dana shwan

1. Social Capital, Civic Engagement
and Democratization
in Kurdistan
MIDDLE EAST TODAY
Hewa Haji Khedir

2. Middle East Today
Series Editors
Fawaz A. Gerges
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics
London, UK
Nader Hashemi
Center for Middle East Studies, Josef Korbel
School of International Studies
University of Denver
Denver, CO, USA

3. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the
US invasion and occupation of Iraq have dramatically altered the geopo-
litical landscape of the contemporary Middle East. The Arab Spring up-
risings have complicated this picture. This series puts forward a critical
body of first-rate scholarship that reflects the current political and social
realities of the region, focusing on original research about contentious
politics and social movements; political institutions; the role played by
non-governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the
Muslim Brotherhood; and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Other themes of
interest include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent powers in the
region, the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an emerging
democracy currently governed by a party with Islamic roots; the Gulf
monarchies, their petrol economies and regional ambitions; potential
problems of nuclear proliferation in the region; and the challenges con-
fronting the United States, Europe, and the United Nations in the greater
Middle East. The focus of the series is on general topics such as social tur-
moil, war and revolution, international relations, occupation, radicalism,
democracy, human rights, and Islam as a political force in the context of
the modern Middle East.
More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14803

4. Hewa Haji Khedir
Social Capital, Civic
Engagement
and Democratization
in Kurdistan

5. Hewa Haji Khedir
University of Winchester
Winchester, UK
Middle East Today
ISBN 978-3-030-42143-4 ISBN 978-3-030-42144-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42144-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover credit: Aanas Lahoui shutterstock.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

6. To
Lwa, Nwa and Rohin

7. Praise for Social Capital, Civic
Engagement and Democratization in
Kurdistan
“This book gives remarkable insights into the problems of transition to
democracy, using an interesting case study. Dr. Khedir’s sociological an-
gle grants us a window into the important and sometimes neglected ques-
tion of social capital in democratic politics. The weakness of the fast-track
transition model becomes evident, as its institutional design proves insuf-
ficient for a transition success without supportive social relationships in
place.”
—Alex Danilovich, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Institute on Governance,
Ottawa, Canada
“The simplistic importation of ‘democratic devices’ such as parliaments,
as Hewa Haji Khedir demonstrates here in this detailed analysis, is not
the same as democratisation. This extensive case study of ‘democratic’
transition in the Kurdistan region of Iraq instead identifies that ‘social
capital literature fails to pay adequate attention to the historical, cultural
and economic pre-transition contexts’. Khedir explains the weaknesses of
social capital in Kurdistan as well. The lack of sufficient societal trust and
effective civil literacy and communications to foster it all undermines the
development of adequate mechanisms for accountability, and without ac-
countability there can be no democracy.”
—Pippa Catterall, Professor of History and Policy, University of
Westminster, London, UK
vii

8. Introduction
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Kurds and Iraq
KRI refers to territories in the four governorates of Erbil, Sulaimani,
Duhok and Halabja in the North East of Iraq which fell under the con-
trol of Kurds since 1991. The area is often, especially in Pan-nationalist
Kurdish circles, called Bashur (south) to point to its geographic loca-
tion vis-à-vis other parts of Kurdistan: Northern Kurdistan in Turkey
(Bakur), Eastern Kurdistan in Iran (Rojhelat) and Western Kurdistan in
Syria (Rojava). Due to historical disputes over vast swaths of land be-
tween Kurds and consecutive Iraqi governments the ultimate geographic
territorial boundaries of KRI is not defined yet.1 The KRI is recognized
by Iraqi constitution of 2005 as an autonomous region within the bound-
aries of the federal state of Iraq (article 117, first). Geographically, KRI’s
area reaches 40,643 km2 (Kurdistan Regional Government Website). De-
mographically, an entirely accurate figure with respect to the population
of the region is not available: the last general population census to have
1Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution (2005) addresses the issue of Internally Disputed
Territories (IDTs) and demographic change policies of Ba’th regime by setting up a three
stage roadmap (normalization, census and referendum). The article was expected to come
to conclusion by December 31, 2007. Apart from partial implementation of stage one
(normalization meant to be restoring the demographic and administrative normal situation
of these areas), no progress has been made with stage two and three.
ix

9. x INTRODUCTION
been carried out in KRI2 was in 1987 which had identified the popula-
tion of the region at 2,015,466. As KRI governorates were out of the
control of Iraqi government, the last population census of 1997 did not
include KRI governorates. However, the census provided an estimation
of 2,861,701. In 2014, Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRSO) and
the Central Statistics Office (CSO) offered an estimation of 5,122,747.
Taking the last figure as the benchmark, the population of KRI counts
for 14.22% of the Iraqi population (estimated at 36,004,552 in 2014).
Overwhelming majority of the KRI population resides in urban settings:
75%, 84% and 85% in governorates of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani respec-
tively (IOM, UNFPA and KSRO 2018, p. 14).3 Ethnically, vast majority
of the population are Kurds, predominantly Sunni Muslims, who have
lived for centuries with Turkmens, Christians, Arabs and other ethnic and
religious communities of Yazidis, Kakais, Shabaks, Jews and Sabean Man-
daeans (Map 1).
Identity is a controversial issue in KRI: to begin with, variations of
identification with different sources of group-identity exist: Aziz’s (2011)
survey reveals this variation eloquently; whilst his survey demonstrates
that Kurdistani (simply being a Kurd from Kurdistan) tended to be the
overriding identity for the university students in KRI, identification with
Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdistan Region, greater Kurdistan, Islam, region
or tribe were reported among the ways his survey respondents presented
themselves in. Additionally, whereas for certain communities whose iden-
tity, at least in relation to Kurds, seems to be relatively clear-cut (for ex-
ample Turkmens who express them as a distinct ethnicity or Christians
who mostly define themselves in terms of identification to Christianity,
for other ethnic and religious communities, such as heterodox communi-
ties of Kakais (Ahli Haqq) and Yazidis the boundaries are not so sharply
drawn. Bruinessen (2006, p. 23) makes a useful distinction between core
2At the time of the 1987 census, a geographic and administrative area to be called KRI
did not exist: Iraqi government would call present KRI governorates, northern gover-
norates or governorates of autonomy area to refer to areas which were allowed to be run
by Kurds according to March manifesto/agreement of 1970 between Kurdish revolution
and Iraqi Government.
3Because Halabja is a newly created governorate and that it was part of Sulaimani
governorate separate official data about it is missing.

10. INTRODUCTION xi
Map 1 Areas under the administration of KRG and Internally Disputed Terri-
tories (Source Created by Dr. Hashim Yasin Al-Hadad, Professor of Geography,
Salahaddin University-Erbil)

11. xii INTRODUCTION
and periphery in Kurdish identity: the core refers to an unambiguous pre-
vailing Kurdish identity for masses of Kurds and the periphery to the out-
lying groups for whom an ethnic Kurdish identity is just one among many
other identities. Therefore, Bruinessen (ibid., p. 21) prefers to use “Kur-
dish Society” or “Kurdish culture” in a relatively loose meaning to denote
to Kurds and communities who “may not in all contexts identify them-
selves as Kurds”. Specifically speaking about KRI, it is worth noting that
identity has become an exceptionally politicized issue for ethnic and re-
ligious communities who populate IDTs (see PAX for Peace 2015). The
fact that KRG and Iraqi government has been in protracted conflict over
the identity of these areas, each pushed hard in order to win the loyalty of
these communities. In consequence, intra community identity divisions
emerged to the surface reflecting conflicting community preferences in
terms of future status of IDTs. With the invasion of Nineveh by Islamic
State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and prosecution of the ethnic and reli-
gious communities, intra community divisions became further apparent.
For instance, among Yazidi community, a Kurdish Identity, a Yazidi Iden-
tity and a dual Kurdish-Yazidi Identity persist. Likewise, for Turkmens, a
tension has grown between a Turkmen Sunni and Turkmen Shi’a identity.
Historically, in the aftermath of the World War I, KRI which would
constitute largest parts of what was back then called Mosul Vilayet, in
1925 was attached to the newly formed state of Iraq. Presenting Iraq as
“artificial”, created to serve the selfish interests of colonial powers, is a
popular thesis among Kurdish nationalists. Research (e.g. Anderson and
Stansfield 2004; Rear 2008; Saleh 2013) suggests that the attachment of
Mosul Vilayet to Iraq took place to realize two central goals: firstly, the
attachment of a predominantly Sunni population (Sunni Arabs and Sunni
Kurds) to Iraq was essential to bring about a sort of demographic bal-
ance between Sunni and Shi’a population of the country. The frictional
relationships of British occupiers and Shi’a clergies even before the cre-
ation of Iraqi state which reached its height in 1920 revolt against occu-
pation, made occupying authorities became progressively hostile to Shi’a
and, therefore, they did everything possible to prevent Shi’a leverage in
Iraq to grow (see Kadhim 2012; Ismael and Fuller 2008; Saleh 2013).
Secondly, the attachment of an area with enormous oil reserves was in-
strumental for the economic viability of the newly emerged Iraq. Up until
1997, the contribution of northern oilfield reached to nearly 50% of the
overall Iraq’s oil production (Ghafur 2010, p. 27). Moreover, In Kur-
dish circles, the creation of Iraq is not only a colonial arrangement, but

