Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Report

Francesca Hughes Disaster Management & Sustainable Development

Analyse one disaster using the
pressure and release model
Introduction
The Pressure and Release (PAR) model provides a framework for analysing disasters, in which
existing vulnerabilities within the affected population, rather than the intensity of the event itself,
lead to certain outcomes. The natural hazard is a trigger event, which exposes these
vulnerabilities and leads to some people suffering more than others. Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans provides a good example of this, where one group of people – primarily the poor, black
population – was more severely affected than another group – the better-off, white population.
There was much discussion in the media and public institutions about why the event played out
as it did, and the US government repeatedly stated that it was not abandoning citizens; but this
paper will argue that the effects of Hurricane Katrina were due to various causes and pressures,
which made certain sections of the population more vulnerable.

The PAR Model
There is growing literature showing that the impact of a disaster is a function of the event and
pre-existing conditions: the preparedness of government and individuals; emergency planning;
and the existing divisions and inequalities in society (Alexander, 2006). The Pressure and
Release model was formulated by Blaikie et al. (1994), and it states that a disaster occurs when
processes creating vulnerability meet with physical exposure to a hazard. The ‘release’ occurs
when vulnerability is reduced, thus reducing the extent of the disaster.

Factors affecting vulnerability include access to resources and wealth, risk perceptions,
community structure, and emergency management which organises warning, planning and
response (Masozera et al., 2007).

Blaikie et al. (1994) and many other authors (Cannon, 2005; Alexander, 2006; Cutter, 2006;
Lukes, 2006; Mulcahy, 2006; Masozera et al., 2007; Schuemer-Cross & Taylor, 2009) have
argued that vulnerability is determined by social conditions and historical circumstances; and
that these conditions creating unequal exposure are perhaps more important than the hazard
itself (Masozera et al., 2007). Cannon (2005) argues that understanding the effects of a natural
hazard can only occur through understanding everyday life before the trigger event.

Northumbria University 1


The general PAR model is shown in Figure 1. The historical circumstances and social
conditions that determine vulnerability are divided into root causes, dynamic pressures, and
unsafe conditions. Root causes are “well-established, widespread processes within a society
and world economy” (Blaikie et al., 1994:24): the political and economic ideologies, which affect
the allocation and distribution of resources, and reflect the distribution of power. Dynamic
pressures are “processes and activities that translate the effects of root causes into the
vulnerability of unsafe conditions” (Blaikie et al., 1994:24). This effectively concerns access to
resources and the scope of social protection measures. Class and race relations are important.
Unsafe conditions are “the specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed
in time and space in conjunction with a hazard” (Blaikie et al., 1994:26), such as poor quality
housing and the actions of public institutions.
Figure 1: Pressure and Release Model

Root causes Dynamic Unsafe
pressures conditions
Limited
access to: Lack of:
Fragile physical
Power Local institutions
environment: Hazard
structures Training
Dangerous locations
Appropriate skills
Resources Unprotected Earthquake
Local
buildings and
investments
infrastructure High winds
Ideologies: Local markets
Political Press freedom (cyclone/
Fragile local hurricane/
systems Ethical standards
economy: typhoon)
in public life
Economic Livelihoods at risk
Human rights Risk
systems Low income levels Flooding
standards and =
Gender accountability Vulnerable society: Hazard + Volcanic
relations
Special groups at Vulnerability eruption
Human rights Macro forces:
risk
regimes Rapid population
Lack of local Landslide
growth
institution
Rapid
Lack of rights based Drought
urbanisation
approaches
Arms
expenditure Virus and
Public actions: pests
Debt repayment
Lack of disaster
schedules
preparedness
Deforestation
Prevalence of
Decline in soil
endemic disease
productivity

Source: Blaikie et a l. (1994)



Hurricane Katrina
The PAR Model will be used to analyse Hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans in August
2005, as one set of physical conditions resulted in two different outcomes. This paper will argue
that this was a result of factors already present in everyday life, making one group of people
more vulnerable. Hurricane Katrina played out as two events: a hurricane followed by a flood.
What follows will show that the floods were exacerbated by human action, but first the problems
associated with coastal storms and floods will be briefly described, as considered by Blaikie et
al. (2004).

