Part 1: Mutual Funds (20 marks)
1. Go to GlobeFund or Morningstar and select six mutual funds, according to the following requirements:
· one index fund
· one dividend fund
· one global fund
· three equity funds in different sectors such as energy, technology, microcaps, income, etc.
2. Prepare a table showing each fund’s load fees (if any), MER, and return over one, three, and five years and from inception. Identify which fund is, in your opinion, the best to invest in considering short- and long-term returns, load fees, and MERs. Explain why you picked this fund.
Part 2: Investment Portfolio Review (45 marks total)
Your response to Part 2 should be between 750 and 1250 words, with complete calculations shown where required. Based on the stocks of the two companies you chose in Last Assignment(Dollarama and Toronto-Dominion Bank) Preparation and worked on in Assignment, answer the following questions:
1. Calculate the total return percentage achieved for each individual stock from the day you selected the stock to the present or most recent business day. Use the formula
End Share Price – Beginning Share Price + Dividends Received (if any)/Beginning Share Price.
(5 marks)
2. Annualize the percentage return for each stock; that is, calculate what your return would be if you held the stock for one year. To do this, take your returns from above, divide by the number of days the share was held, and multiply by 365.
(2 marks)
3. Calculate the annualized return for the portfolio. (Use an equal weighting for each stock.) Was your return higher or lower than the rate of inflation? (3 marks)
4. Compare your annualized return with that of the index from which you have chosen your stocks. For example, if your stocks were chosen from the TSX, compare your return with that of the S&P/TSX Composite index over the past year. If you chose stocks from more than one index, you may have to compare one return with one index and the other return with another index. If, for example, you have one stock from the TSX, you would compare your stock average annual return with the S&P/TSX Composite index. Then, supposing the other stock you chose was traded on the NYSE, you would compare these returns with the S&P 500 index. In one paragraph, explain why each return is greater or less than the index. (10 marks)
5. For each of your stocks, identify (in one sentence) the most significant variable that explains the performance of the stock. For example, if you held U.S. bank stock and your stock has generated a 10% loss, you might identify the U.S. housing market as the most significant variable affecting the stock’s average return. (5 marks)
6. In two paragraphs, describe the concept of “return versus risk,” and explain how you would use it in selecting a new investment portfolio. Explain how and why you used (or did not use) this concept when you chose your original two stocks. In your explanation, ensure that you answer the following questions:
a..
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
Part 1 Mutual Funds (20 marks)1. Go to GlobeFund or Morningst.docx
1. Part 1: Mutual Funds (20 marks)
1. Go to GlobeFund or Morningstar and select six mutual funds,
according to the following requirements:
· one index fund
· one dividend fund
· one global fund
· three equity funds in different sectors such as energy,
technology, microcaps, income, etc.
2. Prepare a table showing each fund’s load fees (if any), MER,
and return over one, three, and five years and from inception.
Identify which fund is, in your opinion, the best to invest in
considering short- and long-term returns, load fees, and MERs.
Explain why you picked this fund.
Part 2: Investment Portfolio Review (45 marks total)
Your response to Part 2 should be between 750 and 1250 words,
with complete calculations shown where required. Based on the
stocks of the two companies you chose in Last
Assignment(Dollarama and Toronto-Dominion Bank)
Preparation and worked on in Assignment, answer the following
questions:
1. Calculate the total return percentage achieved for each
individual stock from the day you selected the stock to the
present or most recent business day. Use the formula
End Share Price – Beginning Share Price + Dividends Received
2. (if any)/Beginning Share Price.
(5 marks)
2. Annualize the percentage return for each stock; that is,
calculate what your return would be if you held the stock for
one year. To do this, take your returns from above, divide by
the number of days the share was held, and multiply by 365.
(2 marks)
3. Calculate the annualized return for the portfolio. (Use an
equal weighting for each stock.) Was your return higher or
lower than the rate of inflation? (3 marks)
4. Compare your annualized return with that of the index from
which you have chosen your stocks. For example, if your stocks
were chosen from the TSX, compare your return with that of the
S&P/TSX Composite index over the past year. If you chose
stocks from more than one index, you may have to compare one
return with one index and the other return with another index.
