Cairo, May 10, 2015
Ishac Diwan's -Paris Sciences et Lettres and ERF- presentation at the ERF's training workshop on ‘Measurements and Analysis of Opinion Poll Data’
1. Demand for democracy in Arab countries
Mohamad Al-Ississ
The American University in Cairo
Ishac Diwan
Paris School of Economics
2. AGENDA
• Review of the literature
• Defining demand for democracy
• 2 hypotheses
• Conclusion on Arab exceptionalism: the results of essentialist
or policies
3. ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM…
VALUES BASED DEFICIT?
• Support for Arab democratic deficit mainly supported in cross country comparisons
– Arab or a Muslim effect (Barro 1999 vs Stepan and Robertson 2003, 2004),
– oil effect (Ross 2001),
– or conflict zone effect (El Badawi and Makdissi, 2013)
– Noland – an Arab, not Muslim effect
• We ask: Is there a gap at the individual cultural values level….?
• Little work looked at Muslim and Arab individual values directly
– Fish (2002) Muslim deficit can be explained by the subordination of women
– No democratic deficit connected to being Muslim,
• whether compared to individuals of other religions in heterogeneous
societies (Hoffman 2011),
• or individuals of various levels of piety are compared in Muslim majority
countries (Tessler 2002, 2005),
• or compared to individuals in other societies (Norris and Inglhart, 2004).
4. We reopen the debate using
the WVS6 UNIQUE DATASET ENABLES UNPRECENTED
LOOK
• The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural
and political change
• Conducted by social scientist at leading global universities
• Surveyed the basic values and beliefs of the publics of over 100
societies, on all six inhabited continents since 1981
• This study pools the results of waves 5 and 6
• 194 thousand subjects in 88 countries
• 25 thousand are Arab in 13 countries in wave 6, 4 in wave 5
• Adequate sample size per country ( 1-3 thousand)
Waves Years
1 1981-1984
2 1989-1993
3 1994-1998
4 1999-2004
5 2005-2008
6 2010-2013
• Enables us to properly evaluate democratic values of Arabs in a way that was not possible before
• Gallup data does not include a good measure of democratic aspirations,
• PEW does not have a detailed list of the respondents’ characteristics,
• the Arab Barometer, rich as it is, does not allow for comparisons with the rest of the world.
5. ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM ?
Democratic index – PolityIV
MRT
YEM
DJI
SDN MAREGY
JOR
DZA
IRQ
LBN
LBY
OMN
BHRSAU
ARE
KWT
QAT
MWIBDI
CAF
NERLBR
MDG
GMB
ETH
GIN
ERI
GNB
UGA
MOZ
TGO
RWA
SLE
BFA
NPL
TZA
MLI
BEN
COM
HTI
ZWEBGD
KHM
TJK
SEN
TCD
LSO
KEN
KGZPAK
CMR
IND
CIV
LAO
ZMB
NIC
GHA
UZB
VNM
SLB
PNG
MDA
HND
BTN
PHL
BOL
NGA
SWZ
LKA
IDNGTM
ARM
GEO
GUY
CPV
SLV
UKR
MNG
PRY
FJI
ALB
IRN
MKDJAM
NAM
THA
AGO
DOM
ECU
ZAFPER
CHN
BWA
BGR
BLRAZE
COL
TKM
MUS
ROM
SUR
CRI
MEX
MYS
TURPAN
BRA
GAB
HUN
HRV
KAZ
POL
VENRUS
ARGLVA
LTUCHLURYSVKTTO
EST
CZE
GNQ
TWNPRTGRCSVNCYP
KOR
ESPITAISRJPNNZLGBR
FRA
DEU
BEL
FINIRLAUTNLDCANUSA
SGP
DNKSWEAUSCHENORLUX
-10
-5
05
10
Polity
4 6 8 10 12
lngdppc
Autocratic
Democratic
7. Measuring PfD
• Straight questions: “do you like democracy”
• Gap1. democratic gap (Norris 2010): democratic aspirations (“how
important is it for you to live in a country that is democratically
governed?”), minus reality (“how democratically is your country being
governed today?”).
