OL 325 Milestone One Guidelines and Rubric The Stra.docx

OL 325 Milestone One Guidelines and Rubric
The Strategic Analysis
The development of a strategic analysis guides all decisions
made regarding your compensation systems throughout the
project. The strategic analysis reveals
firm-specific challenges, objectives, and initiatives that allow
you to align the goals of a compensation system effectively with
those of the company strategy.
The strategic analysis allows you to better understand the
external market challenges e-sonic faces in addition to its
internal capabilities. As a consultant, a
thorough understanding of e-sonic’s business environment
allows you to better align your competitive system design with
e-sonic’s goals, challenges, and
objectives. Follow the outline below when completing this
portion of the project.
Strategic Analysis Outline:
1. Executive Summary (Concisely conveys the project
objectives and main findings. The executive summary is
completed last, but included first in the
strategic analysis.)
2. Strategic Analysis
a) Identification of e-sonic’s industry based on the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS)

b) Analysis of e-sonic’s external market environment
i. Industry Profile
ii. Competition
iii. Foreign Demand
iv. Long-Term Industry Prospects
v. Labor-Market Assessment
c) Analysis of Internal Capabilities
i. Functional Capabilities
ii. Human Resource Capabilities
The Strategic Analysis section is fully described in the
MyManagementLab Building Strategic Compensation Systems
casebook for faculty and students, linked in
the MyLab course menu. Follow the explanations and outline to
complete this milestone. The Strategic Analysis section is due
at the end of Module Three.
Rubric
Requirements of submission: Each section of the final project
must follow these formatting guidelines: 5–7 pages, double
spacing, 12-point Times New Roman
font, one-inch margins, and discipline-appropriate citations.
Critical Elements Exemplary (100%) Proficient (85%) Needs
Improvement (55%) Not Evident (0%) Value

The Strategic
Analysis
Provides in-depth analysis that
includes an executive summary
and the strategic analysis with
all of the elements of the
outlines provided in the
Building Strategic
Compensation Project
documentation, demonstrating
a complete understanding of all
concepts
Provides in-depth analysis that
most of the elements of the
Building Strategic
documentation
Provides an analysis that
some of the elements in the
Building Strategic
documentation
Does not provide an analysis

that includes an executive
summary and/or the strategic
analysis with elements in the
Building Strategic
documentation
50
Integration and
Application
All of the course concepts are
correctly applied
Most of the course concepts
are correctly applied
Some of the course concepts
are correctly applied
Does not correctly apply any of
the course concepts
20
Critical Thinking Draws insightful conclusions
that are thoroughly defended
with evidence and examples
Draws informed conclusions
that are justified with evidence

Draws logical conclusions, but
does not defend with evidence
Does not draw logical
conclusions
20
Writing
(Mechanics/
Citations)
No errors related to
organization, grammar and
style, and APA citations
Minor errors related to
Some errors related to
Major errors related to
10
Total 100%

Third World Quarterly
Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s
Author(s): Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics
(Apr., 1988), pp. 632-657
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992660 .
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SAAD EDDIN IBRAIIIM
Egypt's Islamic activism in the
1 980s
Islamic resurgence has gradually come to dominate the Egyptian
political landscape. Islamic resurgence as a form of political
discourse is
currently competing successfully with its secular counterparts-
liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. Egypt's Islamic
resurgence,
though significant in itself, is only one instance in the context
of far more
complex phenomena that are sweeping the Islamic world from
Morocco
to Indonesia. Questions of 'identity', 'modernisation', 'cultural
authenticity', socio-economic grievances, political participation,
and
foreign domination are all involved in the resurgence. While
there may
exist certain similarities between Islamic movements in various
parts of
the world, there also exist differences that set country
experiences apart
and that may result in quite different developments taking

place, often
within the same country. Egypt is no exception. It is therefore
neither
wise nor accurate to oversimplify or overgeneralise about
Islamic
resurgence.
If Islamic resurgence was to be roughly defined as a marked
increase in
religious activities and action, involving the participation of
greater
numbers of individuals and groups than one would generally
expect
under 'normal' circumstances, then Egypt's Islamic resurgence
could at
present be characterised as a broad movement of activity, action
and
participation, several different tendencies or branches
influencing its
direction. To be more exact, it is possible to identify at least
three distinct
tendencies within the religious movement in Egypt, which are
often
grouped together under the general term of 'Islamic resurgence'.
For the
lack of better terms, these tendencies may respectively be
labelled as
'establishment Islam', 'Sufi Islam', and 'activist Islam'.
Before we elaborate on these three tendencies that constitute the
resurgence movement, a brief account of what has come to be
known as
'Islamic fundamentalism' is in order. In a sense it is this
'fundamentalism' that binds all three tendencies together. The
differences among these three tendencies are very much matters
of

emphasis, concerning such details as their mode of organisation,
strategy, and tactics.
632 TWQ 10(2) April 1988/ISSN 0143-6597/88. $1.25
2014 15:09:58 PM
EGYPT'S ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IN THE 1980s
Fundamentalism is a concept more often used in Western mass
media
than in Muslim countries. Its closest equivalent in Arabic is
usuliyya-from usul al din, meaning origins or roots of religion.
The
Arabic term salafiyya-that of the past or predecessors is
sometimes
used interchangeably with usuliyya. The 'past' in this case refers
specifically to the time of the early Muslims who faithfully
adhered to the
original principles of Islam. Thus 'Islamic fundamentalism'
simply
means the belief in the precepts and commandments of Islam as
stated in
the Holy Koran; and, as enunciated and practised by the Prophet
Muhammad, the Sunna.' In other words, Islamic fundamentalism
is a
return to the purest sources of the religion, a movement to
cleanse Islam
from all the impurities, heresies, and revisionisms which may
have
influenced its body-intellect as well as its body-practice.

Believers, that is those that fit the fundamentalist description,
are
convinced that such adherence to the purest sources will deliver
them,
their society, and the world from all the ills of our time-from
the
world's decadence, corruption, weakness, poverty and
humiliation-in
other words, purity of religious practice is believed to be the
road to total
salvation. It will enable the faithful to establish a perfect social
order on
earth-an order that is virtuous, just, human, compassionate,
free,
strong, and prosperous. It is an order that is believed to be far
superior
to both communism and capitalism. For the Islamic order
balances the
interests of the individual with the welfare of the community. It
balances
the material of the 'here and now' on earth with the
commandments of
the 'hereafter' in preparation for Heaven: 'You do for your
world, as if
you would live for ever; and for the hereafter as if you would
die
tomorrow'. Adherence to the purest sources of Islam, the Holy
Koran
and Sunna, furthermore ensures the faithful Paradise or Heaven
when all
humans are resurrected in the Day of Judgement.
In concentrating on this world, unlike other religions, Islam has
provided not only guidelines to live by, but also a set of
comprehensive

principles for the regulation of all aspects of life-from the
interpersonal
to the international. In some major aspects, Islam has even
provided
detailed codes for human conduct. Its penal codes, hudud, is a
case in
point.
Reinforcing this conviction in the perfection of Islam is not just
the
deep religiosity of the faithful, but also, their reading of past as
well as
their interpretation of the recent history of the umma (Islamic
nation or
I These distinctions are elaborated in Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
'Contemporary Islamic militancy', in
Ideen Unserar Zeit, Zurich: Rugger Verlag, 1987, pp 109-27.
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2014 15:09:58 PM
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY
community of the believers). The glorious period for many
believers was
the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian era and the
first century
of the Islamic era when the Prophet Muhammad and his four
successors,

the rightly guided Caliphs, presided over a society that strictly
adhered
to the spirit and letter of the Holy Koran and Sunna. During that
Golden Age, Muslims not only established a perfect society on
earth, but
were also the masters of the entire world. Dar al-Islam (the
abode of
Islam) was the strongest force and the bearer of the torch of
world
civilisation. Their reading of more recent history is that Dar al-
Islam has
decayed and become vulnerable to Western encroachment
because
Muslims have strayed away from their religion: they no longer
strictly
adhere to its purest sources. The road to salvation, therefore, is
self-evident.
The mainstream of fundamentalist thought (al-salafiyya or
al-usuliyya) espouses a reading of Islam that is far from
extremist. As
expounded by Jamal el-Din, al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu in
the
later part of the nineteenth century and early part of the
twentieth
century, fundamentalism prides itself on being the epitome of
'moderation'. The umma is a moderate or Middle Nation
(ummatun
wasta) among all nations. The 'straight path' of Islam is the path
that
forms the geometric centre between extremes.
Accordingly, Islam is consistent with human nature. It
recognises
mankind's instincts and impulses but attempts to refine,
sublimate, or

moderate them. Politically, it emphasises a participatory society
through
a system of shura -the community's selection of its rulers-
counselling
them, and holding them accountable on the basis of Sharia
(Islamic law).
As such, Islam is consistent with Western-type democracy, the
Holy
Koran being the functional equivalent of a Divine Constitution.
There is
no priesthood, and hence no theocracy, under Islam. The ulema
are
learned men of religion; but, they do not constitute a clergy in
the
Western sense. While rulers may perform some religious
functions, for
example, leading prayers, and rule according to a Divine
Constitution
(the Holy Koran), they are not themselves divine, nor do they
possess
any divine rights. Islamic economic theory regards human
labour as the
only legitimate basis for generating and accumulating wealth. It
recognises private property as guardianship, and protects it in
all spheres
except those having direct bearings on the community as a
whole, for
example, in such spheres as water, energy, and other public
utilities. It
prohibits usury (interest on loans) and the production, trade and
634
2014 15:09:58 PM

