The case involved Lina Joy, a Muslim woman who wished to convert to Christianity. She sought to change her name and remove 'Islam' from her identity card without obtaining a certificate from the Shariah court declaring that she had renounced Islam. The courts dismissed her application, ruling that as a Muslim she was subject to Shariah laws on apostasy and the finality of her decision to convert was within the jurisdiction of the Shariah court, not civil courts. The ruling affirmed that while freedom of religion is protected, Muslims must follow Shariah procedures for converting out of Islam which requires renunciation to be determined by the Shariah court.

1. FACULTY OF SYARIAH AND LAW
SEMESTER 7 (2015/2016)
LAB 2013
ADMINISTRATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IN MALAYSIA
TLB 18
CASE REVIEW
LINA JOY v MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN & ORS
[2004] 2 MLJ 119
NAME OF STUDENT:
SITI NUR JANNAH BT HASANUDDIN
1122051
NAME OF LECTERUR:
MADAM NAWAL BT SHOLEHUDDIN

2. 2
FACTS
The plaintiff was a Muslim by birth. Her parents were also Muslims by birth. They were all
Malays. She was brought up by her Muslim parents and practised the religion of Islam until
she applied to change her name from Azlina Bte Jailani to Lina Lelani, on 21 February 1997,
at the National Registration Department (NRD). She intended to marry a person who is
Christian.
However, the application was rejected on 15 March 1997. The plaintiff applied again to NRD
to change her name from Azlina bte Jailani to Lina Joy and made another application to
remove the word ‘Islam’ from the plaintiff’s new identity card. NRD refused her application
on the ground that it was incomplete without an order of the Syariah Court to the effect that
she had renounced Islam. Lina Joy then sought legal remedies.
ISSUES
a) Whether the plaintiff freedom to profess a religion of her choice under art 11(1) of the
FC was violated?
b) Whether Article 11(1) should be read in isolation?
c) Whether Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 and other related
State Enactments were not applicable to the plaintiff who had (purportedly) professed
the religion of Christianity?
d) Whether s.2 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (‘the
1993 Act’) and other related State Enactments were null and void as they were
inconsistent with art 11(1) of the FC?
HELD & REASON OF JUDGMENT
Dismissing the application:
a) Article 11 of the FC speaks of freedom of religion but this did not mean that the
plaintiff was to be given the freedom of choice to profess and practice the religion of
her choice.
The application of the first part of art 11(1) which provides that every person has the
right to profess and practice his religion, is subject to the second part of art 11(1),
and also to art 11(4) and art 11(5) of the FC because the issue of change of a
person’s religion is directly connected to the rights and obligations of that person as
a Muslim and this is an affair of Muslim falling under the first defendant’s
jurisdiction provided by art 11(3)(a) of the FC read with s 7(1) of the 1993 Act.

3. 3
b) Article 11(1) should not be read in isolation.
It must be construed harmoniously with the other relevant provisions on Islam,
namely, art 3(1), 12(2), 74(2), 121(1A) and 160 (where a Malay is defined as a
person who professes the religion of Islam). The declaration in art 3(1) has the
consequence of qualifying a Muslim’s absolute right to murtad in art 11(1) by
requiring the compliance to the relevant syariah laws on apostasy enacted pursuant
to art 74 List II
c) Since the plaintiff was still a Muslim, art 121(1A) provides that the finality of her
decision to convert out of Islam was within the competency of a Syariah Court, and
not the civil courts.
The plaintiff cannot hide behind the provision of art 11(1) of the FC without first
settling the issue of renunciation of her religion (Islam) with the religious authority
which has the right to manage its own religious affairs under art 11(3)(a) of the FC
d) There was no inconsistency between art 11(1) and s 2 of the 1993 Act
Which it provides the definition of a Muslim. Section 2 of the 1993 Act was enacted
pursuant to art 74(2) of the FC. The enabling article 74(2) confers wide jurisdiction
to the Federal Government to enact Syariah laws to the same extent as provided in
item 1 in the State list (see para 6(e) list 1, Ninth Schedule). Section 2 of the 1993 Act
is directly designed for the purpose of implementing Syariah laws on the Muslim and
it is not in any way designed to curtail the freedom of religion under art 11(1). From
the definition in s 2 of the 1993 Act, the plaintiff is still a Muslim until there is a
declaration to the contrary by the Syariah Court
COMMENTARY
Right to religious freedom is clearly provided under art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. It
seems to be applicable to every person. However, the application of the provision thus far is
still shrouded on mystery and contradictions, especially when it involves the Muslims right to
freedom of religion.
The meaning freedom of religion given to Islam is different from the meaning freedom of
religion given to others religion. It has several restrictions which illustrated that religious
freedom in Malaysia is not precisely equal. But, this provision still remained in the Federal
Constitution because to maintain social stability1.
Even though, the provision regarding freedom of religion is stated as one of the fundamental
liberties by UDHR, it should be noted that UDHR declaration is not binding upon Malaysia2.
Malaysia has it owns constitution which is Federal constitution. Hence, the provision should
be interpreted in a way that generous and harmonious depending on the multi-racial country
circumstances.
1
Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in
Malaysia,supra n.6, p. 202
2 Section 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission Act 1999 clearly provides that the application of any
external laws must be filtered through the Federal Constitution.

