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Network Security’s Friend or Foe
Spyridon Dosis
 Description & Concerns
 Tunneling Protocols &
Protocol Tunneling
 Network Tunneling Tools &
Setup
 Demo
 Conclusions
 A delivery network protocol
encapsulates a payload
network protocol
 The delivery protocol
usually operates at the
same or higher level (e.g.
in the TCP/IP stack) than
the payload protocol
 Protocol Tunneling
◦ Order in Protocol Encapsulation
◦ Obfuscation rather than hiding
◦ Practical use cases & misuse
 Covert Channels
◦ Channels not intended for information
transfer
◦ Hiding in unused protocol fields, utilizing
fields such as IP ID, TCP Sequence number
etc.
◦ Network Steganography
 Carry data over incompatible
delivery-networks
 Provide a (encrypted) path
through a public network
◦ Monitoring vs Anti-Censorship
 Allowing “some kind” of
traffic may lead to “any kind”
 Pre-existing network-based security
tools (firewalls, IDS) may not be able to
apply the controls to the tunneled
traffic
◦ Evading traffic regulation
 Lack of host-based security controls
◦ Defense in depth
 Inability for ingress and egress filtering
 ‘Open-ended’ tunnel may forward
traffic to other internal hosts
 Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) - Remote Control & Data
exfiltration
◦ Backdoors with OS commands, file
transfer capabilities are installed in
target systems.
◦ Upload collected files using
common ports such as HTTP (80),
HTTPS (443) and DNS (53)
bypassing detection.
 Covert channels for malware
◦ e.g. C&C communications over DNS
(i.e. Feederbot, W32.Morto )
 Description & Concerns
 Tunneling Protocols &
Protocol Tunneling
 Network Tunneling Tools &
Setup
 Demo
 Conclusions
 The original IP packet is encrypted
 The ESP header indicates that the entire
packet is the payload (IP-in-IP)
 Inserts a new IP header (next header is ESP)
Image taken from http://www.free-it.de/archiv/talks_2005/paper-11156/paper-11156.html
 Security services from gateway to gateway or
from host to gateway over an insecure
network
 The entire original packet is encrypted
◦ Internal traffic behind the gateways is not protected
 Often used to implement Virtual Private
Networks (IPsec VPNs)
◦ Site-to-site
◦ Client-to-site
 “GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation)
specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an
arbitrary protocol over another arbitrary
network layer protocol” – RFC 2784 and 2890
 Point-to-point links
Image taken from http://netwild.ru/pptp/
 Ethernet over IPv4/IPv6
(e.g. Openstack Neutron)
 Support for tunneling
broadcasting/multicasting
◦ e.g. Delivering routing updates to multiple sites
 IPv4/IPv6 over IPv4/IPv6
 No default encryption/security services
◦ IPSec Tunnel/Transport over GRE
 Tunnel Brokers provide a network tunneling
service
 6in4 – IPv6 over IPv4
 4in6 – IPv4 over IPv6
 ISATAP
 Teredo – IPv6 over UDP over IPv4
 …and others
 Secure channel over an insecure
network between an SSH client
and an SSH server (e.g. OpenSSH)
typically listening at TCP port 22
 Public-key cryptography for server
(and client) authentication
 Remote command execution, file
transfer (SCP, SFTP), TCP port and
X forwarding, tunneling
 Local-port forwarding when traffic coming to
a local port is forwarded to a specified
remote host/port
 Destination is relative to the SSH server’s
location and mostly unrestricted
 SSH client can be configured to act either as a
local-only service or public to other hosts
 Remote-port forwarding when traffic coming
to a remote port is forwarded to a specified
local host/port
 Destination is relative to the SSH client’s
location and mostly unrestricted
 SSH server can be configured to act either as
a local-only service or public to other hosts
 Performs successfully for single-
host/port communications
◦ Simple Web (HTTP)
◦ Mail (SMTP, POP3, IMAP)
◦ SSH
 Fails for more complex network
services
