1Kinship and DescentThis week we’ll begin to talk abou.docx

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Kinship and Descent
This week we’ll begin to talk about the ways in which people
organize themselves in
social terms. We have talked a little about the way that social
groups are linked to culture, but in
the next two weeks we’ll look at the way in which people form
groups. We’ve look at who you
marry, who you live with, who you work with. Because of the
importance of kinship as a basic
structuring principle in most human societies, we’ll begin with
that topic.
Descent Groups, Residence, Kinship calculation
Especially in non-industrial societies, kinship, descent, and
marriage are basic social,
economic, and political building blocks. Kinship entails rights,
obligations, affection, childcare,
and inheritance.
Kin groups are social units whose membership can be charted
and whose activities can be

observed. When anthropologists first began to study non-
western groups through participant
observation, they spent a great deal of time defining kinship
groups and recording their activities.
If you’re interested in seeing the details of kinship charting and
relationships, take at look at the
website of Brian Schwimmer at the University of Manitoba:
http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/anthropology/tutor/kinmenu.ht
ml
For the truly nerdy, see Alan MacFarlane’s lectures on kinship
at YouTube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdLAru7a9Wo
MacFarlane is very old school, British social anthropology. I
think his lectures are great, but
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdLAru7a9Wo
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some may find them a little dry. They contain much more
information than is needed for our
purposes.
The descent group is a basic kin group among non-industrial
food producers. Unlike
families, descent groups last for generations. There are several

types of descent groups, such as
lineages and clans. Some descent groups are patrilineal,
reckoning descent through male lines
only. Some are matrilineal, tracing descent only through the
female line.
The nuclear family is a kin group consisting of a married couple
and their unmarried
children. Nuclear families are widespread among the world’s
cultures, but there are alternatives.
Other social forms, such as extended families and descent
groups, may supplement or even
replace the nuclear family. The nuclear family is most
important in foraging and industrial
societies.
In addition to kin groups, anthropologists also investigate how
people in different
societies define and calculate kinship. Kinship terminologies
are ways of dividing up the world
of kin relationships on the basis of perceived differences and
similarities. Although perceptions
and classifications vary among cultures, comparative research
shows that there are actually only a
few ways of doing it.

Kinship: A definition
Kinship describes a social relationship in which two or more
people consider themselves
to have a strong social bond. That bond can be established in
two ways. There are relationships
of consanguinity (blood relationships), and there are
relationships of affinity (established by
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marriage). The expression “Blood is thicker than water” reflects
the common belief that
relationships of consanguinity are stronger than those of
marriage.
Descent groups
A descent group is a social unit whose members claim common
ancestry. The group
typically endures even though its membership changes as
members are born and die, move in a
move out. Generally, descent group membership is determined
at birth and is lifelong.
Descent groups are generally exogamous, meaning that a
person’s preferred marriage
partner comes from outside the group. Two common rules serve

to admit certain people as
descent group members while excluding other.
Matrilineal descent
With rule of matrilineal descent, children join the mother’s
group automatically at birth
and stay members throughout life.
Patrilineal Descent
With patrilineal descent, people automatically have lifelong
membership in their father’s
group. The children of all the group’s men join the group, but
the children of the females of the
group are excluded. They will belong to their father’s group.
Matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups are types of unilineal
descent. Other types of
descent calculation exist. These are called cognatic.
Ambilineal – descent through both lines.
In many some socieites a child can choice which descent group
it will belong to when it
reaches the age of maturity. Frequently you will see a system
that is formally cognatic but which
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in fact has a preference for unilineal descent. Our own system
for instance, is formally cognatic
in that we recognize both mother’s and other’s ancestor as being
of equal distance from us.
Anglo-american culture, however, in practice has a slight
preference for patrilineality, in that
surnames are traced through he male line.
Lineages and clans
Descent groups may be lineages or clans. Common to both is the
belief that all members
of the group share a common apical ancestor. Apical comes
from the word apex, or top.
A lineage uses demonstrated descent, meaning that the ancestor
is known and descent can
be traced.
A clan uses stipulated or assumed descent. This means that the
apical ancestor is
unknown or assumed. Living people can’t trace their genealogy
accurately to that ancestor.
Many societies have both lineages and clans. In such a case,
clans are made up of
lineages, so that clans have more members and cover a larger
geographical area than do lineages.

