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Using the Web or another research tool, search for alternative means of defending against either
general DoS attacks or a particular type of DoS attack. This can be any defense other than the
ones already mentioned. Write one-page summary regarding the defense technique.
Solution
The most common DoS attacks target the
computer networks bandwidth or connectivity.
Bandwidth attacks flood the network with such a
high volume of traffic that all available network
resources are consumed and legitimate user requests
cannot get through, resulting in degraded
productivity. Connectivity attacks flood a computer
with such a high volume of connection requests,
that all available operating system
resources are consumed, and the computer can no
longer process legitimate user requests.
DoS attacks can be classified into five categories
based on the attacked protocol level, as illustrated
Douligeris, A. Mitrokotsa / Computer Networks 44 (2004) 643–666
DoS attacks in the Network Device Level include
attacks that might be caused either by taking
advantage of bugs or weaknesses in software, or
by trying to exhaust the hardware resources of
network devices. One example of a network device
exploit is the one that is caused by a buffer overrun
error in the password checking routine. Using
these exploits certain Cisco 7xx routers could be
crashed by connecting to the routers via telnet and
entering extremely long passwords.
In the OS level DoS attacks take advantage of
the ways operating systems implement protocols.
One example of this category of DoS attacks is the
Ping of Death attack . In this attack, ICMP
echo requests having total data sizes greater than
the maximum IP standard size are sent to the
targeted victim. This attack often has the effect of
crashing the victims machine.
Application-based attacks try to settle a machine
or a service out of order either by taking advantage
of specific bugs in network applications that
are running on the target host or by using such
applications to drain the resources of their victim.
It is also possible that the attacker may have found
points of high algorithmic complexity and exploits
them in order to consume all available resources
on a remote host. One example of an applicationbased
attack is the finger bomb . A malicious
user could cause the finger routine to be recursively
executed on the hostname, potentially
exhausting the resources of the host.
In data flooding attacks, an attacker attempts to
use the bandwidth available to a network, host or
device at its greatest extent, by sending massive
quantities of data and so causing it to process
extremely large amounts of data. An attacker
could attempt to use up the available bandwidth of
a network by simply bombarding the targeted
victim with normal, but meaningless packets with
spoofed source addresses. An example is flood
pinging. Simple flooding is commonly seen in the
form of DDoS attacks, which will be discussed
later.
DoS attacks based on protocol features take
advantage of certain standard protocol features.
For example several attacks exploit the fact that IP
source addresses can be spoofed. Several types of
DoS attacks have focused on DNS, and many of
these involve attacking DNS cache on name servers.
An attacker who owns a name server may
coerce a victim name server into caching false records
by querying the victim about the attackers
own site. A vulnerable victim name server would
then refer to the rogue server and cache the answer
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have raised the importance of protecting availability as an
aspect of security
context, rather than (as previously) only addressing confidentiality and integrity. Attackers use
DoS in many
different ways, including extortion threats, obfuscation (to hide data exfiltration), hacktivism (to
draw attention
to a particular cause), and even friendly fire (when a promotion goes a little too well).
Now let’s look at the types of DoS attacks you may face – attackers have many arrows in their
quivers, and
use them all depending on their objectives and targets.
Flooding the Pipes
The first kind of Denial of Service attack is really a blunt
force object. It’s basically about trying to oversaturate the
bandwidth and computing resources of network (and
increasingly server) devices to impair resource availability.
These attacks aren’t very sophisticated, but as evidenced
by the ongoing popularity of volume-based attacks, they
are effective. The tactics have been in use since before
the Internet bubble, leveraging largely the same approach,
but they have gotten easier with bots to do the heavy
lifting. Of course this kind of blasting must be done
somewhat carefully to maintain the usefulness of the bot,
so bot masters have developed sophisticated approaches
to ensure their bots avoid ISPs penalty boxes. So we see
limited bursts of traffic from each bot and IP address
spoofing to make it harder to track down where the traffic
is coming from, but even short bursts from 100,000+ bots
can flood most pipes.
