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Beef Hormones & GMO’s
“Are We What We Eat?”
IMAN 625
Spring 2012
B. Ellis
E. Kang
J. Missun
2. 1
Introduction and Background
Since the 1950s, the United States (U.S.) has been using growth hormones in beef
production because the hormones “allow animals to grow larger, leaner and more quickly on less
feed (Hanrahan & Johnson, 2010),” thus reducing production costs. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have approved hormone-
injected beef and uphold their stand that eating hormone-fed beef has no adverse physiological
affect on humans (Hanrahan & Johnson, 2010). However, the European Union (EU) has a
different opinion. The EU has been banning the use hormones in their livestock since 1981
(Hanrahan & Johnson, 2010). Since the early 1980’s the U.S. and EU has engaged in a long
standing disagreement over the EU’s decision to ban hormone treated beef. There have been
several rulings that have been decided by the World Trade Organization (WTO); however, the
EU continues to ban the import of hormone treated beef from the U.S.
The EU has specific concerns with the genetically modified organisms (GMO's) that are
being introduced to foods that are processed and distributed to the public. Cinnamon Carlarne
from the University of Arkansas explains that the EU is concerned over GMO's due to a new
unknown biotechnology and the variables that are associated with introducing the GMO's to
human food (Carlarne, 2007). She also discussed in detail why the “U.S. accepted the use and
marketing of GMO products” (Carlarne, 2007). The EU has a very stringent management for
controlling the use and trade of GMOs (Carlarne, 2007). Because of the recent concerns over
GMO’s, the EU and the U.S. have opposing regulatory rules. The WTO ruled in the fall of 2006
that “Europe’s genetically modified regulations contradict international trade rules” (Carlarne,
2007).
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Key Stakeholders
The disputes over beef hormones and GMO’s have affected many key stakeholders, both in
the US and in Europe. The major stakeholders that are involved are government agencies and
organizations such as the FDA, USDA, World Health Organization, EU, Joint Expert Committee
on Food Additives (JECFA), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, and the
Codex Committee which plays a significant role in determining the standards and safety of the
food for consumption. Additionally, there are private corporations that are also involved and
affected by the dispute between the U.S. and the EU regarding beef hormones and GMO's. The
Monsanto Corporation is a corporation that develops and manufactures genetically engineered
hormones for beef, primarily recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH) sometimes referred to
as Posilac. In August 2008, Monsanto sold their Posilac division to Eli Lilly and Company for
$300 million. Eli Lilly exclusively sold Posilac outside the US for 10 years before the
acquisition (Elanco announces acquisition, 2008).
Issue – The EU’s Ban on Hormones
In a report released in April 1999 by the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures
Relating to Public Health, and titled “Assessments of Potential Risks to Human Health from
Hormone Residues in Bovine Meat and Meat Products”, the use of six natural and artificial
growth hormones in beef production poses a potential risk to human health. These six hormones
include three which are naturally occurring—Oestradiol, Progesterone and Testosterone—and
three which are synthetic—Zeranol, Trenbolone, and Melengestrol (HEALTH, 1999). This re-
port challenged the previous theory in the EU that all hormones had potential health related con-
cerns and should be banned outright, and were in 1981. The report directly questioned the be-
liefs that residues in meat could really disrupt human hormone balance.
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With the ban of hormone treated beef into the EU, the U.S. immediately looked into retal-
iatory counter measures and imposed tariffs (Hanrahan & Johnson, 2010). Over the last few dec-
ades, the EU and U.S. have made several rounds of concessions and amendments to their trade
policies, such as the EU raising the US Beef Quota, and the U.S. reducing some of the penalizing
tariffs. And as an update to this issue, on March 14, 2012 the EU and U.S. finally came to an
agreement on hormone treated beef (Reilhac, p. 1).
Issue – The FDA, USDA, & WTO: Lack of unified mission
In 1993, the FDA gave approval for rBGH (recombinant bovine growth hormone) to be
used in cattle for human consumption, both meat & milk. The initial drug, marketed under the
name Posalic® and developed and manufactured by Monsanto Corporation, rBGH has been
controversial from the start (Sustainable Table, 2012). FDA approval for rBGH came in 1993, in
spite of strong opposition from scientists, farmers and consumers. According to detractors, rBGH
was never properly tested. The FDA relied solely on a study done by Monsanto in which rBGH
was tested for 90 days on 30 rats. The study was never published, and the FDA stated the results
showed no significant problems. But a review by the Canadian health agency on rBGH found the
90 day study showed a significant number of issues which should have triggered a full review by
the FDA (Hansen, 1998)
While the FDA usually oversees: Safety and labeling for food, drugs, & makeup, drug
approvals, biologics (blood supply, etc.), veterinary products, radiation-emitting devices (X-
rays), and medical devices & products (Good, 2012), the USDA oversees a far greater numbers of
goods, basically all food related items (Good, 2012). In what some might think is a move to
appease corporate sponsorship, specifically drug manufacturer Monsanto, the USDA is looking
into trimming down or fast tracking the current approval process for GMO’s (Ettinger, 2012).