Sometimes a clan’s apical ancestor is not a human at all, but an
animal or a plants, called a totem.
Whether human or not, the ancestor symbolizes the social unity
and identity of the
members, distinguishing them from other groups.
Kinship and Economic Structure
The economic types that usually have descent group
organization are horticulture,
pastoralism, and agriculture. Such societies tend to have
several descent groups. Any one of
them may be confined to a single village, but usually they span
more than one village.
5
In a functional sense, what descent groups do is to control
property. They insure that
property is guarded, cared for, and maintained within the group.
Remember when we talked
about economic organization, I said in many societies, most
actually, the means of production
isn’t held by individuals, it is held collectively. Kinship
groups, especially unilineal descent

groups, are the collective entities that control the means of
production in many societies.
When discussing collective ownership of property last week, I
mentioned that among the
Aztec of ancient Mexico, the calpulli was the group that held
property rights to farming land.
They held it collectively and let members use it according to
their need. Calpullis were descent
groups. They were clans, collections of lineages which
putatively had a common ancestor.
The Nuclear Family
In 21 Century North America, we tend to focus on the nuclear
family when we discussst
the “family.” Other societies, however, have a very different
definition of who is family. In many
societies with unilineal descent, one of your parents may not
even be considered to be a relative.
For example, in the Trobriand Islands, where matrilineal
descent is the norm, the biological
father is marginal to “family life.” The rights, duties, and
responsibilities associated with a
‘father’ in the United States are associated with the mother’s
brother.
That is not at all an extreme example. The point is that in many

societies “family” is
defined as the kinship group and not the nuclear family. That
point will become evident shortly,
when we look at kinship terminology to see what names are
given to various kinship roles.
One final point: There are important differences between
nuclear families and descent
groups. In theory, a descent group is permanent, a nuclear
family lasts only as long as the parents
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and children remain together.
Industrialism and Family Organization
As already mentioned, kinship groups are strongest in societies
where there is collective
ownership of the means of production (land, cattle, acorn trees,
etc.). Conversely, it is weakest in
societies where property rights are weak, or where property is
not held collectively. As we
discussed last week, foraging societies lack substantial property
rights for several reasons. First,
because they are highly mobile they do not establish property
rights with respect to resources:

natural resources cannot be owned. Second, mobility means that
property must be limited to that
which can be transported; usually that means that a person can
own no more than he or she can
carry. Third, because foragers (with some notable exceptions)
do not generate large surpluses,
there can be no accumulation of wealth nor is there a means of
transferring short term
subsistence surpluses into durable wealth. All of these factors
mean that lineage groups are
weakly defined in foraging societies, simply because there is
little property to be protected.
Surprisingly, a similar situation exists in the industrial world.
For many Americans and
Canadians, especially members of the middle class, the nuclear
family is the only well-defined
kin group. Nuclear families become isolated from other kin
groups because of geographic
mobility. Mobility is associated with industrialism, so that a
nuclear family focus is characteristic
of modern nations.
Kinship Calculation
In addition to studying kin groups, anthropologists are also

interested in kinship
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calculation, the system by which people in a society reckon kin
relationships. Who are your
relatives and what kind of relatives are they?
At this point we can distinguish between kin terms (the words
used for different relatives
in a particular language) and genealogical kin types. We
designate genealogical kin types refer to
an actual genealogical relationship, such as father’s brother as
opposed to the kin term, which is
English is uncle.
Kin terms reflect the social construction of kinship in a given
culture. A kin term may
(and usually does) lump together several genealogical
relationships. In English, for instance, we
use father primarily for one kin type – the genealogical father.
However, some people extend the
term to adoptive father or to a step-father.
The English term cousin lumps together several genealogical
types. Father’s sister’s son,

father’s sister’s daughter, mother’s brother’s son, mother’s
brother’s daughter, etc. Aunts and
uncles on the father’s side in English aren’t distinguished from
those on the mother’s side.
The kinship terminology that we use in North America reflects
our social organization.
We place an emphasis on the nuclear family. Even though the
nuclear family is under attack, it is
still the most important group that we have, based on kinship.
We are more likely to grow up
with our parents than with our aunts and uncles, who may live
in different towns or states. We
often inherit from our parents, but our cousins have first claim
to inherit from our aunts and
uncles.
Our kinship terminology lumps father’s side and mother’s side
together because our
descent system is bilateral. Even though we generally take the
name of our father, we reckon
descent from both sides, both through custom and through law.
Legally, you are just as close to
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your mother’s parents as to your father’s.
Other people’s kinship terminologies likewise reflect their
social worlds.
It’s helpful at this point to have a little terminology. We’ll need
to delve into Old School
Anthropology and begin with the distinction between role and
status.
Role and Status
Status is a named social position. Father, mother brother, are
all statuses, as are
President, Senator, and janitor. These are cultural categories to
which a name is given.
A role is more or less what a status does. Role is the rights and
duties, and customary
activities associated with the status.
In every society there are many, many social statuses. Kinship
statuses are one of many,
but often the most critical. The links between role and status are
culturally determined. For
example, the kinship term “father” in our society refers to the
male progenitor, or the biological
father. The “father” in our society may also be the joint head of
the household (with “mother”).

