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Gender & Society
DOI: 10.1177/0891243206289499
2006; 20; 441 Gender & Society
Joan Acker
Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations
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Sociologists for Women in Society Feminist Lecture
INEQUALITY REGIMES
Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations1
JOAN ACKER
University of Oregon
In this article, the author addresses two feminist issues: first,
how to conceptualize intersectionality,
the mutual reproduction of class, gender, and racial relations of
inequality, and second, how to iden-
tify barriers to creating equality in work organizations. She
develops one answer to both issues, sug-
gesting the idea of “inequality regimes” as an analytic approach
to understanding the creation of

inequalities in work organizations. Inequality regimes are the
interlocked practices and processes that
result in continuing inequalities in all work organizations. Work
organizations are critical locations
for the investigation of the continuous creation of complex
inequalities because much societal
inequality originates in such organizations. Work organizations
are also the target for many attempts
to alter patterns of inequality: The study of change efforts and
the oppositions they engender are often
opportunities to observe frequently invisible aspects of the
reproduction of inequalities. The concept
of inequality regimes may be useful in analyzing organizational
change projects to better understand
why these projects so often fail and why they succeed when this
occurs.
Keywords: gender; class; race; intersectionality; organizations
Much of the social and economic inequality in the United States
and otherindustrial countries is created in organizations, in the
daily activities of
working and organizing the work. Union activists have
grounded their demands
in this understanding, as have feminist and civil rights
reformers. Class analyses,
at least since Harry Braverman’s 1974 dissection of Labor and
Monopoly Capital
have often examined the doing of work, the labor process, to
understand how
class inequalities are produced and perpetuated (Burawoy
1979). Feminists have
looked at the gendering of organizations and organizational
practices to compre-
hend how inequalities between women and men continue in the
face of numerous

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I want to thank Don Van Houten with whom
I did the research that inspired this
analysis, Barbara Czarniawska who helped me to rewrite the
article to make it more comprehensible,
Sandi Morgen who has been an invaluable research partner, and
all the many other feminist scholars
whose work has made mine possible.
GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol. 20 No. 4, August 2006 441-464
DOI: 10.1177/0891243206289499
© 2006 Sociologists for Women in Society
441
442 GENDER & SOCIETY / August 2006
attempts to erase such inequalities (Acker 1990; Collinson and
Hearn 1996;
Ferguson 1984; Kanter 1977). Scholars working on race
inequality have exam-
ined the production in work organizations of racial disparities
that contribute
to society-wide racial discrimination and disadvantage (Brown
et al. 2003;
Royster 2003).
Most studies of the production of class, gender, and racial
inequalities in orga-
nizations have focused on one or another of these categories,

rarely attempting to
study them as complex, mutually reinforcing or contradicting
processes.2 But
focusing on one category almost inevitably obscures and
oversimplifies other
interpenetrating realities. Feminist scholars of color have
argued for 30 years,
with the agreement of most white feminist scholars, that much
feminist scholar-
ship was actually about white middle-class women, ignoring the
reality that the
category gender is fundamentally complicated by class,
race/ethnicity, and other
differences (Davis 1981; hooks 1984; Joseph 1981). Similar
criticisms can be
made of much theory and research on race and class questions:
“race,” even when
paired with “ethnicity,” encapsulates multiple social realities
always inflected through
gender and class differences. “Class” is also complicated by
multiple gendered and
racialized differences. The conclusion to this line of thinking—
theory and research
on inequality, dominance, and oppression must pay attention to
the intersections
of, at least, race/ethnicity, gender, and class.
The need for intersectional analyses has been, for the past 15
years at least, widely
accepted among feminist scholars (Collins 1995; Crenshaw
1995; Fenstermaker
and West 2002; Weber 2001). How to develop this insight into
clear conceptions
of how dimensions of difference or simultaneous inequality-
producing processes
actually work has been difficult and is an ongoing project

(Holvino 2001; Knapp
2005; McCall 2005; Weber 2001). Different approaches provide
complemen-
tary views of these complex processes. For example, Leslie
McCall (2001, 2005),
using large data sets, shows how patterns of gender, race, and
class inequality
vary with the composition of economic activity in various areas
of the United
States. The analysis I suggest contrasts with McCall’s approach,
as I propose
looking at specific organizations and the local, ongoing
practical activities of
organizing work that, at the same time, reproduce complex
inequalities. The orga-
nizing processes that constitute inequality regimes are, of
course, related to the
economic decision making that results in dramatically different
local and regional
configurations of inequality across the United States. Exploring
the connections
between specific inequality regimes and the various economic
decisions that
affect local economies would be still another approach to these
complex interre-
lations. Here, my goal is limited—to develop the analysis of
organizational inequal-
ity regimes.
I base this analysis on the voluminous research, including some
of my own
(Acker 1989, 1991, 1994; Acker and Van Houten 1974), on the
organization
of work and power relations in organizations. This analysis has
its origins in my
earlier arguments about the gendering of organizations,

reconceptualizing that
approach to add class and race and extending the discussion in
various ways
(Acker 1990, 1992).3
INEQUALITY REGIMES
All organizations have inequality regimes, defined as loosely
interrelated prac-
tices, processes, actions, and meanings that result in and
maintain class, gender,
and racial inequalities within particular organizations. The
ubiquity of inequality
is obvious: Managers, executives, leaders, and department heads
have much more
power and higher pay than secretaries, production workers,
students, or even pro-
fessors. Even organizations that have explicit egalitarian goals
develop inequality
regimes over time, as considerable research on egalitarian
feminist organizations
has shown (Ferree and Martin 1995; Scott 2000).
I define inequality in organizations as systematic disparities
between partici-
pants in power and control over goals, resources, and outcomes;
workplace deci-
sions such as how to organize work; opportunities for promotion
and interesting

work; security in employment and benefits; pay and other
monetary rewards;
respect; and pleasures in work and work relations.
Organizations vary in the
degree to which these disparities are present and in how severe
they are. Equality
rarely exists in control over goals and resources, while pay and
other monetary
rewards are usually unequal. Other disparities may be less
evident, or a high
degree of equality might exist in particular areas, such as
employment security
and benefits.
Inequality regimes are highly various in other ways; they also
tend to be fluid
and changing. These regimes are linked to inequality in the
surrounding society,
its politics, history, and culture. Particular practices and
interpretations develop in
different organizations and subunits. One example is from my
study of Swedish
banks in the late 1980s (Acker 1994). My Swedish colleague
and I looked at gen-
der and work processes in six local bank branches. We were
investigating the
degree to which the branches had adopted a reorganization plan
and a more equi-
table distribution of work tasks and decision-making
responsibilities that had
been agreed to by both management and the union.4 We found
differences on
some dimensions of inequality. One office had almost all
women employees and
few status and power differences. Most tasks were rotated or
shared, and the