Hurricanes bring wind, rain, flooding and storm surges: there will likely be damage to housing,
roads, telecommunications and power facilities. Problems associated with flooding include
water and sewage damage, contamination through sewage, chemical and fuel leaks, and
garbage and debris. In developed countries, floods tend to cause few deaths but can cost up to
billions of dollars in damages. Floods are generally repetitive and are therefore known risks; so
protection should be possible, at least to a certain degree. Dams and levees provide some
protection, but can lead to a false sense of security (Blaikie et al., 2004:203-206).

Despite the risky nature of coastal areas, colonial expansion and global economics have led to
greater coastal populations all over the world. Flood-prone areas provide fertile land, and
therefore have been attractive to farming communities for years. Water was also, at one time,
the primary means of transportation for goods and people. Trading posts grew along
waterways; and communities, industry and commerce built up around these areas. People
migrated in to work, and so communities of families and friends developed and settled (Blaikie
et al., 2004:203-206). Nowadays many people in developed countries dream of retiring in the
sun, which in the USA often means hurricane-prone areas such as Florida and the Gulf coast
(Blaikie et al., 2004:246-249).

Hurricane Katrina was a category 4 hurricane that hit the Gulf coast of the USA at 5am on
Monday 29th August 2005. A 10-20 foot storm surge hit the coast and, in New Orleans, it
entered Lake Pontchartrain (Congleton, 2006). It affected an estimated 90,000 square miles
along the coast, displaced at least 400,000 people (Masozera et al., 2007:303), and there were
1,281 deaths (Wisner & Walker, 2005). Evacuation orders were issued in Alabama, Mississippi
and Louisiana. More than 1 million people evacuated New Orleans on 27th and 28th August, but
more than 70,000 people stayed (Landry et al., 2007:326-327). The hurricane brought wind,
rain and storm surge damage; but also damaged the levees, which slowly flooded 80% of the
city with up to 20 feet of water. Damage was estimated to cost at least $200 billion (Congleton,
2006).



This paper will examine the disaster by looking first to the root causes, then dynamic pressures,
and finally the unsafe conditions.

Root Causes
For New Orleans, factors such as its geographical situation and elevation, political and
economic ideology, and historical racism are root causes of the disaster.

1. Geographical Situation, Environmental Change and Experience of
Hurricanes
New Orleans is situated in southern Louisiana, sandwiched between the Mississippi River to the
south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north (shown in Figure 2). Its location at the intersection of
3 navigable water bodies meant it became an important trading post. The city was built on the
lowest elevation of the state, but the oldest parts of the city are on the highest ground in the
bayou (Cutter, 2006). As commerce increased, so did the size of New Orleans: by 1860 the
population was almost 170,000 (Congleton, 2006:8). Growth of the city was inevitable due to its
importance, and as the city expanded, lower elevations were settled. In 2002, the population
was almost 500,000.
Figure 2: Map of New Orleans

Source: http://www.discoverneworlean s.com/maps/l ouisi ana.htm l



In 2005 much of the city was below sea level –as much as 3 metres below – and protected by
levees. Figure 3 shows a cross section of the city; and Figure 4 shows areas furthest below sea
level in pink and lilac, and levees as bright pink lines. A side effect of the levees is a reduced
elevation of the city (Congleton, 2006): it is sinking in a bowl-shape, so drainage is an issue in
times of high rainfall (Cutter, 2006).
Figure 3: New Orleans Ground Elevation

Source: http://en.wikipe di a.org/wiki/File:New_ Orleans_Elevations.jpg

Figure 4: New Orleans Elevation Map

Source: http://en.wikipe di a.org/wiki/File: Msyelevst.jpg



New Orleans has been struck by several hurricanes in the last century: Betsy in 1965, Camille
in 1969, and Katrina in 2005 (Masozera et al., 2007:301). Many of the older residents
remember previous, intense hurricanes.

2. Political and Economic Ideology
The political ideology in the USA is one of neoliberalism and meritocracy, where everyone is
seen to have the same chance of success; so poverty must be the result of a lack of hard work
and ambition, as opposed to unequal opportunities or access to resources. This leads privileged
people – usually white – to ignore their advantages. These privileges are a result of history,
oppression, and government assistance; and structural inequality continues today through
policy choices (Sweeney, 2006).

The individualistic political ideology, together with a free-market economic ideology, leads to the
promotion of private interests and unequal distribution of power and resources. In New Orleans,
lax environmental laws and land use regulations are adopted to attract industries such as petro-
chemical, tourism and retirement development; as the fishing industry declines due to
overfishing and pollution (Wisner, 2005).