12. INTRODUCTION xiii
it also represents an obvious betrayal of a promise of independence made
to the Kurds in accordance to Treaty of Sevres 19204 which was soon
aborted by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (e.g. see Anderson and Stans-
field 2004; Yildiz 2004; Gunter 2008; Rear 2008; Aziz 2011). It is often
rightly suggested that if the historical Shi’a question in Iraq is to have re-
volved around the legitimacy of governments, for Kurds the whole idea of
legitimacy of the state itself has been in question.
In reaction to reigning on Sevres promises and failure in genuine real-
ization of the Anglo-Iraqi statement of 1922,5 regional and sporadic re-
volts broke out in Kurdistan. In spite of a debate that surrounds the early
Kurdish revolts to have been truly nationalistic or just had been regional
and tribal rebellions to achieve particularistic ends, from the onset, signs
of long Kurdish struggle in Iraq were hard to be hidden (see McDowall
2004; Anderson and Stansfield 2004; Romano 2006). The early regional
revolts led by religious and tribal leaders such as that of Sheikh Mahmoud
in 1920s and early 1930s and Barzan revolts of 1930s and 1940s sup-
plemented by the emergence of urban-based and educated Kurdish elite
who began to provide a more inclusive meaning to Kurdish nationalism.
Bengio (2012) identifies three stages for Kurdish nationalism since the
foundation of Iraq until 1968: 1918–1946 is a period which witnessed
minor and unorganized tribal revolts lacked a clear political orientation;
1946–1961 with the fundamental significance attached to the foundation
of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) which provided organization and
ideological framework for the Kurdish nationalism. It is worth noting that
the creation of KDP was the outcome for the struggle of newly emerged
Kurdish urban elites gradually appeared to the scene in 1930s and the first
half of 1940s. This segment of urban Kurdish nationalists began establish-
ing organizations such as Young Men’s Club (Komeley Lawan), Broth-
erhood Society (Komeley Brayeti), Wood Cutters (Darker), Hope Party
4In articles 62–64, Treaty of Sevres stipulated creation of an independent Kurdistan to
include predominantly Kurdish areas in Mosul Vilayet in the aftermath of the World War
I and the collapse of Ottoman Empire.
5The statement reads “His Britannic Majesty’s government and the government of Iraq
recognize the right of the Kurds living within those boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish
government within those boundaries and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as
soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between themselves as to form which they wish
that government should take and the boundaries within which they wish it to extend and
will send responsible delegate to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations
with his Britannic Majesty’s government and the government of Iraq”.

13. xiv INTRODUCTION
(Hiwa), Revolution (Shorsh) and Salvation of Kurds (Rizgari Kurd). Fi-
nally, stage three, 1961–1968 commences with the outbreak of September
revolution (Shorshi Eilul) which allowed for an inclusive movement able
to, as Bengio suggests, at least temporally, transcend the divisions of Kur-
dish society. This last phase ends with 1968–1970 negotiations between
Kurdish revolution and newly ascended Ba’th party in Iraq.
The two years of negotiations resulted in the famous agreement of
March manifesto/agreement6 (see Anderson and Stansfield 2004; Mc-
Dowall 2004). The agreement/manifesto granted autonomy to Kurds
in majority Kurdish areas in Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok; it recognized
the use of Kurdish as a formal language in the autonomous areas; it ex-
pected the conclusion of the agreement by a census over the final sta-
tus of disputed territories. However, due to inability of both sides to
reach an agreement with respect to disputed territories, Kurdish allega-
tions regarding the continuity of demographic change policies of Ba’th
government, accusing Kurds for receiving external support from Iraq’s
external adversaries, a distrust resulted from a failed assassination attempt
aimed at the life Mustapha Barzani led to the collapse of the March agree-
ment/Manifesto in 1974. The Algiers agreement of March 1975 between
Saddam Hussein and Shah of Iran included stipulations to terminate Iran’s
logistic support to Kurdish revolution. The notorious Algiers agreement
inflicted a painful setback into Kurdish revolution movement. In spite of
a relative swift revival of Kurdish nationalist movement, a new era began
and lasted until the uprising of Kurds in the wake of Gulf war in 1991.
The post 1975 setback marked by two central characteristics: firstly,
the foundation of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 brought
an end for one-party leadership of Kurdish movement which had begun
by the creation of KDP in 1946. As it became evident, the historical intra-
divisions of KDP in 1960s between Mustapha Barzani, on the one hand,
6Ba’th insisted to use the terminology “manifesto” rather than “agreement” for two
reasons: firstly, to imply that the document was a unilateral/voluntary recognition from
the part of the state to its Kurdish citizens. This terminology was essential to devoid
the document of the connotation that describing the document as an “agreement” would
have. An agreement was seen to imply an outcome reached to by negotiations between two
parties on equal footing. Secondly, Ba’th hoped to free itself from any future obligation
should it decided at any point to terminate or cancel the document. Describing it as
manifesto and unilateral would allow Ba’th to have this margin for political maneuvers in
the future.

14. INTRODUCTION xv
and Jalal Talabani-Ibrahim Ahmed, on the other hand contributed sig-
nificantly to tensions and armed conflict between KDP and PUK in the
years preceded the transition in KRI. The two parties and numerous other
Kurdish armed political parties in exile could barely manage to set aside
their disagreements in 1987–1988 when Kurdistan National Front (KNF)
as an umbrella structure was set up to unite Kurdish struggle in Iraq. A
second defining feature of this period manifests itself in a sharp escalation
of violence used against Kurds in the county. This was coincided with
the rise of Saddam Hussein to power in 1979 and the ability of Ba’th
party to eliminate all forms of internal threats coming from the inside
of the regime or from Shi’a opposition in other parts of Iraq. Collective
guilt and punishment of Kurds (e.g. genocide of Barzanis 1983, chemical
bombardment of Halabja 1987 and Anfal operations of 1988) became a
conventional method of violence and large scale demographic change of
ethnically mixed areas in Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala was implemented.
Invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 by Iraqi army and the military re-
action of coalition forces led by the United States coupled with economic
sanction and years of Iraq-Iran war 1980–1988 made Ba’th regime to be-
come progressively frail. In early months of 1991, for Kurds specifically
in March of that year, a twin uprising in Kurdish areas and predominantly
Shi’a governorates of the south broke out. The two uprisings were rela-
tively quickly oppressed by regime forces: as allied forced became increas-
ingly cautious about the influence of Iran on Shi’a opposition with its
potential ramification for the future of Iraq (e.g. see Haddad 2011), the
coalition turned a blind eye on the extreme scale of violence Iraqi govern-
ment used to suppress the uprisings in north and south. By April 1991,
within few weeks of the Kurdish uprising, Iraqi government forces man-
aged to restore their control over vast swath of Kurdistan, including ma-
jor cities of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok. Nevertheless, in spite of military
success in defeating the uprising (popularly called Rapareen), Iraqi gov-
ernment made the decision to withdraw its forces and bureaucratic struc-
tures from Kurdistan in October 1991. As it became obvious, such a move
marked the beginning of a protracted process of transition to democracy
in KRI (the details of which are explored throughout this book).
Finally, a remark on the Kurdish nationalism in Iraq vis-à-vis pan-
Kurdish nationalism is necessary. Obviously, Hamit Bozarslan’s observa-
tion (2018) regarding the relative success of Kurdish movement in tran-
scending intra-Kurdish divisions by “elaborating a common language, a

15. xvi INTRODUCTION
cartographic imaginary, a common flag, shared myths, a national Pan-
theon, and a largely unified historiographical discourse”, and his sug-
gestion that Kurdish movement (by referring to somehow unifying pan-
Kurdish sentiments that Barzanji, Simko, Ararat, Mahabad and Barzani
revolts generated in various parts of Kurdistan) began as a trans-border
movement are largely correct. Consistently, it is principally evident that
Kurds in Iraq, from an ethnic point of view, consider them as being part of
a greater Kurdish family and politically aware that any progress/retreat in
any part of Kurdistan will have favorable/harmful ramifications for other
parts. Nevertheless, from a political/pragmatic standpoint, they progres-
sively came to conclusion that any peaceful future solution for Kurdish
issue, if it ever opted for by dominant nations, will need to take into ac-
count the uniqueness of Kurdish issue in each of the four countries that
share the division of greater Kurdistan. Seemingly, this understanding now
is the formal political discourse of the leading political parties in every part
of Kurdistan.
Setting Up the Theoretical Background
The publication of Making Democracy Work 1993 by Robert D. Putnam
marked the beginning of the proliferation of research linking social cap-
ital to democracy and governance (see Chapter 1). Putnam and schol-
ars of Putnamise tradition have suggested that the success of democracy
and effective governance is predicated on the gradation of civicness de-
fined in terms of the horizontal trust (trust between individuals), civic
engagement and active citizenry, civic social networks and collective ac-
tion. The abundance of social capital, the argument goes, will allow for
the societal inputs (needs, demands, concerns, grievances and so on) to
be articulated and processed in the democratic machinery, and to result in
more responsive democratic outputs (policies). This line of theory has also
widely been tested to study social capital as an impediment of transition
to democracy in post-authoritarian regimes. In this regard, issues such as
atomization of individuals, disappointment in civil society, prevalence of
ethnic-nationalist dispositions, sectarianism, corruption and so forth not
have only been presented to reflect a legacy of authoritarianism, but also
understood to be manifestations of a certain form of social capital. There-
fore, the question of social capital in its association with democracy is not
only a question of how much social capital a given society possesses, but it
is also a question of which quality of social capital is abundant in that