◦ Web with External References / Surfing
 Solution: Chain to a Web Proxy
◦ FTP
◦ Peer-to-Peer
 The SOCKS protocol proxies TCP
connections/forwards UDP packets from
client to server through a proxy
 A local SOCKS proxy is created on the SSH
client’s side and can forward traffic to
arbitrary remote hosts and ports
 Firewall Traversal / Content-filtering
circumvention
 Run remote X Window System based
applications but displayed locally
 Need for X server for Windows
 Secure the X protocol by tunneling it over SSH
 ssh –X user@host <application>
◦ Run a remote browser visiting a blocked website
 “An ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packet contains an
additional 8 bytes worth of ICMP header
followed by an arbitrary-amount of data” –
ping(8) man page
 LOKI (Phrack Issue 49) utilized it to establish
a covert channel between client/server
 IP over ICMP
 TCP over ICMP
 Various network protocols are encapsulated
using the HTTP protocol
 HTTP is rarely blocked
 Bypass restrictions
◦ Firewalls
◦ Proxy server / Content-filtering
 Transport arbitrary data by encoding them into DNS
messages
 Wide support and availability of the global DNS infrastructure
 Few organizations block DNS traffic from individual clients to
the Internet (e.g. captive portals in public Wi-Fi)
 Effective for bypassing security measures such as firewalls or
ACLs
 Used for two-way communication or data exfiltration
 Around since 1998
 NSTX (Nameserver Transfer Protocol)
 OzymanDNS (Dan Kaminsky) – “Tunneling
Audio, Video and SSH over DNS”
 Used mostly for bypassing paywalls
 Mapping domain names and IP addresses
 Record types
◦ A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, PTR, TXT, NULL
 EDNS for UDP payloads larger than 512 bytes
◦ Increased bandwidth
 Internal users can contact arbitrary external
domains through the organization’s DNS
servers/resolvers
Image taken from http://nirlog.com/2006/03/28/dns-amplification-attack/
 Maximum 253 characters in domain
 Maximum 63 characters per subdomain
 Case-insensitive (Base32 encoding)
 TXT requests allow for maximum characters
in response + Base64 encoding
 Bandwidth up to 110KB/s, 150ms latency
(Van Leijenhorst, 2008)
 Description & Concerns
 Tunneling Protocols &
Protocol Tunneling
 Network Tunneling Tools &
Setup
 Demo
 Conclusions
 Combined with NetCat
◦ Establish a local/remote port forward over SSH with
an SSH server
◦ Create a FIFO special file (a named pipe) on both
sides
◦ Listen for UDP requests / Relay through the SSH
tunnel
◦ Forward UDP requests / Relay through the SSH
tunnel
 tcp_to_udp & udp_to_tcp
 socat Relay & UDPTunnel (UDP over TCP)
 In the case of HTTP browsing, DNS requests are
still submitted by the client
 Monitoring can reveal DNS requests for common
websites along SSH traffic.
 Solution: forward DNS requests also to the SSH
server.
◦ (e.g. Firefox network.proxy.socks_remote_dns)
 Multi-hop setups
◦ Client (SSH lpf) -> Host 1 (SSH dpf) -> Host 2 -> Web
 SSH Traffic Volume & SSH Tunnel Endpoints
 Tunnel Hunter (Dusi et al., 2008)
◦ Naïve Bayes Classifier
◦ Packet size & Packet inter-arrival time
◦ Detect Tunneling & Classify the actual protocol
(BitTorrent, POP, SMTP, HTTP) with high accuracy
◦ Limitations with respect to multiple SSH
authentication types, data compression, login
failures, network protocols
 SSH server in non-standard ports (e.g. 443)
◦ EmergingThreats Snort Rules, Cisco IDS
 Degrade SSH performance (TCP over TCP )
Image taken from http://www.sectechno.com/2010/10/31/bypassing-firewalls-using-icmp-tunnel/
 ICMPTX (IP over ICMP)
 ICMP Tunnel (IP over ICMP)
 Hans (IP over ICMP)
 itun (IP over ICMP)
 Ptunnel (TCP over ICMP)
 Droid-VPN , Troid-VPN (Android Apps,
need root)
 PD-Proxy, Wi-Free, Tunnel Guru
 Detection Signatures
◦ ICMP_PingTunnel_Detected
◦ LOKI ICMP tunneling back door
◦ ICMP Raw Sockets
 Non-standard average packet size
 High ICMP traffic volume between tunnel
endpoints