If, for example, you have one stock from the TSX, you would
compare your stock average annual return with the S&P/TSX
Composite index. Then, supposing the other stock you chose
was traded on the NYSE, you would compare these returns with
the S&P 500 index. In one paragraph, explain why each return
is greater or less than the index. (10 marks)
5. For each of your stocks, identify (in one sentence) the most
significant variable that explains the performance of the stock.
For example, if you held U.S. bank stock and your stock has
generated a 10% loss, you might identify the U.S. housing
market as the most significant variable affecting the stock’s
average return. (5 marks)
6. In two paragraphs, describe the concept of “return versus
risk,” and explain how you would use it in selecting a new
investment portfolio. Explain how and why you used (or did not
use) this concept when you chose your original two stocks. In
3. your explanation, ensure that you answer the following
questions:
a. What would you do differently if you were to choose another
two stocks for your portfolio? Explain your answer. (10 marks)
b. What specific actions could you take in the future when
choosing stock investments to reduce risk and increase the
reward in your portfolio?
(10 marks)
Part 3: Learning from the Masters (35 marks total)
Your response to Part 3 should be no more than 1000 words,
with complete calculations shown where required. Use the
lesson notes from Lesson 6 to answer the following questions. If
appropriate, you may use tables to present information.
1. Compare the investment philosophy you used to select your
two stocks with that of Benjamin Graham. What would
Benjamin Graham say about your stock picks? Provide a reason
your choice may be different than Mr. Graham’s. (10 marks)
2. Warren Buffett does not invest in Internet companies due to
the difficulty in predicting their future earnings. Explain to Mr.
Buffett how he could value an Internet company that at present
has no cash flow. Use financial calculations as appropriate to
answer this question. (10 marks)
3. Choose five of the masters listed in Lesson 6. Compare and
contrast their investment styles, using a table if appropriate.
Which of the masters’ investment styles do you believe will be
most effective over the next ten years? As an investment
advisor, which of these investment styles would you use during
a bull market? During a bear market? Be sure to fully explain
each of your responses. (15 marks)
Lesson 6 for Part 3 here under please and this will help you
solving part 3
4. Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
Notes
Note 1: Benjamin Graham
Benjamin Graham began a career on Wall Street at the age of
20. By 1919, he was 25 years old and earning $600,000
annually. In 1926, he formed an investment partnership,
Graham-Newman, where a list of prominent investors (including
Warren Buffett) later worked. Graham is remembered as the
founder and father of value investing. He might also be credited
with the development of rigorous security analysis. His
book The Intelligent Investor is regarded as a classic for
investors. In 1934, he collaborated with David L. Dodd to
write Security Analysis. It has since become known as Graham
and Dodd’s Security Analysis, and its fifth edition was revised
by three prominent professionals and academics, Sidney Cottle,
Roger F. Murray, and Frank E. Block.
Graham thought extensively about the meaning
of investment versus speculation. When he started his career,
stocks were considered a speculation, while bonds were
considered an investment. The great crash of 1929 showed that
bonds can be as speculative as stocks. In Graham’s opinion, it
was the intention of the investor, more than the character of the
transaction, that would determine whether a transaction is an
investment or a speculation.
Graham (1973) defined an investment operation as “one which,
upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and a
satisfactory return. Operations not meeting these requirements
are speculative” (p. 1). In other words, for a security to be
considered an investment, there must be some degree of safety
of principal and a satisfactory return. Analysis determines the
degree of safety and the promise of income. Graham held that
5. the value of an investment is not its earnings this month, or next
month, or in the next quarter, nor what its sales volume will be
next quarter; rather, its value is determined by what an investor
can expect to receive over a long period of time. He described
three phases of analysis (1973, pp. 145–146):
· descriptive analysis, where the analyst gathers all the facts
and presents them
· critical analysis, where the analyst evaluates the security and
the merits of the standards used to communicate information to
the public (e.g., accounting standards) and management’s track
record in communicating openly
· selective analysis, where the analyst decides on the merits of
the security with a recommendation
Graham looked to buy undervalued stocks, those selling below
their intrinsic value. He reasoned that a margin of safety existed
for the common stock if the price of the stock was below its
intrinsic value, which he determined from factual information
such as the company’s assets, earnings, dividends, and any
definite future prospects. Future earnings power is the
determining factor in ascertaining the attractiveness of a stock
and also a limiting factor for accuracy. Graham ventured into
subjective territory when he advocated that a company’s
intrinsic value can be found by estimating the future earnings
and multiplying them with an appropriate capitalization factor.