consumption of commodities which are considered repugnant by
Islam:
alcohol and intoxicating drugs. In social terms, Islam considers
the
family as the basis of society. It recognises women's 'equal, but
different'
rights with men. It accepts religious pluralism with differential
rights and
obligations for Muslims and Peoples of the Book (Christians
and Jews).
While recognising classes, Islam frowns upon great class
differences and
provides several measures to check excessive wealth. It ensures
satisfaction of basic needs for the poor, disabled, orphans, and
the aged.
Finally, Islam glorifies the human mind, the pursuit of
knowledge and
reason, so long as such intellectual activities cast no doubt on
the
existence of God Almighty. Thus, today's fundamentalism has
no
quarrel with modern science and technology.
Articulated in the above terms contemporary Islamic
fundamentalism
is hard to describe as the ideology of the fanatic. In fact, the
majority of
today's activists in Egypt are quite moderate in words and
deeds. While
vigorous in the advocacy of their vision, they do not as a rule

resort to
violence. The exception to this statement is what we may call,
for the
lack of a better term, 'Muslim militants'. Thus, while it is a
century old,
modern Islamic fundamentalism whether at the hands of its
pioneers,
al-Afghani and Abdu, or its mid-century propagators (Hassan
al-Banna
and Sayed Qutb in Egypt, and Abu al-Aala al-Mawdudi in
Pakistan),
the emphasis has always been on consciousness-raising, moral
teachings,
and peaceful pressure on rulers to heed the call of Islam.
Occasional calls
for the use of force were mainly directed against the foreign
occupation
or Zionism. However, even in that respect, Islamic activists
were in tune
with Egypt's other secular nationalist and patriotic forces.
While much of this article will deal with 'activist Islam' in
Egypt, we
shall deal first with the other two branches of contemporary
Islamic
resurgence: 'establishment Islam' and 'sufi-Islam'.
Establishment Islam
Establishment Islam is symbolised by Al-Azhar, the Muslim
world's
foremost and oldest religious university. It is the centre of
Islamic
teaching and spiritual guidance. Establishment or official Islam
is also
embodied in Egypt's Ministry of Religious Endowments-Awkaf

(henceforth the MRE). Together, since the time of Mohamed Ali
(1805-48) (the founder of the modern Egyptian State), these two
bodies
635
2014 15:09:58 PM
of establishment Islam have formed the religious arm of the
State.2
Previously, Al-Azhar had been an important lobbying institution
for the
powerless Egyptian masses vis-a-vis their despotic rulers. With
Al-Azhar's incorporation into the state, it came to abdicate this
vital
function. This was largely due to state control over religious
endowments. Religious endowments have since the ninth
century
provided Al-Azhar with an economic base, securing for the
university
some degree of economic and therefore political independence.
Under
Mohamed Ali, such endowments were brought under state
control. The
ulema or sheikhs of Al-Azhar and other religious functionaries
became
in effect state employees, losing their independence and
consequently
their political role as spokesmen for the masses. To be sure,

occasionally
tenacious towering figures such as Muhammad Abdu and Ali
Abdul
Razek from Al-Azhar opposed the Egyptian rulers. But these
figures
have tended to be the exception rather than the rule, and have
often had
to be men of independent means, in order to secure with
subsequent
dismissal, an alternative income source. Even with such rare
figures, the
government has usually managed to rally other Al-Azhar ulema
figures
against dissenters as was the case with Abdul-Razek and then
Taha
Hussein in the 1920s and 1930s.3 This trend of emasculating
Al-Azhar
continued steadily through the post-Second World War period,
both
under the Royals as well as under Egypt's revolutionary
leadership after
1952.
Establishment Islam is now an easily manipulated tool of the
Egyptian
state. It can be counted on to issue pronouncements (fatwa) to
legitimise
government policies. When King Fouad made his bid to become
a
Muslim Caliph in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman
Empire (and
with the abolition of this institution in Turkey), some Al-Azhar
sheikhs
were ready to provide the necessary pronouncements. Some
went as far
as fabricating genealogical links between the aspiring King and

the
Prophet Muhammad. Gamal Abd al-Nasser, at a later stage, had
no
trouble obtaining fatwas to justify Arab Socialism and his
struggle
against Israel. Justification was provided on Islamic grounds, in
terms of
precepts on social Islamic justice and jihad respectively. Sadat
obtained
2 Hanafi, Hassan, 'Islam and politics in Egypt: 1952-1977' in S
E Ibrahim, Egypt in a Quarter of a
Century (in Arabic). Beirut: Arab Development Institute, 1980,
pp 265-340; and Barbara,
Rosewiez, 'Prestigious Al-Azhar is a force of moderation', Wall
Street Journal, 10 August 1987,
p 18.
3 The reference here is to Ali Abdel Razek's book Islam and
Fundamentals of Rule (in Arabic,
al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm) in which he advocated the
separation between Islam and governments;
and to Taha Hussein's book, The Jahiliyya Literature (in Arabic,
al-Adab al-Jahili), both
appeared in the early 1930s and were considered by Al-Azhar as
'heretical'.
636
2014 15:09:58 PM

fatwas for the sake of justifying opposing policies, including his
treaty
with Israel. Mrs Jehan Sadat found enough ulema to support her
drive
for changing the Personal Status Law in the late 1970s. With
Sadat's
death in 1981, many ulema expressed their misgivings as
regards this law
and the law was amended accordingly in 1985.4
This lack of backbone has logically resulted in an erosion in the
credibility of establishment Islam, particularly among young
educated
Egyptians. The latter would have nothing good to say about A1-
Azhar
and the MRE ulema. Some of them, especially militant
activitists, are
plainly hostile toward these ulema. They often describe them as
'parrots
of the pulpit' (babghawat al-manaber), 'stooges of the
government', or
'religious mercenaries'.5
Despite its emasculation and diminishing credibility with the
young,
establishment Islam still commands considerable respect and
prestige
with common Egyptians. It controls some 10,000 mosques,
hundreds of
secondary educational institutions and several provincial
branches of
Al-Azhar University.6 It has monopoly access to the state-
controlled
media, especially radio and television. In the last fifteen years,

activities
of establishment Islam have grown as rapidly as those of
'activist Islam'.
Between 1970 and 1985, the state-supported mosques have more
than
doubled their number of religious educational institutions and
their
student intake has more than tripled. Finally the number of
radio and
television hours of religious programmes have quadrupled
during this
period. There is now a radio station which is exclusively
devoted to such
programmes (twelve hours daily); religious broadcasting
accounts for
nearly one-quarter of the hours of all other radio and television
channels. Publications issued by Al-Azhar, MRE and the
Supreme
Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), which affirm the officially
approved
version of Islam, have also increased four fold.
This tremendous growth in the activities of establishment Islam
in
Egypt has been partly a genuine response to grass-roots needs,
especially
after Egypt's defeat in 1967 at the hands of Israel. But equally,
the
growth in establishment Islam has also been an attempt by the
government to counterbalance the upsurge in 'activist Islam'.
The latter
4 See an elaborate account of the changing relationship between
the religious establishment and the
state in Fahmy Howaidi, The Quran and the Sultan (in Arabic),
Cairo: Dar al Shuruk, 1982.

5 These descriptions were used by young Islamic militants
interviewed in prison by the author
between 1977 and 1979. See details on this point in S E Ibrahim
'Anatomy of Egypt's militant
Islamic groups', International Journal of Middle East Studies,
12, December 1980, pp 423-53.
6 These figures are obtained from a mimeographed report
prepared by Egypt's Central Agency for
Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMS), titled Imams and
Preachers in the Arab Republic of
Egypt, Cairo, June 1984. See also, Rosewiez 'Prestigious Al-
Azhar'.
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is considered by the state and establishment Islam as 'deviant',
'fanatic'
or 'lunatic'.
Antagonisms between 'establishment' and 'activist' Islam are
often
heightened during episodes of violent confrontations between
the
Islamic activists and the Egyptian state. But for the most part,
the two

'Islams' actually reinforce the general religiosity of the
Egyptian masses.
Establishment Islam emphasises beliefs, worship, and rituals,
while it
generally remains silent on matters of 'politics'. If pressed, it
cannot but
acknowledge the virtues of implementing Sharia (Islamic law),
although
suggesting a 'gradualist' path, often qualified with a statement
of
'preconditions' that must first be fulfilled.
Sufi Islam
Sufi Islam in contemporary Egypt has, likewise, witnessed an
impressive
upsurge in recent years. Some fifty major Sufi orders and twice
as many
minor orders are registered in a federation known as the
Supreme
Council of Sufi Orders (scso)-al-Majlis al-Aala Lilturuk al
Sufiyya.
Each order has its central leadership and headquarters, mostly
in Cairo,
with provincial and village branches throughout Egypt.7
Classical Sufism-along the lines expressed by al-Ghazali, Rabia
al-Adawiyya, Ibn Arabi and similar figures of medieval Islam-is
known
for its puritanic spiritualism and retreat from worldly concerns.
Sufism is
a perpetual quest for 'unity with God'. It seeks human salvation
and
eternal peace and harmony through minimum involvement in
societal
affairs. Egypt's Sufi orders, however, do not strictly conform to
such an