In other societies, however, the role that we associate with
“father” may be held by another
person, as noted previously.
In societies where the kinship group is more important than the
nuclear family, the roles
we associated with the biological father may be filled by a
number of people within the kinship
group. Hence, the term “father” may not refer to one person,
but several. This a another
example where kinship terms may lump together several
geneological kin types.
Social statuses may be divided into 1) ascribed status (a social
category into which you
are placed, generally at birth) and 2) achieved status (a social
category which you may choose, or
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one which you achieve by virtue of accomplishments. In
Medieval Europe, royalty was an
ascribed status. You were either born noble or you were not. In
contrast, mass murderer is an
achieved status.
Kinship Terminology

Kinship terminology is a window to the social world. All
societies carve up social reality.
We never deal with all people as individuals, but rather tend to
classify them into types (recall the
discussion of race as a social category). Analyzing how
different cultures divide the world of
people to whom they are related can tell us a great deal about
social life within that culture.
Anthropologists long ago found that there are relatively few
ways of dividing up your
relatives. In fact, there are just six basic systems of kinship
terminology. There are many
different names for these six systems, but since this is a lecture
on Old School Anthropology, I’ll
use the Old School names. Your textbook uses a different sets
of names, but don’t be alarmed.
You don’t need to learn the details of all six. My goal here is
simply to discuss cultural variation
in the ways people describe their kin relationships and how
those systems are linked to social and
economic reality.
The six types of kinshp terminology systems that I’ll discuss
are:

1) Eskimo
2) Hawaiian
3) Iroquois
4) Crow
5) Omaha
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6) Sudanese (Descriptive)
Eskimo
Eskimo is more or less the system that we use in North
America. As the name implies, it
is also used by the Inuit. This system emphasizes the nuclear
family by specifically identifying
the mother, father, sister and brother, while lumping all other
relatives into a few categories.
Hawaiian – A generational system. All relatives of the same
sex and generation are referred to
by the same term. For instance, all males of your biological
father’s generation are called father.
All males of your own generation are called brother. All
females of your own generation are

called sister.
Iroquois – In the Iroquois system the father and the father’s
brother are referred to by the same
name. The mother and mother’s sister are also referred to by
the same name. However, the
father’s sister and the mother’s brother are given separate
terms.
In one’s own generation, brother’s sisters and parallel cousins
of the same sex are referred
to by the same terms.
Cross cousins are distinguished by terms that set them apart
from other kin.
Iroquois terminology very simply distinguishes between
generations and descent groups.
It is associated with unilineal descent groups, both matrilineal
and patrilineal. Males of your
father’s generation are called “Father”, or something that means
“A male of my father’s
generation and descent group.” Males of your generation and
your descent group are called by
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the same term. Males of your generation, but of another descent

group are called by another
name.
So the term brother would be translated as “male of my
generation and my descent
group.” whereas the term cousin might mean something like “
male of my generation and my
mother’s descent group.”
The logic of this is apparent. The world is divided into kin and
non-kin. You share
property and residence with your kin.
Crow – The Crow system is different in that it doesn’t
distinguish between some generations of
kin. It is found in matrilineal systems.
What Crow terminology does is to lump cross cousins on the
father’s side with the
father’s generation. It also lumps cross cousins on the mother’s
side with ego’s children’s
generation. Otherwise, it’s like Iroquois terminology.
Why would you do this? Because you’re lumping together
relatives of the same kin
group together. You’re lumping your father’s relatives with
him, because that’s his descent

group. You’re lumping your mother’s relatives with you
because that’s your descent group.
But in effect what you’re doing is distinguishing more within
your mother’s line than
your father’s, because mother’s is more important.
Omaha – Omaha teminology is the patrilineal equivalent of the
Crow system.
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Sudanese or Descriptive – This is the most complex . You
basically have a term for everybody.
It’s called descriptive because there really aren’t names or
categories, because you use
genealogical descriptors in lieu of kinship types. That is, your
father’s brother is literally called
“father’s brother” instead of using a kinship term such as
“uncle.”
The Big Picture
What all of these kinship terminologies have in common is that
they lump some
genealogical types together while segregating others. As a
generalization, we can say that people
to whom you are closely related (those who are members of

your kin groups) are split into a large
number of categories, while people to whom you are related in
other ways (such as by marriage)
are lumped together.
Relationships of consanguinity are ascribed statuses. You are
born into a descent group
and your group does not change. Relationships of affinity may
be achieved status for the most
part, although there are exceptions, such as societies where you
will marry a cousin. More on that
topic next week.
http://ics.sagepub.com/
Studies
International Journal of Cultural
http://ics.sagepub.com/content/7/1/33
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/1367877904040603
2004 7: 33International Journal of Cultural Studies
Henry Jenkins
The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence

