2. Introduc1on
• “Basic
research
on
human
learning
and
memory,
especially
research
on
metacogni1on,
much
of
it
carried
out
in
the
last
20
years
or
so,
has
demonstrated
that
our
intui1ons
and
beliefs
about
how
we
learn
are
o>en
wrong
in
serious
ways.
We
do
not,
apparently,
gain
an
understanding
of
the
complexi1es
of
human
learning
and
memory
from
the
trials
and
errors
of
everyday
living
and
learning.”
(Pashler
et
al.
2009)
3. Introduc1on
• “There
is
growing
evidence
that
people
hold
beliefs
how
they
learn
that
are
faulty
in
various
ways,
which
frequently
lead
people
to
manage
their
own
learning
and
teach
others
in
non-‐op1mal
ways.
This
fact
makes
it
clear
that
research
–
not
intui1on
or
standard
prac1ces
–
needs
to
be
the
founda1on
for
upgrading
teaching
and
learning.
If
educa1on
is
to
be
transformed
into
an
evidence-‐based
field,
it
is
important
not
only
to
iden1fy
teaching
techniques
that
have
experimental
support
but
also
to
iden1fy
widely
held
beliefs
that
affect
the
choices
made
by
educa1onal
prac11oners
but
that
lack
empirical
support.”
(Pashler
et
al.
2009)
4. WHAT
ARE
NEUROMYTHS?
WHY
ARE
NEUROMYTHS
INTERESTING?
WHY
DO
NEUROMYTHS
EXIST
AND
RESIST?
5. What
are
neuromyths?
• Beliefs
about
the
brain
and
mind
• False
• Diffused
• Resilient
to
available
informa1on
7. Why
are
neuromyths
interesBng?
Mind
and
brain
sciences
have
raised
the
interest
of
• the
general
public
– E.g.
educators
• policy
makers
– E.g.
domain
of
educa1on
9. Neuromyths
go
ethical
• Misconcep1ons
can
give
rise
to
misapplica1ons
– VAK
&
other
learning
styles
=
Individuals
differ
in
regard
to
the
most
effec1ve
mode
of
instruc1on
for
them
• Individuals
differ
in
regard
to
the
form
of
informa1on
presenta1on
they
prefer
• Individuals
differ
in
regard
to
the
mental
ac1vity
they
find
most
congenial
• The
best
form
of
instruc1on
is
the
matching
one
(meshing
hypothesis)
– (Pashler
et
al
2009)
10. …
Learning
styles?
• The
appropriate
form
of
evidence
:
– Students
must
be
classified
according
to
their
learning
style
– Students
from
each
group
must
be
randomly
assigned
to
receive
to
or
more
forms
of
instruc1on
– A
specific
interac1on
between
learning
style
and
method
must
be
demonstrated:
students
with
Learning
style
1
achieve
be_er
results
with
Method
1
AND
students
with
Learning
style
2
achieve
be_er
results
with
Method
2
– Studies
on
par1cular
classifica1ons
of
learning
styles
and
methods
only
provide
support
for
the
classifica1on/method
that
is
evaluated
11. …
Learning
styles?
• There
is
a
lot
of
literature,
but
not
such
an
evidence
that
the
learning
styles
hypothesis
is
correct
(Pashler
et
al.
2009)
– People
express
preferences
about
a
certain
style
of
presenta1on
– These
preferences
are
not
necessarily
consistent
with
abili1es
– The
interac1on
with
instruc1onal
methods
is
rarely
tested
and
not
demonstrated
(opposite
evidence
exists
as
well)
12. Big
issues
in
learning
styles
debate
• Personaliza1on
vs.
same
instruc1on
for
all
– Do
op1mal
instruc1on
methods
vary
with
disciplines?
–
Do
par1cular
students
benefit
from
having
a
par1cular
content
presented
in
a
different
way?
• How
finely
grained
should
personalized
instruc1on
be?
Individual
cogni1ve
profiling?
And
what
should
be
done
with
them:
mesh
or
unbalance?
• How
great
is
the
benefit
as
compared
to
the
cost?
(When
one
does
something,
one
does
not
do
something
else)
– The
heterogeneity
paradigm
risks
to
draw
a_en1on
away
from
principles
and
prac1ces
that
can
upgrade
everybody’s
learning
(Pashler
et
al.