supervision by the male manager was seen by all working in the
branch as sup-
portive and benign. The other offices had clear gender
segregation, with men han-
dling the lucrative business accounts and women handling the
everyday, private
customers. In these offices, very little power and decision
making were shared,
although there were differences in the degrees to which the
employees saw their
workplaces as undemocratic. The one branch office that was
most successful in
redistributing tasks and decision making was the one with
women employees and
a preexisting participatory ethos.
Acker / INEQUALITY REGIMES 443
In the following sections, I discuss in some detail the varying
characteristics
of inequality regimes, including the bases of inequality, the
shape and degree of
inequality, organizing processes that create and recreate
inequalities, the invisi-
bility of inequalities, the legitimacy of inequalities, and the
controls that prevent
protest against inequalities. I also discuss efforts to reduce
inequality in organi-
zations, including consideration of what elements in inequality
regimes impede

and/or further change. Finally, I speculate about changes in
inequality regimes
that are emerging as a consequence of globalizing processes.
WHAT VARIES? THE COMPONENTS
OF INEQUALITY REGIMES
The Bases of Inequality
The bases for inequality in organizations vary, although class,
gender, and race
processes are usually present. “Class,” as I use the term, refers
to enduring and
systematic differences in access to and control over resources
for provisioning
and survival (Acker 2006; Nelson 1993). Those resources are
primarily monetary
in wealthy industrial societies. Some class practices take place
as employment
occurs and wages are paid. Thus, class is intrinsic to
employment and to most
organizations. In large organizations, hierarchical positions are
congruent with
class processes in the wider society. The CEO of the large
corporation operates at
the top of the national and often global society. In smaller
organizations, the class
structure may not be so congruent with society-wide class
relations, but the owner
or the boss still has class power in relations with employees.
“Class” is defined
by inequality; thus, “class equality” is an oxymoron (Ferguson
1984).
Gender, as socially constructed differences between men and
women and the

beliefs and identities that support difference and inequality, is
also present in all
organizations. Gender was, in the not too distant past, almost
completely inte-
grated with class in many organizations. That is, managers were
almost always
men; the lower-level white-collar workers were always women.
Class relations in
the workplace, such as supervisory practices or wage-setting
processes, were
shaped by gendered and sexualized attitudes and assumptions.
The managerial
ranks now contain women in many organizations, but
secretaries, clerks, servers,
and care providers are still primarily women. Women are
beginning to be distrib-
uted in organizational class structures in ways that are similar
to the distribution
of men. Gender and class are no longer so perfectly integrated,
but gendered and
sexualized assumptions still shape the class situations of women
and men in dif-
ferent ways.5
“Race” refers to socially defined differences based on physical
characteristics,
culture, and historical domination and oppression, justified by
entrenched beliefs.
Ethnicity may accompany race, or stand alone, as a basis for
inequality. Race, too,

has often been integrated into class hierarchies, but in different
patterns than
gender. Historically, in the United States, women and men of
color were confined
to the lowest-level jobs or excluded from all but certain
organizations. People of
color were totally excluded from the most powerful (white,
male) organizations
that were central in shaping the racialized and gendered class
structure of the
larger society. For example, the twentieth-century U.S. military
was, until after
World War II, a racially segregated organization dominated by
white men. Other
examples are the elite universities such as Harvard and Yale.
Other differences are sometimes bases for inequality in
organizations. The
most important, I believe, is sexuality. Heterosexuality is
assumed in many orga-
nizing processes and in the interactions necessary to these
processes. The secre-
tary is or was the “office wife” (Kanter 1977). Homosexuality is
disruptive of
organizing processes because it flouts the assumptions of
heterosexuality. It still
carries a stigma that produces disadvantages for lesbians and
gays. Other bases of
inequality are religion, age, and physical disability. Again, in
the not too distant
past, having the wrong religion such as being a Jew or a
Catholic could activate
discriminatory practices. Today, having a Middle Eastern origin

or being a
Muslim may have similar consequences. Currently, age seems to
be a significant
basis for inequality, as are certain physical inabilities. I believe
that although
these other differences are important, they are not, at this time,
as thoroughly
embedded in organizing processes as are gender, race, and
class.
Shape and Degree of Inequality
The steepness of hierarchy is one dimension of variation in the
shape and
degree of inequality. The steepest hierarchies are found in
traditional bureaucra-
cies in contrast to the idealized flat organizations with team
structures, in which
most, or at least some, responsibilities and decision-making
authority are distrib-
uted among participants. Between these polar types are
organizations with vary-
ing degrees of hierarchy and shared decision making.
Hierarchies are usually
gendered and racialized, especially at the top. Top hierarchical
class positions are
almost always occupied by white men in the United States and
European coun-
tries. This is particularly true in large and influential
organizations.6 The image of
the successful organization and the image of the successful
leader share many of
the same characteristics, such as strength, aggressiveness, and
competitiveness.
Some research shows that flat team structures provide
professional women more

equality and opportunity than hierarchical bureaucracies, but
only if the women
function like men. One study of engineers in Norway (Kvande
and Rasmussen
1994) found that women in a small, collegial engineering firm
gained recognition
and advancement more easily than in an engineering department
in a big bureau-
cracy. However, the women in the small firm were expected to
put in the same long
hours as their male colleagues and to put their work first, before
family responsi-
bilities. Masculine-stereotyped patterns of on-the-job behavior
in team-organized
work may mean that women must make adaptations to
expectations that interfere
with family responsibilities and with which they are
uncomfortable. In a study of
high-level professional women in a computer development firm,
Joanne Martin
and Debra Meyerson (1998) found that the women saw the
culture of their work
group as highly masculine, aggressive, competitive, and self-
promoting. The
women had invented ways to cope with this work culture, but
they felt that they
were partly outsiders who did not belong.

Other research (Barker 1993) suggests that team-organized work
may not
reduce gender inequality. Racial inequality may also be
maintained as teams are
introduced in the workplace (Vallas 2003). While the
organization of teams is
often accompanied by drastic reductions of supervisors’ roles,
the power of
higher managerial levels is usually not changed: Class
inequalities are only
slightly reduced (Morgen, Acker, and Weigt n.d.).
The degree and pattern of segregation by race and gender is
another aspect of
inequality that varies considerably between organizations.
Gender and race seg-
regation of jobs is complex because segregation is hierarchical
across jobs at dif-
ferent class levels of an organization, across jobs at the same
level, and within
jobs (Charles and Grusky 2004). Occupations should be
distinguished from jobs:
An occupation is a type of work; a job is a particular cluster of
tasks in a partic-
ular work organization. For example, emergency room nurse is
an occupation; an
emergency room nurse at San Francisco General Hospital is a
job. More statisti-
cal data are available about occupations than about jobs,
although “job” is the rel-
evant unit for examining segregation in organizations. We know
that within the
broad level of professional and managerial occupations, there is
less gender seg-
regation than 30 years ago, as I have already noted.