 Disallow ICMP traffic
 The Tunnel Client initiates an HTTP
connection to the Tunnel Server
 The application encapsulates the application
requests in HTTP requests destined to the
Tunnel Server
 The Tunnel Server unwraps and forwards
 GNU httptunnel
◦ htc – Tunnel Client component
◦ hts – Tunnel Server component
 Syntax
◦ Server: hts –F remote:<remote_port> 80
◦ Client: htc –F <local_port> server:80
ssh –p <local_port> user@localhost
 OzymanDNS
 Dns2tcp
 Iodine
 Heyoka (+ source IP spoofing)
 DNSCat
 NSTX
 DNScapy
 MagicTunnel, Element53, VPN-over-DNS (Android)
 iodine for iOS
 “VPN over DNS”
 Increased DNS traffic (network traffic profiling)
 Maximum DNS request packet size
 Large number of DNS TXT requests
 Number of DNS requests, unique hostnames to a single
domain
 Composition of hostnames
◦ Length, unique characters, character frequency analysis
 Split DNS
◦ Web proxies (but not clients) can resolve external domains
 Determining which tunneling messages are
malicious
◦ Real-time Blackhole Lists (DNSBL lookups)
 23.42.168.192.dnsbl.example.net
 example.net.dnslist.example.com
◦ NIST National Software Reference Library
 84C0C5914FF0B825141BA2C6A9E3D6F4.md5.dshield.or
g
 Mail server performs DNS TXT requests (SPF)
 Description & Concerns
 Tunneling Protocols &
Protocol Tunneling
 Network Tunneling Tools &
Setup
 Demo
 Conclusions
 Description & Concerns
 Tunneling Protocols &
Protocol Tunneling
 Network Tunneling Tools &
Setup
 Demo
 Conclusions
 Using existing core network protocols in
innovative ways
 Ability to bypass filtering controls and make
monitoring difficult (SSH encrypted tunnels)
 Need for improved tunneling detection (both
delivery and payload protocols) methods and
even forensic capabilities
Network Security’s Friend or Foe: Protocol Tunneling

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Network Security’s Friend or Foe: Protocol Tunneling

  • 1. Network Security’s Friend or Foe Spyridon Dosis
  • 2.  Description & Concerns  Tunneling Protocols & Protocol Tunneling  Network Tunneling Tools & Setup  Demo  Conclusions
  • 3.  A delivery network protocol encapsulates a payload network protocol  The delivery protocol usually operates at the same or higher level (e.g. in the TCP/IP stack) than the payload protocol
  • 4.  Protocol Tunneling ◦ Order in Protocol Encapsulation ◦ Obfuscation rather than hiding ◦ Practical use cases & misuse  Covert Channels ◦ Channels not intended for information transfer ◦ Hiding in unused protocol fields, utilizing fields such as IP ID, TCP Sequence number etc. ◦ Network Steganography
  • 5.  Carry data over incompatible delivery-networks  Provide a (encrypted) path through a public network ◦ Monitoring vs Anti-Censorship  Allowing “some kind” of traffic may lead to “any kind”
  • 6.  Pre-existing network-based security tools (firewalls, IDS) may not be able to apply the controls to the tunneled traffic ◦ Evading traffic regulation  Lack of host-based security controls ◦ Defense in depth  Inability for ingress and egress filtering  ‘Open-ended’ tunnel may forward traffic to other internal hosts
  • 7.  Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) - Remote Control & Data exfiltration ◦ Backdoors with OS commands, file transfer capabilities are installed in target systems. ◦ Upload collected files using common ports such as HTTP (80), HTTPS (443) and DNS (53) bypassing detection.  Covert channels for malware ◦ e.g. C&C communications over DNS (i.e. Feederbot, W32.Morto )
  • 8.  Description & Concerns  Tunneling Protocols & Protocol Tunneling  Network Tunneling Tools & Setup  Demo  Conclusions
  • 9.  The original IP packet is encrypted  The ESP header indicates that the entire packet is the payload (IP-in-IP)  Inserts a new IP header (next header is ESP) Image taken from http://www.free-it.de/archiv/talks_2005/paper-11156/paper-11156.html