3. Racism
The historical discrimination of blacks through slavery and overt racism has produced
disparities in today’s society (Henkel et al., 2006). Southern USA is characterised by deep and
complex racial and class relations. Policies to improve rights and conditions for former slaves
were particularly resisted in the southern states, and presidents made allowances for racial
inequality to win political support (Strolovitch et al., 2006). Relatively few people have migrated
into New Orleans in recent decades, so these relations have hardened over time and are quite
unique (Elliott & Pais, 2006:297).

Contemporary racism has been institutionalised, so that policies, either intentionally or
unintentionally, “unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people” .(Henkel et al.,
2006:101). It is believed that liberal, well-educated whites are ‘aversive racists’: they support
racial equality but also harbour – possibly unconsciously – negative feelings about blacks. It
often leads to more positive attitudes towards whites rather than harm to blacks, but it was
stated in the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968 that this
has led in part to their disadvantaged status (Henkel et al., 2006:102-104).

Dynamic Pressures
New Orleans is in a precarious situation simply because of its geographical location, settled due
to its trading opportunities. Coupled with the southern history of slavery and racism, and



individualistic economic and political ideologies, everyday life becomes one of inequality,
division and differentiated vulnerability.

1. Income, Wealth and Class Relations
Considering the nation as a whole, the southern states of Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi
are historically subordinate (Elliott & Pais, 2006:296). Many of the 37 million people in poverty in
the USA are in the south (Wisner, 2005). Inequality increases as governments reduce taxes for
the richest 1% and also reduce funding for social programmes in education, health, and
emergency management; while increasing military and security spending. Republican
governments have restructured the state so that the needs of poor people are not considered or
cared about. In accordance with the political ideology, the system is concerned only with
securing the private interests of the wealthiest (Goldberg, 2006).

New Orleans is a city with high poverty, low-paid jobs (Masozera et al., 2007), violence and
gang warfare (Alexander, 2006). Prior to Katrina, the poverty rate was twice the national
average. The median per capita income was $19,711, compared to the national average of
$24,020; and 38% of under-18s lived below the poverty level, compared to the state average of
30%. Class and race are closely tied. Those in poverty tend to be black: 84% of those in
poverty were African-American. Ethnic minorities made up 72% of the population prior to
Katrina, compared to the state average of 36.1% (Masozera et al., 2007:301-302).

2. Race Relations
Social scientists have been trying to draw attention to racialised poverty in the USA for a long
time. It is a result of political decisions since slavery, and has not been a presidential campaign
issue for almost 40 years (Strolovitch et al., 2006). The legacy of slavery and continued
exclusion and segregation has created racial disparities in wealth, and drives those with the
least resources into risky areas (Henkel et al., 2006; Molotch, 2006). Vast racial inequalities in
southern USA play out in terms of education, residential segregation, job segregation, lower
wages, and unequal distributions of wealth (Sweeney, 2006:164).

Federal policies have trapped low income black families in poverty, as less funds are available
for education, small businesses, and decent low-cost housing (Wisner, 2005). Discriminatory
policies and practices have led to a distrust of whites, government, other authorities and
policies; and also to blacks occupying more environmentally-vulnerable areas. In 1994, median
family income for blacks was $20,508, compared to $33,600 for whites, and income was 62%
that of whites. Net worth of blacks was only $6,723, 12% of whites’ $52,944. They have more
difficulty finding jobs and tend to be over-represented in jobs with shift work, long hours and



poor job security. Blacks are denied loans more often that whites, which has contributed to
residential segregation (Henkel et al., 2006).

New Orleans also has a history of racial tension, which increased in the months before Katrina:
three white bouncers suffocated a black man during New Year celebrations in January 2005,
followed a month later by a black teenager being shot by Jefferson County police with over 100
bullets (Henkel et al., 2006:112). This is further exposed in comments in the aftermath of
Katrina, about whites ‘finding’ food while blacks were ‘looting’ (Sweeney, 2006:161). A doctor
stranded in a hotel spoke to one newspaper and reported raiding a pharmacy under police
escort, while “looters had to be held back at gun point” (Charatan, 2005:531), apparently seeing
a difference between himself and the ‘looters’.