Scientists, consumer groups, farming organizations, and environmental groups believe that not
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enough long-term research has been conducted in this field of biotechnology and that there may
be some serious long-term side effects that we are still unsure about.
And finally, the weak “punishment” powers of the WTO to install and enforce decisions
of the Dispute Settlement Body, lends to the problem with large economic powers ignoring the
resolution because any restrictions imposed on the economic power would potentially impact the
global economy, as was the case between the U.S. and EU. The WTO made several decisions on
the issue, yet neither side would back down.
Issue – Corporate Perspective
Headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, Monsanto is the world’s leading producer of GMO
agriculture and vegetable seeds, plant biotechnology traits, and crop protection chemicals
(Monsanto, 2012). During the period from 1996 and 2006, the “Global Area of Genetically
Engineered Crops” increased by over 56 times, see chart 1 ( (GMO Compass, 2012).
Chart 1
Global Area of Genetically Engineered Crops, 1996 to 2006: By Country (Million Hectares)
Country USA Argentina Brazil Canada China Paraguay
1996 1.5 0.1 -- 0.1 -- --
1997 8.1 1.4 -- 1.3 0.0 --
1998 20.5 4.3 -- 2.8 <0.1 --
1999 28.7 65.7 1.4* 4.0 0.3 --
2000 30.3 10.0 3.6* 3.0 0.5 --
2001 35.7 11.8 5.7* 3.2 1.5 --
2002 39.0 13.5 6.3* 3.5 2.1 --
2003 42.8 13.9 3.0 4.4 2.8 --
2004 47.6 16.2 5.0 5.4 3.7 1.2
2005 49.8 17.1 9.0 5.8 3.3 1.8
2006 54.6 18.0 11.5 6.1 3.5 2.0
*illegal cultivation of gmos: calculated area
Between 1996 and 2006, through numerous acquisitions, R&D developments and release
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of new products, Monsanto’s stock price soared as well, more than doubling (Monsanto, 2012).
During this same time of rapid technological innovation and change have come questions about
competitiveness in the industry. Specifically, it has been asked if trait providers have abused
their market position to constrain farmers’ ability to choose a range of seed products at different
price and quality levels. In this discussion, it is important to distinguish what products farmers
actually choose from whether or not they have robust, meaningful choices. In other words, the
fact that farmers purchase high performing products that may cost more does not mean that they
were forced to make those decisions; based on the data presented, it appears that farmers had
many choices along the price/quality spectrum (Monsanto, 2011).
Option 1
On the 14th of March the European Union Parliament gave its informal approval for an
increase in the quota of hormone-free beef from 20,000 tonnes to 48,200 tonnes (Reilhac, p. 1).
The resolution needs only to be passed by the Council of Ministers before it is enacted into law.
The U.S. lifted its retaliatory import tariff on the EU in May of 2011. While this legal agreement
between the U.S. and EU isn't an end to the issue, it does display the most likely outcome to the
trade dispute. This outcome is that there will be no final resolution but continued short term legal
agreements. The issue has become something of a non-issue for the U.S. because of the shift in
the US beef market. The EU market for hormone-free beef is relatively well protected from U.S.
exports for the time being because grain that formerly went to animal feed is currently used to
make bio fuels (Reilhac, p. 1). The result is that the US is now a net importer of beef. As long as
the U.S. does not have a beef surplus, it will not put emphasis on this issue with the EU. This is a
temporary solution because the emphasis of the U.S. to pursue this issue is tied to its position in
the international beef market.
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This most likely scenario that consists of a continued lack of a long-term resolution on
the matter leads to the continued ability of the strong economic nations within the WTO to not
abide by WTO rulings. The WTO ruled in 1998 that the risk assessment the EU proposed failed
to address “the carcinogenic potential of these hormones when used specifically for growth-
promotion purposes... or the potential adverse affects arising from [the] presence in food of
residues of the hormones (Kastner, 2001, p. 52).” However, the EU still continued their ban on
U.S. beef. The only real authority the WTO has over nations that don't agree to its rulings is to
eventually force them out of the WTO. This is not viable for very large economic members such
as the U.S. and the EU. As a result, the WTO has very little ability to influence international
trade behavior of nations with powerful economies.
An additional effect of this resolution is that the increased quotas for US and Canadian beef into
the EU is being disputed by other members of the WTO claiming that all countries with most
favored nation status should be allowed to export the same amount of hormone-free beef to the
EU as the US (Renee, 2010, p. 15). Bilateral agreements without going through the WTO create
problems within the WTO because agreements and regulations that affect member nations are
made without a consensus from other members of the WTO.
Option 2
Another possible resolution would have involved no increase in import quotas of
hormone-free beef to the EU and no tariffs on specific EU goods to the US, but a flat
compensation from the EU to the U.S. for instituting the ban on U.S. Beef. The EU offered this
proposal in 1995 and specifically suggested to “keep the hormone ban in place permanently
while compensating the U.S. through means other than tariff hikes (Kastner, 2001, p. 53).”
However, the U.S. would not agree to this as a permanent solution to the issue. This would be a
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difficult agreement to settle upon because compensation would have to be renegotiated on a
periodic basis which would allow for renewed posturing from both sides on a periodic basis.