16. INTRODUCTION xvii
society. A methodological implication is that quantitative indicators of
social capital (for instance, number of voluntary and civil society orga-
nizations) if not scrutinized in light of further detailed data (quantitative
and/or qualitative) can lead to misleading conclusions about social capital.
In spite of the popularity of social capital thesis (especially in Putnam’s
version), criticism, both within and from the outside of the school, has
been tremendously profound. Disagreements revolved around roots of so-
cial capital, methodological measurement of the concept and its relations
with democracy (see Chapter 1). With respect to the roots of social cap-
ital, critics of Putnam call for a more inclusive explanation to go beyond
explaining social capital as an outcome of engagement in civic associations
to encompass the role of religion and denomination, economic develop-
ment and prosperity, collective experience of a society, state policies and
so forth in generating forms of social capital. Putnam’s empirical con-
ceptualization of the concept furthermore criticized on methodological
grounds: his account is presented to be cyclical, tautological and, at best,
inadequate to capture social capital. And lastly, critics contend that social
capital can by no means be understood to be in a causal link (independent
factor) to democracy; they, rather, suggest that social capital is an outcome
for democracy (dependent factor). As far as civil society is concerned, for
instance, structuralists overplay the impact of state policies (legal frame-
works, restrictions and financial support or lack thereof and so on) on the
boost and the vigor of civil society. It is even suggested that trust, as a
main ingredient of social capital, can only grow when democracy persists,
justice is consolidated and rule of law is enforced.
A critical application of social capital theory serves several purposes.
First and foremost, in contexts where politics has chiefly been studied as
an elite endeavor, social capital theory makes it possible to examine politics
as a grassroots activity and to bridge it to what goes into and what comes
out from politics. Social capital theory not only allows to understand
how elite behavior, practices and structural restraints/opportunities shape
grassroots politics, it also permits to comprehend how grassroots activi-
ties, practices and expressions, in turn, form politics in the elite level. This
is of exceptional significance in the case of Kurdish studies, specifically the
growing literature on KRI (see Chapter 1), as the emphasis has largely
been placed on party politics, elections, Baghdad-Erbil relations/tensions
and so on, and in contrast, civil society, civic engagement, grassroots at-
titudes toward politics remained fundamentally beyond scientific enquiry.

17. xviii INTRODUCTION
This book is an attempt to study social capital and transition to democ-
racy in such a two-sided way: on the one hand, it provides a snapshot of
social capital to explore its potential contribution to democracy, and, on
the other hand, it offers an account for multitude structural and elite in-
fluences that have given form and content to social capital in Kurdistan.
Furthermore, social capital theory can have major empowerment conse-
quences in post-authoritarian environments where, for decades, any forms
of public engagement and freedoms have been oppressed and bottom-up
initiatives have been violently stifled. Social capital is an attempt to em-
power marginalized and oppressed individuals, groups and communities
by articulating the worth of collective action in bringing about desired
outcomes. Nevertheless, empowerment is not only about being grouped,
raise demands and pressurize elites, it, in fact, transcends that to stress
that empowerment requires citizens to acquire necessary civic skills and
virtues to participate in politics. Citizens in a polity need to learn how
to negotiate and express demands, set up agendas, organize meetings and
rallies and so forth in order for them to be visible in public life and to
carry out their civic duties. This can essentially be achieved through par-
ticipation in civic associational life. Once again, this is of vital significance
for the context of Kurdistan where a long history of oppression and au-
thoritarianism disappointed, and often terrified popular enterprises and
deprived citizens form boosting civic skills necessary for their empower-
ment in public arena. Nonetheless, a critical employment of social capital
theory is indispensable to abstain from romanticizing the ramifications of
social capital for democracy and effective governance. In essence, some
forms of social capital such as nepotism, clientalism, tribalism and rigid
ethnic/nationalist groupings, for example, constitute tangible threats for
the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of functional and
inclusive governance. In this fashion, social capital theory allows inspect-
ing not only grassroots potentials, but also cultural challenges that risk a
smooth evolvement of a democracy in a given context. As it will be shown
in this book (especially in Chapter 5), there exist fundamental manifesta-
tions of negative social capital that requires both academic scrutiny and
policy interventions.

18. INTRODUCTION xix
Presenting the Argument
This book is a work in political sociology aims at providing a bottom-up
insight, supported by empirical findings, into the process of transition to
democracy in KRI. The book utilizes Social capital Theory to examine
political culture and the ways through which social capital in KRI affects
democratization of the region. Whilst, conceptually, it relies heavily on
the operationalization of the concept of social capital by Putnam (1993,
2000), the book broadens the theoretical framework by examining the
explanatory potential of criticism offered to Putnam’s theory (see Chap-
ter 1). The book has examined the three elements of social capital: Trust,
Social Networksand Public Interest and Civic Participation (PICP) in KRI
to argue that Kurdish social capital has hardly been of a quality to grease
the wheels of democratization and democratic governance in Kurdistan.
Broadly speaking, in spite of regional variations across the KRI, the radius
of trust does not extend to reach “generalized others”: it is evident that
most people (surveyed in this book) find it challenging to trust others,
beyond their immediate social circles of family or close friends, to dis-
cuss political criticisms and grievances or to engage in collective action.
The political potential of social networks, most likely reflecting an overall
inadequacy of generalized trust, seems to be insufficient: discussions of
public issues, especially political issues, in social networks are not com-
monplace; issues which are of central significance for future development
of democracy (such a, ethnic and religious tolerance and democratic gov-
ernance checks and balances) are relatively absent in informal discussions
which take place in social networks; a lack of political knowledge about
political institutions is apparent (see Chapter 3). The least political poten-
tial, among the elements of social capital, is found in civic engagement
and participation: civic collective action to address community-related is-
sues is hard to be identified (see Chapter 4). This form of social capital is
highly likely to prevent grassroots activism to grow and ultimately make
societal inputs to democracy and government machinery to be extremely
deficient.
Nevertheless, this book makes the case for an inclusive account for
the roots of social capital and suggests that Putnam’s theory lacks the
prospective to explain social capital in non-consolidated democracies or
in contexts where transition from an authoritarian regime is still in its
early stages (see Chapter 5). Accordingly, the book summarizes the roots
of Kurdish social capital in four major determinants: legacy of direct Ba’th

19. xx INTRODUCTION
rule (1968–1991) and Kurdish civil war (1994–1997) in the early years of
transition, economic hardships and injustice, proliferation of clientalistic
networks and the state welfare policy and family-centered nature of Kur-
dish society. The outcomes in the intersection of the four determinants
are: involvement in political and collective civic activities, unfavorable by
authorities, let alone “hostile considered” activities, have become largely
risky; social cleavages as a result of real/perceived injustice in the distribu-
tion of wealth has further entrenched; clientalism has stifled great deal the
functioning of civil society organizations; the historical centrality of state
and family have left no significant room for the intermediary structures
to operate in realizing societal and individual needs. This approach to so-
cial capital unravels the roots of Kurdish social capital in the interaction
of a range of historical, political and cultural variables contribute together
in producing a specific form of social capital. This explanation combines
structural (mainly government policies) and cultural (societal norms and
expectations) influences in an explanation for social capital and transition
to democracy in KRI.
In the end, it is fundamental to point out to, as Schuurman (2003)
suggests, the possible victim-blaming potential that social capital theory
inherently poses: lack of democracy or lack of potential in political culture
for democracy can be mistakenly presented as an explanation, or worse as
justification, for the failure of democratization and politics in elite levels.
As elites fail to deliver on good governance, it becomes possible for them
to blame the society and culture for hindering democracy. This explana-
tion is mistaken, at least, for two reasons: firstly, culture, including social
capital, in spite of their significance, is by no means, in their own, of de-
cisive impact for democracy and democratization. A host of other factors
such as economic prosperity, international and regional relations, elite be-
havior, and legal framework and so on contribute in shaping democracy in
a certain way. Social capital is certainly only one among many other factors
to affect the challenging process of transition to democracy. Secondly, and
more importantly, social capital itself, in significant ways, is a byproduct
of political process and levels of democracy in a specific context. The case
of KRI is a classic example for the defining impacts that structural factors
had on social capital. An epistemological consequence is that the interwo-
ven relationship between social capital and political structures need to be
studied in a broader historical context.

20. INTRODUCTION xxi
Organization of the Book
The book consists of five chapters: Chapter 1 explores the theoretical
terrain of social capital, democracy and democratization. In so doing,
the chapter devotes a great deal of space to Putnam’s contribution to
the study of social capital and governance in democracies and the ways
through which his theory being criticized. To explain the originality of
the work, the chapter tries to place social capital in the broader context
of recently mounting literature on KRI. The chapter, then, explains the
methodology used to study social capital in this project. Chapter 2 is a de-
tailed examination of the context of democratization in KRI 1991–2018.
The period has been classified into three sub-periods, they are named: for-
mative years (1991–1996), consolidation years (1997–2003) and years of
deconstruction (2003–2018). Chapter 3 examines the political aspects of
trust and social networks: in this regard, issues such as “generalized trust”,
trust and political criticism, inter-ethnic trust are studied. Meanwhile, the
political aspects of social networks are scrutinized in relations to density,
composition, existence of politics in social networks, political knowledge
and trust in social networks. Chapter 4, addresses PICP in KRI: the chap-
ter begins by providing a structural overview for the legal framework that
sets up the ground for the functioning of civil society in Kurdistan and
explain modes of interaction between Kurdish authorities and civil soci-
ety organizations. In this framework, empirical findings with respect to
civic engagement and participation are presented. Finally, Chapter 5 is an
attempt to unravel the roots of social capital in relations to transition to
democracy in KRI: focus has been placed on legacy of Ba’th rule and Kur-
dish civil war, economic hardships and injustice, clientalism, state welfare
policy and family-based structure of Kurdish society.
References
Anderson, L., and G. Stansfield. 2004. The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democ-
racy or Division. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Aziz, M.A. 2011. The Kurds of Iraq: Ethno-Nationalism and National Identity
in Iraqi Kurdistan. London: I.B. Tauris.
Bengio, O. 2012. The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within State. Boulder and
London: Lynne Rienner.
Bruinessen, M.V. 2006. Kurdish Paths to Nation. In The Kurds: Nationalism and
Politics, ed. Faleh A. Jabar and Dawod Hosham. London, San Francisco and
Beirut: SAQI.