Desegregation has not pro-
gressed so far in other occupations. However, research indicates
that “sex
segregation at the job level is more extensive than sex
segregation at the level of
occupations” (Wharton 2005, 97). In addition, even when
women and men “are
members of the same occupation, they are likely to work in
different jobs and
firms” (Wharton 2005, 97). Racial segregation also persists, is
also complex, and
varies by gender.
Jobs and occupations may be internally segregated by both
gender and race:
What appears to be a reduction in segregation may only be its
reconfiguration.
Reconfiguration and differentiation have occurred as women
have entered previ-
ously male-dominated occupations. For example, women
doctors are likely to spe-
cialize in pediatrics, not surgery, which is still largely a male
domain. I found a
particularly striking example of the internal gender segregation
of a job category
in my research on Swedish banks (Acker 1991). Swedish banks
all had a single
job classification for beginning bank workers: They were called
“aspiranter,” or
those aspiring to a career in banking. This job classification had
one description; it
was used in banking industry statistics to indicate that this was
one job that was
not gender segregated. However, in bank branches, young
women aspiranters had
different tasks than young men. Men’s tasks were varied and

brought them into
contact with different aspects of the business. Men were
groomed for managerial
jobs. The women worked as tellers or answered telephone
inquiries. They had
contact only with their immediate supervisors and coworkers in
the branch. They
were not being groomed for promotion. This was one job with
two realities based
on gender.
The size of wage differences in organizations also varies. Wage
differences
often vary with the height of the hierarchy: It is the CEOs of the
largest corpora-
tions whose salaries far outstrip those of everyone else. In the
United States in
2003, the average CEO earned 185 times the earnings of the
average worker; the
average earnings of CEOs of big corporations were more than
300 times the earn-
ings of the average worker (Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey
2003). White men
tend to earn more than any other gender/race category, although
even for white
men, the wages of the bottom 60 percent are stagnant. Within
most service-sector

organizations, both white women and women of color are at the
bottom of the
wage hierarchy.
The severity of power differences varies. Power differences are
fundamental to
class, of course, and are linked to hierarchy. Labor unions and
professional asso-
ciations can act to reduce power differences across class
hierarchies.7 However,
these organizations have historically been dominated by white
men with the con-
sequence that white women and people of color have not had
increases in orga-
nizational power equal to those of white men. Gender and race
are important in
determining power differences within organizational class
levels. For example,
managers are not always equal. In some organizations, women
managers work
quietly to do the organizational housekeeping, to keep things
running, while men
managers rise to heroic heights to solve spectacular problems
(Ely and Meyerson
2000). In other organizations, women and men manage in the
same ways
(Wacjman 1998). Women managers and professionals often face
gendered con-
tradictions when they attempt to use organizational power in
actions similar to
those of men. Women enacting power violate conventions of
relative subordina-
tion to men, risking the label of “witches” or “bitches.”
Organizing Processes that Produce Inequality

Organizations vary in the practices and processes that are used
to achieve their
goals; these practices and processes also produce class, gender,
and racial
inequalities. Considerable research exists exploring how class
or gender inequal-
ities are produced, both formally and informally, as work
processes are carried
out (Acker 1989, 1990; Burawoy 1979; Cockburn 1985; Willis
1977). Some
research also examines the processes that result in continuing
racial inequalities.
These practices are often guided by textual materials supplied
by consultants or
developed by managers influenced by information and/or
demands from outside
the organization. To understand exactly how inequalities are
reproduced, it is nec-
essary to examine the details of these textually informed
practices.
Organizing the general requirements of work. The general
requirements of
work in organizations vary among organizations and among
organizational levels.
In general, work is organized on the image of a white man who
is totally dedi-
cated to the work and who has no responsibilities for children or

family demands
other than earning a living. Eight hours of continuous work
away from the living
space, arrival on time, total attention to the work, and long
hours if requested are
all expectations that incorporate the image of the unencumbered
worker.
Flexibility to bend these expectations is more available to high-
level managers,
predominantly men, than to lower-level managers (Jacobs and
Gerson 2004).
Some professionals, such as college professors, seem to have
considerable flexi-
bility, although they also work long hours. Lower-level jobs
have, on the whole,
little flexibility. Some work is organized as part-time, which
may help women to
combine work and family obligations, but in the United States,
such work usually
has no benefits such as health care and often has lower pay than
full-time work
(Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey 2003). Because women have
more obligations
outside of work than do men, this gendered organization of
work is important in
maintaining gender inequality in organizations and, thus, the
unequal distribution
of women and men in organizational class hierarchies. Thus,
gender, race, and
class inequalities are simultaneously created in the fundamental
construction of
the working day and of work obligations.
Organizing class hierarchies. Techniques also vary for
organizing class hier-
archies inside work organizations. Bureaucratic, textual

techniques for ordering
positions and people are constructed to reproduce existing class,
gender, and
racial inequalities (Acker 1989). I have been unable to find
much research on
these techniques, but I do have my own observations of such
techniques in one
large job classification system from my study of comparable
worth (Acker 1989).
Job classification systems describe job tasks and
responsibilities and rank jobs
hierarchically. Jobs are then assigned to wage categories with
jobs of similar rank
in the same wage category. Our study found that the bulk of
sex-typed women’s
jobs, which were in the clerical/secretarial area and included
thousands of women
workers, were described less clearly and with less specificity
than the bulk of sex-
typed men’s jobs, which were spread over a wide range of areas
and levels in the
organization. The women’s jobs were grouped into four large
categories at the
bottom of the ranking, assigned to the lowest wage ranges; the
men’s jobs were
in many more categories extending over a much wider range of
wage levels. Our
new evaluation of the clerical/secretarial categories showed that
many different
jobs with different tasks and responsibilities, some highly
skilled and responsible,
had been lumped together. The result was, we argued, an
unjustified gender wage
gap: Although women’s wages were in general lower than those
of men, women’s
skilled jobs were paid much less than men’s skilled jobs,

reducing even further
the average pay for women when compared with the average pay
for men.
Another component in the reproduction of hierarchy was
revealed in discussions
with representatives of Hay Associates, the large consulting
firm that provided
the job evaluation system we used in the comparable worth
study. These repre-
sentatives would not let the job evaluation committees alter the
system to com-
pare the responsibilities of managers’ jobs with the
responsibilities of the jobs of
their secretarial assistants. Often, we observed, managers were
credited with
responsibility for tasks done by their assistants. The assistants
did not get credit
for these tasks in the job evaluation system, and this contributed
to their rela-
tively low wages. But if managers’ and assistants’ jobs could
never be compared,
no adjustments for inequities could ever be made. The hierarchy
was inviolate in
this system.
In the past 30 years, many organizations have removed some
layers of middle

management and relocated some decision making to lower
organizational levels.
These changes have been described as getting rid of the
inefficiencies of old
bureaucracies, reducing hierarchy and inequality, and
empowering lower-level
employees. This happened in two of the organizations I have
studied—Swedish
banks in the late 1980s (Acker 1991), discussed above, and the
Oregon
Department of Adult and Family Services, responsible for
administration of
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and welfare reform
(Morgen, Acker,
and Weigt n.d.). In both cases, the decision-making
responsibilities of frontline
workers were greatly increased, and their jobs became more
demanding and more
interesting. In the welfare agency, ordinary workers had
increased participation in
decisions about their local operations. But the larger hierarchy
did not change in
either case. The frontline employees were still on the bottom;
they had more
responsibility, but not higher salaries. And they had no
increased control over
their job security. In both cases, the workers liked the changes
in the content of
their jobs, but the hierarchy was still inviolate.
In sum, class hierarchies in organizations, with their embedded
gender and
racial patterns, are constantly created and renewed through
organizing practices.
Gender and sometimes race, in the form of restricted
opportunities and particular