These renewed negotiations would occur as frequently as market conditions changed allowing
for a potential trade war.
The effects of compensation on the international trade are interesting because it would
create a new type of international speculation on how much it would be worth to ban the imports
of different products. If the EU and the U.S. were to engage in such a deal, it would prompt other
nations to assess the net worth of their markets and close them off to other nations for
compensation. This would have a detrimental effect on international trade and allow for
protectionism of markets if it is advantageous to the host nation.
Option 3
Another possible option is that the EU attempts to repeal the WTO-SPS framework. Their
argument would be that current testing suggests the possibility that hormone-fed beef may cause
diseases in humans when consumed. They would further their argument by saying that since
additional testing on humans would be unethical given the high probability of illness over test
subjects, the WTO-SPS framework does not allow for the EU to conduct a proper risk
assessment without conducting unethical testing. The EU would then propose a repeal of the risk
assessment from the WTO-SPS framework in order to legitimize their ban on U.S. hormone-fed
beef. This solution is highly unlikely because there is already significant data from the U.S.,
Canada, and other nations that suggest hormone-fed beef is safe for human consumption and has
no adverse affects when ingested. However, relative to the average lifespan of human being,
there has not been sufficient time to see the long term adverse effects consistently ingesting
hormone-fed beef.
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The results of this outcome would be far reaching. The risk assessment within the WTO-
SPS serves to keep import restrictions legitimate when countries claim that the product would
create adverse health effects to their host nation. Without the need to have a WTO approved
scientific risk assessment before banning imports, countries could claim health reasons for all
sorts of bans leading to protectionism and reduced international trade. This is contradictory to the
purpose of the WTO and will ultimately reduce international trade.
Option 4
An additional option proposed in 1995 by Texas ranchers was to label all beef and let the
EU markets decide if they wanted to purchase the hormone-fed beef or not (Kastner, 2001, p.
53). Through a thorough labeling program, EU import bans would have been removed and the
markets would have been able to decide the outcome over the trade dispute. These efforts were
criticized by the U.S. Beef industry for corrupting efforts to end the ban. Eventually the proposal
was silenced by the U.S. Government because it was hindering efforts to remove the ban
outright.
Had this proposal been approved, it would have created a precedent for letting markets
decide what kind products should and shouldn't be traded internationally without intervention
from government bodies. It would have started a new precedent of for free markets as well as
an increased scrutiny and emphasis on research and testing of food safety.
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Works Cited
Carlarne, C. (2007). From the usa with love: Sharing home-grown hormones, gmos, and clones
with a reluctant europe. Retrieved from www.nationalaglawcenter.org
Elanco announces acquisition of posilac(r) dairy business. (2008, August 20). Retrieved from
http://newsroom.lilly.com/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=329001
Ettinger, J. (2012, March). Want More GMOs? No Problem! USDA to Cut Approval Time in
Half. Retrieved March 2012, from Organic Authority:
http://www.organicauthority.com/blog/organic/usda-to-cut-approval-time-in-half-for-
gmos-genetically-modified-food/
GMO Compass. (2012, March). Countries Growing GMOs. Retrieved March 2012, from GMO
Compass: http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/agri_biotechnology/gmo_planting/142.countries_growing_gmos.html
Good, C. H. (2012, March). The FDA and USDA, Explained to the Best of My Ability: A Semi-
Coherent Guide to the Government Agencies Regulating Food. Retrieved March 2012,
from Cheap Healthy Good: http://cheaphealthygood.blogspot.com/2009/08/fda-and-usda-
explained-to-best-of-my.html
Hansen, M. P. (1998, December 15). Statement of Michael Hansen, Ph.D., Research Associate.
Retrieved March 2012, from Consumer Union:
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_food_safety/002269.html
HEALTH, S. C. (1999). ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL RISKS TO HUMAN HEALTH
FROM HORMONE RESIDUES IN BOVINE MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION.
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Johnson, R., & Hanrahan, C. (2010, December 06). The u.s.- eu beef hormone dispute. Retrieved
From
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0
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Kastner, J. J. (2001). Harmonising Sanitary Measures and Resolving Trade Disputes Through the
WTO-SPS Framework. Part I: A Case Study of the US-EU Hormone Treated Beef
Dispute. Food Control, 13, 49-55.
Monsanto. (2011). News & Views: Monsanto. Retrieved March 2012, from Observations on
Competition in the U.S. Seed Industry:
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/monsanto-submission-doj.aspx
Monsanto. (2012, March). Who We Are: Monsanto. Retrieved March 2012, from Monsanto:
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/default.aspx
Reilhac, G. (n.d.). Vote ends EU-U.S. hormone-treated beef row| Reuters. Business & Financial
News, Breaking US & International News | Reuters.com. Retrieved March 17, 2012,
from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/eu-trade-beef-
idUSL5E8EE50620120314
Sustainable Table. (2012, March). Artificial Hormones. Retrieved March 2012, from Sustainable
Table: http://www.sustainabletable.org/issues/hormones/
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