21. xxii INTRODUCTION
Ghafur, A. 2010. The Economic Geography of Oil in Kurdistan, 3rd ed. Erbil:
Kurdish Academia Publications (Original in Kurdish).
Gunter, M.M. 2008. The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish
Problem in Iraq and Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haddad, F. 2011. Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
IOM, UNFPA and KSRO. 2018. Demographic Survey: Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Accessed 2 February 2019.
Ismael, T., and M. Fuller. 2008. The Disintegration of Iraq: The Manufactur-
ing and Politicization of Sectarianism. International Journal of Contemporary
Iraqi Studies 2 (3): 443–473.
Kadhim, A. 2012. Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920 Revolution and Founding of Mod-
ern State. Austin: University of Texas Press.
McDowall, D. 2004. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris.
PAX for Peace. 2015. After ISIS: Perspectives of Displaced Communities from
Ninewa on Return to Ira’s Disputed Territory. Available at http://www.
iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/4368.
Putnam, R.D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
Rear, M. 2008. Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq: A
Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State. New York and London: Routledge.
Romano, D. 2006. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization
and Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Saleh, Z. 2013. On Iraqi Nationality: Law, Citizenship, and Exclusion. The Arab
Studies Journal 21 (1): 48–78.
Schuurman, F. 2003. Social Capital: The Politico-Emancipatory Potential of a
Disputed Concept. Third World Quarterly 24 (6): 991–1010.
Yildiz, K. 2004. The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future. London: Pluto
Press.

22. Contents
1 Theory of Social Capital, Democracy and Democratization 1
Introduction 1
Social Capital, Political Culture, Democracy and
Democratization 2
Robert Putnam: Social Capital and Functioning of Democracy 4
Critiques and Alternative Explanations 17
Studying Democratization and Social Capital in KRI 29
Methodology 33
Conclusions 36
References 38
2 The Context of Democratization in KRI: Implications
for Social Capital 45
Introduction 45
Formative Years 1991–1996 48
Consolidation Years 1997–2003 61
Deconstruction Years 2003–2018 64
Conclusions 76
References 80
3 Political Aspects of Trust and Social Networks 83
Introduction 83
Empirical Findings: Trust 86
xxiii

23. xxiv CONTENTS
Variations of Willingness to Talk About Political Issues
Across Social Circles 86
Relative Readiness to Talk to People About Political
Criticism 88
Absence of Generalized Trust 90
Trust in Ethnic In-Group Versus Trust in Ethnic
Out-Groups 91
Social Networks 94
Overview 94
Political Aspects of Social Networks 99
Conclusions 110
References 114
4 Public Interest and Civic Participation (PICP) 117
Introduction 117
A Structural Overview 120
Empirical Findings 126
Can Empirical Findings Be Challenged? 141
Conclusions 145
References 147
5 Framing Social Capital and Transition to Democracy
in KRI 151
Introduction 151
A Snapshot of Social Capital in KRI 152
Analytical Framework 158
The Legacy of Ba’th Rule and the Kurdish Civil War:
Politics as a Risky Sphere 159
Economic Hardships and Injustice 163
The Proliferation of Clientalistic Networks 166
State Welfare Policy and a Family-Centered Society:
Squeezing the Middle Arena 172
Conclusions 176
References 180
Bibliography 183
Index 195

24. Acronyms
CCBAs Civic and Community-Based Activities
CSO Central Statistics Office
EIU Economic Intelligence Unit
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoI Government of Iraq
IDTs Internally Disputed Territories
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations
IQD Iraqi Dinar
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KIG Kurdistan Islamic Group
KIU Kurdistan Islamic Union
KLM Kurdistan Liberation Movement
KNA Kurdistan National Assembly
KNF Kurdistan National Front
KNN Kurdish News Network
KRG Kurdistan Region Government
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq
KRSO Kurdistan Region Statistics Office
KSDP Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NRT Nalia Radio and Television
OFFP Oil For Food Program
PICP Public Interest and Civic Participation
PTMs Parents-Teachers Meetings
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SCR Security Council Resolution
xxv

25. List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 How often do people talk about politics? (Created by the
Author) 100
Fig. 3.2 Most discussed political issues (Created by the Author) 102
Fig. 3.3 Political knowledge (how many political lists are represented
in the Kurdistan Parliament?) (Created by the Author) 105
Fig. 3.4 Political knowledge (could you mention names of political
parties in government?) (Created by the Author) 106
Fig. 3.5 Sources of information (Created by the Author) 109
Fig. 3.6 Trustworthiness of sources of information (Created by the
Author) 109
Fig. 4.1 Interest in public affairs (mean) (Created by the Author) 131
Fig. 4.2 Obstacles of participation in voluntary sector (Created by the
Author) 137
xxvii

26. List of Tables
Table 3.1 Trust and discussion of political issues in different social
circles (factor analysis) 87
Table 3.2 Trust and political criticisms (factor analysis) 89
Table 3.3 Generalized trust (factor analysis) 91
Table 3.4 Trust in ethnic in-group versus trust in ethnic out-groups
(factor analysis) 92
Table 3.5 Bivariate correlation of research variables and density of
social networks 95
Table 3.6 Bivariate correlation of research variables and composition
of social networks 98
Table 3.7 Bivariate correlation of research variables with discussion
of political issues in social networks 101
Table 3.8 Bivariate correlation of research variables and discussion
of political issues 104
Table 3.9 Bivariate correlation of research variables with political
knowledge 107
Table 3.10 Bivariate correlation of research variables and sources
of information 111
Table 4.1 Participation in civic activities 126
Table 4.2 Social capital and participation in civic activities 128
Table 4.3 Bivariate correlation of research variables and participation
in civic activities 129
Table 4.4 Respondents’ reaction to lack of services in their
neighborhood 130
Table 4.5 Respondents’ activities in normal life 133
xxix

27. xxx LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.6 Bivariate correlation of research variables and individual vs.
collective-based activities 134
Table 4.7 TV programs watched most 135
Table 4.8 Multivariate regression analysis for obstacles of participation
in voluntary organizations 138
Table 4.9 Correlation of different components of social capital 139

28. CHAPTER 1
Theory of Social Capital, Democracy
and Democratization
Introduction
This chapter maps the theoretical terrain of social capital theory by exam-
ining its assumptions and the ways through which it influences democ-
racy and democratization. In so doing, the chapter commences by situ-
ating social capital in the framework of political culture in a bottom-up
approach, as opposed and complementary to top-down (mainly constitu-
tional engineering), to understand transitions to democracy. Distinction
has been made between democracy in its transitional phase and democ-
racy in its consolidated form. In covering the bottom-up approach to
democracy, major contributions of Robert D. Putnam, though in certain
instances argued not to be entirely original, to the theory of social capital
and functioning of democracy and democratic governance were devoted
a substantial area in this chapter. In spite of the centrality of Putnam’s
version of social capital theory in this book, both theoretical and empiri-
cal, criticism of Putnam has been addressed in some details. As Putnam,
especially in his Making Democracy Work (1993), utilizes social capital
in understanding the functioning of already democratic governments, it
will be crucial to scrutinize the appropriateness of his theory to analyze
democracy in its transitional phase, the way it is employed in this book.
© The Author(s) 2020
H. H. Khedir, Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Democratization
in Kurdistan, Middle East Today,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42144-1_1
1

29. 2 H. H. KHEDIR
With the hope of originality in mind, the chapter concludes by a discus-
sion of existing literature on the political developments of KRI to con-
clude that literature has left a significant room for students of social capi-
tal, political culture and civil society to provide an alternative insight into
transition to democracy in KRI. Finally, a brief account of the methodol-
ogy is presented.
Social Capital, Political Culture,
Democracy and Democratization
Putnam indicates that the first use of the term social capital goes back
almost a century. L. Judson Hanifan, a social reformer in West Virginia,
first utilized the term to describe the social context of education. For
Hanifan, social capital points to the “good will, fellowship, sympathy, and
social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social
unit” (cited in Putnam 2002, p. 4). Ever since, although social capital has
been rediscovered several times by sociologists and economic scholars,
the most systematic use of social capital in modern sociology is associated
with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1980s. Bourdieu (cited
in Portes 1998, p. 3) defines the term as “the aggregate of the actual or
potential resources which are linked to possession of mutual acquaintance
or recognition”. Later on, James Coleman puts social capital firmly on
the intellectual agenda (Putnam 2000, pp. 19–20). He defines the term
as “variety of entities having two characteristics in common: they all con-
sist of some aspects of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of
individuals who are within the structure” (Coleman 1990, p. 302). For
Coleman, social capital manifests itself in three basic forms: obligations
and expectations; information channels; and norms and effective sanc-
tions (Coleman 1988, pp. 101–105). In spite of differences in theoreti-
cal underpinnings and variations of contexts in which they are employed,
these definitions share the focus that social networks, solidarity and coop-
eration do matter for individuals and communities. The chapter will elab-
orate on the significance of social capital in the upcoming sections.
The collapse of socialist block in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
Eastern Europe brought transition to democracy to the fore in sociopo-
litical literature. Ever since, a variety of explanatory approaches have
been developed to explain this new wave of democratization in terms
of its nature, directions and the factors that influence it. In this regard,
existing literature has placed emphasis on political culture (Fukuyama

30. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 3
1996, 2005; Pratt 2005; Inglehart 1999), the elite behavior and politi-
cal parties (Herbst 1997; Kohn 1997), economic factors (Haggard and
Robert 1999), and external intervention (Diamond 2005; Whitehead
2005; Kurth 2005) to understand transitions to democracy. In this frame-
work, theory of social capital has mainly been utilized by sociologists and
political scientists to explain both obstacles of transition to democracy
in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the decline of social
cohesion and a sense of community in Western democracies (Badescu and
Uslaner 2003).
Whitehead (2003, p. 27) suggests that “democratization is best under-
stood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process”. It
is a move away from tyranny and dictatorship toward building demo-
cratic institutions and consolidation of pro-democracy political culture.
The move toward democracy, however, can hardly be a smooth and lin-
ear one. Challenges that face any democratization process can be enor-
mous and may cause setback for the transition. Anderson and Stansfield
(2004, p. 190) concluded that out of nearly 100 countries thought to be
in transition to democracy, fewer than fifth has moved in a right direction.
For them, majority of cases of transition has reverted to authoritarianism
or stuck somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy. Further-
more, transition to democracy, from where it begins until it arrives in the
consolidation stage, can take decades provided that it proceeds in right
direction. Francis Fukuyama’s model of democracy consolidation (cited
in Anderson and Stansfield 2004) suggests that democracy to consolidate
requires to emerge in four levels: in the most shallow level, democracy
necessitates a normative belief from the part of people in the legitimacy
and necessity of democracy; democracy then requires to be institutional-
ized in constitutions, elections, political parties and so on; in level three,
democracy is based on a vigor civil society capable of mediating between
primordial groups and the state; finally and in the deepest level, a consol-
idated democracy involves a political culture in which civicness holds an
exceptional significance. As democratization moves from the first level to
the fourth level, it becomes progressively difficult, demanding and time
consuming. In a similar vein, Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 15–16), sug-
gest that democracy cannot be defined as consolidated unless it is con-
solidated behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally. They insist that
behaviorally no serious political force should attempt at overthrowing
a democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence
in order to break away from the state. Attitudinally, the overwhelming

31. 4 H. H. KHEDIR
majority of the people should, even in severe political and economic crises,
believe that further political changes must emerge according to demo-
cratic parameters. Constitutionally, all actors in politics should believe that
all political conflict must be resolved according to the agreed norms and
standards of the constitution.
Broadly speaking, proponents of social capital theory insist that social
capital affects democracy in two ways: first, it can assist in creating democ-
racy in a country which is not democratic and, second, it can preserve and
maintain an already existing democracy (Paxton 2002, p. 257). The lead-
ing argument for theorists of social capital asserts that “a dense network of
voluntary associations and citizens organizations help to sustain civil soci-
ety and community relations in a way that generates trust and cooperation
between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation.
It is suggested that associations create conditions for social integration,
public awareness and action” (Newton 2001a, p. 201). On the whole,
social capital is assumed to be a source which makes people trust one
another, participate in voluntary organizations and facilitate their collec-
tive action. People could engage in more politicized social networks as a
result of the abundance of trust. This, in turn, increases the possibility to
develop critical discourses and social movements in the period of transi-
tion to democracy. Likewise, a positive role is attached to social capital for
consolidated democracies. Social capital with its potential for mass politi-
cal mobilization supposedly enhances the responsiveness and effectiveness
of democratic political institutions.
Robert Putnam: Social Capital
and Functioning of Democracy
This section reviews Robert Putnam’s contribution to the study of social
capital and its association with democracy. This review focuses on his con-
tribution as a transformation and a sizeable stretch in the conceptualiza-
tion of social capital (Portes 1998). Putnam takes the theory of social
capital further by establishing the explanatory value of social capital in
understanding macro-level issues, including the functioning of democ-
racy and democratic governance. Even though Putnam has not invented
the concept (Putnam 2000, pp. 19–20; 2002, pp. 4–6), his works have
largely stimulated recent research on democracy, civic engagement and

32. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 5
social capital (Alex-Assenson 2002, p. 204). The inability of the compet-
ing theories of social capital (such as those put forward by James Cole-
man and Pierre Bourdieu) to influence civic engagement studies makes
Putnam’s contribution to occupy a more central position in sociopolitical
literature (Lichterman 2006, p. 531).
Putnam’s definition of social capital comes consistent across his works:
in his monograph Making Democracy Work, 1993, he defines the term as
“features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”
(p. 167). In his later work Bowling Alone (2000), he introduces a more
lucid definition of the term by stating that social capital involves “connec-
tions among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity
and trustworthiness that arise from them”. Likewise, in Democracies in
Flux 2002, he asserts that social capital is about social networks and the
norms of reciprocity which are associated with them (Putnam 2002, p. 8).
The core idea of social capital theory is that social networks matter (Put-
nam 2002, p. 6) and they have value (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Social net-
works, in Putnam’s explanation of social capital, are central to the defini-
tion of the term (Khakbaz 2006, pp. 120–121).
Trust constitutes an essential ingredient of social capital. It is a by-
product of involvement in social networks (Putnam 1993, p. 170). Put-
nam considers trust as the basis of any possible cooperation among social
actors in different political, social and economic contexts. “Trust lubri-
cates cooperation”. The higher the level of trust in a community, the
larger is the possibility of cooperation. Simultaneously, cooperation itself
regenerates trust (Putnam 1993, p. 171). Putnam draws a distinction
between trust and honesty based on personal experience and familiarity
with specific people and trust in “the generalized others” (Putnam 2000,
p. 136). He calls the former thick trust as it relies essentially on strong and
frequent social networks in which one is engaged. Moreover, this kind of
trust is reduced to people whom one knows and with whom he or she has
had previous personal experiences. The latter, referred to by Putnam as
thin trust, depends implicitly on some background of social networks and
shared expectations. This form of trust transcends the scope of our close
social circles and extends to the wider society in which we live. Putnam
argues that thin trust is even more useful as it extends our social networks
to encompass the rest of the community (Putnam 2000, p. 136).

33. 6 H. H. KHEDIR
In addition, trust is subject to gradations of rational calculations.1 Put-
nam writes: “the trust that is required to sustain cooperation is not blind”.
We do not trust a person or an agency merely because they say that they
will do that. On the contrary, we trust them because we know their dis-
positions (character), available options and their consequences. Based on
these calculations, we expect that the person will choose (italic in the refer-
ence) to fulfill what they promised (Putnam 1993, p. 171). Even though
Putnam pays attention to the influence of social customs, particularly in
early years of the socialization process (what is called the “formative”
years) trust is considerably influenced by personal experiences (Putnam
2000, p. 139). This suggests that in early childhood there is a possibility
to be socialized to trust others. However, these early trusting attitudes
are likely to change in light of future personal experiences.
Furthermore, Putnam reckons that trust should transform from thick
trust to thin trust in complex social settings. In these settings, imper-
sonal social relationships are prevailing and we cannot rely on people with
whom we are familiar. Putnam contends that this transformation (from
thick trust to thin trust) takes place through two mechanisms: norms of
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. As to the first, Putnam
distinguishes between “balanced” (or “specific”) and “generalized” (or
“diffuse”) reciprocity. The former indicates a “simultaneous exchange of
items of equivalent value”. In contrast, the latter points to “a continuing
relationship of exchange that is at any given time unrequited or imbal-
anced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now
should be repaid in the future” (Putnam 1993, p. 172; 2000, pp. 20–
21). The pervasiveness of the generalized reciprocity as a social norm in
communities is particularly significant in sustaining and enhancing trust.
Networks of civic engagement such as choral societies, sports clubs and
mass-based parties create a social structure for horizontal relationships
between social actors. These networks provide the opportunity for devel-
oping more robust norms of reciprocity (Putnam 1993, pp. 173–174).
Mutual obligation and responsibility will emerge from civic engagement
(Putnam 2000, p. 21; 2002, p. 7). People in civic associations do not act
in a way that may undermine their reputation. Constant contact among
different actors creates the possibility for flow of information concern-
ing each actor’s behavior. Thus, the reputation for trustworthiness will be
1Putnam does not use this expression (rational calculation). However, his idea concern-
ing trust is consistent with the essence of rational calculation.

34. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 7
diminished by violating group norms. People meet frequently and estab-
lish norms of a good relationship. This will put the reputation of any
defector in jeopardy (Putnam 1993, pp. 173–174). Therefore, it is much
easier for isolated individuals to violate norms of reciprocity than it is for
socially engaged individuals.
It is noteworthy that Putnam avoids the linear causal language of social
sciences. He states
Social trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and suc-
cessful cooperation are mutually reinforcing. Effective collaborative insti-
tutions require interpersonal skills and trust, but those skills and that trust
are also inculcated and reinforced by organized collaboration. Norms and
networks of civic engagement contribute to economic prosperity and are
in turn reinforced by that prosperity. (Putnam 1993, pp. 180–181)
In addition to social networks and trust, Putnam considers civic engage-
ment as a main component of social capital. For him, civic engagement
indicates “people’s connection with the life of their communities, not
merely with politics” (Putnam 1995, p. 665). At this point, it is cru-
cial to draw attention to the distinction between social capital and politi-
cal participation in Putnam’s theoretical account. In spite of overlapping,
social capital and civic engagement is not a synonym for political partici-
pation. While social capital, as a horizontal concept, involves relationships
between people, political participation, as a vertical concept, is about peo-
ple’s relation to political leaders and institutions (Putnam 1995, p. 665).
Civic engagement, Putnam argues, is a result of civic virtues which are
implanted in dense networks of reciprocal social relations. Social net-
works of virtuous individuals can transform individual civic virtues to
social assets. According to Putnam, individual virtues are not mechani-
cally transformable to civic engagement. In fact, it is the social networks
of virtuous individuals which lead to the emergence of civic engagement.
Putnam contends: “A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is
not necessarily rich in social capital” (Putnam 2000, p. 19). This under-
standing is of central significance for collective action, in the form of civic
engagement and participation. For communities to strive and for democ-
racy to flourish, the social networks of civic-minded individuals become
indispensable. Apparently, isolated civic-minded individuals are devoid of
the potential strengths that groups of civic-minded individuals enjoy in
affecting politics.