This methodology forms the basis for most modern financial
analysis. The variety of methodologies employed by analysts
shows how widely this method can range. For Graham, the
difference between the intrinsic value (calculated) and the price
of the company share should be large enough to create a margin
of safety. Graham liked stocks with a low price to earnings
(P/E) ratio and a low price to book value (market value to book
value) ratio. Net asset value was Graham’s starting point. He
liked to buy companies for less than two-thirds of their net asset
6. value (preferring net current assets) and to focus on low P/E
stocks with some net asset value. He also considered other
factors beyond financial statement “facts,” including
management capability and the nature of the business.
Graham looked at the past record of his potential investments,
and the further back he could look, the better. If an analyst
reviewed the company’s record of earnings and saw that it was
able to annually earn five times the fixed charges, then its
bonds possessed a margin of safety and its stock could be
considered. He did not expect the analyst to accurately predict
future earnings. For Graham, a reasonable estimation would
suffice if the margin between earnings and fixed charges was
large enough.
Graham found that growth stocks—stocks growing their sales
and earnings at an above-average rate—were difficult to deal
with and created a dilemma for investors. How do investors
define the stage of growth in the corporate or product life
cycle? If the investor buys during the company’s rapid growth
stages, the growth may turn out to be temporary. If the investor
can accurately pinpoint a growth company, what price should he
or she pay? Graham said that to get a margin of safety, one
should purchase the shares of a company when the overall
market is trading at a low price or is in a corrective phase, or
one should purchase the stock when it trades below its intrinsic
value even while the market is not cheap. But how do you know
whether the market is cheap or not? If purchasing is restricted
to when the market is fairly valued, you often cannot purchase a
growth stock for long periods.
Graham brought discipline to stock investing and he helped
bring stock into the public realm of investing from its previous
relegation to “speculation.” He believed an analysis mindset
could only truly exert itself if the mind of the investor focused
on the security and the company, rather than on the market. We
7. will encounter this theme often as we look at other famous
investment figures.
Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
Notes
Note 2: Philip Fisher
Philip Fisher formed his own investment-counselling firm in
1931. He reasoned that every investor with any money left after
the crash was probably unhappy with his current broker, so he
viewed this situation as an opportunity for a newcomer to enter
the field. Also, business was slow at the time, so business
people had time to chat. Fisher is the author of Common Stocks
and Uncommon Profits (originally published by Harper and
Brothers in 1958). He believed that he could make superior
profits—firstly, by investing in companies with above-average
potential and, secondly, by aligning his investments with the
most capable management (Fisher, 1996).
Note that these two factors mirror the two intrinsic factors that
Graham found difficult to depend on. In contrast, Fisher relied
and focused on them. He looked for companies that had the
ability to grow sales and profits over the years at rates above
the industry averages. He liked products and services that could
grow and gain in sales for at least several years. Fisher
considered research and development, as well as strong sales
and marketing competence, to be very important factors. As he
considered which companies to invest into he developed some
additional tenets:
· Companies with above-average sales growth without profit
growth should be avoided.
· Companies should be the lowest cost producers and dedicated
to remaining so.
8. · Companies should be able to grow without requiring further
equity financing. This requires high profit margins.
· Management should be willing to subordinate immediate
profits to greater long-range gains but not to sacrifice
immediate profits unnecessarily.
· Management integrity is critical. Managers must act for
shareholders, not for their own well-being.
· The investor should be prepared to interview customers and
vendors as well as management to get comparisons in the
industry.
Finally, Fisher advocated that an investor should invest in his or
her circle of competence, a theme we hear often from successful
investors. Philip Fisher was a long-term holder of technology
growth stocks. He held Texas Instruments for many years, from
before it went public until long into its listed life.
Fisher advocated that the long-term investor should concentrate
on young growth stocks, which could be identified by
· reading widely from a range of trade journals and broker’
reports.