3. Scope of Social Protection
The neoliberal, meritocratic political ideology outlined previously has led to a ‘small state’ in the
USA, without everyday social protection such as public transport, public health or affordable
housing policies (Wisner & Walker, 2005).

Emergency protection can be broken down into prevention and mitigation, warning, and
response. Prevention measures designed to protect the Gulf Coast were considered too
expensive to implement (Atkins, 2005). New levees were estimated to cost $2.5 billion and
would take many years to complete (Congleton, 2006:12). Wetland improvement and offshore
artificial barrier island programmes were not funded (Wisner & Walker, 2005). Two modelling
scenarios had been considered: a hurricane and storm surge, or a levee failure due to a
hurricane (Cutter, 2006). However these focused on probabilistic scenarios rather than worst-
case scenarios (Clarke, 2006), and calls for plans for the poorest residents fell on deaf ears
(Wisner, 2005).

Elections are always a consideration in the USA: current officials shy away from costly, long-
term proposals that would benefit future government and leave few resources for the short-term
(Congleton, 2006:15). Despite the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration warning
that the 2005 hurricane season could be one of the most active on record (Clarke, 2006), few
steps were taken at the local, state or federal level (Congleton, 2006:12). Evacuation plans
should have been a priority for all levels after the near-miss of Hurricane Ivan in 2004 (Murray,
2005), but the potential threat to the population of the Gulf Coast was not a priority. The federal
government made huge cuts in hurricane and flood control funding, preventing necessary work
from being completed (Duenas, 2005).



The official evacuation plan was for citizens to pack up and leave (Congleton, 2006:15).
Although residents knew evacuation plans and help from the city would not be enough, they
were not given alternatives (Alexander, 2006). During the summer of 2005, local officials were
putting together DVDs, essentially telling residents that they would be on their own in the event
of a major hurricane because the city did not have the resources to evacuate residents (Nolan,
2005).

At the national level, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was concerned with
disaster prevention under James Lee Witt (Alexander, 2006), but in 2003 FEMA was absorbed
into the newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It was weakened by this: focus
shifted to counter-terrorism after 9/11, and natural hazards became second-order concerns
(Holdeman, 2005). Some senior staff left (Wisner & Walker, 2005), and 75% of the
‘preparedness grants’ were redirected towards counter-terrorism (Schneider, 2005:516). Five of
the top 8 officials had little experience in managing disasters (Lukes, 2006).

The vulnerability of the citizens was increased prior to Katrina by development decisions in New
Orleans, and the actions and inactions of the US Army Corps of Engineers (Murray, 2005).
FEMA used to encourage states and cities to prepare for disasters: its changing role was a
crucial factor in the local, state and federal response to Katrina (Alexander, 2006).

4. Human-made Environmental Changes
Wisner & Walker (2005) stated that the effects of Katrina were accentuated by human-made
changes to the local environment. This began when human interference affected ‘delta
switching’ about 100 years ago. The Mississippi River has been delta switching for over 7000
years, to find a shorter route to the sea. It abandons its main channel roughly every 1,000 years
(Heerden, 2007). This resulted in a net gain of land of approximately 3 km2 per year, prior to
human intervention. Enhanced river navigation became a national interest in the 19th century,
and by 1851, levees were extending for up to 20 miles (Heerden, 2007:25). Floods often
breached early levees. Flood control became a federal issue in 1879 for the Army Corps of
Engineers, under the authority of the Mississippi River Commission (Congleton, 2006:9). Over
the years construction has practically eliminated overland flooding, and terminated natural
wetland accretion.

Coastal wetlands are being destroyed by the activities of petro-chemical industries, tourism-
driven developments and the building of retirement homes. This is driven by the political and
economic environment, promoting private interest with little concern for social and
environmental consequences (Wisner, 2005). One mile of coastal wetland can reduce a storm
surge by 1 foot: 1,000 square miles have been lost along the Louisiana coast in the past 50



years (Wisner & Walker, 2005). Oil and gas exploration in the 20th century led to the dredging of
“thousands of miles of access canals, pipeline canals, and navigation channels” (Heerden,
2007:25), disrupting the natural wetland hydrology, and increasing the risk of flooding in the city
(Congleton, 2006:11).

Unsafe Conditions
These dynamic pressures led to unsafe conditions that some of the population lived in prior to
Katrina, making them more vulnerable to the effects of the natural hazard. Blaikie et al. (1994)
considered unsafe conditions in terms of limited self-protection and social protection.