35. 8 H. H. KHEDIR
As to features of social capital, Putnam maintains that social capital
has a private face, by serving individual private interests, and a public
face, through its collective and public benefits: on individual level, social
networks generate certain benefits which can help in achieving individ-
ual objectives. In other words, social networks produce “internal” effects
for those who are involved in them. Finding a job opportunity, access to
information about an educational opportunity or receiving support from
co-networkers are common examples for a positive impact of network-
ing. Likewise, living in a community with high stocks of social capital is
valuable both for individuals and for the whole community. This is to sug-
gest that social capital has “externalities”. A person who lives in a neigh-
borhood where residents keep an eye on each other in the absence of
householders, for instance, is able to use this social capital when he or she
is away. Even those who have been less involved in social networks are
likely to benefit from the abundance of social capital in their communities
as normally in this type of social setting the crime rates tend to be lower
(Putnam 2000, p. 20; 2002, p. 6).
Putnam, furthermore, examines similarities and differences between
social capital and other conventional forms of capital such as physical and
human capital. To begin with, social capital like other forms of capital is
productive. Just as a screwdriver (an example of physical capital) or col-
lege education (an instance of human capital) can increase individual and
collective productivity, social networks can equally boost the productivity
of individuals and groups (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Social capital enables
those who possess it to work together to achieve shared objectives. Fur-
thermore, social capital, similar to other forms of capital, can be employed
for accomplishing social or antisocial purposes or favorable and harmful
outcomes (Khakbaz 2006, p. 124). Putnam, at this point, distinguishes
between intended and unintended consequences of the use of social cap-
ital. Similar to a nuclear power plant which may have radioactive material
and negative impacts on society (Putnam 2002, p. 9), social capital in its
negative forms is detrimental to the entire society. Sectarianism, ethno-
centrism and corruption are some negative manifestations of social capital
(Putnam 2000, p. 23). Additionally, social capital is similar to other forms
of capital in the sense that its various forms possess unequal significance
for individuals and communities. In this respect, an extended family, for
instance, can influence individual attitudes and behavior in a different way
than the way voluntary organization do (Putnam 2000, p. 21).

36. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 9
Besides similarities, social capital possesses certain peculiar features: as
a moral resource, the supply of social capital increases with its use and
its stocks decrease if it is not used. The more two people exhibit trust
toward each other, the larger will be their mutual confidence and vice
versa. Additionally, social capital is customarily a public good as its exter-
nal benefits spread beyond those who engaged in social networks in the
first place (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, p. 269). Unlike the conventional
capital (such as material or human capital) which the scope of its benefits
confined to their private owners, social capital benefits the whole commu-
nity. The reputation of a person for trustworthiness can be a motive for
other people to cooperate with them. Conversely, untrustworthiness of
an agent reduces the possibility of positive interaction with others which
is, in turn, likely to harmfully impact wider community. Therefore, social
capital is a public property, not merely an individual capital; its availabil-
ity is a common good for those who have it, and it is, simultaneously,
beneficial for communities (Putnam 1993, pp. 169–170).
Reviewing the usage of social capital in literature, Putnam presents a
classification for the main forms of social capital. This classification is pred-
icated on the degree of formality, the strength of social networks in the
associations, associational objectives and the capability of associations to
bridge social cleavages. In the following, a brief description of each is
offered.
Formal versus informal social capital. Some forms of social capital are
formal such as labor unions and parents’ organizations. These organi-
zations are represented by recognized officers, written constitutions and
membership requirements and so on. Nevertheless, there are other forms
of social capital which are highly informal. Examples for this sort of social
capital include family dinners and people who gather at the same pub or
coffee shop. Both forms constitute networks that can produce norms of
reciprocity and can be used to achieve valuable objectives. Putnam writes
that though early research on social capital focused mainly on formal asso-
ciations, “associations constitute merely one form of social capital (Italic in
the reference)” (Putnam 2002, p. 10). Consequently, the study of social
capital within a given community has to be stretched out to include study-
ing informal social capital too.
Thick versus thin social capital. Some forms of social capital are multidi-
mensional and closely interconnected. Putnam points to the example of a
group of workers who work together every day at a workplace and spend

37. 10 H. H. KHEDIR
their weekends together, as an illustration of thick social capital. Simulta-
neously, there are thin or almost invisible forms of social capital. In this
respect, having a nod with someone whom we see casually and irregularly
comprises a form of social capital. Research indicates that merely nodding
to a stranger increases the probability that he or she will come to help, if
the need be (Putnam 2002, p. 10).
Inward-looking versus outward-looking. There are forms of social capital
that by choice or necessity are inward-looking. These forms of social capi-
tal are organized along with gender, class and ethnic lines, to mention but
a few. These groups tend to serve the material, social or political interests
of their own members and they try to preserve or augment the “bonds
of birth and circumstance”. Contemporary labor unions and chambers
of commerce are two examples of inward-looking associations. Outward-
looking social capital, however, includes associations that are concerned
with public good. In this category, it is possible to mention Red Cross and
environmental movements as two obvious examples of outward-looking
social capital (Putnam 2002, p. 11).
Bridging versus bonding social capital. Putnam makes a distinction
between two brands of social networks: “bridging” (inclusive) social net-
works and “bonding” (exclusive) social networks. The former includes
heterogeneous networks in which people from different, racial, ethnic,
religious and class background are involved. In this respect, Putnam
points to the civil rights movement as an example of this sort of social
capital. It is argued that bridging networks are more likely to have con-
structive contributions as they constitute arenas for gathering of individ-
uals who belong to various forms of social groupings. The latter is about
homogeneous networks which comprise individuals from a similar social
cleavage. Bonding associations tend to reinforce exclusive identities and
to prolong the social distance between communities. Ethnic-based and
certain nationalist organizations, with their narrow agendas, are apparent
examples of bonding social networks. It should be noted that bonding
social networks are not necessarily evil as they may make up a significant
source of support that bridging social networks are unable to offer (Put-
nam 2002, p. 11). In times of economic crisis and physical insecurities,
close family, tribal or ethnic circles can provide individual members with
needed forms of support.

38. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 11
In sum, it is possible to mark Putnam’s approach to social capital as
a functionalist one. It places emphasis on the functionality of social net-
works, norms of reciprocity and trust in establishing cooperative relation-
ships between social actors to achieve mutual objectives (Arneil 2006,
p. 4). Social capital, in addition, is a collective feature of the whole com-
munity or even an entire nation (Portes 1998). It focuses on the cen-
trality of social connections among people and the norms of trust and
reciprocity that govern these connections. Social capital is at the heart of
cooperation, civic engagement and collective action.
Putnam utilizes the concept of social capital for analyzing the func-
tioning of democratic institutions in modern Italy. By using the exam-
ple of Italy for institutional design, he produces a theoretical account of
the performance of democratic institutions. The main question for him is
“why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail?” (Put-
nam 1993, p. 3). The impact of the social, economic and cultural envi-
ronment on the performance of democratic institutions is central in Put-
nam’s work. The creation of fifteen regional governments in Italy con-
stitutes the departure point from which Putnam began his investigation
on social capital and democratic governance. The overarching question
for him was why regional governments, in spite of their symmetrical con-
stitutional structures, displayed immense differences in their performance
in the ensuing decades? While northern regional governments proved to
be responsive and effective, their southern counterparts were irresponsive
and ineffective (Putnam 1993, pp. 63–82). This inconsistency between
similar structures and mandates, on the one hand, and a considerable
variation in performance, on the other hand, is the theoretical motive for
Putnam’s empirical and historical inquiry into the functioning of democ-
racy in Italy.
Putnam employs the concept of Civic Community to explain the stark
regional differences in institutional performance. For him, civic commu-
nity includes the activeness and public-spiritedness of citizenry, egalitar-
ian political relations and a social fabric of trust and cooperation (Putnam
1993, p. 15). In fact, Putnam links the degree of civicness of a given
community to the level of institutional performance in it. The main dis-
covery in Putnam’s work is that institutional performance in Italy’s gov-
ernmental regions is fundamentally contingent on the degree of civicness
of their respective communities. In northern regions, where high levels of
civicness are recorded, the performance of governmental institutions was
high. Conversely, in southern regions where indicators of civicness were

39. 12 H. H. KHEDIR
low, the performance of institutions was accordingly weak (Putnam 1993,
pp. 63–82).
In Bowling Alone, Putnam discusses the relations of social capital and
democracy through two conventional claims: the health of the American
democracy requires citizens to perform their public duties and the well-
being of democratic institutions relies, at least in part, on the participa-
tion of individuals in private voluntary associations and networks of civic
engagement. These voluntary associations and civic networks embody
social capital (Putnam 2000, p. 326). In this way, the interest in the per-
formance of democratic institutions in relation to social capital remains
fundamental in Putnam’s sociopolitical thought.
Putnam argues that voluntary associations and social networks of civic
society contribute to democracy in two ways: they have external effects
on the larger politics, and they have internal effects on the participants
themselves. As to the external effects, voluntary organizations consti-
tute the effective means for the articulation of interests and demands
of various groups. They are also tools which protect them from the
abuses of political leaders. These organizations are arenas for the flow
of information and discussions about politics. Furthermore, these orga-
nizations have the capacity to amplify and strengthen the peoples’ voice;
outside voluntary organizations, it is possible to hear dispersed and weak
voices of divergent individuals. These dispersed and weak voices can trans-
form into a more unified and strong voice through voluntary organiza-
tions. Putnam, however, emphasizes that citizens’ connectedness does not
require formal institutions to be effective; rather, he asserts that in some
cases informal networks have had an unequal capacity to recruit
people to democratic movements rather than pure ideological commit-
ment (Putnam 2000, p. 338).
Internally, associations and less formal networks of civic engagement
contribute to democracy through enhancing the habits of cooperation,
public-spiritedness and the practical skills necessary to partake in public
life. In this respect, researchers of political psychology insist on the pos-
itive correlation between social isolation and the emergence of extremist
attitudes. The more isolated the individuals are, the more likely they are
to transform into extremism. Simultaneously, the associations are places to
learn civic virtues such as participation in public life, trustworthiness and
norms of reciprocity (Putnam 2000, pp. 338–339). In addition, voluntary
associations support building social and civic skills; people within volun-
tary associations learn to run meetings, do presentations, write letters,

40. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 13
organize projects and debate public issues in a civilized manner (Putnam
2000, pp. 338–339).
Nevertheless, not all voluntary associations exercise the same influ-
ence on democracy: the difference between heterogeneous and homoge-
neous associations is profound. Although heterogeneous associations, in
which individuals belong to diverse class, religious, ethnic and social back-
ground, are more likely to produce a positive impact for democracy, the
homogeneous associations also have the probability to have a constructive
impact on democracy. An example is a minority group when campaign-
ing for realizing non-discriminatory policies in schools or on government
boards. It widens the circle of political participation in society through
eliminating the obstacles of participation of minorities (Putnam 2000,
pp. 338–339). Therefore, Putnam tries to avoid making generalizations
about the democratic potential of voluntary organization based solely on
the composition of these organizations; minority right groups are cases in
point as their call for broader participation and removal of discriminatory
barriers can serve in democratizing political systems.
Having said that, efforts need to be made not to over-romanticize vol-
untary organization; in fact, there are serious concerns with respect to
potential harmful impacts that certain voluntary organizations can pose
to democracy. At the outset, not all voluntary associations are necessar-
ily good for democracy. In this regard, Putnam mentions the Ku Klux
Klan (KKK) as an illustration of an antidemocratic association. Sectarian
and extremist national associations are also classical examples for this sort
of voluntary organizations. Moreover, even associations which operate in
accordance with democratic norms can distort policy formations. In a plu-
ralist political environment where various voluntary associations are active,
they do not enjoy comparable capacity to incorporate their agenda into
government’s policies. Putnam states that contrary to the pluralist ideal,
“wherein bargaining among diverse groups leads to the greatest good for
the greatest number, we instead end up with the greatest goodies for
the best-organized few” (Putnam 2000, p. 340). In other words, one can
suggest that organizations with higher amounts of lobbying resources and
advocacy capabilities enjoy stronger potentials to affect policies. In con-
sequence, organizations which lack these resources, no matter how legit-
imate their demands are, will get nowhere in formulating their preferred
policies.
A second concern is that associations tend to benefit those who have
better self-organizing capacities. There are sections of society who by

41. 14 H. H. KHEDIR
nature or circumstance are better equipped to organize themselves and
make their voices heard. This means that people with education, money,
status and close ties with their communities are more likely to get polit-
ical benefit under pluralism than less educated, poor and unconnected
people (Putnam 2000, p. 340). This jeopardizes the possibility for the
emergence of egalitarian politics under pluralism as haves of social capital
would exploit opportunities to advance their interests through using asso-
ciations. In contrast, have-nots of social capital would not have significant
possibilities to articulate and accomplish their interests. In a similar vein,
it is argued that citizen group politics is, by nature, an extremist politics
because individuals with strong views tend to become leaders and activists
in voluntary associations. Frequently, moderately minded individuals are
far less likely to engage in associations. This gives a disproportionate plat-
form to extremists to engage in associational life. Thus, some critics of
pluralism have suggested that pluralism can generate political polarization
and cynicism (Putnam 2000, pp. 340–341).
Having the seriousness of these concerns in mind, Putnam concludes:
Voluntary associations are not everywhere and always good. They can rein-
force anti-liberal tendencies; they can be abused by antidemocratic forces.
Further, not everyone who participates will walk away a better person-
…voluntary groups are not a panacea for what ails our democracy. And
the absence of social capital—norms, trust, networks of association—does
not eliminate politics. But without social capital we are more likely to have
politics of a certain type. (Putnam 2000, p. 341)
Democracy without social capital, i.e., associational life and voluntary
organizations, is still feasible. But then democracy will be a different one;
a kind of “plebiscitary democracy” and politics from a distance will pre-
vail. Many scattered voices would be heard without these voices being
able to engage with one another, without being able to resist or being able
to offer a significant guidance to policymakers. Furthermore, the absence
of real and face-to-face conversations among people about politics pre-
vents them from a meaningful engagement with opposing views. Putnam
(2000, pp. 341–342) writes “without such face-to-face interaction, with-
out immediate feedback, without being forced to examine our opinions
under the light of other citizens’ scrutiny, we find it easier to hawk quick
fixes and to demonize anyone who disagrees”. The withdrawal of people
from engagement in democratic debate, additionally, would make politics

42. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 15
“more shrill and less balanced”. When most people skip the meetings,
those who are left tend to be more extreme ones and more likely to pur-
sue narrow and selfish interests (Putnam 2000, p. 342).
On the other hand, social capital is a key to psychological and cognitive
engagement. Through the psychological engagement, people are more
likely to review their opinions in light of new information they receive
from their friends in informal and formal discussions. Putnam states:
We learn about politics through casual interactions. You tell me what
you’ve heard and what you think, and what your friends have heard and
what they think, and I accommodate that new information into my mental
database as I ponder and revise my position on an issue. In a world of
civic networks, both formal and informal, our views are formed through
interchange with friends and neighbors. Social capital allows political infor-
mation to spread. (Putnam 2000, p. 343)
Putnam argues against the view that stresses the senselessness of face-
to-face mobilization and those who consider large national membership
groups to be sufficient for the functioning of democracy (Putnam 2000,
pp. 343–345). In this respect, Putnam calls for a broader understanding
of democracy and politics than the one which merely lends emphasis to
the advocacy of narrow interests. He contends that those staff-led, profes-
sional and Washington-based advocacy organizations are not substitutes
for local organizations. In the local organizations, he argues, civic skills
are learnt and “genuine give-and-take deliberation” occurs. Additionally,
large professional groups are most likely to try to advance the agenda of
their major patrons such as wealthy individuals, foundations and even gov-
ernmental agencies. These organizations are funded by powerful people
and subsequently serve their wishes, not necessarily those of their mem-
bers. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that a range of important
decisions are taken in local levels, not in capitals which are mechanically
male local/grassroots organizations indispensable in discussion of policy
agendas and policy formation.
The impacts of social capital exceed its significance as an input for
democracy; it can, in fact, shape what comes out of politics and democracy
too. Putting it differently, civic engagement matters on both the “demand
and supply side of government” (Putnam 2000, pp. 344–346). Interest

43. 16 H. H. KHEDIR
in civic affairs and involvement in voluntary associations enables partici-
pants to manifest their demands on the government and hold the govern-
mental agencies accountable. Simultaneously, when governmental institu-
tions recognize that they operate in an active community, they strive to
enhance their performance. In the same vein, when people know and trust
one another, they will have a more robust “moral foundation” for future
cooperation in various realms. This positively impacts on the governmen-
t’s conduct. Putnam states:
Light-touch government works more efficiently in the presence of social
capital. Police close more cases when citizens monitor neighbourhood
comings and goings. Child welfare departments do a better job of “fam-
ily preservation” when neighbours and relatives provide social support to
troubled parents. Public schools teach better when parents volunteer in
classrooms and ensure that kids do their homework. When community
involvement is lacking, the burdens on government employees—bureau-
crats, social workers, teachers, and so fourth—are that much greater and
success that much more elusive. (Putnam 2000, p. 346)
Similarly, when social capital is abundant in a society, the adherence to
procedures of governmental institutions is much more pronounced. In
the tax system, for instance, the actual compliance of people relies in part
on the belief that others do pay their tax share. This suggests that when
one sees that most people cheat on tax, the observer would not feel any
motivation to pay their share. Accordingly, in a community where social
capital is in abundant supply, government is “we” not “they”. In this
way, social capital reinforces the legitimacy of government. I pay my taxes
because I believe that others do, and I know that the tax system works as
it should (Putnam 2000, pp. 347–349).
In conclusion, it is conceivable to suggest that Putnam utilizes the
concept of social capital in relation to democracy in two different ways:
social capital as an input into politics and the democratic process, and
social capital as an output of democracy by looking at its impact on the
functioning and the performance of democratic institutions. As to the
first usage, social capital and networks of civic engagement—formal and
informal—constitute the basis for political discussions, the flow of infor-
mation, for acquiring civic skills and virtues and for the articulation of
group interests. In this respect, social capital assists in the formation of a
more balanced and more inclusive democracy. Moreover, with concerns

44. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 17
to the second usage, the same networks of civic engagements are crucial
in holding democratic institutions and leaders accountable to their con-
stituents. The accountability of democratic institutions has a positive cor-
relation with the performance of democratic institutions. When active and
organized associations are available, democratic institutions would have
to improve their services to avoid protests and challenges that may arise
from below. Hence, social capital in the second phase aids democracy to
be more responsive and more effective one. In spite of these bright con-
tributions that social capital is likely to bring to democracy, an eye should
be kept on adverse consequences that negative social capital can cause to
democracy.
Critiques and Alternative Explanations
Despite an exceptional popularity of Putnam’s thesis in sociopolitical
research following the publication of Making Democracy Work 1993, his
main assumptions regarding the ingredients of social capital, theoretical
analysis and methodological measurements have been widely criticized. As
opposed to scholars of social capital who stress the values of social capi-
tal as an explanatory/independent variable, structuralists argue that social
capital is at best an outcome/dependent variable that reflects the nature
of political institutions. In this sense, social capital becomes devoid of any
capacity for being an explanatory variable per se. In this section, major
points of criticism of Putnam’s approach to social capital and democracy
are presented.
One of the central arguments against Putnam’s version of social capi-
tal comes from Eric Uslaner (Uslaner 1999, 2002; Uslaner and Brown
2005). Uslaner emphasizes the significance of what he calls moralistic
trust, i.e., trust in strangers or trust in people whom we do not know.
On the contrary to Putnam, Uslaner argues that trust in strangers does
not reflect our personal experiences. It, rather, depends on a set of moral
foundations. In this way, trust is based on a fundamental ethical assump-
tion: that other people share our critical values and, therefore, are part of
our moral community. Uslaner (2002, p. 2) contends that other people
do not necessarily agree with us politically or religiously, but at some level
they accept that there are some common bonds between us. This form
of trust relies on our notion of human nature: the world will be a better
place if we trust and cooperate with one another.