· interviewing knowledgeable people, including owners,
managers, suppliers, customers, and competitors.
· visiting company sites if possible.
He also recommended that you sell when you have made a
mistake in your assessment of the company, when the company
deviates from the traits that convinced you to purchase it, or if
you see an opportunity to reinvest your funds in a more
attractive company.
Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
9. Notes
Note 3: Warren Buffett
After Ben Graham’s death, Warren Buffett assumed the
reputation as the leading value investor, and his name has
become synonymous with value investing. Warren Buffett is
Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, which is an
investment holding company. Charlie Munger is Vice Chairman
of Berkshire Hathaway and is Warren’s closest associate. With
help from Munger, Buffett synthesized the characteristics of
Graham and Fisher in developing an approach that combined the
qualitative and quantitative approaches. He has, however,
purchased stocks that would not strictly have met Graham’s
standards for value. Stocks in which Buffett has invested large
sums include American Express, The Washington Post
Company, Capital Cities, ABC, and the Coca-Cola Company.
Buffett realized that absolute adherence to the quantitative
guidelines laid out by Graham was leading him to unprofitable
investments. Graham recognized the importance of the
qualitative factors of management capability and nature of the
business but was reluctant to rely on them. In contrast, Buffett
has come to rely significantly on his judgment in these two
areas and has bought many firms for their strength in these
areas along with a strong quantitative analysis signal.
Robert G. Hagstrom, Jr. (1994) wrote a book that analyzes
Buffett’s investing patterns. In it, he states:
Even today, Buffett continues to embrace Graham’s primary
idea, the theory of the margin of safety.… What Buffett learned
from Graham was that successful investing involved the
purchase of stocks when the market price of those stocks was at
a significant discount to the underlying business value. (p. 46)
10. Sir John Templeton (discussed in the next lesson note) alluded
to the difficulty of applying a strictly quantitative method as
suggested by Graham when he noted the huge growth in the
investment advising business. The number of analysts sifting for
quantitative bargains has increased exponentially with ever-
increasing computing power and more comprehensive data
bases.
Buffett began to study Philip Fisher’s writing as early as 1969.
Charlie Munger helped Buffett move toward Fisher’s investment
philosophy, which was to
· pay a reasonable price for a good business in order to reap the
long-term benefits
· recognize that the type of business matters and the quality of
management can affect the value of the underlying business
· avoid over-diversification—buying a company without having
a thorough understanding of the business is riskier than having
limited diversification by owning only a few companies.
Buffett strongly values the “margin of safety” concept taught by
Graham and mixes in Fisher’s appreciation for the value of a
better business and strong management. In many of Berkshire
Hathaway’s purchases of private corporate interests, the current
management (often family based) is retained to run and grow
the business. For instance, See's Candies was purchased in 1972
for $25 million when the asking price was $40 million and the
company had $10 million in cash. Buffett believed that See's
manager, Chuck Huggins, was responsible for the long-term
record of success, so he kept Huggins on as manager. Huggins
managed the growth of the company in subsequent periods with
a focus on product quality and customer service; in 1993, See's
had revenues of $102 million and returned to Berkshire $24.3
million in net operating earnings (Hagstrom, 1994, p. 11).
11. Buffett shares Graham’s view that the market is driven by the
emotions of its participants and that such sentiment will often
have a more pronounced effect on a company’s stock price than
will its fundamentals. The objective for the investor is to avoid
being caught up in fear and greed. An investor should seek only
to acquire companies at reasonable prices.
As well, Buffett agrees with Graham’s assessment of
forecasting. Stock market forecasting and timing is difficult, if
not impossible.
Buffett did not anticipate the periods in which the market was
likely to go up or down. Rather his goals were modest. “We
simply attempt,” he explained, “to be fearful when others are
greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.”
