1. 1
Interim Presentation of Findings from the
Evaluation of Nuclear Security Communications
Prepared by ORS Impact, with Joy Drucker
Prepared for Carnegie Corporation of New York, Colombe
Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and
The William & Flora Hewlett Foundation
June 2014

2. 2
Purpose of Today’s Discussion
• Provide a status update
 Interviews completed
 Analysis completed
• Share draft findings
 June 26th webinar
 Seek feedback from the funders
 Lift up questions
 Identify actionable areas that inform grantmaking
• Discuss plans for finalizing presentation and reporting

3. Evaluation Purpose, Design, and Sample

4. 4
• Improve understanding of how foundations might target grant support
in order to increase the influence of grantees’ communications
approaches
Evaluation Purpose

5. Joy Drucker
engaged in advisory
role by funders as
content expert
Grantee Data
• Surveys (n=22) and interviews (n=23) with grantees conducted by Fenton
Communications
• Grantee data was used to develop the sample of policy makers, develop
policy maker interview guide, identify key themes and triangulate findings
Policy Maker Data
• Confidential interviews (n=24) with policy makers
• Policy maker data was used to address research questions related to grantee
communications
Evaluation Design
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July
Fenton
Communications
conducts Grantee
Surveys and Interviews
Conduct
Policy
Maker
Interviews
2014
ORS Impact
engaged
Review and
analyze grantee
data
Interim
presentation to
funders
Final
presentation
and report

6. 6
Data Analysis
The ORS Impact team
• Summarized descriptive information from grantee surveys and themes
from grantees interviews
• Created descriptive categories to describe policy makers (e.g. branch
of government, political party, length of career, gender)
• Coded policy maker interviews and extracted key themes
• Themes reflect a weight of evidence as well as unique perspectives that
provide actionable insights
• Examined policy maker interview data to determine any differences
based on descriptive characteristics

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Grantee Data
• Characterization of grantees based on Fenton Communications’
description:
32%
36%
14%
18%
FTEs working on Nuclear
Security (n=22)
Very few FTEs working on nuclear
security, esp given the size of
organizations
0 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 >15
50%
25%
25%
Type of Organization (n=22)
Half are focused on advocacy; the other half
are divided between think tanks and
academia
Advocacy Organizations Think Tanks
Academic Institutions
5%
18%
45%5%
27%
Budgets (n=23)
All but one have budgets over $500,000
Under $100,000 $100,000 to $499,000 $500,000 to $999,999
$1 million to $4.99 million $5 million to $9.99 million $10 million or more

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Policy Maker Data
• Characterization of policy makers that participated in interviews were as follows:
*”Narrow aperture” denotes policy makers focused on nuclear issues; “wide aperture” refers to policy
makers focused on a wider set of issues.
58%
42%
Aperture* (n=24)
Interviews are divided between narrow
and wide focus
Wide Aperture Narrow Aperture
46%
29%
25%
Current Role (n=24)
Split between current and former policy maker roles
Former High-Level Position(s) in Government
Executive Branch
Legislative Branch 21%
79%
Length of Career (n=24)
Majority of respondents are post-Cold War
Pre-1980s Post 1980s

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Policy Maker Data
• Characterization of policy makers that participated in interviews were as follows:
*These numbers are reflective of the overall sample that we approached for interviews. Of the
36 policymakers identified in the process that ORS Impact reached out to, eight were female
and seven were republicans
79%
21%
Gender* (n=24)
More women than men
Male Female
83%
17%
Party Affiliation* (n=24)
More democrats than republicans
Democrat Republican

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Seeking Reactions and Feedback from Funders
• What resonates?
• Anything surprising?
• Need for clarification?
• Key take-aways?
• What are the implications of these findings?
• E.g. how can funders deliver the most effective grant making
approach in the area of nuclear security communications?

11. Grantee Self Report of their
Communication Efforts
Grantee Survey
and Interview
Findings:

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Grantee Self Report of their Communication Efforts
• Majority report having small communications shops
• Majority report having a strong understanding of policymaker’s
unique needs and the political environment
• Majority rate themselves very high on effectively influencing
legislative and executive outcomes
• Majority rate themselves highest around influencing the nuclear security
policy discourse
• Grantees report targeting both legislative and executive branches
with their communications

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Grantee Self Report of their Communication Efforts (cont)
• 74% of grantees report having some type of communications plan
• Most popular common grantee communication products include full
reports, policy briefs, lectures/briefings and editorials
• Majority of grantees rely on personal relationships and connections
within government to augment their communication efforts