expectations for behavior, are reproduced as different degrees
of organizational
class hierarchy and are also reproduced in everyday interactions
and bureaucratic
decision making.
Recruitment and hiring. Recruitment and hiring is a process of
finding the
worker most suited for a particular position. From the
perspectives of employers,
the gender and race of existing jobholders at least partially
define who is suitable,
although prospective coworkers may also do such defining
(Enarson 1984).
Images of appropriate gendered and racialized bodies influence
perceptions and
hiring. White bodies are often preferred, as a great deal of
research shows
(Royster 2003). Female bodies are appropriate for some jobs;
male bodies for
other jobs.
A distinction should be made between the gendered organization
of work and
the gender and racial characteristics of the ideal worker.
Although work is organized
on the model of the unencumbered (white) man, and both

women and men are
expected to perform according to this model, men are not
necessarily the ideal
workers for all jobs. The ideal worker for many jobs is a
woman, particularly a
woman who, employers believe, is compliant, who will accept
orders and low
wages (Salzinger 2003). This is often a woman of color;
immigrant women are
sometimes even more desirable (Hossfeld 1994).
Hiring through social networks is one of the ways in which
gender and racial
inequalities are maintained in organizations. Affirmative action
programs altered
hiring practices in many organizations, requiring open
advertising for positions
and selection based on gender- and race-neutral criteria of
competence, rather
than selection based on an old boy (white) network. These
changes in hiring prac-
tices contributed to the increasing proportions of white women
and people of
color in a variety of occupations. However, criteria of
competence do not auto-
matically translate into gender- and race-neutral selection
decisions. “Competence”
involves judgment: The race and gender of both the applicant
and the decision
makers can affect that judgment, resulting in decisions that
white males are the
more competent, more suited to the job than are others. Thus,
gender and race as
a basis for hiring or a basis for exclusion have not been
eliminated in many orga-
nizations, as continuing patterns of segregation attest.

Wage setting and supervisory practices. Wage setting and
supervision are class
practices. They determine the division of surplus between
workers and manage-
ment and control the work process and workers. Gender and
race affect assump-
tions about skill, responsibility, and a fair wage for jobs and
workers, helping to
produce wage differences (Figart, Mutari, and Power 2002).
Wage setting is often a bureaucratic organizational process,
integrated into
the processes of creating hierarchy, as I described above. Many
different wage-
setting systems exist, many of them producing gender and race
differences in
pay. Differential gender-based evaluations may be embedded in
even the most
egalitarian-appearing systems. For example, in my study of
Swedish banks in
the 1980s, a pay gap between women and men was increasing
within job cate-
gories in spite of gender equality in wage agreements between
the union and
employers (Acker 1991). Our research revealed that the gap was
increasing
because the wage agreement allowed a small proportion of
negotiated increases
to be allocated by local managers to reward particularly high-
performing work-
ers. These small increments went primarily to men; over time,
the increases
produced a growing gender gap. In interviews we learned that
male employees
were more visible to male managers than were female

employees. I suspected
that the male managers also felt that a fair wage for men was
actually higher
than a fair wage for women. I drew two implications from these
findings: first,
that individualized wage-setting produces inequality, and
second, that to under-
stand wage inequality it is necessary to delve into the details of
wage-setting
systems.
Supervisory practices also vary across organizations.
Supervisory relations may
be affected by the gender and race of both supervisor and
subordinate, in some
cases preserving or reproducing gender or race inequalities. For
example, above I
described how women and men in the same aspiranter job
classification in Swedish
banks were assigned to different duties by their supervisors.
Supervisors probably
shape their behaviors with subordinates in terms of race and
gender in many other
work situations, influencing in subtle ways the existing patterns
of inequality. Much
of this can be observed in the informal interactions of
workplaces.

Informal interactions while “doing the work.” A large literature
exists on the
reproduction of gender in interactions in organizations (Reskin
2003; Ridgeway
1997). The production of racial inequalities in workplace
interactions has not
been studied so frequently (Vallas 2003), while the reproduction
of class relations
in the daily life of organizations has been studied in the labor
process tradition,
as I noted above. The informal interactions and practices in
which class, race, and
gender inequalities are created in mutually reinforcing
processes have not so
often been documented, although class processes are usually
implicit in studies
of gendered or racialized inequalities.
As women and men go about their everyday work, they
routinely use gender-,
race-, and class-based assumptions about those with whom they
interact, as I briefly
noted above in regard to wage setting. Body differences provide
clues to the
appropriate assumptions, followed by appropriate behaviors.
What is appropriate
varies, of course, in relation to the situation, the organizational
culture and his-
tory, and the standpoints of the people judging appropriateness.
For example,
managers may expect a certain class deference or respect for
authority that varies
with the race and gender of the subordinate; subordinates may
assume that their
positions require deference and respect but also find these
demands demeaning or

oppressive. Jennifer Pierce (1995), in a study of two law firms,
showed how both
gendered and racialized interactions shaped the organizations’
class relations:
Women paralegals were put in the role of supportive, mothering
aides, while men
paralegals were cast as junior partners in the firms’ business.
African American
employees, primarily women in secretarial positions, were
acutely aware of the
ways in which they were routinely categorized and subordinated
in interactions
with both paralegals and attorneys. The interaction practices
that re-create gender
and racial inequalities are often subtle and unspoken, thus
difficult to document.
White men may devalue and exclude white women and people
of color by not lis-
tening to them in meetings, by not inviting them to join a group
going out for a
drink after work, by not seeking their opinions on workplace
problems. Other
practices, such as sexual harassment, are open and obvious to
the victim, but not
so obvious to others. In some organizations, such as those in the
travel and hos-
pitality industry, assumptions about good job performance may
be sexualized:
Women employees may be expected to behave and dress as
sexually attractive
women, particularly with male customers (Adkins 1995).

The Visibility of Inequalities
Visibility of inequality, defined as the degree of awareness of
inequalities,
varies in different organizations. Lack of awareness may be
intentional or unin-
tentional. Managers may intentionally hide some forms of
inequality, as in the
Swedish banks I studied (Acker 1991). Bank workers said that
they had been told
not to discuss their wages with their coworkers. Most seem to
have complied,
partly because they had strong feelings that their pay was part
of their identity,
reflecting their essential worth. Some said they would rather
talk about the details
of their sex lives than talk about their pay.
Visibility varies with the position of the beholder: “One
privilege of the privi-
leged is not to see their privilege.” Men tend not to see their
gender privilege;
whites tend not to see their race privilege; ruling class members
tend not to see
their class privilege (McIntosh 1995). People in dominant
groups generally see
inequality as existing somewhere else, not where they are.
However, patterns of
invisibility/visibility in organizations vary with the basis for the
inequality.
Gender and gender inequality tend to disappear in organizations
or are seen as

something that is beside the point of the organization.
Researchers examining
gender inequality have sometimes experienced this
disappearance as they have
discussed with managers and workers the ways that organizing
practices are gen-
dered (Ely and Meyerson 2000; Korvajärvi 2003). Other
research suggests that
practices that generate gender inequality are sometimes so
fleeting or so minor
that they are difficult to see.
Class also tends to be invisible. It is hidden by talk of
management, leadership,
or supervision among managers and those who write and teach
about organiza-
tions from a management perspective. Workers in lower-level,
nonmanagement
positions may be very conscious of inequalities, although they
might not identify
these inequities as related to class. Race is usually evident,
visible, but segregated,
denied, and avoided. In two of my organization studies, we have
asked questions
about race issues in the workplace (Morgen, Acker, and Weigt
n.d.). In both of
these studies, white workers on the whole could see no
problems with race or
racism, while workers of color had very different views. The
one exception was in
an office with a very diverse workforce, located in an area with
many minority res-
idents and high poverty rates. Here, jobs were segregated by
race, tensions were
high, and both white and Black workers were well aware of
racial incidents.

