EssaySinger argues that animals deserve moral consideration and

Essay:
Singer argues that animals deserve moral consideration and do
have moral rights somewhat comparable to humans because they
are
sentient
(i.e., have the capacity to experience pain and pleasure). By
contrast, Cohen argues that animals do not have moral rights
comparable to humans because they do not belong to the
moral community
(Note: pay careful attention to the characteristics Cohen lists as
requirements to belong to the moral community). In this essay,
I ask you to discuss
ONE
of the topics listed below:
(A) First, develop a criterion other than Singer's or Cohen's
that will determine whether animals do or do not deserve moral
consideration. Secondly, determine if animals do or do not
have (at least some) moral rights comparable to humans. Make
sure you defend your position with cogent arguments. Then,
compare your position to either Singer's or Cohen's.
Or, if you cannot develop your own criterion:
(B) State whether you agree with Singer's position or Cohen's
position, expressing the reasons for your choice. Then, defend
your position with cogent arguments.
Assignment Direction:

Short writing assignments must be
no less
than two hundred (200)
of
your own words
. This means that
quotations do not count against the two hundred words
. I will not even read assignments shorter than the required
minimum of 200 words (I use a program to monitor word-count)
and you will automatically receive zero (0) points for any such
assignments. I expect a professionally written essay that is well
formulated, without spelling and grammatical errors. I will
deduct points for sloppily written essays (see the rubric below).
In your essay you should address the question posed directly
and thoroughly. You do not need to waste too much space on
background unless the question of the essay specifically
demands such background.
Notes From Instructor:
Notes to accompany Singer (2007) and Fox (2007).These notes
are not a substitute for reading the text.
1
Singer
Peter Singer probably is one of the most well-
knownphilosophers alive today. He has been in the public
spotlight anumber of times for taking controversial moral
positions basedon an uncompromising utilitarianism. He was
one of thepioneers of the animal welfare movement, starting
with his 1975book,
Animal

Liberation
. I mention all of this because you aremuch more likely to
encounter his name outside this course thanmost of the other
authors we will be reading. Article #14represents very early
work, apparently published a year beforethe first edition of
Animal
Liberation
.
2
The
argument
Singer’s thesis is that we ought to extend to (non-
human)animals the same equality of consideration that we
extend tohuman beings.
Here’s how I think the main contours of his argument shapeup:
1. The only criterion of moral importance that succeeds
inincluding all humans, and excluding all non-humans, issimple
membership in the species
Homo
sapiens
.2. However, using simple membership in the species
Homosapiens
as a criterion of moral importance is completelyarbitrary.3. Of
the remaining criteria we might consider, onlySENTIENCE—
the capacity to experience things likepleasure and pain—is a
plausible criterion of moralimportance.4. Using sentience as a
criterion of moral importance entailsthat we extend to other

sentient creatures the same basicmoral consideration (i.e. ”basic
principle of equality”) thatwe extend to (typical, sentient)
human beings.5. Therefore, we ought to extend to animals the
same equalityof consideration that we extend to human
beings.6.
2
3
Details3.1
The
only
criterion
of
moral
importance
thatsucceeds
in
including
all
humans,
and

excludingall
non-humans,
is
simple
membership
in
thespecies
Homo
sapiens
.
Singer argues for this simply by pointing to variation
amonghumans. If we examine the usual chracteristics that
people sayall humans, and only humans, share, we always find
that thereare human beings who lack those characteristics:
Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans comein
different shapes and sizes; they come with differingmoral
capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differingamounts of
benevolent feeling and sensitivity to theneeds of others,
differing abilities to communicateeffectively, and differing
capacities to expe- riencepleasure and pain. In short, if the
demand for equalitywere based on the actual equality of all
human beings,we would have to stop demanding equality.
(Singer2007, p. 173)
The only characteristic that every single human has incommon,
that no animal1 has, is membership in the humanspecies. If you

want to say that every human is morallyimportant, and humans
are the only creatures that are morally important, your criterion
for moral importance must be basedsimply on species
membership.
3.2
However,
using
simple
membership
in
the
species
Homo
sapiens
as
a
criterion
of
moral
importanceis

completely
arbitrary.
Singer seems to think this is fairly obvious once it is stated.
Ifthere is, in fact, no relevant difference between your group
andsome other group, there is no rational ground for thinking
thatthose who belong to your group deserve greater
considerationthan those who belong to the other group.
Although it is fairlynatural for people to think of their own
group as more importantthan others, for no other reason than
because it is
their
group,Singer thinks the obvious parallels with racism are so
striking asto invalidate that natural impulse.2
3.3
Of
the
remaining
criteria
we
might
consider,
onlysentience—the
capacity