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A R T I C L E
INTERNATIONAL
journal of
CULTURAL studies
Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi
www.sagepublications.com
Volume 7(1): 33–43
DOI: 10.1177/1367877904040603
The cultural logic of media convergence
● Henry Jenkins
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
A B S T R A C T ● Responding to the contradictory nature of
our current

moment of media change, this article will sketch a theory of
media convergence
that allows us to identify major sites of tension and transition
shaping the media
environment for the coming decade. Media convergence is more
than simply a
technological shift. Convergence alters the relationship between
existing
technologies, industries, markets, genres and audiences. ●
K E Y W O R D S ● collective intelligence ● creative
industries
The American media environment is now being shaped by two
seemingly
contradictory trends: on the one hand, new media technologies
have
lowered production and distribution costs, expanded the range
of available
delivery channels and enabled consumers to archive, annotate,
appropriate
and recirculate media content in powerful new ways;1 on the
other hand,
there has been an alarming concentration of the ownership of
mainstream
commercial media, with a small handful of multinational media
conglom-
erates dominating all sectors of the entertainment industry.
Few media critics seem capable of keeping both sides of this
equation in
mind at the same time. Robert McChesney (2000) warns that the
range of
voices in policy debates will become constrained as media
ownership
concentrates. Cass Sunstein (2002) worries that fragmentation

of the web
is apt to result in the loss of shared values and common culture.
Nick
Gillespie (1999) points towards a ‘culture boom’, while Mark
Crispin
Miller (2002) speaks of an American ‘monoculture’. Todd
Gitlin (2003)
worries about a ‘media torrent’, whereas Grant McCracken
(1997) sees the
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 33
www.sagepublications.com
3 4
‘plenitude’ of a highly generative culture. Some fear that media
is out of
control; others that it is too controlled. Some see a world
without gate-
keepers; others a world where gatekeepers have unprecedented
power. They
all get partial credit, given the contradictory and transitional
nature of our
current media system.
This article will sketch a theory of media convergence that
allows us to
identify major sites of tension and transition shaping the media
environ-
ment for the coming decade. My goal is to identify some of the

ways that
cultural studies might contribute to those debates and why it is
important
for us to become more focussed on creative industries.
Media convergence is more than simply a technological shift.
Convergence
alters the relationship between existing technologies, industries,
markets,
genres and audiences. Convergence refers to a process, but not
an endpoint.
Thanks to the proliferation of channels and the portability of
new comput-
ing and telecommunications technologies, we are entering an
era where
media will be everywhere and we will use all kinds of media in
relation to
each other. Our cell phones are not simply telecommunications
devices; they
also allow us to play games, download information from the
internet and
receive and send photographs or text messages. Any of these
functions can
also be performed through other media appliances. One can
listen to The
Dixie Chicks through a DVD player, car radio, walkman,
computer MP3
files, a web radio station or a music cable channel. Fueling this
technological
convergence is a shift in patterns of media ownership. Whereas
old Holly-
wood focussed on cinema, the new media conglomerates have
controlling
interests across the entire entertainment industry. Viacom, for
example,
produces films, television, popular music, computer games,

websites, toys,
amusement park rides, books, newspapers, magazines and
comics. In turn,
media convergence impacts the way we consume media. A
teenager doing
homework may juggle four or five windows, scanning the web,
listening to
and downloading MP3 files, chatting with friends,
wordprocessing a paper
and responding to email, shifting rapidly between tasks. And
fans of a
popular television series may sample dialogue, summarize
episodes, debate
subtexts, create original fan fiction, record their own
soundtracks, make
their own movies – and distribute all of this worldwide via the
internet.
Convergence is taking place within the same appliances . . .
within the
same franchise . . . within the same company . . . within the
brain of the
consumer . . . and within the same fandom.
For the foreseeable future, convergence will be a kind of kludge
– a jerry-
rigged relationship between different media technologies –
rather than a
fully integrated system. Right now, the cultural shifts, the legal
battles and
the economic consolidations that are fueling media convergence
are preced-
ing shifts in the technological infrastructure. The way in which
those
various transitions play themselves out will determine the
balance of power

within this new media era.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L journal of C U LT U R A L studies
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The rate of convergence will be uneven within a given culture,
with those
who are most affluent and most technologically literate
becoming the early
adapters and other segments of the population struggling to
catch up.
Insofar as these trends extend beyond a specifically American
context, the
rate of convergence will also be uneven across national borders,
resulting
in the consolidation of power and wealth within the ‘have’
nations and
some shift in the relative status and prominence of developing
nations.
Convergence is more than a corporate branding opportunity; it
represents
a reconfiguration of media power and a reshaping of media
aesthetics and
economics. The French cyberspace theorist Pierre Levy uses the
term ‘collec-
tive intelligence’ to describe the large-scale information
gathering and