45. 18 H. H. KHEDIR
In arguing for his theory that trust in others mirrors our collective
experience, not individual experiences, Uslaner broadens his explanation
to suggest that a sense of optimism and distribution of wealth in a given
society are key elements of our collective experience, and subsequently,
are determinants of our sense of trust in others. Trust stems from the
presence and interaction of these two elements, optimism and equality. As
countries become more equal, they become more trusting. Uslaner writes
that, as the income gap increased in the USA people became less trust-
ing (Uslaner 2002, pp. 3, 16). Although Uslaner agrees on the impor-
tance of personal experiences, particularly their indirect effects for trust,
he believes that these personal experiences matter for trust in specific peo-
ple or what he calls strategic trust. There is another side of trust (trust
in strangers), namely that “most people can be trusted”. This faith in
stranger others is what Uslaner calls “moral foundations of trust” which
is based essentially on the collective experiences of a society. Moralistic
trust is at odds with the strategic trust in the sense that the former is a
social value marked by stability, and it is contingent on the collective and
formative events of a society whereas the latter is fragile and conditional
on personal experiences of individuals with specific people (Uslaner 2002,
pp. 14–50).
The most important predictor of trust is not engagement in civic social
networks as Putnam argues. Uslaner contends that perceiving trust as a
product of civic engagement, formal or informal, is mistaken because of
two reasons: first, by the time we involve in civic social networks most of
our fundamental worldviews have already been consolidated. Early in life
we learn about trust from our parents and close families and this social
learning tends to persist in the rest of our lives. Furthermore, relying on
Newton’s (1999a, b) argument (which will be discussed later), Uslaner
believes that we do not spend enough time in voluntary associations to
change anything significant in our moral upbringing. Second, when we
socialize with our friends, or when we attend meetings of civic associa-
tions, in fact, we congregate with people having similar experiences and
having the same values. We do not extend the scope of our trust to peo-
ple whom we do not know or people who are not similar to us. Hence,
engagements in group-life are more likely to merely reinforce particu-
larized trust, people whom we personally know, but not the generalized
or moralistic trust, people whom we do not personally know (Uslaner
2002, pp. 4–5). The only exception is the positive effect of a specific
sort of engagement (volunteering and giving to charity) on trust. Uslaner

46. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 19
(2002, p. 250) suggests that even volunteering and giving to charity is
not an outcome for socializing in these associations. In fact, it is a prod-
uct of the “moral roots” of these organizations which make participants
develop a positive outlook toward others.
For Uslaner, trust is predicated on an economic equality, an optimistic
worldview and a distinctive cultural foundation. The wealth of a given
society tends not to make a major difference; rather, its distribution is
what matters most for trust. In this regard, the more egalitarian a society
becomes, the greater will be the likelihood of generating optimistic world-
views. This, in turn, leads to an enhancement of trust in others. Drawing
on the worldwide data, a significant correlation is found between eco-
nomic equality and trust; more economic equality has generated trust and
more economic inequality has destroyed it. This entails that trust again
echoes the collective experience. In situations where people feel that they
are treated equally, they feel more of a common fate and subsequently
more trust in one another. Even in economically poor countries, when
people felt that equality existed, they were more optimistic and trusting
(Uslaner 2002, pp. 217–242).
Trust, in Uslaner’s explanation, is grounded on a cultural foundation
too. Uslaner argues that Protestant societies have been more trusting than
Muslim societies. A Protestant denomination is individualistic and places
high value on cooperation among individuals in order to succeed in a
competitive world. Uslaner believes that Muslims have less trust in oth-
ers, particularly in Euro-Americans, because of a history of colonialism
and efforts that were aimed at converting Muslims to Christianity. Fur-
thermore, some core beliefs of Islam, such as the supremacy of Islam
versus the inferiority of other religions, are behind a lack of trust in Mus-
lim societies (Uslaner 2002, pp. 231–237). Apparently, in this respect,
Putnam deviates from the focus on cultural elements of trust (religion)
to inviting the dark experience of Muslim societies with colonialism as an
explanation of Western/non-Muslim-oriented hostility and distrust.
As to the link of trust to democracy, Uslaner asserts that trust is nei-
ther the prerequisite nor the consequence of democracy. Trust cannot
create democracy; rather, it can assist in a better functioning of democ-
racy. Uslaner shares Putnam’s view that democratic structures are more
responsive and effective in trusting societies. In trusting societies, people
display a more robust obedience to the law because they have confidence
that others obey the law too. But the effects of democracy on trust are
not so straightforward. Democracies can be both trusting and distrusting.

47. 20 H. H. KHEDIR
Countries which have not had a legacy of communism scored a higher
mean value of trust. Nevertheless, a democracy can generate trust only in
the long run. Using Inglehart’s measure of the number of years of con-
tinuous democracy, Uslaner concludes that only countries which have had
more than 46 years of continuous democracy have been able to produce a
more trusting society. This is to say that it is not easy, if at all possible, to
rapidly generate new values from structural changes. Transforming con-
stitutions and rearranging them more democratically does not necessar-
ily make people more trusting in one another. The democratic structural
changes must be permanent over time so that they will be capable of
enhancing trust (Uslaner 2002, pp. 219–229). In this direction, Uslaner
(1999, pp. 140–141) states that democracies which confront challenges
of ethnic and racial conflict and are not capable of setting up solutions
for their economic insufficiencies lose the capacity to breed prosperity
and optimism.
Ronald Inglehart’s (1999) account on social capital overlaps with
Uslaner’s in terms of its focus on cultural elements of trust. Inglehart
argues that interpersonal trust is a product of the whole cultural heritage
of a society. This heritage, in turn, is an upshot of economic, political and
social experiences of a people. Neither economic situations, democracy
nor religion, on their own, can provide an explanation for interpersonal
trust. Some Catholic and Confucian societies, for instance, in spite of
having same levels of economic development, have had sharp variations
in interpersonal trust. Drawing on data from sixty-one societies, he con-
cludes that societies which have been Protestant have scored higher rates
of interpersonal trust than other societies. Likewise, democracy has not
been the main and the only predictor of trust. Even under the most out-
standing democracies such as the USA, the rates of trust have declined
during the last few decades. Hence, trust becomes a characteristic of a
society which is shaped through the interaction of economic, political,
social and religious factors in a historical context. In Inglehart’s view,
general feelings of well-being and happiness in combination with cultural
dimensions, particularly Protestant religiosity, are crucial determinants of
trust.
Inglehart (1999, p. 99) proposes that a distinction should be made
between three aspects of democracy: “its long-term stability, levels of
democracy at given points of time, and short-term changes in the level
of democracy”. While subjective well-being and trust constitute neces-
sary conditions for the long-term stability of a democracy, the feelings of

48. 1 THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 21
unhappiness and distrust are central for the commencement of a transi-
tion to democracy. People should feel unhappy and distrust one another
so that they will be willing to spend some effort in getting rid of their
unpleasant situations. In Inglehart’s explanation, the impact of trust on
democracy is stage based as in each stage of pre-transition, transition and
consolidation, trust plays a different role. Hence, when we talk about
trust and democracy, the language of always good or always bad loses its
significance.
Broadly speaking, Inglehart insists that a political culture conducive to
democracy stems from modernization, in general, and economic devel-
opment and industrialization, in particular (Inglehart 2000, pp. 95–96).
Thus “the sequence of human development” is as follows: modernization,
cultural change and democracy. Inglehart (2000) argues that economic
development results in two types of favorable changes for democracy:
It tends to transform a society’s social structure, bringing urbanization,
mass education, occupational specialization, growing organizational net-
works, greater income equality, and a variety of associated developments
that mobilize mass participation in politics… [what is more] economic
development is also conducive to cultural changes that help stabilize
democracy. It tends to develop interpersonal trust and tolerance, and it
leads to spread of post-materialist values that place high priority on self-
expression and participation in decisionmaking. Insofar as it brings higher
levels of well-being, it endows the regime with legitimacy, which can help
sustain democratic institutions through difficult times. (Inglehart 2000,
p. 92)
In sum, Inglehart traces roots of social capital to cultural changes that
result from modernization and industrialization of the economy. Social
capital is not a product of engagement in civic social networks as Putnam
has suggested. It is rather a by-product of prosperity and feelings of well-
being which are brought about by economic progress. In this respect,
Inglehart and Uslaner share the view that collective experience matters
and that well-being and feelings of optimism are crucial to generate social
capital.
On the other hand, Newton (1999a, b, 2001a, b) criticizes the main
assumptions of social capital theory, particularly in Putnam’s understand-
ing of social capital. Newton argues that voluntary organizations do
not constitute significant arenas for generating social trust: the reason is
twofold: first, most participants in voluntary organizations do not spend