• Gap2: (Inglehart 2005) democratic aspirations minus preference for
autocracy (“as a way of governing your country, what do you think of
having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and
elections”).
• Our measure: “preference for democracy” (PfD), uses 3 questions that ask
to rank in 3 separate menus, values connected democratic environments
(“people have more say in how things are done”, “giving people more say
in important government decisions”, “protecting freedom of speech,
progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society”) and to
rule and order (but not openly tyrannical) environments (“making sure the
country has strong defense forces”, “maintaining order in the nation”, “the
fight against crime”).
8. EXISTING INDICATORS OF DEMOCRATIC
PREFERENCES….ARE PROBLEMATIC
How important is it
for you to live in a
country that is
democratically
governed?
How democratically is
your country being
governed today
How important is it for
you to live in a country
that is democratically
governed?
As a way of governing
your country, what do
you think of having a
strong leader who does
not have to bother with
parliament and election
GAP1 (Norris)
GAP2 (Inglehart)
Democratic Gap
Democratic Gap
Democratic Aspirations Status Quo
AutocracyDemocratic Aspirations
Unconstrained or too constrained
Noisy (relies on one question)
9. WHICH ONE OF THESE YOU, YOURSELF, CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT AND
WHICH WOULD BE THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT?
Democracy
Protecting freedom of
speech
People have more say
about how things
Progress toward a less
impersonal and more
humane society
Giving People more
say in important
government decisions
Strong Rule
& Security
Maintaining
order in the
nation
Making sure this
country has
strong defense
forces
The fight against
crime
V.S.
•Rank-based PfD
vs Security
•Higher PfD
values indicate a
stronger
preference for
democracy
•Includes values
connected to
democratic
environments
WE CONSTRUCT NEW RANK BASED
CONSTRAINED MEASURE FOR PfD
11. Regression technique
• Demographics different -> control for individual characteristics
• Countries level of development different -> control for GDP/capita
(more controls?)
• Individual characteristics controls
– Age. Continuous variable 15-99
– Education. Aggregate into 3 levels
– Piety. Use question on whether religion is an essential quality for kids
– female
• Should be using Logit: Use OLS for simplicity of interpretation
• Used standardized forms for all variables: x
• Do factor analysis on indexes
12. MODEL SPECIFICATION
PfD = A + B + C +
Describes individual
characteristics (age,
education, gender, faith,
income, self-expression)
Describes the Arab world
in various ways (a dummy
for all Arab countries,
dummies for sub-regions
of the Arab world, or
dummies for individual
Arab countries).
Set of independent
variables that describe
countries (GDPc, oil
dependency, share of
Muslims in population, and
average national levels of
support for democracy)
•Constrained rank-based
index on democratic vs
security values
•Includes values connected to
democratic environments
•Higher PfD values indicate a
stronger preference for
democracy
13. 3 measures of democratic values
PfD Gap1
Asp-DF
Gap2
Asp-SL
Demo
aspiratn
Strong
Leader
Demo
De facto
ARB -0.09** 0.16*** 0.10** 0.04 -0.12*** -0.17***
Wave6 -0.05** -0.05* -0.12*** -0.09*** 0.09*** -0.01
W6*AB1 -0.03** 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.02
LnGDPc 0.11*** -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.09*
N 147440 128636 125740 138262 132347 129549
R2 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
(regressions also controls for individual characteristics)
• There is Arab democratic gap around 2013
• …unlikely due entirely to the Arab Spring as per the small negative
wave 6 * ARB1 interaction (as well as the recent work of Mark Tessler)
14. The PfD regression globally
PfD
Arab -0.09***
Wave 6 -0.05**
Wave 6*Arab1 -0.03**
Age -0.04***
Education 0.08***
Female 0.01*
Faith -0.03*
Low Income 0
Middle Income 0.03***
High Income 0.01
GDPpc(ln) 0.11***
N 147440
R
2
0.02
Standardized beta coefficients. Table 2 also controls for individual characteristics. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Other dynamic results consistent with
literature
• Youth, educated and middle class
are democracy’s champions
15. DRIVERS OF ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM
Preference for
Democracy
Age -0.06***
Education 0.07***
Female 0.00
Faith -0.02
Low Income 0.00
Mid Income 0.03***
High income 0.01
GDPc 0.11***
Arab -0.04
wave6 -0.04*
w6*Arab1 -0.04*
Age*Arab 0.04**
Edu*Arab -0.06**
Fem*Arab 0.01**
Faith*Arab -0.02
Low Inc*Arab -0.01
Mid Inc*Arab -0.01
High Inc*Arab -0.00
N 142884
R2 0.04
Standardized beta coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
The globally strong youth
push for democracy is
stunted by a Self
Expression gap among
Arab youth
The globally equally
strong modernizing
impact of education on
democracy is stunted too
for Arab youth by lack of
modernization effect and
heightened religious
conservatism
After controlling for
individual effects, the
Arab democratic deficit
disappears!