processing activities that have emerged in web communities. On
the
internet, he argues, people harness their individual expertise
towards shared
goals and objectives: ‘No one knows everything, everyone
knows some-
thing, all knowledge resides in humanity’ (1997).2 The new
knowledge
culture has arisen as our ties to older forms of social community
are
breaking down, our rooting in physical geography is
diminishing, our bonds
to the extended and even the nuclear family are disintegrating
and our
allegiances to nation states are being redefined. However, new
forms of
community are emerging. These new communities are defined
through
voluntary, temporary and tactical affiliations, are reaffirmed
through
common intellectual enterprises and emotional investments and
are held
together through the mutual production and reciprocal exchange
of know-
ledge. Levy maps the intersections and negotiations between
four potential
sources of power: nomadic mobility, control over territory,
ownership over
commodities and mastery over knowledge. The emergent
knowledge
cultures never fully escape the influence of the commodity
culture any more
than commodity culture can function fully outside the
constraints of terri-
toriality. However, knowledge cultures, he predicts, will
gradually alter the

way that commodity cultures or nation states operate. Nowhere
is that tran-
sition clearer than within the culture industries, where the
commodities that
circulate become resources for the production of meaning and
where peer-
to-peer technologies are being deployed in ways that challenge
old systems
of distribution and ownership.
Ultimately, our media future could depend on the kind of
uneasy truce that
gets brokered between commercial media and collective
intelligence. Imagine
a world where there are two kinds of media power: one comes
through
media concentration, where any message gains authority simply
by being
broadcast on network television; the other comes through
collective intelli-
gence, where a message gains visibility only if it is deemed
relevant to a loose
network of diverse publics. Broadcasting will place issues on
the national
agenda and define core values. Grassroots media will reframe
those issues
for different publics and ensure that everyone has a chance to be
heard. Inno-
vation will occur on the fringes; consolidation in the
mainstream. But that
Jenkins ● The cultural logic of media convergence 3 5
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3 6
makes it all sound a little too orderly, since in our transitional
moment, the
power relations between these forces are being fought over amid
much name-
calling and acrimony.
Understanding these changes and participating in the debates
that will
shape the future of media will require cultural studies to revisit
and rethink
some of its core assumptions. Since these changes occur at the
intersection
between production and consumption, they will demand detente
between
political economy (which has perhaps the most powerful theory
of media
production) and audience research (which has the most
compelling account
of media consumption). As we do so, political economy will
need to shed
its assumption that all participation in the consumer economy
constitutes
cooptation and look instead at the ways that consumers are
influencing the
production and distribution of media content. Audience
researchers will, at
the same time, need to abandon their romance with audience
resistance in
order to understand how consumers may exert their emerging

power
through new collaborations with media producers. We should
not give up
our desire to contest the homogenization of our culture, but
contemporary
consumers may gain power through the assertion of new kinds
of economic
and legal relations and not simply through making meanings.
We need to move from a politics based on culture-jamming –
that is,
disrupting the flow of media from an outside position – towards
one based
on blogging – that is, actively shaping the flow of media.
Blogging came
into its own during the Gulf War, providing an important
communication
channel for the antiwar movement. In the Vietnam War era, it
took years
to build up the network of underground newspapers, alternative
comics and
people’s radio stations that supported the antiwar movement. In
the digital
age, antiwar activists emerged almost overnight, forming
important
alliances, sharing ideas, organizing actions and mobilizing
supporters, with
most of the important work taking place in cyberspace. Others
used
blogging technology to link together important international
coverage of
the war, providing an implicit critique of the narrowness of the
American
media’s hyperpatriotic accounts. In some cases, bloggers
collected money to
send their own reporters to the front so that they could obtain

more direct
and unfiltered knowledge of what was going on. As blogging
has taken off,
the form has been incorporated into commercial media sites:
Salon, the
online news magazine, for example, has a number of famous
writers and
political leaders who regularly run blogs through its website.
Mainstream
reporters increasingly scan blogs in search of leads for stories
that will then
be reported more widely through broadcast media. Furthermore,
early signs
are that blogging may play a decisive role in shaping the 2004
American
presidential elections, having been identified as a key factor in
propelling
maverick candidate Howard Dean into the front ranks for the
Democratic
Party nomination.
I am struck by the ending of The Truman Show, a film that buys
into
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culture-jamming assumptions. All the film can offer us is a

vision of media
exploitation, and all its protagonist can imagine is walking
away from the
media and slamming the door. It never occurs to anyone that
Truman might
stay on the air, generating his own content and delivering his
own message,
exploiting the media for his own purposes. Bloggers are
rewriting the
ending, resulting in a new vision of media politics.
Convergence is both a top-down corporate-driven process and a
bottom-
up consumer-driven process. Media companies are learning how
to acceler-
ate the flow of media content across delivery channels to
expand revenue
opportunities, broaden markets and reinforce viewer
commitments.
Consumers are learning how to use these different media
technologies to
bring the flow of media more fully under their control and to
interact with
other users. They are fighting for the right to participate more
fully in their
culture, to control the flow of media in their lives and to talk
back to mass
market content. Sometimes, these two forces reinforce each
other, creating
closer, more rewarding, relations between media producers and
consumers.
Sometimes, these two forces are at war and those struggles will
redefine the
face of American popular culture. Media producers are
responding to these
newly empowered consumers in contradictory ways, sometimes