  • 10.  Security services from gateway to gateway or from host to gateway over an insecure network  The entire original packet is encrypted ◦ Internal traffic behind the gateways is not protected  Often used to implement Virtual Private Networks (IPsec VPNs) ◦ Site-to-site ◦ Client-to-site
  • 11.  “GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an arbitrary protocol over another arbitrary network layer protocol” – RFC 2784 and 2890  Point-to-point links Image taken from http://netwild.ru/pptp/
  • 12.  Ethernet over IPv4/IPv6 (e.g. Openstack Neutron)  Support for tunneling broadcasting/multicasting ◦ e.g. Delivering routing updates to multiple sites  IPv4/IPv6 over IPv4/IPv6  No default encryption/security services ◦ IPSec Tunnel/Transport over GRE
  • 13.  Tunnel Brokers provide a network tunneling service  6in4 – IPv6 over IPv4  4in6 – IPv4 over IPv6  ISATAP  Teredo – IPv6 over UDP over IPv4  …and others
  • 14.  Secure channel over an insecure network between an SSH client and an SSH server (e.g. OpenSSH) typically listening at TCP port 22  Public-key cryptography for server (and client) authentication  Remote command execution, file transfer (SCP, SFTP), TCP port and X forwarding, tunneling
  • 15.  Local-port forwarding when traffic coming to a local port is forwarded to a specified remote host/port  Destination is relative to the SSH server’s location and mostly unrestricted  SSH client can be configured to act either as a local-only service or public to other hosts
  • 16.  Remote-port forwarding when traffic coming to a remote port is forwarded to a specified local host/port  Destination is relative to the SSH client’s location and mostly unrestricted  SSH server can be configured to act either as a local-only service or public to other hosts
  • 17.  Performs successfully for single- host/port communications ◦ Simple Web (HTTP) ◦ Mail (SMTP, POP3, IMAP) ◦ SSH  Fails for more complex network services ◦ Web with External References / Surfing  Solution: Chain to a Web Proxy ◦ FTP ◦ Peer-to-Peer
  • 18.  The SOCKS protocol proxies TCP connections/forwards UDP packets from client to server through a proxy  A local SOCKS proxy is created on the SSH client’s side and can forward traffic to arbitrary remote hosts and ports  Firewall Traversal / Content-filtering circumvention
  • 19.  Run remote X Window System based applications but displayed locally  Need for X server for Windows  Secure the X protocol by tunneling it over SSH  ssh –X user@host <application> ◦ Run a remote browser visiting a blocked website
  • 20.  “An ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packet contains an additional 8 bytes worth of ICMP header followed by an arbitrary-amount of data” – ping(8) man page  LOKI (Phrack Issue 49) utilized it to establish a covert channel between client/server  IP over ICMP  TCP over ICMP
  • 21.
  • 22.  Various network protocols are encapsulated using the HTTP protocol  HTTP is rarely blocked  Bypass restrictions ◦ Firewalls ◦ Proxy server / Content-filtering
  • 23.
  • 24.  Transport arbitrary data by encoding them into DNS messages  Wide support and availability of the global DNS infrastructure  Few organizations block DNS traffic from individual clients to the Internet (e.g. captive portals in public Wi-Fi)  Effective for bypassing security measures such as firewalls or ACLs  Used for two-way communication or data exfiltration
  • 25.  Around since 1998  NSTX (Nameserver Transfer Protocol)  OzymanDNS (Dan Kaminsky) – “Tunneling Audio, Video and SSH over DNS”  Used mostly for bypassing paywalls
  • 26.  Mapping domain names and IP addresses  Record types ◦ A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, PTR, TXT, NULL  EDNS for UDP payloads larger than 512 bytes ◦ Increased bandwidth  Internal users can contact arbitrary external domains through the organization’s DNS servers/resolvers
  • 27. Image taken from http://nirlog.com/2006/03/28/dns-amplification-attack/
  • 28.
