Sun, sea, sand and tsunami examiningdisaster vulnerability .docx

Sun, sea, sand and tsunami: examining
disaster vulnerability in the tourism
community of Khao Lak, Thailand
Emma Calgaro1 and Kate Lloyd2
1Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University,
Sydney, Australia and Stockholm Environment
Institute – Asia Centre, Bangkok, Thailand
2Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University,
Sydney, Australia
Correspondence: Emma Calgaro (email: [email protected])
The impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on coastal tourism
communities highlights the
vulnerability of tourism destinations to external shocks. Based
on fieldwork conducted in Thailand
in the wake of this disaster, this paper addresses one
fundamental question: what sociopolitical and
environmental conditions contributed to the vulnerability of the
affected tourism community of
Khao Lak in the southern Phang Nga Province. We argue that an
understanding of the root causes
of destination vulnerability is vital not only for the successful

implementation of regional recovery
plans, but also for building long-term resilience against future
shocks. In the absence of an appro-
priate tourism vulnerability framework, this paper analyzes
Khao Lak’s vulnerability through an
innovative theoretical framework comprised of the
sustainability vulnerability framework, rela-
tional scale and place. The findings reveal that Khao Lak’s
vulnerability is shaped by 13 interlinked
factors. These are the complex outcomes of social norms and
developmental and dynamic gover-
nance processes driven by the competing agendas and scaled
actions of key government and industry
stakeholders. The identification and understanding of the
drivers of Khao Lak’s vulnerability and a
strong vulnerability framework have significant implications for
the wider tourism community. First,
the empirical findings provide tourism communities with a
blueprint for understanding the foun-
dations of their vulnerability to external shocks. Second, the
tourism vulnerability framework
presented here provides destination communities and
government stakeholders with an analytical
tool through which to analyze their unique sociopolitical

conditions. Together, these empirical and
theoretical contributions bring us closer to securing sustainable
livelihood futures for tourism
dependent communities.
Keywords: coastal hazards, place, relational scale, sustainable
development, tourism, vulnerability
assessment
Introduction
The World Tourism Organization (WTO) and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs)
such as Tourism Concern and the Netherlands Development
Programme have endorsed
tourism as having the capacity to stimulate development,
economic growth, new oppor-
tunities for poverty alleviation and self-governance, particularly
in regions that are
resource-scarce and have limited livelihood options. (Ashley et
al., 2000; WTO, 2005a).
Such endorsements have enticed many developing countries to
embrace tourism as a
viable livelihood alternative where fragmented small
economies, limited natural
resources (Wilkinson, 1989) and unequal terms of trade (Oliver-
Smith, 1996; Bankoff,
2003) limit livelihood options. This development trend has seen
tourism eclipse tradi-
tional subsistence-based livelihoods such as agriculture and
fishing as the main source
of revenue (Richter, 1993; UNEP, 2002).

Missing from the WTO’s advocacy of tourism’s developmental
capabilities is an
acknowledgement of the inherent vulnerability of host
communities to shocks, as was
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9493.2008.00335.x
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 29 (2008) 288–306
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Department of Geography, National
University of Singapore and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
mailto:[email protected]
powerfully demonstrated by the impacts of the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami. The reper-
cussions of prior events such as the 1997–1998 Asian financial
crises, the Bali bombings
of 2001 and 2005, the severe acute respiratory syndrome and
bird flu epidemics of 2003
and 2004 had already highlighted the sensitivity of destination
communities to both
localized and remote events beyond their control (Ritchie,
2004).
In the light of this, we deem it essential to investigate how
long-term benefits from
tourism can be sustained in the face of risk and vulnerability by
incorporating an
assessment of a host community’s vulnerability into all tourism
development and
management strategies. Research on risk and sustainability
supports this view: long-

term resilience plans aimed at securing future sustainable
livelihoods cannot be opera-
tionalized without an understanding of the underlying
sociopolitical processes and
environmental linkages that underpin vulnerability (Clark et al.,
2000; Cutter et al.,
2000; Pelling, 2003; Turner et al., 2003; Thomalla et al., 2006).
The tourism literature identifies five factors that help to explain
why some
destinations are vulnerable to shocks: the place-specific nature
of tourist activity
(Richter & Waugh, 1986, Sönmez et al., 1999), the fragility of
destination images
to negative perceptions of risk (Richter & Waugh, 1986;
Sönmez & Graefe, 1998;
Mansfeld, 1999; Huan et al., 2004), a high dependency on
tourism as a primary live-
lihood (Knox & Marston, 2004; Ritchie, 2004), a heavy reliance
on the marketing
strategies of international tour operators (Knox & Marston,
2004), and high levels of
seasonality (Méheaux & Parker, 2006). These are common
characteristics of tourism
activity in many developing country destinations including
those affected by the 2004
tsunami, in Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The growing
popularity of using
tourism as a development tool in resource-scarce regions will
likely see this vulner-
ability increase (Knox & Marston, 2004). Seasonal tourism
flows and annual business
revenue can easily be disrupted by shocks, causing simultaneous
losses for household,
community, regional and national actors. Losses further
diminish investment confi-

dence, lower rates of job creation, slow economic growth and
reduce gross domestic
product (GDP) (Sönmez et al., 1999; Gurtner, 2004). Richter
and Waugh (1986)
observe that if there is trouble in one area tourists simply
choose alternate destina-
tions, which demonstrates the most disempowering
characteristic of tourism-
dependence for destination households and communities. In
contrast, international
tour operators and national governments anxious to retain
projected levels of GDP
and foreign exchange can avoid this pitfall by diverting
business to alternate
in-country or regional destinations.
While the identification of these provide significant insights
into the vulnerability of
tourism communities, a systematic analysis of the place-specific
environmental and
sociopolitical causal factors underlying vulnerability in tourism
destinations is missing.
This research addresses this omission by focusing on the
impacts of the 2004 tsunami
on Khao Lak, Phang Nga Province, southern Thailand. By so
doing, it provides the
foundational knowledge necessary for tourism community
stakeholders, regional plan-
ners and policy makers to formulate robust resilience building
strategies that account
for the root causes of destination vulnerability rather than the
consequences of shocks
alone.
Building a framework for analyzing tourism destination
vulnerability

Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, vulnerability is
recognized as a multidimen-
sional product of the coupled human–environment system and
defined as:
Examining disaster vulnerability, Thailand 289
The degree to which an exposure unit [human groups,
ecosystems and communities] is
susceptible to harm due to exposure to a perturbation or stress,
and the ability (or lack thereof)
of the exposure unit to cope, recover, or fundamentally adapt
(become a new system or
become extinct) (Kasperson et al., 2002: 7).
The vulnerability of a community or group is determined by
three dynamic and inter-
connected dimensions: exposure, sensitivity, and resilience
(Clark et al., 2000; Turner
et al., 2003). Exposure, a product of physical location and the
character of the built and
natural environment (Pelling, 2003: 48), is defined as the degree
to which an exposure
unit comes into contact with stressors or shocks (Clark et al.,
2000: 2). Sensitivity is
defined as the degree to which an exposure unit is affected by
any set of stresses (Clark
et al., 2000) and reflects the capacity of individuals or groups to
anticipate and with-
stand the impacts of a hazard (Pelling, 2003: 48). Sensitivity is

characterised predomi-
nantly by preexisting conditions of the social system that may
be improved or
exacerbated by coping and adaptation strategies post-shock.
Resilience is defined as the
ability of an exposure unit to absorb and adapt to recurrent
external stresses without
losing its fundamental structure and function (Adger et al.,
2002). Resilience is a direct
expression of the strength of the coupled human–environment
system reflecting its self
organization, learning, and adaptation capabilities in response
to shocks (Carpenter
et al., 2001).
The ability to anticipate, withstand, and recover from shocks
hinges upon people’s
access and entitlements to natural, economic, social and
political capital. These, in turn,
are determined by the strength and effectiveness of the
governance systems and social
networks (Hewitt, 1997; Adger, 2003) that facilitate (or
constrain) access to capital and
the competing agendas and ideologies driving them (Adger,
1999; Pelling, 2003; Wisner
et al., 2004). These are expressed through formal government
structures, political ide-
ologies, ethnicity, class, religion and social norms determined
by human agency and
wider historically embedded and contemporary sociopolitical
and economic processes
operating simultaneously at multiple scales of social
organization (Kelly & Adger, 2000;
Bankoff, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). An awareness of the
processes that drive the uneven
distribution of power and resources within the social system is

therefore crucial to
understanding vulnerability.
Climate change, disaster management and food security research
has provided
numerous frameworks and methods for assessing vulnerability
in risk prone locations
(see Cannon et al., 2003), but none of these approaches have
been adapted to assess
vulnerability in tourism destinations. Nankervis (2000) does
provide an industry specific
vulnerability framework but its focus on all tourism business
stakeholders operating at
the global to local scales leaves the framework lacking
necessary detail at the commu-
nity level. In the absence of a suitable framework, this paper
presents a robust tourism
vulnerability framework consisting of three complementary
theoretical constructs:
Turner et al.’s (2003) sustainability vulnerability framework,
relational scale and place.
Together, these theoretical tools create a strong framework for
analyzing the multiple
causal factors and underlying power discourses that contribute
to the vulnerability of
tourism communities.
The sustainability vulnerability framework
Born out of the interdisciplinary systems approach to
vulnerability analysis, Turner et al.
(2003) present a framework that systematically identifies and
maps the scaled inter-
linked components and processes that heighten vulnerability
within the human–
290 Emma Calgaro and Kate Lloyd