4. 4
Besides that, the courts emphasized that 'A person as long as he or she is Malay and by
definition under art 160(2) is, a Malay person cannot renounce his or her religion at all'. A
Malay under art 160(2) remains in the Islamic faith until his or her dying days. The said
Malay cannot renounce his or her religion through a deed poll and seek a declaration by
virtue of art 11 of the Malaysian Constitution on freedom of religion as art 11 does not
provide freedom of choice of religion. Even if one is non-Malay and embraces Islam and
becomes a Muslim convert (Mualaf) and later decides to leave the Islamic faith, he or she is
still required to report and see the relevant State Islamic authority who will decide on her
renunciation of Islam’.
This quotes speaks about Islam is the main dominant religion in Malaysia. Islam has a special
position in Malaysia. It grants every person the freedom to profess and practise his religion.
However, in respect of an act of conversion out of Islam, it must be subject to the relevant
Shariah laws to be determined by the Shariah courts.
Freedom of religion under art 11(1) must be read with art 3(1) which places Islam in a special
position as the main dominant religion of the Federation, with the Federation duty bound to
protect, defend and promote Islam.
“Taking such stand would elevate the fear that those who born and taught as Muslims but
willfully or unintentionally disregard the practice of Islam, will declare themselves as non-
Muslims for purpose of avoiding punishment under the Islamic laws”3. It means that the
Chief Justice took into account the public interest in reaching his conclusion, in particular
the Muslim society. If the Court permits Muslim to convert out of Islam at his/her own wishes
and fancies, the Muslim society would be in chaos”.
In the circumstance above, consideration of public interests override individual interest, i.e.
Lina Joy’s right to convert out of Islam merely by her own declaration within going through
the process prescribed under the Islamic laws. This decision is in line with the Islamic law
(siyasah syariyyah) principle under maslahah amah or saddu zarai’ or da’rul mafasid
muqaddam ‘ala jalbil masalih, which means avoiding harm is more important than taking the
benefit.
As was adjudicated in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court, the case of
Lina Joy is primarily administrative in nature. It essentially deals with the question of
conversion procedure - whether or not a Muslim has to obtain a decree from the Syariah
Court confirming ones apostasy.
In my opinion, the law is simple and straightforward. There is no need to complicate matters
by manipulating the issues to the extent of threatening national unity. If one is not happy with
any decision of any subordinate Syariah Court, then one may appeal. But some seem to
already admit defeat without even trying, i.e., where Lina Joy did not even refer to Syariah
court. It can be said as an excuse to avoid the Islamic criminal sanction as apostasy is a crime
under several states.
3 Ahmad Fairuz FCJ, (2007) 4 MLJ 585

5. 5
It should be noted that some of the academician belief that, we have to honour the life given
by Allah to Lina Joy and grant her the freedom to practice her faith. It is stipulated in the
Quran, "To you your religion, and to me my religion4’ and "Let there be no compulsion in
religion5”.
They further spelt out that freedom of faith means not only freedom to choose a faith, but also
freedom to change one's faith. While Islam regards apostasy a grave sin, but that is between
God and the respective individual. When it is a matter of simple apostasy, i.e., merely
changing one's faith without any aggression or treason against an Islamic State or Muslims,
the principle of freedom of faith in Islam requires that such apostate must be allowed to
exercise their God-given freedom.
This view can be rebutted by administration of Islamic law in Malaysia. When it comes to
matters pertaining to Islamic law, they must be referred to the Syariah Court as it is the main
body entrusted with administering justice according to the confines of Islam. Conversion out
of Islam is part of Islamic law, and therefore the Syariah Court is the only proper platform to
resolve the issue. It is hard to believe that some people simply refuse to deal with the Syariah
Court assuming that justice will be denied.
Whereas some of activists belief that the ruling against Joy could strengthen non-Muslims'
fears that they are discriminated against in Muslim-majority Malaysia, which has substantial
Christian, Buddhist and Hindu minorities. In fact, some of them even labelled the judge as
biased in the verdict.
This cannot be denied that the case gives negative impact to the non-Muslim practising in
Malaysia. As from the layman perspective, when a person reverts to Islam, latter become a
Malay and profess Islam, there is no turning point as they view that Islam denied the right to
apostasy which unlike other religion.
As a conclusion, Lina joy’s case is the first case in Malaysia that makes a clear and bold
statement about the position of Islam and the right to freedom of religion. Art 11(1) gives a
person the right to profess a religion of his choice but if a Muslim wishes to convert out of
Islam only the Shariah Court is competent to determine the matter.
4 Quran : 106:6
5 Quran: 2:256