  • 29.  Maximum 253 characters in domain  Maximum 63 characters per subdomain  Case-insensitive (Base32 encoding)  TXT requests allow for maximum characters in response + Base64 encoding  Bandwidth up to 110KB/s, 150ms latency (Van Leijenhorst, 2008)
  • 30.  Description & Concerns  Tunneling Protocols & Protocol Tunneling  Network Tunneling Tools & Setup  Demo  Conclusions
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 33.  Combined with NetCat ◦ Establish a local/remote port forward over SSH with an SSH server ◦ Create a FIFO special file (a named pipe) on both sides ◦ Listen for UDP requests / Relay through the SSH tunnel ◦ Forward UDP requests / Relay through the SSH tunnel  tcp_to_udp & udp_to_tcp  socat Relay & UDPTunnel (UDP over TCP)
  • 34.
  • 35.  In the case of HTTP browsing, DNS requests are still submitted by the client  Monitoring can reveal DNS requests for common websites along SSH traffic.  Solution: forward DNS requests also to the SSH server. ◦ (e.g. Firefox network.proxy.socks_remote_dns)  Multi-hop setups ◦ Client (SSH lpf) -> Host 1 (SSH dpf) -> Host 2 -> Web
  • 36.  SSH Traffic Volume & SSH Tunnel Endpoints  Tunnel Hunter (Dusi et al., 2008) ◦ Naïve Bayes Classifier ◦ Packet size & Packet inter-arrival time ◦ Detect Tunneling & Classify the actual protocol (BitTorrent, POP, SMTP, HTTP) with high accuracy ◦ Limitations with respect to multiple SSH authentication types, data compression, login failures, network protocols  SSH server in non-standard ports (e.g. 443) ◦ EmergingThreats Snort Rules, Cisco IDS  Degrade SSH performance (TCP over TCP )
  • 37. Image taken from http://www.sectechno.com/2010/10/31/bypassing-firewalls-using-icmp-tunnel/
  • 38.
  • 39.  ICMPTX (IP over ICMP)  ICMP Tunnel (IP over ICMP)  Hans (IP over ICMP)  itun (IP over ICMP)  Ptunnel (TCP over ICMP)  Droid-VPN , Troid-VPN (Android Apps, need root)  PD-Proxy, Wi-Free, Tunnel Guru
  • 40.  Detection Signatures ◦ ICMP_PingTunnel_Detected ◦ LOKI ICMP tunneling back door ◦ ICMP Raw Sockets  Non-standard average packet size  High ICMP traffic volume between tunnel endpoints  Disallow ICMP traffic
  • 41.  The Tunnel Client initiates an HTTP connection to the Tunnel Server  The application encapsulates the application requests in HTTP requests destined to the Tunnel Server  The Tunnel Server unwraps and forwards
  • 42.  GNU httptunnel ◦ htc – Tunnel Client component ◦ hts – Tunnel Server component  Syntax ◦ Server: hts –F remote:<remote_port> 80 ◦ Client: htc –F <local_port> server:80 ssh –p <local_port> user@localhost
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45.  OzymanDNS  Dns2tcp  Iodine  Heyoka (+ source IP spoofing)  DNSCat  NSTX  DNScapy  MagicTunnel, Element53, VPN-over-DNS (Android)  iodine for iOS  “VPN over DNS”
  • 46.  Increased DNS traffic (network traffic profiling)  Maximum DNS request packet size  Large number of DNS TXT requests  Number of DNS requests, unique hostnames to a single domain  Composition of hostnames ◦ Length, unique characters, character frequency analysis  Split DNS ◦ Web proxies (but not clients) can resolve external domains
  • 47.  Determining which tunneling messages are malicious ◦ Real-time Blackhole Lists (DNSBL lookups)  23.42.168.192.dnsbl.example.net  example.net.dnslist.example.com ◦ NIST National Software Reference Library  84C0C5914FF0B825141BA2C6A9E3D6F4.md5.dshield.or g  Mail server performs DNS TXT requests (SPF)
  • 48.  Description & Concerns  Tunneling Protocols & Protocol Tunneling  Network Tunneling Tools & Setup  Demo  Conclusions
  • 49.
  • 50.  Description & Concerns  Tunneling Protocols & Protocol Tunneling  Network Tunneling Tools & Setup  Demo  Conclusions
  • 51.  Using existing core network protocols in innovative ways  Ability to bypass filtering controls and make monitoring difficult (SSH encrypted tunnels)  Need for improved tunneling detection (both delivery and payload protocols) methods and even forensic capabilities