'ideal type'. They are mostly loosely organised fraternities
around
mystical leaders. Members of a tarika (order), are fully engaged
in
everyday pursuits. But they gather together periodically
(weekly,
monthly, or annually) for collective prayers, religious chanting,
dancing
(zikr) and dining. Every tarika has its own recitals, insignia,
parades and
other identifying symbols. On the occasion of the Prophet's
birthday, all
of Egypt's Sufi orders gather for several days around the
mosque of
al-Hussein (the mosque named after the Prophet's grandson).
Their
ceremonies culminate in a grand parade in the Old City. Each
order
usually mobilises its membership for the occasion. The parade
often goes
on for hours. And it is at times like these that an observer takes
ready
note of the annual growth of such orders.
7 For a detailed account on Egypt's sufi orders, see Morroe
Berger, Islam in Egypt Today: Social
and Political Aspects of Popular Religion, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970
especially pp 62-89.
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There is little information available on the membership of
Egypt's Sufi
orders. But members who have registered with the scso, and
hence have
the privilege of participating in the annual parades have tripled
between
1970 and 1985.8 In the mid-1960s the parade march took no
more than
two hours following the afternoon prayer (al-asr) and ending
well before
the sunset prayer (al-maghreb). In the mid-1980s, the parade
begins after
the noon prayer (al-zuhr) and may continue long after sunset.
Sufi Islam provides its members with an intimate sense of
belonging
(to a tarika). The spirit of fellowship and communion is
exhilarating.
There is a good deal of mutual help among each order's
membership.
There are no harsh demands or strict organisational obligations.
As such
the Sufi orders seem well suited for traditional middle-aged
urbanites.
On the surface, Sufi orders in Egypt are apolitical. As such they
represent
no threat to the state or the regime. If anything, the government
is
sufficiently comfortable with their activities for it to provide
facilities for
their congregation in Cairo and other cities. While there is

peaceful
rivalry among the different orders, the orders as a whole do not
take
sides on socio-political issues. They neither condemn nor
condone
'establishment Islam' or 'activist Islam'; establishment Islam
(Al-Azhar
and MRE) tends to take a benign attitude toward Sufi Islam. In
fact
several well-known Azhar ulema were and are known to be
Sufis
themselves. Activist Islam, on the other hand, holds a critical
view of
Sufism in general, and of Egypt's Sufi orders in particular.
Muslim
militants see these orders as inimical to true belief. A true
believer for
them should be engaging and striving in matters of this world
'as if he
would live forever' in the same manner as 'he prepares for the
hereafter
as if he would die tomorrow'.
Despite their apolitical appearance and manners, Sufi orders are
potential social activists. It is not unusual for a member who
joined an
order for 'individual salvation' to discover or be persuaded that
such
salvation is better attained collectively and through other means
as well.
The late Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim
Brotherhood is a
case in point. He started as a young Sufi during his college
career. But
soon after, he smoothly made the transition into religio-political
activism.

8 Information obtained directly from Egypt's Supreme Council
of Sufi Orders (scso) indicate that
the number of such registered orders has grown from twenty-
one in 1960 to sixty in 1985. Some
minor orders in existence and active are not registered,
especially if they are split-offs from major
orders.
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Activist Islam
Contemporary 'Islamic activism' in Egypt has its roots in the
Muslim
Brotherhood, which was established by Hassan al-Banna in
1928. Thus,
while millions of Egyptian Muslims subscribe to fundamentalist
ideas,
and take their cues from 'establishment Islam' or 'Sufi Islam',
only
Islamic activists are willing to go one step further. They strive
to bring
about the Islamic order-to restore a 'paradise lost'. The activists
propagate the vision of Islam by words and deeds. In their
advocacy they
use peaceful or violent means; and often, a mixture of both.

In its sixty years, the Brotherhood has managed to politicise
Islam as
no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt's
history.
The impressive development and the march of the Brotherhood
is
beyond the scope of this paper, and details of its development
can be
found elsewhere.9 In its most violent phase (1945-65) the
Brotherhood
was implicated in assassinations of its political opponents in
both royal
and revolutionary Egypt.'0 It was such an attempt on Nasser's
life in
1954 that broke the Brotherhood's back and marginalised it in
Egyptian
politics for nearly twenty years. Nasser hit back with
unprecedented
ferocity. Thousands of the Brotherhood's members were jailed
and
tortured. Several of the Brotherhood's leaders were executed,
including
top theoreticians such as Abdel Qader in 1955 and Sayyed Qutb
in 1965.
It was not until Nasser's defeat in 1967 that the Muslim
Brotherhood
was to gradually recover from its twenty-year eclipse. When it
did, its
remaining leaders had made the strategic decision to discard
violence.
The decision was preceded by heated debates among the
membership
inside and outside Nasser's prisons. Younger members never
accepted

the new strategy of 'non-violence'. Others had decided to
divorce
themselves not only from violence but from politics as well.
Thus, by the
time Sadat released them from jail, the Muslim Brothers were
divided
into four broad tendencies, all of them activists and committed
to the
cause of an Islamic socio-political order, but widely differing
on issues of
strategy, tactics, and internal organisation. These four
tendencies were
9 The best and most detailed account of the foundation and
evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood
is found in Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem
Brothers, London: Oxford University
Press, 1969. See also, Ishaq Musa Husayni, The Muslim
Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic
Movements (translated from Arabic), Beirut: Khayat College
Book Cooperation, 1956; Rifat
al-Said, Hassan al-Banna (in Arabic), Cairo: Madbouly
Bookshop, 1978.
10 See an account of the Brotherhood's acts of violence in
Fahmy Howaidi, 'The new Commander
[of the Faithful] in Upper Egypt' (in Arabic), Al-Ahram, 17
November 1987. Among these
assassinations before 1952 was a judge A al-Khazendar and a
prime-minister M F al-Noukrashi
in 1947 and 1948-49, respectively.
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2014 15:09:58 PM

the apolitical Muslim Brotherhood; the mainstream Muslim
Brotherhood; the anti-regime Muslim groups; and the anti-
society
Muslim groups.
The ideological underpinnings of the four tendencies are fairly
clear;
and will be dealt with shortly. Organisationally however, the
boundaries
between them, particularly the last two, are not as clear. The
official
security reports are often confusing as to the names, numbers,
size, and
relative weight of these groups. We rarely learn anything
definitive about
them until their membership is either implicated, arrested or
tried for
'illegal acts'. In the last several years the violence-prone groups
have
received much of the media attention at home and abroad
especially
after the Iranian revolution. Their acts of defiance and bloody
confrontations with the Egyptian state have been sensational
enough to
warrant such attention. But in the longer term it is probably the
first two
tendencies that are gradually, if less dramatically, having an
impact on
the 'body-social' of Egypt.

The apolitical Muslim Brotherhood
Encompassing a smaller number, mostly middle-aged
professionals, this
group while still loyal to the mission of the Muslim
Brotherhood has
decided to devote its time and energy to religious teaching,
moral
reinforcement, and setting up modem economic and service
institutions
along 'Islamic lines'.'1 As it turns out, this group has been as
active as the
other groups, though without the same blatant public profile,
and
without resorting to violence or extra-legal methods. Its
members try to
be as 'Islamic' as possible within the existing 'non-Islamic'
socio-political
order of the Egyptian state.
Its initial success in setting up economic enterprises (Islamic
Banks,
investment companies, factories, large-scale farming and
agribusiness)
has tempted several intruders (not originally Muslim Brothers)
to follow
suit, using the same religious appeal of usury-free enterprises.
By the
mid-1980s, the original as well as the intruding Islamic
entrepreneurs
Having escaped Egypt to the oil-rich Arab countries during
Nasser's crack-down on the
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, many members of the
Brotherhood accumulated substantial
savings abroad; returned to Egypt in the early 1970s, took

advantage of Sadat's new open-door
economic policy, and set-up various types of industrial
enterprise. The Al-Sherif brothers are
perhaps a good example of Brotherhood entrepreneurship. In
one decade their small plastic
enterprise had grown into an agglomeration of multi-industries
agribusiness, and investment
companies. The total value of its assets are estimated to be in
excess of one billion dollars at home
and abroad. See, al-Ahram al-Iktisadi (in Arabic-Al-Ahram
Economist), 8 December 1986.
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had amassed substantial deposits from a broad strata of
Egyptian
Muslims. The competition with public (state-owned) and other
conventional private institutions is increasingly in their favour.
Press
reports have estimated the volume of Islamic venture-capital
held by
these institutions to be anywhere between $5 billion and $15
billion.12
With the exception of Islamic banking (which like all banking is
regulated by Egypt's Central Bank), most of the other Islamic
economic
enterprises are simple contractual arrangements between a

major
entrepreneur and thousands of individual 'partners' (depositors).
3
Hence, the details of their transactions, through accounts and
annual
reports, etc, are not publicly monitored. This fact alone has
been a
belated cause for alarm by the state-controlled press since mid-
1986. A
sustained campaign was intensively waged against 'the so-called
Islamic
investment companies' in the autumn of that year. Citizens were
warned
to stop dealing with them. One of these companies, al-Rayyan,
was
rumoured to have lost millions of dollars while speculating in
gold and
hard currencies abroad.'4 The campaign and the rumour resulted
in a
run on the company's offices by thousands of clients demanding
their
money. To the surprise of all, including the government, al-
Rayyan
honoured every request for withdrawal. This episode
strengthened,
rather than weakened, the Islamic investment companies,
particularly
al-Rayyan. Most of those who had withdrawn their money
returned it
shortly after. The loud publicity surrounding the episode
encouraged
new clients to deal with these companies, particularly as the
news of their
high rate of return (20 per cent annually or more-twice the rate
of
return given by the commercial banking sector) became widely

known.
Apolitical Islamic activism has not confined itself to the
economic
sphere. There is a broad range of services rendered under the
catchword
'Islamic'. Again most of these were started by the original
Muslim
Brothers in the 1970s. Among the most widely used facilities of
the
Brotherhood are the medical services clinics to be found in
more than
12 ibid., see also an interview with Dr Atef Sidky Egypt's Prime
Minister, Al-Ahram, 14 August,
1987. The higher estimates of L.E. 48 billion (about $25 billion)
of the 180 Islamic investment
companies was given by the Cairo weekly Sawt al-Arab, 9
August 1987.
13 The typical contractual arrangement takes the form of a
statement to the effect that 'the
undersigned has agreed to put the amount of ... at the disposal
of ... (the name of the
enterpreneur) to invest on his behalf in Islamically lawful
activities; and accepts the risks of such
an investment. In case of positive return he gets the profits ...
(monthly, quarterly, or annually).
14 See details of this campaign in the state-controlled Cairo
weeklies al-Mosawwar, 14, 21, and 28,
November 1986, and Al-Ahram al-Iktisadi, 1, 8 December 1986.
642