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Grantee Self Report of their Communication Efforts (cont)
• Grantees report four primary limitations emerged from the grantee
data that inhibits the effectiveness of grantee communications:
• Nuclear security issues have been deprioritized in the current policy
discourse
• Opponents have the liberty to criticize a proposed nuclear security
policy with little repercussion
• Polling indicates that salience of nuclear issues is very low amongst the
general public
• Increased partisanship has made it very difficult to find Republican
champions

15. Policy Maker
Interview
Findings:
Perspectives about the Relative
Value of External Communications

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Perspectives About the Relative Value of External
Communications
Value of external communications:
1) Educates and informs those inside
government
2) Informs the public
3) Frames issues
4) Supports government efforts to
communicate with key audiences
5) Breaks through “group think”
6) Provides “cover” or “validation”
• Weight of evidence strongly indicates that policy makers’ view
external communications as valuable for those in government.

17. Elements of Useful
Communications
Policy Maker
Interview
Findings:

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Elements of Useful Communications
• Weight of evidence indicates the most useful communications
come via a variety of formats, are simple, and utilize credible
external validators.
1) No single communications approach is
sufficient to reach all policy makers;
multiple platforms are needed.
2) Those inside government have limited
bandwidth; clear messages, brevity and
(relative) simplicity are important.
3) Credible external validators improve
influence and persuasion.
4) Reports are important, but alone are not
sufficient for a policy maker audience.
5) Communications can be more useful if
made relevant to the current policy context
and/or policy makers’ agendas and needs.
6) Useful communications utilize a strong,
unifying frame.

19. Credible Individuals & Organizations
Policy Maker
Interview
Findings:

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Credible and influential individuals
Characteristics of credible and influential individuals:
• Past government experience (15+years)
• High level government experience
• Prominent journalists
• Current or former high-ranking military officials
*The size of the name is representative of the frequency that each individual was
mentioned in the policymaker interviews.

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Credible and influential organizations
The size of the name is representative of the frequency that each organization
was mentioned in the policymaker interviews.

22. Actionable Implications

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Actionable Implications
1) There is considerable work to do to
strengthen grantee communications
• Gap between the current status of
grantee communications and what
policy makers report as useful and
effective
• Need to “serve it up right”
Disconnect; grantees reported
that they feel they effectively
influence the nuclear security
policy discourse

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Actionable Implications (cont)
2) Grantees need to be tuned in and
additive to the current policy
context
• What is currently moving
• Recognition of policy maker needs,
perceptions and constraints (e.g.,
trade-offs)
• Find openings based on what is of
highest priority to certain individuals
Disconnect; grantees report a strong
understanding of policy makers’ unique
needs and the political environment

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Actionable Implications (cont)
3) Frame message proactively and
strongly
• Policy makers have limited bandwidth
• Policy makers are looking for actionable
information
• New START Treaty as an exemplar
• Drive new thinking on long-term
issues– help policy makers break out of
groupthink
Disconnect; policy makers report grantees
often provide dense reports – policy
makers would prefer shorter, more
targeted communications

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4) It is important that grantees show up in person and not fear being
seen as lobbying.
• Policy makers felt the nuclear security community seemed afraid of
“crossing the line,” and indicated that nuclear security community can and
should be more visible and assertive and that doing so does not “cross the
line.”
• Policy makers noted that as a general rule progressive groups generally
self-impose greater constraints, perhaps because they have an incorrect
understanding of the law, and more right-leaning groups are less
constrained and therefore make more of their advocacy efforts.
• Grantees may need clarity that their work reflects education. Non-
profits are permitted under U.S. law to educate and inform about
treaties and legislation, e.g. explain the value of a treaty like New
START but not say “please vote for this treaty.”
Actionable Implications (cont)
Disconnect; policy makers express preference for direct contact and
communication and grantees keep a distance

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5) Utilize credible external validators
• Credibility is based on many factors,
including trust, prestige, unlikely allies,
unexpected voices
• External validators may write articles or
op-eds, testify, make personal contact
Actionable Implications (cont)
Opportunity; while grantees use
validators, it could happen more often
and/or grantees could more frequently
utilize the most credible voices

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6) Aim communications at those that
aren’t in government now but will be
someday, or people who serve in
more junior positions who might be
promoted in the future.
• Many policy makers new to
foreign relations and nuclear
security
• Nuclear security “not sexy” to
young people
Actionable Implications (cont)
Disconnect; limited outreach to
younger/newer policy makers and youth;
tightly knit and aging nuclear security
community

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7) Other ideas
•
•
•
Actionable Implications (cont)

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Jane Reisman, jreisman@orsimpact.com
Anne Gienapp, agienapp@orsimpact.com
Cameron Clark, cclark@orsimpact.com
Jill Hurson, jhurson@orsimpact.com
With Joy Drucker, joydrucker@msn.com