encourag-
ing change, sometimes resisting what they see as renegade
behavior.
Consumers, in turn, are perplexed by what they see as mixed
signals about
how much participation they can enjoy.
The so-called media companies are not behaving in a monolithic
fashion
here; often, in fact, different divisions of the same company are
pursuing
radically different strategies, reflecting their uncertainty about
how to
proceed. On the one hand, convergence represents an expanding
oppor-
tunity for media conglomerates, since content that succeeds in
one sector
can expand its market reach across other platforms. On the other
hand,
convergence represents a risk, since most of these media fear a
fragmen-
tation or erosion of their markets. Each time they move a viewer
from, say,
television to the internet, there is a risk that the consumer may
not return.
Sometimes media executives are thinking across media;
sometimes they
can’t extract themselves from medium-specific paradigms.
Collaborations,
even within the same companies, are harder to achieve than we
might
imagine looking at top-down charts mapping media ownership.
The closer
to the ground you get, the more media companies look like
dysfunctional
families.

Convergence is also a risk for creative industries because it
requires media
companies to rethink old assumptions about what it means to
consume
media – assumptions that shape both programming and
marketing
decisions. If old consumers were assumed to be passive, the new
consumer
is active. If old consumers were predictable and stationary, then
new
consumers are migratory, showing a declining loyalty to
networks or even
media. If old consumers were isolated individuals, then new
consumers are
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 37
3 8
more socially connected. If old consumers were seen as
compliant, then new
consumers are resistant, taking media into their own hands. If
the work of
media consumers was once silent and invisible, they are now
noisy and
public. Much of this is old news to those of us who have been
following

debates in cultural studies over the past few decades. But, as
John Hartley
and Toby Miller suggest in this issue, with varying degrees of
pessimism,
the idea of the active and critical consumer is gaining new
currency within
media industries, creating new opportunities for academic
intervention in
the policy debates that will shape the next decade of media
change.
Here are nine sites where important negotiations between
producers and
consumers are apt to occur:
1 Revising audience measurement
Rethinking the usefulness of the ‘impression’ in an age of
transmedia
branding, the American television industry is increasingly
targeting
consumers who have a prolonged relationship and active
engagement with
media content and who show a willingness to track down that
content
across the cable spectrum and across a range of other media
platforms. This
next generation audience research focusses attention on what
consumers do
with media content, seeing each subsequent interaction as
valuable because
it reinforces their relationship to the series and, potentially, its
sponsors.
Each shift in audience measurement, as Ien Ang (1991) and
Eileen Meehan
(1990) note, among others, results in shifts in cultural power,

with some
groups gaining greater influence and others being marginalized.
Will fan
communities be the new beneficiaries of audience measurement?
2 Regulating media content
Many parents complain that the media floodgates have opened
into their
living rooms and that they are no longer able to exercise
meaningful choices
about what media should enter their homes. Historically, media
producers
sought to appeal to the broadest possible population; self-
regulation sought
to ensure that all the content produced was appropriate for
every member
of the family; ideological struggles occurred whenever there
was an attempt
to broaden the possible themes that could be included within
mainstream
entertainment. There is now a push away from consensus-style
media and
towards greater narrowcasting. In this context, consumers are
expected to
play a much more active role in determining what content is
appropriate
for their families. Ironically, perhaps the biggest success story
in niche media
production has been the emergence of an alternative sphere of
popular
culture reflecting the tastes and ideologies of cultural
conservatives, the very
groups who are also working to impose those ideological norms
onto main-
stream media through governmental regulation of media content

(see
7(1)
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 38
Hendershott, 2004). Will the tension between narrowcasting and
regulation
result in more or less media diversity?
3 Redesigning the digital economy
Most believe that the commercializing of cyberspace has
significantly
undercut the web’s prevailing gift economy. There will still be a
great deal
of free content produced by amateurs and academics, but more
and more
content will come with a price tag. The choice of how we pay
for web
content can have enormous cultural implications. Many feel that
a shift
towards a subscription-based model will result in greater media
concen-
tration and the construction of higher barriers of entry to the
cultural
marketplace, since most consumers will buy only a limited
number of
subscriptions and are more apt to buy them from companies that