Another basis of inequality, sexuality, is almost always
invisible to the majority
who are heterosexual. Heterosexuality is simply assumed, not
questioned.
The Legitimacy of Inequalities
The legitimacy of inequalities also varies between
organizations. Some orga-
nizations, such as cooperatives, professional organizations, or
voluntary organiza-
tions with democratic goals, may find inequality illegitimate
and try to minimize
it. In other organizations, such as rigid bureaucracies,
inequalities are highly
legitimate. Legitimacy of inequality also varies with political
and economic con-
ditions. For example, in the United States in the 1960s and
1970s, the civil rights
and the women’s movements challenged the legitimacy of racial
and gender
inequalities, sometimes also challenging class inequality. These
challenges
spurred legislation and social programs to reduce inequality,
stimulating a decline
in the legitimacy of inequality in many aspects of U.S. life,
including work orga-

nizations. Organizations became vulnerable to lawsuits for
discrimination and
took defensive measures that included changes in hiring
procedures and educa-
tion about the illegitimacy of inequality. Inequality remained
legitimate in many
ways, but that entrenched legitimacy was shaken, I believe,
during this period.
Both differences and similarities exist among class, race, and
gender processes
and among the ways in which they are legitimized. Class is
fundamentally about
economic inequality. Both gender and race are also defined by
inequalities of var-
ious kinds, but I believe that gender and racial differences could
still conceivably
exist without inequality. This is, of course, a debatable
question. Class is highly
legitimate in U.S. organizations, as class practices, such as
paying wages and
maintaining supervisory oversight, are basic to organizing work
in capitalist
economies. Class may be seen as legitimate because it is seen as
inevitable at the
present time. This has not always been the case for all people in
the United States;
there have been periods, such as during the depression of the
1930s and during
the social movements of the 1960s, when large numbers of
people questioned
the legitimacy of class subordination.
Gender and race inequality are less legitimate than class.
Antidiscrimination
and civil rights laws limiting certain gender and race

discriminatory practices
have existed since the 1950s. Organizations claim to be
following those laws in
hiring, promotion, and pay. Many organizations have diversity
initiatives to
attract workforces that reflect their customer publics. No such
laws or voluntary
measures exist to question the basic legitimacy of class
practices, although mea-
sures such as the Fair Labor Standards Act could be interpreted
as mitigating the
most severe damages from those practices. In spite of
antidiscrimination and
affirmative action laws, gender and race inequalities continue in
work organiza-
tions. These inequalities are often legitimated through
arguments that naturalize
the inequality (Glenn 2002). For example, some employers still
see women as
more suited to child care and less suited to demanding careers
than men. Beliefs
in biological differences between genders8 and between
racial/ethnic groups, in
racial inferiority, and in the superiority of certain masculine
traits all legitimate
inequality. Belief in market competition and the natural
superiority of those who
succeed in the contest also naturalizes inequality.
Gender and race processes are more legitimate when embedded
in legitimate
class processes. For example, the low pay and low status of
clerical work is his-
torically and currently produced as both a class and a gender
inequality. Most
people take this for granted as just part of the way in which

work is organized.
Legitimacy, along with visibility, may vary with the situation of
the observer:
Some clerical workers do not see the status and pay of their jobs
as fair, while their
bosses would find such an assessment bizarre.9 The advantaged
often think their
advantage is richly deserved. They see visible inequalities as
perfectly legitimate.
High visibility and low legitimacy of inequalities may enhance
the possibili-
ties for change. Social movements may contribute to both high
visibility and low
legitimacy while agitating for change toward greater equality,
as I argued above.
Labor unions may also be more successful when visibility is
high and legitimacy
of inequalities is low.
Control and Compliance
Organizational controls are, in the first instance, class controls,
directed at
maintaining the power of managers, ensuring that employees act
to further the
organization’s goals, and getting workers to accept the system

of inequality.
Gendered and racialized assumptions and expectations are
embedded in the form
and content of controls and in the ways in which they are
implemented. Controls
are made possible by hierarchical organizational power, but
they also draw on
power derived from hierarchical gender and race relations. They
are diverse and
complex, and they impede changes in inequality regimes.
Mechanisms for exerting control and achieving compliance with
inequality
vary. Organization theorists have identified many types of
control, including
direct controls, unobtrusive or indirect controls, and
internalized controls. Direct
controls include bureaucratic rules and various punishments for
breaking the
rules. Rewards are also direct controls. Wages, because they are
essential for sur-
vival in completely monetized economies, are a powerful form
of control (Perrow
2002). Coercion and physical and verbal violence are also direct
controls often
used in organizations (Hearn and Parkin 2001). Unobtrusive and
indirect controls
include control through technologies, such as monitoring
telephone calls or time
spent online or restricting information flows. Selective
recruitment of relatively
powerless workers can be a form of control (Acker and Van
Houten 1974).
Recruitment of illegal immigrants who are vulnerable to
discovery and deporta-
tion and recruitment of women of color who have few

employment opportunities
and thus will accept low wages are examples of this kind of
control, which pre-
serves inequality.
Internalized controls include belief in the legitimacy of
bureaucratic structures
and rules as well as belief in the legitimacy of male and white
privilege.
Organizing relations, such as those between a manager and
subordinates, may be
legitimate, taken for granted as the way things naturally and
normally are.
Similarly, a belief that there is no point in challenging the
fundamental gender,
race, and class nature of things is a form of control. These are
internalized, often
invisible controls.10 Pleasure in the work is another
internalized control, as are fear
and self-interest. Interests can be categorized as economic,
status, and identity
interests, all of which may be produced as organizing takes
place. Identities, con-
stituted through gendered and racialized images and
experiences, are mutually
reproduced along with differences in status and economic
advantage. Those with

the most powerful and affluent combination of interests are apt
to be able to con-
trol others with the aim of preserving these interests. But their
self-interest
becomes a control on their own behavior.
CAN INEQUALITY REGIMES CHANGE?
Inequality regimes can be challenged and changed. However,
change is diffi-
cult and change efforts often fail. One reason is that owner and
managerial class
interests and the power those interests can mobilize usually
outweigh the class,
gender, and race interests of those who suffer inequality. Even
where no obvious
economic interests are threatened by changes, men managers
and lower-level
employees often insist on maintaining ongoing organizing
patterns that perpetu-
ate inequalities. For example, white masculine identity may be
tied to small rela-
tive advantages in workplace power and income. Advantage is
hard to give up:
Increasing equality with devalued groups can be seen and felt as
an assault on
dignity and masculinity. Several studies have shown that these
complicated
motives on the part of white men, in particular, can scuttle
efforts at organiza-
tional change, even when top management is supporting such
change. For exam-
ple, Cynthia Cockburn (1991) analyzed the multiple ways that
men resisted
equality efforts in four British organizations in spite of top-
level support for these