1. Self-protection
Available choices differ depending on income and residence. Many who ‘chose’ to stay in New
Orleans had no transport, did not think their property would be protected, and did not have
insurance (Atkins, 2005). According to the census in 2000, 54% of poor households, and 65%
of poor elderly households, did not have their own transportation, which would make it more
difficult to evacuate and therefore increase their vulnerability. 35% of black households and
59% of poor black households, and 15% of white non-Hispanic households did not have private
transportation (Sherman & Shapiro, 2005:2). Lower socioeconomic status and poor access to
better-paid work meant blacks especially could not buy a vehicle, which would have helped
them evacuate, and they also lacked the means to pay for a hotel room (Henkel et al.,
2006:108). Other people who might require help to evacuate include elderly and special needs
populations, homeless people, transients and tourists (Cutter, 2006).

As well as access to private transport, class and racial division also affected where people lived,
including population density and quality of land and housing. In New Orleans in 2005, 70% of
the population lived on 36% of the land, at or below sea level, and much of this was flooded
(Heerden, 2007:24). Public housing largely occupied by blacks was on lower, more flood-prone
land. Middle income blacks living in New Orleans East bought affordable homes built on slabs,
up to 4 foot below sea level. Lower Ninth Ward was home to multi-generational black families,
close to an industrial canal, and had been devastated by Hurricane Betsy (Henkel et al.,
2006:108). In areas that experienced the most damage, a large proportion of the population
were poor (Masozera et al., 2007:303).

Blacks were less inclined to evacuate before the storm, most believing the storm would not be
as devastating as it was, due to previous experience (Elliott & Pais, 2006:113). Older people
had already survived several other hurricanes: why should this one be any different? Deep-
rooted feelings of distrust of government, which existed due to past policies, probably
contributed to decisions not to evacuate (Henkel et al., 2006:113).



Limited self-protection, through access to transport, existing assets, and quality of housing, was
influential for many of those who remained. Perceived risk was another deciding factor.

2. Social protection
Social protection in New Orleans is generally focused around the levees and Hurricane
Protection System (HPS), weather warnings, evacuation orders, and the local, state and federal
response.

Katrina was expected in the sense that a major hurricane is always a risk in New Orleans due to
its location. The weather service did a good job of tracking Katrina (Scanlon, 2006). However,
mandatory evacuation orders for the most vulnerable areas, mostly inhabited by blacks, were
delayed until 19 hours before landfall, despite 56 hours warning. Evacuation became impossible
for many people once the severity of the hurricane became clear (Henkel et al., 2006).
Prediction and warning became disengaged: scientific information was not translated into public
action (Alexander, 2006).

The federal government declared an emergency, but residents were on their own in terms of
evacuation (Duenas, 2005). The evacuation announcement led to many people leaving the city,
but others considered the message less urgent due to the shelters within the city (Scanlon,
2006). The census in 2000 registered many people who would require help, including 102,000
residents with a disability, and people over 65 who accounted for 12% of the population (Wisner
& Walker, 2005), but there were no plans to use buses, trains or planes to evacuate those
without private transport (Wisner, 2005).

More than half of the 3,560 miles of levee system was breached or destroyed. The
effectiveness of the HPS is diminished because it is designed on antiquated assumptions and
policies. The Army Corps of Engineers was aware of vulnerabilities, but seemed uninterested in
making improvements. Engineering errors and political decisions left New Orleans with a sub-
standard levee system (Heerden, 2007).

The breakdown of administrative elements in emergency management played a role in the
major problems of Katrina, at the local, state and federal levels (Schneider, 2005). The
Governor was reluctant to give up her authority, but she did ask for federal help before the
levees were breached (Lukes, 2006). FEMA waited until they were called on by local and state
governments with specific requests rather than initiating relief efforts (Clarke, 2006). Federal
agencies blamed local and state government for vague requests (Molotch, 2006). FEMA trained
firefighters in community relations for days before sending them into New Orleans, stopped



trucks carrying bottled water, and refused other aid (Lukes, 2006). The inability of public
agencies to assist disaster victims led to a breakdown of social order (Schneider, 2005:515).