environment system. Turner et al.’s (2003) sustainability
vulnerability framework was
chosen to guide and structure the analysis of destination
vulnerability based on its
inclusion of the multiple attributes of vulnerability. It captures
the dynamic and differ-
ential nature of vulnerability whereby populations,
characteristics and driving forces of
vulnerability change over space and time (Vogel & O’Brien,
2004). The framework not
only recognises that an individual’s or group’s exposure,
sensitivity and resilience to
shocks is directly linked to access and entitlements to resources
in a given location
(Figure 1) but also places this experience within a wider
context. The focus of the
framework expands to show the way in which resource
entitlements, distribution and
usage is influenced by evolutionary (Cutter et al., 2000;
Bankoff, 2003) sociopolitical
and environmental processes operating at multiple scales of
social organisation
(Figure 2). Further, the framework also shows that vulnerability
is affected by multiple
and compounding stressors and a population’s capacity to
respond and adapt over time
and space (including consequences and risks of slow and poor
recoveries) (Lewis, 1999;
Cutter et al., 2000; Turner et al., 2003; Adger, 2006).
However, the sustainability vulnerability framework does not
offer a forum for
analyzing how various social actors use scaled sociopolitical

processes and structures to
both facilitate and constrain access to capital, which in turn
influences an individual’s or
community’s vulnerability to external shocks. The geographical
concepts of relational
scale and place fulfil these analytical requirements.
The dynamics of relational scale
Stemming from geographical theory on spatial organization,
relational scale recognizes
scale as a fluid and dynamic sociopolitical construct that
reflects the subjectivity of
historical and contemporary power processes. Through the
deconstruction of ‘natural-
ized’ scales of social organization (such as national, regional,
local, and so on), relational
scale explores the way in which actors simultaneously use
multiple scaled social pro-
cesses and supporting structures to either reinforce the uneven
balance of power within
a given society or create new landscapes of power, recognition
and opportunity (Howitt,
1993; Ellem, 2002; Herod & Wright, 2002). The angle depends
on the politicized
agendas or positionality of the actors involved. Put simply,
knowing which political
buttons to press and at what scale is crucial in bringing about a
favourable outcome.
Recognizing scale as an expression of power and control over
capital, relational scale
adds depth and dynamism to Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability
framework by exposing
the underlying sociopolitical processes and corresponding
structures that perpetuate
social inequality, and the agendas that drive them. This creates

an invaluable medium
for analyzing the vulnerability of tourism communities in three
ways. First, its focus on
stakeholder dynamics requires the identification of the various
actors that influence
destination vulnerability. Second, it explores how these
stakeholders position them-
selves within the political arena to increase their access to
capital. Finally, the identifi-
cation of key stakeholders with vested interests in tourism
development and the
multiscaled structures they work through provide planners,
policy makers and commu-
nity members with a clear directive regarding the type of
resilience strategies required,
the target audience and the most appropriate scales for policy
intervention.
Place: a sociopolitically charged landscape
Place provides a theoretical lens through which to define Khao
Lak as the subject
of study and ‘situate’ it within the wider structures and
processes that influence
its vulnerability. The concept of place is more than a physical
location or politically
Vulnerability
Exposure Sensitivity Resilience
Adjustment and
adaptation/response

(e.g. newprogrammes, policy,
& autonomous options)
Impact/response
(e.g. loss of life,
economic production,
soil, ecosystem
service)
Coping/
response
(e.g. extant
programmes,
policy,
autonomous
options)
Human conditions
social/human capital & endowments
(e.g. population, entitlements,
institutions, economic structures)
Environmental conditions
natural capital/biophysical
endowments
(e.g. soil, water, climate,
minerals, ecosystemstructure
& function)
Components
(e.g. individuals,

households,
classes, firms,
states, flora/fauna,
ecosystems)
Characteristics
(e.g. frequency,
magnitude,
duration)
Figure 1. Interactive components of vulnerability within a given
place from Turner et al. (2003: 8077,
Figure 4). Inset figure at the top left refers to the full
vulnerability framework at Figure 2 below. (Copyright
(2003) National Academy of Sciences, USA; reproduced with
permission.)
Adjustment &
adaptation/
response
Coping/
response
Vulnerability
Characteristics
& components
of exposure
Human

conditions
Environmental
conditions
Impact/
response
Interactions of hazards
(perturbations, stresses,
stressors)
Variability & change
in human conditions
Variability & change
in environmental
conditions
Environmental influences outside the place
State of biosphere, state of nature,
global environmental changes
Impact/
responses
Adjustment &
adaptation/
response
Human influences outside the place
Macro political economy, institutions,

global trends and transitions
ConsequencesDrivers/causes
System operates at multiple
spatial, functional and
temporal scales
World
Region
Place
Dynamics
Cross-scale
In place
Beyond place
Figure 2. The sustainability vulnerability framework proposed
by Turner et al. (2003: 8076, Figure 3).
(Copyright (2003) National Academy of Sciences, USA;
reproduced with permission.)
demarcated space. Place embodies a sociopolitically charged
landscape infused with
multiple layers of meaning, collective identities, experiences
and understandings devel-
oped over time and space (Massey, 1993). Like vulnerability,
place is an ever evolving
multifaceted creation of social processes and human agency.
The uniqueness of place

derives from a distinct blend of localized and wider social
interactions operating outside
a given place and a historical layering of events particular to
that area (Massey, 1993).
However, underlying the subjective construction of place is the
power of definition
(Cresswell, 1999).
Place as a sociopolitical product of multiple images, identities
and interactions is
embodied in the systematic creation of the tourism product. The
product encapsulated
in the tourism destination is a blend of multilayered
imaginations constructed and
defined by tour operators and key destination stakeholders in
accordance with the
perceived expectations and desires of the travelling public
(Pritchard & Morgan, 2000;
Young, 1999). In this sense, places are reinterpreted,
reimagined, designed and mar-
keted (Knox & Marston, 2004) as manufactured and ‘placed’
images that are sold to
tourists (Nijman, 1999). The identification of who carries out
the reimaging and cultural
packaging and on what terms (Knox & Marston, 2004) are key
to understanding
important power dynamics that not only mould the tourism
product, but may also
influence the destination’s vulnerability.
Methodology
Considering the place-specific nature of vulnerability, case
study analysis has come to
dominate vulnerability assessment based on its capacity to
deconstruct complex and

place-based phenomena. Khao Lak was chosen as the case study
because it was the
worst affected tourism destination across Asia and Africa in
terms of lives lost and
property damage. Three qualitative methods were used to
identify the factors and
processes that contribute to Khao Lak’s vulnerability to shocks.
An exploratory litera-
ture review together with secondary document analysis (of
newspaper reports, NGO
recovery reports and various official and government
documents) identified preliminary
causal factors that heightened Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the
tsunami, which in turn,
shaped relevant questions for semistructured field interviews.
Twenty-four interviews
with tourism stakeholders (8 in Bangkok, 1 in Phuket and 15 in
Khao Lak) were
undertaken over a one-month period in mid-2005 to verify and
build upon the factors
identified from the secondary data, supplemented by ongoing
updates. Interview par-
ticipants included national, provincial, district and subdistrict
government representa-
tives, nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives,
environmental action
group members, research institute and media representatives,
and tourism industry
representatives from small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
Khao Lak. The Bangkok
and Phuket participants were selected for their knowledge of the
tourism industry and
Thai government structures, plus their involvement in the
recovery process. Khao Lak
participants were identified using snowballing techniques. As
many interviews were

conducted on condition of anonymity, the names of some
individuals quoted here are
withheld.
Khao Lak: beautiful and booming one day, gone the next
Khao Lak is a new coastal resort destination that had grown
from 100 rooms in 1996 to
5315 rooms by December 2004.1 Located on Thailand’s
southwest Andaman Coast, in
Takuapa District, Phang Nga Province, and bordered by Khao
Lak-Lamru National Park,
the heart of the destination extends from Khao Lak Beach
northwards to Laem
Pakarang (or Coral Cape) (Figure 3). Positioned within the
competitive Thai tourism
market as an alternative to its bustling neighbouring destination
of Phuket
(98 km to the south), Khao Lak is marketed as a peaceful haven
for nature lovers who
want to relax. Tourists attracted to Khao Lak are predominantly
German and Swedish
families and retirees escaping the European winter.
The service community that has grown with the destination
mainly comprises
locally owned SMEs including resorts, restaurants, souvenir
shops, tailoring and
health spa facilities, taxi and guide services, and scuba diving
companies. Khao Lak’s
4- and 5-star resort developments, owned by both local

investors and international
chains, only appeared after 2000 but their numbers have
increased since the tsunami,
whereas many smaller businesses have lacked the financial and
psychological strength
to rebuild. Strong tourist demand is generated through locally
run accommodation
websites, travel guidebooks and the promotions of European
tour operators including
TUI AG (Touristik Union International Aktiengesellschaft) and
Thomas Cook. Con-
0 10 20 30 40km
N
Phuket 98km
Krabi 171 km
Takuapa
30km
Bus
Station
Market
International
Tsunami
Museum
TonPling
Waterfall
Tap LamuPier