of
a
being
to
experiencethings
like
pleasure
and
pain—is
a
plausiblecriterion
of
moral
importance.
Singer argues for this in two ways. First, he argues, by
example,that the other criteria are poor criteria, because (again)
they willexclude people who we think ought not be
1For the sake of brevity, I will, throughout most of
theremainder of these notes, use the word ANIMAL

in the colloquial sense, designating all NON-
HUMANANIMALS specifically.
2This is a typically consequentialist way of thinking; youshould
consider how deontologists might look at thisgiven the
allowance for “duties of special relationships.”Is common
species membership an appropriate “specialrelationship”?
Should it be?
2
excluded. For instance, we don’t really think that it would
bepermissible to disregard the well-being of someone who
hasmuch lower
intelligence
than average, so we can’t possibly thinkthat intelligence is a
suitable criterion for moral consideration.
Second, Singer argues that it is only by virtue of beingsentient
that anything can be said to have INTERESTS, so thisplaces
sentience in a different category than the other criteria:“The
capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisitefor
having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfiedbefore
we can speak of interests in any meaningful way” (Singer2007,
p. 175). That is, Singer is trying to establish that if a beingis
not sentient, then the idea of extending moral considerationto
it makes no sense. This negative argument is important,because
one common criticism of Singer is that his criterionends up
excluding humans who are no longer sentient (such asthose in
an irreversible coma). Singer is content to accept
thatconsequence, but it is important that he show why the
exclusionof some humans by
his
criterion is not problematic, given that hehas criticized other
criteria for their exclusions3.

However, establishing that
non
-sentient creatures do
not
meritmoral consideration, falls short of demonstrating that
sentient
creatures
do
merit moral consideration. Singer doesn’t supplymuch
argument for the latter claim, but probably has the samekind of
rationale in mind as other utilitarians: clearly, each of
usrecognizes our
own
suffering as a bad thing, so there should bean automatic
extension of that to the recognition that
all
suffering is bad. And if all suffering is bad, then it must be
badfor
any
creature to suffer.4 So, if we want to make a radicaldistinction
between our suffering and the suffering of othercreatures, the
burden of proof is on us. Looking again to thearguments above,
it is clear that Singer thinks this burden ofproof cannot be
met—our criterion of moral importance must besentience.
3.4
Using
sentience
as
a

criterion
of
moralimportance
entails
that
we
extend
to
othersentient
creatures
the
same
basic
moralconsidera-
tion
(i.e.
“basic
principle

of
equality”)that
we
extend
to
(typical,
sentient)
humanbeings.
I need to unpack all of this carefully for you, because
whatSinger means by it often is misunderstood, and he
doesn’texplain himself in enough detail in this article to
preventmisunderstandings. Let’s be clear: Singer is
not
saying that weare required, in practice, to treat humans and
animals identically.Extending to animals the same moral
consideration we extend tohumans means that we count the
interests of animals equallywith
compa-
rable
interests of humans. However, not allinterests necessarily are
comparable. In other words, we cannotgive the interests of
animals less weight just because thecreatures that have them are
animals
, but we can give lessweight to some of the interests they
happen to have if thoseinterests just
do
have less weight.

To clarify, it will be helpful to introduce a distinction
Singermakes outside of this article: that between
persons
and
sentientnon-persons
. Singer defines a
person
(a creature with
3And this is precisely what his negative argument tries todo
4Though not necessarily so bad that we must eliminateall
suffering—remember that Singer is a utilitar- ian.
2
personhood
) as a creature that has awareness of its ownpersistence over
time5. Because of their awareness of theirown existence over
time, persons are opened up to specialforms of suffering that
sentient non-persons cannotexperience. A sentient non-person,
for instance, can feelpain while dying, but only a person can
experience the extradread that comes with awareness of its own
mortality. Asentient non-person can experience pain, but only a
personcan feel the hopelessness brought by awareness that his
orher pain will last for weeks, months, or years into the
future.In other words, persons have some interests that
sentientnon-persons do not. As a result, taking into
equalconsideration the comparable interests of all sentient
beings, no matter what their species, does
not
dictate that we must,in practice, treat all sentient beings
equally. If, for instance,you can save either a dog or a human