Those who were stranded broke into stores for supplies in their desperation. The Mayor and
Governor prioritised law and order, to stop widespread looting and violence (Duenas, 2005).
The Superdome and Convention Centre were used to house people who were not able to
evacuate, but there was no electricity, toilets or water. Hygiene standards were below the
minimum Sphere standards (Wisner, 2005). People were turned away from the Superdome by
armed guards when capacity was reached (Congleton, 2006:18). The National Guard was sent
in on 31st August, but food and water was not sent until 2nd September (Charatan, 2005). Media
reports about violence and crime were exaggerated, but served to aggravate relations when the
troops arrived (Wisner & Walker, 2005).

Those who were unable to self-protect were not adequately assisted by authorities (Schuemer-
Cross & Taylor, 2009:47): they were “left to sink or swim” (Younge, 2005). However there was
some good practice: the coastguard rescued twice as many people in the aftermath than it had
over the previous 50 years (Wachtendorf & Kendra, 2006).

Summary
Poor self-protection resulted from limited access to resources and assets, which is a result of
political and economic systems that promote inequality and private gain, as well as the history
of racism and discrimination. Poor social protection was a result of the inability and
incompetence of public institutions, both before the disaster (the inadequacy of the levees and
proper planning) and in the aftermath (the slow, uncoordinated response). These were results
of the political and economic systems, which did not prioritise social protection. Wetland
destruction also worsened the effects of the hurricane, and again, this occurred as private
interests were promoted over social interests in the free market, neoliberal environment.
Flooding affected neighbourhoods regardless of income or race, but lower socio-economic
groups were made vulnerable by a lack of revenue, resources and political will; together with
the free-market ideology, destruction of wetlands, and reliance on the levees (Alexander, 2006).

Release
Socio-economic status is also important in recovery, due to insurance, savings, more secure
employment and income (Mulcahy, 2006; Masozera et al., 2007). In order to prevent another
similar disaster, the area requires proper disaster planning and an effective evacuation plan, as
well as the re-establishment of barrier islands and wetlands, and the construction of good
quality housing for all. Class and racial divisions need to be managed, and social protection



needs to become a priority. The future does not look good. Henkel (2006) stated that
predominantly white communities were able to ‘look and leave’ much sooner than black
communities, and bulldozing was commissioned before informing residents. Institutional actions
in the recovery phase have further fuelled racial divisions and distrust. Low income and poor
credit have led to 82% of 276,000 loan applications to the Small Business Administration (SBA)
being rejected. Alternative grants from FEMA are less than a quarter of that available from SBA
(Goldberg, 2006:91). Meanwhile, the wealthy, powerful, white elite are determined to rebuild the
city with fewer poor people and therefore fewer blacks. The root causes have not changed, so
the continued unequal distribution of power and resources will lead to the promotion of the
interests of oil and shipping firms and tourism developers (Marcuse, 2006).

Conclusion
In considering whether the factors leading to vulnerabilities were more important than the
natural hazard itself, it can be concluded that this was very much the case in New Orleans.
Media attention initially focused on the strength of the storm, individual action and poor disaster
management. As the social reality of New Orleans became better known, more focus was
placed on management. Self-protection was limited and social protection failed: there was little
preparedness, no evacuation plan for the poorest, and the failure of levees that were never built
to standard anyway. But these issues were a result of bigger factors, which academic writers
and better journalism drew attention to: the class and race divisions present in American society
and especially New Orleans; human-made environmental change as a result of private
interests; and the focus and scope of government and disaster management approaches. It has
been argued that these were the results of the economic and political ideologies of the USA,
and history of slavery.

Katrina exposed disparities that were the result of underlying power structures and inequalities
with historical and institutional roots (Strolovitch et al., 2006). Disasters reflect neglect by elites
and poor governance, which leads to fragile livelihoods (Wisner & Gaillard, 2009). If
vulnerability is to be reduced, disaster management policy must focus on improving social
conditions: improving these fragile livelihoods (Cutter, 2006; Masozera et al., 2007). It is
possible that in a society more concerned with social and environmental matters, that the
outcome would have been quite different. In Cuba’s disaster management, a high priority is
assigned to human life and collective action. There is a four-phase plan: the public is informed
that a hurricane is likely to strike two days ahead, and a day later they are told to prepare for
evacuation. The third phase is telling the public that a hurricane has struck; and immediately all
vehicles are prepared to evacuate people. All in a country with scarce fuel and poor road
conditions (Sims & Vogelmann, 2002).



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