2014 15:09:58 PM
20,000 non-governmental mosques,'5 many of which have
operating
facilities for minor surgery. The Islamic clinics charge their
clients a
nominal or modest fee for a generally better and more
compassionate
service than their state-run counterparts.'6
Similar educational and other social services are rendered by
apolitical
Islamic activists. Often these are also located on the premises of
non-governmental mosques. These are run on a low-cost
overhead basis
and generally provide good-quality services given the donated
time and
expertise of their volunteer workers. More recently, Islamic
economic
entrepreneurs have also involved themselves in providing
similar services
on a graded service-charge basis, according to ability to pay.'7
Thus
al-Rayyan, the controversial and well publicised investment
company,
has advertised daily for its newly established nurseries, schools,
medical
clinics, restaurants, and publishing houses.
This strand of Islamic activism has therefore set about

establishing
concrete Islamic alternatives to the socio-economic institutions
of the
state and the capitalist sector. Islamic social welfare institutions
are
better run than their state-public counterparts, less bureaucratic
and less
impersonal, if slightly more expensive and riskier. They are
definitely
more grass-roots oriented, far less expensive and far less
opulent than
the institutions created under Sadat's infitah (open-door policy),
institutions which mushroomed in the 1970s and which have
been
providing an exclusive service to the top 5 per cent of the
country's
population.
Apolitical Islamic activism has thus developed a substantial
socio-economic muscle through which it has managed to baffle
the state
and other secular forces in Egypt. The Islamic non-
governmental
organisations are operating within the bounds of Egyptian law
but
independently of the state. So far they are displaying a high
degree of
vitality and viability that is envied by their secular counterparts.
And so
5 In 1980, the number of mosques in Egypt was about 28,000 of
which slightly more than 7,000
were government controlled and the remainder (more than
20,000) were independently
controlled. The former are maintained, their preachers and
employees are paid, and their

activities (including the text of the Friday Ceremony, (Khutba)
are directly supervised by the
government's MRE and Al-Azhar. The latter remained
completely outside government control till
1981, when they too were placed under partial governmental
supervision. See CAPMAS' report,
Imams and Preachers, op. cit.
16 This statement is based on field observations by a research
team currently working with the
author. Three medical institutions in Cairo-one Islamic
(Mustafa Mahmoud Mosque), one
governmental (Abu al-Rish Hospital), and one private (al-
Salamm International Hospital) have
been sampled for comparable services.
7 See, for example, al-Rayyan's and al-Hoda's advertising for
such services in Egypt's major daily
Al-Ahram 6, 13 November 1987.
643
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far, attempts to smear or discredit them by the state media have
had little
impact. The irony of the matter is that while the Egyptian public
may
often be exposed to hostile editorials against such

organisations, they
will also be exposed to positive promotional advertising on
behalf of
these Islamic organisations, usually in the same daily
newspapers and
weekly magazines.'8 In fact, most of these institutions are quite
sophisticated in their advertising. Their style combines an
appeal of
'Islamic authenticity' and a Madison Avenue-like attraction. The
atmosphere they have created is also beneficial to the
mainstream
Muslim Brotherhood.
The mainstream Muslim Brotherhood
Encompassing the majority of the old Muslim Brothers, the
mainstream
Muslim Brotherhood has retained the original name and is
perceived by
the state and the public to be an extension of the original
Brotherhood.
Although still technically banned (since the attempt on Nasser's
life in
1954), the Brotherhood has enjoyed 'de facto recognition' by the
Egyptian government since the mid-1970s and has also issued
its own
monthly publication (al-Daawa, al-Iitisam, and al-Mukhtar al-
Islami)
regularly between 1974 and 1981.
When Sadat released Brotherhood leaders from prison in the
early
1970s, and then allowed them a reasonable measure of freedom,
his
motives were concerned with the support that the Brotherhood
could
give in countering his Nasserist and leftist detractors. In the

first years of
Sadat's presidency, the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups
were
largely to keep their side of the bargain.'9
While committed as ever to its historical objective of bringing
about
an Islamic social order, the Brotherhood is now equally
committed to
achieving this objective by non-violent means, a decision that
led in the
early 1970s to the breakaway of several groups from its ranks.
Even
when its disenchantment with Sadat grew steadily in the late
1970s, the
Brotherhood remained true to its commitment, confining its
opposition
to legal political means. Many of President Sadat's policies
were
18 See, for example, issue of Al-Ahram al-Iktisadi, 2 Nov 1987
in which the editorial and three
articles (pp 8-2 1) were directed against these companies.
Meanwhile the Al-Ahram daily (the same
publishing house) on the same day carried promotion
advertising for three of these companies
(al-Rayyan, al-Huda, and al-Saad). This practice is not confined
to the state-controlled media.
The leftist weekly Al-Ahali issue of 25 November 1987
published an article against Islamic
investment companies (p 3) and an advertisement for one of
them (al-Rayyan) on the back page.
'9 For an account of the relationship between the Brotherhood
and Sadat, see Ibrahim, 'An Islamic
alternative in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat', Arab

Studies Quarterly, 4 (2) Spring
1982.
644
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vehemently criticised, especially his 'peace initiative' with
Israel. The
Brotherhood has had a long-standing hostility toward Zionism.
Its
volunteers had fought beside the Palestinian resistance long
before the
Arab armies entered the war of 1948. The Brotherhood's
position on
Sadat's policy towards Israel centred on the impossibility of
peaceful
co-existence with the Jewish state. Israel is viewed as 'a villain
aggressor
on the abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam). Israel is directly or
indirectly
behind major calamities befalling Muslims everywhere,
particularly in
Palestine. Israel has desecrated Muslim Shrines in the Holy
Land. As an
evil it must be eradicated'.20 These assertions were echoed in
nearly every
issue of al-Daawa and al-Iitisam, with increasing passion
following

Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and before these
two
magazines and other Brotherhood publications were banned by
Sadat in
September 1981. It was the openness of the attack by the
Brotherhood
that emboldened other opposition groups to come out against
Sadat's
policy of reconciliation with Israel. His alliance with the West,
especially
the USA, was criticised as well. The Brotherhood's criticism
was
credible, effective, and painful.
Thus, in his September 1981 crackdown on the opposition,
Sadat
spared one or two top leaders of each opposition party, for
example, K
Mohi-eldin of the Progressive Unionist Party (PuP) and Ibrahim
Shukry
of the Socialist Labour Party (SLP). However, with the Muslim
Brotherhood, Sadat's arrests included all elements within the
top
leadership, in addition to the seventy-year-old Supreme Guide,
Omar
el-Telmessani. Out of the 1,500 arrested and detained between
3-5
September 1981, about two-thirds were from the Muslim
Brotherhood
and other Islamic groups.
Shortly after Sadat's assassination on 6 October 1981, by the
Islamic
group al-Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was released
from
jail. The Brotherhood was not implicated in the use of violence

on this
occasion nor had it been in earlier confrontations with Sadat
that had
occurred in April 1974 and January and July 1977. This
violence-free
record of the Brotherhood further consolidated its image as a
respectable and responsible opposition. Under the wise
stewardship of
its third Supreme Guide, Omar el-Telmessani, the Brotherhood
increased its membership and considerably improved its
relationship
with other opposition parties. There was also a significant shift
in the
Muslim Brotherhood's political thought and practice.
20 See the Brotherhood's monthly al-Dawa, issues of December
1977 to April 1981.
645
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Beside discarding violence and opting for change by peaceful
means,
the Brotherhood in the 1980s had clearly accepted political
pluralism
and parliamentary democracy as the road forward. In earlier
decades,
the Brotherhood had firmly asserted that only two types of party
can

possibly exist: God's Party (Hisbu Allah) and Satan's Party
(Hisby
Ashytan). The Brotherhood was the former, and all others the
latter. Not
only has the Brotherhood come to discard this stand in recent
years but
it also entered into alliance with other parties in coalitional
arrangements for parliamentary elections. Thus in 1984 the
Brotherhood, which is still illegal as regards formal political
participation and cannot run on a separate party2l list, chose to
form an
alliance with the Wafd party (wp). This decision was all the
more
significant for the fact that the wp has been the most 'secular' of
Egypt's
modern political parties since the 1919 revolution. The coalition
managed to win some sixty-five seats (out of 450), seven of
which were
for the Brotherhood. The coalition came second only to
Mubarak's
National Democratic Party (NDP) and served as the major
opposition in
the People's Assembly (Egypt's Parliament) for three years. In
the 1987
elections, the Brotherhood shifted its alliance and formed a
coalition
with two smaller parties: the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) and
the Liberal
Party (LP). The new coalition took the name of Islamic Alliance
(IA)-al-Tahaluf al-Islami. Again this bloc came second to the
NDP, with
some sixty seats, thirty-eight of which went to the Brotherhood.
The IA
now forms the major opposition group to the ruling party.
The 1987 election was a landmark for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Three
years earlier it was a minor partner in a coalition dominated by
the wp.
In contrast, the Brotherhood was now the dominant partner in
the IA;
and was responsible not only for the IA'S 'Islamic' name but
also for the
first demand in the coalition's ten-point election platform,
which called
for the implementation of Islamic Sharia.22 The campaign's
only slogan
was 'Islam is the
Solution
'. The Brotherhood's resounding success was
2' Egypt's electoral law was changed in 1984 (shortly before the
election) from an individual
candidacy to a complicated proportional representation.
Candidates must be on a party-list for a
given enlarged district (Egypt was divided into some fifty
electoral districts) to compete for its
seats (ranging from seven to ten seats per district). A given
party must first obtain a minimum of
8.0 per cent of the popular vote nation-wide, then gets a number
of seats (or none) in each district
proportional to the number of votes it obtained in that district.