2009)
• All
humans
are
astounding
learners
• There
are
prac1ces
that
benefit
to
all
(i..e.
memory
enhanced
through
tes1ng)
13. Neuromyths
go
ethical
• Misconcep1ons
can
give
rise
to
misapplica1ons
– When
different
parts
of
the
brain
and
body
do
not
work
in
a
coordinated
manner
they
block
learning
– Brain
Gym:
specific
body
exercises
that
integrate
brain
func1ons
and
make
the
en1re
brain
work
as
a
whole
(whole
brain
learning)
• Equilibrate
le>-‐right
hemispheres
(laterality)
-‐>
reading,
wri1ng,
maths,
..
• Coordinate
front-‐back
(focusing)
-‐>
ADHD
• Integrate
top-‐bo_om
(centering)
-‐>
emo1ons
and
ra1onality
14. …
Brain
Gym?
• There
is
no
evidence
that
Brain
Gym
methods
work
(Spaulding,
2010;
Hya_,
2007)
– 5
peer
reviewed
papers
;
4
acceptable
3
of
which
published
on
journals
that
ask
to
pay
for
publica1on
– Many
flaws
in
the
experimental
senngs
• US:
“whenever
possible,
schools
must
provide
students
with
academic
instruc1on
using
scien1fic,
research-‐based
methods”
(Hya_,
2007)
– Sputnik
1957
– A
Na1on
at
Risk
1983
– No
Child
Le>
Behind
2004
– Individuals
with
Disabili1es
Educa1on
Improvement
Act
2004
15. Neuromyths
go
ethical
• “The
very
same
person
who
tells
your
child
that
blood
is
pumped
around
the
lungs
and
then
the
body
by
the
heart,
is
also
telling
them
that
when
they
do
the
Energizer
exercise
then
‘this
backward
and
forward
movement
of
the
head
increases
the
circula1on
to
the
frontal
lobe
for
greater
comprehension
and
ra1onal
thinking.”
(Goldacre,
2008)
16.
17. How
can
we
know
if
it
is
a
myth?
• Scien1fic
knowledge
• Clinical
research
– Control
groups
• Placebo
• Different
treatment
– Randomiza1on
– Double
blindness
• Meta-‐analyses
and
reviews
of
the
l1erature
19.
1.
Bridge
too
far
• What
if
the
bridge
is
too
far?
– Oversimplifica1on
– Commercial
programs
20. 2.
Sub-‐op1mal
scien1fic
communica1on
• Sensa1onalism
– Covering
of
new,
provoca1ve,
counter-‐intui1ve
results
(Simons,
2010)
• Rare
explana1ons
of
(fMRI)
techniques
capabili1es
and
limita1ons
(Racine,
et
al.,
2006)
21. 2.
Sub-‐op1mal
scien1fic
communica1on
• Neuro-‐realism:
uncri1cal
use
of
brain
imaging
to
validate/invalidate
our
ordinary
views
• Neuro-‐essen1alism:
brain
used
as
shortcut
for
more
global
concepts,
as
the
person,
the
individual,
the
self
• Neuro-‐policy:
a_empts
to
use
brain
imaging
to
promote
poli1cal
and
personal
agendas
22. 3.
Sub-‐op1mal
scien1fic
literacy/
images
• Brain
images
are
expert
images
(Dumit,
1999)
– They
are
difficult
to
interpret
• Brain
images
are
not
pictures,
but
maps
• Brain
images
are
maps
of
sta1s1cal
ac1va1on
• Brain
images
are
subtrac1ve
(
• Brain
images
are
one
possible
form
of
representa1on
of
the
data
obtained
through
fMRI,
PET,
…
24. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Brain
images
are
seducing
and
persuasive
(McCabe
&
Castel,
2008):
– Ra1ngs
of
scien1fic
reasoning
for
arguments
made
in
neuroscien1fic
ar1cles
are
higher
when
the
ar1cle
is
accompanied
by
brain
images
as
compared
to
brain
graphs,
topographical
maps
of
brain
ac1va1on
and
even
worst
no
image
at
all
26. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Neuroscien1fic
jargon
is
persuasive:
– An
explana1on
for
a
cogni1ve
func1on
is
perceived
as
being
more
convincing
(good
explana1on)
when
associated
to
“placebo”
neuroscien1fic
jargon
– Bad
explana1ons
(circular)
tend
to
be
perceived
as
good
when
associated
with
non
explanatory
brain
areas
ac1va1on
bla-‐bla
– Good
explana1ons
are
less
affected
(not
at
all
for
lay
people,
a
bit
for
neuroscience
students)
– Neuroscience
young
students
are
vic1ms
of
the
bias;
neurosciences
experts
are
not
and
tend
to
judge
nega1vely
the
good
explana1ons
that
are
associated
to
“placebo”
neuroscience
bla
bla
– IN
any
case,
scien1fic
literacy
does
not
seem
to
help
(only
exper1se
in
the
domain
does)
(Weisberg,
2008)
27. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Neuroscience
bias
(What
is
the
added
value
of
neuroscience?)