KHAO LAK
BEACH
NANG THONG
BEACH
BANG NIANG
BEACH
KHUK KHAK
BEACH
LAEM
PAKARANG
ANDAMAN
SEA
P
h
e
tk
a
s
e
m
N
a
tio
n
a
l

H
ig
h
w
a
y
N
o
.
4
KhaoLak-Lamru
National Park
Office
Khao
Lak-
Lamru
National
Park
Tsunami
Memorial
Penang
Banda Aceh
Sumatra
(INDONESIA)

BANGKOK
Phuket
THAILAND
GULF
OF THAILAND
ANDAMAN
SEA
MALAYSIA
MYANMAR
STRAIT
OF MALACCA
Earthquake
epicentre PUTRAJAYA
Krabi
N
Study area of
Khao Lak
0 200km
Figure 3. Location map of Khao Lak in Phang Nga Province,
southern Thailand; the dotted line approxi-

mates the tsunami-eroded beachfront.
stant demand fills the resorts to full capacity for six months
between October and
March, providing enough earnings to sustain the community
through the wet low
season (averaging 30 per cent capacity).
During the December 2004 tsunami, 10.6-m-high waves
penetrated up to 2 km
inland, destroying approximately 90 per cent of the hotel rooms
available in Khao Lak
(Bangkok Post, 2005). Seventy per cent of the 8212 deaths in
Thailand occurred in Phang
Nga Province (ADPC, 2006). Estimates suggest that 358 of
Khao Lak’s tourism employ-
ees lost their lives along with 2229 foreigners (ADPC, 2006;
director, Department of
Labour, Phang Nga Province, pers. comm., Phang Nga, 7
February 2007). Those workers
who survived were left with no jobs, no income and few
livelihood alternatives to
support a recovery.
Case study findings: the vulnerability of Khao Lak
deconstructed
Disasters such as the 2004 tsunami dramatically expose the
strengths and weaknesses of
the affected community’s socioenvironmental system and thus
its vulnerability to
shocks (Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). But disasters can

also be catalysts for change
(Oliver-Smith, 1996; Lewis, 1999). Reflecting the complex
nature of vulnerability, the
presentation of the causal factors is neither simple nor linear;
the factors feed into and
off each other. Accordingly, we use a conceptual structure
based on Turner et al.’s (2003)
framework to explore the causal factors that have contributed
respectively to the
exposure, sensitivity and resilience of the Khao Lak community
to the tsunami. Woven
throughout the analysis are elucidations into how these factors
are socially constructed
and reinforced by economic development processes, uneven
access to resources, weak
governance and the competing agendas of key stakeholders. An
overview of the 13
three-dimensional factors that underlie Khao Lak’s vulnerability
and the scales at which
they are constructed is presented in Figure 4.
Exposure
An examination of Khao Lak’s natural and developmental
characteristics revealed two
interlinked factors that heightened the primarily coastal-based
community’s exposure to
the tsunami: flat coastal terrain lacking environmental defences
and inappropriate
coastal development.
Nature of the physical terrain. The nature of the coastal terrain
where much tourism
development is found (Murphy & Bayley, 1989) is a key
contributor to Khao Lak’s
exposure to coastal hazards (senior Thai researcher, Thailand
Institute of Scientific And

Technological Research, pers. comm., Bangkok, 29 June 2005).
Khao Lak’s tourism
facilities are concentrated along a strip of flat land that extends
2 km inland to the foot
of an escarpment. This, along with the clearing of the original
deep-rooted forest,
grasslands and rubber plantations, heightened the coastline’s
susceptibility to erosion
and left the built environment with no buffer against the force
of the waves (Thai
environmentalist, Toward Ecological Recovery and Regional
Alliance (TERRA), pers.
comm., Bangkok, 29 June 2005). Developments on higher
ground in the hills fronting
Khao Lak Beach sustained little damage.
Placement and type of development. Jeff McNeely, chief
scientist of the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), attributed the
enormous loss of life from
the 2004 tsunami to the human intrusion on natural shorelines
typified by the
inappropriate developments that line the Indian Ocean coastal
rim (Bangkok Post, 2004).
In Khao Lak, the proximity of many resorts to the flat exposed
beach – sited to capitalize
on the foreshore terrain and beach views – coupled with the
types of structures built,
clearly heightened the physical exposure to coastal hazards.
Provincial building regulations stipulated a 30-m setback from

the natural vegeta-
tion line but did not include structural codes (government
officer, Khuk Khak Sub-
district, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 8 July 2005). Smaller
structures (mainly bungalow
clusters) were largely built out of wood while many larger
resorts were constructed from
concrete. The pattern of destruction caused by the tsunami
indicates the unsuitability of
the beach-facing developments in Khao Lak. Entering the
buildings through the large
sea-fronting windows, the tsunami waves demolished the
wooden structures and gutted
the concrete structures. Concrete buildings constructed
perpendicular to the shoreline,
however, remained structurally intact. Ensuring that safety
standards are not compro-
mised to fulfil tourist demands for water views is a continuing
challenge for Thai
tourism communities and planners.
Sensitivity
According to Adger (2003) and Hewitt (1997), a system’s
ability to absorb external
shocks and recover rests with the robustness and effectiveness
of preexisting governance
systems and social networks that control a community’s access
to resources. Findings
confirm that Khao Lak’s sensitivity was heightened by factors
relating to the local
private sector’s differential access to resources, the aptitude of
governance structures
and agendas of stakeholders who work through these structures,
as well as the desti-
nation’s dependency on highly seasonal tourism flows.

Key
International
National
Regional
Local
Human Conditions
Limited livelihood options
Access to economic capital
and insurance
Pre-existing weakness of
government structure and
processes
Unpreparedness for natural
hazards
Human conditions
Vulnerability of Khao Lak to the 2004 tsunami
Components
Natural terrain

Development
style
Adjustment and
adaptation/response
Early warning system
Post-tsunami tourism strategy
Natural resource management
Resilient market base
Robust marketing strategies
Impact/
response
Government-
led financial
assistance
Coping/
response
Strong local
representation
Figure 4. Scaled causal factors contributing to Khao Lak’s
vulnerability following Turner et al.’s (2003)
vulnerability framework.

Limited livelihood options and seasonality. Livelihood
diversification is a key strategy in
reducing vulnerability against multiple shocks (Moser et al.,
2001). Prior to the com-
mencement of tourism development in 1988, the greater Khao
Lak area was charac-
terized by sparsely populated villages that derived livelihoods
from rubber and fruit
plantations, and subsistence fishing. Tourism created new
opportunities for people to
start up businesses that provided hundreds of jobs (Khao Lak
SME Group representa-
tive, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 9 July 2005). However, the rapid
development of lucrative
tourism options along the narrow coastal strip dramatically
reduced the attraction and
prospects of traditional livelihoods, leaving little land for
plantations. Only a minority of
local operators concurrently engage in alternate businesses in
the neighbouring town of
Takuapa or plantations nearby (MK, restaurant and bungalow
owner, pers. comm.,
Khao Lak, 13 July 2005).
Khao Lak’s vulnerability is further exacerbated by being
dependent on highly
seasonal tourism business accruing from a ‘pristine’
environmental image, one that was
shattered by the tsunami. Occuring at the height of the tourism
season, this greatly
diminished the community’s annual earnings (Thai
environmentalist, TERRA, pers.
comm., Bangkok, 29 June 2005). The Thai government’s
decision to divert all remain-

ing business to unaffected destinations across the country
compounded Khao Lak’s
financial losses. While this strategy helped to stabilize national
tourism numbers and
retain high levels of GDP, Khao Lak business owners believed
that it marginalized them
further.
Uneven access to economic capital and insurance. Khao Lak’s
tourism boom saw many
people in the greater Takuapa District invest all their accessible
financial capital from
savings, land sales or previous business ventures into small
tourism ventures,
re-investing the profits to expand these over time (Phang Nga
Tourism Association
representative, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 9 July 2005). This
strategy left many smaller
business owners with limited savings and a reduced capacity for
recovery, while larger
investors with preexisting bank loans were left with no
immediate means to meet
repayments (Khao Lak SME Group representative, pers. comm.,
Khao Lak, 9 July
2005). Compounding business recovery efforts further was the
typical lack of insurance
coverage, purportedly seen by most entrepreneurs as an
unnecessary business cost.
Larger resorts with access to outside financial backing and the
benefit of insurance
policies still experienced economic shortfalls; payouts were
insufficient to cover the
rebuilding costs (PY, resort owner, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 11
July 2005). But the
hardest hit were the industry employees who were left with no
jobs, no land to sell or

rebuild on and few other local livelihood options (SO, tour
operator, pers. comm., Khao
Lak, 12 July 2005). While officially registered employees
qualify for social security
compensation entitlements, many in the tourism sector,
including Burmese construc-
tion workers and those in the lowest paying jobs, are
undocumented (United Nations
Environment Programme representative, pers. comm., Bangkok,
5 July 2005).
Weaknesses in governance structures and processes. The
contingent basis of policy formula-
tion and implementation in Thailand were a major contributing
factor to Khao Lak’s
vulnerability. While the Ministry of Tourism and Sports
oversees the direction of
tourism policy at the national level, the decentralization of
tourism planning strategies
in 2003 allows provincial and local governments to implement
strategies suited to
localized needs and resources (Brickshawana, 2003; The Nation,
2005a). Though a
positive step towards localized empowerment, the necessary
logistical support for this is
lacking. Phang Nga provincial officials have limited capacity to
oversee the local imple-
mentation of tourism planning strategies while subdistrict-level
authorities lack the
expertise, power and often political will to implement and
enforce these strategies (The