In the 1984 Elections no
'independent' candidate could run for the People's Assembly.
The law was amended again, also
shortly before the 1987 Election, because of the Supreme
Constitutional Court's ruling, and
allowed 'independents' to run, but only for one seat per district.
The 1987 electoral law is also
contested in Court by the opposition.
22 For the Islamic Alliance Platform, see the SLP weekly al-
Shab issues of 17 March through to 15
April.
646
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dramatised by the fact that the son of its founder and first

Supreme
Guide, Seif al-Islam Hassan al-Banna was among those elected,
along
with the son of the Brotherhood's second Supreme Guide,
Maamoun H
al-Hudhaiby. While all other major parties, namely the
government's
NDP and the wp, registered a net loss in votes cast in 1987 as
compared to
1984,23 the Brotherhood also increased its number of seats in
the
Assembly by more than five-fold, the number of seats rising
from seven
to thirty-eight.
Equally significant was the IA'S accommodating and
sophisticated
election campaign. The campaign went out of its way to dispel
the fears
of Egypt's Christian Copts by both words and deeds. The second
demand of the ten-point election platform was the unequivocal
affirmation of the IA's desire for 'full equal rights and
obligations
between Muslims and their Coptic brothers'.24 To couple these
words

with deeds, the IA placed several Copts on its candidacy lists.
The only
Copt who was put at the top of a party list and was elected in
the 1987
Election was with the IA.25
Spearheading the IA, the Brotherhood's position during and
after the
1987 election was one of moderation, gradualism, and
constitutionalism.
Its spokesmen emphasised the imperative of going slowly, but
steadily,
with the implementation of Sharia, making clear that they do
not wish a
repeat of the premature and ill-fated experience of the Sudan,26
nor its
implementation in the convulsive revolutionary manner of Iran.
By the
same token, the Brotherhood has painstakingly distanced itself
from the
anti-regime violence-oriented Muslim groups, such as
Repentance and
Holy Flight (al-Takfir wa al-Hijra) and Holy War (al-Jihad).
The
Brotherhood has largely benefited from the fanaticism of such

groups,
23 Out of the 448 seats, the NDP had 391 in 1984, which
dropped to 353 in 1987 (a net loss of
thirty-eight seats). The wp (with the Brotherhood combined)
had fifty-seven seats in 1984, which
dropped to thirty-five in 1987. Since the Brotherhood was not
with wp in the latter election its net
loss is actually twelve seats (i.e. from forty-seven to thirty-
five).
24 Al-Shaab, 17 March, 1987.
25 The reference is to Mr Gammal Asad Abdel-Malak. The NDP
(the majority party) did not put any
Copt on the top of any of its districts' lists. Dr Botrous Ghali,
the State Minister for Foreign
Affairs since 1977, is a Christian (but not a Copt) and was on
one of the NDP's lists for the number
two District of Central Cairo and was the only other Christian
elected in 1987. It is noteworthy
that there are ten seats in the Assembly whose occupants are
appointed by the President; most of
which go to Egyptian Copts. For other accommodating
statements by the Brotherhood vis-a-vis

the Copts, see Sheikh Mustafa Mashhour, 'The correct Islamic
understanding of national unity',
al Shaab, 3 November 1987, p 5.
26 The reference is to former President Numeiri of Sudan when
he hurriedly implemented the Islamic
Penal Code in September 1983. As this coincided with the
severe drought in the Sudan (1983-85),
not to mention the chronic economic problems of the country,
the result was that hundreds of
poor Sudanese had their hands chopped for thieving. Wide-
spread protest inside and outside the
Sudan broke out. Ultimately Numeiri was toppled, for this and
other reasons, in April 1985.
647
2014 15:09:58 PM

looking quite sane and respectable by comparison. Meanwhile
the
Brotherhood never fails to point out that had the state allowed
its own
organisation political rights, these fanatic groups would not
have
flourished underground.27
The Brotherhood has taken full advantage of present conditions
in
Egypt. It has capitalised on the upsurge in the overall religiosity
of the
Egyptian masses since 1967. It has been steadily filling the
political
vacuum created by Nasser's departure from the scene in 1970.
Its
religious populism is proving to be the functional equivalent to
Nasser's
national socialism. Both types of populism seem to appeal to the
same
constituency: the lower-middle class in particular and the
middle class in
general. The mainstream politicised Muslim Brotherhood has
also taken

advantage of the growing economic muscle of the apolitical
Muslim
Brotherhood tendency. And as we have also noted, the
Brotherhood has
benefited, by default, from the actions of the other more
violence-prone
Islamic groups.
The Brotherhood's success can be attributed to a number of
factors.
One of the main factors was its decision to pursue its objectives
peacefully. A factor of equal significance was the leadership of
Sheikh
Omar el-Telmessani, the third Supreme Guide of the
Brotherhood.
Telmessani was a seasoned and shrewd politician. He navigated
steadily
but gently in post-Nasserite Egypt. He never compromised in
matters of
principles under Sadat or Mubarak. His advocacy of Islamic
Sharia
remained relentless till his death in 1986. Telmessani
vehemently
objected to Sadat's policies: especially Camp David, the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and alliance with the USA. He

did all this
with a style that baffled and at times outraged Sadat; but,
without
libellous or illegal implications. Telmessani was also successful
in ending
the Brotherhood's half-century of self-imposed alienation from
secular
political forces in the country. He instituted the practice of
cooperation
with other political parties. His motto in this regard was 'we
cooperate
sincerely with others in matters on which there are common
agreement-we sincerely excuse each other on matters of
disagreement.'28 Finally, Telmessani laid firm rules of
leadership in the
Brotherhood, proposing that it should be-collectively organised
through
the Supreme Office of Guidance (soG), with command passing
to the
oldest member unless he wilfully declines. This practice spared
the
Brotherhood of one of the toughest problems faced by all mass
27 See Mashhour, 'Islamic understanding', op. cit. p 5.
28 From an interview with the author in February 1984.

648
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movements, namely the problem of succession. Thus, when
Telmessani
passed away, the issue of succession was smoothly settled
without much
fanfare.29
Social movements seem to go through a process of maturation.
The
first stage of the process is that of preaching and advocacy. The
second
stage is that of organisation and confrontation, in which the
emphasis is
on radical action. The third stage is that of 'institutionalisation'
in which

the emphasis is on consolidation and statesmanship. Egypt's
Muslim
Brotherhood seems to have followed this general pattern of
development. Its three successive stages fall between the
periods
1928-45, when the organisation pursued its educational
programme and
formulated its objectives; 1945-70, when the organisation's
programme
of radical action led to its being declared an illegal
organisation; and
1970 to the present day following successive liberalisations,
first by Sadat
and then by Mubarak.
The last stage in the Brotherhood's sixty-year history has
coincided
with external societal developments that have indirectly
enhanced the
Brotherhood's strength. The Brotherhood have been able to
capitalise
on discontent arising from actions taken in Sadat's Egypt in the
1970s
and the lack of direction under Mubarak during the 1980s.
Sadat's

open-door policy, his alliance with the USA and peace with
Israel,
effectively undermined the legitimacy of his regime. In the
1980s growing
inequities, coupled with rising foreign influence, and alienation
from the
rest of the Arab and Muslim world has also created conditions
of
widespread discontent. The Brotherhood has thus been able to
capitalise
on mass frustration, particularly among the youth and the lower-
middle
and middle classes. The Brotherhood, however, is not the only
Islamic
group to have done so. More violence-prone groups have been
able to
appropriate some younger elements from these same classes that
make
up the discontented.
The anti-regime Muslim groups
The anti-regime Muslim groups represent some of the factions
that
broke away from the main body of the Brotherhood and have
been

acting on their own behalf since the early 1970s. The militant
violence of
these groups was aimed at toppling the regime (Sadat's and now
Mubarak's) and bringing about an 'Islamic regime'. Proponents
of this
29 Upon Telmessani's death in 1986, Mr Hamed Abn-Alnasr,
the oldest member of SPG was
automatically chosen as the fourth Supreme Guide of the
Brotherhood. Other more able but few
other younger members, e.g. Sheikh Mustafa Mashhour (cited
above) were bypassed.
649
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tendency contend that the present decadence and corruption that

characterises society is rooted within the ruling political elite.
No
amount of preaching, religious consciousness-raising, or
behaviour-
modelling is sufficient to change this state of affairs (as the
first tendency,
the apolitical Brotherhood contends). Nor would any amount of
non-violent political activism bring about the desired result (as
the
second tendency, the mainstream Brotherhood contends). In
their view,
Egyptian society at large is redeemable if, and only if, its
leadership
would be truly 'Islamic'. Thus, the struggle must be directed
against the
rulers, to remove them or force them to submit to the Islamic
will. This
anti-regime tendency has been embodied in the Islamic
Liberation
Organisation and the Jihad Organisation. The first, otherwise
known as
the Technical Military Academy Group (TMA), had a bloody
confrontation with the Sadat regime in April 1974.30 The
second, the
Jihad, is believed to be an ideological, if not also an

organisational,
extension of the former, the TMA. The Jihad group was by far
the
bloodiest and most deadly in its confrontations with the state.
For
despite the preventive arrest of hundreds of its members by the
state in
September 1981, it still had sufficient organisational capability
to plan
and successfully carry out the assassination plot that took the
life of
President Sadat on 6 October 1981. And despite a second round-
up of its
members in the aftermath of the assassination, the Jihad was
still able to
storm the main police headquarters in the Governorate of
Assyut, and
kill or wound tens of state security men. Some members have
already
been tried for direct involvement in the assassination of
President Sadat,
receiving death sentences or varying terms of imprisonment. A
second
trial, involving 302 Jihad members charged for the Assyut
events and

membership in an unlawful organisation, ended on 30
September 1984
with 1 10 convicted, receiving prison sentences ranging from
two to forty
years.31
30 The TMA plan to topple the regime was fairly simple. Some
100 TMAS were to storm the Technical
Military Academy (in cooperation with some of their own
members inside who were cadets), seize
enough arms and vehicles; march on to the Arab Socialist Union
building where Sadat and other
top leaders were attending an official event, arrest or kill them;
and storm the nearby radio and
television building to announce the birth of the 'Islamic
Republic of Egypt'. The first two stages of
the plot on 18 April, 1974, were carried out. Before the TAMs
could leave the Academy on their
way to the Arab Socialist Union, the State Security Forces
counter-attacked. Eleven people were
killed and twenty-seven were wounded. For more details, see
Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's
Militant Islamic Groups', op. cit., p 450.
3' For a full analytical account of the Jihad group and the events

of 1981, see Nemat Guenena, 'The
Jihad an "Islamic Alternative" in Egypt', Cairo Papers in Social
Science (9) Monograph 2,
Summer 1986.
650
2014 15:09:58 PM
After a four-year lull under President Mubarak, the Jihad and
other
like-minded groups resumed their confrontations with the state
through
acts of defiance and violence. In 1986, several attacks and
bombing
incidents were directed against nightclubs, video shops, alcohol
stores
and taverns. In 1987, assassination attempts were made on the