• We
read
neuroscience
studies
with
a
biases
eye
– We
find
them
interes1ng
– We
find
them
explanatory
– We
find
them
persuasive
– Even
when
we
have
other
methods
at
hand
and
the
“where”
informa1on
does
not
add
valuable
explanatory
or
causal
informa1on
– We
consider
neural
evidence
as
sufficient
and
necessary
to
support
claims
about
cogni1ve
processes
• the
simple
presence
of
neural
evidence
supports
claims/we
need
neural
evidence
to
support
claims
• (Skolnick
Weisberg,
2008)
28. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• The
counter-‐intui1ve
nature
of
neuroscience
could
explain
(at
least
in
part)
its
fascina1on
(Skolnick
Weisberg,
2008;
Bloom,
2004,
2006)
• Mind/brain
Dualism
– Neuroscien1fic
reports
are
perceived
as
interes1ng
because
we
are
intui1vely
dualists
– We
are
fascinated
by
the
counter-‐
intui1ve
idea
that
our
body
is
involved
in
our
mental
processes
– But
we
are
also
wronged
by
the
confusion
between
correla1on
and
causa1on
(knowing
“where”
=
knowing
“why”)
29. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Where/why
problem
in
neuroscience
– Neuroimaging
tells
us
where,
and
expand
our
knowledge
– But
“where”
is
different
from
“why”
and
“how”
– Knowing
“where”
is
not
necessarily
informing
• We
do
not
need
a
brain
scan
for
knowing
that
smoking
is
addic1ve
(Smoking
changes
brain”)
– And
o>en
brain
imaging
data
are
correla1onal,
not
causal
• Press
covering
of
the
“where”
problem
is
not
that
informing
because
taking
place
somewhere
in
the
brain
is
the
only
possibility
for
cogni1ve
processes
30. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Illusory
causaBon
• i.e.
Micho_e’s
launching
effect
– Could
be
behind
jargon
bias
and
related
to
mind/
brain
dualism
31. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Length
effect:
– People
tend
to
rate
longer
explana1ons
as
being
more
similar
to
expert
explana1ons
• DistracBng
details
effect:
– Presen1ng
related
but
irrelevant
details
to
people
as
part
of
an
argument
makes
the
argument
more
difficult
to
encode
and
recall
– People
respond
posi1vely
more
o>en
to
requests
with
uninforma1ve
“placebo”
informa1on
in
the,
like
“Can
I
use
the
photocopier?
I
need
to
make
some
copies”
works
be_er
than
“Can
I
use
the
photocopier?”
(Goldacre,
2008)
32. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Illusory
sense
of
fluency:
– Weisberg’s
experiments
show
that
neuroscien1fic
informa1on
provides
a
sense
of
fluency
=
a
sense
of
understanding
that
an
explana1on
conveys
a
cue
to
a
good
explana1on,
a
feeling
of
intellectual
sa1sfac1on
– But
fluency
or
”sense
of
understanding”
is
not
the
same
as
accuracy
or
good
explana1on
(Trout,
2008)
• The
sense
of
understanding
has
not
an
epistemic
virtue
– Fluency
derives
from
a
sense
of
tractability
which
is
provided
by
reduc1onist
explana1ons
• The
sense
of
understanding
is
the
effect
of
non-‐
epistemic
forces
• (Trout,
2008)
33. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Illusory
sense
of
fluency:
– Fluency
is
the
consequence
of
(or
at
least
is
influenced
by)
2
cogni1ve
biases
• Hindisight
=
I
knew
it
all
along
– So,
it
is
so
evident
• Overconfidence
=
I
am
100%
sure
– If
I
feel
it
is
evident,
then
it
is
– (Trout,
2002)
• CogniBve
dissonance
(Fes1nger,
1957)
34. 4.
Cogni1ve
biases/intui1ve
beliefs
• Source
amnesia
• Confirma1on
bias
• Desire
for
be_ering
• Other
fears,
desires,
…
• Like
in
other
forms
of
urban
legends
– (Beyerstein,
2010)
– (Brunvand,
1981)
35. What
can
we
do
against
neuromyths?