Nation, 2005a; Tourism Authority of Thailand representative,
pers. comm., Phuket
Town, 7 July 2005). Such shortcomings undermined the
enforcement of planning
regulations on beachfront developments prior to the tsunami.
Discussions with national and local stakeholders alike
confirmed that widespread
corruption at the local level compounded these governance
shortcomings. Stakeholders
with money and political connections successfully ‘secured’
approvals for developments
contravening planning regulations – most conspicuously, the
unabated construction of
hotels within the 30-metre setback line (government official,
Khuk Khak Subdistrict,
pers. comm., Khao Lak, 8 July 2005; PY, resort owner, pers.
comm., Khao Lak, 11 July
2005). Corruption frequently includes government officials who
belong to the local
elite; they not only benefit financially from unofficial
‘additional’ payments, but also use
their positions to partake in illegal development (WK, tour
operator, pers. comm., Khao
Lak, 10 July 2005; PY, resort owner, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 11
July 2005). The fear of
negative political consequences that collectively discourages
challenges to well con-
nected stakeholders works to strengthen this alternate
governance system and heighten
vulnerability.
Lack of disaster awareness and preparedness. Cassedy (1991)
and Murphy and Bayley
(1989) state that tourism businesses and industry organizations
are often ill-prepared for

disaster situations, particularly in high risk areas where
potential impacts of hazards are
regularly played down for marketing purposes. This was the
case for Khao Lak. Com-
munity members interviewed remained largely unaware of the
threat natural hazards
posed to the Andaman Coast, an ignorance fostered by the
routine suppression or
official denials of hazard predications and warnings. For
example, a warning issued in
1998 by the Meteorological Department detailing the likely
threat tsunamis posed to the
Andaman Coast was reported in the local Phuket and Phang Nga
newspapers (WK, tour
operator, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 10 July 2005; RB, tour guide,
pers. comm., Khao Lak,
19 July 2005). However this was immediately refuted by the
Thai government because
the potential ramifications upon tourism flows to Phuket and the
surrounding destina-
tions were considered too costly (The Nation, 2005a). This same
reason was cited for the
failure of the Meteorological Department to issue an immediate
tsunami warning early
on the morning of 26 December 2004 (The Nation, 2005b). In
this case, economic and
politically loaded decisions to withhold vital information on
coastal risks not only
contributed greatly to the number of lives lost, but, with
hindsight, also incurred far
more costly socioeconomic ramifications. This demonstrates the
extent to which the
agendas of the ruling national elite directly influenced hazard
vulnerability at the local
scale.

Resilience
Resilience is a direct expression of the strength of the coupled
human–environment
system reflecting its self-organization, learning and adaptive
capabilities (Carpenter
et al., 2001). As Khao Lak recovers from the impacts of the
tsunami, the importance of
strong governance, self-organization and adaptation has become
clear. The Thai gov-
ernment played a crucial role in distributing financial capital to
aid recovery by formu-
lating resilience-building strategies and campaigning hard to
restore tourist confidence.
However, these actions were undermined by the preexisting
deficiencies in and prefer-
ences of Thai governance structures that perpetuated unequal
resource distribution.
Faced with these deficiencies, the Khao Lak community
mobilized strong community
action aimed at regional, national and international stakeholders
in a bid to restore
Khao Lak as an international tourism destination.
Strong national tourism recovery policies. Following the 2004
tsunami, the central Thai
government introduced the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan
(phaen maebot feunfu
kangthongthieo Andaman), a product of multiple stakeholder
input aimed at stimulat-
ing rapid and sustainable tourism recovery in the six southern

tsunami-affected prov-
inces – Ranong, Phang Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Satun
(Prof Suraches Chetamas,
Khao Lak Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan project manager,
pers. comm., Bangkok, 4
July 2005). Three key strategies were propounded: formulating
an integrated tourism
development strategy, facilitating a strong private sector
recovery by offering financial
support and launching multiple marketing drives (TAT, 2005).
While the plan offers
strong guidelines for the affected communities, successful
implementation is proving
difficult due to deficiencies in governance structures and
conflicting interests operating
at various scales of social organization.
The post-tsunami tourism planning strategy includes the
introduction of strict
zoning regulations and building codes and an integrated road
evacuation system. The
new zoning restrictions and building codes include a 30-m
development setback, mul-
tiple graded density zones and structural codes. However, the
subdistrict and district
governments lack the financial and human resources required to
oversee their enforce-
ment (Thawee Haomhuam, civil engineer, Department of Public
Works and Town and
Country Planning, Phuket, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 12 July
2005). Consequent viola-
tions continue to perpetuate the exposure of built structures and
their inhabitants to
future coastal hazards. No obvious steps have been taken to
address these contraven-
tions in governance (Prof. Suraches Chetamas, Khao Lak

Andaman Tourism Recovery
Plan project manager, pers. comm. Bangkok, 4 July 2005). The
completion of the road
evacuation system was stalled and finally halted by two factors:
bureaucratic obstacles
created by local opposition from multiple stakeholders and the
Thai government’s
inability to finance the repossession of prime development land
(Prof. Suraches Cheta-
mas, Khao Lak Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan project
manager, pers. comm.,
Bangkok, 4 July 2005). Local stakeholders adamantly resisted
changes seen to nega-
tively alter the appeal of Khao Lak’s beachfront and lower
market share. Without local
support the central government is unable to implement action
plans, placing recovery
plans in doubt.
The second component of the recovery plan involved substantial
government-led
financial assistance to promote a strong recovery. In early 2005,
the Thai government
endorsed the establishment of three financial assistance
measures for private sector
stakeholders: (i) initial emergency payments supported by the
Ministry of the Interior,
(ii) a Tsunami Recovery Fund (kongthun feunfu sunami)
supported by the Thai Gov-
ernment Venture Capital Fund, aimed at assisting larger
businesses, and (iii) soft loan
provisions under a Bank Of Thailand ‘Lending to entrepreneurs
affected by the tsunami
in six provinces’ programme (kanhai nguen kuyeum samrap phu
prakobkan tii dai rap
pholkratob chaak sunami nai 6 krongkarn radab changwat),

which catered to small
business interests (BOT, 2005; 2006; UN 2005; WTO 2005b).
While these measures have
assisted the recovery of some businesses, application delays,
bureaucratic obstacles and
corrupt practices hindered their effectiveness.
The distribution of emergency payments placed under the
jurisdiction of local village
leaders often disproportionately benefited friends and relatives
(PJ, restaurant owner,
pers. comm., Khao Lak, 8 July 2005). Claims from larger
businesses exceeded the capital
made available through the Tsunami Recovery Fund and were
subject to long delays
(PY, resort owner, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 11 July 2005). Soft
loan provisions were
made available through the Government Savings Bank (GSB,
2005; 2006) and the SME
Bank’s Tsunami SME Fund (kongthun chuayleua visahakij
kanad klang lae kanadyom
tii dai rap pholkratob chaak sunami). Yet many small businesses
were unable to secure
funding because they lacked the required documentation
(business registration papers,
proof of assets and so on), either because it was swept away or
because prior to the
tsunami, they were not required to register (Khao Lak SME
Group representative, pers.
comm., Khao Lak, 9 July 2005). Furthermore, claim limits of
THB 500 000 (USD
14 650) and THB 300 000 (USD 8780) (from the SME Fund and

Government Savings
Bank respectively) were too low to make a substantial
difference to the recovery of
successful small business claimants (CR, restaurant and
bungalow owner, pers. comm.,
The only other financial resources available for reconstruction
were via commercial
bank loans, family support and alternate livelihood sources.
Preexisting loans held by
some of the larger business owners coupled with doubts
regarding Khao Lak’s future
financial viability limited the success of new applications
(Phang Nga Tourism Association
representative, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 9 July 2005). This
reluctance to reinvest and
finance rebuilding negatively affects Khao Lak’s image as a
tourist destination. While
those with multiple businesses or livelihood sources were more
able to aid their own re-
covery, the majority had to turn to family and friends families
for support where possible.
The final component of the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan
concerned the resto-
ration of consumer confidence and tourism flows to pre-tsunami
levels. The Tourism
Authority of Thailand was responsible for restoring consumer
confidence on behalf of all
the affected destinations by hosting familiarization trips for
international and Thai tour
operators and travel agents to affected areas, running aggressive
promotional campaigns
and offering discount packages (TAT, 2005). These promotions
did prove effective for

Phuket and Krabi (about 171 km south of Khao Lak). Khao Lak,
however, was not
included as, given the extent of damage sustained, recovery was
thought unlikely
(Tourism Authority of Thailand representative, pers. comm.,
Phuket, 7 July 2005). These
preferences based on economic reasonings have resulted in the
uneven distribution of
financial and political support among affected communities,
stimulating recovery in
established destinations while heightening vulnerability levels
in others – most notably
Khao Lak.
Strong local representation. Disaster outcomes can also create
opportunities for political
reorganisation, solidarity and activism, and social
transformation (Oliver-Smith, 1996).
Much of Khao Lak’s resilience is based on the strength, self-
organization and adaptive
capabilities of local groups. The Phang Nga Tourism
Association (samakhom kan-
thongthieo changwat Phang Nga) and the Khao Lak SME Group
were instrumental in
petitioning the central government for more funding to hasten
the rebuilding process,
influencing development plans and accessing core markets to
restore confidence and
business. The skilful use of multiscaled actions by both parties
in securing more capital
resonates strongly with relational scale theory: recognizing
scale as a fluid expression of
power creates multiple opportunities for social transformation
(Ellem, 2002; Herod &
Wright, 2002; Howitt, 2003).