lives of
two former ministers of the interior, Hassan Abu-Pasha, El-
Nabawy
Ismael, and a leading journalist, Makram M Ahmed. The first
two were
targeted by Islamic militants for their alleged role in ordering
the torture
of 'fellow Muslims' while in jail between 1981 and 1984. The
third was
singled out for his relentless smearing of Muslims groups in his
editorials
in the weekly magazine al-Miswar. It took a few months before
the
Egyptian authorities were able to arrest some, but not all,
suspects in
August 1987 and charge them for committing these acts in
November
1987. In the process, several skirmishes and shoot-outs took
place, with
a score of dead and wounded on both sides.32
In a few upper-Egyptian cities, namely Assyut, Sohag, Menia,
and
Bani-Souef, Islamic militant students have been harassing other
students

either for being too 'liberal' or for being Christian Copts.33
They are
audacious enough to occasionally hold hostages and make
demands on
the authorities in return for their release.34 They also issue
their own
religious pronouncements and edicts (fatwas) and proceed to
implement
them directly, bypassing religious (Al-Azhar) and state
authorities.35
The ideological underpinnings of this anti-regime violent
Islamic
tendency are outlined in a small booklet al Faridha al Ghaeba
(The
Absent Commandment) attributed to Mohammed Abdel Salam
Farag.
The 'absent commandment' is the Jihad and hence the name
given by the
authorities to the group led by Farag, which assassinated
President
Sadat in 1981. Farag takes his cues from Ibn Taymiyya (AD
1263-1328),
a noted Islamic thinker of more than six centuries ago.36 Both
pronounced on the society of their respective times as an abode

in
between the abode of Peace (dar al-Silm) and the abode of War
(dar
al-Harb). This 'in-between' status means that the majority of
subjects
(citizens) are basically good Muslims, but are living under 'non-
Islamic'
laws and 'non-Muslim' or 'nominal Muslim' rulers. The
implication of
32 For details of these shoot-outs. See Al-Ahram, 30 August
1987.
33 For details and analysis of these acts, see Al-Shaab, 27
October 1987, p 3; and F Howaidi, 'The
New Commanders of the Faithful in Upper Egypt', Al-Ahram,
17 November, 1987, p 7.
34 Howaidi, ibid, p 7.
35 ibid.
36 See a full account by both Ibn Taymiyya and Abdel Salam
Farag in Mohamed Emera, The Absent
Commandment: Presentation, Dialogue, and Evaluation (Arabic)
Cairo: Dar Thabet, 1982.

651
2014 15:09:58 PM
this characterisation is that it is the duty (commandment) of
good
Muslims to fight their ungodly rulers and liquidate their laws.
In Farag's
words:37
The State is ruled by heathen laws despite the fact that the
majority of its people
are Muslims. These laws were formulated by infidel and
compelled Muslims to
abide by them ... And because they deserted the Jihad, Muslims
of today live in
subjugation, humiliation, division, and fragmentation. The
Koran has aptly

scolded them in the verse. Thou believers why if told to rise up
for the sake of
God, you hedge closer to the ground? Are you more content
with earthly life
than with the hereafter? The pleasures of the earthly life are
little compared to
that of the hereafter. If you do not rise up God will torture you
most painfully
. . .3 Thus, the aim of our Group is to rise up to establish the
Islamic State and
restore Islam to this Nation ... The means to this end is to fight
against heretical
rulers and to eradicate the despots who are no more than human
beings who
have not found those who can suppress them with the order of
God almighty.
This combatant spirit, combined with religious passion, has
made
Islamic militants quite deadly in their confrontations. Often the
leaders
have no illusions about a quick victory over the 'heathen State'
and its
rulers. Nevertheless, they are willing to 'rise-up in anger for the
sake of

God' (Ghadhabah lilallah). Their death in battle, or subsequent
execution
after trial, is akin to martyrdom that takes one right to heavenly
paradise
(al-Janna).
The anti-regime Islamic tendency appeals to educated,
motivated
youngsters of rural or small-town and lower-middle-class
backgrounds;
but who are often living in large cities and away from their
families at the
time of their recruitment.39 Contrary to common stereotypes
that these
radical groups generally attract a disproportionate number of
'misfits',
'alienated', 'marginals', or otherwise 'abnormal', our fieldwork
showed
Egypt's Islamic militants to be almost 'model young Egyptians'.'
M A Farag, The Absent Commandment (Arabic with no
publisher or date) pp 7-8, as cited in Ibid
pp 10-1 1.
38 Al-Taba, Chapter of the Holy Koran, verses 38-39.

39 For details on the Militants Social Profile, see Ibrahim 'The
Anatomy of Egypt's militant Islamic
groups' op. cit. pp 437-40.
40 Shukry Mustafa was a young agricultural engineer, who in
the mid 1960s after the Second
crack-down on the Brotherhood was heavily influenced by
Sayed Qutb, a Brotherhood hard-liner
while in prison. Released by Sadat in the early 1970s, Shukry
Mustafa organised what came to be
known as the Takfir Wal-al-Hijra group (Repentance and Holy
Flight, RHF); which in July 1977
engaged the Sadat regime in a bloody confrontation, leaving six
people dead and fifty-seven
wounded. Shukry Mustafa, along was four others, were
sentenced to death and executed in 1978
at the age of thirty-seven.
652
2014 15:09:58 PM

The anti-society Muslim groups
The fourth tendency, the anti-society Muslim groups, also broke
away
from the Brotherhood in the early 1970s, believing that the
Brotherhood's analysis of societal affairs was incorrect and that
different
strategy and tactics were required for the situation at hand.
Initiated by
Shukri Mustafa,4' this tendency deplores the corrupt, decadent,
and
sinful nature of Egyptian society. Thus they believed that moral
change
was required from the grass-roots upwards. Its strategy,
therefore, is one
of patience and its goals, long-term. It calls for building a
nucleus
'community of believers' who would act out 'the true life of
Islam'. This
Islamic community of believers would grow in numbers, in
spirit and in

material strength, until it is capable of marching and bringing
down the
already crumbling sinful social order of Egypt at large. Shukri
Mustafa
and his young followers cite the example of the Prophet
Muhammad
who, surrounded and harassed by the jahiliyya people of Mecca,
fled to
Medina with a few followers, and established there the first true
Muslim
Community. Ten years later, and much stronger, the Prophet
marched
on Mecca and terminated the state of jahiliyya.
The notion of removing oneself, literally or metaphorically,
from the
present corrupt society is akin to a Hijra-holy flight from
jahilliyya, a
condition of infidelity, decadence, and oblivious ignorance
similar to
that prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia. Hence the name given by
Egyptian
authorities to the group formed and led by Shukri Mustafa in the
early
1970s was al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra, literally Repentance and Holy

Flight
(RHF).
While ultimately committed to the use of violence, RHF would
only do
that in the long run, the ultimate sanction in its final struggle
against the
jahiliyya society. Unlike the third tendency, symbolised by the
Jihad, RHF
was not bent on engaging the state in a continuous and
immediate war of
attrition, but rather on striking one final blow later. Thus, the
1977 big
bloody confrontation of RHF with the Egyptian government was
not part
of its long-range plan. The group had scarcely begun building
its 'model
community' somewhere in an unpopulated hinterland on the
edge of the
Nile valley. According to RHF militants, the 1977 confrontation
was
forced on them by the regime. Egyptian security forces had
arrested
several of their 'brothers' and detained them without trial. Their
pleas to

be tried or set free were repeatedly ignored. In retaliation the
RHF
kidnapped Sheikh A H al-Dahabi, a former minister of Awqaf
(Religious
4' For more details on this confrontation, see Ibrahim, 'Anatomy
of Egypt's militant Islamic
Groups', op. cit., pp 442-3; and p 450.
653
2014 15:09:58 PM
Endowments), and held him as a hostage until their brothers
were freed.
When their deadline passed without a positive response from the
government, they felt they had to kill their hostage as they had
threatened. Their credibility was at stake.42

The shoot-outs that followed between RHF and the government
left
some sixty dead or wounded. Ultimately the state prevailed and
several
hundred RHF members were arrested and tried. Five RHF
leaders,
including Shukri Mustafa, were sentenced to death, while others
received varying prison sentences ranging from five to twenty-
five
years.43
At present there is no evidence that RHF still exists as an
organised
group. But the tendency that the RHF embodied is still alive.
Several
small groups have sprung up, influenced by the same ideas, but
bearing
different names-'The Saved from Fire', 'The Pause and Reveal'
groups." The intellectual roots of this anti-society tendency are
to be
found primarily in the writings of Sayed Qutb, the Brotherhood
veteran
who was executed by the Nasser regime in 1965. In his famous
book,

Maalemfi al-Tarik (Landmarks on the Road), Qutb declared the
entire
Egyptian Society as a jahiliyya society.45 His arguments have
been
compelling to thousands of Muslim youngsters in Egypt and
elsewhere.
To date, this book has been reprinted more than thirty times in
Egypt
alone. In addition, this tendency has been influenced by the
writings of
the modern Pakistani Islamic thinker Abu al Ala al-Maudoudi,
and
Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahab, an eighteenth-century Arabian
thinker
as well as by the Kharajites (al-Khawarij) tradition (which goes
back to
the middle of the first Islamic century).
At present, the anti-society Islamic groupings in Egypt are
small. Its
membership tends to have the same sociological profile as the
membership of the anti-regime Islamic tendency: young,
educated, high
achievers, from rural or small lower-middle-class backgrounds.
They

represent the raw nerve not only of the Islamic Movement but
also of
Egyptian society at large. Three decades earlier their
counterparts of
similar background responded readily to Nasser's Arab
Nationalism
and Arab Socialism. And six decades ago, the youth of Egypt
also
responded readily to Saad Zaghlul's anti-colonial liberal
democratic call.
42 ibid., p 450.
43 See Al-Ahram, Issues of 30, 31, August and 1 September,
1987.
" Sayed, Qutb, Landmarks in the Road (Arabic, Maalemfi al-
Tarik), Cairo: Dar al-Shuruk, 1983
edition, p 191.
45 For details and critical analysis of these intellectual roots,
see M A Khalafallah, 'Islamic
awakening in Egypt', op. cit. (footnote 10 above) pp 62-3 and
pp 66-7.
654