(Hagstrom, 1994, p. 52)
Portfolio insurance involves constantly rebalancing a portfolio
between risky and risklessassets to maintain its capital or
ensure it does not fall below a minimum level. Buffett does not
think much of this concept. Hagstrom (1994) notes that Buffett
considers portfolio insurance to be as absurd as asking investors
to
… consider the rationale of a landowner who, after buying a
farm, instructs his real estate agent to begin selling off plots the
minute a neighbouring farm is sold at a lower price. Or whether
a large pension fund owning shares in General Electric [or other
blue-chip stock] is logical in selling portions of its investments
just because the last quoted share price was a downtick or in
buying shares because of an uptick. (p. 53)
Buffett views the stock market simply as a market that is there
to serve the buyers and the sellers and not as a price-setting
guide.
Buffett views inflation as inevitable, given the lack of
constraints on government spending. The constant increase in
12. money supply will push inflation higher. Inflation will erode
profit, gains, and asset value over time until the demand for an
inflation premium revises costs incurred. Income taxes with no
inflation still leave the investor with a profit unless the taxes
are raised to 100%.
Knowing that he will not benefit from inflation, Buffett instead
seeks to avoid those businesses that will be hurt by inflation.
Companies that require large amounts of fixed assets to operate
are hurt by inflation. Companies requiring little in fixed assets
are, Buffett says, still hurt by inflation but hurt a little less. And
the ones that are hurt the least are those with a significant
amount of economic goodwill. (Hagstrom, 1994, p. 60)
Economic goodwill is the perception of value received or
reputation. A company with a good or strong reputation (often
referred to as “brand”) can garner premium prices. Today,
Toyota and BMW are examples of companies with strong brand
reputations. Buffett believes that investors should view
themselves as business analysts, rater than market analysts,
macroeconomic analysts, or even security analysts.
Investing in a good company is usually an easy decision. If a
decision to purchase a business is not easy, Buffett will not
purchase the company. He does not make purchases or sales
often. While most investors cannot resist the temptation to
constantly buy and sell, Buffett’s success lies in his inactivity.
Buffett’s great success may be attributed to a dozen or so of his
best decisions. Otherwise his performance would be no better
than average. Peter Lynch (see Lesson Note 5) has noted that if
an investor has one or two “ten baggers” or thirty baggers in his
or her investing history, he or she will likely have outperformed
the market.
Hagstrom (1994, pp. 77–122) discusses 12 tenets that guide
Buffet’s investing decisions:
13. 1. Is the business simple and understandable?
2. Does the business have a consistent operating history?
3. Does the business have favourable long-term prospects?
4. Is management rational (particularly in allocation of capital)?
5. Is management candid with the shareholders?
6. Does management resist the institutional imperative (the
drive to imitate the behaviour of other managers, leadership
pandering, and following of peer companies)?
7. Does the company focus on return on equity over earnings
per share?
8. Calculate owners’ earnings to get a true reflection of value
(net income + depreciation, depletion, and amortization –
capital expenditures – increase in working capital).
9. Does the company earn high profit margins?
10. Does the company create at least one dollar of market value
for every dollar it retains?
11. What is the value of the business? (Liquidation, going
concern, or market are common but for Buffett this is
discounted net cash flow.) If Buffett cannot estimate future cash
flows, he will not value the company.
12. Can the business be purchased at a significant discount to
its value?
Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
Notes
14. Note 4: Sir John Templeton
Sir John Templeton founded Templeton Investment
Management. Until his death in 2008 at age 95, he devoted
himself to his foundation and to managing his own fortune. He
sold his fund company to the Franklin Group in 1999 but his
flagship fund still invests using the principles he established for
it.
Templeton started his career on Wall Street in 1937 and made
his reputation as a value investor on a global basis. His stated
goal was never to just make money for himself but to earn it for
others. He is well known for his statement, “History shows that
time, not timing, is the key to investment success.” He has also
noted that while he greatly admired Warren Buffett, he felt
Buffett was short sighted by investing only in the United States.
Templeton’s great innovation was to expand his horizon and
invest globally. Note that he used the term global instead
of international because the latter term would exclude domestic
stocks. He felt free to buy a cheap stock wherever he could find
it. He formed the Templeton Growth Fund in 1954 and produced
exemplary returns during the time he owned and managed it.
Another oft-repeated quote attributed to Sir John surmises that
“to buy when others are despondently selling and sell when
others are avidly buying requires the greatest fortitude and pays
the greatest reward.”