• Scien1fic
educa1on
– Not
enough:
even
students
in
neuroscience
are
vic1ms
of
the
neuroscience
jargon
bias
(only
full-‐formed
neuroscien1sts
don’t:
Weisberg,
et
al.,
2008)
• Be_er
scien1fic
media1on
(Racine,
et
al.,
2008)
– Neuroscien1sts
more
involved
in
it
(Racine,
et
al.,
2008;
Weisberg,
2008)
– New
professions
(Racine,
et
al.,
2008)
– Ac1ve
informa1on
• McDonnel
Founda1on
bad
neuro-‐journalism
h_p://www.jsmf.org/neuromill/calmji_eryneurons.htm
• SFN
neuromyths
busters
• OCDE
neuromyths
• …
– Public
topographic
maps
of
ac1va1on
rather
than
images
(McBace
&
Castel,
2008)
– Develop
the
ethics
of
scien1fic
research
and
of
scien1fic
communica1on
• Raise
skep1cism
(without
reducing
the
interest
for
sciences)
• Make
cogni1ve
biases
and
common
beliefs
widely
known,
at
least
by
scien1sts
and
science
media1on
professionals
36. Timothée
Behra
• Finalement,
je
ne
crois
pas
que
les
neurosciences
aient
réellement
quelque
chose
à
apporter
à
l’éduca1on.
Aujourd’hui,
cela
ne
semble
pas
être
le
cas
;
mais
même
en
principe,
c’est
la
psychologie
qui
étudie
le
niveau
per1nent
pour
fonder
les
méthodes
de
l’éduca1on.
Les
enseignants
sont,
comme
beaucoup,
séduits
par
l’a_rait
des
images
de
cerveau.
Pourtant,
savoir
que
telle
ou
telle
zone
cérébrale
est
impliquée
pour
telle
tâche
ne
sert
strictement
à
rien
dans
la
pra1que
!
Ce
qui
sert,
c’est
d’avoir
un
modèle
décrivant
les
différentes
étapes
nécessaires
à
la
réalisa1on
d’une
tâche.
Pour
faire
une
métaphore
qui
ne
sera
sans
doute
pas
au
goût
de
tout
le
monde
:
quand
on
apprend
à
conduire
une
voiture,
on
n’apprend
pas
la
mécanique.
J’ai
donc
l’impression
qu’on
mélange
les
niveaux.
37. • L’ar1cle
de
Goswami
pose
la
ques1on
:
«
faut
il
lu_er
contre
les
programmes
d’éduca1on
soit
disant
basés
sur
les
neurosciences
?
»
Ce_e
même
ques1on
se
pose
pour
d’
autres
domaines,
comme
les
médecines
alterna1ves.
L’exemple
de
l’homéopathie
me
fait
dire
que
laisser
ces
programmes
en
libre
concurrence
ne
perme_ra
pas
d’en
sélec1onner
les
meilleurs.
Je
suis
par1san
d’une
éduca1on
plutôt
«
communiste
»,
c’est-‐à-‐dire
la
même
pour
tous,
au
moins
à
bas
niveau.
Donc
d’après
moi,
oui,
il
faut
mener
des
inves1ga1ons
scien1fiques
pour
dis1nguer
les
méthodes,
et
ne
pas
laisser
proliférer
les
méthodes
«
basées
sur
les
neurosciences
»,
qui
u1lisent
le
bon
vieux
ressort
markenng
du
«
vu
à
la
télé
».
38. • Ce
qui
est
ennuyeux
aujourd’hui,
c’est
que
la
vulgarisa1on
scien1fique
ne
prend
pas
les
précau1ons
nécessaires.
Je
pense
au
magazine
Cerveau
&
Psycho,
que
je
trouve
bien
trop
sensa1onnaliste…
des
conjectures
y
sont
souvent
présentées
comme
des
faits.
Ainsi,
des
communicateurs
reconnus
comme
crédibles,
les
journalistes
scien1fiques,
diffusent
des
informa1ons
simplifiées
sur
des
sujets
encore
très
sensibles.
N’est
ce
pas
ainsi
que
naissent
et
voyagent
les
neuromythes
?