2014 15:09:58 PM
Thus successive socio-political movements of mass following in
Egypt-such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism-have had
their
respective share of militants in past times. We ought not to
confuse the
bulk of a grass-roots trend with the behavioural manifestations
of its
most extreme elements. The anti-regime and anti-society
Islamic
militants represent the margins of the otherwise moderate grass-
roots
Islamic activist movement that is a major force in Egypt today.
Conclusion
Islamic activism, with its various tendencies, is dominating

much of the
political space and discourse of Egypt at present. In recent years
a day
has hardly passed by without some form of media coverage of
an act of
violence by one of these Islamic groups. There is also alarm
over their
growing economic power, or their ascendancy within the
political forum.
In passing, we mentioned a number of the conditions
responsible for the
upsurge of Islamic activism in Egypt. However, a broader
explanation of
the phenomenon is in order. Here, the Egyptian case must be
placed in
the wider Arab-Islamic context.
To begin with, Islamic activism under various names, has been
always
an integral part of Arab-Islamic history. In fact, much of that
history is
one of successive religious movements striving to return to the
pure
sources of Islam and to put its vision into effect. Some of these
movements have succeeded in seizing power at one time or

another, and
some have failed. Seizure of power did not always lead to
implementation of the promised vision-in fact that often
triggered
others to take on the challenge. Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-
century
precursor of modern social science, noted the cyclical nature of
these
attempts in which assabiyya (esprit de corps) coupled with
religious zeal
punctuated the rise and fall of ruling dynasties in Arab Islamic
history.
The cycle was roughly one hundred years, the life-span of four
generations in the Islamic Middle Ages.
Focusing on the last two centuries, we note the disruption of
Islamic
societies' traditional modes of life by Western intrusion. By the
end of
the nineteenth century no Muslim country was free of direct or
indirect
domination by one or more Western power. This swift
domination was
both traumatic and humiliating. It generated three modal
reactions in

Muslim countries. One response has been to attempt to emulate
the West
in its ways in order to befriend or fight it back. A second
response was to
reject Western ways completely and to draw back on the
glorious
655
2014 15:09:58 PM
heritage of Islam and adhere to its pure sources as the only
means of
successful resistance. The third response was one of attempting
to
reconcile the best elements of Islamic heritage with the best
elements of
Western civilisation.

The emulators, the rejecters, and the reconcilers have co-
existed,
debated with one another intellectually, and competed or even
conflicted
politically throughout the last hundred years. The names of the
three
trends are liberals, fundamentalists, and nationalists
respectively. The
emulators and reconcilers included all types of secular
combinations,
some even involving socialist, Marxist, or even fascist
elements. Each
trend has had its expansion, ups and downs, during the past
century. But
none of them has completely disappeared. At brief historical
moments
they have even cooperated.
The liberals and nationalists dominated the political scene
during the
fight for independence and in early decades thereafter.
However, with
mounting problems of modem nation-building, and especially
because

of failures to check new hegemonic designs of outside powers,
the
liberals and nationalists began to lose their credibility. To
many, the
defeat of Arab armies at the hand of Israel in 1967, for example,
was not
just a military one. It was a defeat of political regimes and their
secular
ideologies. Furthermore it was a blunt reminder of the century-
long
humiliation by the West, which is seen by Arabs and Muslims as
patron
and supporter of Israel. The USSR, which had befriended some
of the
defeated Arab regimes, did not fare much better. The rejecters
of
everything foreign (Western, Zionist, and Communist) were
ready with
their explanation of the defeat and with their prescription for
salvation:
the return to the purest sources of Islam. In the late 1960s and
1970s the
fundamentalist call found many takers.
We submit that a fuller interpretation of the spread of Islamic

activisms must be sought in understanding the century-long
crisis of
Muslim societies. The salient dimensions of this crisis are the
frustrated
quests for true independence, social equity, political
participation, and
economic development. The culprits behind these frustrations
are said to
be capitalism, communism, and Zionism; or, the West
(especially the
USA), the USSR and Israel.
Islamic activists have no difficulty in amassing evidence to
corroborate
this assertion. Along with outside culprits, there are domestic
perpetrators of secular ideologies who are at best misled or
brainwashed
and at worst outright agents of this or that foreign power.
656
2014 15:09:58 PM

Regardless of the truth of its claims, the above explanation is
simple,
clear, and enhances amorphous but deep-rooted sentiments in
the
Arab-Islamic world. And while many secular political forces
may share
some of the above explanation of the present crisis, it is only
the Islamic
activitists who have displayed daring and effectiveness. They
ousted the
hated pro-Western, pro-Zionist Shah. They shot down the pro-
Western
Sadat; and, they forced the US Marines out of Lebanon. They
are also
bleeding Israel daily. Many of the secular political forces in the
Arab-Islamic world may have wanted to achieve these
objectives, but
only the militant Islamic activists have managed to do so.
Whether Islamic activists in general or its militant elements in

particular can offer more than suicidal missions, displays of
martyrdom,
investment companies, and service institutions, is still to be
seen. For the
time being at least Islamic activism has galvanised the
imagination and
mobilised the energy of thousands of Islamic youth and
attracted them
to its ranks. In Egypt, Islamic activism is still on the rise. Its
achievements are so far impressive. Its future depends on its
own ability
to come up with creative solutions to problems not only left
over from
this century and from previous centuries but-more so-for the
looming
challenges of the twenty-first century.
657
2014 15:09:58 PM
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspArticle
Contentsp. 632p. 633p. 634p. 635p. 636p. 637p. 638p. 639p.

640p. 641p. 642p. 643p. 644p. 645p. 646p. 647p. 648p. 649p.
650p. 651p. 652p. 653p. 654p. 655p. 656p. 657Issue Table of
ContentsThird World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics
(Apr., 1988), pp. i-xvi+473-1154Front Matter [pp. i-
1116]Editorial: Islam and Politics [pp. xiii-xv]Three Islamic
Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice [pp. 473-
498]African Islam and Competitive Religion: Between
Revivalism and Expansion [pp. 499-518]Islamic Reform in
Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and Aims [pp. 519-538]The
Monarchy, the Islamist Movement and Religious Discourse in
Morocco [pp. 539-555]Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of
Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled Arians of Algiers [pp.
556-589]The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence
[pp. 590-614]Islamic Opposition in Libya [pp. 615-631]Egypt's
Islamic Activism in the 1980s [pp. 632-657]The Muslim
Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza [pp. 658-
682]Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology,
Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria [pp. 683-
698]Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad
Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm [pp. 699-729]Iran
and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam [pp. 730-749]Islamic
Reassertion in Turkey [pp. 750-769]Unrest in the World of
Soviet Islam [pp. 770-786]Islam within the Afghan Resistance
[pp. 787-805]Pakistan's Shia Movement: An Interview with Arif
Hussaini [pp. 806-817]Indian Muslims since Independence: In

Search of Integration and Identity [pp. 818-842]The Politics of
Malaysia's Islamic Resurgence [pp. 843-868]Indonesian
Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt? [pp. 869-
896]The Moro Struggle in the Philippines [pp. 897-922]'The
Pure and True Religion' in China [pp. 923-
947]LiteratureLiterary ProfileA Passion for Experimentation:
The Novels and Plays of Tawfiq al-Hakim [pp. 949-960]Literary
Feature ReviewsReview: Negritude and after: Changing
Perspectives in French-Language African Fiction [pp. 961-
965]Review: Chinese Literature in Renaissance [pp. 966-
970]Literary ReviewsReview: Tyranny and Redemption [pp.
971-973]Review: Suffering with Stoicism: Kenyan Histories
[pp. 973-978]Review: The Politics of the Soul [pp. 978-
980]Review: Images of Istanbul [pp. 980-983]Review: Enemies
Within [pp. 983-985]Review: Frustrated Fantasies [pp. 985-
987]Review: Tending Towards One Voice [pp. 988-990]Review:
Land of Riches [pp. 990-992]Review: Autobiography of the Age
[pp. 992-994]Review: Caribbean Childhoods [pp. 995-
998]Review: Traumas of Partition [pp. 998-1000]Review:
Mirroring Pakistan: Reflections and Distortions [pp. 1000-
1002]Review: Prize Poetry [pp. 1002-
1003]BooksBibliographyIslamic Awakening in the Twentieth
Century: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature
[pp. 1005-1023]Feature ReviewsReview: Yet More on the
Islamic Revival [pp. 1024-1027]Review: Minorities and the

Problem of the State [pp. 1027-1041]Review: Iran's Revolution
Reappraised [pp. 1041-1047]Review: The Discovery of the
Lebanese Shia [pp. 1047-1052]Review: The Beguiling Gulf
Cooperation Council [pp. 1052-1058]Book Reviews: The
Islamic WorldReview: untitled [pp. 1059-1062]Review: untitled
[pp. 1062-1065]Review: untitled [pp. 1065-1069]Review:
untitled [pp. 1069-1071]Review: untitled [pp. 1072-
1073]Review: untitled [pp. 1073-1075]Review: untitled [pp.
1075-1077]Review: untitled [pp. 1077-1078]Review: untitled
1085]Review: untitled [pp. 1085-1087]Review: untitled [pp.
1087-1089]Review: untitled [pp. 1089-1091]Review: untitled
1101]Review: untitled [pp. 1101-1103]Book NotesReview:
untitled [p. 1104]Review: untitled [pp. 1104-1105]Review:
untitled [p. 1105]Review: untitled [pp. 1105-1106]Review:
untitled [p. 1106]Review: untitled [p. 1106]Review: untitled [p.
1107]Review: untitled [p. 1107]Review: untitled [pp. 1107-
1108]Review: untitled [p. 1108]Review: untitled [p.
1108]Review: untitled [pp. 1108-1109]Review: untitled [p.
1109]Review: untitled [pp. 1109-1110]Review: untitled [p.
1110]Review: untitled [p. 1110]Recent Publications [pp. 1111-
1115]North-South Monitor [pp. 1117-1148]Third World