Quite a few specific techniques have been developed for volumetric attacks, but most look like
some kind of
flood. Floods target specific protocols (SYN, ICMP, UDP, etc.), and work by sending requests
to a target
using the chosen protocol, but not acknowledging the response. This quickly exhausts the ability
of these
devices to maintain state and causes the target to fail. Attackers need to stay ahead of Moore’s
Law,
because targets’ ability to handle floods has improved with their processing power. So network-
based
attacks may include encrypted traffic, forcing the target to devote additional computational
resources to
decrypting massive amounts of SSL traffic. Given the resource-intensive nature of encryption,
this type of
A volumetric attack is really
a blunt force object. It’s
basically about trying to
oversaturate the bandwidth
and computing resources of
network (and increasingly
server) devices to impair
resource availability.
Securosis — Defending Against Denial of Service Attacks 10
attack can melt firewalls, IPS, and WAF devices unless they are configured specifically for
large-scale SSL
termination (which they are typically not). We also see some malformed protocol attacks but
these aren’t as
effective nowadays because even unsophisticated network security perimeter devices drop bad
packets at
wire speed.
The attackers have compounded the severity of the attack using tactics like DNS amplification
and reflection.
In a reflection attack at the same time they target your site with a variety of floods, they are also
spoofing
your IP address and sending traffic to thousands of other sites. Those sites reply to your IP
address to
establish the session, and further increase the traffic hitting your site. Likewise, the attackers can
also send a
simple DNS request (using your spoofed IP address) to an open DNS resolver, which results in
upwards of
50:1 amplification of the traffic directed to you via the response. Again, these aren’t very
sophisticated
techniques, but can be very effective in magnifying the impact of the network-based attack.
These volume-based attacks are climbing the stack as well, targeting web servers by actually
completing
connection requests and then making simple GET requests and resetting the connection, over
and over
again, with approximately the same impact as a volumetric attack – overconsumption of
resources effectively
knocking down servers. These attacks may also include a large payload to further consume
bandwidth. The
now famous Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), a favorite tool of the hacktivist crowd, has
undertaken a similar
evolution, first targeting network resources and now proceeding to target web servers as well. It
gets even
better – these attacks can be magnified to increase their impact by simultaneously spoofing the
target’s IP
address and requesting sessions from thousands of other sites, which then bury the target in a
deluge of
misdirected replies, further consuming bandwidth and resources.
Fortunately defending against these network-based tactics isn’t overly complicated, as we will
discuss later
in this paper, but without a sufficiently large network device at the perimeter to block these
attacks or an
upstream service provider/traffic scrubber to dump offending traffic, devices tend to fall over in
short order.

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Using the Web or another research tool, search for alternative means.pdf

  • 1. Using the Web or another research tool, search for alternative means of defending against either general DoS attacks or a particular type of DoS attack. This can be any defense other than the ones already mentioned. Write one-page summary regarding the defense technique. Solution The most common DoS attacks target the computer networks bandwidth or connectivity. Bandwidth attacks flood the network with such a high volume of traffic that all available network resources are consumed and legitimate user requests cannot get through, resulting in degraded productivity. Connectivity attacks flood a computer with such a high volume of connection requests, that all available operating system resources are consumed, and the computer can no longer process legitimate user requests. DoS attacks can be classified into five categories based on the attacked protocol level, as illustrated Douligeris, A. Mitrokotsa / Computer Networks 44 (2004) 643–666 DoS attacks in the Network Device Level include attacks that might be caused either by taking advantage of bugs or weaknesses in software, or by trying to exhaust the hardware resources of network devices. One example of a network device exploit is the one that is caused by a buffer overrun error in the password checking routine. Using these exploits certain Cisco 7xx routers could be crashed by connecting to the routers via telnet and entering extremely long passwords. In the OS level DoS attacks take advantage of the ways operating systems implement protocols. One example of this category of DoS attacks is the Ping of Death attack . In this attack, ICMP
  • 2. echo requests having total data sizes greater than the maximum IP standard size are sent to the targeted victim. This attack often has the effect of crashing the victims machine. Application-based attacks try to settle a machine or a service out of order either by taking advantage of specific bugs in network applications that are running on the target host or by using such applications to drain the resources of their victim. It is also possible that the attacker may have found points of high algorithmic complexity and exploits them in order to consume all available resources on a remote host. One example of an applicationbased attack is the finger bomb . A malicious user could cause the finger routine to be recursively executed on the hostname, potentially exhausting the resources of the host. In data flooding attacks, an attacker attempts to use the bandwidth available to a network, host or device at its greatest extent, by sending massive quantities of data and so causing it to process extremely large amounts of data. An attacker could attempt to use up the available bandwidth of a network by simply bombarding the targeted victim with normal, but meaningless packets with spoofed source addresses. An example is flood pinging. Simple flooding is commonly seen in the form of DDoS attacks, which will be discussed later. DoS attacks based on protocol features take advantage of certain standard protocol features. For example several attacks exploit the fact that IP source addresses can be spoofed. Several types of DoS attacks have focused on DNS, and many of these involve attacking DNS cache on name servers. An attacker who owns a name server may