The Phang Nga Tourism Association (representative, pers.
comm., Khao Lak, 9 July
2005) used its weekly meetings with the provincial governor to
air grievances over
delays and the uneven distribution of financial resources and
used its close connections
with the local parliamentary member (a former president of the
association) to voice
opinions regarding the future planning strategy for Khao Lak at
the national level. Set
up by a locally resident German business owner in direct
response to the tsunami, the
Khao Lak SME Group (representative, pers. comm., Khao Lak,
9 July 2005) successfully
sourced additional funding from key markets including
Germany through a Khao Lak
accommodation website (http://www.khaolak.de) and distributed
this equally among
its members. The establishment of this group brought stability
to many small business
owners who lost everything and, by creating new landscapes of
power and opportunity,
heightened the community’s adaptive capacity and resilience.
To restore consumer confidence, Phang Nga Tourism
Association representatives
successfully gained marketing support, particularly
international brochure exposure,
through long-established European partnerships that had
facilitated Khao Lak’s pre-
tsunami boom – for example, although business for 2005 was
diverted to other Thai

destinations, Thomas Cook featured medium and large resorts in
Khao Lak for the 2006
season (PY, resort owner, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 11 July
2005). Small resort owners con-
tinue to reach their market – the independent traveller – through
locally controlled web-
sites and guidebook exposure (WK, tour operator, pers. comm.,
As the founder of the Khao Lak SME Group (Richard Doring,
pers. comm., Khao Lak, 30
August 2005) pointed out, smaller resorts had greater control
over their marketing tools
and strategies and were more resilient in this respect than their
larger counterparts.
Resilient markets and clientele. The resilience of Khao Lak’s
tourism community is not
solely based on its capacity to access sociopolitical and
economic resources but also on
the resilience and loyalty of their European market base. The
business community’s
focus on building close relationships with clients has created a
strong repeat client base,
ranging from 20 per cent for larger resorts to 80 per cent for
some smaller resorts. Loyal
clientele, returning with family and friends, have proved
instrumental in Khao Lak’s
recovery (Khao Lak SME Group representative, pers. comm.,
Access to this type of social capital further strengthens the
community’s resilience
against external shocks.
Early warning system: a key component of tourism’s recovery
plan. The establishment of the
UNESCO-led Indian Ocean Early Warning System was heralded

by the government and
tsunami affected communities as a crucial tool for increasing
preparedness against
future shocks, and helping to reassure tourists and hasten
recovery (UN, 2005). In
Thailand, the Department for Disaster Mitigation And
Prevention and Ministry of
Interior had oversight of its implementation in the six affected
southern provinces.
Functioning towers were erected in Phuket and Krabi by July
2005, but not until
December 2005 in Khao Lak, well into the high season. No
explanation was given for
the delay, which caused some anger and frustration in the
community and, among those
interviewed, reinforced the government’s perceived preference
for restoring tourist
confidence in the more lucrative neighbouring destinations.
Some interviewees also
attributed this to the ineffectiveness of the subdistrict and
district authorities in com-
municating the concerns of the community to the national level.
Whatever the reason-
ing, installation delays left the community vulnerable to
possible tsunami threats and
hindered their efforts in attracting tourism business back to
Khao Lak.
http://www.khaolak.de
Natural resource management. Adger et al. (2005) stress the
need to complement socio-
political measures with strategies that enhance the capacity of

ecosystems to regenerate
and adapt to hazardous conditions, particularly in sensitive
coastal zones where 23 per
cent of the world’s population live. To counteract the physical
exposure of the open
terrain and buffer the built environment against future wave
surges, the replanting of
native trees and grasses along Khao Lak’s eroded beaches was
undertaken by the
Department of Marine and Coastal Resources (DMCR
representative, pers. comm.,
Takuapa, 8 July 2005). Casuarina and Pandanaceae trees were
chosen because their root
systems prevent further erosion and their presence creates a
natural barrier against
storm surges or tsunami impacts. As a major driver of change in
coastal areas, tourism
ironically has the capacity to decrease resilience through the
destruction of the ecologi-
cal resource base that it relies upon for its success. Increasing
the biophysical resilience
also underpins the sustainability of tourism development and
livelihoods.
Conclusions
The findings presented in this paper answer one fundamental
question: what sociopo-
litical and environmental conditions contributed to the
vulnerability of Khao Lak’s
tourism community to the impacts of the 2004 tsunami? In line
with other tourism
research (Richter & Waugh, 1986; Sönmez et al., 1999; Knox &
Marston, 2004; Ritchie,
2004; Méheaux & Parker, 2006), findings from Khao Lak
confirm that its vulnerability

stems from a high reliance on place-based and seasonal tourism.
The tsunami ruined
Khao Lak’s highly marketable image as a peaceful haven for
European winter travellers.
The heavy reliance on the marketing strategies of international
tour operators leaves
many medium and larger businesses with little control over the
recovery of their
market; small businesses that access their market base through
locally controlled web-
sites and guidebooks retain more control. That said, the findings
categorically show
that the causes underlying the vulnerability of tourism
communities are much more
complex than the tourism literature acknowledges.
Analyzed through the theoretical lens of the sustainability
vulnerability framework
(Turner et al., 2003), relational scale and place, Khao Lak’s
vulnerability can be traced to
13 environmental and sociopolitical factors that collectively
contribute to the exposure,
sensitivity and resilience of the community. These factors are
complex outcomes of
inextricably linked social norms and developmental and
governance processes that have
evolved over space and time. Underlying these processes are the
competing and politi-
cally charged agendas and scaled actions of government and
industry stakeholders.
An examination of the Thai government’s Andaman Tourism
Recovery Plan and
community responses clearly demonstrate the role that power
distribution and political
preferences play in influencing the uneven distribution of

resources and vulnerability.
While the plan is designed to benefit the six affected provinces
equally, preexisting
weaknesses in governance structures and processes coupled with
national and subdis-
trict governmental preferences simultaneously strengthened
some communities while
marginalizing others. The failure to acknowledge and address
these governance weak-
nesses not only compounds Khao Lak’s vulnerability to future
stresses, but also inhibits
the long-term sustainability goals of the regional recovery plan.
Four years after the
tsunami, corruption along with limited governmental capacity
and financial constraints
at the subdistrict level are compromising the implementation
and enforcement of
redevelopment regulations designed to decrease physical
exposure to tsunamis and
storm surges. Limited access to credit continues to hinder full
redevelopment while
compounding debt and lower tourist earnings have forced some
business closures
(Calgaro et al., forthcoming). Given the limited success of
government interventions, the
Khao Lak community drew support from the strong and
multiscaled actions of provin-
cial and local tourism organizations. Instigated at the local
level, these actions permeated
through to the regional, national and international level to
create a network of socio-

political and financial supports that, in turn, strengthened the
community’s adaptive
capacity and resilience. This demonstrates the importance of
community-driven actions
that both respond to immediate needs and create new landscapes
of power, recognition
and opportunity.
A deeper awareness of the underlying causes of Khao Lak’s
vulnerability together
with the formulation of a tourism vulnerability framework has
implications for both
Khao Lak and the wider tourism community. First, an improved
understanding can
better inform the design and facilitate the implementation of
appropriate resilience
building actions that are aimed at addressing the root causes of
destination vulnerability.
Second, the scaled causal factors presented in Figure 4 provide
a blueprint for under-
standing the vulnerability of other tourism communities facing
similar livelihood
restrictions. Third, the tourism vulnerability framework
presented in this paper provides
tourism communities with an analytical tool for analyzing their
unique sociopolitical
conditions. But given the exploratory nature of this work, more
research is required to
further develop, evaluate and refine the framework and
substantiate the drivers of
vulnerability in tourism communities.
With this in mind, it is recommended that a full-scale
vulnerability assessment of
the affected destinations covered by the Andaman Tourism
Recovery Plan be under-

taken. The advantages of such an assessment are threefold.
First, it adds longitudinal
depth to the analysis of vulnerable tourism communities.
Second, it facilitates the
identification of commonalities and place-specific differences
that influence different
patterns of vulnerability in the Andaman region. Finally, it
creates an opportunity for
reevaluating and refining the theoretical framework and enables
broader conclusions
to be made regarding the drivers that underlie the vulnerability
of tourism commu-
nities. Tourism does have the potential to create economic
growth and alleviate
poverty in regions facing resource scarcity. Incorporating
vulnerability assessment into
tourism development strategies will ensure that these are
achieved in a more sustain-
able way.
Acknowledgements
The research presented in this paper builds on the fieldwork
conducted by the lead author (Calgaro,
2005) as part of a BA honours thesis. We gratefully
acknowledge constructive feedback on an
earlier draft from Dale Dominey-Howes (University of New
South Wales) and Robert Fagan
(Macquarie University) as well as Frank Thomalla (Stockholm
Environment Institute) and Fiona
Miller (University of Melbourne), and that of the anonymous
SJTG reviewers.