can
promise them the broadest range of possible content. A
micropayment
system would allow media producers (recording artists,
independent game
designers, web comics artists, authors) to sell their content
directly to the
consumers, cutting out many layers of middle folk, adjusting
prices for the
lowered costs of production and distribution in the digital
environment.
Although long predicted, a viable micropayment system has yet
to emerge,
although there are new signs of life in this area. Which
economic and
cultural model will dominate in the web environment in the
coming decade?
4 Restricting media ownership
In the summer of 2003, following heated debates that cut across
traditional
ideological divisions, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC)
lifted many of the existing restrictions on US media ownership.
The debate
pitted those who believed that technological change had
resulted in an
explosion of media options against those who saw the present
moment
primarily in terms of media concentration. Many fear that the
FCC rulings
will pave the way for even more consolidation within the media
industries.
Even if they don’t, the battlelines drawn between – and within –
the two

factions may shape future policy debates over the coming
decade. One
significant consequence of the debate has been a heightened
grassroots
awareness of the issue of media ownership. Will public
dissatisfaction with
corporate media be a driving political issue in the coming
years?
5 Rethinking media aesthetics
P. David Marshall (2002) describes the emergence of ‘the new
intertextual
commodity’, as franchises expand across media channels in
response to the
opportunities represented by media convergence. His focus is
primarily on
the economic implications of these shifts, but we should also
monitor their
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 39
4 0
aesthetic implications. In the old system, a work that was
successful in one
medium might be adapted into other media or used to brand a
series of

related but more or less redundant commodities. More recent
media fran-
chises, such as The Blair Witch Project, Pokemon or The
Matrix, have
experimented with a more integrated structure whereby each
media mani-
festation makes a distinct but interrelated contribution to the
unfolding of
a narrative universe. While each individual work must be
sufficiently self-
contained to satisfy the interests of a first time consumer, the
interplay
between many such works can create an unprecedented degree
of complex-
ity and generate a depth of engagement that will satisfy the
most commit-
ted viewer. Will transmedia storytelling enrich popular culture
or make it
more formulaic?
6 Redefining intellectual property rights
In the new media environment, it is debatable whether
governmental
censorship or corporate control over intellectual property rights
poses the
greatest threat to the right of the public to participate in their
culture. Take
the case of Harry Potter. In public schools across the US, the
J.K. Rowling
books have been attacked by religious conservatives who want
them pulled
from libraries or removed from classrooms because they
allegedly promote
paganism. The publishing industry has joined forces with
librarians,

teachers and civil libertarians to stave off these attacks on
children’s rights
to read. At the same time, Warner Brothers has been
aggressively asserting
its rights over the Harry Potter franchise to shut down fan
websites. One
case centered around the right of children to read the Harry
Potter books;
the other, their right to write about them. Can these two rights
be so easily
separated in an era of read-write culture? Will the general
public preserve
and expand its right to participate or will corporate restrictions
on intel-
lectual property use gradually erode away the concept of free
expression?
7 Renegotiating relations between producers and consumers
So far, the recording industry has responded to the emergence
of peer-to-
peer technologies through legal action and name-calling rather
than
developing new business plans or reconceiving consumer
relations. In the
games industry, on the other hand, the major successes have
come within
franchises that have courted feedback from consumers during
the product
development process, endorsed grassroots appropriation of their
content
and technology and that have showcased the best user-generated
content.
Game companies have seen the value of constructing, rather
than shutting
down, fan communities around their products and building long-

term
relationships with their consumers. Which model will prevail?
7(1)
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 40
8 Remapping globalization
Much academic writing on globalization has centered on the
flow of
western media products into global markets, falling back on old
models of
cultural imperialism. Yet globalization also involves the flow of
goods,
workers, money and media content from east to west. The Mario
Brothers
are recognized by more American kids than Mickey Mouse –
even if many
of them don’t yet realize that Nintendo is a Japanese-based
game company.
As they grow older, they certainly recognize Asian origins as a
marker of
cultural distinction. Much as teens in the developing world use
American
popular culture to express generational differences, western
youth is assert-
ing its identity through its consumption of Japanese anime and
manga,

Bollywood films and bhangra and Hong Kong action movies. A
new pop
cosmopolitanism is being promoted by corporate interests both
in Asia and
in the West, but it is also being promoted by grassroots
interests, including
both fan and immigrant communities, who are asserting greater
control
over the flow of media content across national borders. What
will be the
long-term economic and cultural impact of these trends?
9 Re-engaging citizens
Asian American activists use the web to quickly launch a
nationwide protest
against Abercrombie & Fitch when it releases a line of T-shirts
featuring
exaggerated Asian stereotypes (for example, ‘Two Wongs Make
a White’).
Hoping to increase its visibility in American culture, APA First
Weekend
has created a massive mailing list designed to buoy opening
grosses for films
with Asian or Asian American content. Adbusters produces
mock commer-
cials that use Madison Avenue conventions to challenge
consumerism and
corporate greed. Conservative talk show hosts direct their ire
against The
Dixie Chicks after one of the performers made negative
comments about
George W. Bush, resulting in a dramatic decline in their
revenues and then
a rebound as buying a Dixie Chicks album became a litmus test
for antiwar