In 1939, John Templeton borrowed money to buy $100 worth of
every NYSE stock trading under $1 per share. He bought 104
names and he notes that three years later he had a profit on 100
of the 104. He sold high during the Internet boom, bought Ford
near bankruptcy in 1978, and was early into Japan and early to
sell. He bought Japanese stocks at a P/E of 3 and started
seriously selling when P/Es reached a market average of 30.
15. While his flagship stock fund is called the Templeton Growth
Fund, Templeton was always a value investor. He did, however,
insist on companies with an above-average growth rate (20%).
Combining this filter with strict value purchase criteria led to
great results and probably pushed a global strategy just to find
enough attractive companies to buy. Templeton analyzed
companies, not markets, and always sought cheap companies.
Templeton liked “maximum pessimism.” Logically, you can buy
at the lowest price only when pessimism is highest. When crises
hit a country or region, Templeton looked for bargains. He
bought solid companies if they were inexpensive, but while he
insisted on quality, he was perfectly happy to buy tiny
companies if he found value.
Patience was a virtue to Templeton. He believed in giving a
purchase time to work out and held stocks on average four
years. He would hold as long as six years waiting for a stock to
reflect the fair intrinsic value of the business. If disappointed,
Templeton quietly exited the stock holdings.
Templeton held diverse portfolios. He was never a focus
investor (one who focuses on sectors or few companies).
Instead, he held a widely diversified portfolio. Templeton was
similar to Benjamin Graham in that he used results data based
on a period of time longer than the twelve-month earnings
figure commonly used by analysts. He favoured five years of
history and advocated longer periods if available. His reason for
using longer earnings histories was to eliminate normal cyclical
downturns.
Templeton looked for low P/E ratios and healthy operating
profit margins. He bought cheap stocks but not bad ones. He
always had an exit strategy and would sell all stocks in his
portfolio as soon as they became fairly priced. He looked at
16. companies for their fire sale price (often book value) as his
ultimate downside risk.
Templeton believed in flexibility. He would change his strategy
to adjust for new events. He felt that the world is in a state of
constant change and that the investor must change with it. He
found value investing difficult in his later years, partly because
of the proliferation of investment analysts and also because of
the ready availability of information.
While Buffett happily invested from Omaha, Templeton set up
his funds in the Bahamas. He felt that being away from New
York made him a better investor and freed him from the
impulses of the mob. He didn’t trust rules. He always tinkered
with his system, improving it and testing it to ensure its current
validity. He noted that in order to buy stocks at a bargain price,
you have to do the opposite of what the crowd was doing. He
felt that he could do this better from Nassau than New York—an
analyst in New York goes to the same presentations, events, and
meetings as everyone else, which makes it difficult to deviate
from the crowd.
Templeton’s principles for investment success can be
summarized as follows (Franklin Templeton Investment
Management Limited, 2006):
· Invest for real returns after taxes.
· Keep an open mind, stay flexible, and never permanently
adopt any rule-based formula or any one type of asset.
· Do not follow the crowd—if you buy what other people are
buying, you will get the same results as other people. Buy when
others are selling (in a crisis, not because of a bad company
report).
17. · Everything changes. Bear and bull markets are all temporary.
· Learn from your mistakes. Saying "this time is different” is
dangerous.
· Buy during times of market pessimism.
· Hunt for value and bargains.
· Search globally.
· No one has all the answers.
Some of Templeton’s investment criteria included looking at
P/E ratios in relation to other comparable companies, looking
for rising operating profit margins, a good liquidation value,
and an average growth rate of earnings showing consistency. He
would not buy companies whose earnings slipped two years in a
row.
Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
Notes
Note 5: Peter Lynch
Peter Lynch made his name managing the Fidelity Magellan
Fund for 13 years (until May 31, 1990). His returns beat those
of most of his contemporaries and he wrote a number of books
on his experiences and his stock-picking practices. Lynch joined
Fidelity upon graduating from Boston College in 1969. In 1977,
he took over the Magellan fund, which had $22 million in
assets. Thirteen years later, that figure was $14 billion. Lynch
was widely diversified and successfully held purchases for
years. Over half his stock choices were self-admitted mistakes,
but he sold them within months. Magellan is not restricted to a
particular management style (e.g., value or growth) nor
industrial sectors or geographical areas.