Foundation News [pp. 1149-1153]Back Matter [pp. 1154-1154]
Hamas: A Historical and Political Background
Author(s): Ziad Abu-Amr
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer,
1993), pp. 5-19
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the
Institute for Palestine Studies
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HAMAS: A HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
ZIAD ABU-AMR

Hamas-the Islamic Resistance Movement-was born of the
intifada,
which marked the beginning of the true political revival of the
Islamic forces
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the face of Israeli
occupation on the one
hand, and the national secular forces led by the PLO on the
other. Up until
that time, the most important Islamic movement in the occupied
territories,
the Muslim Brotherhood, had shied away from active resistance
against the
Israeli occupation, a decision that stood in the way of its full
development as
a popular force. This situation was suddenly to change with the
outbreak of
the Palestinian uprising, which led the Muslim Brotherhood to
play an active
role in the resistance for the first time. This it did through
Hamas, the organ-
ization it created from its own ranks expressly for that purpose.
It was thus
that the Islamic movement, after many years in existence, was
able to emerge

as the first true challenge ever posed in the occupied territories
to the domi-
nant nationalist trend.
The new force-for Hamas soon overshadowed its parent
organization-
now prevails in a number of localities, especially the Gaza
Strip, with a mag-
nitude that parallels that of Fateh, the largest of the PLO
factions. Its emer-
gence has brought about a state of imbalance in the political
forces that had
held sway for decades. Moreover, the developing rivalry
between the Islamic
Ziad Abu-Amr, an associate professor of political science at
Birzeit
University, is the author of Islamic Fundamentalism in the West
Bank and Gaza:
The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Indiana University
Press,
forthcoming). This article is based on an article that appeared in
the spring
1993 issue of our sister publication, Majallat al-Dirasat al-
Filastiniya.

Joumnal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-
19.
2014 15:15:09 PM
6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
trend led by Hamas and the national secular trend under the
PLO may not
cease in the event that the Israeli occupation ends, since what is
at stake in
this rivalry is nothing less than the leadership, the identity, and
the future
direction of the Palestinian people.
The Rise of the Islamic Groups in the Occupied Territories
Since Hamas was the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Palestine, to

understand it one must begin with the history of the parent
organization in
the occupied territories.
The Muslim Brotherhood
Up until the 1980s, when the radical Islamic Jihad broke away
from the
Muslim Brotherhood Society, the history of the Islamic
movements in Pales-
tine can be reduced to the history of the Brotherhood. The
Brotherhood had
been founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, and soon
spread to other
parts of the Arab world. In his attempt to revitalize the Islamic
call, al-Banna
stressed three elements: revival, organization, and upbringing.
Basically, the
goal of al-Banna's movement, like other Islamic revival groups,
was to trans-
form society to approximate as closely as possible that
established by the
Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. This would entail the
establish-
ment of an Islamic state, with no distinction being made

between religion
and government, and with the Quran and the sunna serving as
the basis for
all aspects of life.
The Brotherhood's connection with Palestine dates back to
1935, when
Hasan al-Banna sent his brother, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, to
establish con-
tacts there. In 1945, the group inaugurated its first branch in
Jerusalem.
With the assistance of the mother group in Egypt, more
branches were estab-
lished in other Palestinian towns, reaching twenty-five by the
year 1947. The
branches had memberships ranging from 12,000 to 20,000, and
were at-
tached to the command of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.'
Al-Haii Amin
al-Husseini, preeminent Palestinian nationalist leader, was
named a local
leader of the Brotherhood, which helped spread its influence in
the country.2
It should be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine,

while em-
bracing the same ideology as the Society across the Arab world,
does give a
special place to two figures, aside from the founder, Hasan al-
Banna. One
important model for Palestinian Islamists is Sayyid Qutb, who
was executed
in Egypt in 1966 and is considered a true symbol of
revolutionary Islam. In
contrast to Hasan al-Banna, known for his moderation, Qutb
embodies the
concept of active opposition to, and noncooperation with, the
existing order.
The other source of inspiration for Palestinian Islamists is 'Izz
al-Din al-
Qassam, the first leader of armed resistance in the history of
modern Pales-
tine, who was killed by the British in 1935 in the events leading
up to the
Great Palestinian Rebellion of 1936-39. The military branch of
Hamas today
bears his name.
2014 15:15:09 PM

HAMAS: A BACKGROUND 7
After the creation of Israel in 1948, relations between the
Brotherhood and
the Hashemite leadership in Jordan, which had annexed the
West Bank in
1950, were generally smooth and cordial, despite periodic
tensions. The ac-
tivity of the Brotherhood in the West Bank was not political in
the main, but
social and religious. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand,
administered by
Egypt until 1967, the Brotherhood's relations with the
administration were
problematic most of the time, and the Brothers were persecuted
and
outlawed.
In the years following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza in

1967, the Brotherhood continued to concentrate mainly on what
it described
as "the upbringing of an Islamic generation" through the
establishment of
religious schools, charity associations, social clubs, and so on.
But the Broth-
erhood's emphasis on the Islamic restructuring of society and
religious edu-
cation seemed to have little relevance for a population that was
seeking
liberation from foreign occupation. The emerging Palestinian
nationalist
resistance movement had far greater appeal, and the failure of
the Brothers to
participate in this resistance cost them many potential
adherents.
Several factors, both organizational and objective, contributed
to strength-
ening the Brotherhood. In 1973, al-Mujamma' al-Islami (the
Islamic Center)
was established in Gaza by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, a dynamic
preacher and
1948 refugee who was later to become the primary force behind
Hamas.

Within a relatively short period of time, virtually all religious
organizations
and institutions dominated by the Brotherhood-including the
Islamic Uni-
versity in Gaza-were controlled through the Center. Then, in the
1970s, the
centralizing effect of al-Mujamma' was reinforced by a
reorganization within
the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood: the societies in the
Gaza Strip,
West Bank, and Jordan were now merged into a single
organization called
"The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine."3
This reorgani-
zation affected the position and policies of the Brotherhood in
the occupied
territories by bringing guidance, instruction, and support from
the Society
and its leadership based in Jordan.
The organizational changes laid the groundwork for the
Brotherhood's
growth. Then, in the late 1970s, a certain disillusionment had
begun to
spread with regard to the Palestinian resistance movement,

making the popu-
lation more amenable to alternative political or ideological
approaches. The
Islamic revolution in Iran also had a galvanizing effect,
capturing people's
imaginations. These factors gave a boost to the Brotherhood,
which stepped
up its political activities, especially within Palestinian
universities. Initially,
most of these activities were aimed at countering the secularist
ideas and
influence of the nationalist factions of the PLO, with only part
of the group's
efforts being directed against the Israeli occupation. Moreover,
while the oc-
cupation authorities were expending considerable energies on
dismantling
and repressing the resistance organizations, the Muslim
Brotherhood, which
was not involved in armed resistance, was able to build its
organizational
2014 15:15:09 PM

8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
structure and pursue its work among the masses with little
Israeli
interference.
The Muslim Brotherhood had a number of means at its disposal
in spread-
ing religious ideas and rallying support for the Islamic
movement. Aside
from the various associations it had established throughout the
territories
such as libraries and sports and social clubs, the organization
used zakat
(alms giving, one of the five pillars of Islam) to help thousands
of needy
families. Thousands of children were enrolled in nursery
schools, kindergar-
tens, and schools run by the Islamic movement. Loans were
extended to
students in Palestinian and Arab universities.

The Brotherhood was also able to gain significant access to the
population
through its increasing control over the religious institution of
the waqf (reli-
gious endowments), which controls an extensive network of
property that it
leases to the local inhabitants. In the Gaza Strip, waqf
constitutes 10 percent
of all real estate: "Hundreds of shops, apartments, garages,
public buildings,
and about 2,000 acres of agricultural land belonged to its trusts,
and the waqf
employed scores of people, from preachers and other clerics to
grave
diggers."4
But the Muslim Brotherhood's most effective tool in spreading
its influence
was the mosques, especially given their proliferation following
the Israeli oc-
cupation. Thus, in the period from 1967 to 1987, the number of
mosques in
the West Bank rose from 400 to 750, in the Gaza Strip from 200
to 600.5

After daily afternoon and sunset prayers, the Muslim
Brotherhood was able to
use mosques-as sanctuaries generally not subject to interference
from the
Israeli authorities-for political work and for recruiting
followers.
Still, despite the Brotherhood's growth and effectiveness in
gathering sup-
port through its social services and activities, a certain amount
of dissatisfac-
tion continued because of its failure to engage in fighting the
occupation.
This dissatisfaction led to the creation of the Islamic Jihad
movement, which
broke away from the Brotherhood in the early 1980s.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad
While Islamic Jihad has remained small and never commanded
anywhere
near the following of the Brotherhood, it is important to dwell
briefly on the
movement and its positions, because these positions encompass
criticisms

leveled at the Brotherhood and which in fact were later
addressed in the
creation of Hamas-that is, the Brotherhood's lack of
commitment to an all-
out struggle against Israel.
Islamic Jihad was founded by two 1948 refugees who grew up
in camps in
the Gaza Strip, Fathi al-Shaqaqi and 'Abd al-'Aziz Auda. As
university stu-
dents in Cairo, both were strongly influenced by trends within
the Muslim
Brotherhood Society in Egypt, and notably by the militant
Islamic groups that
had emerged from the ranks of the Egyptian Brotherhood in the
mid-1970s,
al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (The Atonement and Holy Flight), and
Tandhim al-Jihad
(the Jihad Organization).
2014 15:15:09 PM

OL 325 Milestone One Guidelines and Rubric The Stra.docx

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