adult from a burningbuilding, Singer would say you must save
the human adult,because the balance of pleasure over pain
will
be greater ifyou save the adult, than if you save the dog.
However, Singer argues, situations in which one is facedwith
that
kind of choice are unusual. There are indeeddifficult cases,
such as animal experimentation, where weneed to sit down and
weigh carefully how much totalsuffering our possible courses of
action will cause; allSinger asks is that we
do
the calculation in those cases,instead of dismissing the
suffering of non-humans from thevery start. Most of our
practices toward animals, however,are very
easy
cases to Singer: in the vast majority of ourpractices toward an-
imals, we sacrifice important animalinterests (such as life and
freedom) for the sake ofabsolutely
trivial
human interests (such as satisfying a tastefor meat). In these
cases, the interests in question are stillnoncomparable, but in
the
other
direction; for instance, thesufferin g inflicted on factory farm
animals vastly outweighsour enjoyment of cheap and convenient
meat. All suchpractices, Singer concludes, quite clearly lack
any moraljustification, and must be eliminated as quickly as
possible.
3.5
Statistics
I am going to close this section on Singer with somestatistics
that I found surprising. The following are theUnited States

livestock and poultry slaughter statistics forthe year of 2009
(with a bit of rounding), from the USDANational Agricultural
Statistics Service:6
33 million cattle
1 million calves
114 million hogs
2.5 million sheep
8.5 billion chickens7
5Personhood is not coextensive with humanity—Singer
contends that adult chimpanzees are persons,but human infants
are not.
6Livestock stats:
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/LiveSlauSu//2010s/20
10/LiveSlauSu-
04-29-2010.pdf Poultry stats:
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/PoulSlauSu//2010s/20
10/PoulSlauSu-
02-25-2010.pdf
7Yes, with a
b
.
2
240 million turkeys

23 million ducks
If one agrees with Singer’s argument, these statistics offer a
glimpse of a moral problem so immense, that it must
dwarfvirtually any other moral problem imaginable. On the
otherhand, if one disagrees with Singer’s argument, then
perhapsthese statistics rep- resent the pinnacle of human
achievement inefficiency and mastery over the world. I’ll leave
it at that.
4
Fox’s
response:
Autonomy
and
the
moralcommunity
Fox believes that of all of the creatures on Earth, only
humanbeings have moral RIGHTS.8 The division between
humans andother creatures is not based strictly on membership
in the species
Homo
sapiens
, but the gap is unlikely to be crossed by anynonhuman form of
life on Earth.
According to Fox, the division rests on participation or lack

ofparticipation in a MORAL COMMUNITY. A moral
communityis a collection of individuals who recognize their
moralobligations to one another. Participation in a moral
communityrequires an individual to have an entire
cluster
ofcharacteristics, not an individual characteristic such as the
ones Singer considers (and rejects) one-by-one. The
characteristics inquestion are the ones required for a being to
function as a moralagent, or (what amounts to the same thing,
for Fox) thecharacteristics needed for autonomy:
•
critical self-awareness
•
the ability to manipulate complex concepts
•
the ability to use a sophisticated language
•
the ability to reflectively plan and choose a course of action
•
the ability to accept responsibility for one’s choices
To sum up, for Fox, possession of the above cluster
ofcharacteristics makes one autonomous, which means one
canfunction as a moral agent. Autonomy, or moral agency, in
turn,allow one to participate in a moral community. Finally, it
isparticipation in a moral community that gives one rights.
Ascription of rights, and a claim to them for oneself, occursonly
within a moral community. Here are two passages whereFox
makes the point:
8It is worth emphasizing that Singer would agree thatanimals
lack rights. However, he would deny that humanshave rights

either. Since the concept of moral rights is adeontological
concept, Singer does not believe there aresuch things as moral
rights at all. But it is not as thoughSinger and Fox are talking
completely past one another:they do disagree about whether
there is any reasonablebasis on which to count the interests of
humans as moreimportant than the comparable interests of
animals.
2
[1] The ascription of rights...is an act signifying therecognition
that others are beings [possessing theprerequisites for
autonomous, rational behavior andhence for moral personhood]
and expresses in symbolicform the resolve that they shall be
related in a mannerappropriate to the autonomy and personhood
thusperceived. (Fox 2007, p. 185)
[2] Assigning rights to others and claiming them foroneself is
tantamount to issuing a declaration ofnonintervention in the
self-governing lives of others, byacknowledging the sort of
being they are, and acquiringmoral guarantees of this type by
tacit agreement. (Fox2007, p. 186)
Why can only
autonomous
beings perform such acts asascribing or claiming rights?
Because being autonomous means that:
•
one has the ability to act freely and responsibly.
•
one recognizes that this ability is of defining importance
tooneself.
•
one recognizes the autonomy of other agents, and thedefining