The Arab middle class, like
the rest of the world, is the
champion for democracy
16. …BUT WHAT’S explains THIS DEFICIT?
2 possible theories
Modernist
Aspirations
Religious
Conservatism
Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) show how
individual preferences
evolve, from survivalist
to self-expressive values.
Measured as an index
based on three WVS
questions: two related to
parents preferences
regarding imagination
and self-expression, and
one relating to the extent
respondents think of
themselves as being
creative and critical.
Religious conservatism
may affect individual
values on DfD.
Measured using WVS
question on support for
the statement that
“Religious authorities
should ultimately
interpret the laws.”
PFD
Individual,
MICs
Individual,
Arab
Countries,
global
Religious
Conservatism
.01* -.06* -.42*
Self
Expression
.10* .12* .43*
Correlation Coefficients with PfD
17. Other Arab specificities
PI S-E
GDPc -0.17*** 0.01
ARB 0.18*** -0.11**
wave6 0.01 -0.08**
w6*ARB1 -0.01 0.04**
18. Self expression
JOR -0.02
MAR 0.02
EGY -0.03
LBN -0.01**
QAT -0.01
TUN -0.01
LBY 0.01
YEM -0.02***
IRQ -0.09**
DZA -0.00
SAU -0.05**
20. DRIVERS OF ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM
Preference for
Democracy
Religious
Conservatism
Self
Expression
Age -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.10***
Education 0.07*** -0.11*** 0.08***
Female 0.00 0.02*** -0.03***
Faith -0.02 0.14*** -0.07***
Low Income 0.00 -0.01 -0.06***
Mid Income 0.03*** -0.02* -0.06***
High income 0.01 -0.01 -0.02**
GDPc 0.11*** -0.16*** 0.03
Arab -0.04 -0.02 -0.07
wave6 -0.04* -0.01 -0.09**
w6*Arab1 -0.04* -0.01 0.03
Age*Arab 0.04** 0.09*** 0.07**
Edu*Arab -0.06** 0.10** 0.01
Fem*Arab 0.01** -0.00 0.00
Faith*Arab -0.02 0.00 -0.08**
Low Inc*Arab -0.01 0.03 -0.01
Mid Inc*Arab -0.01 0.03* -0.01
High Inc*Arab -0.00 0.01 -0.02
N 142884 131229 146601
R2 0.04 0.14 0.05
Standardized beta coefficients. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
The globally strong youth
push for democracy is
stunted by a Self
Expression gap among
Arab youth
The globally equally
strong modernizing
impact of education on
democracy is stunted too
for Arab youth by lack of
modernization effect and
heightened religious
conservatism
After controlling for
individual effects, the
Arab democratic deficit
disappears!
The Arab middle class, like
the rest of the world, is the
champion for democracy
22. ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM: REOPENING
THIS CAN OF WORMS…
We document support for Arab democratic deficit
… that can however be entirely explained by individual effects
The Self Expression among youth which contributes to democracy
through direct and indirect effects is neutralized in the Arab World
The positive education effect on democracy is constrained due to
Arab educational policies and religious conservatism
ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL NOT ESSENTIALIST