18. Lynch believes that individual investors can compete with the
professionals by using common sense and sticking to what they
can understand (a familiar refrain with our successful
investors). He believes that one can spot investment
opportunities all around—for example, in the mall, in the
classroom, at work, and on the playground.
In his book One Up on Wall Street, Lynch (1989) outlines six
categories into which companies generally fall (pp. 99–118):
· slow growers—companies that are growing at approximately
the same rate as the economy
· stalwarts—good companies with about 10–12% growth in
earnings
· fast growers—companies that are growing at 20–25% or more
per year; often small, aggressive, new companies
· turnarounds—companies that are temporarily depressed, but
have good prospects
· cyclicals—companies whose earnings rise and fall with the
economy’s cycles
· asset plays—companies whose shares are worth less than their
assets (provided those assets can be sold)
Lynch believes that if you hold cash, you cannot gain a
reasonable return, so he advises potential investors to consider
investing at least in stalwarts. Cyclicals are generally too hard
to time and slow growers are not profitable enough.
He also believes that you have to be able to tell the story behind
your stock choice: why it interests you, what it needs to do to
succeed, and the obstacles to its success. He also suggests that
19. you check the key numbers. Look for companies whose growth
products are a sufficient portion of sales to make a difference
and whose balance sheet shows a strong cash position and
manageable debt. Look for a high pre-tax profit margin and a
P/E ratio below the forecast EPS growth (a low PEG). PEG =
(P/E)/Annual EPS growth. According to Lynch, the P/E ratio of
a fairly priced company will equal its growth rate, so its PEG
will be 1. In other words, P/E = G, where G is the earnings
growth rate. Note that this is just a rule of thumb and G must
represent a period of greater than five years, preferably ten.
Lynch advises that you keep an eye on the stocks you own, not
on the economy or the market. An investor’s performance will
be based on the stocks held, not on the economy or market. Sell
stalwarts when their PEGs reach 1.2 to 1.4 or their long-term
growth rate slows. Sell fast growers if the scope for
growth/expansion narrows or disappears.
In his book Beating the Street, Lynch (1993) states that “you
can’t see the future through a rear view mirror” (p. 41) and “the
key to making money in stocks is not to get scared out of them”
(p. 36).
He notes that the very best way to make money in a market is in
a small growth company that has become profitable for a couple
of years and goes on growing.
Lynch has not changed his views since leaving the Magellan
fund. In an interview with Money Magazine writer Glenn
Coleman, Lynch states “I’ve found that when the market is
going down and you buy funds wisely, at some point in the
future you will be happy. You won’t get there by reading ‘Now
is the time to buy’ ” (Coleman, 2003, p. 1).
In an interview on PBS Frontline (1997), Lynch notes that “I
think the secret is if you have a lot of stocks, some will do
20. mediocre, some will do okay, and if one or two of 'em go up big
time, you produce a fabulous result.”
During his career, Lynch tried to stay aggressive, always
looking for a better stock rather than trying to justify and
defend past purchases. He tried to be flexible and buy the
unusual if he believed in it. For instance, he bought Taco Bell
when general market investors would not look at a small
restaurant company.
Lesson 6: Learning from the Masters
Notes
Note 6: Kenneth Fisher
Kenneth Fisher, son of Philip Fisher, worked in his father’s firm
for a year after graduating from college in 1972. He then set up
and now runs his own firm, which is based on a hybrid
value/growth investing philosophy that both resembles and
differs from his father’s investment philosophy. Kenneth Fisher
prefers stocks that are cheap due to their bad image but that are
actually better stocks than investors view them to be. He then
sells when the reputation and price return to more normal
levels.
Fisher also looks for “super companies” that can internally fund
growth at well above average rates. According to his
book Super Stocks, Fisher (1984) has determined that a super
company has the following attributes (p. 106):
· a growth orientation evidenced by management’s burning
desire for growth and displayed “not only in growth markets
but, more importantly, throughout the daily lives of the
employees that make growth happen”
· marketing excellence shown by an ability to identify and
21. satisfy customer needs
· a competitive advantage as lowest cost producer, or an
established, unique, or proprietary position in its major product
lines
· creative personnel relations or a company culture that listens
to staff and rewards useful innovations and contributions
· strong financial controls that provide early warnings if results
are not as planned, along with a drive to improve financial
controls relative to competitors
In addition to these critical attributes, we would expect high
margins, high market share, superior management, leading
products, and a quality image (Fisher, 1984, p. 106).