efforts. In the Oregon pay equity project (Acker 1989), some
male unionists could
not believe that women’s work might be as skilled as theirs and
thus deserve
higher pay. The men maintained this objection even though their
own wages
would not be lowered if the women’s wages were increased. It
was as though their
masculine self-respect depended, to a degree, on the differences
in pay between
women and men, not the actual level of pay.
Successful change projects seem to have had a number of
common character-
istics. First, change efforts that target a limited set of
inequality-producing mech-
anisms seem to be the most successful. In addition, successful
efforts appear to
have combined social movement and legislative support outside
the organization
with active support from insiders. In addition, successful efforts
often involve
coercion or threat of loss. Both affirmative action and pay
equity campaigns had
these characteristics. Affirmative action programs sought to
increase the employ-
ment opportunities for women of all races and men of color in
organizations and
jobs in which they had very low representation. The federal
legislation required
such programs, and similar equality efforts, in organizations
that received gov-
ernment funds. Employers who did not follow the law were
vulnerable to loss of
funds. Pay equity projects, intended to erase wage inequality
between women-

predominant jobs and men-predominant jobs of equal value,
were authorized
primarily by state and local legislation and took place primarily
in public-sector
organizations. In both types of efforts, the mobilization of civil
rights and women’s
movement groups was essential to success.
When the political climate changed, beginning in the 1980s,
pressures against
such equality-producing initiatives grew.11 By 2006,
affirmative action programs
had become mere bureaucratic paper shuffling in most
organizations, undermined
by a lack of outside enforcement and inside activism and by
legal attacks by white
men claiming reverse discrimination.12 Pay equity efforts were
undermined
by industrial restructuring, attacks on labor unions,
delegitimation of the public
sector, and legal attacks.13 Industrial restructuring began to
undermine blue-
collar, well-paid, male employment and to turn unions away
from pay equity to
the problems of their white male members and the defense of
unions themselves
against employer attacks. Unions had been prime actors in the

pay equity move-
ment; their relative weakening undermined the movement.
Furthermore, govern-
ment organizations came under attack in the era of private-
sector, free market
celebration, and funds for various programs including wage
reforms were cut.
When pay equity campaigns succeeded, wage gains were often
modest, as, for
example, the Oregon case showed (Acker 1989). The modest
gains that did occur
resulted from political compromise to keep costs down: The
potential costs of
raising clerical and other service workers’ pay to comparable
levels with skilled
blue-collar workers or the pay of female-typed professions to
the pay of male-
typed professions were enormous. These potential costs were, I
believe, the
underlying reasons for legal challenges to pay equity (Nelson
and Bridges 1999).
Real pay equity extending into the private sector would have
imposed huge
increases in labor costs at the very time that employers were
cutting their work-
forces, turning to temporary workers, outsourcing, and off-
shoring jobs to save on
labor costs.
The history of pay equity projects reveals a fundamental
contradiction facing
many efforts to reform inequality regimes: The goals of
inequality reduction or
elimination are the opposite of some of the goals of employing
organizations, par-
ticularly in the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first

century. In the
private sector, management wants to reduce costs, increase
profit, and distribute
as much as possible of the profit to top management and
shareholders. In the pub-
lic sector, management wants to reduce costs and minimize
taxes. Reducing costs
involves reducing wages, not raising them, as pay equity would
require. While
wage inequality is not the only form of inequality, eliminating
that inequality may
be basic to dealing with other forms as well.
Another lesson of this history is that a focus on delimited areas
of inequality,
such as gender and racial imbalance in job categories or pay
gaps between
female and male jobs of equal value, do nothing to address
underlying organi-
zational class inequality. Both of these models of intervention
work within the
organizational class structure: Affirmative action intends to
remove racial and
gender barriers to entry into existing hierarchical positions; pay
equity efforts
compare male and female jobs and sometimes white
predominant jobs and

other-than-white predominant jobs within organizational class
levels, not across
those levels.14
These interventions also fail to address other underlying
processes of inequal-
ity regimes: the male model of organizing or the persistent
gendering and racial-
ization of interactions in the workplace. Family-friendly
policies provide only
temporary relief for some people from the male model of
organizing. The use of
family-friendly policies, primarily by women when they have
young children, or
the use of part-time work, again primarily involving women,
may increase gender
inequalities in organizations (Glass 2004). Such measures may
reinforce, not under-
mine, the male model of organizing by defining those who
conform to it as serious,
committed workers and those who do not as rather peripheral
and probably unworthy
of promotions and pay increases (Hochschild 1997).
Diversity programs and policies seem to be often aimed at some
of the more
subtle discriminatory processes dividing organizational
participants along lines
of race/ethnicity and sometimes gender through education and
consciousness
raising. Diversity programs replaced, in many organizations, the
affirmative
action programs that came under attack. As Kelly and Dobbin
(1998) point out,
diversity programs lack the timetables, goals, and other
proactive measures of

affirmative action and may be more acceptable to management
for that reason.
But that may also be a reason that diversity training will not
basically alter
assumptions and actions that are rooted in the legitimation of
systems of orga-
nizational power and reward that favor whites, particularly
white men. The
legitimacy of inequality, fear of retaliation, and cynicism limit
support for
change. The invisibility of inequality to those with privilege
does not give way
easily to entreaties to see what is going on. The intimate
entwining of privilege
with gendered and racialized identity makes privilege
particularly difficult to
unsettle.
Change projects focused on gendered behaviors that are
dysfunctional for the
organization provide examples of the almost unshakable fusion
of gendered iden-
tities and workplace organizing practices. For example, Robin
Ely and Debra
Meyerson (2000) describe a change project aimed at discovering
why a company
had difficulty retaining high-level women managers and
difficulty increasing the
proportion of women in upper management. The
researcher/change agents docu-
mented a culture and organizing practices at the executive level
that rewarded
stereotypical “heroic” male problem-solving behaviors, tended
to denigrate
women who attempted to be heroes, and failed to reward the
mundane organiza-

tion building most often done by women. Although members of
the management
group could see that these ways of behaving were dysfunctional
for the organi-
zation, they did not make the links between these organizing
practices, gender,
and the underrepresentation of women. In their eyes, the low
representation of
women in top jobs was still due to the failure of individual
women, not to system
processes.
GLOBALIZATION, RESTRUCTURING,
AND CHANGE IN INEQUALITY REGIMES
Organizational restructuring of the past 30 years has contributed
to increasing
variation in inequality regimes. Restructuring, new technology,
and the global-
ization of production contribute to rising competitive pressures
in private-sector
organizations and budget woes in public-sector organizations,
making challenges
to inequality regimes less likely to be undertaken than during
the 1960s to the
1980s. The following are some of the ways in which variations
in U.S. inequality
regimes seem to have increased. These are speculations because,