Endnote
1 As of April 2008, room capacity had increased to 3225 (Phang
Nga Tourism Association
representative, pers. comm., Khao Lak, 5 May 2008).
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http://www.gechs.org/aviso/13
Ethnicity, politics and inequality: post-
tsunami humanitarian aid delivery in
Ampara District, Sri Lanka
M.W. Amarasiri de Silva Professor, Department of Sociology,
Faculty of Arts,
University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
The provision of humanitarian aid at times of disaster in multi-
ethnic community settings may
lead to conflict, tension and even the widening of the distance
between various ethnic groups. That
aid agencies distribute humanitarian aid directly to affected
communities, to speed up recovery,
may often lead to chaos and the intensification of ethnic
sentiments. The new distribution mech-
anisms introduced for the delivery of tsunami aid in Ampara
District, Sri Lanka, did not recognise
local networks and the culture of the ethnically mixed
community setting. This paper analyses
post-tsunami aid distribution in Ampara and shows how such an
extemporised effort in an

ethnically cognisant context increased ethnic division,
inequality and disorder, while marginalis-
ing the poor segments of the affected population. It recommends
the inclusion of local networks in
aid dissemination as a measure for improving ethnic neutrality
and social harmony in disaster-hit
multi-ethnic communities.
Keywords: Ampara District, Asian tsunami, ethnicity,
humanitarian aid, Sri Lanka
Introduction
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 is viewed
overall as a tragedy that
did not recognise ‘culturally derived discriminations and social
distinctions’ (Fritz,
1961, p. 685). Due to the enormity of the catastrophe, various
groups—rich and poor,
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and
the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)—were
suffering the ramifications
in the immediate aftermath.
In Ampara District on the east coast of Sri Lanka, however, the
picture is somewhat
different. The theory that the effects of disasters are
indiscriminate proved misplaced
here, since the people most affected largely comprised those on
the lower rungs of the
social ladder and in certain ethnically identifiable communities.
Disasters are seen
as ‘products’ of the economic, political and social environment
and of the natural
events that cause them. Poor people are most likely to be the
victims of disasters in
developing countries in particular (Blaikie et al., 1994; Peacock

and Girard, 1997).
Such social groups often consist of ethnic minorities and
excluded communities.
Ethnicity is thus an important index of increased vulnerability
to disasters in devel-
oping countries (Aptekar and Boore, 1990; Enarson, 1998;
Peacock and Girard, 1997;
Bates and Peacock, 1993; Peacock and Ragsdale, 1997).
doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2008.01073.x
Disasters, 2009, 33(2): 253−273. © 2009 The Author(s). Journal
compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2009.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA
02148, USA
M.W. Amarasiri de Silva254
In ethnically mixed communities, the distribution of economic
and political power
has implications for coping with disaster-based vulnerabilities
(Fothergill, Maestas
and Darlington, 1999). Disaster vulnerability among racial and
ethnic minority com-
munities has reportedly increased in the recent past (Anderson,
1996; Peacock and
Girard, 1997). Significant differences in risk perception among
different ethnic groups
vis-à-vis disaster events have been reported (Ives and Furseth,
1983); and different
consequences of hazards for ethnic minorities have been
highlighted (Hutton, 1976;
Bates et al., 1963).

In terms of fatalities and other effects of the tsunami, the poor
Muslim commu-
nities in the coastal areas of Ampara suffered particularly badly.
Rates of mortality,
morbidity and damage to property were extremely high among
the politically less
powerful Muslims in the coastal areas of Ampara compared to
those of the Sinhalese
and the Tamils. Locations most seriously affected on the east
coast were those inhabited
by the Muslims. Lower middle-class families in the affected
ethnic minority commu-
nities were less likely to attract subsidies and assistance, a fact
observed elsewhere as
well (Aptekar and Boore, 1990).
The unequal impact of the tsunami may have been precipitated
by the fact that
the Muslims lived along the coast, and the majority of them
were involved in the
fishing industry. The congested housing settlements of the
Muslims may have been
a factor in the higher levels of mortality and morbidity, as well
as physical damage.
That ethnic minorities on the east coast live in segregation, in
ribbon-like discrete
communities, and that, for historical reasons, Muslims in
particular reside in less
prestigious, low-lying places, hemmed in between the lagoon
and the sea, might have
heightened their vulnerability to the 2004 tsunami.
In the process of recovery, cultural boundaries have been
reinvented and culture-
based discrimination has resumed. During this process, some
people and community
groups sought advantages while others were deprived of
benefits and opportunities

for recovery. Despite the indiscriminate effects of disasters, it
is generally recognised
that disaster risk and vulnerability are not equally distributed,
particularly in the
recovery stage. Thus, the recovery process is seen as sensitive
to ethnicity and social
stratifications, especially those that emerge post disaster (Couch
and Kroll-Smith,
1985; Fordham, 1999; Morrow, 1997).
This paper argues that ethnicity has become the organising
principle in the post-
tsunami humanitarian aid distribution process in Ampara.
Ethno-political relation-
ships that existed in the pre-tsunami era in the District,
particularly between Muslims
and Tamils, were further ethnicised and intensified in the
process. The disadvan-
taged and vulnerable communities affected by the tsunami along
the coast of Ampara,
largely comprising poor Muslim fisher folk, were deprived of
the benefits of humani-
tarian aid. Creating highly centralised, elite-run mechanisms for
the distribution of
humanitarian aid in such multi-ethnic settings led to a widening
of the ethnic divide,
increasing inequalities and chaos, and thereby making the poor
and the marginal-
ised communities even poorer and more marginalised. As a
prelude to the analysis, the
paper first contextualises tsunami-affected areas in their
socio-economic setting in
Ampara District.
Ethnicity, politics and inequality 255

Ampara District in the Eastern Province
Ampara District in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, where the
research was con-
ducted between March and June 2006, covers an area of 4,431
square kilometres and
has a population of 635,332. Muslims (41.59 per cent),
Sinhalese (39.33 per cent) and
Tamils (18.76 per cent) constitute the major communities in the
District. Of the 20
District Secretariat (DS) divisions in Ampara, the tsunami
affected 10 along the
coastal belt. Muslims predominantly inhabit most of these. The
main livelihood in
these divisions is fisheries, while paddy production is the main
activity of the District
as a whole.
Muslims and Tamils live in juxtaposed, but discrete
communities, spread along
the coastal belt from south to north. Although the two
communities maintain eco-
nomic exchange and trade links, mutual trust between Muslims
and Tamils has been
eroded since the 1980s due to a heightening of political
activities. As in Muslim
villages in Trincomalee (Korf, 2004), the Muslim fisher folk
here are caught up in
the power struggle between the GoSL forces and the LTTE,
which has diminished
their ability to fish in the deep seas. Despite cultural and lingual
similarities, includ-
ing matrilocality and practising of the kudi system of
inheritance and naming (Yalman,
1967; McGilvray, 1982), the Muslims and Tamils of Ampara
view themselves as
separate ethnic groups, different from one another. Cultic

worship of Kannaki and
Mari Amman makes the Eastern Tamils unique. They also view
themselves as distinct
from the Tamils and Muslims living in the rest of Sri Lanka.
The March 2004 break-
away of Colonel Karuna or Karuna Amman, the leader of the
eastern faction of the
LTTE, further reflects the ethnic distinctiveness and identity of
the Eastern Tamils.
In the past, the Eastern Province was regarded as under the
control of the Jaffna
Tamils, who often held important positions in administration
and local govern-
ment. Over the past two decades, Muslim political leaders in
particular have pushed
for a stronger Muslim identity and have been instrumental in
setting up ethnically
segregated governance and welfare structures in Ampara. A
situation has gradually
evolved in which both Tamils and Muslims in the Eastern
Districts are seeking
greater political and administrative independence.
The Sinhalese communities, located in the interior and in the
southern tip of the
District, are not in direct confrontation with any of the other
ethnic groups in the
tsunami-affected areas of Ampara District. GoSL forces and the
LTTE operate
within their own territories, which were demarcated more or
less in the years after
the ceasefire agreement of 2002, with minimal trespass on
either side at the time of
the author’s fieldwork (March–June 2006).1
Ongoing power politics in the country influence the political
set-up of the District.

The pre-tsunami situation was that the Tamils (predominantly
the LTTE) and the
Muslims had political problems associated with land-related
matters. Both Muslim
and Tamil traders were subject to harassment and taxation by
militant groups, includ-
ing the LTTE. Riots involving Muslims and Tamils have
occurred since the 1990s
(Goodhand and Lewer, 1999). Muslim villagers in the Northern
Districts were
expelled by the LTTE at the beginning of its struggle for a
Tamil homeland or Eelam
Map 1 Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions in Ampara District
affected by the 2004 tsunami
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka.
(in the 1990s), and this affected mutual trust and relations
between these two ethnic
communities in the Eastern Province. Competition for political
power and economic
resources, including land, between Tamils and Muslims in
Ampara shows the deep
mistrust between them, although they were neighbours who
lived in adjacent com-
munities and engaged in trade and economic activities at the
time of the tsunami. It
is into this ethnically sensitive context that the tsunami entered
on 26 December 2004.