Fisher explains that a super company is not necessarily a super
stock if it is already fairly priced or overpriced. He explains his
use of price sales ratios (PSRs) to evaluate promising stocks. He
uses this measure to get around some of the limitations of P/E
ratios in looking at growth stocks in particular. We could also
note that earnings numbers are much further downstream than
revenue numbers and subject to much more variation due to
accounting conventions and choices. The PSR is the aggregate
market value of a company (its share price times the number of
outstanding shares) divided by its sales. In this frame of
reference, a super stock is a super company bought at a low PSR
relative to the company’s size. Fisher says that a super stock
represents a business that can generate internally funded future
long-term average growth of from 15% to 20%, will generate
after-tax profit margins above 5%, and is bought at a PSR of
0.75 or less (pp. 36–37).
Fisher also looks to price research ratios (PRRs) for companies
in industries where research and innovation pave the road to
growth. PRR is the market value of the company divided by the
22. corporate research expenses for the last 12 months. The lesson
is not to pay too much for research. The issue, according to
Fisher, is what a company will earn from its research, and for
that the key is marketing. Once an investor can determine
marketing capability, valuing research becomes relatively easy
(pp. 59–60). Fisher advises against purchasing a super company
with a PRR greater than 15.0 but likes super companies with
PRRs of 5.0 to 10.0, provided they meet PSR tests (p. 60).
Alternatively, a company with a PSR of less than 0.75 would be
disqualified with a PRR of 25.0, which implies it is not
spending enough on research to maximize its future (p. 61).
We have looked at the value approach, which buys underpriced
low P/E stocks, and the growth stock approach, which looks for
companies that are growing at an above-average pace believing
that the price will eventually follow; however, both of these
approaches leave us wanting when we look at groups of
companies (e.g., technology) and young growth companies.
Fisher thus proposed adding the PSR to the mix of evaluation
tools. Note that the use of price sales ratios is fairly common
today but was not widely prevalent when Fisher wrote his book.
He notes (p. 35):
I like the concept of multiples … I just don’t like price-earnings
multiples. I prefer other multiples—particularly sales multiples.
I choose to value stocks in terms of Price Sales Ratios (PSRs),
actual and potential profit margins, and Price Research Ratios
(PRRs).
A company recognized as a growth stock may have a PSR of
5.0, 10.0, or higher. It then is not a super stock. Buyers will not
make superior profits buying and holding it. PSRs measure
popularity relative to business size. Sales are generally fairly
stable and good companies rarely suffer catastrophic sales
declines. The price of stocks vary considerably with market
psychology, thus creating opportunity.
23. Fisher has a number of rules for using PSRs to make money
with super stocks (pp. 43–44):
· Avoid stocks with PSRs greater than 1.5, and never buy a
stock with a PSR greater than 3.
· Seek super companies with a PSR less than .75; there are
generally some available.
· Sell stock in a super company when the PSR reaches between
3.0 and 6.0.
PSRs can also be applied to non–super stocks and companies; in
these cases, PSR won’t tell an investor what to buy, but what to
avoid. Historically, buying high PSR stocks leads to substantial
losses or comparatively small gains.
Fisher provides the following table to relate P/E ratios to PSRs.
Table 6-1Implied P/E Ratios under Varying Profit Margins and
PSRs
Profit Margin (percent)
PSRs
12
10
7.5
5
2
1
.12
1.00
1.20
1.60
2.40
6.00
12.00
26. 100.00
133.33
200.00
500.00
1,000.00
Note. Adapted from Super Stocks (p. 40), by K. L. Fisher,
1984,Homewood, Il: Dow Jones-Irwin.
For example, when a company sells at 1.0 times sales and earns
7.5% after tax, it implies a P/E ratio of 13.33 (Fisher, p. 40).
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