in my view,
there is not yet sufficient evidence as to how general or how
lasting these changes
might be.
The shape and degree of inequality seem to have become more
varied. Old,
traditional bureaucracies with career ladders still exist.
Relatively new organi-
zations, such as Wal-Mart, also have such hierarchical
structures. At the same
time, in many organizations, certain inequalities are
externalized in new seg-
mented organizing forms as both production and services are
carried out in
other, low-wage countries, often in organizations that are in a
formal, legal
sense separate organizations. If these production units are seen
as part of the
core organizations, earnings inequalities are increasing rapidly
in many differ-
ent organizations. But wage inequalities are also increasing
within core U.S.-
based sectors of organizations.
White working- and middle-class men, as well as white women
and all people
of color, have been affected by restructuring, downsizing, and
the export of jobs
to low-wage countries. White men’s advantage seems threatened
by these changes,
but at least one study shows that white men find new
employment after layoffs
and downsizing more rapidly than people in other gender/race
categories and that
they find better jobs (Spalter-Roth and Deitch 1999). And a

substantial wage gap
still exists between women and men. Moreover, white men still
dominate local
and global organizations. In other words, inequality regimes
still seem to place
white men in advantaged positions in spite of the erosion of
advantages for middle-
and lower-level men workers.
Inequalities of power within organizations, particularly in the
United States, also
seem to be increasing with the present dominance of global
corporations and their
free market ideology, the decline in the size and influence of
labor unions, and the
increase in job insecurity as downsizing and reorganization
continue. The increase
in contingent and temporary workers who have less
participation in decisions and
less security than regular workers also increases power
inequality. Unions still exer-
cise some power, but they exist in only a very small minority of
private-sector orga-
nizations and a somewhat larger minority of public-sector
unions.
Organizing processes that create and re-create inequalities may
have become
more subtle, but in some cases, they have become more difficult
to challenge. For
example, the unencumbered male worker as the model for the
organization of

daily work and the model of the excellent employee seems to
have been strength-
ened. Professionals and managers, in particular, work long
hours and often are
evaluated on their “face time” at work and their willingness to
put work and the
organization before family and friends (Hochschild 1997;
Jacobs and Gerson
2004). New technology makes it possible to do some jobs
anywhere and to be in
touch with colleagues and managers at all hours of day and
night. Other workers
lower in organizational hierarchies are expected to work as the
employer
demands, overtime or at odd hours. Such often excessive or
unpredictable
demands are easier to meet for those without daily family
responsibilities. Other
gendered aspects of organizing processes may be less obvious
than before sex and
racial discrimination emerged as legal issues. For example,
employers can no
longer legally exclude young women on the grounds that they
may have babies
and leave the job, nor can they openly exclude consideration of
people of color.
But informal exclusion and unspoken denigration are still
widespread and still
difficult to document and to confront.
The visibility of inequality to those in positions of power does

not seem to
have changed. However, the legitimacy of inequality in the eyes
of those with
money and power does seem to have changed: Inequality is
more legitimate. In a
culture that glorifies individual material success and applauds
extreme competi-
tive behavior in pursuit of success, inequality becomes a sign of
success for those
who win.
Controls that ensure compliance with inequality regimes have
also become
more effective and perhaps more various. With threats of
downsizing and off-
shoring, decreasing availability of well-paying jobs for clerical,
service, and man-
ual workers, and undermining of union strength and welfare
state supports,
protections against the loss of a living wage are eroded and
employees become
more vulnerable to the control of the wage system itself. That
is, fear of loss of
livelihood controls those who might challenge inequality.
CONCLUSION
I had two goals in writing this article. The first was to develop a
conceptual
strategy for analyzing the mutual production of gender, race,
and class inequali-
ties in work organizations. I have suggested the idea of
inequality regimes, inter-
linked organizing processes that produce patterns of complex
inequalities. These
processes and patterns vary in different organizations; the

severity of inequalities,
their visibility and legitimacy, and the possibilities for change
toward less
inequality also vary from organization to organization. In the
United States at the
present time, almost all organizations have two characteristics
that rarely vary:
Class inequality, inflected through gendered and racialized
beliefs and practices,
is the normal and natural bedrock of organizing, and white men
are the normal
and natural top leaders.
My second goal was to better understand why so many
organizational equal-
ity projects have had only modest success or have failed
altogether. Looking at
organizations as inequality regimes may give some clues about
why change pro-
jects designed to increase equality are so often less than
successful. Change
toward greater equality is possible, but difficult, because of
entrenched economic
(class) interests, the legitimacy of class interests, and
allegiances to gendered and
racialized identities and advantages. When class identities and
interests are inte-
grated with gender and racial identities and interests, opposition

may be most
virulent to any moves to alter the combined advantages.
However, top male exec-
utives who are secure in their multiple advantages and
privileges may be more
supportive of reducing inequalities than male middle managers
who may lose
proportionately more through equality organizing.
Greater equality inside organizations is difficult to achieve
during a period,
such as the early years of the twenty-first century, in which
employers are push-
ing for more inequality in pay, medical care, and retirement
benefits and are
using various tactics, such as downsizing and outsourcing, to
reduce labor costs.
Another major impediment to change within inequality regimes
is the absence
of broad social movements outside organizations agitating for
such changes. In
spite of all these difficulties, efforts at reducing inequality
continue. Government
regulatory agencies, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in partic-
ular, are still enforcing antidiscrimination laws that prohibit
discrimination
against specific individuals (see www.eeoc.gov/stats/).
Resolutions of com-
plaints through the courts may mandate some organizational
policy changes, but
these seem to be minimal. Campaigns to alter some inequality
regimes are under
way. For example, a class action lawsuit on behalf of Wal-
Mart’s 1.3 million
women workers is making its way through the courts

(Featherstone 2004). The
visibility of inequality seems to be increasing, and its
legitimacy decreasing.
Perhaps this is the opening move in a much larger, energetic
attack on inequal-
ity regimes.
NOTES
1. Some of the analysis in this article is based on chapter 5 in
my book Class Questions: Feminist
Answers (Acker 2006). I began to develop the concept of
inequality regimes in a series of papers
beginning in 1999 (see Acker 2000).
2. An outstanding exception to this generalization is Cynthia
Cockburn’s (1991) In the Way of
Women: Men’s Resistance to Sex Equality in Organizations.
Cockburn’s study of gender equality pro-
grams in four large British organizations integrates
understanding of class processes and racial dis-
crimination in her analysis of efforts to achieve sex equality.
3. I base my analysis primarily on organizations in the United
States. However, I also use
research that I and others have done in Sweden, Norway, and
Finland, where inequality issues in orga-
nizations are quite similar to those in the United States.
4. At that time, the employees of all banks in Sweden were
organized by the same union,
Svenskabankmannaforbundet. Thus, a union-management
agreement applied to all banks, although

they were separate enterprises. Also, at that time, the union
cooperated with management on issues of
organization of work. In our study, we did observations and
interviews in branches of the two largest
Swedish banks.
5. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s (1977) Men and Women of the
Corporation for an early analysis
of the gendered realities faced by managerial women, realities
of the workplace that made top jobs
more difficult for women than for men. These gendered class
realities still exist 30 years later,
although they may not be as widespread as in 1977.
6. Women have never been more than a tiny fraction of the
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. In
2004, eight women were 1.6 percent of the CEOs of these
companies (see http://www.catalyst.org/
files/fact/COTE%20Factsheet%202002updated.pdf).
7. In some European and Scandinavian countries in the 1970s
and 1980s, there was a push for
workplace democracy by social democratic parties and labor
confederations that resulted in a number
of innovations to give workers, usually through their unions,
more voice in organizing decisions. In
Sweden, for example, a codetermination law was passed in the
late 1970s encouraging the signing of
labor-management contracts on employee/union participation in
many company and workplace issues