Tsunami recovery politics and actors
The territorial demarcations and political barriers that existed
before the tsunami
between the GoSL forces and the LTTE, and between the Tamils
and the Muslims,
were relaxed in the immediate wake of the tsunami, when both
the GoSL forces
and the LTTE commenced relief and welfare work for the
people. In this environ-
ment, civil society organisations were at ease in providing for
tsunami recovery
through existing local networks (Frerks and Klem, 2005). The
new development in
the Eastern Districts, particularly in Ampara, was seen as a
precursor to a renewed
peace process. These local non-governmental organisation
(NGO) and civil society
initiatives (Rodriguez et al., 2006) were viewed as a sign of
good things to come after
the tsunami.
It was in this context that the GoSL introduced an institutional
arrangement for
tsunami recovery and the reconstruction of the affected
communities: the Post-
Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS).
P-TOMS was the regula-
tory outcome of the Joint Mechanism on Tsunami Aid
Distribution, signed between
the GoSL and high-level LTTE politicians on 24 June 2005.
P-TOMS, as proposed,
was to operate within a limited area of two kilometres from the
coastline, in the six
Districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu

and Trincomalee
(Asian Tribune, 2005). Under this structure, there was no place
for the civil society
organisations that had played a key role in the early tsunami
recovery process (von
Braunmühl et al., 2006).
Following the signing of the agreement, there were major
demonstrations organ-
ised by predominantly Sinhala political parties—the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)—and by the Muslim
political parties (Pirani
and Kadirgamar, 2006). The protest leaders questioned the
legitimacy of P-TOMS
and its control over resources. The JVP left the GoSL coalition
as a result. The massive
opposition culminated in a hunger strike or fast-unto-death by
Dr Omalpe Sobhita,
a prominent member of the Buddhist clergy and a member of the
JHU, which was
called off only after then President Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga pledged
to discuss the agreement with Buddhist prelates before it was
put into effect. The
four Maha Nayaka Theros2 of the Amarapura, Asgiriya,
Malwatte and Ramanya chap-
ters gathered to issue a Sangha Agna (command) and to summon
a mass gathering
to object to the signing of the Joint Mechanism between the
GoSL and the LTTE
(Lankanewspapers.com, 2005).
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ruled out certain clauses of
the accord, and this
proved to be the final nail in the coffin of P-TOMS. The LTTE
later reneged on
the PTOMS agreement, saying that it would ‘refuse to work

under any authority
under the Sri Lankan government . . .’ (Asian Tribune, 2005).
The LTTE’s rejection
of a coordinated approach to tsunami recovery may have been
induced by the notion
that economic prosperity in the region would hamper its
struggle for Eelam.
The impact of the failed P-TOMS agreement reverberates to the
present day in
tsunami-affected Ampara District. The political manoeuvring
surrounding this accord
reinforced the importance of ethno-geopolitical identities and
the internationalisation
of the tsunami recovery process (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 2006;
Goodhand and Klem,
2005). The new aid delivery process created afterwards
involved various GoSL depart-
ments, the Government Agent of the District, the GoSL forces,
especially the Special
Task Force (STF), and the LTTE, including the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation
(TRO). The various civil society organisations that were
engaged in the recovery pro-
cess at the beginning were not included as key agents in the aid
delivery process. It is
unfortunate that the macro players, who took part in P-TOMS
and later in tsunami
aid delivery, did not pay attention to those civil society actors
and did nothing to utilise
participatory experience of recovery and reconstruction efforts
in Ampara District.

The attempt by the GoSL to establish P-TOMS is viewed here
as the product of
a misreading of the emerging cooperation among divergent civil
society groups and
local political organisations following the materialisation of a
burgeoning partner-
ship between the GoSL and the LTTE. Not only did the direct
intervention of the
GoSL, international NGOs and macro political parties impede
the opportunity to
create local participatory methodologies for post-tsunami
reconstruction, but also
the efforts that developed at the community level were nipped
in the bud by the fail-
ure to support them.
Sixty-four international NGOs in Ampara that were distributing
tsunami aid
formed the Ampara District Livelihood Coordination Committee
(or the Consortium
for Livelihood Coordination as it is popularly known) in 2006
under the leadership
of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
similar lead agencies.
This Consortium was set up to counteract the GoSL’s inability
to develop a coor-
dinated humanitarian aid structure in the District. Here, too,
local NGOs and
community-based organisations were regarded as unimportant,
and they did not
participate in the meetings. As one local NGO activist3 noted,
‘they operate in
English and conduct their meetings in Ampara town far away
from the coastal areas.
We are not important for them . . . we do not take part in this

group’. Local NGOs
have found it difficult to make their programmes effective as
their clientele is now
communally driven and preoccupied with various forms of
assistance provided by
the international NGOs. Ultimately, macro actors, such as the
Ministry of Relief,
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (RRR Ministry), and the
departments within
it, P-TOMS, the LTTE, and the international NGOs, replaced
the bodies that took
an active interest in the early tsunami recovery process.
Due to their failure to include local networks, the aid agencies
from outside did
not have a ground-level mechanism for aid distribution. The
affected people lived
in their natural groups of kith and kin in camps, and this was
misread as ethnic
segregation and concentration. Aid distribution was organised
by the international
NGOs and other aid agencies according to those ethnically
segregated camps and
villages, and this became the new organising principle for
delivering aid. The aid
agencies were identified with the ethnicity of the camp inmates.
As a result, partici-
pation and cooperation on the part of affected communities
developed an ethnic
strand, and grew into renewed competition among ethnic groups
for tsunami aid.
The ethnocentric political ideology of the new participating

agencies, particularly the
GoSL forces, the LTTE, TRO and some international NGOs,
provided the leader-
ship for this competition.
The study’s focus and methodology
This paper examines how new developments in the humanitarian
aid distribution
process have led to a widening of the ethnic divide and
increased inequality in
Ampara District, with fisheries and housing serving as
particular examples. In doing
so, the study focuses on how tsunami aid has reached the
affected populations, and
assesses whether the aid distribution programmes were able to
provide for margin-
alised people, including the poor, vulnerable and backward
communities. These
aspects are appraised in the context of the multi-directional,
complex relationship
system that developed around tsunami aid distribution in
Ampara.
The data for this exploratory study were collected through
interviews, observa-
tions, focus group discussions and case studies. Thirty-five
interviews were held
between March and June 2006 with tsunami-affected people,
beneficiaries of tsu-
nami aid, the agencies supplying aid, key informants in the
communities, political
leaders, and members of the armed forces. The District
Livelihood Coordination
Committee of Ampara4 was a useful source. In addition,
fisheries cooperative socie-
ties offered valuable information. The armed forces in Ampara
furnished additional

information on incidents reported by the interviewees. However,
the author was un-
able to verify any of the contents of this paper with the LTTE
and the TRO.
Initially, the aid agencies were pinpointed through a list
produced by the Humani-
tarian Information Centre, Ampara (HIC, 2005) and the
Consortium for Humani tarian
Agencies–Ampara (CHA-Ampara), which was later verified by
talking to officials
from international NGOs, UNDP and the Food and Agriculture
Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) in Ampara. Secondary information
obtained through aid
agencies and the media was helpful in comprehending the
context. The triangulations
employed in the study helped to establish the authenticity,
validity and reproducibility
of the data.
Post-tsunami ethnic polarisation in Ampara
During the post-tsunami reconstruction process, ethnic
polarities resurfaced and
intensified among the Muslim and Tamil communities of
Ampara, partly due to the
failure of P-TOMS, poor recognition of local networks, and the
exclusion of local
communities from the decision-making and implementation
dimensions of the aid
delivery system. An upsurge in violence and the augmentation
of ethnic segregation
in Ampara were the results. Tsunami aid delivery thus became a
political process in
which the GoSL, the LTTE, Muslim political leaders, and
international NGOs played
the main role. The Muslim community in Ampara felt dejected

because it was not
granted adequate power and representation in the proposed
structure. What is more,
it criticised the GoSL for giving ‘undue’ power to the LTTE in
the Joint Mechanism,
despite the fact that the Muslims were the largest affected
community in the East.
Muslim leaders expressed their dismay and anger over not being
made a signatory to
the proposed P-TOMS (Rhodes, 2005).
Disagreements over the proposed institutional set-up for joint
post-tsunami recon-
struction among the GoSL, the LTTE, and the Muslim
community permeated down
to the local activities and politics of the District. Such variance
was interpreted as
reflecting ethnic differences and discrimination at the local
level. The distribution
of relief and the creation of camps occurred along ethnic lines,
reinforcing ethno-
geographic boundaries. Many incidents of ethnic rivalry were
reported afterwards,
including separate hartals5 staged by Muslims and Tamils,
highlighting the promi-
nent position of ethnic politics in post-tsunami aid distribution.
These had a negative
effect on the aid delivery system and heightened mistrust
between the communities.
A series of violent events occurred two months after the
tsunami, including:

• the killing of three Muslim men and the destruction of Tamil
barbershops in
Marathamunai;
• the killing of five Muslims during the Drawpadi Amman Kovil
festival and their
interment in Tamil burial grounds as an insult to the Muslims;
and
• the killing of a number of Tamils returning from the festival in
retaliation.
President Kumaratunga came under pressure and was forced to
appoint a com-
mission in February 2005 to investigate the murders.
The organisation of welfare camps on ethnic lines provided the
basis for various
aid agencies to select communities on ethnic grounds. The
people, Muslims and
Tamils alike, described the aid agencies that supplied assistance
as ethnically biased,
and viewed these interventions as partial, undemocratic,
wasteful, and not needs-
oriented.
Such procedures have enhanced ethnic resentment and division
between the
Muslims and Tamils, and have given an ethno-political
colouring to tsunami aid
distribution. Eventually, there were more and more instances of
aid agencies work-
ing for and among their own communities in the District,
resulting in further
distancing between the communities. Muslim politicians have
extensively utilised
the fact that Muslims were discriminated against for their own
political gain, further

aggravating ethnic consciousness. One respondent said that,
‘Muslim Congress poli
ticians headed by the minister . . . promised houses when they
win the election and
wanted us to vote for them in the election’.6
Ethnic distancing and segregation became apparent in the
ethnic concentration
of aid packaging especially that organised by the Muslims in
Colombo and outside,
which was a reaction to the failure of GoSL organisations and
international NGOs
to meet the needs of the Muslim communities. Jamathe-e-Islami
and the Muslim
Relief Foundation helped the Muslims in the area after the
tsunami. The Colombo
Mamen Society (Mamen Sangam) supported the Muslim Baithul
Tsunami (Tsunami
Fund) in Marathamunai. The Government of the United Arab
Emirates pledged to
build a new town, comprising 800 houses and modern amenities,
for tsunami-affected
people in Kalmunai. Similarly, the Government of Turkey
pledged funds for hous-
ing programmes in tsunami-affected Muslim areas. The United
States Agency for
International Development (USAID) has helped the Peace
Secretariat for the Muslims
(PSM).7 The PSM established regional centres in predominantly
Muslim areas and
assisted poor Muslim people in the communities with redressing

their grievances, with
support from USAID (USAID, 2008).
Many economic interactions between Muslims and Tamils used
to take place in
relation to land, but now it has become a politically sensitive
resource, generating
competition between the two ethnic groups. The competition is
so intense that the
LTTE has forbidden Muslims from building houses on land
located in Muslim
areas. Land-related ethnic distancing has been a factor behind
the marginalisation
of communities such as the fisher folk. They have been deprived
of the right to
their own land because of the GoSL’s policy that prohibits any
form of construction
within 65 metres of the sea, and the LTTE’s claim to all land
suitable for construc-
tion in Eastern Province.
Ethnic orientation and distancing in tsunami aid distribution
worsened over time,
because the participating agencies in the aid delivery system
took decisions and
worked spontaneously, without being subject to any central
coordination. Owing
to this lack of coordination (Stirrat, 2006), the agencies were
driven by emotional
attachments to their ethnic communities rather than by the needs
of the affected
people. As stated by the interviewees, the TRO started diverting
aid, transported
in trucks, to the North and the Tamil areas and distributing it
only to Tamils in
refugee camps. The presence of the TRO in the GoSL-controlled
areas was a result
of the Joint Mechanism, which introduced national politics to

the local scenario of
Ampara District. The intervention by the GoSL army and the
STF in aid delivery
was the result, leading to fights between the LTTE and GoSL
forces over the distri-
bution of aid. The TRO was allowed to maintain its offices in
the camps because of
the Joint Mechanism and the need to coordinate relief work.
Poor coordination and
deviations from a commonly agreed agenda between the TRO
and STF finally led
to the elimination of the TRO from the refugee camps in
Ampara. The STF inter-
vened and eventually assumed sole authority for the distribution
of humanitarian
aid in the refugee camps. Instead of facilitating the aid
distribution process, the pres-
ence of the TRO generated fear and discontent, particularly
among Tamil refugees,
as occurrences of child recruitment increased during the
post-tsunami recovery pro-
cess (Kautzky, 2005; Becker, 2005; Hindustan Times, 2005).
An incident reported at the time of the fieldwork for this paper,
which exacerbated
tension between the Muslims and the LTTE, was the decree
issued by the LTTE
on 16 April 2006 in which it stated that all females should
refrain from any form of
employment in the NGO sector (TW News, 2006). This order
was issued after a
case of abortion, alleged adult filmmaking by an unspecified
NGO, involving female
employees, and the selling of such Digital Versatile Discs
(DVDs) in the area.8 The

LTTE viewed these events as detrimental to the culture of the
Tamils (TW News,
2006). This had an effect on Muslims in Ampara because a large
number of female
Muslims, who had had to abandon their jobs because of the
tsunami, were working
in the NGO sector that sprung up in the aftermath of the
disaster. Muslims, as well
as ordinary Tamils, criticised the LTTE for prohibiting females
from working with
NGOs, as they have lost income.
There was a spate of killings and abductions of people from all
communities in the
post-tsunami environment, which also affected tsunami relief
management at the
local level in the District. The killing of the Director of the
Vocational Training
Centre (Ministry of Agriculture Marketing Development), Mr T.
Kailanathan, a Tamil,
on 4 April 2005, and the fatal shooting of the Divisional
Secretary of Thirukkovil,
Mr T. Thavaraja, another Tamil, on 15 April 2005, in
Vinayagapura, Thirukkovil,
were seen as protests against Tamils working with tsunami aid
delivery programmes
(GoSL, 2006; UTHR (J), 2005).
The power struggle between the GoSL and the LTTE over the
post-tsunami
resource (aid is seen as a resource) distribution system in the
east has terrified the
affected people, who could not effectively participate in the aid
distribution pro cess.
The instigation of the LTTE ban on the provision of land to

Muslims for house
construction was a Machiavellian move to undermine the aid
delivery process of
the GoSL and the local and international NGO sectors. The
ethnic distance between
Muslims and Tamils in Eastern Province was further widened as
a result. According
to a Tamil trader from Kalmunai:
although Marathamunai is a predominantly Muslim area, the
Tamils used to come there
before the Kovil ceremony, to a land belonging to the Kovil, to
collect poovarasu [Thespesia
populnea] trees for the ceremony. This time when they came to
collect the trees, there was
tension and fights between the local Muslims and the Tamil
visitors because of the current
situation.9
The Muslims questioned the political power of the Tamils in
the Eastern Province
in the wake of the tsunami, due to the revived tension between
the two communities.
A Muslim politician from Eastern Province pointed out that:
the LTTE is interested in the land in the Northeast and is asking
for more Pradeshiya
Sabha10 Council areas for them. The Tamils are only 19 per
cent of the total population in
the Eastern Province, but have four Pradeshiya Sabha, namely
Thirukkovil, Alayadi-
wembu, Karative and Navadanveli. They are asking for a fifth
one, which includes
Pothuvil and Komari. The Government also gave them a
separate Pradeshiya Sabha in
Valachchena bordering Polonnaruwa. Out of the 13 Pradeshiya

Sabha in the North East,
the Muslims have only seven’.11
Thus, the tsunami provided a stage for the Muslims and Tamils
(the LTTE) to im-
peril further their already endangered ethnic relationship. It also
enabled the GoSL
to demonstrate its power and control over the resources that
emerged after the event.
These developments undermined the democratic process of aid
distribution, caus-
ing delays, neglect and the exclusion of communities that were
in need of aid at a
time when such assistance was in urgent demand. The next
sections examine these
issues in relation to the provision of housing and fisheries aid to
communities in
Ampara District.
Housing programmes for tsunami-affected
people in Ampara
Tsunami-affected families in Muslim settlements along the
coast are deprived of land
for housing for two reasons:
• First, the GoSL has declared that land within
65 metres of the sea is unsafe for
living due to possible seismic effects, and people are thus
prohibited from engag-
ing in any construction in that beach area. This land strip is the
traditional living

area of the Muslims, particularly the fisher folk. Those families
that lived along
the narrow beach strip have not been offered alternative land or
adequate com-
pensation to buy land outside of the 65-metre zone.
• Second, the LTTE has prohibitedMuslims from
building houses on land purchased
for them by outside agencies, on the pretext that it belongs to
the Tamils.
These two aspects are analysed below.
The GoSL established several institutions as a response
strategy for post-tsunami
recovery after the failure of P-TOMS. The Task Force for
Rebuilding the Nation
(TAFREN), the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) and the
Tsunami Housing Recon-
struction Unit (THRU) were the lead agencies created through
processes involving
private and public sector participation. In November 2005,
following the election of
President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Reconstruction and
Development Agency (RADA)
was set up. This became an authority with executive powers
following parliamen-
tary ratification of the RADA Act in 2006. RADA’s mandate is
to accelerate recon-
struction and development activities in the affected areas,
functionally replacing all
the tsunami organisations, as well as a significant part of the
former RRR Ministry.
According to RADA, the total number of houses built so far (as
of May 2006)
in Ampara is 629, while total housing units pledged is 6,169. At
the time of the

research (March to June 2006), none of the housing projects
completed is in a pre-
dominantly Muslim area.
Payment of compensation for damaged houses was not based on
a consistent scheme.
As a result, some families received large sums, while others did
not get any money.
In some instances, those who collected compensation were not
the affected families.
The Auditor General, Mr S.C. Mayadunne, noted that:
Payment of an excessive amount even for minor damages due to
the payments being made
without assessing the cost of restoring the houses to normal
condition. (For example, Rs.
100,000 had been paid for minor damages of Rs. 10,000) …
Payments made without
identifying the value of the damaged houses, thus resulting in
heavy expenditure by the
Government. (For example, a sum of Rs. 250,000 had been paid
for the total destruction
of a temporary house valued at Rs. 10,000) (Mayadunne, 2005,
p. 8).
That compensation was not paid according to an acceptable
scheme led to agitation
among the affected people, and provided an opportunity for
political manipulation.
The LTTE and the TRO requested direct provision of aid for
reconstruction work
in LTTE-controlled areas. The poor response of the GoSL to

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