sentiment. Media celebrities, such as World Wrestling
Federation superstar
Jesse Ventura or action hero Arnold Schwarzenegger, are
emerging as
important political figures. In such an environment, it is no
surprise that
activism draws models from fan culture or that popular culture
becomes
the venue through which key social and political issues get
debated. What
models of democracy will take roots in a culture where the lines
between
consumption and citizenship are blurring?
Media and cultural scholars have important contributions to
make in
each of these spaces. There is an enormous demand right now
for public
intellectuals who can help the public, policy makers and
industry alike
understand the stakes in these power struggles. In order to play
that role,
we will need visibility to address large and diverse publics,
credibility to get
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 41
4 2

our ideas heard in the corridors of power, accessibility to ensure
that our
perspectives are clearly understood and widely embraced and
pragmatism
to develop solutions that acknowledge the legitimate interest of
all stake-
holders. To play that role, we need to shed some of our own
intellectual
and ideological blinders, to avoid kneejerk or monolithic
formulations and
to imagine new possible relations with corporate and
governmental inter-
ests. This route may not lead to radical transformations of the
economic
and political system, as Miller correctly notes, but we may
score some
important local and tactical victories in the struggle for political
freedom
and cultural diversity.
In many parts of the world, cultural scholars have engaged in
active inter-
vention in the public debates shaping cultural policy, often
working closely
with governmental bodies to pursue their interests even where
they did not
fully agree with the other participants or totally endorse the
outcomes
achieved. They did so because they knew it was more important
to try to
influence policy than to remain ideologically or intellectually
pure. Hartley
notes that we have historically been more comfortable
collaborating with
state institutions than private corporations. But, in an era of

privatization,
cultural policy is increasingly being set not by governmental
bodies, but by
media companies; we lose the ability to have any real influence
over the
directions that our culture takes if we do not find ways to
engage in active
dialogue with media industries.
This is why discussions of creative industries need to take
center stage as
cultural studies enters the 21st century. We need to go into such
collabora-
tions and dialogues with our eyes wide open and, to do so, we
need more
nuanced models of the economic contexts within which culture
gets
produced and circulated.
Notes
1 I am framing this discussion narrowly to describe trends and
debates within
American popular culture. Many of these same issues are
emerging elsewhere
around the world, but they are playing out differently in
different national
contexts. The ideas contained here will be developed more
fully, albeit for a
popular readership, in my forthcoming book The Empowered
Consumer:
How Convergence Is Changing Our Relations to Media
(working title).
These ideas have taken shape through my column in Technology
Review,
which can be found online at:

(http://www.technologyreview.com).
2 See Levy (1997). For a fuller discussion of Levy’s notion of
collective intelli-
gence, see Jenkins (2002).
7(1)
76T 04 040603 (ds) 1/3/04 9:37 am Page 42
References
Ang, Ien (1991) Desperately Seeking the Audience. London:
Routledge.
Gillespie, Nick (1999) ‘All Culture, All the Time’, Reason
(Apr.).
Gitlin, Todd (2003) Media Unlimited. New York: Owl Books.
Hendershott, Heather (2004) Shaking the World for Jesus:
Media and
Conservative Evangelical Culture. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Jenkins, Henry (2002) ‘Interactive Audiences?’, in Dan Harries
(ed.) The New
Media Book. London: British Film Institute.
Levy, Pierre (1997) Collective Intelligence. Cambridge:
Perseus.
McChesney, Robert (2000) Rich Media, Bad Democracy. New

York: New
Press.
McCracken, Grant (1997) Plenitude. URL:
http://www.cultureby.com/books/
plenit/cxc_trilogy_plenitude.html
Marshall, P. David (2002) ‘The New Intertextual Commodity’,
in Dan Harries
(ed.) The New Media Book. London: British Film Institute.
Meehan, Eileen (1990) ‘Why We Don’t Count’, in Patricia
Mellencamp (ed.)
Logics of Television. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Miller, Mark Crispin (2002) ‘What’s Wrong with this Picture?’,
Nation (7 Jan.).
Sunstein, Cass (2002) Republic.com. Trenton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
● HENRY JENKINS is the director of the comparative media
studies
program and holds the John E. Burchards chair in the
humanities at MIT.
He is the author or editor of nine books, including Textual
Poachers:
Television Fans and Participatory Culture and Hop on Pop: The
Politics
and Pleasures of Popular Culture. He is currently writing a book
examining how media convergence and collective intelligence
are
impacting contemporary popular culture. Address: Department
of
Literature, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77
Massachusetts
Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139–4307, USA. [email:

[email protected]] ●
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