39. • Voici
un
pe1t
exemple
de
vulgarisa1on
des
neurosciences…
ou
comment
expliquer
l’immaturité
des
adolescents
d’aujourd’hui
(et
de
chez
nous)
comme
un
fait
naturel
des
neurosciences
:
h_p://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-‐VkRzR65fB8
• Voilà,
maintenant
vous
savez
que
si
les
adolescents
sont
mous,
turbulents
ou
incapables
de
se
concentrer
10
minutes,
c’est
parce
qu’ils
ne
sont
«
pas
finis
du
cortex
».
On
nous
présente
ici
le
cerveau
d’un
adolescent
comme
un
grand
chan1er,
qu’il
faut
réorganiser,
et
que
tout
cela
se
fini
dans
le
cortex
préfrontal,
qui
gère
l’impulsivité.
Ce_e
impulsivité
ne
serait
donc
pas
correctement
gérée
avant…
Je
ne
sais
pas
si
c’est
suffisamment
diffusé
pour
être
considéré
comme
un
neuromythe.
40. Océane
Le
Tarnec
• En
fait,
les
neurosciences
peuvent
être
extrêmement
u1les
à
l’éduca1on
de
manière
tout
à
fait
indirecte,
et
c’est
là
que
je
rejoins
Timothée
sur
le
fait
qu’on
«
mélange
les
niveaux
».
Les
neurosciences
ont
selon
moi
le
rôle
essen1el
de
poser
les
bonnes
ques1ons.
C’est
à
dire,
justement,
de
casser
les
mythes
et
de
reposer
la
probléma1que
des
appren1ssages
dans
les
bons
termes.
Je
crois
notamment
que
les
mythes
viennent
non
seulement
d’études
neuroscien1fiques,
mais
aussi
et
surtout
de
l’accepta1on
générale
que
ces
résultats
ont
immédiatement
rencontrée,
notamment
parce
que
ces
idées
avaient
déjà
leur
terreau
dans
l’opinion
générale.
Par
exemple,
l’idée
de
la
courte
durée
du
développement
cogni1f
(plus
ou
moins
3
ans)
a
bien
pu
être
fortement
présente
avant
même
l’existence
des
sciences
cogni1ves.
Mais
les
résultats
scien1fiques
ont
solidifié
/
pérennisé
ces
croyances,
les
transformant
en
mythes
aujourd’hui
difficiles
à
contester.
41. • Les
neurosciences
peuvent
poser
les
bonnes
ques1ons
en
repérant
des
différences
ne_es
d’ac1vité
du
cerveau
entre
des
tâches
différentes
:
ces
différences
peuvent
répondre
aux
ques1ons
«
Quoi
?
»
et
parfois
en
par1e
«
Comment
?
»
mais
certainement
pas
«
Pourquoi
?
»
(«
Pourquoi
les
adolescent
sont-‐ils
«
mous,
turbulents
ou
incapables
de
se
concentrer
»,
etc).
Mais
s’il
est
vain
d’y
chercher
une
réponse
au
«
pourquoi
»,
il
serait
dommage
de
refuser
les
demi-‐réponses
(ou
les
très
bonnes
ques1ons)
que
sont
le
«
quoi
»
et
le
«
comment
».
• Si
l’on
parcourt
les
travaux
de
S.
Dehaene
par
exemple,
on
se
rend
compte
que
les
résultats
d’imagerie
peuvent
perme_re
de
faire
des
hypothèses
solides
notamment
sur
l’état
cogni1f
dans
lequel
l’enfant
«
se
présente
à
un
appren1ssage
»,
qui
correspond
à
l’état
ini1al
sur
lequel
doit
s’appuyer
l’enseignement
pour
être
efficace
et
ne
pas
«
demander
l’impossible
»
au
cerveau.
Par
exemple,
une
hypothèse
majeure
de
S.
Dehaene
est
que
notre
appren1ssage
de
la
lecture
se
fait
«
malgré
»
de
fortes
contraintes
biologiques,
grâce
à
un
recyclage
ac1f
de
neurones.
Ces
neurones,
après
les
millénaires
de
sélec1on
naturelle
qui
nous
précèdent
mais
qui
n’ont
pas
«
eu
le
temps
»
de
différencier
les
cultures
écrites,
étaient
dédiés
à
des
tâches
bien
plus
basiques
de
la
vision
et
de
la
reconnaissance.
Ces
contraintes,
si
elles
existent
effec1vement,
sont
une
raison
extrêmement
per1nente
de
choisir
un
mode
d’appren1ssage
plutôt
qu’un
autre,
par
exemple
pour
la
lecture
:
la
méthode
syllabique
plutôt
que
la
méthode
globale.
