant event because suicide is prohibited by most Islamic
clerics, both Sunni and Shi‘a
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
20. 20
1991 – 1992: Al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives created informal
Agreement in support for actions carried out primarily against Israel and U.S.
Al-Qaeda operatives traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives
o UBL sent senior aides for training with IRGC to Lebanon for
training with Hizballah
1993: Khartoum, Sudan: Ali Mohamed (al-Qaeda terrorist / trainer), UBL and
Ayman al Zawahiri met directly with Mughniyah and Iranian officials, including
IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr (worked out an alliance)
Imad Mughniyah major connection point between Iran and al -Qaeda
o Mughniyah made UBL into an accomplished terrorist
o Mughniyah coordinated training activities with Iranian officials
and IRGC officers working undercover at Iranian embassy
o Supreme Leader – aware Hizballah was training foreign terrorists
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
21. 21
Coordinated Campaign(s):
1992:
o March: Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina truck-bomb
killing 29 and wounding 242
• NSA intercepts proved Iranian involvement in the attack
• Provided Israel with proof that Imad Mughniyah and
Hizballah Talal Hamiaa, executed operation
1993:
o February 26; 1st WTC bombings, killing 6, injuring 1,000 +
• Al-Qaeda conspiracy to bomb NYC landmarks, including
Lincoln tunnel and the Holland tunnel
o Omar Abdul Rahman (aka Blind Sheikh) convicted of plot
• Ramzi Yousef, coordinator of the WTC attack
• Ali Mohamed, training to extremists at Farouq Mosque
o Yousef, prosecuted for Bojinka plot: U.S. aircraft over Pacific
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
22. 22
1994:
o July; Imad Mughniyah‘s activate sleeper network and
detonated a truck bomb at Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina
(AMIA) in Buenos Aires, Argentina killing 86 and injured 252
• U.S., Israel, and Argentina all concluded that Iran, Hizballah,
and Imad Mughniyah were responsible for the bombing
o December; Algerians associated with al Qaeda hijacked French
airliner, intending to crash into Eiffel Tower
o Jean-Louis Bruguière believes the hijacking was a precursor to 9/11
1995:
o July; Ayman al Zawahiri‘s Egyptian gunmen, supported by Iran,
tried to assassinate Hosni Mubarak near Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
23. 23
1996: UBL expelled from Sudan
o Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, invited UBL to Afghanistan
• UBL relocated with assistance of Iranian Intel
• Mustafa Hamid negotiated a secret relationship between UBL
and Iran, allowing al Qaida members safe transit through Iran
o June; Khobar Towers in Dhahran, killed 19 and wounding 500
• Operation undertaken on orders from Iranian government
leaders. Operators trained / funded by IRGC in Bekaa Valley
1998:
o February; UBL issued 2nd public fatwa in name of World Islamic
Front against America, calling for murder of Americans as
individual duty for Muslimsin any country in which it is possible
o August 7; U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam, killing
over 300 and wounding more than 5,000
• Unmistakable modus operandi of Imad Mughniyah
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
24. 24
2000:
o October 12, al-Qaeda attacked U.S.S. Cole –
Yemen killing 17 and injuring 39
o Explosives used were trademark Hizballah shaped charge
2001:
o 9/11 Report implicates Iran / Hizballah in preparations for 9/11
o Iranian officials prior to September 11, 2001, facilitated travel of
al- Qaeda members through Iran to and from Afghanistan, where
hijackers trained at al-Qaeda‘s training camps
o 8 - 10 of the 14 Saudi muscle’ operatives traveled into or out of
Iran between October 2000 and February 2001
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
25. 25
Iran’s Contingency Plans :
Witnesses X, Y, and Z, provide evidence concerning
Iran‘s contingency plans for asymmetrical warfare,
o Evidence concerning Iran‘s development in 1980s of contingency
plans employing many of the same tactics used by 9/11 hijackers
o Defector witnesses testify to Iran‘s foreknowledge of the means
and time of the 9/11 attacks
Some analysts continue to believe the outdated conventional wisdom of the
centuries-old historical religious rift between Sunnis and Shi‘a somehow
precludes their working together, even in areas of common interest
(e.g. al-Qaeda and Hizballah)
“When you see someone like Mughniyah meeting with bin Laden, and Mughniyah
moves freely back and forth between the Bekaa Valley and Iran –and the Bekaa Valley
is where the explosives come out . . . , all of a sudden, you need to step back and say,
okay, maybe this is not quite as we pictured it.”
~ Larry Johnson
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Havlish v. Iran”
26. 26
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Iran’s Support for Terrorism
in the Middle East”
Iran: One of most dangerous terrorism sponsors in world
Terrorism: Important foreign policy instrument for Iran
o Hezbollah –Trained and funded over $100 million/year
o Increasingly, Hezbollah is partner to Tehran Sunni groups
including Iraqi Kurdish organization, and also Shia militants in
Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan, Afghanistan et al
Tehran employed terrorists for an array of strategic purposes
o Undermining and bleeding Rivals
o Power Projection and playing spoilers
o Gaining a voice in opposition councils
o Deterrence – subvert its enemies
o Preserve options
Tehran’s logic is often more strategic than ideological
Willing to work with avowed enemies
Distance itself from attacks and thus evades responsibility (Khobar)
27. 27
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Iran’s Support for Terrorism
in the Middle East”
Revenge on their opponents
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Thailand, Georgia, and Azerbaijan
India and Georgia
Kenya
2011 - U.S. attempt on Saudi ambassador
o Iranian officials –probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei
– changed their calculus and more willing to attack in U.S. to real
Or perceived US actions that threaten the regime
“Hardliners and Pragmatists”
Not fanatical but have worldview that sees revolutionary violence
as valuable for its own sake and an important tool of state
Iran and Hezbollah have shown a presence in every inhabited continent
28. 28
State Sponsored Terrorism
“Iran’s Support for Terrorism
in the Middle East”
Acquiring a nuclear weapon is bad for U.S. and allies in a host of way
Make states more cautious as they fear potentially catastrophic
escalation that a nuclear crisis could bring about
Tehran might become emboldened by a nuclear weapon
o Pakistan: Acquiring nuclear capability became more aggressive
supporting various terrorist groups in Kashmir
Hezbollah: Free pass with U.S. allies because it engages in political
and social welfare activity
States try to distinguish between legitimate and the illegitimate sides
Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran repeatedly crossed U.S. red lines in last
decades with relatively few consequences
Reducing the credibility of future U.S. threats
o Significant AQ presence in it borders