(Forsebäck 1980). No such broad initiatives occurred in the
United States.
8. An example of such naturalization of inequality occurred in
2005 when Lawrence Summers,
then president of Harvard, explained the low representation of
women in science by saying that
women did not have the natural ability to do mathematics that
men had. The local and national uproar
over this explanation of inequality indicates how illegitimate
such arguments have become.
9. The film 9 to 5 with Dolly Parton, Jane Fonda, and others
captured this alternative view from
below. Its great success suggests a wide and sympathetic
audience that understood the critique of
workplace relations.
10. Charles Perrow (1986) calls these “premise controls,” the
underlying assumptions about the
way things are.
11. For a review and assessment of legislation and court
antidiscrimination cases related to racial
inequality, see Brown et al. (2003, chap. 5).
12. For an analysis of affirmative action and women’s
employment, see Reskin (1998).
13. Figart, Mutari, and Power (2002) discuss several reasons for
the demise of comparable worth,
including the privatization of many public services. See also
Nelson and Bridges (1999) for a discus-
sion that includes an analysis of court cases undermining pay
equity.

14. Cynthia Cockburn (1991) also makes this point.
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Food Stamps: A Study of
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__MACOSX/required readings (part2)/._Acker 2006.PDF
required readings (part2)/GC_brochure_FINAL[1].pdf
Corporate Sustainability in
the World Economy

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Launched in July 2000, the UN Global Compact
is a leadership platform for the development,
implementation and disclosure of responsible
and sustainable corporate policies and practices.
Endorsed by chief executives, it seeks to align busi-
ness operations and strategies everywhere with
ten universally accepted principles in the areas
of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption. With more than 8,500 signatories in
over 135 countries, the UN Global Compact is the
world’s largest voluntary corporate sustainability
initiative.
Through a wide spectrum of specialized work-
streams, management tools, resources, and topical
programs, the UN Global Compact aims to advance
two complementary objectives:
• Mainstream the ten principles in business
activities around the world
• Catalyze actions in support of broader UN
goals, including the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs)
By doing so, business, as the primary driver of
globalization, can help ensure that markets, com-
merce, technology and finance advance in ways
that benefit economies and societies everywhere
and contribute to a more sustainable and inclusive
global economy.

The UN Global Compact is not a regulatory instru-
ment, but rather a voluntary initiative that relies
on public accountability, transparency and disclo-
sure to complement regulation and to provide a
space for innovation and collective action.
What is the UN Global Compact?
Never before has there been a greater alignment between the
objectives of the internation-
al community and those of the business world. Common goals,
such as building markets,
combating corruption, safeguarding the environment and
ensuring social inclusion, have
resulted in unprecedented partnerships and openness between
business, governments, civil
society, labour and the United Nations.
• Adopting an established and globally recognized
policy framework for the development, imple-
mentation, and disclosure of environmental,
social, and governance policies and practices.
• Sharing best and emerging practices to advance
practical solutions and strategies to common
challenges.
• Advancing sustainability solutions in partner-
ship with a range of stakeholders, including UN
agencies, governments, civil society, labour, and
other non-business interests.
• Linking business units and subsidiaries across
the value chain with the UN Global Compact’s

Local Networks around the world – many of
these in developing and emerging markets.
• Accessing the United Nations knowledge of and
experience with sustainability and development
issues.
• Utilizing UN Global Compact management tools
and resources, and the opportunity to engage in
specialized workstreams in the environmental,
social and governance realms.
Why Should Companies Participate
The UN Global Compact seeks to combine the best properties of
the UN, such as moral
authority and convening power, with the private sector’s
solution-finding strengths and
resources, and the expertise and capacities of other key
stakeholders. The initiative is
global and local; private and public; voluntary, yet accountable.
Participation in the UN Global Compact offers a wide array of
practical benefits:
the Corporate Commitment
The UN Global Compact is a leadership initiative,
requiring a commitment signed by the compa-
ny’s chief executive, and, where applicable, en-
dorsed by the highest-level governance body. Any
company joining the initiative is expected to:
• make the UN Global Compact and its principles
an integral part of business strategy, day-to-day
operations, and organizational culture;

• incorporate the UN Global Compact and its
principles in the decision-making processes of
the highest-level governance body;
• engage in partnerships to advance broader
development objectives (such as the MDGs);
• integrate in its annual report (or in a similar
public document, such as a sustainability
report) a description of the ways in which it
implements the principles and supports
broader development objectives (also known
as the Communication on Progress); and
• advance the UN Global Compact and the case
for responsible business practices through ad-
vocacy and outreach to peers, partners, clients,
consumers and the public at large.
How do you join the UN Global Compact?
To participate in the UN Global Compact,
a company:
• Sends a letter signed by the chief executive
(and, where possible, endorsed by the board) to
the United Nations Secretary-General express-
ing support for the UN Global Compact and its
principles (mailing address: United Nations,
New York, NY 10017; fax: +1(212) 963-1207).
• Completes the online registration form on the
UN Global Compact website (www.unglobal
compact.org) and uploads a digital copy of the
letter of commitment.

Financial Contributions
In addition to these actions, participating compa-
nies are asked, upon joining, to make an annual
financial contribution to help support the work
of the UN Global Compact. suggested annual
contribution levels are set as follows:
• USD 10,000 for companies with annual
revenues of USD 1 billion or more;
• USD 5,000 for companies with annual revenues
between USD 250 million and USD 1 billion;
• USD 2,500 for companies with annual revenues
between USD 25 million and USD 250 million;
• USD 500 for companies with annual revenues
of less than USD 250 million.
Further sponsorship opportunities are
available for events and specialized work
streams.
The Foundation for the Global Compact serves as
the financial intermediary for all contributions
(www.globalcompactfoundation.org).
“ We need business to give practical meaning
and reach to the values and principles that
connect cultures and people everywhere.”
— Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Participation in the UN Global Compact
blueprint for Corporate

sustainability leadership
The Blueprint is a model for achieving higher
levels of performance and generating enhanced
value through the Global Compact. It provides
an action plan in three core areas: (i) integrating
the Global Compact ten principles into
strategies and operations; (ii) taking action in
support of broader UN goals and issues; and
(iii) engaging with the Global Compact. The
Blueprint identifies best practices in each of
these dimensions, with a total of 50 criteria for
leadership. The Blueprint sets targets that all
companies can work towards in order to ascend
the learning and performance curve.
Global Compact Local Networks:
Local Networks in over 90 countries perform
increasingly important roles in rooting the
UN Global Compact within different national
and cultural contexts. As self-governed multi-
stakeholder bodies led by business, they support
companies in their implementation efforts,
while also creating opportunities for further en-
gagement and collective action. Local Networks
also play a key role in facilitating participants’
Communications on Progress and safeguarding
the overall integrity and brand of the Global
Compact.
Dialogue and Learning: A culture of dialogue
and learning is crucial to continuous perfor-
mance improvement. From its inception, the
UN Global Compact has fostered and promoted

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