"The African Agriculture Policy Agenda in Practice: Managing processes and improving advisory capacities”, Accra, June 2014

1. The Political Economy of African
Agricultural Policy
Colin Poulton
cp31@soas.ac.uk
11/06/2014
SNRD Agricultural Policy Learning Event,
Accra
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2. Outline
• Some “big picture” political economy theory
– Exclusive vs inclusive institutions
• Political settlements: towards a typology
• Democratisation and the political economy of
agricultural policy in Africa
Key message: Politics and institutions define
the incentives that policy makers face and the
“room for manoeuvre” for policy change.
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Accra
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3. Levels of Political Economy Analysis
source: DFID (2009)
• Macro-level
– How political leaders are selected
– How the highest level political institutions function
• Sector-level
– Forces that shape policy formation and prioritisation at
sector level
– How sector level institutions function
• Problem-driven
– How to change a particular policy or tackle an identified
constraint
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4. Exclusive vs Inclusive Institutions
sources: North-Wallis-Weingast (2009) and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
• Political and economic institutions reinforce
each other
– Vicious or virtuous circle
• All states begin with exclusive institutions
– Elite agreement to limit violence (NWW 2009)
– Rents are created by and for the elite
– High inequality, as a result of economic policy, is
protected by political control
– Economic outcomes reinforce the power of the elite
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Accra
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5. Exclusive vs Inclusive Institutions II
• Inclusive institutions
– Competitive politics sustains and is sustained by a
liberal market economy
– If a leader tries to limit competition in the
economy (or use violence), s/he will be voted out
– The liberal market economy means that there are
multiple sources of capital to finance (new)
political organisations
– These countries have become the most wealthy
over time, because they grow more steadily.
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Accra
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6. Exclusive vs Inclusive Institutions III
• Only a minority of countries have yet made the
transition to inclusive institutions
– Most are now in transition
– Historically, the transition has taken generations or
even centuries
• Those in power “hold all the cards”
– They have to perceive reform as being in their interest
• Hence, the importance of
– competition between nations and/or between elite
groups
– “critical junctures”: typically crises!
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Accra
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7. Political Settlement (Elite Bargains)
• After a crisis, new “rules of the game” are
negotiated, covering:
– How power is to be obtained / maintained
– Limits upon the behaviour of those in (or seeking)
power
– How elites behave – and whether or not the poor
benefit - flow from this
• Some elite groups may be excluded from the
new settlement
– This is only sustainable as long as they are unable
to gain support to force their way back into power
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Accra
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8. Why Might Elites Adopt Pro-Poor Policy?
Competition
between States
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Competition
between Elite Groups
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Accra
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Incentives
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

9. 20th Century Asian “Tigers”
Competition
between States
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Competition
between Elite Groups
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Accra
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Incentives
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

10. Africa according to van de Walle (2001)
Competition
between States
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Competition
between Elite Groups
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Autonomous States
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

11. Autonomous States
• An elite of a few thousand per country could
do largely what they liked!
• Priority given to security and elite expenditure
• Numerous jobs in state agencies given to
supporters as rewards (source of rents)
– Low capacity of state agencies as a result
• Vicious circle of low tax base, hence little
revenue left for development (left to donors),
hence low tax base …
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SNRD Agricultural Policy Learning Event,
Accra
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12. Theory of Democratisation
Competition
between States
11/06/2014
Competition
between Elite Groups
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Accra
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Incentives
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

13. Democratisation and Agricultural Policy
• Urban bias (Bates 1981)
– Will democratisation counter this?
• Reduction in taxation, but neglect of public
investment?
• Voting on the basis of ethnicity, local issues, to
secure patronage … and general policy
performance (growth, corruption)
• Rural poor uneducated, dispersed, unorganised
• Public goods have long time lags from investment
to impact, which may be “unattributable”
– Offer transfers (e.g. input subsidies) instead?
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Accra
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14. Settlement Types 1 and 2
Competition
between States
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Competition
between Elite Groups
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Accra
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Incentives
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

15. Settlement 1: Kenya
• “Champions” gather votes from their regions
– Often playing on fear of other groups (e.g. land)
• Rewarded with ministries as source of rents
• History of state intervention in agriculture
– Each region has its commodity and state agency
– Some local elites obtain substantial benefits
– High inequality (within and across regions)
• Weak incentives to invest in national public
goods
• Crisis 2008: have the rules changed?
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SNRD Agricultural Policy Learning Event,
Accra
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16. Settlement 2: Ghana
• Eventual return to democratisation after early 1980s political
and economic crises
– Political stability: investment climate for steady growth
• 2 institutionalised parties, but as much duopoly as
competition (both have the same internal logic)
• Payments at every stage to obtain power
– Recoup investment and reward funders once in office: posts, perks
• High elite expenditure and political appointments
– Low capacity of state agencies as a result
– Heavy reliance on donors for non-salary expenditure
• Will competitive clientelism become too expensive?
– Marginal cost of votes is rising
– Macroeconomic instability
– Oil is coming!
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SNRD Agricultural Policy Learning Event,
Accra
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17. Settlement Type 3
Competition
between States
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Competition
between Elite Groups
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Accra
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Incentives
Demand from
Poor Groups
Fear of Revolt
by Poor Groups

18. Settlement 3: Rwanda
• Forged following 1994 genocide
– Never let this happen again
– Secure future for Tutsis through wealth for all
– Visionary leadership; others willing to follow
• Political control (ethnic politics prohibited) plus
broad-based growth
– Establish legitimacy
– N.B. external threat + latent internal sympathy
• Highly incentivised state
– Outcome-based management, learning
• Big investment in agriculture since 2007
– MR perspective encourages public goods investment
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19. Thank you!
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20. References
• Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of
Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London, Profile Books.
• Bates, R. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political
Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley, University of California Press.
• DFID (2009). Political Economy Analysis How to Note. DFID Practice
Paper, Department for International Development, London,
www.odi.org.uk/events/2009/07/23/1929-dfid-note-political-economy-
analysis.pdf.
• Hopkin, J. (2006). Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political
Exchange and Democratic Theory. Paper prepared for APSA annual
meeting, Philadelphia, 31 August – 3 September 2006. [you can
Google this!]
• North, D., J. Wallis and B. Weingast (2009). Violence and the Rise of
Open-Access Orders. Journal of Democracy 20(1): 55-68.
• van de Walle, N. (2001). African Economies and the Politics of
Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. New York, Cambridge University Press.
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21. References II
Please see also:
• www.future-agricultures.org for numerous case studies
• A forthcoming special issue of Development Policy
Review entitled “Democratisation and the Political
Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa”. This will
feature papers on Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and
Rwanda, all of which will be freely downloadable
online.
• http://www.soas.ac.uk/courseunits/P527.html. This is
a fee-paying course! It is currently being revised for
2015 study and covers the material in this presentation
and much more.
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Accra
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22. Clientelism
• “the distribution of selective benefits to individuals
or clearly defined groups in exchange for political
support” (Hopkin 2006)
• A product of unequal social and political
relationships, and of excessive power being vested
in the executive
– those in power act as principals (patrons), not agents
• Competitive clientelism: parties or groups compete
to control the state in order to use its resources for
the benefit of themselves and their supporters
– Politics as an investment
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