  • 3. coerce a victim name server into caching false records by querying the victim about the attackers own site. A vulnerable victim name server would then refer to the rogue server and cache the answer Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have raised the importance of protecting availability as an aspect of security context, rather than (as previously) only addressing confidentiality and integrity. Attackers use DoS in many different ways, including extortion threats, obfuscation (to hide data exfiltration), hacktivism (to draw attention to a particular cause), and even friendly fire (when a promotion goes a little too well). Now let’s look at the types of DoS attacks you may face – attackers have many arrows in their quivers, and use them all depending on their objectives and targets. Flooding the Pipes The first kind of Denial of Service attack is really a blunt force object. It’s basically about trying to oversaturate the bandwidth and computing resources of network (and increasingly server) devices to impair resource availability. These attacks aren’t very sophisticated, but as evidenced by the ongoing popularity of volume-based attacks, they are effective. The tactics have been in use since before the Internet bubble, leveraging largely the same approach, but they have gotten easier with bots to do the heavy lifting. Of course this kind of blasting must be done somewhat carefully to maintain the usefulness of the bot, so bot masters have developed sophisticated approaches to ensure their bots avoid ISPs penalty boxes. So we see limited bursts of traffic from each bot and IP address spoofing to make it harder to track down where the traffic is coming from, but even short bursts from 100,000+ bots can flood most pipes. Quite a few specific techniques have been developed for volumetric attacks, but most look like some kind of flood. Floods target specific protocols (SYN, ICMP, UDP, etc.), and work by sending requests
  • 4. to a target using the chosen protocol, but not acknowledging the response. This quickly exhausts the ability of these devices to maintain state and causes the target to fail. Attackers need to stay ahead of Moore’s Law, because targets’ ability to handle floods has improved with their processing power. So network- based attacks may include encrypted traffic, forcing the target to devote additional computational resources to decrypting massive amounts of SSL traffic. Given the resource-intensive nature of encryption, this type of A volumetric attack is really a blunt force object. It’s basically about trying to oversaturate the bandwidth and computing resources of network (and increasingly server) devices to impair resource availability. Securosis — Defending Against Denial of Service Attacks 10 attack can melt firewalls, IPS, and WAF devices unless they are configured specifically for large-scale SSL termination (which they are typically not). We also see some malformed protocol attacks but these aren’t as effective nowadays because even unsophisticated network security perimeter devices drop bad packets at wire speed. The attackers have compounded the severity of the attack using tactics like DNS amplification and reflection. In a reflection attack at the same time they target your site with a variety of floods, they are also spoofing your IP address and sending traffic to thousands of other sites. Those sites reply to your IP address to establish the session, and further increase the traffic hitting your site. Likewise, the attackers can also send a simple DNS request (using your spoofed IP address) to an open DNS resolver, which results in
  • 5. upwards of 50:1 amplification of the traffic directed to you via the response. Again, these aren’t very sophisticated techniques, but can be very effective in magnifying the impact of the network-based attack. These volume-based attacks are climbing the stack as well, targeting web servers by actually completing connection requests and then making simple GET requests and resetting the connection, over and over again, with approximately the same impact as a volumetric attack – overconsumption of resources effectively knocking down servers. These attacks may also include a large payload to further consume bandwidth. The now famous Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), a favorite tool of the hacktivist crowd, has undertaken a similar evolution, first targeting network resources and now proceeding to target web servers as well. It gets even better – these attacks can be magnified to increase their impact by simultaneously spoofing the target’s IP address and requesting sessions from thousands of other sites, which then bury the target in a deluge of misdirected replies, further consuming bandwidth and resources. Fortunately defending against these network-based tactics isn’t overly complicated, as we will discuss later in this paper, but without a sufficiently large network device at the perimeter to block these attacks or an upstream service provider/traffic scrubber to dump offending traffic, devices tend to fall over in short order.