importance of their autonomy to them.
Animals can be trained to obey standards, but not tounderstand
the rationale behind them. They do not possess therequisite
cluster of characteristics, so they are not autonomous,and
cannot function as moral agents. Being unable to participatein a
moral community, they, therefore, cannot have rights.
5
“Deficient”
humans
But Singer’s challenge comes back at this point: Fox’s
criterionwould exclude infants, the mentally disabled, people in
comas,and any other human who is deficient in the cluster
ofcharacteristics. Fox is not unaware of this challenge, and
hasseveral things to say in response:
•
Many deficient humans9 are
potentially
members of themoral community, in ways animals are not.
•
Natural feelings of kinship are adequate to make us
includedeficient humans into our moral community.
•
The natural feelings just alluded to are the “cornerstone
ofcivilization,” and erosion of them could lead us down
aslippery slope to the elimination of “undesirables” whoactually
are proper parts of our moral community.
•
Personal prudence counts in favor of ascribing rights
todeficient humans, since we ourselves, individually, may
oneday become deficient.

9Fox’s terminology.
2
•
Medical breakthroughs might remedy supposedly
permanentdeficiencies.
In sum, deficient human beings are “borderline cases”
andshould be seen as part of an “immediately extended
moralcommunity and therefore as deserving of equal moral con-
cern”(Fox 2007, p. 190). Is the introduction of extended
moralcommunities speciesist? Fox thinks not: (i) it is required
bycharity, benevolence, humaneness and prudence, and these
areconsistent with giving central status to autonomy; (ii)
anyanimals that are also borderline cases should likewise
beconsidered in such an expansion.
COMMENT: It is unclear to me exactly how Fox intends theidea
of the “extended moral community” to work. There seem tobe
two possibilities: either (i) Fox thinks the members of
theextended moral community actually
have
rights, or else (ii) Foxthinks the members of the extended
moral community do
not
have rights, but nevertheless should be treated
as
though
theyhad rights. Although Fox seems to me to talk as though
heintends the first option, such a move would invalidate his
entireargument, since it would mean that a living being can

have rights
without
having any of the cluster of characteristics he considers.The
second option is easier to square with his overall argument,but
then it leaves one with the question of whether we have
goodreasons to exclude all other animals from the extended
moralcommunity. You will have to judge for yourself whether
Fox hasgiven adequate reasons.
References
Fox, M. A. (2007). The moral community,
in
H. LaFollette (ed.),
Ethics
in
Practice:
Third
Edition
, Blackwell, Malden, MA,chapter 15, pp. 181–191.
Singer, P. (2007). All animals are equal,
in
H. LaFollette (ed.),
Ethics
in
Practice:
Third

Edition
, Blackwell, Malden, MA,chapter 14, pp. 171–180.
Sample A Paper From Instructor:
Opinion
Personally, I agree with Singer. I think it is important to take
into consideration that animals can feel pleasure, and especially
pain, because during these animal experimentations, they are
most of the time undergoing a significant amount of pain.
Cohen’s point of view, that animals do not have moral rights as
humans do because they are not part of the moral community,
doesn’t really take into consideration the suffering that the
animals experience, which I think is something that humans
should give more thought to.
Singer’s Argument
In Singer’s essay, he states that we should extend the equality
of humans to other species. He also talks about speciesism,
which is bias against a being because of the species it belongs
to. Humans are a major example, because of the way we treat
animals in experiments and killing them for food. Singer says
that if people argue that since humans have higher intelligence,
making it so humans cannot be used for experimentation
purposes, then how does that entitle humans to take advantage
of animals? Singer also argues that if a being is capable of
suffering, there is no reason for refusing to acknowledge that
suffering and to take it into consideration.
Cohen’s Argument
Cohen argues that animals do not have the same moral
capacities as humans, so animal experimentation isn’t a

violation of their rights because they don’t have any rights. He
also says that rights are claims, or potential claims, and can
only be defended by beings who are actually able to make moral
claims against one another. Cohen lists attributes for the moral
capability that human beings have, and mentions that the most
influential one has been the emphasis on the human possession
of a moral will and the autonomy its use entails. He believes
that just because an animal is alive, does not give it a “right” to
its life.
Conclusion
After hearing both points of views, I most agree with Singer
because he believes in thinking of how the animals feel, rather
than disregarding that and only thinking of humans and how it
could possibly be beneficial to them. Cohen’s argument comes
off as though he doesn’t really care about the pain the animals
experience at all. I also don’t agree with him saying that
animals do not have rights at all. If something can feel pain, I
think that humans should realize that it is wrong to be making
them go through that, especially since animal experimentations
are unsuccessful a decent amount of the time.
Notes
N

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